PROCEEDINGS 0F ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 615
[1188] AFTERNOON SESSION
(The Board at 2 p. m. continued the hearing of witnesses.)
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel WEST. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Kenneth P. Bergquist, Colonel, A. U. S., with the Army Air Forces; Executive Officer to the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Operations, Commitments, and Requirements.
2. Colonel WEST. That is Washington, D. C.
Colonel BERGQUIST. Washington, D. C.?
3. General GRUNERT. Colonel, the Board is attempting to get at the facts as to the background and the viewpoints prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack and also during the attack itself. We hope that you can throw some light on the subject and the position and assignment you occupied while in Hawaii during the latter part of the year 1941. General Frank will conduct the hearing, and the other members will ask such questions as they deem necessary to help develop the subject. General Frank.
4. General FRANK. On what duty were you in the latter part of November and the first part of December 1941?
Colonel BERGQUIST. I was Operations Officer of what was then known as the Hawaiian Interceptor Command.
5. General FRANK. Of what did the Interceptor Command consist?
Colonel BERGQUIST. It consisted of the two fighter [1187] groups, and later on it had operational control over all the air warning service.
6. General FRANK. Just at that time the Signal Officer was in charge of the A.W.S.?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
7. General FRANK. But you were working in there and using it?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
8. General FRANK. On a sort of cooperative basis?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
9. General FRANK. What were the number and locations of the permanent A. W. S. stations?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Before the 7th, sir? Before the 7th of December?
10. General FRANK. Yes.
Colonel BERGQUIST. I don't know for sure now. I can't recall exactly, but if my memory is correct I believe we did not have any permanent radar stations set up at that time; they were all mobile.
11. General FRANK. Do you know what the locations were in which the permanent sets were to be installed?
Colonel BERGQUIST. I will give it as well as I can remember, from my memory of it. I believe one was to be at Kokee over on Kauai, as a permanent installation. One w as to be up on a point on the northern shore of Kauai: Kilauea, was it?
616 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
12. Colonel WEST. Yes, sir.
Colonel BERGQUIST. Kilauea Point. I am not sure; I believe that was to be perhaps a mobile one. We were to put [1188] one on top of Kaala in Hawaii, which is the highest point in Hawaii.
13. General FRANK. You mean on Oahu.
Colonel BERGQUIST. I mean on Oahu, yes, sir. We were to put one up on near Kahuku Point, just back of Kahuku Point on some high ground. I have forgotten what we called that location. We were to put one on Mokapu Point. That is the point near Kaneohe Bay, as distinguished from Makapuu Point.
14. General FRANK. One is Mokapu and the other is Makapuu.
Colonel BERGQUIST. That is right. This is Mokapu.
We were to put one back up from Barbers Point. Now, I don't recall very well which were to be mobile and which were to be fixed. I believe I do have a chart which would indicate it to me, in my files.
15. General FRANK. When they were going to put three fixed ones up, where were the three fixed ones going to be?
Colonel BERGQUIST. One on Kaala, one on Haleakala, and one on Kokee.
16. General FRANK. That is right. You stated that none of those sets was yet installed on the 7th of December?
Colonel BERGQUIST. As far as I know, that is correct, sir
17. General FRANK. Had they arrived in the Department?
Colonel BERGQUIST. I don't think so, sir. I don't recall. I didn't check on that.
18. General FRANK. Do you know?
Colonel BERGQUIST. I do not know.
19. General FRANK. Did you have any 270 mobile sets in the Department at that time?
[1189]
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
20. General FRANK. How many? You had at least how many?
Colonel BERGQUIST. We had at least five.
21. General FRANK. When did they arrive?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Oh, I would say about July or August of 1941, as far as I can recall.
22. General FRANK. When were they set up and operating?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Well, as I recall, I think it was in perhaps July. They may have arrived a little sooner than July, but I believe it was approximately July or August when I conducted the first practice runs with two sets, one of which we had operating over at Waianae, and the other of which we had operating at Haleiwa, but I can't recall the exact date, sir.
23. General FRANK. All right. But did you have an exercise in which you had four or five of them operating later in the fall?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
24. General FRANK. When was that?
Colonel BERGQUIST. That was--
25. General FRANK. In November?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir; in November we did that.
26. General FRANK. Will you look at that chart showing the Island of Oahu with those crosses on it (handing chart to the witness)? Was the location of those crosses generally the points where the mobile sets were set up?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 617
Colonel BERGQUIST. That is correct, sir.
27. General FRANK. Well, will you state about where those were?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir. We had one at Haleiwa, [1190] one at Kahuku Point, one at Kaala, and one at Koko Head, and one back up in the rear of Fort Shafter.
28. General FRANK. All right. Were they effective?
Colonel BERGQUIST. They were effective to a degree. We had not calibrated them all. There were a considerable number of loopholes, as we found out later when we did attempt to calibrate them, to find out every weakness we could about them. But they were effective to a fair degree.
29. General FRANK. How far?
Colonel BERGQUIST. I would say a maximum range of approximately 130 miles.
30. General FRANK. That might vary more or less under different conditions?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
31. General FRANK. All right.
Colonel BERGQUIST. And also with respect to the altitude of the target.
32. General FRANK. How were they operated? By motor generator sets or by commercial electricity?
Colonel BERGQUIST. No, sir; at that time we were still operating them with the motor generator set, and we were attempting to get commercial lines put in.
33. General FRANK. Did you have plenty of spare parts and tubes?
Colonel BERGQUIST. I do not know the exact situation of that, sir.
34. General FRANK. Were you ever held up in operations for lack of spare parts?
Colonel BERGQUIST. As I recall, I believe we were.
[1191]
35. General FRANK. To any extent?
Colonel BERGQUIST. No, sir. No, I would say not, offhand. It is not clear in my memory.
36. General FRANK. Was your information center organized?
Colonel BERGQUIST. No, sir.
37. General FRANK. Was it operative?
Colonel BERGQUIST. No, sir, it was not operative as an information center should be.
38. General FRANK. Could it have been used?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
39. General FRANK. Actually was it used on December 8?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
40. General RUSSELL. 7th?
41. General FRANK. As a matter of fact, it did get some information on December 7th, didn't it?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
42. General FRANK. Will you make a statement to the Board covering generally the state of training of the men assigned to the Aircraft Warning Service both for operation of the radar sets and for Operation of the information center?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Well, I think we had had the sets operating in practice a sufficient length of time so that the radar scope operators that we had were fairly well trained. We had plotters and information
618 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
center personnel of the Signal Corps fairly well trained. I was in the process of training what I called pursuit officers, which is one of the positions on the board-on the control platform, that is-by running a roster of the fighter pilots in the Interceptor Command [1192] order to do two things: to both train them to function as pursuit officers on the control board and to acquaint them with the workings of the board in order to better carry out instructions that they received from the board on flying missions. The only controllers that we had, we considered, that could operate, that were trained sufficiently, were myself, Major Tindal-I mean Colonel Tindal; he was a Major at that time-and I did have with me at that time Commander William E. G. Taylor of the Navy. The other positions on the control platform, we did have an antiaircraft liaison officer, and had conducted problems with them so that they were in a fair state of training. We had not been able to get the Navy liaison officers assigned, so there was no one trained in that. The same applies to the bomber command liaison, the liaison officers with the Hawaiian Department headquarters.
43. General FRANK. What about civilian defense?
Colonel BERGQUIST. And also the civilian defense.
44. General GRUNERT. What was the second one you named after the Navy? Navy, headquarters, civilian defense, and what was the fourth one?
Colonel BERGQUIST. The bomber command. We were making all efforts to get the people assigned to man all these positions in order that I could train them and thus operate. We had a conference on the 24th of November, of which I have the notes, in which we had representatives from the Department Signal Office, Colonel Murphy I believe; we had Commander Coe from the Navy, who was then Operations Officer for Patwing 2, I believe it was; and we had Commander Taylor of the Navy, who was working with me; and we had Colonel Tetley and a couple of [1193] other officers. I forgot their names; I can't recall now. But at that time we brought out the fact that we wanted to get it on 24-hour operation as soon as possible. We asked that the Navy take the matter up immediately to get their liaison officers, and that the other agencies do likewise.
45. General FRANK. To whom was that communicated?
Colonel BERGQUIST. This was to be handled by each of the representatives whom we had there, to be handled verbally with their own organization to get it. There were no requests put through in writing that I recall.
46. General FRANK. Did you get any results out of this thing?
Colonel BERGQUIST. After the 7th, sir.
47. General FRANK. You got no results before the 7th?
Colonel BERGQUIST. That is right, sir.
48. General FRANK. And the 7th was just about two weeks later, wasn't it?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir. If you like, I can--
49. General FRANK. How much cooperation did you get from the Department headquarters?
Colonel BERGQUIST. You want my opinion on that, sir?
50. General FRANK. Yes.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 619
Colonel BERGQUIST. Very little. I would like to state that perhaps the main reason for lack of cooperation from mostly the higher headquarters was a lack of education as to what air defense was and what it could do and what the setup could do.
51. General FRANK. Were you having difficulty putting your [1194] program through?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
52. General FRANK. What was the nature of that difficulty?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Getting the radar stations set up and operating.
53. General FRANK. You mean the permanent ones?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir; the permanent as well as the necessary power and facilities for the mobile ones.
54. General FRANK. That is the commercial power for the mobile ones?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir; getting the proper interest by the various agencies that had to cooperate with us on setting up and making this go; such as furnishing liaison officers, getting them to agree to putting operational control in our hands, in the hands of the Interceptor Command in the person of the controller to operate all the various agencies involved, such as the antiaircraft not only of the Army, but of the Navy in Pearl Harbor, and controlling all the radio stations, commercial radio stations, controlling the movements of all aircraft; not so much to the exact telling of them what to do-for instance, the bombers-but to insure that they abide by the principles that we operated under, in that we would know at all times where they were so that we could filter out any plots that we received.
55. General FRANK. No only who they were but where they were?
Colonel BERGQUIST. That is right, sir.
56. General FRANK. With whom were you having difficulty putting this across?
[1195]
Colonel BERGQUIST. All the Signal Corps activity was mostly handled-as far as I was concerned, my contacts were mainly with Colonel Tetley, occasionally with Colonel Murphy.
57. General FRANK. He is now deceased?
Colonel BERGQUIST. That is right, sir. And occasionally with Colonel Powell, the Department Signal Officer.
58. General FRANK. Who was your Commander at that time?
Colonel BERGQUIST. General Davidson.
59. General FRANK. Where was he?
Colonel BERGQUIST. At Wheeler Field.
60. General FRANK. Was he at Wheeler Field in November?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir. I was too.
61. General FRANK. Well, when did he come back to the United States?
Colonel BERGQUIST. He didn't come back to the United States until--
62. General FRANK. Didn't he come back to the United States for a course of instruction?
Colonel BERGQUIST. He came back to observe a maneuver, as I recall now; that is right. And I believe he arrived back in Hawaii on the 5th of December, just in time to be there.
63. General FRANK. Well, did you ever make representations to him of the difficulties that you were having?
620 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Colonel BERGQUIST. Occasionally, yes, sir. I tried to do most of this work of getting this up by verbal contacts and plugging along by myself, which was perhaps a lack of knowledge on my part; experience, rather.
64. General FRANK. Was the fact that this was not progressing satisfactorily ever taken up with Department headquarters to [1196] get some backing on it?
Colonel BERGQUIST. As I recall, I do not know definitely but I believe that General Martin had some discussions on it with the Department headquarters.
65. General FRANK. Get any results?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Very little as far as I could determine. One of the big arguments was: we wanted to take over the radar stations and get them set up and operating. The Signal Corps said no, that was their job; they wanted to set them up and get them operating and then turn them over to us for our operational control. The Department headquarters decided in favor of the Signal Corps.
66. General FRANK. Do you think that that delayed the ultimate completion of the system?
Colonel BERGQUIST. My personal opinion is that it did.
67. General FRANK. By how much?
Colonel BERGQUIST. I don't know, sir.
68. General FRANK. Well by five days, two months, or what?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Oh, I would say perhaps a month, thirty days.
69. General FRANK. About a month. All right.
What was the status of training of the enlisted personnel in the information center and in the radar sets, or was that under the Signal Corps?
Colonel BERGQUIST. That was under the Signal Corps, sir.
70. General FRANK. Well, are you conversant with the status of training?
Colonel BERGQUIST. I can only judge by the results we [1197] obtained and from the operations which I was directly connected with, and my opinion on that is that they were fairly well trained at that stage of the game.
71. General FRANK. How many did you have? What I mean by that, could you operate three shifts? Did you operate three shifts after December 7th?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
72. General FRANK. Well, the proof of the pudding is in the eating of it.
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir; we did, but we were short. As I recall now, we were short of operators, trained operators, and some of the boys were ruining their eyes because we had to keep them on too long. I recall that now very clearly, that we were short of trained operators.
73. General FRANK. Were you having any trouble with your gasoline engines, power engines, folding up?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes sir.
74. General FRANK. Well, was it just ordinary engine trouble which was repairable in a short length of time, or was it serious trouble?
[1198]
Colonel BERGQUIST. I think it was rather serious. In fact, as I recall, the design of the engine was not quite what it should
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 621
have been and was not able to hold up in the continuous operation that was required.
75. General FRANK. Where were you on the morning of December 7?
76. General GRUNERT. May I interrupt right there?
77. General FRANK. Certainly.
78. General GRUNERT. I have an extract here from the Roberts Commission report in which it appears that you stated that you wanted to have 24-hour service by November 24, that the mobile units could have stood it; the main failure was not the detector but the gas engine running them; had sufficient personnel to run 24 hours and could have run even with the gas engine failure.
I just wanted to recall that to your mind. That was the testimony you gave while it was still fresh in your mind.
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir. We were having trouble with the engine, and I think my statement in there was correct, that we could have operated. Some of our stations may have gone out but still others could be operated.
79. General FRANK. Where were you on the morning of December 7th?
Colonel BERGQUIST. At 7:55, sir, I was in bed.
80. General GRUNERT. A. M. or P. M.?
Colonel BERGQUIST. A. M., sir.
81. General FRANK. What were the hours of operation of the A. W. S. at that time?
Colonel BERGQUIST. At that time, in accordance with an order that the air warning signal officer had received, as I [1199] understood it, from Department Headquarters, they were to operate the detector stations from 4 to 7 in the morning.
82. General FRANK. Had you ever made any recommendation with respect to the hours of operation?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Only from a training point of view.
83. General FRANK. Not from an operating point of view?
Colonel BERGQUIST. NO; not from a warning point of view.
84. General FRANK. There was an officer there by the name of Tyler, was there not?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
80. General FRANK. How did he happen to be there?
Colonel BERGQUIST. He was on the roster of officers which I made up and had at the Information Center. The primary purpose was to train this officer to be a pursuit officer, to acquaint him with the system, and to be on hand during the time that the warning stations were operating. When I was informed that they had received orders to operate the stations from 4 to 7, I took it upon myself to have an officer down there, because I could see no reason why they should just operate the station and not do anything with the information that they got. So I did have an officer there each morning. My schedule was from 4 to 8, or the first watch.
86. General FRANK. Did you take any steps to give them any instructions as to their duties?
Colonel BERGQUIST. My only instructions to them, as I recall, were that the main purpose was to go down there and to learn as much as they could about the setup during the time they were on. I do
622 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
not recall specifically whether I pointed my finger at them and said, "Call me if anything comes up", but I had it in the back of my mind that if they got into trouble [1200] they should call me.
87. General FRANK. We had Lieutenant Tyler up here before the Board. He was the only officer down there, I think, on the morning of December 7.
Colonel BERGQUIST. I believe he was; yes, sir.
88. General FRANK. And the nature of his duties and responsibilities was pretty vague in his mind.
Since you were sending officers down there to become familiar with the system and to teach them to be pursuit officers, why did you not make a regular scheduled course of instruction to teach them about the system and give them a regular course of instruction on the duties and responsibilities of being pursuit officers?
Colonel BERGQUIST. I ran a school in October, sir. We began a school in October. I have the outline of that in my briefcase. I called it the Air Defense School, in which I included as many of the pursuit officers as I could. I also had Marine Corps officers in this school.
89. General FRANK. Had Lieutenant Tyler been a member of that?
Colonel BERGQUIST. I do not recall whether he had or not, but I think he was. I do not recall definitely whether he was or not, but I think he was.
90. General FRANK. For the Army Air Force were you carrying the load in an effort to get this thing in shape and operating?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
91. General FRANK. Aside from what the Signal Corps was doing?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
92. General FRANK. Did you receive any complaints, or did you have any complaints about the tardiness in the construction of these permanent sets and the failure of the constructors to get [1201] them finished on time?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, I did; I was continually harping to the Signal Corps people to get the stations up and get them operating. I do not know of having put anything down in writing on it.
93. General FRANK. You made your complaints to the Signal Corps?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
94. General FRANK. Did you ever make any complaints to your own immediate headquarters through channels?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Verbally, I kept General Davidson informed as to what I was doing.
95. General FRANK. Do you know whether or not he followed it up and made any official complaints?
Colonel BERGQUIST. I do not recall. I also worked through our own headquarters on Signal Corps matters with Colonel Hoppough, in the Air Force Headquarters.
96. General FRANK. Did you ever find out who was responsible for delays?
Colonel BERGQUIST. No, sir.
97. General FRANK. You know that there were some delays, do you not?
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 623
98. General FRANK. Was the communication between the radar sets and the Information Center satisfactory?
Colonel BERGQUIST. It was not good. Those on Oahu, where you could connect them up by telephone, were fairly good. Those on the other islands, where you had to rely on radio, were fair and improved greatly when we installed the F.M.'s, which was after December 7th.
[1202]
99. General GRUNERT. Were there five mobile sets on Oahu?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
100. General GRUNERT. I have not heard any evidence yet that there were any in active operation.
Colonel BERGQUIST. That is right, sir. Before the 7th of December there were not, as I recall.
101. General FRANK. Could hostile planes have been detected from any direction coming into Oahu?
Colonel BERGQUIST. No, sir. There were some blank spaces.
102. General FRANK. In what direction?
Colonel BERGQUIST. I would say generally north of Molokai, about due east of Makapuu Point in a sector of about 20 degrees, perhaps. That was pretty much of a blank space. As I say, we had not had all those sets calibrated before the 7th, and we did not go definitely into the blank spaces. I am speaking now of what I found out afterwards when we did get them all set up and operating and began running checks on the stations.
103. General FRANK. You state that the Signal Officer was responsible for installing the equipment and training the Signal Corps personnel?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir; that is my understanding.
104. General FRANK. And then turning it over to the Air Force?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
106. General FRANK. At the same time you were charged with the control of such operation as was incident to the training of your fighters, working with the A.W.S.?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
106. General FRANK. Was there ever any confusion because of this dual control?
Colonel BERGQUIST. No, sir. I do not remember that I ever [1203] received any orders to do it. We just went ahead and did it. Colonel Tetley and I worked together very well. I think that if anyone built the whole business up it was Tetley and I; and we just went ahead and worked, and worked out our problems. He was very much interested in radar. I was very much interested in the whole system of getting the devices set up and handling problems, and we just went ahead and set up schedules and worked out problems and went ahead with our training.
107. General FRANK. Did you ever get any of the permanent sets in place and operating before you left?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir. I believe the one at Halakeala was put in and operating.
108. General FRANK. What was the difference between the permanent set and the mobile set at that time?
Colonel BERGQUIST. There was practically no difference, only one was on a fixed base and the other on a mobile base.
624 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
109. General FRANK. What was the advantage of the fixed station?
Colonel BERGQUIST. The advantage of the fixed station was that you could construct it in a more inaccessible place, and I think you could perhaps get it calibrated more accurately.
110. General FRANK. You could get it higher so that you had less interference?
Colonel BERGQUIST. That is correct. I am not too well acquainted, or I do not recall now the technical differences. I think I knew them at one time, but I have forgotten them now.
111. General FRANK. What was your feeling with respect to the probability of an air attack at that time? Were you surprised?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir; I was surprised.
112. General FRANK. Did you think an air attack was probable?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
[1204]
113. General FRANK. YOU thought it was probable?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir; I thought it was. Generally, my view was that it was probable. That is why I was trying to get the thing operating on a 24-hour basis if I could.
114. General FRANK. Did you know at that time that there was a tense situation existing between the United States and Japan?
Colonel BERGQUIST. I did not know it was as tense as I do now. I did not realize it was that tense.
115. General FRANK. Was there any information passed down from higher military authorities at that time with respect to that period being an acute period?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Not that I know of sir.
116. General FRANK. With respect to this alert, what is your point of view with respect to the advantages, so far as protection of airplanes against sabotage is concerned, of an alert where the planes were all massed on an apron as compared with dispersing the planes reasonably with the crews sleeping in the vicinity?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Well, if it was a matter of guarding the airplanes, it naturally is much easier to have them all together there. You do not have to have so many guards, particularly if the crews are not going to sleep with the airplanes, which they were not required to do at that time. If you have them dispersed with the crews actually at their alert huts, as we call them, then I believe that you would have sufficient guards to prevent sabotage, although a determined saboteur would have a much easier time if the airplanes were dispersed, because he could come in out of the bushes near the edge of the field.
117. General FRANK. YOU do not have to disperse them all right [1205] around the edge of the field.
Colonel BERGQUIST. No. That is where we had our dispersal point set up at that time, right back off the edge so we could operate from any position.
118. General FRANK. It would have been possible, however, to have provided a reasonable amount of defense against a saboteur and still have had the planes dispersed?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
119. General FRANK. It would have been possible to have had the crews sleeping in the vicinity, would it not?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 625
120. General RUSSELL. You stated that you went on duty 24 hours a day with the Interceptor Command as of December 8th?
Colonel BERGQUIST. As of December 7th.
121. General RUSSELL. After the attack on December 7th.
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
122. General RUSSELL. Did it function fairly well?
Colonel BERGQUIST. It took a few days, sir, to get everybody in there operating and get a roster going and get the people there trained.
123. General RUSSELL. How many days?
Colonel BERGQUIST. I do not recall, sir
124. General RUSSELL. A week?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir; I would say probably a week.
125. General RUSSELL. Was the problem to get them in or to get them trained, after December 7?
Colonel BERGQUIST. The first problem was to get them there.
126. General RUSSELL. How long did that take?
Colonel BERGQUIST. As I recall, it only took me a day or [1206] two to do that. After the 7th I just had to snap my fingers and I got what I wanted.
127. General RUSSELL. You had your Information Center, and then your stations in the field?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
128. General RUSSELL. Roughly, those were the two groupments of operations?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
129. General RUSSELL. YOU had no trouble on December 7 about the training of the people at the operational stations in the field; you had trained those people, had you not?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir; they were fairly well trained.
130. General RUSSELL. Now, with reference to the Information Center, I have got the impression that you had a pursuit officer at one part of the Center, and then you had another group there which I understand consisted of the liaison officers for these organizations and the control officer you referred to. Is that correct?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes sir
131. General RUSSELL. Who else?
Colonel BERGQUIST. May I have permission to show you a diagram?
132. General RUSSELL. No; I do not want to get confused. I am trying to get straightened out. I know these diagrams.
Colonel BERGQUIST. This diagram will show you the exact people.
133. General RUSSELL. Leave it out and us look at it. You had these control officers and this pursuit officer. Those were your commissioned people; is that right?
[1207] Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir; a controller and a pursuit officer; and we had two antiaircraft men. One controls the searchlight and one controls the guns. Then we had a Navy liaison officer and a bomber command liaison officer. All those were commissioned officers. Then we had a Hawaiian Department Headquarters liaison officer.
134. General RUSSELL. What training did these liaison men have to have?
Colonel BERGQUIST. I had to train them on the job.
135. General RUSSELL. But what did they have to do?
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Colonel BERGQUIST. The antiaircraft officer-
136. General RUSSELL. Is he a liaison officer?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir, in that he advises and suggests actions to the controller. The controller is the boss, however. He tells him when certain areas are released from antiaircraft fire.
137. General RUSSELL. He is just an ordinary liaison officer?
138. General FRANK. [sic] No; he is not. He is not supposed to be. He is specially trained in the system to function in accordance with the method of operating. You cannot take any "bohunk" and put him in there and expect to get the desired results.
139. General GRUNERT. One just hangs around and gets something to transmit, but these liaison officers in the Information Center have almost a constant job of transmitting information from the Control Officer; is that right?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
140. General FRANK. They were operators.
Colonel BERGQUIST. Another important thing he does is this: The antiaircraft have stations all around Oahu, so they [1208] have a lot of men who are lookouts and who send in information if they see an airplane, a submarine, or anything else. In other words, they are feeding information which also comes in through this liaison officer into the controller.
141. General RUSSELL. I think I know what a liaison officer is. Now, who was the controller?
Colonel BERGQUIST. The controllers were the ones I had selected and had to train on the job to be controllers. I was the first controller.
142. General RUSSELL. Where were you going to get them? All from the Air Corps?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
143. General RUSSELL. It was the Air Corps' job to select them and train them?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
144. General RUSSELL. And you did not have to go any further than that to get them?
Colonel BERGQUIST. No, sir.
145. General RUSSELL. These other people who were liaison officers: You went to the heads of the respective branches to get them, including the Navy?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
146. General RUSSELL. That gives us the big picture at the Information Center?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
147. General RUSSELL. In about a week you were able to train them and get them going?
Colonel BERGQUIST. I believe so.
148. General RUSSELL. The problem up until then had been getting people into this place?
[1209] Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir. I had been sent to the Air Defense School, at Mitchel Field, in April of 1941.
149. General RUSSELL. Who sent you there-the Air people or the Hawaiian Department?
Colonel BERGQUIST. It came as an order from headquarters here in Washington, I believe. They set up a school and got people from all
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 627
over, from Hawaii, Panama, and all the continental air forces. They went to Mitchel Field to be instructed in the air defense system which had been developed by the First Fighter Command as a result of their operations and training in England; and that was the system then that was put in all over. These people went from the school out to the continental air forces; some went out to the Philippines and to the south Pacific; and Colonel Tetley went back out to Hawaii.
150. General RUSSELL. When did you get there?
Colonel BERGQUIST. I left there on March 17 and arrived back on April 15.
151. General RUSSELL. When was the order for you to go over and take charge of this Information Center issued in Hawaii?
Colonel BERGQUIST. I did not quite get your question.
152. General RUSSELL. When you got back out there in April, did you immediately go on duty with this outfit?
Colonel BERGQUIST. No, sir.
153. General RUSSELL. How long thereafter was it before you went on duty?
Colonel BERGQUIST. May I just recite what I did? I got back there in April and was placed on approximately two weeks special duty to write up a report on what should be done in Hawaii. I did that and submitted it, and I have never seen it since. I do not know whether you have it, or not. I was then [1210] issued orders that I was relieved to go back to normal duty. I was at that time still supposed to be in command of a fighter squadron. That was about in May, the first part of May. About the 22nd of May we started the Hawaiian Department maneuvers. I was with my squadron that morning ready to start operating with my squadron when about 10 o'clock I was called up to the Group Headquarters and asked to take control of operating the device. I relinquished command to my next senior in the squadron and went up and set up what was perhaps the first Information Center. It was not much, because I set it up in one hour. It was not really an information center; it was a fighter control center. I than operated during maneuvers that way.
154. General RUSSELL. All of the people that operated there were Air Force people?
Colonel BERQUIST. That is right, sir. After the maneuvers I was then assigned to the Wing as Assistant Operations Officer. I then began building on my own hook a little information center in the base of the headquarters building at Wheeler Field. I wanted to get something started so that we would have some kind of an information center going in case of attack. That was my idea. We set up this little information center down in the basement. It was not really authorized. We had an awful time trying to get equipment for it; but by the usual methods of chiseling here and there I got the stuff and that was when I had my first contact with actually putting something in writing, because I put in a request for some headsets for the controller and the pursuit officer to use, and got an endorsement back from headquarters of the Air Force asking me by what right I was setting up an information center. I mean, this was addressed to the commander, of course. They said I could not have the equipment.
[1211]
I wrote up a 2-page endorsement for General Davidson to sign, which he did, which explained the position, that we had
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one, that was the only one that was ready to operate, such as it was, and they also stated in their letter from the headquarters of the Air Forces that the Signal Corps was setting up an information center, and I knew that that one wasn't going to be ready for about six months, so that was my first contact I had with writing, and they did approve then my going ahead with this, and that was my first opening wedge to have a chance to educate headquarters, the Air Forces: at all, as to just what it was all about, and especially the Signal Officer, Colonel Hoppough.
Then I attempted this: We ran experiments down there, ran problems, with our fighters. I sent out airplanes to act as target airplanes. I worked with Colonel Tetley at that time, and we had two of his sets set up, and we began working problems.
155. General GRUNERT. Who was Tetley?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Tetley was in the Signal Corps, in the Department Signal Office, and was in charge of the radar. In fact, at that time I believe he was still up at Schofield Barracks in charge of this little plotting outfit they were training as plotters, and getting these radars set up.
156. General RUSSELL. When did you amalgamate those operations, yours and Tetley's?
Colonel BERGQUIST. That's right. Well, then we began. Tetley then told me that they had finally gotten an authorization to build an information center down near Fort Shafter. I then worked with him, and I drew up the design for the [1212] information center, and the Signal Corps went ahead and built it. Then, I guess it was probably in November, when we finally got the thing built and began putting in our communications into it. I am trying to get to your original question of when I took over. Actually, it wasn't until the 7th of December, maybe the 8th. You can say the 7th, because I went down there on the 7th, and, from then on, operated.
157. General RUSSELL. When did you move physically into this new building, which was completed in November?
Colonel BERGQUIST. We completed it in November, and we began running practice problems. In other words, we would go down there and open it up and operate it, to train and qualify them.
158. General RUSSELL. But you were merely representing the Air Forces, then?
Colonel BERGQUIST. That's right. Then, we actually moved our headquarters down, in December, after we started operating.
159. General RUSSELL. I want to connect up one link that is missing in my mind; it may be, in the record. When you went to this school, in April, I believe I asked you? but I do not remember the answer, were you sent there as a representative of the Hawaiian Department or by the Air Forces, or was that an Air Force school, or what sort of school was it?
Colonel BERGQUIST. It was an Air Force school. We did represent the Hawaiian Department. It was the Hawaiian Department issued the orders.
160. General RUSSELL. Were all those in that school Air Force people?
Colonel BERGQUIST. No, sir; there were some Signal Corps [1213] and antiaircraft people.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 629
161. General RUSSELL. Now, Colonel, the problem out there was to take away from these various branches those elements which were going to operate as part of this entire whole that we are discussing, now; is that true? You got some people from the Navy, some from the antiaircraft people, and some from other services, there?
Colonel BERGQUIST. That was a small part. They had to furnish a liaison officer, but they also had to agree to the method of operation, whereby I had control.
162. General RUSSELL. And that placed the command of relatively large elements of the Navy and of the other branches under the command of this coordinator?
Colonel BERGQUIST. The controller; yes, sir.
163. General RUSSELL. You stated a moment ago that there was opposition to turning over the command of these units to this central commander, who would have been General Davidson.
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir
164. General RUSSELL. That is one of the problems you had?
Colonel BERGQUIST. That was one of the problems; yes, sir.
165. General RUSSELL. And in so far as the naval elements went that was a matter of cooperation, because there was not unity of command?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
166. General RUSSELL. Now, radar, as I understand your testimony was more or less new, at the time?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Very much so; yes, sir.
167. General RUSSELL. These sets which arrived out there some time in the summer of July, August, or September, whenever they did arrive, were the first to appear on the Island?
[1214] Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
168. General RUSSELL. And it was necessary to start training from the ground up?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
169. General RUSSELL. Most of the training of operating personnel for the field stations was done by the Signal Corps?
Colonel BERGQUIST. That is right, sir
170. General RUSSELL. Did Colonel Tetley "play ball," out there, with you?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Colonel Tetley? Yes, sir-to the utmost.
171. General RUSSELL. And I believe he was finally on the Staff of the Department?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir
172. General RUSSELL. And he represented the Department Commander in the development of the Interceptor Command?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes sir.
173. General RUSSELL. One other question. We are now dealing, Colonel, with a good deal of philosophy, apparently. Had you had a complete set-up, with all of the people trained, and all of the command chain established, if they had been off duty beginning at 7 o'clock that morning, they would not have been helpful in this situation?
Colonel BERGQUIST. That's right; but your supposition that we had everybody, and had them all trained, would mean that we would be operating 24 hours a day.
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174. General RUSSELL. I am bringing a supposition in, too, that they were all in bed, after 7 o'clock that morning, and it would have been to no effect?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Well, if they had been, yes; but as I [1211] stated, on this conference we had on the 24th of November, I wanted to get them on 24-hour duty.
175. General RUSSELL. That is all.
176. General GRUNERT. Did the lack of progress in getting the information started stem into the lack of being air-warning-service-minded, in the high command, do you suppose; or what?
Colonel BERGQUIST. I think that was the trouble, to a great extent.
177. General GRUNERT. We hear the expression quite frequently among the witnesses that they "made all efforts" to do so-and-so. Apparently the all-out effort they made after December 7 amounted to something because there was unity of purpose after that, caused by the attack.
Colonel BERGQUIST. That is right; yes, sir.
178. General GRUNERT. Apparently, before that, there was not the realization of the necessity nor the unity of purpose to push the things through that there was after December 7. Was Davidson air-warning-service-minded?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes sir; I believe he was.
179. General GRUNERT. Was Rudolph so minded?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Perhaps to less extent. I do not think so. I think they say, in that, he was not.
180. General GRUNERT. He was the liaison officer, up there?
Colonel BERGQUIST. That is right. He was not educated into what it could do and what it meant. There was a stock phrase that I got from him.
181. General GRUNERT. Whose business was it to put this thing across, in the line of education? Was that Davidson? Was it Martin? Somebody had to educate the Department Commander and his staff, so that it could be pushed. Or was it the [1216] Departmental Commander's Signal Officer who should have been the air-warning-service man?
Colonel BERGQUIST. I believe, sir, it should have started with the report that Colonel Tindal and myself drew up when we got back, and turned in to the Air Force Headquarters.
182. General GRUNERT. Then it would appear that sending you two to the United States to go to a school was just another school detail, but when you came back and put in your report, there was nothing happened for several months?
Colonel BERGQUIST. That is right, sir.
183. General FRANK. What did you say General Rudolph's stock phrase was?
Colonel BERGQUIST. I was trying to get the liaison officers, and the stock phrase was, and the answer was, they "couldn't be spared."
184. General GRUNERT. There appears to have been issued on the 5th of November an SOP in which there was set up an Interceptor Command. Now, somebody had sold it to the Department Commander and to the Staff that got up this SOP that they put in there-
"There will be an Interceptor Command"
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 631
and they stated, I think, as I remember it, what it was; and it was well stated.
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
185. General GRUNERT. But it was not implemented until, really December 7?
Colonel BERGQUIST. That is right, sir
186. General FRANK. It really was not effective until December 17, was it?
Colonel BERGQUIST. The name was changed from-let's see- [1217] "The Hawaiian Interceptor Command"-that is right; I believe it was the 17th of December that it was officially changed from the Wing designation to the Interceptor Command designation.
187. General GRUNERT. But this November 5 SOP, when you read it, looks as if this goes into effect as soon as that order is received; and it appears, according to the testimony, to have misled the Navy into thinking that it was in being, when it was not really activated Although it did operate December 7, it was not really activated finally until December 17.
Now, do you suppose some of that delay was caused by a sort of little jealousy between the Air Corps and the Signal Corps as to the Signal Corps giving up something?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir; I believe that contributed to it.
188. General GRUNERT. Or was it because they did not think the Air Corps, being a new and growing branch, was to be trusted with something as important as that; or was it a combination of that?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
189. General GRUNERT. Tell me about Tetley.
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.
190. General GRUNERT. We are going to have Powell as a witness, but Tetley had not come into the picture, so far as I have seen. Who can give us the best information on the Signal Corps end of this Air Warning Service? * * * On the record, again:
Do you know anything about the sites for the permanent radar? Have you been on those sites? Do you know what [1218] difficulties there may be in getting to them, doing the construction work, and installing the permanent radar sets?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir; I do. I was on the Board that selected the sites.
191. General GRUNERT. Do you know of any physical reason why those sites should not have been prepared prior to December 7, even if you did not have the permanent radar equipment? I mean, as to access to the sites, and the roads. In one place, they had a cable with which to haul stuff up to the top side.
Colonel BERGQUIST. I believe that some of those sites that we selected were very inaccessible and would require considerable time to put the stud up in there. I am not in a position, I do not know enough of the facts or the engineering data, to know whether or not it could have been done before December 7.
192. General GRUNERT. I have forgotten whether you said they were there when they were completed, or not; but when the impetus was back of it, after December 7, the dirt started to fly and they got there, did they, or didn't they?
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Colonel BERGQUIST. Well, you might say Yes, but they had started on the work before, and there were just men finishing it up. Now, naturally everyone was working a little harder after that, and perhaps it did get done a little faster.
193. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions?
194. General RUSSELL. Yes.
What happened to that report which you made when you came back from the school?
Colonel BERGQUIST. It was turned in to the Air Force [1219] Headquarters, and I have not seen it, since.
195. General RUSSELL. You do not know where it went from there?
Colonel BERGQUIST. No, sir.
196. General RUSSELL. Do you know who wrote the SOP section for this Interceptor Command?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir. If I recall correctly, Colonel Paul was the Air Corps Liaison Officer, in the G-3, the Hawaiian Department, at that time, when that was written up. He had received considerable information on what an "interceptor command" was and what it did, from me, as well as information through the normal channels, because Colonel Paul was the Operations Officer of the Fighter Wing at Wheeler Field, and I was his assistant from May through September.
197. General RUSSELL. Did he write that SOP section?
Colonel BERGQUIST. I am not sure; but I think he did.
198. General RUSSELL. When were the selections for the permanent radar sites made?
199. General FRANK. Were preparations made for the selection of those sites back in 1939?
Colonel BERGQUIST. No, sir; not that I know of. I didn't know what a radar was until I came back from the school, in 1941.
200. General FRANK. Or 1940?
Colonel BERGQUIST. I wasn't acquainted with that, sir.
201. General RUSSELL. When did your group make these selections?
Colonel BERGQUIST. We made selections during the midsummer, I believe, of 1941, and then I believe they had to go back to the War Department for approval, and I don't know what the final date was when that actually was approved.
[1220]
202. General RUSSELL. Were they eventually installed at the sites that your group selected?
Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir; I believe most of them were.
203. General GRUNERT. Thank you very much for helping us.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
(Brief recess.)