ACTION IN BADOENG STRAIT
FEBRUARY 19-20

Action of Badoeng Strait
February 19

Northwest of Port Darwin, meanwhile, heavy bombing of Bali indicated that that island would be the next objective. About the middle of February this softening process had begun, and an enemy advance west from Celebes became apparent. Submarines were therefore withdrawn from the entire length of Makassar Strait to defensive positions off Bali and Timor. Likewise the striking force, which had been patrolling the West Java Sea, was ordered from Priok to a new base at Soerabaja. It was this force which the Houston had been ordered to join from Darwin, but she failed to arrive in time for the attack made in Badoeng Strait, off Bali, on the night of February 19th-20th.

On the 18th Japanese forces landed on the southeast coast of Bali and seized the airfield there. Consolidation of this position and use of the field would naturally expose the entire sea area south of the Barrier Islands to air attack, so that quick action on our part was essential. Admiral Doorman therefore decided on a night raid on the vessels used in the landing. Reconnaissance revealed that at least two cruisers and three transports were anchored in Badoeng Strait southeast of Bali.

An attack was planned in three waves. The Dutch cruisers De Ruyter and Java were to come from Tjilatjap, accompanied by the destroyers Piet Hein, Ford and Pope. The second wave was to include Tromp, Stewart, Parrott, John D. Edwards, and Pillsbury, all of which were to come south from Soerabaja through Bali Strait, round the southern tip of Bali, then turn north into Badoeng Strait to make their attack. Dutch torpedo boats from Soerabaja were to conclude our attack. Approach from the southwest was planned, and after the attack our ships were directed to proceed through Lombok Strait and thence back to Soerabaja.¹⁸ The four submarines on patrol in that area were therefore told to haul clear and resume their stations at dawn on the 20th.

The actual engagement proved successful, though accurate reporting of damage is difficult in a night battle. Two or three ships were fired by the first group, which may also have torpedoed a cruiser of the Katori

class. The second and third waves each made sure torpedo hits on ships of unknown class. We lost the Dutch destroyer Piet Hein, while the Java and the Tromp were damaged. Our destroyer Stewart was also hit. The Japanese disposition in two groups enabled our single column formation to pass between, and caused the enemy to fire on his own ships.

The cruiser group attacked first, with De Ruyter in the lead, followed by Java, Piet Hein, Ford, and Pope in the order named. Arrival off the south coast of Bali took place as scheduled at about 2130 on the 19th. An hour later the action began. The cruisers searchlights illuminated two enemy vessels off the port bow, and firing from the gun batteries began at once.¹⁹ The return fire was almost immediate, indicating that an attack had been expected. The enemy ships were stationed, however, as if our forces had been expected from the north, but the initial advantage as to disposition was with the Japanese, for the coastline behind their vessels made our targets less distinct. In this exchange the Java was hit on the stern, but damage was slight.

The destroyers in this first wave bore the brunt of the fighting, especially Ford and Pope, which gave an exceptionally good account of themselves. As the three destroyers were about 3 miles behind the cruisers when contact with the enemy was made, the first clue that action was joined came from searchlights and red star shells. Before they could themselves bear on any targets, Piet Hein turned radically to the right, laying a smoke screen of white and black smoke. Pope and Ford followed. Off the port beam an enemy warship or transport was then silhouetted, at a range of about 3,000 yards. Another vessel reported as a cruiser appeared off the port bow. Apparently the warships were underway, but they were moving slowly, taking advantage of Bali's coastline. Piet Hein opened fire with her guns,²⁰ while the Ford fired three torpedoes. One hit was believed made on the cruiser, later reported to be of the Katori class. As the last torpedo was released, Piet Hein was enveloped in flames. Whether she had been hit by large caliber gunfire or by a torpedo is not known, but Ford noted that she did not settle as if holed below the water line. Pope meanwhile in the rear of the column saw two ships in flames, and herself fired two torpedoes at the enemy

transport or cruiser on her port beam. The hit scored may have been made by either Pope or Ford. At about the time the Piet Hein was hit a shell cut the after falls of Ford's whaleboat, necessitating cutting the forward falls and dropping the boat overboard. Apparently it landed right side up, for at dawn 13 Piet Hein survivors climbed aboard. They salvaged a floating gas drum, rescued 20 more Dutch survivors, and then made their way to Java in safety.

Track of Ford and Pope

After Piet Hein had been hit all three destroyers slowed radically. Contact with the cruisers had been lost some minutes before, and now, of course, the Dutch destroyer was out of the action. Pope and Ford fired two more torpedoes apiece at the transport on their port beam but reported no hits. Gunfire from port caused Ford to make smoke and head toward Bali. Course was then changed to south, and then to the southeast. During this time enemy vessels from the north opened fire, and Pope responded with a torpedo which reportedly hit a destroyer off her port quarter.

About 2300 a searchlight illuminated Ford, and she immediately came under heavy fire. A big cruiser was about 2,500 yards to starboard, and Ford was virtually smothered by near hits from main and secondary batteries. The pattern of enemy fire was excellent, and the searchlight was brilliant, well-controlled, and focused. Our destroyers took prompt action. Both turned on fighting lights, and changed course sharply toward Nusa Besar. Ford launched three of her starboard torpedoes but as the target angle was sharp hits were not observed. As the enemy cruiser continued to concentrate its fire on Ford, Pope fired five of her torpedoes and then opened fire with her guns. Although no hits could be seen the cruiser ceased firing and turned off its searchlight. Our destroyers followed suit. This phase of the engagement had lasted only 5 minutes. The known disposition of superior forces to the north caused Ford and Pope to retire to the southeast and then along Java's south coast to Tjilatjap, rather than proceeding to the planned rendezvous at Soerabaja.

Heavy gunfire continued in the area that Ford and Pope had just cleared. Several destroyers in column were illuminated, and two were seen to burst into flames. Our destroyers at first thought the Dutch motor torpedo boats were starting their run through the enemy force, but it is more likely that the Japanese were firing at each other. Their crossfire had endangered our ships but the risk proved amply justified by the

damage which they inflicted on themselves. Two enemy destroyers were believed sunk and another severely damaged at this time.

As the second wave, consisting of the United States destroyers Stewart, Parrott, J.D. Edwards, and Pillsbury, with the Dutch cruiser Tromp 5 miles astern, approached Badoeng Strait they could see two fires on or near the beach of Bali. Previously searchlights and heavy gunfire had indicated that our first wave had engaged the enemy, but as voice radios failed to establish contact with them we were able to get no information about the disposition or composition of the enemy forces. This proved a handicap, as the Japanese were close to Nusa Besar Island and the second wave passed too far to the north to make the torpedoes as effective as they might have been at closer ranges.

At 0134 Stewart at the head of our column sighted two ships signalling off the port bow. The free use which Japanese warships made of a high intensity, all-round signal light with a greenish hue was advantageous in spotting these ships and others later in the engagement. They were against the dark background of Bali and the haze resulting from the earlier engagement made their outlines indistinct. Our ships on the other hand were clearly outlined in the bright starlight. As our column veered to starboard, the Stewart and Parrott each fired six torpedoes from their port batteries. No hits were scored and the ships were directed to hold their torpedo fire. A few minutes later enemy searchlights revealed one of their own vessels off the port quarter and our destroyers opened fire with their torpedoes and guns. A cruiser some 4,000 yards off the port bow and farther inshore immediately illuminated the Stewart and our column was soon heavily engaged. Fire from 8-inch batteries landed over and ahead of the Stewart, which was the only one of the destroyers to receive a direct hit. A shell went clear through her without exploding, but the after steering control station was damaged. Astern, the Tromp was reported engaged with a cruiser which finally blew up.

Proceeding on their northeast course the destroyers next encountered one or more destroyers to port near Bali and three vessels to starboard. This second phase began at about 0212. The Pillsbury's guns scored four direct hits on the vessel to port, which she believes sank. Next our destroyers opened fire on the ships to starboard, which were at a range of 5,000-6,000 yards.

The Stewart released five starboard torpedoes, the Parrott six, and the J. D. Edwards several. Three hits were reported. The Japanese imme-

diately responded and our column was soon exposed to heavy crossfire, which, however, scored no hits, though the accuracy of their fire was mentioned in several reports. Our ships zigzagged radically and opened fire with their guns. Two Japanese ships were seen burning and heavily smoking close to the beach at Nusa Besar. After a few minutes enemy gunfire was shifted to the Tromp coming up astern. She was seen firing guns to both sides but her value would probably have been greater had she led the column and thus identified targets for the destroyers. So, likewise, her blued signal was criticized as too bright for its purpose and probably proved of value to the Japanese, for they scored 8 or 10 hits on the Dutch cruiser, damaging her badly.

By 0225 firing ceased, "a clear manifestation of God's grace" as the captain of the Parrott termed it, for his ship's steering control had jammed while maneuvering at 28 knots. This had caused her to swing to the left toward the Bali shore. Emergency full speed astern was ordered, and this sudden maneuver threw overboard a Chief Petty Officer. During the engagement he floated around in the water, and the next day reached Bali. Joining up there with some isolated Dutch soldiers he finally succeeded in reaching Java and eventually regained his ship at Soerabaja.

The cessation of firing gave the Parrott the opportunity to continue on her course by steering with her engines. All the ships were, therefore, able to return to Soerabaja, except for Ford and Pope, which had gone to Tjilatjap. The Dutch motor torpedo boats are known to have engaged the enemy in the third wave of the attack but reports of damage inflicted by them are not available.

Footnotes

18 See chart opposite p.29.

19 De Ruyter did not get into the action and did not fire a shot. Commander Binford has suggested that she had heen designated to fire to starhoard. As the only ships sighted were to port, this order may have rendered De Ruyter ineffective.

20 The fact that Piet Hein used her guns hefore releasing torpedoes may have rendered her less effective and more vulnerable than the American destroyers.