SECRET 10 Downing Street, S.W. 1
3rd April 1943Dear Molson,
I have been giving careful consideration to your letter of 17 March in consultation with the Admiralty. The whole business was, I expect you realised, somewhat complicated by the fact that there was a debate on anti-U-boat warfare in the Lords on 24 March, which it would have been unwise to anticipate. You will find much useful material in the Speech which Lord Bruntisfield made on the occasion (House of Lords Official Report 24 March, Cols. 894-902).
It may be helpful however if I deal more particularly with the two questions on which you expressed concern in your letter. The first relates to unified command. Let me say at once that both His Majesty's Government and those fighting the day to day battle fully realise the general advantages of unified command. Efforts to achieve the greatest practical advance towards this ideal in the North Atlantic have been continuous and the recent Washington conference was concerned largely with this question.
There comes a point, however, in the development of all large commands where one must consider whether the general advantages of unity will outweigh the practical difficulties of administration as the size of the command and the complexity of the arrangements increase. In the North Atlantic there are very real practical limits which no paper arguments can possibly overcome. In the first place the endurance of escorts, both sea and air, is limited, so that they cannot take a convoy right across the Atlantic. This means that there has to be a change-over point somewhere. This in turn means that there are different sets of escorts operating from bases on opposite sides of the Atlantic. It would be extremely difficult for a single command to control adequately escorts operating from bases thousands of miles away on the other side of the ocean. This is all the more apparent when one considers that the problem is not simply one of sending out ocean escorts and bringing them back again; in fact, the movements of the ocean convoys and their escorts have to be coordinated at either end of the voyage with all the necessarily complex arrangements for coastal convoys on either side, with minesweeping in coastal waters and the approaches to ports, with all manner of other local operations, and with the administration of the ports and bases themselves. When all this is taken into account, it is clear that the best practical
arrangements to have separate commands, working in close cooperation and unison, on either side of the Atlantic. Subject to this limitation, our constant object, which as I have said was greatly furthered by the recent Washington conference, is to achieve the greatest simplicity and the utmost harmony of working. The improved organisation now being set up as a result of that conference will not be regarded as the last word by anybody but will be kept under continuous review in order to improve it still further.
I can assure you that our experience confirms us in our view that this inevitable delimitation of separate spheres of action, with separate centres of control, is the best practical arrangement. There has been no breakdown so far, and recent improvements in organisation should undoubtedly lead to still better protection for the convoys. There is the closest possible contact between the operational authorities concerned and between the bodies responsible for strategic direction. We have a strong naval representation in Washington and the Americans have a strong naval representation over here. Added to this, communications are very highly developed and there is a constant stream of messages to and fro, all designed to ensure that the best possible use is made of the resources available.
Your second point concerns the "committee of busy departmental chiefs of Staff". I take it that here you have in mind the Anti-U-boat Committee. First let me say that this Committee is not designed to take charge of the operations against the U-boats. That is necessarily the function of the operational centres of control on either side of the Atlantic to which I have already referred. These centres have a highly experienced staff who spend their whole time on this work. In the Admiralty and the Navy Department there are also many efficient and experienced officers who spend their whole time devising the new tactics and new weapons, improving convoy organisation, speeding up operation organisation and in fact prosecuting the war against U-boats in every conceivable way. It would be wuite impossible to do all this through a Committee however constituted. The purpose of the Committee over which I preside is, as I have already indicated, to focus the energies of all the various Departments of State concerned in the large questions which arise out of this unceasing struggle. I understand the reasons which lead many people to feel that in view of the importance of these large questions the members of the Committee should be free to spend their whole time on the Committee's business. But the core of the problem is this. Either the committee can be composed of persons who are actually responsible for the provision and administration of the various resources which must be brought to bear, or they can only make recommendations which will still have to be carried out by the persons actually responsible for executive action. I do not think it can be questioned that a Committee constituted in accordance with the first alternative will be the one to reach decisions on the most accurate data and to see that those decisions are carried out with the greatest authority, accuracy and speed.
Hugh Molson, Esq., M.P.
Yours sincerely,
WINSTON S. CHURCHILL
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