PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 485
...
The court then, at 12:35 p. m., took a recess until 1:45 p. m., at which time it reconvened.
Present: All the members, the judge advocate and his counsel, all the interested parties and their counsel with the exception of the interested parties, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, and Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.), whose counsel were present. Frederick T. Lachat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the inquiry were present.
[644] A witness called by the judge advocate entered, was duly sworn, and was informed of the subject matter of the inquiry.
Examined by the judge advocate:
1. Q. Will you state your name, rank, and present station?
A. George E. Elliott, sergeant, headquarters company, station complement, Camp Lee, Virginia.
2. Q. What duties were you performing on the morning of December 7, 1941?
486 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. I was performing two duties, sir, at the same time. I was on guard from 12 o'clock noon, the Saturday before December 7; that is, it was not a walking guard post. It was just for security purposes, because it was just peace time at that time. My first duty was the operation of the radar equipment from 4 o'clock in the morning of 7 December until 7 o'clock that morning. My duty was plotter.
3. Q. Will you state where this station was located where you were performing this duty on the morning of December 7,1941?
A. It was at the north end of the island near Kahuku Point. The name of the station was Opana. The call sign was 6QN.
4. Q. On what island was this station located?
A. On the island of Oahu.
5. Q. Territory of Hawaii?
A. Yes, sir.
6. Q. Will you state what your duties as plotter consisted of on this morning?
A. As soon as the scope operator picked up the target, he would say "Target" and give me the range. I would take the azimuth from the antenna. By taking the azimuth from the antenna and having the plotting board, I was able to locate the position of aircraft as to the direction in which it was approaching the island.
7. Q. Did this plot you have told us about consist of some sort of chart of the island of Oahu with the surrounding water areas?
A. Yes, sir.
8. Q. How did you put this plot on the map or chart?
A. There is a map of the islands. The center point of the compass is the point of the location of our unit, and the radius rule has the mileage compiled on that map. The zero point, true north on the map, is zeroed with the antenna, and as you rotate the radius to the degree that you [645] received and the mileage, you make a point, and that will be the exact position on the map where the target is located in relation to the islands.
9. Q. Did you do anything with this information which you received in making this plot, other than plot it yourself?
A. This plot was not taken during our regular program. It was after 7 o'clock.
10. Q. I have not asked you about any particular one. This is just general.
A. Yes, sir. Since our operating problem was over and there was no one on the other end of the head set that the plotter has--
11. Q. I have not asked you about any particular time or plot. I am asking you what your custom was in the station when you received a radar contact and when you plotted it yourself. Was it your custom then to do something else with the information you had in the way of passing it on?
A. I misunderstood you completely. From the time I made out the plot, I would send it in over the plotter head set to the information center. The information would go directly to the information center.
12. Q. Who received this information on the other end, if you know?
A. Yes, sir, I do know. The plotter on the other end that would plot on the board at the main information center.
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13. Q. Had you received any instructions as to how your duties were to be performed?
A. Yes, sir.
14. Q. Were they given to you in written or oral form?
A. Oral form
15. Q. Were those instructions materially different from what you have already testified your duties were?
A. No, sir.
16. Q. Now, what was the organization of this post at Opana where you were stationed on the morning of December 7, 1941, with respect to personnel?
A. Well, sir, our detachment was located at Kawailoa with another unit. Kawailoa was about nine miles from the position where the detector was. We had no camp at the detector. The organization of the-that is, the title was the Signal Company Aircraft Warning, Hawaii, with their headquarters at Fort Shafter.
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17. Q. I am afraid that you have not understood my question. What was the organization of this particular duty station or radar plot at which you were stationed at about 0700 on December 7, 1941?
A. There were only two men there: Private Locard and myself.
18. Q. You have described the duties to which you were assigned at that station at that time. What were Locard's duties?
A. Private Locard's duties were to operate the scope; thereby giving me the information for my plots.
19. Q. How much instruction had you had in the duties that you were performing prior to December 7, 1941?
A. Between a week and a half to two weeks. That is for the plotting.
20. Q. Do you feel that you were at that time perfectly competent to perform the duties that had been assigned you?
A. Very definitely, sir.
21. Q. On the morning of December 7, 1941, had you had any information of the movement of friendly aircraft in the vicinity of Oahu?
A. No, sir, none whatsoever.
22. Q. I ask you specifically, Did you know of a flight of B-17's coming to Oahu from the mainland?
A. No, sir.
23. Q. At what time did you arrive at the Opana station for the purpose of assuming the duties to which you were assigned between four and seven on the morning of December 7, 1941?
A. The time we arrived at the unit at Opana was 12 o'clock noon, December 6. From that time we were expected to be there for a 24-hour tour of duty, as I said, for security reasons. Within that time, from four to seven in the morning, we were to operate our problem. Actually, we were there from December 6 at 12 o'clock noon.
24. Q. Had you been performing duties during this period of time, from 0400 to 0700 in the morning, on the days preceding December 7, 1941?
A. No, sir, not operating duties.
26. Q. Prior to December 7, 1941, at what hours during the day were you performing regularly assigned duties at the Opana station?
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A. Well, usually, sir, during the late morning or early afternoon. That, sir, was when I was receiving my training as a plotter. There were no scheduled hours.
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26. Q. There were no scheduled hours?
A. No, sir, there were no scheduled hours.
27. Q. Was the period from four to seven on December 7, 1941, a schedule of operation at Opana?
A. Yes, sir, it was.
28. Q. Do you know of any reason why this should have been a scheduled period on that morning?
A. No, sir, other than the fact that it was just a problem and that we knew at that time that all the plots we sent in were being recorded and checked. That is the only assumption that we had as to our operation.
29. Q. But that period from four to seven in the morning was the first time that you stood a tour of duty that early?
A. That is the first time I ever stood one. They had previously other men operating from four to seven.
30. Q. Had you been at Opana station daily for a number of days prior to December 7, 1941?
A. Yes, sir.
31. Q. Sunday, December 7, was the first morning that you had performed duties between the hours of four and seven; is that correct?
A. That is correct.
32. Q. For a few days preceding December 7, 1941, the duties that you performed at this station were done at some other period of time during the day?
A. Yes, sir.
33. Q. Were the times for performing these duties specifically prescribed as to some particular period during the day, or was it rather discretionary as to when you performed the duties?
A. I can't remember exactly, sir. I don't believe there were any prescribed times.
34. Q. Adverting to the morning of December 7, 1941, did anything out of the ordinary come to your attention after 0700 on that morning?
A. Yes, sir.
35. Q. Will you state what it was?
A. While I was at the scope receiving instructions as to its operation, Private Locard noticed a large echo on the scope. He was looking over my shoulder and could see it also. At first Private Locard thought it was the main pulse and that the mileage scale was off kilter. Checking the mileage scale, I found that it was actually a flight out at a distance of 137.
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36. Q. On what bearing?
A. At 2 degrees, sir.
37. Q. By true azimuth?
A. Yes, sir. Our maps were lined up by true azimuth.
38. Q. Can you recall the time of this observation?
A. Yes, sir, the time by our clock was two minutes after seven. However, sir, at the time I was notified to close down at the end of our scheduled problem, the time by our clock was 0654, and actually when I sent in the reading to the information center over the administrative line, it was about 0706, but in explaining it to him I gave the reading as of 0702.
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39. Q. When you received this information to which you have testified, was a plot made in Opana in accordance with what you said was your custom?
A. Yes, sir, it was.
40. Q. Who made this plot?
A. I made the plot, sir.
41. Q. Who did the talking between the station at Opana and the information center?
A. I did, sir, the very first time. You see, sir, at that time, and after we picked up the flight and after recording it on the plotting table, I suggested to Private Locard that we send it in to our information center. At that time Private Locard laughed at me and told me I was crazy for wanting to do it. I kept talking of this flight that we had received and even mentioned the fact that if it was Navy planes coming to the islands, if the Army were to send up interceptors, it would make a very fine problem. After speaking of it for some time, he told me to go ahead and send it in if I liked. At that time I tried to get the information center over the plotter's head set, and there was nobody there, so I called on the administrative line and spoke to the switchboard operator, who was Private McDonald. I explained to him what we had found, although I can't remember whether I gave the actual reading, that is, the code reading and location. I know that I gave the mileage and bearing, but I'm not sure of the other. After explaining to Private McDonald what Private Locard and I had found, Private McDonald stated that he did not know what to do about it, that there was nobody in the information center. I asked Private McDonald to get somebody who would know what to do, so with that I hung up, and Private McDonald called back the unit a few minutes later with the officer that was mentioned in the Roberts Report. I don't know his name, sir, but Locard picked up the 'phone and talked to the officer that was calling through Private McDonald's efforts, and that is when the officer told Private Locard that there was nothing to it and to forget.
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Frank M. Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frederick T. Latchat, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, withdrew.
42. Q. How do you know what this officer on the other end of the telephone told then Private Locard?
A. The only way I know, sir, is by Private Locard relaying it to me.
43. Q. Were any succeeding plots made of this flight of aircraft that was discovered at 0702 on 7 December 1941?
A. Yes, sir, I might mention, sir, that after receiving the telephone call from the officer, Private Locard wanted to shut down and I insisted on operating, and we followed the flight all the way in, taking readings every three to six minutes, I would say, to complete the flight all the way in to about fifteen or twenty-five miles off the island of Oahu, at which time, due to land obstructions on the oscilloscope, it was impossible to follow the flight any further.
44. Q. Was this plot recorded in any manner, a permanent record could have been kept of it?
A. Yes, sir.
45. Q. Do you know what happened to this plot?
A. You mean the chart, sir?
46. Q. The chart, the plot that you made.
490 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. Yes, sir, a very few days after December 7, it was around December 9-from the information that I heard it wasn't definite-the chart and the record of reading sheet was turned into Army G-2, Military Intelligence.
47. Q. You have no personal knowledge of this yourself, except by hearsay?
A. Yes, sir.
48. Q. After the initial telephone report that you have stated you made and the reply that then Sergeant Locard received from some one in the information center, were any further conversations-were there any further conversations between your post at Opana and the information center relative to these plots that you were receiving at that time?
A. None other, sir, than a personal telephonic conversation between Private Locard and Private McDonald. I might mention, sir, that in correction of your statement, Private Locard, the one you referred to, at the time was not sergeant. At the time he was private third class, specialist.
49. Q. Then so far as your information goes, no further reports were made from Opana to the information relative to [650] this flight of planes?
A. No, sir, there were not.
50. Q. Had any suggestion been made by either you or Private Locard as to the desirability of keeping the information center informed?
A. No, sir, there was not, because it was understood that there was nobody at the information center to receive our plots if we could send them in.
51. Q. When did you first become aware that there was an attack by an enemy force on the island of Oahu?
A. At 7:45, Private Locard and I were relieved from our duty at Opana by Private Lawrence and Private Hodges. The driver of the truck that came to Opana was Private Farmbeck. Private Farmbeck took us to our camp, which is nine miles from Opana, and upon our arrival at the camp we found the Japs were bombing Pearl Harbor.
52. Q. About what hour of the day was this when you arrived back at camp?
A. It was somewheres near 8:00 o'clock, sir. There was a highway to the camp, although it took at least five to eight minutes to climb down the mountain to get to the highway. It was somewhere very close to 8:00 o'clock, sir, as I remember it.
53. Q. Did you return to the Opana station on 7 December, 1941?
A Yes, sir. Our purpose for going back to camp was to get breakfast. However, we didn't eat breakfast. We packed our field bags and went right back to Opana.
54 Q. What time did you arrive back at Opana on the morning of 7 December 1941, if you did get back there?
A. Yes, sir, I did get back there, but I don't recall the time it was. It must have been very close around 9:00 o'clock, sir, because we had to pack up our field equipment and take our belongings out to Opana. I don't remember, sir, what time.
55. Q. On your return to Opana about 0900, as you have testified, did you yourself make any more plots of aircraft that day?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 491.
A. No, sir, I did not
56. Q. Did you observe anybody else make any plots from the Opana station on the morning of 7 December 1941?
A. Yes, sir, and the plots were made on the same chart as the original flight that I referred to a while ago. It [651] was made on the same chart, for all of the flights on December 7 were made on this one chart. That is the chart that was turned in to Army G-2.
57. Q. Can you recall whether or not during the time you were making these observations on the morning of 7 December, the plot revealed aircraft retiring from the Island of Oahu to seaward?
A. That I can't say for sure. I just know that there was quite a few plots on that chart. I don't believe they were able to follow the flights, that is, individual flights, because there were so many scattered flights.
The interested party, Admiral Harold R. Stark, U. S. Navy, did not desire to cross-examine this witness.
Cross-examined by the interested party, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Ret.):
58. Q. I understood you to say that you closed your station under directions at 6:54, at Opana, which you were operating?
A. Yes, sir.
59. Q. Who directed you to close then?
A. The plotter on the other end at the information center.
60. Q. Did your clock synchronize with his?
A. Sir, I don't remember as to whether a time-check was made.
61. Q. Did you make a time-check before you started operating that morning?
A. I can't remember, sir, whether we did or not, although, sir, it had been the usual procedure to do that.
62. Q. You had been out there at Opana for a week and a half or two weeks prior to 7 December?
A. Yes, sir.
63. Q. You never had been on the 4:00 to 7:00 watch before this particular Sunday?
A. No, sir, I had not.
64. Q. Do you know whether the station had been operating during those morning hours, before the 7th of December?
A. Yes, sir, I am sure that it was.
65. Q. Everyday?
A. I believe so, sir.
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66. Q. Although you hadn't been there?
A. No, sir, the testimony I just gave is what was told me. I mean there were schedules to operate from 4:00 to 7:00.
67. Q. Everyday?
A. Yes, sir. and I presume they did.
68. Q. Now how many were there in the unit that was supposed to be operating the station at any one time? How many were supposed to be in the unit that operated the station at one time?
A. At that time, sir, I believe the full crew was four men, possibly five-but I believe it was four at that time.
69. Q. What duties did they perform? You described what you did and what Locard did-and what did the other two or three do?
492 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. One man would be the crew chief. He would have taken charge of the unit as a whole, one man operating the scope, one man plotting and one motorman to take care of the gasoline engine for the auxiliary power we had.
70. Q. How many were there operating on this Sunday morning?
A. There were only two of us.
71. Q. Did only two of you go out on this 24-hour watch on Saturday noon?
A. Yes, sir.
72. Q. Who directed that?
A. Sergeant Murphy. Sergeant Murphy was in charge of our detachment at the time of December 7.
73. Q. Were you on the island of Oahu after the 7th of December for any considerable length of time?
A. Yes, sir, for about six months, sir.
74. Q. Did you testify as a witness before the Roberts Commission?
A. No, sir, I did not.
Cross-examined by the interested party, Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Ret.):
75A. Q. Sergeant, this problem that you were engaged in-was that a set-up that you had handed to you in advance? The problem that you engaged in on this Sunday morning-were you given the setup before you went on out to the station- [693] that you were to put through the telephones?
A. Yes, sir.
75B. Q. It was a prearranged problem?
A. Yes, sir, the problem was operated from the standard form.
76. Q. Then you hadn't got any planes on which you had data; your data was all imaginary, so to speak?
A. When we had actual flights we sent them in. On this particular morning, we had no flight whatsoever.
77. Q. And those flights that were sent in were on the data that was on your sheet of paper; is that correct?
A. I am sorry, sir, I don't--. We had no data to send.
78. Q. You said you were on a problem, didn't you?
A. Yes, sir.
79. Q. What was the problem?
A. The problem was to pick up targets and send them in to our information center.
80. Q. Suppose you had got no targets; then what did you do?
A. We sent none in.
Examined by the court:
81. Q. Sergeant, were two men all that were supposed to be out there that morning of December 1?
A. Sir, referring back to the gentleman's question here, as I remember, there should have been four men, but I can't--.
82. Q. Before you left your base or your quarters or your organization wherever it was, how many men were supposed to go out to be on duty that morning of December 7, at that station? There was you and Locard, and was anybody else supposed to go?
A. Yes, sir. Private Farmbeck was to go out there for motorman for the unit.
83. Q. And why didn't he go out?
PROCEEDINGS OF NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY 493
A. That, sir, I don't know.
84. Q. Who was supposed to check up to see that everybody that was supposed to be there actually was there? Whose duty was that?
A. Well, that would have been the duty of Sergeant Murphy, our detachment sergeant.
[654] 85. Q. You don't know whether the morning hours at that station were any different from the Sundays?
A. No, sir, they were the same, 4:00 o'clock until 7:00 in the morning.
86. Q. Opana was about nine or ten miles from your quarters?
A. Yes, sir.
87. Q. And you were supposed to be relieved at 7:00 o'clock Sunday morning, to go back to your quarters?
A. No, sir. There was no definite time that we were to be relieved to go to breakfast. Our original intention was to go to breakfast and come back to the unit and stay 'til 12:00 o'clock; but that was changed. The two men that came to relieve us at a quarter of 8:00 told us that we need not come back; that they could take over the duties of watching the unit for security reasons.
88. Q. Didn't you know when you left the quarters what time you were to be relieved, the hour you would be relieved? What hour did you expect to be relieved the next morning? You left on Saturday?
A. Yes, sir, at noon.
89. Q. What time did you expect to be relieved on Sunday morning to go back to breakfast?
A. There was no particular time to go to breakfast, sir.
90. Q. You were supposed to close down the station at 7:00 o'clock?
A. Yes, sir.
91. Q. Did you make any request on any higher authority to be allowed to remain there that morning?
A. Yes, sir, we had prearranged permission with the sergeant.
92. Q. Had you made any request for that particular morning, to be allowed to remain there overtime?
A. Well, for the operations purpose, yes, sir. We had asked Sergeant Murphy for permission to operate longer than 7:00 o'clock, for the purpose to instruct me further in the operation of the scope.
93. Q. That was permission for the extra training, but did you ask permission to stay out there in spite of your breakfast, in order that you could continue your operation?
A. No, sir, at that time our--.
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94. Q. I just want to know what your previous arrangement in the form of a request was?
A. I am not sure, sir, that I understand you.
95. Q. Well, was then the request you speak of made after you got to the unit?
A. No, it was prearranged. It was made before. We knew the Saturday afternoon that we came out there that we were going to operate longer than 7:00 o'clock.
96. Q. But by orders or by your request?
A. By our request, sir. This Sergeant Murphy who had charge of our unit would give us permission to operate over our scheduled time.
97. Q. Well, ordinarily, wouldn't that interfere if the truck came out there? Would you have to hold the truck up so you could operate when the truck came to take you to breakfast?
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A. Well, I don't even recall whether we were even going back to breakfast. I mean, they called and said they were going to send someone out for breakfast, or to relieve us, so we could go back to breakfast-but other than that, I don't recall of having a specified time that we were going to breakfast, or even that we would get any breakfast that particular morning.
98. Q. Had you any intimation of an attack, or had you been advised that war was becoming imminent?
A. No, sir. One thing, sir, I might say that made me a little cautious at that time. I had been in the Air Corps at Hickam Field and there was a sergeant that used to roll us out in the morning by saying, "Get up and get out; the Japs are coming!"-and every once in a while, why someone would say, "The Japs are coming." But it was all in a joking manner.
99. Q. Did you know of the existence of Alert No. 1?
A. At that time, no, sir.
100. Q. Do you know what Alert No. 1 signified?
A. No, sir, I don't.
101. Q. Well, it is a matter of public record that it is a precaution against sabotage. Were any particular precautions taken by the unit to which you were attached?
A. As I have stated, sir, before, we were there for security reasons. We had the 45-pistol and 7 rounds of ammunition. At all times somebody was present at the unit. There were always 2 men present at the unit.
102. Q. When did this begin, this procedure?
A. That began, sir, from the time that we moved out there. This was about 3 weeks to a month before Pearl Harbor.
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103. Q. Those were normal precautions that might be expected to be taken for the preservation of a station of that nature-nothing particular about it?
A. Yes, sir.
104. Q. As I understand it, there were several, at least 5, other stations, on that warning system?
A. Yes, sir.
105. Q. Was there direct communications between the stations of the system, or did they all have to go to the information center?
A. Yes, sir, in order to talk from one unit to another-that didn't hold true exactly. In a unit that was close together like say the unit that was at our quarters and the unit at Opana, the distance of 9 miles, we had a direct line between those two units.
106. Q. I am talking about radar units now. Was there a radar set at the place where your quarters were also?
A. Yes, sir, that was the purpose of it. We moved out to Opana, had no quarters whatsoever and we were quartered with this other unit that had already been there, and it was 9 miles away.
107. Q. When you and Private Locard both found that you could get no satisfaction over this suspicious occurrence-that is, the presence of a large number of pips on the scope-did it occur to you to try to get in communication with any other one in authority?
A. No, sir, I mean after an officer had ordered on it, nothing more was to be done about it. It would have been jumping over his head at that particular time if we tried to do anything more.
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Frank L. Middleton, yeoman second class, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter, entered. Frank Murrell Sickles, yeoman first class, U. S. Naval Reserve' reporter, withdrew.
108. Q. Have you any information acquired since to the effect that any such flight was detected by any of these other units?
A. Yes, the flight was detected by other units, although I believe it was a little later than our particular unit picked it up. The range, I believe, was greater on ours.
109. Q. Well, it was all after 7:00 a. m.?
A. Yes, sir.
110. Q. I am asking you now from your best recollection from subsequent information, because you had no other information at the time what the other stations did.
A. Well, on that morning, sir, that we returned to camp for our breakfast by Pearl Harbor, the particular units that we were quartered with had picked up a part of the flight that we had.
111. Q. Did you have any reason to believe that anybody had reported anything about this flight except your own unit?
A. Well, no, sir, just by hearsay. Other units had reported it, I think.
112. Q. To the information center?
A. Yes, sir.
113. Q. You don't know positively that any of these other four radar stations reported to the information center, do you?
A. No, sir, just by what I heard.
114. Q. You stated that this radar station was manned every morning from 4:00 to 7:00 during the week; is that correct?
A. Yes, sir, I'm sure it was, sir.
115. Q. Well, you are sure, but how do you know it was manned? Were you there to see that it was manned?
A. No, sir, I was not there.
116. Q. In other words, you simply think it was manned; is that correct?
A. That is right, sir
117. Q. Have you any idea as to the hours this station was manned? Do you know positively when this station was manned during weekdays?
A. Well, yes, sir. At the time I was present, I [658] know it was usually late in the morning or early afternoon on those weekdays.
118. Q. What do you call "late in the morning"?
A. Well, I would say anywhere from 9:30 until 12:00; until probably 3:30. I can't recall correctly just what time we did operate but I know it was about that time.
119. Q. To clear up this reference of your going out there for a problem, which I understood was a problem for Sunday morning. Now, it wasn't a problem, was it?
A. Well, that's what we termed it, yes, sir.
120. Q. Was that what you called it?
A. Yes, sir.
121. Q. Going on duty to guard the surrounding area and report the presence of planes? Was that designated by the term "problem"?
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A. Yes, sir, from 4:00 to 7:00. We knew that at that time, between 4:00 and 7:00 that all the plots that we sent in were actually being handled down in the information center and that men from the Navy, Marines, Coast Artillery, and all the different branches were down in the information center to work their problem on targets that we would pick up.
Re-examined by the judge advocate:
122. Q. Sergeant, you stated that during the week preceding 7 December you were at the Opana station working the sets in the late morning and early afternoon. At those times when you were working the set, was the information center functioning? Were you funneling the information in to the information center?
A. No, sir, we were not.
123. Q. In other words, am I correct in saying that any time outside of these 4:00 a. m., to 7:00 a. m., hours it was simply a practice session at the individual units, and the whole system, including the other units and the information center, was not in operation?
A. That, sir, I can't answer with full knowledge. I believe, though, that at that time certain units throughout the day took over picking up and sending in flights to the information center. One reason that we were left out of it was that it was a new unit and we had just put it up and there was quite a bit to be done, although I do believe some of the other units did report in.
None of the parties to the inquiry desired further to examine this witness.
The court informed the witness that he was privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating [659] to the subject matter of the inquiry which he thought should be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by the previous questioning.
The witness made the following statement: The Roberts Report; that is, the published report, states, in part, that a non-commissioned officer who was receiving training at that time picked up these planes. That is somewhat the wording. Anyhow, it says a non-commissioned officer. Well, at that time, sir, there was no non-commissioned officer present at our station during the operation. However, when Private Locard went to testify before the Roberts Commission, another staff sergeant, Sergeant Hilton, was put in charge of our detachment the day after Pearl Harbor. Now, he went in with him to the Roberts Commission, although sir, I don't know whether he testified nor whether that could have been where they got the non-commissioned officer, but as I stated before the Commission, Lieutenant Locard was a private at the time of December 7th.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The court then, at 2:45 p. m., adjourned until 9:30 a. m., Friday, August 25, 1944