demobilized by March as had
been planned. Strikes on the west coast delayed disarmament. It was often
difficult to get the owners of ships to make them available for disarmament.
Until such time as the guns were removed, it was necessary to keep two
maintenance men on board to care for about $170,000 worth of Navy equipment.
Late in April, 1946 about 1300 enlisted men remained in the Armed Guard.
Practically all the officers had been transferred or separated from the service
by this time.115
--41--
Communication Personnel
The primary
responsibility of the Armed Guard Commanding Officer was for the defense of the
ship from enemy attack, but when a communication liaison officer was not
supplied he was given the additional duty to assist the master in handling
wartime communications of the ship. This assignment was a recognition of the
fact that successful handling of vital communications could be as important in
the defense of the ship as manning guns. The arrangement was never an ideal
one, for the responsibilities of the Armed Guard Commanding Officer were large
enough in defending the ship from enemy attack, without encumbering him with
communication duties. Nevertheless, it was a working arrangement that brought
results.
In discussing
the involvement of the Navy in merchant ship communications, a responsibility
which by law rested with the master of the ship, the following facts should be
remembered. There were not enough commercial radio operators available to
conduct the necessary radio watches under wartime conditions on an expanding
merchant marine. The merchant crews were not trained and organized to handle
the vast amount of visual communications involved in voyages in convoy.
Receiving or sending signals in wartime cannot be delayed until claims for
overtime are approved. Since the escorts were naval vessels, it was desirable
to have naval signalmen on merchant ships to conduct visual communications. For
a time, at least, the Navy suspected
--42--
the loyalty of many commercial operators and desired
to replace them almost entirely with naval personnel. For a large part of the
war the demand of the Fleet for commissioned communications officers was so
great that a communication liaison officer could not be assigned to each
merchant ship, but only to the most important ships.
It could also
be pointed out that communication personnel and duties came generally under the
cognizance of the Communications Division in Naval Operations and not under the
Arming Merchant Ships Section, which exercised control over all other matters
connected with the Armed Guard. Where there was consultation between the two
divisions substantial agreement was reached on most matters, but at times the
Communications Division did not consult Op-23L before issuing directives. The
first directive from the Chief of Naval Operations concerning Communications
Liaison Groups on United States flag merchant ships and Army transports, dated
January 8, 1942, provided that a commissioned communication officer should be
furnished to all Army and Navy transports under all conditions of charter.
Normally one radioman and two signalmen should be furnished to United States
flag merchant vessels in convoy. On Navy owned or bareboat chartered vessels
operated by civilian crews and on Navy indefinite time chartered vessels there
should be a special Communication Liaison Group consisting generally of two
radiomen and two signalmen. But these numbers could be increased to three on
vessels carrying more than 200 troops. Where possible
--43--
the services of
commercial radio operators should be dispensed with, unless they were in the
Naval Reserve or Army Signal Corps, but it might be necessary to keep operators
of unquestioned loyalty on board because of the shortage of Navy radiomen. In
any event, there might be one Navy radiomen on board all transports, all
indefinite time chartered vessels, and all Navy owned or bareboat chartered
vessels operated by civilian crews.116
This directive
was quickly changed on January 24 to provide for three signalmen in addition to
a Communication Officer on all Army and Navy transports. It was also provided
that commercial radio operators were not to be displaced except when unfit to
serve by reason of evidence of subversive activities. Port Directors were to
allocate radiomen and signalmen to meet conditions in each specific case where
such personnel were not available in sufficient numbers. Like the earlier
directive, this letter stated that accommodations for communication personnel
should be provided by using commercial radio operators' quarters as far as
possible and by providing suitable spaces near the radio room and bridge.117
The early
directives assigned no communications duties to Armed Guard officers, but the
Navy signalmen and radiomen would naturally be under his jurisdiction when he
was the only naval officer on board.
--44--
They would, however, be responsible to the
master for communications. Because of the shortage of officer personnel,
CominCh recommended in May, 1942 that Armed Guard officers should be given a
short course in communications and that they should be given additional duty as
Communications Liaison Officers. At the same time there should be a long range
procurement plan which would provide eventually for detailing a separate liaison
officer to merchantmen.118
By July 1 definite instructions had been given to Armed Guard officers to assume
communication liaison duties when no commissioned communication officer was on
board.119
The
Communications Division began to take over the responsibilities with regard to
communications on merchant ships in the first year of war and by early 1943 had
complete cognizance over radiomen and signalmen on merchant ships,120
although these men were assigned to the Armed Guard Centers in the same way as
gunners. In the coming months the Communications Division in Naval Operations
issued several complicated directives concerning the assignment of communication
personnel which the Port Directors had difficulty in interpreting. Perhaps the
principal difficulty lay in the fact that categories were established in part on
the basis of whether ships were to operate in convoy or independently. On many
occasions ships thus supplied with communication
--45--
personnel for independent routing would find themselves proceeding for at least part of their voyage in
convoy, with the resulting need for increased personnel. The principal
directives as regards communication personnel were issued on 30 March, 5 July,
29 October 1943 and on 28 February and 6 May 1944. These directives will be
described in considerable detail in the following paragraphs since they
illustrate some of the problems the Port Directors faced in making certain that
the proper personnel was assigned to merchant ships.
The directive
of 30 March established five definite categories of ships of over 1000 gross
tons and a complement for each category. Navy radiomen and signalmen were to be
assigned as necessary to complete the established complements, but Army Signal
Corps personnel and loyal commercial operators were not to be replaced. (1)
Independently routed vessels employed in trans-oceanic service which maintained
radio guard as prescribed under the BAMS system and also maintained radio guard
on naval schedules by special arrangement were to be supplied with one
commissioned communication liaison officer, nine radio operators, and three
signalmen. At least six of the radio operators must be naval personnel. (2)
Independently routed vessels employed in trans-oceanic service, other than other
operating in the Pacific, were to be supplied with three radio operators. (3)
Vessels proceeding in North Atlantic convoys were to have three radio operators
and two signalmen. (4) Other independently routed vessels should have three
radio operators. (5) Other vessels in convoy should have three
--46--
radio operators
and two signalmen. When no commissioned communication liaison officer was
assigned, the communication personnel should be under the orders of the Armed
Guard Commander as provided in General Instructions for Communications Officers
of Naval Armed Guards. Port Directors were to assign available communication
personnel with priority in the order listed above.121
The directive
described above was canceled by a new directive, dated 5 July, which established
a new complement to be completed as necessary by the assignment of naval
personnel. (1) United States Navy Convoy Commodores and Vice Commodores should
have a communication staff consisting of one communication liaison officer, two
signalmen, and one radioman, with additional personnel assigned for specific
trips as necessary to bring the complement on the flag ship up to four signalmen
and three radiomen. (2) Independently routed vessels employed in trans-oceanic
service which maintained the radio guard prescribed in the BAMS system and also
maintained guard on naval schedules by special arrangement were to have a
commissioned communication liaison officer, nine radio operators, and three
signalmen. (3) Vessels carrying over 2,000 troops and proceeding independently,
other than those in category two should have a liaison officer, three radio
operators, and one signalman. (4) Vessels carrying over 250 troops and
proceeding in convoy should have a liaison officer, three radio operators, and
three signalmen. (5) Vessels proceeding in
--47--
Atlantic trans-oceanic convoy other
than those carrying over 250 troops should have three radio operators and two
signalmen. (6) Independently routed vessels employed in trans-oceanic service
other than those guarding naval schedules or carrying more than 2,000 troops
should have three radio operators. This complement was increased on 15 October
to provide for one signalman on the suggestion of Op-23L. (7) Vessels
proceeding in trans-oceanic convoys other than in the Atlantic and not carrying
over 250 troops should have three radiomen and two signalmen. (8) Independently
routed coastwise vessels traveling outside of inland waterways for more than 24
hours should have three radio operators (9) Vessels in coastal convoys traveling
outside of inland waterways for more than 24 hours other than those carrying
more than 250 troops should have three radio operators and two signalmen. (10)
Vessels routed independently or in convoy which were outside the inland
waterways for less than 24 hours should have one radio operator. Port Directors
should supply personnel to ships with priority in the order listed above. Port
Directors or Routing Officers were empowered to assign one signalman to foreign
ships when it was deemed necessary. Additional communication personnel could be
assigned to specific ships with the approval or by the direction of the VCNO.
Every United States vessel of over 1,000 gross tons and equipped with radio must
have at least one radio operator. When a commercial operator was not on board,
a Navy radioman should be placed on board regardless of the precedence
established above for the assignment of scarce
--48--
communication personnel.122
It would be interesting to know how many grey hairs were added to the heads of
Port Directors who attempted to execute this directive.
A directive of
29 October 1943 made certain changes in communication complement. United States
Commodores and Vice Commodores should have one liaison officer, one radioman,
and four signalmen, but additional radiomen should be assigned as necessary to
bring the complement of the flag ship up to four. A new category was added.
Vessels carrying between 250 and 2,000 troops and proceeding independently, but
not guarding Navy schedules, should have three radiomen and one signalman.123
The shortage
of Navy radiomen was so serious by early 1944 that the War Shipping
Administration agreed to replace naval operators with commercial operators as
rapidly as possible. The War Shipping Administration agreed to assign three
commercial operators to ships with a declared speed of 13.5 knots or over, to
vessels operating in trans-Atlantic service, including vessels sailing for
Iceland, the Azores, and Ascension Island, but excluding Greenland, and to
vessels employed in trans-Pacific service which proceeded in the area west of
160° W. and south of 42° N. Priority in assigning commercial operators should
go to vessels operating in the Atlantic. United States merchant vessels were to
include Panamanian and Honduran flag shipping
--49--
owned, controlled or operated by
the United States or citizens thereof and Army transports were considered as
merchant vessels for communications purposes. After 6 March 1944, the effective
date of this directive, Navy radiomen were to be removed from merchant vessels,
except for transports carrying 250 or more troops, when the ships arrived in
continental United States ports. Navy radiomen would still be assigned to
United States managed foreign ships other than Panamanian and Honduran in order
that these ships would have three radiomen if they were of over 13.5 knots
speed, or operating in trans-Atlantic service or in the western Pacific. Port
Directors or Routing Officers still had the authority to assign one signalman to
foreign vessels when this was deemed necessary. It was now possible to
establish a communication liaison complement distinct from the total
communication complement for merchant ships. (1) United States convoy
Commodores were still to receive one liaison officer, one Navy radioman, and
four signalmen. (2) The figure for independently routed trans-oceanic ships
guarding both BAMS and Navy schedules was one liaison officer, six radiomen, and
three signalmen, but a total of nine radiomen must be carried on these ships.
(3) Vessels carrying over 2,000 troops and sailing independently should have a
liaison officer, a signalman, and should be supplied with radiomen as necessary
to bring the total to three operators. (4) Vessels carrying over 250 troops but
proceeding in convoy should have a liaison officer,
--50--
three signalmen, and Navy
radiomen as necessary to bring the total to three. (5) Independently routed
vessels in trans-oceanic service other than those carrying over 2,000 troops or
those guarding Navy schedules should have a signalman and Navy radiomen as
necessary to bring the total of radio operators to three. (6) Vessels
proceeding in convoy but not carrying over 250 troops were allowed two
signalmen.124
This directive
was in turn cancelled and superseded by that of 6 May 1944. By this time as
agreement had been reached between the War Department, the Navy Department, and
the War Shipping Administration whereby at least three radio operators would be
assigned not only to ships of over 13.5 knots declared speed, ships in the
trans-Atlantic service, and ships operating in the western Pacific, but also to
all vessels designed to transport 250 or more troops. The Army and the Navy
would furnish all the radiomen to ships designed to carry over 250 troops and no
commercial operators were to be assigned to ships in this category. Army and
Navy personnel should not be assigned to the same vessel at the same time.
Qualified commercial operators were to be assigned to cargo vessels chartered or
space allocated to the War Department, and Navy Department, or to commercial
interests. Vessels manned or operated by the War Department were to have Army
radio technicians. It was intended that Navy radiomen would ultimately be
replaced entirely on cargo vessels by commercial operators. But it was
recognized that Navy radiomen would still be required for some
--51--
cargo vessels
until such time as commercial operators became available. In no case should a
vessel of over 13.5 knots declared speed sail with less than three operators.
Vessels operating in the western Pacific and in trans-Atlantic service should
never have less than two operators aboard. Navy radiomen would also be assigned
as necessary to United States managed foreign flag ships to bring the total
operators up to three if the ships were in the categories outlined at the
beginning of this paragraph. Port Directors and Routing Officers still had the
authority to place a signalman on board foreign vessels when necessary.
Additional communication personnel could be assigned with the approval or by the
direction of the Chief of Naval Operations.
The complement
for Navy communications personnel as established by this directive was as
follows: (1) United States Convoy Commodores and Vice Commodores still received
one liaison officer, one radioman, and four signalmen, but they could be
assigned additional radiomen to bring the complement aboard ship to four. (2)
Independently routed ships guarding both the BAMS system and Navy schedules
would have a total of one liaison officer, nine radiomen, and three signalmen.
(3) Vessels carrying over 2,000 troops and proceeding independently, but not
guarding Navy schedules should have one liaison officer, three radiomen or Army
technicians, and one signalman. (4) Vessels carrying over 250 troops and
proceeding in convoy should have one liaison officer, three radiomen or Army
technicians, and three signalmen. (5) Other independently
--52--
routed vessels should
have one signalman and would only be supplied with radiomen on request from the
local War Shipping Administration representatives. (6) Other vessels proceeding
in convoy should have two signalmen, but should be supplied with radiomen on
request from the local War Shipping Administration representatives. Ships
carrying Navy radiomen should have one chief radioman or radioman first class.125
From the
outbreak of war to 11 September 1945 the Navy supplied 803 communication liaison
officers to merchant ships and transports. It furnished 15,769 radiomen and
signalmen in the same period.126
The most
troublesome question was the role of the Armed Guard officer in communications.
The Bureau of Naval Personnel directed that all Armed Guard officers should
receive training in communications, beginning on or before 1 September 1943.127
But on 20 December the Arming Merchant Ships Section requested the Communication
Division to modify Change 3 to Communication Instructions for Merchant Ships so
that the Armed Guard officer would be relieved of responsibility for
communications when the communication liaison officer was absent.
Communications, it was asserted, were the responsibility of the master of the
ship. Recent experience in the Mediterranean, where merchant vessels had been
subject to almost constant attack, had indicated that it was essential for the
Armed Guard officer to devote his entire attention to the defense of the ship.
It was further requested that
--53--
all directives concerning assignment of additional
duties to Armed Guard officers be cleared through the Arming Merchant Vessels
Section of the Fleet Maintenance Division. Clarification of the matter was
desired before the new Wartime Instructions for Merchant Ships appeared.128
Op-20 denied issuing directives affecting Armed Guard officers without reference
to Op-23 and opposed relieving Armed Guard officers of present communication
duties. This step would, it asserted, make it necessary to place an additional
naval officer aboard Merchant Ships or have Navy radiomen receive orders from
one of the ships officers.129
When the
galley proof of WIMS 1 and 3 was received by Op-23L for comment in February, the
Arming Merchant Vessels Section proposed changes which would have relieved the
Armed Guard officer of the responsibilities and duties of a communication
officer. According to this section, it was neither reasonable nor practicable
to hold the Armed Guard officer responsible for the proper maintenance of all
radio equipment and the efficient operation of the radio office, or for the
supervision and instruction of all radio officers on board. The master should
be entirely responsible for communications. The third mate should be in charge
of visual communications and the radio officer in charge of radio
communications. It was unreasonable to interpose the Armed Guard officer
between master and the radio officer, who was a union man not subject to
military discipline. The Armed Guard officer should serve only in an advisory
capacity to assist and inform the
--54--
master regarding the latest procedure in
communications. Op-23L intended to modify the General Instructions for
Commanding Officers of Naval Armed Guards on Merchant Ships to make the
communication duties of Armed Guard officers advisory. Op-23L desired that the
changes in this sense be incorporated in the original printing of WIMS rather
than in a subsequent change.130
This limitation of the responsibilities of the Armed Guard officers became even
more desirable when it was decided by February that three commercial operators
would be supplied [to] armed cargo and tank ships.131
Op-23L also
made certain suggestions for changes in WIMS regarding communication equipment
and navigational lights to the Director, Convoy and Routing Division. These
changes based on directives in force were readily accepted by CominCh, except
that the matter of an emergency antenna was referred to the Communications
Division.132
The
Communications Division opposed delaying the initial printing of WIMS pending a
review of questions at issue regarding the responsibilities of Armed Guard
officers, and proposed that a change be issued after agreement had been reached.133
But on 23 February Op-23L again proposed that the changes suggested on 5
February be made in the publication before it was issued to the service. The
replacement of Navy radiomen with commercial operators made this step all the
more desirable. The Armed Guard officer was not considered sufficiently
--55--
experienced nor technically equipped to take charge of one of the departments of
a merchant ship, a department which should be under the direct supervision of
the master.134
The
Communication Division strongly opposed the proposed reduction of the Armed
Guard officer's responsibility in communications to that of an advisor to the
master, and Sub-Chief of Naval Operations concurred in this view. There would
be no responsibility for the maintenance of equipment and it was expected that
the instruction of radio operating personnel in wartime merchant ship
communications would be kept to a minimum. The Armed Guard officer would be
responsible for assuring that operating personnel could send and receive
necessary traffic. WIMS 3 would limit this responsibility to wartime merchant
ship communications.135
Here matters appear to have rested. It is interesting to note that Op-23L was
not furnished a revised chapter covering Armed Guard officers nor asked to
approve such a copy prior to promulgation.136
Instructions
still in effect at the close of the war made the communication liaison officer
or, in his absence, the Armed Guard officer responsible to the master for the
efficient conduct of communications, except for the maintenance of equipment.
Communication personnel were to be under the officer's immediate supervision as
to watches, operations, and performance of their duties in all matters
--56--
relative
to wartime merchant ship communications. On convoy flag ships communications
should be under the immediate supervision of the communication officer attached
to the Commodore or Vice Commodore. However, the senior radio officer should be
responsible to the master for the maintenance of all radio equipment. On Army
transports not having a Convoy Commodore or Vice Commodore on board the Navy
communication officer should be in charge and responsible to the master for all
communications unless Army radio technicians were on board. In this event the
Navy communications officer should be responsible to the master for visual
communications and should act as advisor to the Army Commanding Officer of
Troops. The Commanding Officer of Troops should be responsible to the master
for the maintenance of equipment and the operation of the radio office. Thus,
the master of the ship was responsible for communications and all personnel
performing communications duties were responsible to him, but the Armed Guard
officer assumed military command over all Navy communication personnel on board
a merchant ship. If a naval communication liaison officer was on board the
Armed Guard officer had no further communication duties. If no communication
officer was supplied the Armed Guard officer assumed the Communication
responsibilities of the liaison officer and was accountable to the master for
the performance of such responsibilities. Among these responsibilities were the
following: (1) Setting communication and radar watches (2) Efficient performance
--57--
of personnel while on watch (3) Proper log-keeping (4) Preservation of radio
silence (5) Aiding the master with transmitting details (6) Supervising the
delivery of incoming messages to personnel concerned (7) Attending pre-sailing
routing or convoy conferences on communications; but only if this conference did
not interfere with his attendance at the convoy conference (8) Prevent
unauthorized persons from entering the radio room (9) Make nonapproved private
broadcast receivers inoperative while at sea (10) supervise upkeep of visual
signaling gear (11) Arrange for emergency disposal of all classified matter (12)
Assure that identification signals are available on the bridge of ships ailing
independently (13) Assure that the radio room receives publications and
information necessary for efficient and proper operation (14) Assure that
communication and radar personnel are familiar with publications, current voyage
instructions (communications), call signs, effective BAMS and numbered messages,
security messages, proper message form, distress procedure, changes to
procedures or standard organization, and changes to publications (15) See that
radar personnel make necessary reports as due.137
Throughout the
Arming Merchant Vessels Section attempted to keep the Armed Guard officer as
free as possible from duties and responsibilities which would interfere with his
mission -- the defense of the ship. In
--58--
the matter of communications this effort
was not entirely successful, but all communications maintenance
responsibilities, except for visual signaling equipment, were kept from the
shoulders of the Armed Guard officers. This section opposed efforts to increase
the communication training of Armed Guard officers. In April 1944 Com 8
proposed that this training be increased from 30 to 95 hours. This proposal
received a firm negative, with the comment that it was not intended to make
accomplished signalmen of Armed Guard officers.138
By the middle
of 1945 such questions as communications personnel for transports operating in
noncombat areas and the relationship between communication liaison officers and
maintenance personnel required settlement. It was decided that liaison officers
should still be supplied to ships capable of carrying 250 or more troops
regardless of operating area. As regards radiomen, the directive of 6 May,
discussed above, remained in effect. Three signalmen should be assigned to each
of four Monster class transports, two signalmen to each Army and WSA
vessel designed to carry 2,000 or more troops, and one signalman to other
vessels of 1,000 or more gross tons operating in noncombat areas except for
vessels exclusively in the coastwise trade.139
When guns were placed in a maintenance status but a communication liaison
officer was still aboard this officer would be responsible for discipline and
administrative control of Navy communication and
--59--
maintenance personnel and for
all Title B communication equipment. He would not be responsible for the
maintenance or armament nor for Title B gunnery equipment, for those matters
were the responsibility of the Maintenance Petty Officer.140
Not until 11 September 1945 was the order given to remove all communication
personnel from merchant ships. This was to be done at the first continental
United States port which the ship touched.141
--60--
One other
mater with regard to merchant ship communications deserves mention -- the
training of Navy and merchant personnel by the Navy. This program appears to
have commenced in July, 1943, when the Bureau of Naval Personnel order[ed] the
establishment of schools to give training to merchant and Navy personnel in
merchant ship communications and convoy procedures in the 5th, 8th,
12th, and 13th Naval Districts. The minimum time of
instruction was 30 hours but by March 1944, 60 hours was to be given if possible
at Armed Guard Centers and War Merchant Ship Communications Schools which were
established primarily to increase the efficiency of the Master and Mates in
communications. In the same month two officers were ordered to the Maritime
Commission for duty as instructors in convoy procedure and merchant ship
communications.142
Among places offering instruction to merchant seamen in communications by March,
1944, were New York, Seattle, New Orleans, Norfolk, and San Francisco. After it
became established policy that increasing numbers of commercial operators would
be employed on merchant ships, the Communications Division in Naval Operations
suggested to the Bureau of Naval Personnel the desirability of establishing
"brush-up" schools at Baltimore and Los Angeles in connection with the plan to
issue certificates of proficiency in wartime merchant ship communications to
masters, mates, and radio operators.143
In April BuPers ordered a similar school
--61--
established at Boston.144
By 1 January
1945 all United States merchant marine deck officers were required to obtain a
certificate of proficiency in Wartime Merchant Ship Instructions, including
communications, of face the prospect of being beached until they did. This
involved about 20,000 merchant marine officers. The certificates were issued on
the basis of tests designed to show whether the applicant had a practical
working knowledge of Wartime Instructions for Merchant Ships. Applications for
certificates could be made at Wartime Merchant Ship Communications Schools at
Baltimore, Boston, New Orleans, Newport News, New York, Norfolk, San Francisco,
San Pedro, and Seattle, and at Navy Routing Offices in 52 ports located in the
United States and overseas. The "brush-up" courses at the schools lasted on an
average 5 days, but a merchant marine officer needed only take what he felt was
necessary in order to qualify for the certificate. Merchant marine deck
officers of any of the United Nations might also attend the schools. Commercial
radio operators were invited to qualify for a similar certificate, but this was
not mandatory.145
--62--
Facilities for Training Merchant Seamen
By March, 1942, facilities for the training of merchant
crews of United States and allied vessels had been established at the following
places:
| |
Boston ---------- |
Naval Training School
United States Naval Drydock
Building No. 21 |
| |
New York ------ |
Receiving Station
51st St. and 1st Avenue
South Brooklyn |
| |
Philadelphia ----- |
Naval Reserve Armory
Camden, New Jersey |
| |
Norfolk --------- |
Armed Guard School
Little Creek, Virginia |
| |
Baltimore ------- |
Assistant Port Director's Office |
| |
Charleston ------ |
Section Base |
| |
Savannah ------- |
Section Base |
| |
New Orleans --- |
Naval Reserve Armory
829 Camp Street |
| |
San Diego ------ |
Armed Guard School
United States Receiving Station
Destroyer Base |
| |
San Francisco -- |
Armed Guard Center
Treasure Island |
| |
Seattle ---------- |
Anti-Aircraft Training Center
Port Angeles, Washington |
Instructions consisted of care, operation, upkeep of guns
and ammunition, bore-sighting and checking of sights by use of horizon and bench
marks, loading drill, pointing, spotting, identifying aircraft
--63--
and submarine, elementary fire-control, and first aid.146
The Navy took steps in May, 1942 to establish facilities
for night lookout training at the three Armed Guard Centers, at Boston, and Key
West. It also recommended that instruction of this type be developed at
Philadelphia, Seattle, Norfolk, and San Pedro in conjunction with other existing
instructional facilities for merchant seamen.147
The Navy also directed that instruction in the 20mm gun be
readily available for Armed Guards and merchant seamen. Not only was this
instruction to be available at the Schools and Centers, but also at Boston,
Baltimore, San Pedro, Galveston, Seattle, on Mobile Units 1 and 2 at New York,
and at 827 Camp Street, New Orleans.148
In an effort to give instruction to more merchant seamen
the Navy established mobile units. Mobile Units 1 and 2 in the New York area
gave instruction to 50,674 men from 2,954 ships in the period from their
establishment in the spring of 1942 to their discontinuance in September, 1944.
These units were for a time under the supervision of the Armed Guard Center
(Atlantic), but were transferred to the Port Director at New York in October,
1943. Efforts to establish mobile units at other ports were not as successful.
In October, 1942, arrangements were made to have two buses fitted out by Com 3
for assignment to the Port Directors at Baltimore and San Francisco
respectively. Mobile unit No. 3 at Baltimore gave instruction to 285 men from
30 ships between 14 January and 11 June
--64--
1943. It was then transferred to Com 3,
but soon assigned for local transportation purposes. This unit was of little
use at Baltimore because of its poor mechanical condition and because new crews
did not sign on for voyages until just before the departure of ships. Not until
1 August 1943 did Mobile Unit No. 4, still not equipped with machine guns,
arrive at San Francisco. The Commandant of the 12th Naval District
found the bus unsuited for training merchant seamen in gunnery because of its
type and age. On October 2 the bus was transferred to the Bureau of Yards and
Docks for local transportation purposes. After training was discontinued at New
York, Mobile Units 1 and 2 were turned over to the Armed Guard Center for use in
Transporting personnel.
The outstanding fact about attempts to train American
merchant seamen ashore is that it failed. The merchant seamen refused to attend
in any great numbers. Even after the establishment of the Armed Guard Gunnery
School at New York, a place of many wonderful devices, which should have
entertained any man for a day or so, it was impossible to get the merchant men
to attend. It became evident by 1943 that training on the beach had failed
insofar as the merchant seamen were concerned. Efforts were shifted to ship
board training under the direction of the Armed Guard officer and this type of
training was somewhat more successful.
If our own seamen refused to take advantage of the finest
synthetic training devices in the world and some of the best firing ranges, the
same was not true of the seamen of allied nations. They attended whenever the
opportunity presented itself. This training was taken by Russian,
--65--
British, Chinese, Norwegian, and other allied nationals.149
It is perhaps true that in the early stages of the war our merchant seamen
established a fairly good record for attending DEMS schools. By the end of 1942
a large number of facilities were available to seamen of allied nations who
visited the United States. In addition to the centers at Brooklyn, New Orleans,
and Treasure Island, and the schools at Little Creek, Gulfport, and San Diego,
training was available at the AATC's at Dam Neck, Virginia; Price's Neck, Rhode
Island; Shell Beach, Louisiana; Point Montara, California; Pacific Beach,
Washington; Pacific Beach (San Diego), California; Guantanamo, Cuba; NOB,
Bermuda; and at the instruction centers for merchant seamen from allied
nations. In the Seattle area instruction was given aboard a trailer truck.
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Training of Armed Guards
Much of the success of the Armed Guard in World War II must
be attributed to the good training which officers and men alike received. The
primary goal of all this training was to teach men to shoot accurately and
rapidly with 5", 3", and 20mm guns at air and surface targets. In order to
accomplish this basic purpose a vast training program was inaugurated. There
were three basic Armed Guard Schools. These were located at Little Creek,
(later moved to Shelton) Virginia; Gulfport, Mississippi; and San Diego,
California. For several months in 1942 a basic school existed at Chicago. But
weather conditions on the Great Lakes were not suited to year round firing from
surface ships and this school was closed as soon as Gulfport training facilities
were ready. Of these schools the Virginia school was recognized as the best.
It was also the largest. Its training methods were adopted by the other
schools.
Each of the basic schools had an Anti-aircraft Training
Center nearby, and also sent its men out on firing ships for anti-aircraft and
surface firing. Men from the schools could thus supplement their training by
actual firing before they completed the Armed Guard course. Men from Gulfport
fired at Shell Beach either before or after they reported to the Armed Guard
Center at New Orleans. Dam Neck supplied firing facilities for the men from
Little Creek (later Shelton). Men from the San Diego school fired at Pacific
Beach, California.
Before the war had ended four well equipped Armed Guard
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Gunnery Schools had been established. These were located at New York, New
Orleans, San Francisco, and Seattle. Their basic mission was to give refresher
training to Armed Guards by the use of a wide variety of ingenious synthetic
gunnery devices. Refresher training was also available at the British D.E.M.S.
schools, and these schools were of great help to American Armed Guards early in
the war. But British schools became crowded and our own instruction facilities
had improved to such a degree that instructions were given to Armed Guard
officers on 26 October 1943 that they should request instruction for their crews
at D.E.M.S. schools only when no refresher training had been received in four
months or when they were to go on special missions for the British War
Transport.150
Armed Guards used five ranges for refresher firing
practice, in addition to the D.E.M.S. ranges. These were located at Lido Beach,
New York; Dam Neck, Virginia; Point Montara, California; Pacific Beach,
Washington; and Shell Beach, Louisiana.
In addition to the above mentioned training facilities, the
Centers gave some training to Armed Guards. The most ambitious and the best
training program developed at the Centers was that at New Orleans. But the
primary mission of the Centers, as we shall see, was not to train men but
rather to handle the assignment of men to sea duty, outfitting, including all
preparations for sea, housing while in port, arranging
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leave, handling records
and pay accounts, and transmitting latest approved instructions.
Such was the machinery for training Armed Guards. We shall
now describe briefly the history of the principal schools and, using Shelton,
the Armed Guard Gunnery School at New York, and the Armed Guard Center at New
Orleans as examples, we shall describe the training of Armed Guards.
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Armed Guard School, Little Creek (Shelton)
On 15 October 1941 BuNav established an Armed Guard School
at the Section Base, Little Creek, Virginia under the command of the Commander
of the Inshore Patrol. Not until 15 November 1942 did the officer-in-charge of
the school become a commanding officer. The school had very modest beginnings.
The original staff consisted of four retired chief gunner's mates, but the staff
expanded rapidly. The first class, consisting of 23 officers and 184 men,
reported to the Armed Guard Center (Atlantic) just as the Neutrality Act was
being repealed.151
Training was constantly being improved. In fact, the
school played a major part in producing the very fine curriculum which finally
emerged by the later part of 1943. In the early days of the Armed Guard much
emphasis was placed on ship board training. Students spent one week out of the
four allowed for training on board a training ship. With the expansion of
training, this period was reduced to three days, and finally to about 36 hours.
The original training ships were the U.S.S. Dubugue and the U.S.S.
Paducah and for a time the U.S.S. Eagle 19. The U.S.C.G. Monomoy
and the U.S.C.G. Menemsha and briefly the U.S.C.G. Marita were
later assigned. These ships were fitted with guns currently being installed on
merchant vessels and students were given actual experience in firing the weapons
which they would later use aboard merchant
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ships. For a brief period the operating area was outside the
Virginia Capes, but a firing area was soon provided inside Chesapeake Bay near
Tangier Island. For a long time the old San Marcos wreck was used as a
target for surface firing until it was too badly shot up. Eventually target
practice at towed sleeves and towed surface targets was provided.152
The history of the school is one of constant expansion. By
the end of 1942 the physical limitations of the Section Base had been reached
and the Little Creek school began to overflow into the Naval Training School,
Naval Operating Base, Norfolk. By the end of 1942 the quest for a suitable site
on which to build a new school to accommodate about 4,000 men was underway. Not
until 10 March 1943 did VCNO formally approve the Shelton site. The new school
was located southeast of Lake Bradford with Camp Bradford to the westward.
Actual construction of the new plant did not begin until May. The school was
ready for opening on 1 September, but building continued after that date. By
the end of the war the school consisted of over 90 buildings occupying 120
acres. The concrete drill field alone occupied almost seven acres. The visual
training hall had a capacity of 1,500, while the mess halls could feed 4,000 men
at one time. Recreation facilities were excellent. In short, the Navy had
built a small modern city out of the forest and filled it with Armed
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Guards.153
With the discontinuation of preliminary Armed Guard
training at the Inshore Patrol School at South Boston on 1 July 1943 and at
Treasure Island about 15 July, future Armed Guard officers received their
preliminary training from July to September, 1943, at the Local Defense School
at South Boston. After this date the officers were received at the Armed Guard
Schools direct from indoctrination schools and were given two months of Armed
Guard training instead of one.154
Some of the officers from the Boston school eventually joined the staff at
Shelton.155
Latest battle experience was utilized at Shelton, as at other Armed Guard
schools, by the policy of sending all instructors who were physically qualified
to sea and bringing in men who had two or more voyages or one voyage of more
than six month's duration. The same policy was followed with regard to petty
officers assigned to the schools. Officers and men who had been under attack
were preferred for duty as instructors.156
After 1 September 1943 the Armed Guard officer received one
month of basic Armed Guard training. During his second month he was in charge
of enlisted men who were receiving their basic Armed Guard training and he
received further instruction himself at the same time. At Shelton an
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important course for petty officers was the 5"/38 maintenance course. Many of the best
petty officers were brought back for this training either at Shelton, New
Orleans, or Treasure Island. If these men were sent to Shelton, they generally
trained a second month as petty officers in charge of the enlisted men who were
receiving their first month of basic Armed Guard training. By 1 January 1945
men who had sea experience in the Atlantic or Mediterranean theater were being
returned to Shelton for a month of refresher training at Shelton. It was
important to keep the battle tried enlisted men of the Atlantic in the Armed
Guard because no further recruits were being sent to Shelton. It was also
important to give these men additional training and a period of rest before
sending them to Armed Guard duty in the Pacific. These veterans of the Atlantic
were counted upon heavily in the tough fighting which was anticipated in the
final invasion of Japan. The Navy was anxious to keep them in the Armed Guard
and that transfers, where necessary, should be from men who had been on Armed
Guard duty in the Pacific, where little or no battle experience had been gained.157
It was decided in April, 1945, that 30 men a week were to be given a week of
training in aircraft recognition beyond their month of refresher training at
Shelton. One of these men was to be assigned to each Area 1-A ship carrying a
24 man gun crew for the purpose of instructing
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the rest of the gun crew in aircraft recognition.158
Of far reaching importance were the moves to standardize
Armed Guard training and doctrine. Shelton played an important role in this
effort, since its training was accepted as the standard which the other schools
should adopt. Bu August, 1943, BuPers was attempting to standardize the Armed
Guard curriculum. Op-23L wisely suggested that the teaching first be made
uniform for officers before proceeding with the standardization of enlisted
training.159
At about the same time VCNO (Op-23L) began issuing Armed Guard Bulletins to all
Armed Guard officers. This enabled the spread of doctrine and instructions to
the entire service quickly. The Bulletins were distributed through the Armed
Guard Centers and through the Port Director's Offices.160
Perhaps even more important from the standpoint of uniformity in the service was
the CNO directive of 3 July 1944 that all books, pamphlets, or instructions
concerning fire control procedure be submitted to CNO for approval before
printing and issue.161
This move was essential because there had not always been agreement at the
various schools on gunnery doctrine. It can be safely said that the school at
Shelton and the gunnery school at New York played a major part in the
development of gunnery doctrine and procedures for the entire Armed Guard.
Since the course at Shelton became the standard for the
entire Armed basic training program some description of the curriculum
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seems in order. It should be noted that the officers who came to Shelton generally had
been through indoctrination school, but some officers were sent there for
training from shore billets in the United States and had never received the Navy
indoctrination course. As indicated above, the basic course at Shelton lasted
four weeks after which the officer learned to handle and instruct his crew and
received additional training in gunnery. The officer studied the following
subjects in his first four week period at Shelton:
(1) Aircraft Recognition. The officer was shown slides and
films which acquainted him with the characteristics. Silhouettes, and
performance of enemy and friendly planes. This instruction required eight
hours.
(2) General Instructions. The officers had 14 hours of
instruction on the many problems which the Armed Guard officer would encounter.
These included reports, administration, discipline, relations with the merchant
marine, security, censorship, general defense policies, regulations, advancement
of enlisted men, medical treatment, welfare and morale. At the end of this
course the officer had the answers to the most common problems he would face
when he first went to sea. The instructors were generally officers who had
recently been at sea.
(3) Ordnance. This course was intended to give the officer
a thorough acquaintance with the heavy weapons used by the Armed Guard. The
course began with a lecture on the performance of the guns. The officer became
familiar with the standard nomenclature for all parts of the gun. He actually
broke down the breach, firing mechanism, and
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generally all dismountable parts.
Problems of maintenance, lubrication, and casualties were stressed. The entire
course lasted 19 hours; seven hours for the 3"/50AA gun, 4 hours on the 4"/50, 2
hours on the 5"/51, and 6 hours on the 5"/38.
(4) Fire Control. In 17 hours of intensive training the
officer studied the problems of when and how to open fire, the type of fire
which was most effective, gun crew training, fuse setting and ready box
arrangement, all approved doctrines of fire control. This instruction was based
on the latest actual experience in fighting the enemy, for the instructors were
men who had only recently been in combat. Three hours were devoted to the
spotting tank.
(5) Communications. The officer was given sufficient
training to enable him to gain some understanding of the general problems of
communications. He received some training in sending and receiving blinker,
semaphore, and radio code. He was trained in wartime merchant ship
communications, communication reports, international code flags, convoy
procedure, coding and decoding, operation of the TBY, sound powered telephones,
and care of confidential publications. Only 24 hours was devoted to
communications training, enough time to acquaint the officer with some of the
basic problems and procedures.
(6) Synthetic Training. The officer spent 24 hours with a
number of mechanical training devices which would also be used in training
enlisted men during his second month at school. It must be said that the finest
mechanical equipment was located at New York Gunnery School, which had an
important part in the development of synthetic training
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devices. But Shelton and the other basic schools also had much fine equipment. Shelton gave
instruction with seven synthetic gunnery devices. These were: (a) Stationary
Target Eyeshooting Teacher, a geometrical device to illustrate the mathematical
basis for doctrine of fire control of short range AA guns; (b) Portable Aiming
Teacher, a simple device for teaching the principles and practice of the use of
the Mark IV sight; (c) Multiple Trainer, mounted miniature planes and Mark IV
sights operated in banks of five to teach approach angle, apparent length and
proper aim off with scoring system to evaluate ability and progress; (d)
Panoramic Trainer Mark IV (3A-11), a film projector mounted on a 20mm gun with
counter registering hits on planes approaching as dive bombers or torpedo
attackers; (e) AA Battery Trainer Mark III, Mod. 1 (3A-2), crews with battery
officers fired at planes on a screen with both 3"/50 and 20mm guns; (f)
Deflection Trainer Mark VI (3B-6), gave training in judgment of approach angles
of miniature planes controlled by instructors, involving firing at planes and
registering hits and misses by use of photo-electric cells; (g) Polaroid Trainer
Mark I, film, screen, and 50 cal. Machine gun with sound device to give sound
effect of actual firing. The vibration of the guns was mechanically controlled
and hits were recorded by a photo-electric cell. Tracer effect was provided on
firing. Late in the war this trainer was adapted to a 20mm gun. Officers were
given instruction in short range fire control before receiving training in the
synthetic devices.
(7) Small Boats. This four hour training included instruction in
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handling boats, commands, lowering away, emergency navigation,
abandon ship drill, survival, and provisioning of life boats. It was essential
that the officers have sufficient knowledge of navigation to be able to take
charge of a life boat and bring it safely to land in the event his ship was
sunk.
(8) 20mm Instruction. An intensive 7 hour course in the
construction, care, maintenance, nomenclature of the gun included actual
breakdown and assembly. The officer also learned what to do in case of casualty
and how to keep the gun well lubricated.
(9) Bore Sighting. One hour was devoted to the use of the
bore sight telescope and muzzle disc for bore sighting broadside guns.
Simplified methods of bore sighting and short cuts were considered.
(10) Maintenance, Ammunition, and Magazines. Nine hours
were devoted to maintenance of guns, ammunition, and magazines. Instruction was
given in fuses, powder, safety regulations, powder decomposition and testing,
sprinkler systems, magazine temperature control, detonators, projectile markings
and other problems. The officer was instructed in making reports and keeping
the ammunition log.
(11) Degaussing. The officer learned of his relation to
the master in regard to degaussing, the theory of degaussing, and the reading of
area charts for settings. This instruction lasted only one hour.
(12) Gas protection. In two hours the officer learned
handling and care of gas masks, proper method for donning the mask, testing and
replacement of cartridge, types of gases, countermeasures, and gas
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decontamination.
(13) Seamanship. This instruction consisted of only three
hours with attention to the practical problems as related to the Armed Guard.
(14) Binoculars. In one hour the care and proper technique
in using binoculars were explained to the officer. This was correlated with
spotting targets from the boat dock.
(15) Pointer, Trainer, Sightsetting Course. This lasted
for three hours. Actual firing practice on the 3"/50 and 4"/50 guns was given
by firing a 22 cal. gun, which was rigged up to the large gun, at movable
targets.
(16) AA Sight Setting Drill. This one hour drill stressed
deflection and sight angles.
(17) Loading Drills. The officer received 22 hours of
training in loading, climaxed by a night battle practice in a blacked out room
(gun shed). Live primers were fired in the 5"/51 gun. Seven hours were devoted
to loading drill on the 3"/50, six hours to the 5"/38, four hours to the 4"/50,
and four hours plus the night battle practice to the 5"/51.
(18) Tracking 3"/50 and 5"/38. For one hour moving targets
were tracked with simulated loading and use of customary commands.
(19) 20mm Tracking. This training lasted for one hour.
(20) 20mm Bore Sighting. This was a one hour period of
instruction in sight adjustment on the 20mm gun.
(21) Pistols 38 and 45 cal. The officer spent two and
one-half hours breaking down the pistols and one-half hour of firing.
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(22) 30 cal. Rifle. One hour was spent on the breakdown of
this gun. No actual firing was given.
(23) Military Drill. For three hours the officer was
drilled in military formations, the manual of arms, and the like. Normally
officers had received drill at indoctrination schools, but some officers were
assigned to Armed Guard schools from shore bases and had never received the Navy
indoctrination course.
(24) Physical Education. The officer received a half-hour
of exercise on each of the six working days of the week. This consisted of
calisthenics or of such organized games as volley ball.
(25) Range Estimation. One hour was spent in estimating
range using the BuAer 5-C-4 Range Estimator.
(26) First Aid. Normally two hours were devoted to this
subject. The training consisted of movies and a lecture by a Doctor at the
school.
(27) AA Range Preparation. One hour of instruction was
given to the officers just before they went to the firing range at Dam Neck.
This period was used to acquaint them with what they were expected to do at Dam
Neck.
(28) Firing Ship Preparation. One hour of instruction was
given to the officers before they went aboard the firing ship. They learned of
the ship's routine and of their assignments to the various gun crews on the
firing ship.
(29) Liberty Ship. The officer spent four hours on board
an Armed Guard manned merchant ship in Norfolk harbor.
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(30) Dam Neck. The officers spent one day firing 20mm,
3"/50, and 5"/38 guns at the anti-aircraft range. They were organized into gun
crews and rotated positions at the guns.
(31) Firing Ship. On a one day trip the officer fired at
surface and air targets.162
After this month of intensive training the officer was
ready to take charge of the enlisted men who were entering the school for their
month of basic Armed Guard training. After working with these men for a month
he was prepared to command the Armed Guard at sea. Few problems would be
entirely strange to him. He would have acquired skills and knowledge which
would have required a much longer period of training under peace time
conditions. He had the confidence and self-assurance which could come from a
thorough knowledge of what his duties and responsibilities were. Additional
training at Armed Guard Centers improved his efficiency as an Armed Guard
commanding officer.
During the second month at the Armed Guard School the
officers were in charge of small groups of enlisted men. The enlisted men
received the following training at Shelton, and the course was likewise copied
at Gulfport and San Diego:
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(1) Synthetic Training. This training was essentially the
same as for officers with increased skill as the objective. The enlisted man
received 27 hours of this training.
(2) Aircraft Recognition. While only eight hours of
training in this important subject were given at Shelton, the special course for
selected petty officers late in the war meant that on each ship there would be a
man capable of giving additional instruction to other members of the gun crew.
(3) Loading Drills. The men spent 17 hours in loading
drills, six on the 5"/38, six on the 3"/50, three on the 4"/50, and two on the
5"/51.
(4) Instructional Movies. This program involved five hours
of movies. Movies were used to teach proper firing methods. Movies on the
Armed Guard, Eye Shooting, and Barrage Fire Control were produced by BuAer from
technical information supplied by the Armed Guard Service. The Armed Guard
Gunnery School at New York played a leading role in the development of these
films. In the early part of the war British eye shooting films were shown.
(5) Night Lookout Trainer. Four hours were spent in this
training.
(6) 20mm Gun Breakdown, casualties and care, 6 hours.
(7) Tracking Targets. In 9 hours the student learned how
to track targets. Six hours were pent tracking with the 20mm, one hour with the
3"/50, and two hours with the 5"/38.
(8) Pointer, Trainer, Setter Drills. Crews were trained
prior to going to the firing range or to the firing ship by using dotters rigged
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with .22 caliber guns attached to firing keys and firing at a moving mechanical
target. Lectures and dry runs prepared the men for actual firing.
(9) Pistol Range and Rifle Breakdown. In four hours the
men received essentially the same instruction as the officers. They had actual
experience in firing and expert instruction in handling small arms.
(10) Physical Activity. In 18 hours of planned exercise
the men built up their physical strength. They ran the obstacle source, learned
self-defense, engaged in calisthenics and sports.
(11) Military Drill. Since the men had already received
military training during their boot training period, they were given only two
additional hours. One hour was devoted to basic formation and precision
drills. The second hour was on the manual of arms for rifle fire.
(12) Dam Neck. All men were sent to Dam Neck for actual
experience in firing 20mm, 3"/50, 5"/38 guns.
(13) Firing Ship. Two days were spent aboard the firing
ship in Chesapeake Bay. Actual firing at surface and air targets aboard ship
completed their training. They were then ready to report to the Centers for
further assignment.
(14) Other Miscellaneous Instructions. (One hour classes
each)
| |
(a) Attack films |
| |
(b) Small Stores |
| |
(c) Lecture by Battery Officer |
| |
(d) Range Estimator |
| |
(e) Dam Neck Preparation |
| |
(f) Dam Neck Review |
| |
(g) Bag Inspection163 |
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Shelton also developed a very fine four weeks course for
the 5"/38 maintenance men. Carefully selected petty officers were selected from
the Center at New York. In the early days at Little Creek only one week of
instruction was given, but at Shelton the course was expanded to four weeks. In
the first week the 5"/38 was studied intensively. The student learned to
breakdown the gun, to assemble it, how to service the gun, and studied
adjustment of the hydro-pneumatic recoil system, bore sighting, rammer system,
maintenance and operation, routine checks, lubrication, test or practice firing,
cleaning, and painting. Special attention was given to the quick repair of
material casualties and to methods of prevention. On the basis of an
examination the class was then divided into two parts. The better half spent
two weeks studying the hydraulic drive and the rammer system; the other half was
given a more general course of instruction, including a day at fire fighting
school and another day of observation at the Norfolk Navy Yard. The entire
class was brought together for the final week and studied lubrication and
ammunition. The petty officers then became leaders of gun crews who were
beginning their four weeks of basic training. The basic curriculum for the
maintenance course was written by BuPers, but methods and training aids were
developed by the instructors at
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Shelton.164
Before a course was set up at New Orleans an officer from the Center visited
Shelton with instructions to observe the course there and to set up a similar
course upon his return to New Orleans.165
An important contribution of Shelton to the war effort was
the housing and feeding of some 2,000 persons in amphibious training during much
of 1944. Fleet and Army personnel at times received gunnery training at
Shelton, as did British, Netherland, Norwegian and French gun crews.166
In fact, the training of personnel other than Armed Guards was an important
contribution of the entire Armed Guard training program. More than 1,000 Army
personnel received gunnery instruction from the Armed Guard schools during the
war.
In early 1945 the input of recruits for Armed Guard
training ceased. Thereafter, all enlisted training at Shelton was for the
maintenance course or refresher training. In seven months Shelton gave
refresher training to 12,807 men in 28 classes. The curriculum, as established
by BuPers in June, 1945, provided that 135 hours of refresher training should be
given. The objectives were: (1) To review and bring up to date the student's
knowledge of guns used in the Armed Guard service; (2) To develop skill in
anti-aircraft gunnery; (3) To develop facility and accuracy in identifying
aircraft; (4) To develop team efficiency in
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loading and firing guns; (5) To
develop a high level of physical fitness. The student spent 11 hours on
ordinance, 24 hours on gunnery, 28 hours on gun drill, 9 hours at the range, 14
hours on a firing ship, 19 hours in lookout-recognition, 11 hours in general
instruction, including small boats, abandon ship, rescue equipment, and first
aid, 19 hours in physical training.167
The Armed Guard School at Little Creek (later Shelton)
trained 533 classes of officers and men for a grand total of 72,278. These
figures included 164 classes of enlisted men in basic training for a total of
52,331, 154 classes in 5"/38 maintenance for a total of 2,945 gunner's mates,
187 classes of officers for a total of 4,195, and 28 classes of enlisted
refresher training for a total of 12,807. When training ended on 11 August 1945
and the school was converted into a separation center, 2,045 enlisted men and
186 officers in addition to those mentioned as completely trained were under
instruction.168
When one considers that training programs and procedures had to be developed
from scratch, the record at Shelton and the other schools is indeed an
impressive one.
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Armed Guard School, Chicago
BuNav directed the establishment of the Armed Guard School at Chicago on 10 March 1942.
The School was located in the Naval Reserve Armory. It provided facilities for 100 officers
and 800 enlisted men. The first assignment of 200 men and 25 officers was received late in March.
169 The four week's training
was the same as that followed at Little Creek and San Diego. The U.S.S. Wilmette and the
U.S.S. Dover were assigned as firing ships. The school continued to function and to
receive the above mentioned quotas until Gulfport was finished. The school at Chicago was closed
in October, 1942. The winter weather on the Great Lakes was not suited to firing practice aboard
ship. Nevertheless, the Chicago school played an important part in filling the personnel needs
of the Armed Guard during a period when men were desperately needed and facilities for training
were not yet available elsewhere.
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Armed Guard School, Gulfport
Plans to establish an Armed Guard school at Gulfport were being developed as early as
March, 1942. The school was completed about 1 September 1942.170
The U.S.S. Dover and the U.S.S. Lash were originally assigned as firing ships.171
The U.S.S. Monomoy and the U.S.C.G. Marita also served as firing ships.172
The school appears to have functioned smoothly and effectively. Its curriculum was standardized
with that of Shelton in the Spring of 1944.173
The most serious tax on facilities of Gulfport
came when training at Shelton was reduced in 1944 to accommodate some 2,000 amphibious
personnel. For a time, as we have seen, conditions were very crowded at Gulfport. There had
been a similar period in the summer of 1943, just prior to the completion of Shelton.174
Between the opening of the school in October, 1942, and the closing of training on 14 December
1944, Gulfport trained 2,005 officers and 32,401 enlisted men.175
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Armed Guard School, San Diego
The Armed Guard School at San Diego was established prior to the outbreak of hostilities and even
before the repeal of the Neutrality Act. It was a part of the Destroyer Base and was somewhat limited
as to space and facilities. It had little part in the development of new devices and courses. In fact,
two officers from the Armed Guard School at Shelton visited the school for 12 days in May, 1944, and
outlined the instruction which should be given to bring training up to Shelton standards.176
The school was disestablished on 27 January 1945.177
It trained 1,273 officers and 16,931 men.178 Most of the men trained
were assigned to merchant ships through Armed Guard Center at Treasure Island. Training ships were
generally destroyers which were available briefly for such duty, but eventually the U.S.S. Sacramento
was assigned as a training ship. Late in 1944 arrangements were made to assign the U.S.S. Dover
to San Diego, but this ship was shifted to Treasure Island when the school at San Diego closed soon
thereafter.179
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Armed Guard Gunnery School, New York
The primary purpose of the gunnery schools which were established at New York, New Orleans,
Seattle, and Treasure Island was to provide brief periods of refresher training in the most essential
duties of Armed Guards afloat. The special emphasis of these schools was on defense of merchant ships
from air attack.
The first gunnery school established was located in the South Ferry Terminal Building, owned by the City of New
York. This was the best of the four gunnery schools and the most completely equipped. In addition to training
Armed Guards by the use of synthetic devices, the school played a prominent part in developing new training
devices and in the formulation of anti-aircraft gunnery doctrine. The officers at Shelton worked closely with
the officers at the New York school in the development of anti-aircraft defense doctrine.
Prior to the establishment of the gunnery school at New York the officer-in-charge visited a dozen training
activities and later sent other officers to some of these activities for more extended visits. The school
was thus able to take advantage of the latest training procedures known to the Navy.
Arrangements were made to feed the men at the Seaman's Church Institute. Men were brought to the school by
ferry, subway, and other public transportation. The Navy furnished transportation tickets to men scheduled
for training.
The school was formally authorized by BuPers on 25 January 1943 and
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training actually commenced on 6 May 1943
when the first training group of 25 men reported for a one day drill. Prior to the formal opening of the school
three officers had spent 10 days at the D.E.M.S. school at Halifax. The officer-in-charge, later promoted to
Commanding Officer, had already begun visits to the Bureau of Aeronautics Special Devices Section in Washington
which were to be so fruitful in the development of new training devices and which finally converted the school
into a kind of wonderland for the Navy gunner. A wise policy had also been adopted that instructors should be
brought to the school fresh from duty afloat. Officers were carefully selected by personal interview on the
basis of general qualifications, experience afloat, and their interest in training. These officers in turn
suggested outstanding enlisted men who had served under them. By the early fall of 1943 the school was training
about 1,150 men a week.
In the spring of 1943 the first edition of Anti-aircraft Defense of Merchant Ships appeared. The fourth
edition was adopted by CNO as an official text for all Armed Guard training and 17,000 copies were printed. Many
copies went to other Navy activities and the Coast Guard. Numerous Fleet and amphibious units were supplied with
the publication. The publication remains one of the best manuals on anti-aircraft gunnery by simple local control methods.
Largely through the efforts of the officer-in-charge of the school an anti-aircraft range for 20mm firing was
established at Lido Beach
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and ready for firing in September, 1943. This was a separate activity but established
primarily for Armed guard training of officers and men who attended the school at South Ferry. The caliber of guns
used was naturally restricted by the location of the range.
From May, 1943, to July, 1945, the Armed Guard Gunnery School at South Ferry trained 90,296 men and 3,716 officers in
local control firing, using the cartwheel sight. All officers and 20,102 men received special training in fire
control for the 3"/50 and 5"/38 guns. Inexperienced officers and those newly assigned to the Armed Guard found the
course especially valuable. Great emphasis was placed on fire control, enemy tactics, and the best means of meeting
enemy attack. The instruction was entirely practical and not theoretical. In addition, an officer and a gunner's mate
were sent aboard merchant ships in transit and those with a rapid turnabout. They brought recognition material and
portable training equipment. The most important item was a multiple trainer which used only two planes mounted on a
portable frame, arranged to vary the approach angle of the planes in unison. The dual purpose gun and one or more
machine guns could be brought to bear on the planes. The officer from the school explained the use of training material
to the Armed Guard officer and laid out a plan of instruction to be followed while at sea. The gunner's mate held a
short practice session with the Armed Guard crew, and instructed them in the use of the multiple trainer. From the
beginning of 1944 to the middle of 1945 this service was given to 490 ships. A total of 498 officers and 10,391 men
thus received
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training on board their ships while in the port of New York.
The school also extended its facilities to the Coast Guard, the Army and to Navy personnel other than Armed Guards.
A number of Army enlisted men assigned to harbor defense received the training afforded by the school. Merchant seamen
from British, Norwegian, Dutch, French, Polish, Russian, and Greek ships received the training in large numbers. It
was, however, almost impossible to get American merchant seamen to attend the school. In all cases where foreigners
attended there were officers and men attached to the school who were able to speak the language and thus contribute to
the efficiency of the instruction.
In addition to a course in the actual breech breakdown of the 20mm and 3"/50 guns, the school used 16 ingenious synthetic
training devices to teach gunnery. These devices made the school the best equipped of all the Armed Guard schools and one
of the best equipped training activities in the entire Naval Service. Many were developed by the Special Devices Section of
BuAer, in collaboration with the Armed Guard School at New York and the Fleet Maintenance Division of CNO, especially for
the training of Armed Guards. The following devices were in use at the school when the war with Germany ended and refresher
training of Armed Guards at New York virtually came to an end:
(1) Night Vision Training Stage. This stage consisted of a hemispherical dome with the horizon at eye level. The
men received instruction in night vision, watch standing, and relative bearings for 30 minutes while being dark adapted
by wearing red goggles.
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(2) Recognition Projector. This device flashed recognition silhouettes on a screen for exposures as short as 1/100th
of a second and was used to supplement the instructor's lecture on aircraft recognition.
(3) Multiple Trainer. This device consisted of five Mark IV Cartwheel Sights mounted on a wooden frame. These sights
could be moved in any direction to bear upon a number of plane models set in a frame a distance of about 20 feet and above
the level of the sights. The direction of flight and approach angle of the planes could be altered. The student applied the
proper amount and direction of lead and the instructor checked each sight as set to see that it was properly set.
(4) Machine Gun Trainer Mark III. (Special Device 3A2) A dual 16mm projector flashed a film of synthetic attacks by
model planes on a screen. The gunner used a 20mm mount equipped with a ring sight. His aim could be corrected by the
instructor who could project a spot on the screen to show the proper point of aim.
(5) Machine Gun Trainer Mark I (Polaroid Trainer). This device was designed primarily to teach aiming of machine
guns by tracer control. Mounting a sight on the gun so that errors in aim by tracer observation could be corrected,
increased the effectiveness of the device.
(6) Machine Gun Trainer Mark II (Waller Trainer). This was one of the finest training devices developed during the
war. A British Vice Admiral who visited the Armed Guard Gunnery School was so fascinated with this device that it was
difficult to get him away from it. The British requested and were given one of the ten Waller Trainers which
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were built.
Three of the trainers were installed at the South Ferry Building, but they were vast improvements over the original Waller
Trainer as developed by the Waller people. These improvements were the work of the New York Gunnery School. Among
improvements were the hooking up of four guns instead of one, the enlargement of the screen and increases in the number of
projectors, the development of means for recording the number of rounds and bursts fired and the number of hits scored, the
fitting of all guns with cartwheel sights, and the fitting of guns with compressed air hammers to simulate the vibration of
a gun actually being fired. Four gunners could track and fire at planes as the four projectors threw a panoramic composite
picture on the large spherical section of the screen. Pin points of light on the screen indicated where the shell bursts
were taking place with regard to the plane. It was all very realistic, almost as real as the actual firing of a 20mm at a
real plane. The recording devices scored the number of shots fired by each gun and the number of hits.
(7) Tracking Range. Model planes were suspended by an endless steel cable about 30 feet above the deck. The cable
passed over idlers and a large electrically driven pulley. The students tracked with 20mm guns from tubs equipped with
firing steps as the planes approached. The instructors used check sights to help the students apply the correct lead.
(8) Tracking Dome. Single and multiple attacks were simulated by means of a 16mm projector and a spherical-section
screen of smaller
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arc than that used with the Waller Trainer. Four 20mm gunners and one or more 3"/50 gun crews could train
simultaneously in tracking. The instructor controlled the fire by issuing directions over sound powered battle telephones.
(9) Machine Gun Range. Two metal planes, affixed to cables, were used as targets for air operated machine guns, firing
BB shot. One plane approached as a level bomber, the other as a dive bomber. Six guns using modified cartwheel sights were fired
one at a time by the students. The speed of the planes was so scaled that proper lead must be applied.
(10) Machine Gun Trainer Mark IV (Panoramic Trainer). A 35mm continuous film projector was mounted directly on a 20mm gun.
The gunner must elevate, depress, and train his gun as he would do under actual attack. The number of rounds fired and
the number of hits scored were automatically recorded. The school installed this device on a small number of troop transports.
(11) Machine Gun Trainer Mark VI (Night Attack Trainer). This device was equipped with a Mark IV Cartwheel Sight and
operated under lighting conditions which required fast and accurate estimation of the direction of flight and approach angle
of planes.
(12) Range Estimator (BuAer 5-C-4). This electrically operated device consisted of a tunnel in which scale model enemy
planes could be moved forward or awat from the observer and could be stopped at any relative distance by the instructor. The
observer looked at the planes
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through a lens which made them appear at normal size. A dial showed the scale distance from the
observer, who wrote down his estimate and then checked it with the dial. Eight men could be trained at the same time on each
machine. Two were in operation at the school.
(13) Anti-aircraft Spotting Trainer. This device was developed by the school. It gave practice in estimating barrage
firing, giving of commands by the gun captains and officers, and spotting corrections of fire by observation of bursts. Model
planes traveled on wires. Wands bearing flashing lamps at their ends were actuated by a combination of tracking motion and aim
off and timing devices. They produced flashes at intervals corresponding to the firing rate and time in flight of 3" and 5"
gunfire. The student gave the orders to commence firing, for correcting aim, and for handling a 3"/50 or 5"/38 gun. The
instructor operated the machine in accordance with the orders received. The bursts appeared in relation to the plane as they
would if a real gun was fired at a real plane. The sound of gunfire was also produced by this trainer.
(14) Surface Spotting Trainer. This trainer was also developed by the school and applied much the same principle to
surface gunnery. The object was to teach estimation of range and deflection, and to give practice in issuing orders and in
correcting errors by observation of splashes. The student viewed six targets, each of which represented a ship in motion. The
angle, speed of winds, and motion of the ship on which the student was supposed to be located were all indicated on the face
of the training device. The student estimated range by observing
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the small angle between the waterline of the target and the
horizon, as well as the apparent size of the ship. He estimated deflection by the ballistic data in "Shirtcuff Range Tables",
a publication of the school. A sight setter applied these estimates to the sight wheel. The splash was produced by a time
delay electric circuit and was determined by the controls. Two officers or gun captains would fire at identical problems at
the same time, thus introducing competition.
(15) Pointer-Trainer Machine. This device was designed to teach perfect coordination between pointer and trainer. A
cartwheel sight was suspended behind a muslin screen and behind this sight was a model plane. A light beyond the plane threw
the shadow of the plane and sight sharply upon the screen. The pointer and trainer on the left and right of the machine
respectively went through the same movements of the machine they would employ in using a real gun. The instructor could change
the approach angle and direction of flight.
(16) Pneumatic Training Gun. This device originated at the school. A 20mm gun was made to vibrate in a way similar to
that of a firing gun and there was even some resemblance to the sound of a 20mm gun firing.
The Armed Guard Gunnery School at New York also played as important part in the development of ordnance equipment. The development
of a cartwheel sight for the 3"/50 and 5"/38 guns was perhaps the major contribution. In addition it developed a 3"/50 Breech
Dismounting Tool, a 3"/50 Salvo Latch Securing Tool, a 3"/50 Extractor Tripping
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Tool, a 3"/50 Recocking Tool, and a 20mm Securing Tool.
It should be pointed out that the school, along with Shelton, played an important part in developing a method of anti-aircraft
fire control with telescope sights when BuOrd failed to produce the cartwheel sight brackets needed to mount that type sight
on all 5"/38 guns.180
The school at New York and the center at Treasure Island distributed portable spotting boards to Area 1-A ships for training purposes.181
The school was ordered disestablished on 1 November 1945. All specially constructed training equipments developed and used in
the school were blueprinted for future reference before being dismantled. BuOrd training devices were packed and stored for
future use.
The general improvement in Armed Guard anti-aircraft gunnery and in the defense of their ships is largely due to refresher
training at the Armed Guard Gunnery Schools. This training amply paid for all costs in saved money, time, and effort.
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Armed Guard Gunnery School, New Orleans
Greater opportunities for training of Armed Guards awaiting assignment to ships existed at New Orleans than
at any other Armed Guard Center. Officers and men were frequently at New Orleans for considerable periods of time,
whereas their stay at the Brooklyn Center, for example, was often very brief. Although an Armed Guard Gunnery School,
New Orleans, was established by BuPers as a Naval Training School until 12 December 1944, gunnery training had been
started as early as June, 1942. At New Orleans was developed a most diverse program of instruction for Armed Guards
who had already been trained at the basic schools. Real excellence was achieved in this training program. The
training was a credit to the Center and later to the officer-in-charge and staff of the Gunnery School who came
under the commanding officer of the Center.
The original impetus for training at the Armed Guard Center at New Orleans came from a knowledge that personnel
reporting for duty afloat had been hurriedly trained in gunnery, watch standing, and aircraft recognition.
Additional instruction appeared desirable during the period when Armed Guards were waiting to be assigned to ships.
The original training equipment consisted of a 4"/50, a 3"/50AA, a 20mm, a .50 cal., and two .30 cal. Machine guns.
The early instructors were experienced officers who were awaiting assignment to ships. Two 5"/38 D.P. guns were
later added to the training equipment.
The original instruction consisted only of gunnery theory and practice. But the program was quickly expanded to
include seamanship,
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night lookout, aircraft recognition, and communications. The 5"/38 maintenance training of
gunner's mates, based on the Shelton curriculum, became an important course. Training was given in the maintenance
and operation of gasoline and diesel generators for 5"/38 power. Officers were given courses in navigation and in
convoy procedure. A course was even developed before the end of the war for the maintenance crews which were to be
left on ships.
Officers and enlisted men were given refresher training on the mechanics, maintenance, and preservation of all
types of naval ordnance found on merchant ships. They were taught to function effectively as a coordinated gun crew
and were given the latest defense tactics. Conditions at sea were simulated as much as possible. At the Gun Dock the
operation, breakdown, and maintenance of machine guns was stressed. Enlisted personnel, working in small groups
became quite proficient in taking these guns apart and putting them together again. The correct application of proper
oils and greases for different climatic conditions was emphasized. Every effort was made to show the student all
parts of guns either by placing them on display tables or by substituting glass covers for metal plates.
Every effort was made to give Armed Guards additional training in correct loading procedure, sight-setting,
pointing, training, and the duties of a gun captain. It was considered that each Armed Guard should know the duties
of every member of the gun crew. Great emphasis was placed upon safety precautions, including the operation and
testing
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of magazine sprinkler systems and surveillance tests for ammunition. Every effort was made to adapt training
to new and changing tactics of the enemy. Synthetic devices were used at the school, as at all Armed Guard schools,
and much credit must be given the officers for ingenuity in making modifications and in developing new ideas. A dual
trainer was developed at the school, but this was not adopted elsewhere. The school also developed a frame for the
gunnery cards which were used in training at about the same time BuAer was developing a similar frame.
Men were sent to Shell Beach for actual firing at towed sleeves. Their speed of firing was greatly increased by
training at the school. The men became so adept at identifying aircraft that they could make proper identification
by seeing the plane for 1/100 of a second.
Lookout training, especially night lookout duty, was given in a special building with a stage which could be made
to appear as the horizon, moonlight at sea, a burning vessel, distant gun fire, or lightening. Miniature ship models
were moved across the stage. The men wore battle telephones and simulated actual watch standing at sea.
A large number of men received training in visual and radio communications. Three signal bridges were erected at
the school. Convoy procedure was emphasized.
Officers received a very fine course in celestial navigation which stressed procedures for locating positions at
sea and plotting the course of a ship. The course gave practical training without detailed explanations of how the
data was arrived at.
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Enlisted men received very good training in handling boats and in abandon ship procedures. A fully equipped lifeboat
could be lowered and hoisted from the roof of the training building. The men later engaged in lifeboat drill on Lake
Pontchartrain.
The school was widely attended by men from the Fleet, the Army, the Marines, the Coast Guard, and by naval units from
Great Britain, Russia, Canada, Australia, Brazil, France, Norway, and Greece. A few merchant marine officers attended.
By June, 1945 about 30 percent of the personnel in training were from Fleet and other naval commands. The school was
finally disestablished on 4 December 1945.182
In April, 1945 the following amounts of time were given to courses at the New Orleans school: (1) Problems of Armed
Guard Commands - 24 hours; (2) General Gun Maintenance for Officers - 96 hours; (3) 5"/38 Course for Gunnery Officers -
48 hours; (4) Advanced Gunnery for Officers - 23 Hours; (5) Fire Control - 12 hours; (6) 5"/38 Gunner's Mates' Maintenance
Course - 240 hours; (7) Gunnery for Signalmen and Radiomen - 11 hours; (8) Elementary Gunnery for Seamen - 70 hours;
(9) General Gun Maintenance for Enlisted Personnel - 190 hours; (10) Wartime Instructions for Merchant Ships - 34 hours;
(11) Visual Communication - 12 hours; (12) Visual Communication for Signalmen - 60 hours; (13) Preparation for Gunner's
Mate
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Third Class Rating - 14 hours; (14) Petty Officer Preparation for Higher Rating - 8 hours; (15) Preparation for
Coxswain Rating - 8 hours; (16) Navigation - piloting 12 hours, celestial navigation 42 hours, lifeboat navigation 6
hours; (17) Lifeboat Handling - 9 hours; (18) Lookout Training and Aircraft Recognition - 24 hours; (19) Military
Training - 10 hours; (20) Physical Training and Athletics - 18 hours. Normally about 2,000 officers and enlisted men were
available for instruction while awaiting assignment to merchant ships.
While total figures for men trained at New Orleans are not available, the figures which are at hand indicate that from
the middle of 1943 to the end of September, 1945, more than 3,000 officers and more than 42,000 men received refresher courses
in anti-aircraft gunnery.183
The list of training publications produced at the School and Center at New Orleans is impressive. They were: Five
Inch Thirty-Eight Manual (revised ed., 1945); Armed Guard Commanding Officer's Ordnance Ledger; Ordnance Inspection;
Ordnance Lubrication Manual; Safety Precautions; Spare Parts, Tools, and Accessories for Armed Guard Merchant Ships;
Understanding Celestial Navigation; Watch, Quarter, and Station Bill for the Naval Armed Guard Afloat; Training Syllabus;
Training Review; Course Outline for Ships Maintenance Crew; Course Outline of Armed Guard Inspection Service.
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Armed Guard Gunnery School, Seattle
While training for Armed Guards under the direction of the Port Director was started very early in the war in the Seattle
area, the Armed Guard Gunnery School under an officer-in-charge who would be under the command of the Port Director was not
established as a Naval Training School until 21 June 1944.184 Not until the congestion in the port of San Francisco indicated
the trend of expansion toward Seattle was an attempt made to standardize the synthetic training with that of other schools.
By the fall of 1943 the USAT TEAPA was being regularly employed as a firing ship. This ship, while engaged in
training pilots for coastwise waters, gave firing practice in both the 20mm gun, as well as examinations for advancement in
rate, was given at the Training Center in the Exchange Building. In this building was located the Convoy and Merchant Ship
Communication School which gave training to Armed Guard officers, signalmen, and radiomen. Some of the students were commercial
radiomen and masters and mates from merchant ships. Another training center for Armed Guards was located at the Harbor Island
Receiving Station. Training here included general indoctrination, loading drills on 3", 4", and 5" guns, night lookout training,
breakdown of the 3", 4", and 20mm guns, and seamanship. A few Armed Guards were sent to
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Manchester, Washington fire fighting
school. Swimming classes were given at the YMCA. Another training center for Armed Guards was located at Portland, Oregon,
Receiving Barracks. Early in 1944 this training center was giving loading drills on the 3"/50 and breakdown of this gun and
the 20mm machine gun. It also gave night lookout training.
By February, 1944, instruction on the Mark I trainer was being given at Harbor Island Training Center at Seattle and soon a
recognition course was added. Audio-visual training films and training with the .38 cal. Pistol and the .30 cal. Rifle were also
added to the training program at the Exchange Building. The Training Center at Portland rapidly increased its training program.
It used audio-visual films, the 3A2 trainer, and gave instruction on such subjects as general Armed Guard duties, safety
precautions, ordnance and gunnery instructions, and breakdown and safety precautions for the .38 cal. Pistol and the .30 cal.
Rifle. A large number of Russians received training at Seattle and Portland.
By the middle of 1944 a tug was operating in Puget Sound to tow a surface target for the Teapa and ships departing
the area to fire at. A plane was also provided to tow a sleeve for anti-aircraft firing practice.
In an effort to standardize training, in August, 1944, BuPers ordered an officer from the school at Seattle to visit
Washington, New York, and Shelton to observe and discuss Armed Guard training methods.185
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In the spring of 1945 the synthetic
training officer at Shelton visited the Armed Guard Gunnery School at Seattle and made a number of recommendations. His mission
was primarily for the purpose of bringing uniformity in instruction in fire control of the 5"/38 guns which did not have ring
sights and were forced to use telescopic sights, and to make suggestions concerning refresher training, including target
practice at towed sleeves. Op-23L was especially anxious that as many officers and men as possible be sent to the AA training
center for actual firing.186 The officer from Shelton
was at Seattle from April 8 to 15. He found 10 items of synthetic training
equipment. There were two Mark 3 Trainers, one utilized two 20mm guns and the other used a 3"/50 mount. There were four Mark 4
Trainers, two Mark I Trainers, and two Mark 6 Trainers. In addition equipment was available for maintenance, breakdown, and
loading instruction. Two weaknesses appeared in the training. There was no fixed program for anti-aircraft gunnery training.
The Armed Guard officer selected the type of training to be given to his men. Another weakness was that no provision was made
for sending officers and men to the anti-aircraft firing range at Pacific Beach, Washington. The weather was inclement about
60 per cent of the time and the trip to the range from Seattle required five hours each way.
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No firing ship was available since
the Teapa had been required by the Army for other duty since July. Merchant ships fired at surface targets and a towed
sleeve if such a sleeve was present when they passed through the firing area on their outbound trips. But this coincidence was
very infrequent.
The officer from Shelton suggested 10 changes in the refresher training program: (1) More emphasis on gunnery and fire control;
(2) A definite two day course for officers and men using a drill manual from Shelton and an instructor's manual from the New York
gunnery school and such equipment as was available at Seattle; (3) The program should be based on a six period day; (4)
Construction of one or more multiple trainers; (5) Plastic sights of a reduced size and a reticle projector were installed on the
guns of the Mark 3 trainers; (6) Arrangements were made for the installation of sighting steps for 20mm guns on synthetic training
devices; (7) Each new Mark 3 trainer installed should be set up so as to consist of a battery of one 3" mount and two 20mm guns; (8)
Plans were set up for teaching anti-aircraft fire of the 5"/38 using telescopic sights; (9) A miniature target plane would be
installed for tracking purposes; (10) A program of training for 60 enlisted men and 10 officers a day during a two day training
course was planned.187
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A forward step had come already on 1 February 1945 when all Armed Guard training was consolidated at Building 98, Receiving
Barracks. The U.S.S. Discoverer (ARS 3) and the U.S.S. ATR-69, or in their absence any available YMS, were operated
during alternate weeks for towing a surface target for merchant ship firing.188
The larger training program anticipated for the Seattle school was cut short by the end of the war. The school was
decommissioned on 20 August 1945 and personnel were transferred to the Naval Training School at Lake Union.189
Official figures of the Arming Merchant Ships Section in the Fleet Maintenance Division of Operations reveal that from 1 July 1943
to the end of training, 284 officers and 9,219 men received anti-aircraft gunnery training at Seattle.190
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Armed Guard Gunnery School, San Francisco (Treasure Island)
An excellent program of refresher and continuation training was developed at the Armed Guard Center at Treasure Island.
This training was designed to supplement the basic instruction received at San Diego; to turn men who had not received
basic training into accomplished Armed Guards, and to keep men who had been at sea abreast of the latest gunnery developments.
By March, 1942, a training program was underway at the Center in earnest. Com 12 on 11 January 1942 had directed the
establishment of an Armed Guard School and a Signal School at the Center. The Armed Guard School was to include gunnery
drills, small arms instruction, loading drill, pointing and training, sight setting, spotting, and machine gun instruction
for all Armed Guards. In addition they were to receive as much communication instruction as possible. The Signal School was
to make signalmen in the communication pool thoroughly familiar with their duties prior to their assignment to ships.191
The training program had very modest beginnings with a .30 cal. Machine gun loaned by the Section Base, but equipment
was added rapidly. Even before Com 12 directed the establishment of a school two 4"/50 loading machines had been obtained.
By early 1945 the school was well equipped with all weapons used by the Armed Guard and with sufficient
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synthetic training devices to accommodate about 200 men per hour. The gun shed covered 15,000 square feet of space.
Early instructors were officers awaiting assignment to ships. Some of the reserve officers who had been trained at Annapolis
and other midshipmen schools served in a dual capacity as students and instructors while at the Center. In the fall of 1942 the
training program was reorganized by the officer who had formerly served as the first Operations Officer at the Center while
waiting assignment to a ship. The entire program appears to have been rather flexible. There were programs for recruits trained
by the Center, others for veteran seamen undergoing refresher training, for seamen striking for petty officer rates, for petty
officers undergoing refresher training, for the merchant marine, continuation training for the officers, and refresher training for
officers. Again in the fall of 1943 the training was reorganized to place more emphasis on defense against aircraft. Officers
and men were sent to Point Montara for firing practice, beginning in April, 1942. A Field Instruction Unit was formed to furnish
the latest information to Armed Guards on ships in the stream which were not able to send crews in for refresher training because
of quick turn around or transportation limitations. BuPers formalized the training program at Treasure Island on 12 December
1944 by establishing the Naval Training School (Armed Guard Gunnery) with an officer-in-charge who reported to the commanding
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officer of the Armed Guard Center.192
The Armed Guard Center at Treasure Island had been designated as one of the three schools to give the 5"/38 maintenance course
for petty officers. By the end of 1944 more men were being trained in this course at Treasure Island than at any other school. This
training followed the Shelton pattern, with instruction not only in the 5"/38 but also in the operation and upkeep of the gasoline
or diesel generators which were frequently necessary to furnish power for the operation of the gun. The monthly quota for the
5"/38 maintenance course was set at 60 on 24 July 1944. In addition, 40 gunner's mates were given a general gun maintenance course
each month and 10 a week were sent to San Diego to act as leading petty officers until each had completed a month in training two
gun crews. These petty officers were then returned to the Center for further duty afloat.193
Near the end of 1944 the U.S.S. Dover was ordered to report to Com 12 for operation as a firing ship for the Armed Guard
Center at Treasure Island. Firing from this ship was at surface targets. Anti-aircraft firing continued to be conducted at Point
Montara.194 The
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official records of Op-414-D3 indicate that 84 officers and 3,370 enlisted men were given refresher training in
surface firing aboard the Dover in the San Francisco area.195
In an effort to standardize instruction in fire control, the use of telescopic sights on 5"/38 guns for antiaircraft defense,
and the whole program of refresher training for officers and men,196
an officer from Shelton visited Treasure Island from 16 to 20
April, 1945. This officer found the training excellent. The synthetic devices were adequate for training needs. The method of
controlling anti-aircraft fire of the 5"/38 equipped with telescopic sights was thoroughly discussed and arrangements were made
to include this instruction in the training program. At Point Montara sighting steps were provided for Armed Guards firing
the 20mm guns.197
The Visual Signal School trained strikers for signal duty and gave additional training to personnel from the communication school
at Los Angeles. The practice began of sending strikers to sea for training as signalmen. In May, 1943 refresher training for radiomen
was started. Additional radio refresher courses and training in equipment maintenance were added in the summer of 1944. All
communications officers and Armed Guard officers were required to attend the Wartime Merchant Ship Communication School at San
Francisco for a two day course every six months.198
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Classes were held in a variety of subjects in addition to gunnery. They included watch standing (night lookout training),
reporting, log keeping, hygiene, first aid, safety precautions, ammunition stowage (special attention was devoted to this problem
in the latter part of the war), fuse setting, care and maintenance of binoculars and goggles, seamanship, naval regulations,
customs and ethics of the service, and recognition. Practical training was given in small boat handling and the receipt of supplies
while anchored in the stream. Some men were given fire fighting training and chemical warfare instruction.199
It is not definitely
known how many men received some form of training at Treasure Island. Up to 30 June 1944 practically every officer and man had
received continuation training and this practice seems to have continued until the end of the war. By the middle of 1944 about 2,200
officers and 43,000 men had received continuation training. Definite figures for refresher training in anti-aircraft gunnery indicate
that 4,045 officers and 49,565 men received this training from the middle of 1943 to the end of the war.200
Hundreds of foreign seamen and petty officers were given training at the Center. These foreigners were mainly Russian, Norwegian,
and Dutch. Two gunners who spoke Russian served as interpreters for the
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Russians and translated the instruction booklets into Russian.201
Chinese Navy gunners were also trained with the aid of an interpreter and a special manual written in Chinese.202
It is interesting to note that in the spring of 1943 ConServPac complained of the poor showing of Armed Guards in target practice
in the Hawaiian area, but that by the fall of 1943 a decided improvement in target practice had been observed. No doubt the improved
training at the Center was in part responsible.203
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The Functions of the Armed Guard Center
Histories have been written by the three Armed Guard Centers established during World War II. While these histories
are not uniform in quality, two of them are acceptable documents written with something of the historical point of view.
By all odds the least satisfactory of the histories prepared by the Centers is that of the Armed Guard Center (Pacific).
It is written in a spirit of criticism of the Navy Department and from a biased viewpoint which hardly does justice to
the rather excellent record of the Center at Treasure Island. However, in view of what has already been written about
the Centers, it seems fitting that only the barest outline of the important developments and a broad discussion of their
functions should be attempted here.
It should be
understood at the outset that the Armed Guard Center was a new development which had few if any precedents in naval history.
It should also be recognized that these Centers were established in haste to meet pressing needs of personnel in the Armed
Guard Service. The best available facilities were utilized and expanded as necessity demanded. Great responsibility and much
room for the exercise of initiative and ingenuity were imposed upon the officers connected with these Centers. If material and
equipment were not always readily available in the early days of the war and if the personnel on hand for assignment were not
always adequate, the same situation prevailed throughout the Navy. Such situations were not caused by those who were directing
the process of arming merchant ships, but were inherent in the critical situation which
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the whole country faced with the
outbreak of a two ocean or global war. If any blame attaches to the Navy Department for the trial and tribulations of the Centers
in the months after Pearl Harbor, it is for the lack of long range planning and preparation in the months and years before the
outbreak of war. But the framework of the Neutrality Act was not conducive to planning and preparation to do the thing which
it prohibited.
The Armed Guard Center was charged with receiving officers and men from Armed Guard training schools and
with the assignment of these men on request of the Port Directors to armed merchant ships. The Center was the wartime home of the
Armed Guards from completion of training until they went to sea and upon their return from sea. It fed them, supplied them with
special clothing, books, and recreational equipment, paid them, gave additional training, furnished recreation, repaired their
teeth and gave medical care, and finally placed them aboard a ship. All Armed Guards were attached to a Center as long as they
remained in the Armed Guard Service. Their records were carried by the Centers and their pay accounts were handled by the Centers.
The Centers had important responsibilities in seeing that latest instructions were in the hands of Armed Guard officers. Matters
of Armed Guard discipline and leave were handled by the Centers. Personal and legal problems of the Armed Guards also received
attention.
The responsibility of the Center was not limited to those periods when Armed Guards were not at sea. It performed important
functions for
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officers and men when they were at sea. These functions included handling of mail, handling of war ballots, keeping
pay accounts, and transmitting important information to the Armed Guard.
Of all the functions performed by the Centers perhaps none was more important than handling Armed Guard mail. Letters from home were
perhaps the most important morale builders the men received as they manned the guns of the merchant ships. Prior to the fall of 1943
the Armed Guard Centers gave complete directory service on every piece of Armed Guard mail, for the only address which the Armed
Guard was allowed to use was the Center to which he was attached. Every effort was made to give Armed Guard mail the same prompt
service as was given mail for combatant ships of the Navy by use of Fleet Post Officers. In December, 1942, merchant marine mail
was given the same handling as for the Armed Guards and personnel of Navy combatant ships.
204 The Navy refused, however, to make the Armed Guard officer in any way responsible for the mail on merchant ships.
205 His only responsibility was to censor the mail of the Armed Guards under
his command and to see that it was mailed at the nearest naval activity. In November, 1943, a move was made which greatly improved the mail
service for Armed Guards, especially those operating in areas other than the Pacific. Armed Guards were allowed to use the name of the ship
on which they were assigned, to
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indicate in the address that they were Armed Guards
on that ship, and to designate appropriate Fleet Post Office, New York, New Orleans, or San Francisco, to which the mail should be
sent. In the event that there were two or more ships with the same name, the Armed Guards were allowed to designate the steamship
company.206 Every effort was made to improve the mail service.
Complaints, which had been frequent in the early part of the war,
rapidly declined as experience was gained in the most effective means of handling mail for many people who were constantly moving
from one part of the world to another. The Centers continued to play an important part in giving directory service when it was needed.
Furthermore, Armed Guards at the New York Center, and presumably at other Centers, were assigned to the Fleet Post Office around
Christmas in order to keep the mail from piling up.
Pay accounts of Armed Guard officers and men were carried by the Center to which they were attached, but a simple and effective
means was provided for making partial payments to meet personal needs while Armed Guards were on voyages to all parts of the world.
Armed Guards were issued partial pay cards which were valid for a year. New cards could be issued when these cards were filled up
or had expired. These cards were to be given the same handling as United States Treasury checks or currency. Any Navy, Marine, or
Coast Guard disbursing office could make payments to Armed Guards with partial pay cards. Masters of ships or other authorized
representatives of steamship companies could pay Armed Guards when 30 days had elapsed since the last payment and it was not
practicable for a Navy, Marine, or Coast Guard disbursing officer to make
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payments, provided such procedure was satisfactory to the
steamship company. In cases of urgent necessity Army finance officers and State Department representatives outside continental limits
of the United States could make payments to Armed Guards. BuSandA did not approve a CNO recommendation that masters be allowed to pay
Armed Guards as often as every 15 days.207 With certain exceptions,
Armed Guards were able to secure their pay promptly when they needed it. The greatest difficulties appear to have developed in the Gulf area,
notably at Houston, but every effort was made to remedy all difficulties which arose. A procedure was even worked out for making payments
when partial pay cards had been lost.208
The centers distributed post cards for the purpose of requesting a ballot to Armed Guard officers and these officers in turn
distributed the cards to all eligible naval and merchant marine personnel. Personnel
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were allowed to give the name of their ship as
part of their address provided the cards were delivered to the Armed Guard officer, who was directed to deposit them in a Fleet,
Army, or United States Post Office wherever possible, or if not possible with a Navy or State Department activity. Not until 22
June 1945 were Armed Guard officers relieved of all responsibility for attesting oaths of merchant seamen who were voting. This
step became necessary because Armed Guard officers were being removed from ships in areas where little danger of attack existed.
Armed Guard officers still facilitated the exercise of the franchise by naval personnel aboard merchant ships. The War Shipping
Administration called the handling of war ballots by Washington, the Centers, and the Armed Guard officers a "splendid job".
209
Commanding officers from the Centers and other key officers frequently visited other Centers and schools and the Arming Merchant
Ship Section in Washington. Efforts were made, for example, to have officers from the San Francisco Center come East every six
months. These visits were made in an effort to standardize the Armed Guard Service and to iron out inevitable difficulties
concerning procedure.
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Armed Guard Center (Atlantic)
The Naval Reserve Armory at 52nd Street and 1st Avenue, South Brooklyn, was commissioned on 20 May 1941 as a Navy Receiving Station.
It was used to accommodate the crews of British vessels undergoing repairs in local shipyards. On 18 November 1941 the first Armed
Guard officers and men arrived from Little Creek, Virginia, for on 10 November the Receiving Station had been designated by BuNav
as the Armed Guard Center for the Atlantic Coast.210
The Center was placed under the direct command of the officer assigned to
command the Receiving Station and was operated under general direction of Com 3.
The story of the Armed Guard Center (Atlantic) is one of rapid expansion until it became one of the largest military commands in
the Navy. Matters ran on a day-to-day and month-to-month basis, but no ship ever missed a sailing date for lack of an Armed Guard
crew. In the early days the Center even trained 500 men who had been sent direct from a recruiting station, giving them three weeks
of recruit training and three weeks of Armed Guard training. These men made up 30 per cent of the gun crews on many ships which
were sent into dangerous areas. Other recruits received similar training later.
The Center operated around the clock. Calls for gun crews could come at any time of day or night. Other Navy personnel were for
a time
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quartered at the Center in addition to Armed Guards. Some British personnel were at the Center until late in 1942. Not
until October, 1942 was the designation Armed Guard Center (Atlantic) given to the station, thus indicating that it should
concentrate only on the Armed Guard.
Figures for March 1944 indicate the enormous activity at the Center. With 47,000 men and 2,800 officers attached, the Disbursing
Office paid out over two million dollars a month. Leave papers were written for about 1,000 men a week. Nearly 5,000 men were fed
each day. About 1,800 men were advanced in rating each month out of 2,500 taking examinations. Special clothing and small stores
issued each month amounted to $750,000 and returned special clothing to $225,000. About 1,000 disciplinary cases were handled
each month. The ship's service store served from 6,000 to 8,000 men a day and monthly receipts were more than $130,000, a figure
which increased to $266,000 for December, 1944. Over 1,100 personnel ran this mammoth station. New drafts were being received each
week from Shelton and Gulfport, running as high as 465 men. Training was given on the 5"/38, the 4"/50, the 3"/50, and on the
20 mm gun, and in first aid, recognition, and boat handling, and signaling. A polaroid trainer, a night vision room, and loading
machines were also used in training. Instruction was also given in small arms and on the many duties and responsibilities of Armed
Guard officers. But the training program at the Center never became as important as that at the other Centers because of the usually
short periods of time at which men were at the Center. Figures for November would be even more
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impressive, except that there had
been a marked reduction in administrative personnel to 885. By 1 November 59,062 officers and men were attached to the Center. This
represented the peak in the Center's activity. A steady decline set in until only 45,089 officers and men were attached on 1 June
1945. But in the spring of 1945 crews of Navy ships not yet in commission were assigned to the Center for housing and feeding.
By the middle of 1945 the process of shifting battle tried veterans of the war in the Atlantic and Mediterranean to the Centers at
New Orleans and Treasure island was well under way. Plans were developed to use these men in the coming battle of the Pacific. No
longer did the Center at New York have to fit out hundreds of ships with full crews of Armed Guards. Merchant ships sailing from
Atlantic ports carried a maintenance crew of a gunner's mate and a seamen first class. Pools had been established at various
strategic points in the world from which full Armed Guard crews could be drawn if the ships were sent into combat areas. The Armed
Guard Center (Atlantic) supplied personnel for the very vital pool at Port Said.
Some indication of the intimate contact the Center had with the realities of war comes from the losses of personnel attached. To
1 June 1945 some 505 ships carrying Armed Guards from the Center had been sunk. Personnel losses included 76 officers and 1,330
men. Survivors from sinkings numbered 412 officers and 7,679 men.
What of the physical plant which took care of the needs of such a large number of men? The most important building was, of course,
the
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Armory. On the drill deck, called "The Jungle", 1,763 men could sleep after a fashion in triple decked bunks. In July, 1942
the U. S. S. Newton was obtained for use as a barracks for 600 men and it was later used for a time as a brig. Barracks B,
completed in the summer of 1943, had a bunk capacity of 3,200. Building A, a three story building, ran across the entire front of
the Armory and was used for offices, ship's service, recreational facilities, class rooms, disbursing, sick bay, muster area, and
barracks. Additions were made to the Armory itself, including a penthouse atop the west end. A gun shed was built late in 1942
and a Polaroid Trainer Building in late 1943. Other buildings acquired included a garbage disposal building, a storehouse, a
warehouse and garage. During emergencies the Receiving Barracks at Flushing Avenue and the Lido Beach Receiving Station were used
to accommodate personnel. At times 1,600 men were berthed off the station. Additional barracks space was secured in the fall of
1943 when a car barn on 52d Street between 1st and 2d Avenues was leased. When this barracks was completed, the Central could
house more than 6,000 men on station. In November, 1942 the station had come under the Navy Yard, New York for repair and
maintenance purposes. Not until 1945 was the Newton taken out of service. It had never been considered absolutely safe.
Many officers waiting assignment were quartered at the Henry Hudson Hotel. Transportation facilities included 44 trucks and
automobiles and 5 motor boats. The American Women's Voluntary Service was of great help in the transportation problem. The Red
Cross and the Army Ambulance Corps
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furnished ambulance service. The Palisades Interstate Park Commission lent the Huntington
Estate at Haverstraw for use as a rest camp. After 2 September 1944 men were sent to a rest camp at Delant, Florida and the use
of Haverstraw was discontinued because of insurmountable engineering problems, especially the water supply. Recreation facilities
also existed on the large drill ground and on the main deck of the Armory. Religious services were held on the main deck each
Sunday, and a chapel was used for smaller affairs and confessions. The Center published its own newspaper, "The Pointer", every
two weeks. Free tailor, barber, and laundry service was furnished to all hands, except that officers paid for their laundry.
211
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Armed Guard Center (Gulf)
The Armed Guard Center at New Orleans was established on 2 March 1942 as a separate activity under the Receiving Station at Algiers.
Not until 23 September 1944 did it become a subordinate command of the Naval Repair Base with a commanding officer instead of an
officer-in-charge. By August, 1943 the Center consisted of an administration building and four barracks capable of housing 1,500
men. When the Center reached the peak of its activity in March, 1945 about 16,000 men were at sea and 4,000 awaiting assignment.
Armed Guards were occupying four permanent and thirty temporary barracks.
The period following the surrender of Germany saw continued activity at the Center as men were assigned to ships bound for the
Pacific. There was a decline in the pool of men awaiting assignment.
By all odds the greatest and most distinctive contribution of the Center to the Armed Guard Service came from its very fine training
program which is discussed elsewhere. The Center was a well run activity which handled the problems of the Armed Guards quietly and
effectively and in a very military manner. The 38 buildings which formed the Center were kept neat and the grounds were constantly
improved.
Prior to the disestablishment of the Center on 1 April 1946 about 110,000 men were placed on ships from New Orleans. In December,
1944 alone 250 officers and 5,000 enlisted men were assigned or detached. At times the monthly pay roll exceeded $600,000.
212
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Armed Guard Center (Pacific)
The Armed Guard Center at Treasure Island was established by Com 12 on 19 December 1941 in compliance with a BuNav Directive of 15
November. It was the intention of the Navy Department that the Center should perform the same functions performed by the other
Centers, no more and no less. But the District General Order No. 32-41 which created the Center contained mention of services with
regard to supplies and equipment which were the source of most of the Center's troubles and which the Center was neither equipped
nor intended to handle. The Center was originally placed under an officer-in-charge, who was responsible to the commanding officer
of the Section Base. Correspondence also went through Commander Patrol Force before it reached Com 12. In January, 1942 the quarters
for the Center were set up in Building N, and on 30 May in its permanent location in Barracks D. On 2 June 1942 the Center was
designated as a command with a commanding officer.
In spite of the many difficulties, misunderstandings, jealousies, rivalries and confusion, including the alleged stupidity of most
people in Washington, which the historian of the Center describes so vividly, the Armed Guard Center at Treasure Island does not
appear to have had greater difficulties that other Centers with its basic mission to take care of Armed Guard personnel. Nor does
the job which the Center did in this regard appear to have been much better or much worse that that done by the other Centers. It
is the proud boast of the Center that no ship was ever delayed for lack of a gun crew even though many of the
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early Armed Guards were recruits who had been quickly trained by the Center.
Like other Centers the Treasure Island command constantly expanded its facilities. During the summer of 1943 the bunk capacity was
increased to 1,900. In the summer of 1944 the Center had berthing facilities for 4,875 enlisted men, adequate Wave facilities, and
increased office and storage space. By the end of the war the Center could berth 5,671 men in four buildings. The peak figure for
personnel attached to the Center was reached on 28 June 1945 when 46,817 officers, men, and Waves were attached, of which 2,111
were officers. The peak for officers was reached on 22 August when 2,339 were attached. On 30 August personnel from the Center
were aboard 2,106 vessels for duty in gunnery, communications, and transport administration.
The Armed Guard Center was never intended to have material functions other than with regard to such items as special protective
clothing, recreational equipment, and a few simple shipboard training devices. The material responsibilities rested with the Port
Directors. Inspection and repair of defense installations were likewise arranged by the Port Directors and the Assistant Industrial
Managers. But at San Francisco the Port Director did not do the job which CNO directives required him to do. Both material and repair
functions were shifted over to the Center. It is not surprising that the story is one of constant confusion, frequent misunderstandings,
and that the Center performed these various tasks with the greatest of difficulty. Perhaps the fault lies squarely
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on the shoulders of
the Port Director or perhaps the Center is equally to blame for assuming diverse functions which it was not equipped to perform. Perhaps
the fault lies in the general tendency which appears to have existed on the West Coast to disregard Navy Department directives. It is
also true that the Navy Department did not crack the whip to bring the San Francisco set up into line with approved procedures elsewhere.
The main interest of the Arming Merchant Ship Section in Operations during the early years of the war was the Atlantic and Mediterranean,
for it was here that the Armed Guard was engaged in a life and death struggle with the enemy. Little action was experienced in the Pacific
prior to the invasion of the Mariannas, and not until the Philippines invasion did the Armed Guard receive its full baptism by fire in
the Pacific. Washington was not neglecting the Pacific area. It sent out very clear directive to the Armed Guard Center (Pacific) -- the
same directives which went to other Centers. Unfortunately, many of these directives were not followed. It also brought in officers from
the Center for conferences and visits to other activities in an effort to promote uniformity.
The Center at Treasure Island assumed responsibility for supplying Armed Guards with material. The monthly turnover in general supplies
ran as high as $250,000. In addition the Center assumed large responsibilities for inspection and repair of ordnance. In short, the Center
appears to have done just about everything except place ammunition on board merchant ships and carry out the initial installation of guns.
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It is not surprising that there was constant friction with the Assistant Industrial Manager that the Center was forced to resort to all
kinds of expedients in order to get the job done. After all, supplying spare parts for naval ordnance is a specialized job. To the credit
of the Center is the fact that it got the job done. But the Center was certainly doing much more than it was established to do and its
extra tasks were probably accomplished in the most difficult manner possible because of lack of experienced and of trained specialists
in material and ordnance.
The Center even took over the repair of all sound powered telephones. There was certainly no lack of initiative. When contractors were
unable to supply convoy lights men from the Center were employed to assemble the lights. A repair service was established for diesel
generators used in operating the 5"/38 guns.
On one of the responsibilities which Centers were expected to assume, the Pacific Center was slow to come in line with approved practice
elsewhere. This concerned the issue of winter clothing. The procedure finally adopted at Brooklyn and New Orleans was to issue the special
clothing to each Armed Guard, accepting the man's chit. Treasure Island stubbornly insisted that the clothing should be issued to the Armed
Guard officer. This meant that clothing often did not fit the individual. Men who were transferred to another ship might find themselves in
zero weather with no winter clothing. CNO directed the Pacific Center to follow the East Coast system of issue on 31 July 1944 and the
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Center complied in April, 1945.
During the 46 month period from 1 January 1942 to 1 November 1945 the Center paid $69,468,800 to personnel.
In addition to its many Armed Guard duties the Center became heavily involved in the Navy Chartered Transport Pool. While the personnel in
the pool were eventually turned over to the Training Center at Treasure Island for administration, their pay accounts were carried by the
Armed Guard Center and the Center was expected to issue partial pay cards. But according to BuSandA regulations the partial pay cards could
only be issued to Armed Guards. The question of authority and responsibilities of the Center with regard to this pool appears to have been
the source of endless confusion and bickering, if we may accept the official history of the Center.
Prior to the establishment of the Armed Guard Inspection Service, inspections were made by the Center, the Port Director's office, and by
the Assistant Industrial Manager. It appears that there were too many inspectors during the early part of the war. After the establishment
of the Armed Guard Inspection Service early in 1944 the Center discontinued its official inspections, but later established a Field
Instruction Unit which gave instruction to Armed Guard on Ships making quick turn arounds and also served as an inspection unit for the
Center. Thus inspections passed largely into the hands of the Port Director, but material and repairs remained in the hands of the Center.
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A number of publications were issued by the Center. In fact, there was constant danger that these publications would include doctrines and
procedures not sanctioned for the Armed Guard Service. The Manual for Armed Guard Officers was intended to supplement the excellent
instruction books issued by the Chief of Naval Operations. Bulletins called Argupacs were issued to Armed Guard officers after the
summer of 1943. The Center also issued Hints on Surface Fire Control, Hints on Eyeshooting, AA Defense of Merchant Ships, and
Recreation at Sea. Pamphlets were issued on lubricants and sound-powered telephones; also issued were relative bearing and approach
angle cards, check off lists for armament lubrication and maintenance, and safety precautions for all guns and magazines. Not until rather
late in the war did CNO require submission of all publications on fire control for approval before issue.
In conclusion, it is suggested that the Armed Guard Center (Pacific) did a good job, but its history furnishes one of the best examples of
the trials and tribulations which can come when an activity is operating outside the framework laid down by those who are responsible for
establishing the broad policies and procedures for the Navy Establishment. Subordinate commands are too often unaware of the careful
planning and analysis of all angles of questions which go into directives issued by CNO and the Material Bureaus. Difficulties are often
avoided if subordinate commands comply with the letter and spirit of these directives. Confusion and trouble result when these directives
are disregarded. In the case of the Armed Guard Center (Pacific), most of
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the confusion and worry came because the Port Director at San
Francisco was not complying with CNO directives and the Center was attempting to go far beyond its expected functions. Such situations do
not lose wars as long as somebody does the job. But they do lead to grey hairs and unjust recriminations in official histories.
213
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Port Directors and the Armed Guard Program
The Port Directors played a vital role in the Armed Guard program. They made the arrangements with the Maritime Commission for placing
guns and other defense installations on ships and with the Centers for supplying Armed Guards. It was their responsibility to see that
all Armed Guard equipment, defensive ammunition, and all spare parts for ordnance were placed on board. They issued winter clothing
when the Centers failed to do so and winter clothing was needed. The inspection of the Armed Guards and of defense installations came
under the Port Directors and they were responsible for seeing that all repairs to defensive equipment were made by working parties, or
by the Industrial Managers of the Maritime Commission. For all practical purposes they served as the personal agents of the Arming Merchant
Ship Section in the Fleet Maintenance Division of Operations. They brought unsatisfactory messing conditions to the attention of the master,
owner, or operator. They forwarded latest instructions to Armed Guards and could take Armed Guards off ships when they were guilty of serious
breeches of discipline. In short, they made all of the necessary arrangements to insure that ships were ready to defend themselves before
they left port and that defensive equipment was in good condition upon return of the ships to port. Theirs was a vast responsibility. They
were undoubtedly the most important agents in the execution of the
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program.214 With the exception of San Francisco, the Port Directors
assumed their responsibilities and did a good job. It has already been indicated that the Center at Treasure Island was burdened with the
responsibilities which the Port Director at San Francisco was expected to perform.
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Armed Guard Pools
While Armed Guards were generally placed aboard ships in continental United States ports, the practice of establishing pools of Armed Guards
in various ports of the world began to develop very early in the war. All Armed Guards in pools, remained attached to the Armed Guard Center
which had sent them out. The pools were made up mostly of personnel who were survivors or who had been taken off ships returning to the
United States, but a few officers and men were sent out from the Centers in special cases. Each pool had an officer-in-charge who came under
the command of the Area Commander. Assignments to merchant ships were handled by the Area Commander or his service force, which normally handled
personnel for the area. The pools grew to meet the needs of the service. They varied widely in size and were constantly increasing and
decreasing as those needs changed.
The first pool established was that at Londonderry. During the course of the war other pools were established at Antwerp, Oran, Port Said,
Melbourne, Fremantle, Sydney, Brisbane, Milne Bay (later moved to Samar), Hollandia (later moved to Manila), Finschaven (later moved to Manus),
Subic Bay, Ulithi, Saipan, Pearl Harbor, and Balboa. By all odds the two most important pools were those at Port Said and Balboa. Ships with
a maintenance crew or with and Area 2 crew of 9 men could be readily brought up to Area 1-A requirements when they passed through the Panama
and Suez canals. Repair parties were attached to the pools at Milne Bay and Hollandia. In addition to foreign pools, the Center at
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Treasure
Island kept small pools at San Pedro and Seattle and Brooklyn kept a small pool at Norfolk.
The pools
performed three main functions. They allowed rotation of crews on shuttle runs. They made it easy to add the Area 1-A equipment to ships
which had been operating with maintenance or reduced crews. They furnished replacements for crew members removed for hospitalization and
disciplinary action.215
Directions were given on 17 November 1944 to increase the pool at Pearl Harbor by 200 men and to increase the pool at Balboa by 100 men
in preparation for increasing Area 2 crews to Area 1-A.216
But by January, 1945 members of the pool at Pearl Harbor were assigned to various activities at the naval base and were assigned to digging
ditches and other similar work. The men were collected and arrangements were made to quarter them at the Armed Guard Pool.
217
The recommendation of the Commanding Officer Armed Guard Center (Pacific) that an officer-in-charge of all pools in the Southwest Pacific
be designated with responsibilities for inspection and coordinating these activities was disapproved by Op-23L.
218 Likewise, the proposal to place an officer-in-charge for all Pacific Armed Guard
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Pools was disapproved.219 Approval was given to designate an officer
at the Center to serve as Armed Guard Liaison Officer (Pacific) Armed Guard Pools.220
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The Mission of the Armed Guard
The Armed Guards had only one main mission -- to defend merchant ships and transports from enemy air, surface, and submarine attacks. Their
primary duties, therefore, were watch standing and manning guns and maintenance of guns and defensive equipments. They had nothing to do with
running the merchant ships although they greatly assisted at times in fighting fires, and in salvage operations, especially when the merchant
seamen became panicky or abandoned ship. We shall see in the following chapter that Armed Guards assumed some responsibilities with regard
to defense installations other than guns, but such duties were never to interfere with manning the guns. Armed Guards were expected to live up
to the highest standards and traditions of the Navy. The officer was a commanding officer of a separate and distinct command and he was entrusted
not only with the welfare and safety of his men but with all matters concerning opening fire in defense of the ship, with maintenance of ordnance
and ammunition, and with calling attention to necessary repairs.
Standard doctrine was that Armed Guards should open fire in the direction of an attacking submarine, even if the enemy could not be seen. They
were to open fire on any unidentified plane outside the Western Hemisphere which flew within 1,500 yards of the ship or flew directly towards
the ship. Armed Guards could only abandon ship when sinking was imminent and gun fire impossible.
Upon the Armed Guard officer and his petty officers rested the
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heavy responsibility of instructing the merchant seamen in gunnery and with
converting his own gun crew and the merchant seamen into an effective combat team. An allowance of 60 rounds of 20 mm ammunition was allowed
for target practice every 60 days and 25 target balloons a year were supplied to each ship.221
For 3", 4", and 5" guns an allowance of five rounds was provided every 60 days. Machine guns were tested daily ay dawn by a short burst of
fire while in the zone of enemy aircraft operations.222
Armed Guards stood watches at the heavy guns. Two men were on lookout duty at each gun 3" or larger. A normal 24 man gun crew had 8 men on
watch at all times while at sea, two men at the stern gun, two men at the forward gun, and a petty officer and three men stationed in the
vicinity of the bridge. The petty officer was in charge of the watch and did not stand lookout duty. The three men in the vicinity of the
bridge were to stand by and relieve the lookouts. No more than two hours steady lookout duty for submarines or one hour steady lookout duty
for aircraft was allowed before a relief was supplied. Where aircraft attack was possible half the gun crew were on watch. One man was
required to be at each machine gun in such cases, but the merchant seamen were supposed to furnish half of the watch at the machine guns.
Men were on watch for four hours, but the watch was dogged during the
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evening watch on Saturday. Normally each Armed Guard was on watch for
8 hours of each 24 hour period while at sea, but when attack was suspected half of the gun crew were on watch and half were off watch. All
Armed Guards went to general quarters manning all guns for about one hour at dawn and sunset when at sea. Submarine and air attacks were
most likely to occur at dawn or dusk. The normal sea watch was maintained while ships were anchored in open roadsteads. In United States
ports one third of the Armed Guard crew was required to be aboard at all times and two men were normally on watch while in port in this
country. One man performed sentry duty and another man had a roving watch. Both men on watch were protecting naval equipment from sabotage
and theft.223 Watch standing in foreign ports was governed by local
conditions. Often some of the heaviest action of the war took place while ships were anchored in foreign ports.
The life of the Armed Guard was a busy one. He had to keep his own quarters and clothing in good shape. He went to general quarters at
least twice a day while at sea. His watches ran from eight to 12 hours, depending on conditions. He spent much time cleaning and
lubricating guns and performing the many duties necessary to maintain Navy equipment at sea. Training and study for advancement added
to his full day. But he had a little time for reading books
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supplied by the Navy and for listening to phonograph records and playing games.
When nothing happened and the weather was good his life was not too hard. But when the weather was bad life was not so pleasant and when
enemy attacks were pressed for long periods of time he might remain at his guns until completely exhausted and longer. His was the most
dangerous job in the United States Navy in certain areas in the early part of the war. But near the end of the war he generally had the
best duty afloat. At any rate, he received no overtime. Where necessary he stayed at general quarters around the clock. His was not the
privilege of arranging for overtime pay before going to his duty station. He could not even receive extra pay when he performed services
in unloading cargo in times of great urgency at advance bases when the authority of the senior naval officer present was given for him to
perform this work. He could not receive gifts from his better paid companions in the merchant marine. He fought and did his duty as a Navy
man and in this respect his lot was very similar to that of his fellow countrymen on the Navy escort vessels, except that they had more
guns and faster ships, and a full complement of naval personnel aboard.
Every effort was made by Op-23L to prevent the Armed Guard from assuming duties which would interfere with the defense of the ship or which
were proper functions of the master and his merchant crew. All attempts to involve Armed Guards in gangway watches so as to act as a police
force for merchant seamen were strongly resisted. Discipline
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of the merchant crew was no responsibility of the Armed Guard.224 Op-23L also
opposed a requirement of the Naval Transportation Service that Armed Guard officers be required to keep elaborate cargo logs. Op-39 replied
that its directive, which had not been cleared with Op-23L, required that the Armed Guard officer only secure the information from the
master of the rate of discharge of cargo.225 Armed Guards were not to serve
as cargo hold watchmen nor to work in cargo holds. At advance bases they might be used in emergencies to discharge essential cargo, but only when
directed by the senior naval officer present. In such cases they could only be used on deck near their guns.
226
Precautions were taken to ensure that Armed Guard officers on Army ships would have adequate authority to carry out all duties in defending
the ship. The Armed Guard officer should be of equal rank or senior in rank to the Commander of Troops and the Communication Liaison
officer.227 Navy Chartered Transports sailing from the West Coast
presented special problems and led to the creation of Commanding officers of Naval Armed Guards and Troops who had authority over all military
personnel and all civilian passengers aboard. Armed Guard
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officers with much duty were spotted in rank for these responsible jobs. The Commanding Officer of Troops executed orders from the Naval
Commanding Officer. If senior to the Navy Officer he could appoint a representative to serve during the voyage.
228
--145--
The Armed Guard Inspection Service
One of the first acts of the newly created Arming Merchant Ships Section in Operations was to institute the inspection of armament on merchant
ships on 31 January 1942. The Port Directors were to make the inspections and minor repairs.229
To carry out this directive some 45 O-V(S) officers were eventually assigned to the various Port Directors' offices. Directions were
given on 10 February that the inspection service should be a function of the District Material Officers in cooperation with the Port
Directors230, but in actual practice the Port Director
assumed most of the responsibility.
On 22 October 1943 CNO directed the assignment of 40 officers with at least a year of Armed Guard sea experience to Port Directors in 23
ports. This service was immediately dubbed "AGIS". These officers were not to displace the O-V(S) officers who acted in the capacity of
ordnance specialists. The new inspectors were to inspect personnel as well as defense equipment. It was realized at the time that more
of the inspectors would probably be needed and,231 in fact, many
more were assigned before the end of the war.
The duties of the Armed Guard inspectors were carefully outlined in a CNO letter of 14 January 1944. The AGIS officers were
--146--
to board every United States and allied flag merchant vessel and transport and were to inspect all guns, gun foundations, splinter protection,
magazines, ammunition hoists, Armed Guard quarters, Armed Guard messing facilities, darkening ship arrangements, and other naval defense
equipment. In addition they were to assist the Armed Guard officers with their many problems. One of their functions was to take the new
Armed Guard officer aboard outbound merchant ships, to introduce him to the master and the officers, and to acquaint him with all defense
equipment on the ship. The AGIS officer also acquainted the Armed Guard officer with all essential information concerning facilities in the
port for Armed Guard and their equipment. Among special ordnance problems which received the attention of the AGIS officer in ports where
there were no O-V(S) officers to conduct inspections and make repairs were failure of 3"/50 guns to train freely and lack of proper sights.
Many 20 mm guns lacked dip pots and spare barrel containers and on a large number the splinter shield had been lowered to clear the vision
when the gun was depressed. The trunnion elevating gear on many 20 mm guns required careful checking. The training and elevating gear on a
number of old 4" and 5" guns was badly worn and either required adjustment or replacement. Splinter protection on all guns had to be checked
to see that there was no danger of firing into the protection and that it was supplied with the required freeing ports. Some 20 mm guns did
not have the proper sighting steps. All ready service boxes were inspected to see
--147--
that they had the proper hinges and that the axis of all
ammunition was parallel to the fore and aft center line of the ship. Canvas awnings were to be over all ready service boxes to protect them
from the direct rays of the sun. The sprinkler system for ammunition magazines received special attention. Armed Guard officers and petty
officers were required to conduct an actual test under the observation of the AGIS officer. General Alarm Bells and switches for sounding
the general alarm were checked.232 From time to time the duties of
AGIS officers were increased by CNO directives. On 6 March 1944 they were directed to inspect all generators supplying current to 5"/38
guns.233 On 4 July spot inspections were ruled out. The Armed Guard
officer should be advised of the time of inspection so that he could be on board and ready for the inspection. At this time AGIS officers
were directed to check on the failure to install an Ordnance Storeroom and Armory with the view of arranging for the installation where
lacking.234 On 3 February 1945 they were directed to examine the
hydrogen bottle clamps in view of the fact that some hydrogen bottles had broken adrift in rough weather.
235
Responsibilities imposed on AGIS officers for inspection of material on ships operating in Area 3 or Area 2-B while in a maintenance
--148--
status became very great. They checked all armament and equipment to see that the ship was in every sense ready in a material way for Area 1-A duty.
It was their responsibility to see that all equipment was in proper condition before the Armed Guard officer was detached and to see that the
maintenance crew were performing their duties in a satisfactory manner.236
It was necessary to expand the number of officers attached to the
AGIS, especially with the assumption of these new responsibilities. It was also necessary to furnish working parties from the Port Director's
office to provide security watches over ammunition while vessels were under repair, to assist in the fitting out of new construction armed
merchant vessels, the storage of ammunition there on, and the replacement of ammunition on vessels in a maintenance status. These working
parties could undertake maintenance work while the vessel was in port and act as reliefs for maintenance personnel on leave.
237 One of the
duties of the AGIS officers late in the war was to see that no Armed Guard gear was stowed in the forward part of the ship where there was
great danger of damage from sea water, especially in heavy seas.238
Of great importance were the inspections of Armed Guard establishments by officers from Op-23L. These officers made frequent visits to
Schools and Centers in connection with the standardization of training
--149--
and procedures. They also visited the Port Directors in connection
with the proper functioning of the Armed Guard program, especially the inspection service. These visits were valuable in standardizing all
aspects of the Armed Guard service, in correcting mistakes, and in keeping the Arming Merchant Ship Section informed in detail of what was
being done. They formed a valuable supplement to the numerous visits by Center and School officers in other Centers and Schools and to
Washington.
--150--
Table of Contents **
Previous Chapter (1) *
Next Chapter (3)
Footnotes
1.
BuPers ltr., Pers-635-JS, 16 Feb. 1943.
2.
See Appendix I.
3.
See Appendix II.
4.
BuNav rest. Ltr., Nav-61-RS Qs1/P16-1(786), 17 Nov. 1941.
5.
Information concerning the training of Naval Reserves for ordinance and
gunnery duties can be found in enclosures to Naval Academy ltr., ser.
235063, 18 Sept. 1945.
6.
CNO conf. ltr., ser. 0104122, 25 Sept. 1941.
7.
CNO conf. ltr., ser. 0119622, 3 Nov. 1941.
8.
BuNav rest. ltr., Nav-61-RS QS1/P16-1(786), 17 Nov. 1941.
9.
The Armed Guard Pointer, 23 Nov. 1944.
10.
CNO conf. ltr., ser. 0145622, 22 Dec. 1941.
11.
CNO conf. disp., 171830, 17 Jan. 1942.
12.
VCNO conf. ltr., ser. 0265523, 11 Aug. 1942.
13.
CNO conf. ltr., ser. 017238, 19 Jan. 1942; JAG conf. ltr., ser. 017238, 28
Jan. 1942.
14.
CNO rest. ltr., ser. 29223, 12 Feb. 1942.
15.
Rest. memo., Op-23 to CNO, 16 Feb. 1942; CNO conf. disp., 162027, 17 Feb.
1942.
16.
Rest. ltr., CNO to BuNav, Ser. 31823, 17 Feb. 1942.
17.
CNO rest. ltr., ser. 38923, 21 Feb. 1942.
18.
VCNO rest. ltr., ser. 147323-M, 19 May 1942; BuPers rest. ltr., Pers-61-JAT
P17-2/MM(3877), 29 May 1942.
19.
CNO rest. disp., 271455, 27 Feb. 1942.
20.
Op-23L memo. for File, 7 March 1942.
21.
Op-23L memo. for File, 11 March 1942.
22.
Op-23L memos. for File, 9 and 11 March 1942.
23.
Rest. ltr., VCNO to BuNav, ser. 90423, 6 April 1942.
24.
Rest. memo, Op-23L for Op-23, 14 May 1942.
25.
VCNO conf. ltr., ser. 0161623, 16 May 1942; BuPers rest. ltr., Pers-1411-EW,
18 May 1942; VCNO conf. ltr., ser. 0180123, 1 June 1942; BuPers conf. ltr.,
Pers-1411-DW P/16-5(C) (986), 14 June 1942.
26.
BuPers conf. ltr., Pers-1411-DW P/16-5(C) (986), 14 June 1942; BuPers rest.
ltr., Pers-123dMjj, 13 Jan. 1944.
27.
Rest. ltr., Com 3 (Port Director) to VCNO, P16-5/PD9(2-0) FGR:EBMcK; alk, 25
July 1942; BuPers rest. ltr., Pers 635-owc, 28 July 1942.
28.
Op-23L rest. memo. for File, 13 July 1942.
29.
Op-23L rest. memo. for File, 29 July 1942, VCNO conf. disp., 241940, 24 Aug.
1942.
30.
Rest. ltr., VCNO to BuPers, ser. 282223, 24 Aug. 1942. Directions were
given on 7 November to place officers on Area 2 ships with six or more men
in their gun crews, but Area 1 ships were still to have priority. VCNO
conf. disp., 071825, 7 Nov. 1942.
31.
CominCh rest. ltr., ser. 3350, 3 Sept. 1942.
32.
CominCh ltr., ser. 3451, 11 Sept. 1942.
33.
BuPers ltr., Pers-1411-DW P16-5(C) (2475), 3 Sept. 1942; BuPers ltr.,
Pers-635-HW P16-5(C)(2475), 5 Sept. 1942; BuPers ltr., Pers-67-Mt
P17-2/MM(3937), 5 Nov. 1942.
34.
VCNO conf. ltr., ser. 0508723, 9 Dec. 1942.
35.
VCNO rest. ltr., ser. 476123, 3 Dec. 1942.
36.
Op-23L rest. memo., 15 Dec. 1942.
37.
Op-23L memo. for File, 7 Jan. 1943; VCNO rest. ltr., ser. 4423, 13 Jan.
1943.
38.
Op-23L memo. for File, 28 Jan. 1943.
39.
Op-23L rest. memo. For File, 5 Feb. 1943.
40.
BuPers memo., P-2423a-mb, 20 Feb. 1943; Op-23L rest. memo. For File, 25 Feb.
1943. Pencil note on Armed Guard Center requirements for March 8, 1943.
For a time officers were being trained at the rate of 360 to 390 a month.
Conversation with Capt. Cleave, 25 April 1946.
41.
Rest. memo., Op-23 to Assistant CNO, 18 Jan. 1943.
42.
BuPers ltr., Pers-6-LE P16-5(C), 12 March 1943.
43.
BuPers ltr., PERS-3131-VEP, 3 April 1943. Policy had been set for
detachment of D-V(G) officers by BuPers ltr., Pers-31-VM NM22/P16-1(160), 20
Oct. 1942.
44.
BuPers ltr., Pers-313-NM, 25 April 1943.
45.
Port Director NTS Tampa conf. ltr., ser. 420, 9 Feb. 1943.
46.
VCNO conf. ltr., ser. 065223, 20 Feb. 1943.
47.
Ltr., Joseph Curran to SecNav, 11 Feb. 1943.
48.
Conf. ltr., SecNav to Admiral Land, Ser. 0195023, 15 May 1943.
49.
VCNO conf. ltr., ser. 0212423, 26 May 1943; VCNO conf. ltr., ser. 0255823,
22 June 1943; VCNO conf. ltr., ser. 0432623, 22 Sept. 1943; VCNO conf. ltr.,
ser. 0436123, 25 Sept. 1943; BuPers conf. ltr., P16-5(C), 1 Nov. 1943.
50.
BuPers memo., Pers-635-HB, 2 June 1943.
51.
Op-23L rest. memo. for File, 15 June 1943.
52.
VCNO rest. ltr., ser. 179723, 28 June 1943.
53.
Port Director NTS 13nd ltr., ser. 673, 3 Dec. 1943.
54.
Op-23L rest. memo. for File, 11 Aug. 1943.
55.
Rest. ltr., VCNO to BuPers, ser. 223923, 13 Aug. 1943.
56.
Op-23L rest. memo for File, 16 Aug. 1943; Operating Force Plan for the
Fiscal Year 1945, approved by SecNav on 20 Aug. 1943 (conf.)
57.
Op-23L rest. memo. for File, 23 July 1943.
58.
Op-23L conf. memo. for File (Annual Report fiscal year 1944) 21 July 1944.
59.
Op-23L conf. memo. for File (Annual Report fiscal year 1945) 25 July 1945.
60.
Op-23L rest. memo. for File, 19 Aug. 1943.
61.
Commandant Navy yard Washington ltr., NY5/NC17(251), 24 Sept. 1943; BuPers
ltr., Pers-423d-rf, 16 Nov. 1943; Op-23L pencil note.
62.
See Naval Liaison Officer, Colombo conf. ltr., ser. 100-43, 3 Oct. 1943.
63.
Op-23L rest. memo. for File, 29 Oct. 1943.
64.
Rest. memo., Op-23L for Op-23, ser. 321323, 10 Nov. 1943.
65.
CNO conf. ltr., ser. 0549923, 13 Nov. 1943.
66.
CNO conf. ltr., ser. 0598623, 6 Dec. 1943. This estimate did not include
the 15 per cent allowance for contingencies which should be added to the
above figure.
67.
Op-23L conf. memos. for File, 13 Nov. 1943.
68.
Op-23L rest, memos. for File, 1 and 18 Nov. 1943.
69.
Op-23L rest, memo. for File, 8 Dec. 1943.
70.
Op-23L rest. memo. for File 1 Jan. 1944; BuPers rest. ltr. Pers-6333-CC-4,
29 Dec. 1944
71.
BuPers conf. ltr., Pers-10154-ILA P16-5(C), 12 Jan. 1944.
72.
Conf. ltr., CNO to BuPers, ser. 042923, 22 Jan. 1944.
73.
For BuPers estimates, see Op-23L Operating Force Plan File; conf. memo.,
Op23 to Op-12, ser. 073125, 5 Feb. 1944.
74.
Conf. memo., Op-23L to Capt. Darden, 21 Jan. 1944.
75.
BuPers conf. ltr., Pers-101MN, P16-5(C), 2 Feb. 1944.
76.
Conf. memo., Op-23 to VCNO, ser. 069323, 4 Feb. 1944.
77.
Conf. memo., Op-05 to Op-23 and Op-30, ser. 040605-G, 16 Feb. 1944.
78.
Op-23L rest. memo. for File, 22 Feb. 1944.
79.
Op-23L conf. memo. for File, 17 Feb. 1944.
80.
Op-23L rest. memos. for File, 28 and 30 March 1944.
81.
Officers were sent from Shelton to Gulfport to standardize the training.
CNO conf. ltr., ser. 0104923, 17 Feb. 1944.
82.
Op-23L memo. for File, 30 March 1944.
83.
Memo., Commanding Officer Shelton to Op-23L, 6 May 1944; Op-23L memo. for
File , 3 July 1944.
84.
Conf. memo., Op-23 to Op-05, ser. 0466923, 31 July 1944.
85.
In February 500 Seamen were transferred to the amphibious forces and by
March there was a surplus of 368 officers to be transferred to other
activities. There was also a reduction by 50 of officers in excess in
training at Shelton in March, Op-23L memo. for File, 8 Feb. 1944; CNO rest.
ltr., ser. 52923, 23 Feb. 1944; Op-23L rest. memo. for File, 13 March 1944.
86.
Conf. memo., CominCh for VCNO, ser. 02935, 24 Aug. 1944; CNO conf. ltr.,
ser. 0522623, 28 Aug. 1944.
87.
Op-23L rest. memo. for File, 23 Aug. 1944; BuPers rest. ltr., Pers-4232-Mjj,
Aug. 23, 1944.
88.
Op-23L memo. for File, 13 July, 1944.
89.
Op-23L rest. memo. for File, 15 July 1944.
90.
BuPers ltr., Pers-635-HB P16-5(C), 29 April 1944.
91.
Pencil note on BuPers rest. estimate of Armed Guard Requirements as of 12
June, dated 30 May 1944. The note was dated 31 May.
92.
Pencil note on BuPers estimate of Armed Guard Requirements as of 19 June,
dated 5 June 1944.
93.
Op-23L rest. memo. for File, 11 Aug.1944.
94.
Op-23L conf. memo. for File, 22 Nov. 1944.
95.
BuPers ltr., Pers-1015-ILA P16-5(C), 15 Sept. 1944; BuPers conf. ltr.,
P16-5(C) Pers-101-MN, 22 Nov. 1944; CNO conf. ltr., ser. 0671223, 27 Nov.
1944.
96.
CominCh conf. ltr., ser. 04094, 11 Dec. 1944.
97.
Op-23L rest. memo. for File, 23 Oct. 1944.
98.
Conf. ltr., CNO to BuPers, ser. 0469823, 1 Aug. 1944.
99.
Conf. ltr., CNO to BuPers, ser. 0621323, 24 Oct. 1944.
100.
Op-23L conf. memo. for File, 8 Dec. 1944.
101.
Op-23L rest. memo. for File, 12 Dec. 1944; conf. ltr., CNO to BuPers, ser.
0701323, 15 Dec. 1944. Op-23L rest. memo. for File, 4 Jan. 1945.
102.
Op-23L conf. memo. for File, 21 Feb. 1945; conf. ltr., CNO to BuPers ser.
097023, 27 Feb. 1945.
103.
BuPers conf. memo., Pers-2113-ILA P16-5(C), 1 March 1945; BuPers ltr.,
Pers-67-oz P17-2/NM, 24 Feb. 1945.
104.
Op-23L rest. memo. for File, 12 March 1945. On 23 April it was decided that
the quota of officers at Shelton would be reduced from 170 to 75, beginning
1 June. BuPers conf. memo., Pers-2113-ILA, 23 April 1945; BuPers conf.
ltr., Pers-423-rc NC116, 18 May 1945.
105.
End 1, CNO to BuPers, ser. 174323, 30 April 1945 on CO Armed Guard Center
(Pacific) ltr., ser. 2618, 25 April 1945; BuPers ltr., Pers-2113-ILA, NM
22/P16-1, 4 June 1945.
106.
Op-23L conf. memo. for File, 18 April 1945.
107.
BuPers conf. ltr., Pers 20 SP P16-5(C), 9 June 1945; CNO conf. ltr., ser.
0260923, 13 June 1945.
108.
Op-23L rest. memo. for File, 28 June 1945.
109.
Op-23L rest. memo. for File, 29 June 1945.
110.
Op-23L rest. memo. for File, 4 July 1945.
111.
Op-23L rest. memo. for File, 4 July 1945.
112.
CNO ltr., ser. 359523, 25 Aug. 1945; BuPers memo. Pers-2113-ILA, 1 Sept.
1945.
113.
Op-414 D3 memo. for File, 30 Oct. 1945. This was the new Op number for
Op-23L.
114.
BuPers memo. Pers-2111-FBH, 17 Sept. 1945; Op-414-D3 memo. for File, 18
January 1946.
115.
Conversation with Capt. E. C. Cleave, 29 April 1946.
116.
CNO rest. ltr., ser. 390438, 8 Jan. 1942. On 29 November 1941 the Secretary
of the Navy had informed the Chairman of the Maritime Commission that some
vessels would be furnished a communication liaison group of three petty
officers. Rest. ltr., SecNav to Admiral Band, ser. 396423, 29 Nov. 1941.
117.
CNO rest. ltr., ser. 19238, 24 Jan. 1942.
118.
3d end., CominCh to BuNav, ser. 1181, 13 May 1942 on Com 6 ltr., ser. 00;
P16-3/QS1/A6(37Me), 26 April 1942.
119.
General Instructions for Commanding Officers of Armed Guards on Merchant
Ships (rest. edition of July 1, 1942), pp. 49-51.
120.
Op-23L rest. memo. for File, 8 Feb. 1943.
121.
VCNO Ò rest. ltr., ser. 1719520, 30 March 1943
122.
VCNO rest. ltr., ser. 3007320, 5 July 1943; rest. memo., Op-23 to Op-20,
ser. 276923, 2 Oct. 1943; CNO rest. disp., 151404, 15 Oct. 1943.
123.
CNO rest. ltr., ser. 3654320, 29 Oct. 1943.
124.
CNO rest. ltr., ser. 1412920, 28 Feb. 1944.
125.
CNO rest. ltr., ser. 1429020, 6 May 1944.
126.
Op-414-D3 memo. for File, 29 Dec. 1945.
127.
BuPers ltr., P-2423e-jf, 16 July 1943.
128.
Rest. memo., Op-23 to Op-20, ser. 360423, 20 Dec. 1943.
129.
Rest. memo., Op-20 to Op-23, ser. 4135720, 5 Jan. 1944.
130.
Rest. memo., Op-23 to Op-20, ser. 36423, 5 Feb. 1944.
131.
Op-23L conf. memo. for File, 16 Feb. 1944.
132.
Conf. memo., Op-23 to Director, Convoy and Routing, ser. 073623, 5 Feb.
1944; conf. memo., CominCh for Op-23L, ser. 0609, 18 Feb. 1944.
133.
Memo., Op-20 to Op-23, ser. 1411720, 19 Feb. 1944.
134.
Rest. memo., Op-23 to Op-20, ser., 53723, 23 Feb. 1944.
135.
Rest. memo., Op-20 to Op-23, ser. 1415420, 28 Feb. 1944.
136.
Op-23L rest. memo. for File, 14 March 1944.
137.
Articles 5401-5407, General Instructions for Commanding Officers of Naval
Armed Guards on Merchant Ships (4th ed., 21 March 1944), pp.
85, 86; General Instructions for Naval Communication Liaison Officers
(May, 1945) Article 5, WIMS 3. (All Restricted)
138.
End. 3, CNO to BuPers, ser. 97523, 5 April 1944 on Com 8 ltr., ser. 7955 of
30 March 1944.
139.
CNO rest. ltr., ser. 1327620, 7 June 1945.
140.
Op-23L memo, for File, 20 June 1945.
141.
CNO disp., 131224, 11 Sept. 1945.
142.
BuPers ltrs., P-2423e-jf of 16 July 1943, P-2423c-jf of 30 July 1943,
Pers-423d-mjj of 6 March 1944; End. 3, BuPers to Com 8, Pers-423d-Mep, 15
April 1944 on Com 8 ltr, ser 7955 of 30 March 1944.
143.
Ltr., CNO to BuPers, ser. 1421120, 30 March 1944; ltr., BuPers to Com 5,
Pers-423d-mjj, 5 April 1944 ordered the Boston School.
144.
Ltr., CNO to BuPers, ser. 1426920, 26 April 1944; ltr., BuPers to Com 5,
Pers-423d-mjj, 28 April 1944.
145.
United States Navy Press Release, 21 November 1944.
146.
CNO rest. ltr., 78623, 26 March 1942.
147.
VCNO rest. ltr., ser. 124923, 2 May 1942.
148.
VCNO rest. ltr., ser. 131623, 3 May 1942.
149.
Op-23L rest. memo., 8 Feb. 1944; OinC Gun Crew Training Center, San Diego conf. ltr., ser. P11-1(C-4), 2 Feb. 1942.
150.
CNO rest. ltr., ser 304923 (Armed Guard Bulletin 16-43), October 26, 1943.
151.
For many of the facts concerning the history of the Armed Guard School
(Eastern) see Commanding Officer Personnel Separation Center Shelton ser.
3671, Dec. 1, 1945. Hereafter cited History AGS Shelton. See also conf.
Station History U.S. Naval Armed Guard Center (Atlantic), p. 10.
Hereafter cited History AGS Shelton.
152.
History AGS Shelton, pp. 1,2.
153.
History AGS Shelton, pp. 2, 3, 9, 10; Memo. end., Op-23 to Op-30,
ser. 502923, Dec. 23, 1942, on Commanding Officer, Section Base, Little
Creek ltr., of Dec. 4, 1942; VCNO conf. ltr., ser 0455230, March 10, 1943;
Op-23L memo for Admiral Newton, March 28, 1943.
154.
BuPers ltr., NC116 P-2423e-jf, May 4, 1943.
155.
History AGS Shelton, p. 3.
156.
BuPers rest. ltr., Pers-635-HAB P16-5(C) (2762), Dec. 16, 1942.
157.
CNO conf. ltr., ser. 0701323, Dec. 15, 1944; Conversation with Capt. E. C.
Cleave, May 1, 1946.
158.
Op-23L memo. for File, April 3, 1945.
159.
Op-23L rest. memo. for File, Aug. 9, 1945.
160.
VCNO rest. ltr., ser 237423, Aug. 26, 1943.
161.
CNO ltr., ser. 205723, July 3, 1944.
162.
Much of this course is listed in History AGS Shelton. Information
concerning the training has been supplied also by Lt. Comdr. L. J. Snyder,
USNR, who was a member of the teaching staff at Shelton. It will be seen
that the course at Shelton differed somewhat from the curriculum prepared by
BuPers in August, 1943, (NAVPERS-16208, restricted). These differences were
minor.
163.
History AGS Shelton, pp. 8, 9; BuPers curriculum for Enlisted
Training, March, 1944, (NavPers 16280), restricted.
164.
History AGS Shelton, p.9; BuPers Curriculum June, 1944, (NavPers
16269) rest. The BuPers curriculum made no provision for dividing the class
into two parts.
165.
Rest. ltr., BuPers to OinC Armed Guard Center (Gulf), Pers-423d-mjj, Jan.
18, 1944.
166.
History AGS Shelton, p.4.
167.
BuPers curriculum, June, 1945, (NavPers 16437 rest.).
168.
History AGS Shelton, pp. 4,5.
169.
Ltr., BuNav to Com.9, Nav-141-AC NC116/106, March 10, 1942.
170.
Ltr., BuPers to VCNO, Pers-1411-DW NC116/304, July 15, 1942.
171.
Op-23L rest. memo. for File, Aug. 14, 1942; CominCh conf. airmailgram, 151844, Aug. 15, 1942.
172.
Op-414-D3 memo. for File, Dec. 29, 1945.
173.
Ltr., Lt. A. J. Sellers and Lt. G. W. McCleskey (Officers from Shelton ordered to Gulfport)
to BuPers, ser. 1009, April 5, 1944. These officers were at Gulfport from early March to March 23 in
connection with training in anti-aircraft gunnery.
174.
BuPers ltr., P-2423e-jf NC116/P16-1, July 6, 1943.
175.
Figures were supplied by BuPers.
176.
Ltr., Lt. A. J. Sellers, USNR, and Lt. G. W. McCleskey, USNR, June 14, 1944.
177.
Op-23L memo. for File, July 23, 1945.
178.
Figures supplied by BuPers, May 6, 1946.
179.
Op-23L rest. memo. for File, Markch 28, 1944; Op-23L conf. memo. for File, Dec. 7, 1944.
180.
Most of the information given above comes from History of United States Naval Training School (Armed Guard Gunnery),
written by the New York School. Information on the development of anti-aircraft fire control with telescopic
sights may be found in the files of Op-414-D3 (formerly Op-23L).
181.
Memo., Op-23L to training Aids Section, BuPers, May 3, 1945.
182.
This account is based almost entirely on the Final Report of the Armed Center, New Orleans (1 April 1946), pp. 2, 16-18 and Commanding Officer Armed
Guard Center (Gulf) ltr., ser. 5946, 16 April 1945.
183.
Op-23L conf. memo. for File, July 21, 1944; Op-414-D3 conf. memo. for File, October 19, 1945.
184.
SecNav ltr., ser. 184513, June 21, 1944.
185.
BuPers ltr., Pers-4232-mjj, August 3, 1944.
186.
Rest. memo. Op-23L to Port Director 13 Naval District, attention OinC Armed Guard Gunnery School, Seattle, April 3, 1945.
187.
Lt. G. W. McCleskey's ltr., ser. 138077, May 8, 1945.
188.
Port Director, N.T.S., 13ND ltr., ser. 27, March 2, 1945.
189.
Port Director, N.T.S., 13ND ltr., ser.AG 10407, October 16, 1945.
190.
Op-23L conf. memo. for File, July 21, 1944; Op-414-D3 conf. memo. for File, October 19, 1945.
191.
History of the Armed Guard Center (Pacific), p. 115.
192.
For training see History of the Armed Guard Center (Pacific), pp. 114-124; BuPers ltr., Pers-423a-rf, Dec. 12, 1944;
Outline of Training and Instruction Conducted for Armed Guard and Communication Liaison Personnel (Naval Training School Armed Guard Gunnery), January, 1945.
193.
BuPers ltr., Pers-4232-mjj, July 24, 1944; Op-23L rest. memo. for File, November 15, 1944.
194.
Rest. memo. Op-23L to Op-23F, 20 Dec. 1944; Op-23L conf. memo. for File, Dec. 22, 1944; Op-23L rest. memo., January 5, 1945.
195.
Op-414-D3 conf. memo., for File, October 19, 1945.
196.
Op-23L rest. memo., April 3, 1945.
197.
Lt. G. W. McCleskey's ltr., ser. 138077, May 8, 1945.
198.
History of the Armed Guard Center (Pacific), pp. 117-119, 122.
199.
Ibid., pp. 123, 124.
200.
Commanding Officer Armed Guard Center ltr., ser. 8634, July 10, 1944; Op-23L conf. memo. for File, July 21, 1944; Op-414-D3 conf. memo. for File, October 19, 1945.
201.
History of the Armed Guard Center (Pacific), pp. 116, 117.
202.
See Foreign Merchant Vessels, Chinese File in Op-414-D3 (formerly Op-23L).
203.
ComServPac conf. ltr., ser. 0152, March 11, 1943; ComServPac conf. ltr., ser. 0519, September 9, 1943.
204.
SecNav ltr., ser. 1642120, December 23, 1942.
205.
Memo., Op-23 to Op-20, March 1, 1943.
206.
CNO rest. ltr., ser. 315723 (Armed Guard Bulletin 19-43), November 4, 1943; CNO ltr., ser. 3465020, November 10, 1943.
207 .
End. 1, CNO to BuSandA, ser. 59323, Feb. 29, 1944 on OinC Armed Guard Center (Gulf) ltr., ser. 2568, Feb. 22, 1944; End. 2 BuSandA to CNO,
P16-5 (2) (OBX), March 15, 1944 on the same ltr. See General Instructions for Commanding Officers of Naval Armed Guards on Merchant Ships
(rest., 4th ed., 1944) pp.73, 74 for list of disbursing offices all over the world.
208.
ibid., p.66.
209.
For correspondence concerning war ballots see War Ballots File, Op-414-D3.
210.
BuNav ltr., Nav-164-AD NM7/P16-1(1143), November 10, 1941.
211.
Facts about the Armed Guard Center (Atlantic) are taken from its conf. Station History.
212.
For facts about the Center see Final Report, 1 April 1946.
213.
Most of the facts presented above are taken from History of the Armed Guard Center (Pacific), which does not contain useful
information in spite of the spirit in which it is written and the complete misunderstanding of the careful planning and direction of the
Armed Guard program by the Arming Merchant Ship Section in Operations, which did so much to make the Armed Guard Service succeed.
214.
For a good example of the work of the Port Directors in the Armed Guard program see Historical Narrative of Port Director
-- New York, Third Naval District 15 October 1939 to 14 August 1945, Chapter V (confidential).
215.
Op-23L conf. memo. for File, 22 May 1945; Op-414=D3 memo. for File, 29 December 1945; History of the Armed Guard Center (Pacific),
pp.171-175. A special pool set up for the Normandy operation was not needed because of low losses.
216.
CNO conf. ltr., ser. 0658923, 17 Nov. 1944.
217.
Op-23L rest. memo. for File, 15 March 1945.
218.
Armed Guard Center (Pacific) conf. memo. 28 Feb. 1945; Op-23L rest. memo., 6 March 1945.
219.
Op-23L rest. memo. 5 May 1945.
220.
Armed Guard Center (Pacific) rest. ltr., ser. C-78, 16 July 1945; End 2, CNO to BuPers, ser. 314423, 27 July 1945.
221.
CNO rest. ltr., ser 309823 (Armed Guard Bulletin 18043), 30 Oct. 1943.
222.
Rest. Ordnance and Gunnery Instructions, pp. 41, 42.
223.
General Instructions (rest. 4th ed.) pp. 31, 32, 36, 39.
224.
CNO rest. ltr., ser. 307523 (Armed Guard Bulletin 17-43), 28 Oct. 1943.
225.
Rest. memo. Op-23 to Op-39, ser. 327123, 17 Nov. 1943; Op-39 memo., ser. 96339, 22 Nov. 1943.
226.
CNO rest. ltr., ser. 295823 (Armed Guard Bulletin 50-44), 11 Sept. 1944; General Instructions (4th ed., rest.), p. 115
227.
Conf ltr., VCNO to BuPers, ser. 0338223, 9 Aug. 1943; Army Regulation No. 55-3301-2.
228.
CNO ltr., ser. 3939, 14 Feb. 1944.
229.
CNO rest. disp., 311600, 31 Jan. 1942.
230.
CNO rest. ltr., ser. 23723, 10 Feb. 1942.
231.
CNO rest. ltr., ser. 300823, 22 Oct. 1943.
232.
CNO rest. ltrs., sers. 9323 and 9423, 14 Jan. 1944.
233.
CNO rest. ltr., ser. 64623, 6 March, 1944.
234.
CNO rest. ltr., ser. 207423, 4 July 1944.
235.
CNO rest. ltr., ser. 42923, 3 Feb. 1945.
236.
CNO rest. ltr., ser. 229623, 9 June 1945.
237.
CNO rest. ltr., ser. 286623, 11 July 1945.
238.
CNO rest. ltr., ser. 322623 (Armed Guard Bulletin 36-45), 1 Aug. 1945.
Transcribed and formatted for HTML by Rick Pitz for the HyperWar Foundation.
