Foreword

For the first time, this division is going to be operating in what has been the Japanese Empire for twenty-five years. Until now, we have been reconquering former Allied territory, and the zone of action have been in relatively unexploited, wild parts of the Pacific. We sweated it out in the jungles of the Solomon Islands, and on the sandy beaches of little Tarawa. The local populations usually wore grass skirts or loin cloths and were willing to help us drive out the Japanese occupation forces. The only signs of life, with the exception of the few simple natives, were those brought by us and by the enemy.

Now, however, we are going to be fighting in what has become almost part of the Japanese homeland. There will be many thousands of Japanese civilians. There will be large and small towns -- the largest consisting of nearly 6,000 buildings. There will be much open farm country and sugar plantations greatly resembling the countryside of Hawaii. There will be railroads, good roads, public utilities (such as telephones, electric lights, sewer systems, water mains, etc.) and all the other facilities that we would ordinarily expect to find in a well built up community. For the first time, we will find ourselves up against the same problems that Allied troops in Europe are encountering--street fighting, orthodox open terrain, possibly hostile populations, numerous buildings, and private property. We will also find ourselves fighting enemy troops who are probably just as heavily equipped as we, and who are more familiar with the terrain.

We must be prepared for a completely different type of warfare than any we have encountered up to date. The chief purpose of this booklet is to point out some of the most important "dos and don'ts" of fighting the enemy in his own front yard.

Civilian Population

The operations that we are about to carry out is another "first". It will be the first area taken by us from which Tokyo can be bombed. It is also to be the first time in history that American forces come into contact with Japanese civilians in their own homes.

For that matter, throughout our history, we Americans have almost never fought in the territory of hostile civilians. [Much as I try to avoid introducing unnecessary commentary into these documents, your editor cannot avoid pointing out the numerous exceptions to this typical mythology: the "Indian Wars", Canada in the Revolution and War of 1812, all of the Mexican War, the Civil War, the Philippine Insurrection, the Boxer Rebellion in China, and the so-called "Banana Wars" in Latin America; leaving only the Quasi-War with France, the Barbary Wars, and World War I, that did not involve fighting in the presence of hostile civilian populations.--HyperWar] In the last war, we fought in the land of our Allies, the French and Italians, and only reached German soil after the war was over. In this war, the French and Italian citizens of North Africa and Italy were many of them our friends before we entered our territories.

Now, however, the 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions have been picked to fight in Saipan, where over 25,000 Japanese men, women, and children have worked, farmed, built cities, and made their homes for a quarter of a century. They will not be critically new to you, for they have come to Saipan from the same part of the Japanese Empire, that is, the islands lying between Japan and Formosa, from which most of the Japanese in Hawaii come. In addition, there are 3-4,000 native civilians who lived here long before the Japanese, who have, in many cases, some Spanish blood and customs, and who may be friendly to us if they are given the chance.

We do not know how many of the Japanese civilians will actively fight us. Some of the men will have had Army training at one time or another, but most will have had little or no military experience. The women and children will be no more or less dangerous than our own mothers, sisters, or small brothers would be under similar circumstances.

The reason this information is being written now is that we, by the way we handle this operation, are going to make a new reputation for Americans, both to our families at home and to people all over the world. This does not mean a reputation for fighting ability; that has been proven time and time again, and no one anywhere has any doubt that we will win this one, hard as it may be. It means rather, a reputation for self-control and fairness in dealing with people.

We think of ourselves, and most other people thin of us, as being fair to anyone who is helpless. We also think of the German and Japanese military as being ruthless in their treatment of civilians. It has come as a surprise to us, though, to learn that the enemy thinks we, too, are brutal and ruthless. Many of the Japanese prisoners we have taken thought that we were going to torture them to death. They have a number of gruesome stories about us, that they believe in, such as the one that we slowly cut off various parts of a prisoner's anatomy until he is reduced to hopeless pain, then run over his still-living body with a steam-roller. Ridiculous as these sound to us, if Japanese soldiers and sailors believe them, the chances are that some Japanese civilians will also believe them. And if they believe them, they are going to do what most of the soldiers do, and continue to fight, taking some of us down with them.

We know that much suffering by unoffending people is necessary on military grounds. Many civilians have been killed in London and Berlin, and many will be killed in the bombings before we land on Saipan, in the good-sized towns of Garapan and Charan-Kanoa.

The problem of how much the civilians are going to impeded us is one to think about carefully. We can beat the Japanese military, but

if any large number of civilians take up arms against us they will make our job a great deal harder. The Germans are still pinned down fighting the armed civilians of Jugoslavia, years after they smashed the local army. On, if we absolutely had to, we could handle the civilians by force of arms, but beyond, there are areas of much larger size where hundreds of thousand, and even millions of Japanese live. What happens on, may, in part, determine these other Japanese civilians to fight or not to fight. Whether large numbers of them resist or not is, of course, not entirely up to us. Not entirely--but in large part. If we can convince these civilians that we are doing our best to observe international law and not harm them when it is unnecessary, most of them will not take up arms against us. Many more will probably be killed by us when they are caught in fortified positions that we have to reduce with flame-throwers, demolitions, or artillery fire.

Most of the civilians, however, will probably not be killed in the ways mentioned above. They are being told by thousands of leaflets dropped from planes that we are not warring on civilians, and that they in their turn must get out of the areas in which there is fighting. Unlike Betio, has plenty of back country in which they can hide from the bombings and artillery preparations. Probably even most of those who are caught in the fighting areas will not be killed, for in ground combat, those who do not fight back, and so do not have to be reduced in large groups by artillery or demolitions, are not as likely to die. On Betio, for example, though we took less than 1% of the combat Japanese troops prisoner, we took almost 10% of the non-combat civilian Korean laborers alive. On, with its

much larger area, a majority of those who do not fight back will probably live through the heaviest fighting.

It is these people, the civilians, Japanese, Korean, or native, to whom we have certain duties under international law, under the dictates of military necessity, and, most important, under our own consciences. Remember, our reputation for fairness to others has been built up mainly from our peacetime actions. Whereas the Germans and Japanese have earned most of their reputations for atrocities in combat areas inhabited by large numbers of civilians, we, so far in this war, have not gained any reputation, good or bad, for the treatment of civilians. Our actions on Saipan will give us, and through us, all Americans, a reputation for generations to come.

Many people have a number of misconceptions about international law. The most widespread one is that it is no longer in effect. This is not true; international law is just as binding upon us today as it was before Pearl Harbor. Furthermore, those provisions that will be pointed out in what follows are part of our own U.S. military law, as binding upon us as any part of the Articles for the Government of the Navy.

The most important thing to know here about these laws is that they lay down the rules under which different types of enemy personnel are to be treated. A basic rule, that covers all the enemy, soldiers and civilians alike, is that they are to be taken prisoner and not killed whenever it is possible to do so without taking great risks ourselves. Furthermore, once an enemy has been taken prisoner, he must be treated with humanity, and not killed or injured.

All of us understand the above rule. What is often not so

clearly understood, however, is the status of enemy civilians when we occupy their territory. Some may actively fight us, while many may never take up any arms against us. International law says that certain classes of the civilians that take up arms against us have the same status as soldiers, that is, they will be fought where necessary and taken prisoner when possible, and that, when taken prisoner, they are to be treated with humanity. The classes of fighting civilian who come under this heading are:

1. Militia and volunteer corps, who adhere to the following rules:

   1. are commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;

   2. have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance;

   3. carry arms openly; and

   4. conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and usages of war. In countries where militia or volunteer corps constitute the army, or form part of it, they are included under the denomination "army".

2. The inhabitants of a territory who, on the approach of the enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading troops without having had time to organize themselves into a militia or volunteer corps as described above, and who carry arms openly and respect the same laws and customs of war that we do.

It is believed that most of the civilian inhabitants of, if they take up arms against us, will fall into one of the two classes just outlined above, except for a few possible marauders or assassins

who can easily be recognized. Thus, for all practical purposes, any of the citizens of who fight us openly can be treated as Japanese soldiers.

We must, however, be absolutely sure in our own minds that a civilian is fighting us or harming our installations before we shoot him. International law clearly demands that civilians who do not fight back at us--whether they are Japanese or Korean civilians working as laborers or specialist for the military, or noncombatants in the armed forces, like doctors and nurses, or ordinary civilians with no connection with the military--must, whenever possible, be taken alive, and must not be injured or have their possessions taken from them except after a due trial by competent authority. Neither such a person nor his property are the property of any one of us who captures him. It is one thing to kill a Japanese soldier in battle; it is an entirely different thing to kill civilians who have not fought against us, whether they are Japanese or not. The latter is murder, nothing more nor less. Likewise, though it is alright to take a flag or gear found on the field of battle, get it cleared by the intelligence section, and keep it as a souvenir, it is nothing short of robbery to take the only cooking utensils out of a house where the people have done nothing to us, or to tear down a picture or break their furniture. In short, international law states in regard to civilians, that "Family honor and rights, the lives of persons and private property, as well as religious convictions and practices must be respected. Private property cannot be confiscated and pillage is forbidden." there is nothing unusual about these laws protecting civilians. They are just like the laws that we are used to in our own home communities.

Their Homes, Farms, and Industry

is considered by the Japanese to be one of their prize possessions. They developed it well and exploited every inch of the island long before they fortified it. We too, expect to put to good use as one of the most powerful military bases in the Pacific, where thousands of Marines, soldiers, sailors, and airmen will have to live. From here, Japan can be bombed.

Such a base needs many more facilities than we found or could build on the coral atolls of the central Pacific. It needs hundreds of buildings to house supplies and troops. It needs extensive repair ships, power plants, electrical transmission lines, water works, plumbing, roads, and railroads to move heavy gear, telephone systems, docks, cranes, fuel storage, radio stations, ice plants, and an almost endless number of base installations.

One great advantage of using for such a base is that it already has all of those facilities. The Japanese have built two large towns and numerous smaller villages. Garapan, the main town, has about 6,000 buildings, ranging from 4-story concrete office buildings to small houses, laid out in blocks on well-tended, symmetrical streets. There are over 60 miles of improved, graded roads and about 60 miles of railroads, with several hundred locomotives and cars. They have bus lines, hundreds of automobiles, a modern telephone system with over 1,000 subscribers, five large electrical power plants, and miles of transmission lines. They have built and equipped high-powered radio stations, machine shops capable of repairing small ships and aircraft, oxygen, and chemical plants, ice plants, and large concrete sugar mills of several stories. They have huge warehouses and dumps

storing food, clothing, drugs and medical supplies, tools, and fuel.

We must have these installations, and many others to run our base there. Everything that is destroyed in the fighting will have to be replaced by us from the United States, at a cost of millions of dollars and carried over 5,000 miles of ocean. Many such facilities will unavoidably be destroyed by naval gunfire and bombing, and the progress of our attacks will inevitably destroy many more. This cannot be helped. But what we must guard against is the further destruction or removal of important equipment or installations by unthinking Marines, once they have come under our control. It is the responsibility of every officer and man to insure that as much material as possible is saved for our own later comfort and use. In addition to these installations of obvious military value, there are hundreds of others that are of equal importance for one purpose or another. is the center of the Japanese civilian government for the Marianas. In addition, there are local island, city, and village governments, each in an office building of some kind, crammed with the type of records and papers that we would find in the city hall or administration buildings at home. All of these records are of great intelligence value and the buildings can be used by us later as offices and barracks. There will be police stations and courts and libraries, whose documents we must have. There will be banks with money that we cannot personally keep because it becomes the property of the United States Government when we capture it and can be used to good advantage by our Treasury Department. There will be newspaper plants that we will need to print papers for ourselves. There are lumber yards and canneries that can be used in rebuilding the areas

destroyed and in feeding us.

There will also be stores and shops. The goods in them can and will, if necessary, be taken by the organizations to which we belong to supply us. They must not, however, be looted by us as individuals.

When gear like that is looted, far more of it is always destroyed than is used and some other Marine has to go short. Moreover, it will be impossible to get any captured goods, gear, or papers off the island unless they are passed by Division Intelligence.

Lastly, there will be thousands of homes, large and small, in the cities and on the farms. Though many of these will be unavoidably destroyed during the fighting, many others will stand.

Most Japanese civilians, according to our standards, are very poor. Most of the plantation laborers and farmers live on a small homestead consisting of a farmhouse of only 2 or 3 rooms, surrounded by a shed and a few outbuildings and enclosed in a hedge. A few of them have a bomb shelter in the farmyard. The ordinary farmer will not have a stove, radio, telephone, toilets, automobiles, etc., that many of us have. He is usually a tenant farmer, badly in debt and has no more than the necessities of life. A pig or a few chickens means more to him than it does to us; it may be the difference between his family starving or not. He will probably have only a few cooking pots in the house. These pots, plus a vase, a plant in a basket or pan, a picture or a scroll on the wall, are the family's most treasured possessions.

International law, our own military law, and the laws that we are all used to in our own homes forbid pillage, which is nothing short of robbery of people who cannot defend themselves. Remember what was said in the first section of this pamphlet. Our success

in and on beyond will depend in large par ton whether we can keep the civilians quiet and acquiescent or not. Nothing will put them against us so much as for us to harm or mistreat those who do not take up arms against us, or for us to steal what few possessions they have. It is senseless of us to take a place like, where we may have to live for some time, and to wantonly destroy or loot the power plants that can give our camps electricity, the ice plants that can keep our food fresh, or the offices full of records and documents that can give us valuable intelligence. It is equally senseless to pillage a poor family's house. This is not said out of any sentimental pity for the Japanese, but for the practical reason that if, for the sake of a few chickens, a worthless scroll, or a few trinkets, we give their propagandists material to work on, it will embitter them and their like in other territories to the point where we will have to fight our way through them.

The Germans have tried the pillage method in ruling conquered people and now no German's life is safe on the streets of Paris or Warsaw. We must do whatever our training and common sense tell us is necessary to win the battle; we must not do what will make our job unnecessarily tough.

Sanitary Precautions

For the first time, you are going to find yourself in contact with not only the health hazards of a tropical island, but also those of thickly populated areas which have been devastated by war. One thing that must remain paramount in every man's mind is the fact that this is going to be an important base from the time it is secured. As such, it will provide a billet for thousands of our men, and it is necessary that it be kept as healthful and as well sanitated as possible.

It will be impossible to evacuate all of the inhabitants of the island, practically all of whom are Japanese. Consequently, you will be exposed to whatever diseases they have and those which may occur after the disruption of their sanitary facilities. Most of these will probably be carried by water, food, and by certain insect vectors, such as flies, mosquitoes, mites, and fleas.

Water Supply: The chief source of water has been from the heavy rainfalls that are present throughout the year. Practically every house and building has a cistern adjoining. Besides these, there are several large reservoirs scattered throughout the island. None of these can be regarded as safe after heavy shelling because of the possibility of pollution. All drinking water must be treated. Chemical poisoning of water as a military measure must always be borne in mind.

Untreated water may carry the dysentery organisms as well as those of typhoid and paratyphoid fevers. All of these are known to be present in this locality.

Food: There are a few poisonous plants on the island, but these are not apt to cause much trouble. Except for figs and such cultivated

plants as breadfruit and papayas, it is wise to avoid all plants with a milky sap. because of the widespread use of human feces (night soil) as fertilizer, uncooked, locally-grown vegetables or fruits should not be used.

Some kinds of fish are poisonous to eat, others may be poisonous at one time and not another. Never eat a "puffer" fish or one armed with numerous spines. Usually natives can tell which fish to avoid, but in a hostile country, they cannot be depended upon.

Insects of Medical Importance

1. Flies. House files, as well as other types are abundant throughout the area. Climatic conditions are ideal for their breeding. At one time, the inhabitants allowed flies to breed unchecked because of gratitude for one species of fly, introduced from New Guinea, which parasitized sugar cane pests and saved their crops. Japanese military occupation probably eliminated a great deal of this hazard. But, as a result of bombing and shelling, latrines will be destroyed or abandoned, food dumps will be exposed, bodies will be unburied. Enormous numbers of flies can breed in such places. They will carry the organisms of dysentery and typhoid from the feces of the Japs to the food of our troops. Practically all civilians must be regarded as potential carriers of these organisms. If flies are allowed to breed unchecked, epidemics of dysentery will flare quickly, spread rapidly, and incapacitate a considerable portion of the troops.

Yaws, a disease of festering body sores, somewhat related to syphilis, is probably present among the natives and is carried by flies. There is a possibility that conjunctivitis "pink-eye" is also carried by the flies. The "blue-bottle" or "blow flies" may lay eggs on wounds, resulting in an infestation of these wounds by fly maggots,

called myiasis. Medical officers should be aware of this possibility.

2. Mosquitoes. No Anopheles (malaria) mosquitoes are known to be present on the island.

Dengue (breakbone fever) is present. It is carried by Aedes mosquitoes. These mosquitoes bit both by day and night. They are shy but highly attracted to man. Unless very numerous, their biting is often undetected. They prefer to bite around the ankles. Aedes mosquitoes breed in small water containers, usually artificial, or man-made, such as tine cans, barrels, pails, wells, etc. They will breed in any container which will hold water for more than a week. The abundance of rainfall and the difficulty in locating small, scattered breeding places will make their control difficult. All men should be impressed with the necessity of their cooperation in disposing of containers. Dengue is seldom a fatal disease, but it spreads with amazing rapidity when started and may decrease to almost nothing in a very short time the number of effectives at the disposal of the command.

Culex mosquitoes, the common household pest, are known to be present. They are night biters. Their breeding habits are similar to Aedes. Filariasis, carried by Culex mosquitoes, is presumed to be present among the natives, though probably not among the Japanese. It is doubtful whether filariasis will become a disease of military importance, since exaggerated symptoms result from continuous massive infections over a long period of time. White men are not particularly susceptible, and all symptoms disappear when the victim is returned to a temperate climate.

3. Mites. Scrub typhus or Japanese River (Tsutsugamushi) fever is presumed to be present. This disease is carried by harvest mites.

On patrols, clothing should be worn at all times. Added protection for the legs should be worn, such as leggings, or socks rolled over trouser legs. Insect repellent should be sprinkled on the clothes where they are tight against the body; and should be applied to all exposed parts of the body. Medical officers should be aware of the possibility of scrub typhus and treat all typhus patients with the same precautions against mites as against lice.

4. Fleas. The species and abundance of fleas in the island are not known, but it is believed their numbers are few. Flea-borne diseases, plague and murine (rat) typhus are not known to exist in recent years, but the possibility of their having been introduced should be kept in mind.

Venereal Diseases: All of the venereal diseases are encountered. Gonorrhea is widespread among the natives and Japanese in this area. Syphilis also is present. It should be assumed that many women on the island are infected with one or both diseases, and contact with them must be avoided.

Other Diseases: Other diseases which are present among the natives but are not likely to affect troops, are tuberculosis and small-pox.

The natives are very susceptible to our common respiratory diseases. It is possible for germs that our troops carry, and to which they have become immune, to infect natives and increase in virulence thereby. Following infection of the natives, the virulence of the organisms has increased so much that our troops may succumb to the disease.

Bathing Precautions: Corals are in general dangerous. most of them may cause severe lacerations to bathers or to those who must land

on reefs. Coral cuts, scratches, and even minor abrasions, are usually slow in healing, and bad infections are apt to follow. The slightest coral cut should be promptly treated and never neglected.

Schistosomiasis, or infestation with blood flukes, is a disease that may be contracted from bathing in infected water. The larvae emerge from certain infected snails found in fresh water. They enter the water and may infect men through penetration of the skin. The adult worms live in the small intestine and discharge their eggs in the feces. When the egg is deposited in fresh water, it hatches, and the embryo enters a snail. Thus, the cycle goes on.

Much can be done toward removing the hostility of the civilians toward our forces, if it is possible to keep them healthy. Any outbreak of disease will be blamed directly on us. In order to secure their cooperation, it is necessary that we show we have their welfare and their interests in mind. Do your part toward keeping them and yourself healthy.

Booby Traps and Mines

The enemy will undoubtedly make great use of mines, especially anti-vehicle or "tape measure" mines. All roads, trails, bridges, and their approaches should be regarded suspiciously. The enemy will have ample time to lay mines and will use them in an attempt to delay our advance.

Street fighting, buildings, installations, etc., afford many good opportunities for booby traps.

There have been numerous reports of the Japanese use of booby traps in China and Burma and scattered reports of their use in the Pacific areas. Since booby traps are weapons principally of retreating forces, it is probable they will occur more and more frequently as the United Nation's offensive campaigns continue. Japanese sources indicate special instructions recently have been issued to engineers and other specialized troops on the use of booby traps, These instructions place special emphasis upon improvization and exercise of ingenuity by the individual soldier. they also include examples of trip wires stretched across trails or attached to doors, windows, the parts of a road block, souvenirs such as rifles, and corpses. they give examples of pressure traps in the ground and under floor boards, and instructions on making booby traps form bottles, trunks, empty tobacco tins, parasols, bamboo cylinders, cones, kerosene tins, flashlights, matchboxes, clocks, vehicles, and other material that is to be left behind. there is nothing new or unusual about any of these examples or in any Japanese booby traps that have been found. they employ familiar principles and methods. the chief difficulty is in locating them. Once located and carefully examined, they are disarmed easily.

It should be remembered that the Japanese are known to have information and plans of German and Italian mines and booby traps, and since the Japs are good at copying, imitations probably will be encountered in the future.

The following information is published for the information of all troops taking part in this and future operations:

Booby Traps

General:

A booby trap is any form of concealed mechanism which causes destruction of personnel, equipment, or communications by being so placed that it will be inadvertently activated by the enemy or will function automatically by means of a time mechanism. Although explosives are the normal method of destruction, booby traps may also be designed to use flares or incendiary bombs.

The object of employing booby traps is to create an atmosphere of uncertainty and to impose a strong sense of caution in the minds of the enemy, thereby lowering his morale and slowing up his actions.

Since booby traps rely for their success on surprise, both the charge and the operating mechanism are either concealed or made to resemble some common and harmless object.

Operation:

In almost every case, booby traps may be operated by one of the following methods:

1. Direct pressure of a foot, wheel, or track on the concealed mechanism;

2. Movement of some apparently harmless object;

3. Movement of some concealed object, such as a thin trip wire;

4. Some form of automatic delay mechanism designed to function independently of any human agency. The delay may vary from a few hours to many days.

In the first three cases, the mechanism may fire the charge instantaneously or by means of a delayed action varying form a few seconds to several minutes.

Principles of Employment

The following underlying principles are usually observed in setting booby traps, and conversely, may be taken as a useful guide in detection:

1. Preservation of normal appearance. Every attempt is made to disturb the surroundings as little as possible and to remove or conceal carefully all signs of preparation after laying the trap.

2. Constricted localities. The more constructed the site in which the trap is laid, e.g., passages, stairways, dugout inclines, and defiles, the more chance there will be of the trap's being sprung.

3. Concentration of traps. tramps are normally laid in considerable concentrations in order to reduce the chances of finding them all without springing some. dummies may be used freely.

4. Double bluff. An obvious trap is often used to mask a well-concealed trap nearby.

5. Curiosity. The natural desire to handle souvenirs, pictures, food, and drink containers, musical instruments, and other articles, are considered in laying the trap.

6. Everyday Operations. Traps may be actuated by the opening or closing of doors or windows, the use of telephones or electric light switches, turning on the ignition of automobiles, etc.

7. Firing. Each trap may be provided with two or more methods

of actuating.
8. Variety. As many different types as possible are usually employed in any one locality.

Detection

1. General. Since there are not apt to be sufficient engineer personnel to assume complete responsibility for the detection of traps, it is necessary that other troops be on the alert for them.

   A reconnaissance should include, so far as time permits, the marking of known or suspected booby trap areas as well as the disarmament of detected traps. Reports of the types of traps found are also extremely important.

   The detection of booby traps is largely a matter of training, with the emphasis on quick appreciation of unnatural phenomena and knowledge of enemy booby trap equipment and methods.

2. Suspicious signs. The following signs may indicate the existence of an enemy's booby trap:

   1. Disturbed ground, especially after the rain.

   2. Explosive wrappings, sawdust, nose caps from shells, etc.

   3. Traces of camouflage, withered vegetation, etc., indicating some attempt at concealment.

   4. Breaks in the continuity of vegetation, dust, paintwork, timbering, etc.

   5. The presence of pegs, nails, electric leads, or pieces of cord or wire for which there is no apparent use.

   6. Marks on trees, on paths, on the ground, or on walls of buildings without any obvious reason.

   7. Movable objects, such as equipment souvenirs, musical

instruments, food and drink containers, and kitchen utensils.
8. Enemy dead and our own dead.

9. Minor obstructions of all kinds on roads, in trench systems, and in buildings.

10. Irregular foot or wheeled traffic tracks, for the presence of which there is no apparent reason.

11. Any indication that an area has been carefully avoided. Most booby traps that the Japanese might set will probably employ push or pull igniters more frequently than prepared demolition charges. A "pull-type" hand grenade is particularly suitable for hasty booby traps. Remember, however, that variations on booby traps are limited only by the ingenuity of the enemy. he will try to catch you when you are off your guard. DON'T LET HIM DO IT!