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[377] TESTIMONY OF MAJOR KENNETH P. BERGQUIST, AIR CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY
(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)
The CHAIRMAN. Your full name?
Major BERGQUIST. Kenneth P. Bergquist.
The CHAIRMAN. Your rank?
Major BERGQUIST. Major, Air Corps, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Your assignment here?
Major BERGQUIST. The Hawaiian Interceptor Command, sir.
General McNARNEY. What particular position in the Interceptor Command?
Major BERGQUIST. I am the operations officer of the Hawaiian Interceptor Command, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. As such have you to do with the Warning Service?
Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Is that your particular assignment now?
Major BERGQUIST. My assignment includes the operations of the Hawaiian Interceptor Command, a part of which is the operational control of the Aircraft Warning Service.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes. When was that interceptor service set up as outlined in the Operating Procedure? What date? We have been told December 17; is that about right?
Major BERGQUIST. That is the date that the Hawaiian Interceptor Command, as that name, was ordered, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Now, what was being done with the devices for warning on and before December 7, 1941?
Major BERGQUIST. We were operating them, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. As a regular service to the Department?
Major BERGQUIST. We were setting up the information center, sir, and I was working at that most of the time to get that functioning.
The CHAIRMAN. And how much were you operating your [378] detecting devices each day?
Major BERGQUIST. We were operating them from 4 in the morning a week prior to this, sir. We were operating them from 4 in the morning until 11 in the morning. Four to seven was as ordered by, I believe, a verbal order from the Chief of Staff of the Hawaiian Department, and from 7 to 11 we were operating them for the purpose of calibrating the instruments and training our pursuit pilots in interception.
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Admiral STANDLEY. That was what period?
The CHAIRMAN. What?
Admiral STANDLEY. What period was that?
The CHAIRMAN. That was from 7 to 11.
Admiral STANDLEY. Seven to eleven?
Major BERGQUIST. Seven--
Admiral STANDLEY. Yes, but what period? What period of days?
The CHAIRMAN. A week.
Major BERQUIST. That schedule was approximately taking in a week before and previous to that.
The CHAIRMAN. A week before the 7th?
Major BERGQUIST. Sir, previous to that we were operating them during the period 7 to 12, I believe it was, sir, and also two or three hours in the afternoons.
Admiral STANDLEY. In addition from 4 to 7?
Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir. In other words, were attempting to get the sets calibrated and get all our personnel trained.
The CHAIRMAN. Now, do you know why the order was during this week prior to December 7 that you should operate from 4 to 7 a. m. each day?
Major BERGQUIST. I do not, sir. The Hawaiian Interceptor Command was not set up. Therefore, the Aircraft Warning Service was operating directly under the Department signal officer, and we had no control whatsoever over it, but we were [379] as a matter of cooperation and coordination operating, and the period 4 to 7 was ordered for the detector stations but for nothing else.
The CHAIRMAN. And you operated, therefore, on the morning of Sunday, December 7, from 4 to 7?
Major BERGQUIST. The detector stations were operating at that time, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. As a matter of training, or what?
Major BERGQUIST. On Sunday morning, sir, I would say as a matter of compliance with the order. On the weekday mornings, other mornings, they were, in addition to compliance with that, operating as a matter of training, and I also had assigned watch officers during those periods in order to train them, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Now, was Lieutenant Tyler one of the men you assigned as a watch officer?
Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir. That was done just on the part of the wing on my own hook, so to speak. We were not required to do that, but--
The CHAIRMAN. You were not?
Major BERGQUIST. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Who would have operated the service?
Major BERGQUIST. As far as I can see, sir, they would have just operated with the Aircraft Warning Service personnel. They would have had no Air Corps officers there, but I took it upon myself to have these watch officers assigned as long as those stations were required to operate, so that I could train my officers in the system.
The CHAIRMAN. And therefore Tyler was sent up and other officers were sent up to get familiar with the things?
Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Is that about the size of it?
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Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir. I had a roster of officers. I published a roster of officers.
[380]] The CHAIRMAN. Who were to go up there in turn?
Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. And various times. You would not expect Tyler to know very much about the whole thing, would you?
Major BERGQUIST. No, sir. I just hadn't had time to get around to all officers that were on this roster. I was trying to teach as many as I could, to acquaint them with the system.
The CHAIRMAN. Then, I take it that Tyler had no duty, so to speak, there, of communication or warning or anything of that kind, had he? Or what was his function?
Major BERGQUIST. My instructions, sir, were verbal to these officers that they were to go down there during the times I specified, acquaint themselves with the whole setup as far as they possibly could, and if anything went wrong they were to notify me.
The CHAIRMAN. Now, what do you mean by "anything went wrong"?
Major BERGQUIST. Well, in an emergency they should have notified me.
The CHAIRMAN. So that if Tyler had been conscious that what was being recorded in front of his eyes was a flight of enemy airplanes he should have called you?
Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Now, was it likely that Tyler would identify this flight as enemy planes?
Major BERGQUIST. I don't believe so, sir, due to the fact that we had not had the Navy liaison position manned so that we could know the movements of the naval air forces.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Major BERGQUIST. And so it was logical for him to assume that there probably was a friendly carrier up in that area operating their planes.
The CHAIRMAN. Now, had there been a Navy liaison officer [381] there, on the earlier days prior to Sunday, December 7?
Major BERGQUIST. No, sir. We were trying to get that arranged, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. That hadn't been set up?
Major BERGQUIST. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. So it was not unnatural that there was no Navy officer there that morning?
Major BERGQUIST. That's right, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Is that right?
Major BERGQUIST. That's right, sir. We had a meeting on the 24th of November of coast officers and representatives from the Navy in order to try to get an interceptor command-or interceptor information center, rather-operating.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Major BERGQUIST. And ironically we said-I have the notes on that meeting-and we said that we had hoped to get everything operating within a period of two weeks, and I think that was just about two weeks to the day that we had the attack.
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The CHAIRMAN. And therefore you hadn't notified the Navy that things were running so now that there would be a regular routine whereby a Navy officer could be there as liaison officer? I say, you hadn't sent them that notice yet? Or had you?
Major BERGQUIST. No, sir. Commander Taylor who was loaned to the Army by verbal arrangement to help with this setup, had contacted the Commander-in-Chief's staff, I would say, approximately on the 24th, thereabouts, sir, and had asked for liaison officers to be assigned.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Major BERGQUIST. But they had not been assigned, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Now, it was contemplated that when your staff had been properly trained and you had your liaison arranged and established with the Navy this communication center would be run under regular orders and that the information would be released to the Army and Navy as received?
[382]
Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir. On the 24th of November we wanted to expand every effort to get it operating on a 24-hour-a-day basis.
The CHAIRMAN. You couldn't run these little mobile stations that much a day, could you?
Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir, we can. They are operated by an auxiliary power unit.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes?
Major BERGQUIST. And we had also made arrangements and asked the signal officer at that time to bend every effort to get us commercial power put in at these positions, which he said he was going to do, but in the meantime they could be operated by these engines.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes. They would wear out pretty fast if you ran them?
Major BERGQUIST. Well, the main difficulty was the gasoline engines that ran the generators.
The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes.
Major BERGQUIST. They were subject to failure on occasions, but they could be operated.
The CHAIRMAN. So that if there had been an emergency whereby it became critical to sweep the seas with these detectors around Oahu you think you could have arranged, subject to breakdowns, to run a 24-hour detector?
Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. You had enough personnel to work it out, did you?
Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. And you don't know why you were instructed to run a regular tour of three hours daylight or dawn, do you?
Major BERGQUIST. Well. you see, when you say why I was, I mean I wasn't in the organization that was ordered to do that.
The CHAIRMAN. Which organization was ordered to do it? [383] Signal corps?
Major BERGQUIST. It was the Aircraft Warning Service company which operated directly under the Department signal officer, and we were just cooperating with them on the basic principles.
The CHAIRMAN. Until the time would come for you to take it over as part of the Interceptor Command?
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Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Any questions, General McNarney?
General McNARNEY. If you had been operating on a wartime basis how many pursuit officers would be present in the information center?
Major BERGQUIST. There would be a controller and a pursuit officer, both of which would be flying officers of the Air Corps.
General McNARNEY. Had you a trained controller?
Major BERGQUIST. I considered myself trained as a controller, sir, and also Commander Tyler or Major Tindal; any one of the three of us could have taken over controller, as we did after the attack.
General McNARNEY. None of the three were present that Sunday morning prior to the attack?
Major BERGQUIST. No, sir, not prior to the attack.
General MCNARNEY. Did you have any trained pursuit officers?
Major BERGQUIST. No, sir.
General McNARNEY. You were training Tyler as a pursuit officer?
Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir. May I retract that? One officer who I know could have been considered a trained pursuit officer was at Wheeler Field.
General McNARNEY. If you had been in condition Alert No. 2, how many squadrons would you have had in the first [384] degree of readiness at the hour of the attack?
Major BERGQUIST. That being the dawn period, sir, we would have had all available squadrons on the alert. When I say "on the alert," I mean that all the planes are in the dispersed position, the pilots are in a tent or dugout near their planes, with their flying equipment on ready at a moment's notice to jump in their planes and get off. In other words, it would take them from the time they were ordered off from one to three minutes before they would be in the air.
The CHAIRMAN. You mean your engines would be warmed up?
Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir, and there would be a man sitting in the cockpit. As soon as the signal came he would start the engine. In the meantime the pilot would slip his parachute on and jump in the plane.
General McNARNEY. During your maneuvers here what was the rendezvous of the pursuit that took off on the dawn period?
Major BERGQUIST. We have initial points around the Island which we have had for-I think I made them up about approximately two years ago now, initial points. In other words, this Island being rather roughly a square shape, each corner of the Island plus one point in the middle-I can enumerate them for you, sir, or show you them on a map.
The CHAIRMAN. There is a map right behind you.
Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir. Kahuku Point is Affirm or Point A. That is phonetic. Ulupau Head is Point Baker. Koko Head is Point Cast. Hickam Field is Point Dog. Barbers Point is Point Easy. Waianae parenthesis City-Waianae City-is Point Fox. Kaena Point is Point George. Haleiwa is Point Hypo. Wheeler Field is Point William.
In other words, the system that we have been operating on for the past two years is that if we get a warning of an enemy coming from any direction, if I knew the general direction it is coming from the system was to immediately dispatch pursuit to the initial point nearest
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to the approach of the [385] enemy, and then while they were getting there and gaining their altitude, then from the information I had I would try to figure out their course for collision, interception. That was prior to the operation of the Radar. Our system now is, with the Radar plot we also will plot our own pursuit, and we can direct them right from the board by giving them course changes following their plot.
General McNARNEY. You still get them off to initial point, though?
Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
General McNARNEY. During your practices how was the radio communication between you and the patrol in the air?
Major BERGQUIST. Fair, sir. Not good.
General McNARNEY. Not good?
Major BERGQUIST. No, sir. That has been one of the worst things over here, is the radio communications.
The CHAIRMAN. What is the matter with it?
Major BERGQUIST. The transmitters in the airplanes are too weak, and the transmitters we have had on the ground are too weak, but we now have, I believe, a satisfactory system right now, because we have some stronger transmitters.
General McNARNEY. If the information center had been in operation the controller would give the order for take-off, or the pursuit officer?
Major BERGQUIST. The controller would tell the pursuit officer to order so many squadrons off and tell them where to send them.
General McNARNEY. And the controller determines the number of pursuit that takes off?
Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
General McNARNEY. The controller, being the more experienced officer,--
Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
General McNARNEY. --determines that, and the pursuit [386] officer is really just a method of transmitting information?
Major BERGQUIST. More or less, yes, sir. He helps the controller.
General McNARNEY. Yes.
Major BERGQUIST. He is really the assistant controller, but normally he just operates to direct-to carry out the orders of the controller.
General MCNARNEY. The controller has the mike in his hands; he can talk direct into the air then?
Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
General McCOY. You speak of arriving on the morning of the 7th at the center. At what time did you arrive there?
Major BERGQUIST. I did not arrive there, sir, until approximately 10 o'clock, 10:15. The first thing I did was to try to get an organization at Wheeler Field of what we had left, to get the squadrons organized into-I mean even if we had to disband one squadron and take the airplanes we had left and organize them into an air unit. Actually control is centered at Wheeler. That is, this is merely a relay point, because we had most of our squadrons at Wheeler. Get them-be sure that that was operating. I directed the signal Officer to check all our lines, and as soon as I had finished that then I immediately started out for the information center at Shafter.
General McCOY. Did Lieutenant Tyler bring to your attention this peculiar plotting that would have indicated the approach of the enemy planes?
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Major BERGQUIST. No, sir. I had no inkling that he even saw a plot.
General McCOY. When did you discover that?
Major BERGQUIST The next day, sir.
General McCOY. Were you conscious of the fact that it was important to follow these planes out to their aircraft [387] carrier?
Major BERGQUIST. I should have been, sir. I was not that morning.
General McCOY. So that nothing was done toward following them out?
Major BERGQUIST. Not that I know of, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Nothing was done, no directions were given from the control room, the information center?
Major BERGQUIST. No, sir. I believe that Major--
The CHAIRMAN. The operator?
Major BERGQUIST. Major Tindal was there operating.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, do you mean you don't know what he did, or you do know?
Major BERGQUIST. I do not know what he did up to the time I got there.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes. After you got there what was done?
Major BERGQUIST. It is not clear in my mind exactly. I cannot give the sequence of what I did. The only thing I can say is that I immediately went to work and tried to get everything functioning properly. I went from one position to the other in an attempt to make it function.
The CHAIRMAN. I suppose your crews for your stations had all disbanded and gone?
Major BERGQUIST. They were called back, sir, at the time of the attack.
The CHAIRMAN. And went back to their stations at the mobile units?
Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir. In fact, they have those base camps near there, their stations.
The CHAIRMAN. I see.
General McCOY. What were they called back for?
Major BERGQUIST. Well, as soon as we knew that we had been attacked, from then on we were on 24-hour-a-day operation. [388] Immediately ordered that.
The CHAIRMAN. And then they were starting tracing, were they, from their stations?
Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. And were those tracings coming into the information center?
BERGQUIST. I believe they were, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. And you think Tindal was acting as controller?
Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. And somebody was relaying information as to were these planes were going, or were they able to find them, or what was it?
Major BERGQUIST. I do not know, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. You don't. You didn't stay there?
Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir, I did after I got there, but all the pilots those planes were going out, as far as I know, had disappeared by
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the time I got there. You see, that was two hours-a little over two hours after the attack.
The CHAIRMAN. Where had they disappeared to?
Major BERGQUIST. I mean, evidently the planes had gone so far out that we couldn't pick them up even.
The CHAIRMAN. I see.
Major BERGQUIST. But it is not clear in my mind, sir, exactly what I did when I got there or what I saw.
The CHAIRMAN. You don't know whether the control room was all in service in advising air service as to where these planes were disappearing to? You can't say that?
Major BERGQUIST. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Whatever happened in that respect happened before you got there?
Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
General MCNARNEY. Normally would the bombardment have an [389] officer in the control room to relay information to the bombardment?
Major BERGQUIST. Yes. sir. We had a bomber liaison officer there.
General McNARNEY. Was there one there on the morning of the 7th?
Major BERGQUIST. No, sir.
General McNARNEY. At any time?
Major BERGQUIST. No, sir, I don't believe we got one there until either that afternoon or the next day; probably that afternoon.
General McCOY. Is the center functioning now?
Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
General McCOY. How would it be if we stroll over with you, Major, and see it?
Major BERGQUIST. We would like very much to have you come, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. I guess we just have about time to do it before we have to leave to beat the darkness. If there are no other questions from the major we will do that.
General McCOY. We might do that on the way home.
The CHAIRMAN. On the way, yes.
Let me just say to you, Major, that under our regimen here we desire that the witnesses say nothing about the questioning here.
Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Or discuss what goes on in this room with anyone.
Major BERGQUIST. Right, sir.
Colonel BROWN. Major Tindal is here.
The CHAIRMAN. Perhaps we shall bring him in, and we will be with you in a minute.
Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.