554 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK ...
[1071] TESTIMONY OF COMMANDER WILLIAM E. G. TAYLOR, QUONSET NAVAL AIR STATION, CHARLESTOWN, R. I.
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel WEST. Commander, will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?
Commander TAYLOR. Commander William E. G. Taylor, attached to the staff of Commander Fleet Air, Quonset Naval Air Station Charlestown, Rhode Island.
2. General GRUNERT. Commander, this Board is making an attempt to get at the facts as to the background and what led up to and what happened in the attack at Hawaii. Through reading of the Roberts Commission report we assume that you have some facts that will be of value to us, primarily along the line of your assistance to the Army, your being loaned to the Army, I believe, to assist in putting in the air warning service and toward the interceptor command.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 555
Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir.
3. General GRUNERT. And General Frank will lead in propounding the questions, and the other members will try to keep from butting in until he gets through, but then we shall expand on it if necessary.
4. General FRANK. To what organization in the Navy did you belong in October, November, December of 1941?
Commander TAYLOR. I was attached to the Bureau of Aeronautics and was on temporary duty with Admiral Halsey's staff.
5. General FRANK. You were associated with the Army in Honolulu, in Hawaii, in the establishment of the aircraft [1072] warning service, were you not?
Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir, at the request of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force.
6. General FRANK. Were you over there for full time or part time, or just what was the arrangement?
Commander TAYLOR. The arrangement was verbal and informal. I was told to report to Interceptor Command by Admiral Kimmel's staff, and I worked with them full time there.
7. General FRANK. With whom particularly did you work in association over there?
Commander TAYLOR. I worked very closely with the Operations Officer of the Interceptor Command; his name was Captain--
8. General FRANK. Bergquist?
Commander TAYLOR. Bergquist; yes, sir.
9. General FRANK. Tindal also?
Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir.
10. General GRUNERT. Captain Powell?
Commander TAYLOR. There was one Captain of the Signal Corps whose name I can't recall. Is that he?
11. General FRANK. Powell.
Commander TAYLOR. Captain Powell.
12. Major CLAUSEN. He is a Colonel now.
Commander TAYLOR. He may be.
13. General FRANK. He was then Captain, now Colonel, Powell.
Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir.
14. General FRANK. When did you go over to assist the air force?
Commander TAYLOR. It was somewhere in the second week of [1073] November, sir. I am not sure of my dates.
15. General FRANK. At that time had the permanent radar sets, the 271s, arrived?
Commander TAYLOR. No, sir. They had, I think it was, five 270s around the Island, no 271s. They were on their way; they had not arrived.
16. General FRANK. I see. Where was the information center? Shafter?
Commander TAYLOR. The information center was off the reservation at Shafter. They had set up a special temporary information center.
17. General FRANK. Just where was it? Underground? Aboveground?
Commander TAYLOR. No, sir; this was above-ground, across the main road from Shafter, a temporary wooden house.
18. General FRANK. Over in the antiaircraft cantonment?
Commander TAYLOR. No, sir; it was, I thought, a special cantonment of its own.
556 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
19. General FRANK. They did have a certain number of 270 sets?
Commander TAYLOR. Yes, they had five, as I remember.
20. General FRANK. They had been placed in position?
Commander TAYLOR. When I joined the Interceptor Command they were in position. They had just been sighted. They had crews who were just learning to operate them. The communication lines were either all in, between the radar sets themselves and the information center, or were within the next few days; and there were a combination of either commercial land lines or Signal Corps field lines that were laid in.
21. General FRANK. So that they could be operated with [1074] commercial current?
Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir.
22. General FRANK. All of them?
Commander TAYLOR. There were all in. Within 2 or 3 days of the time I got there there were communications established between the sets themselves and the communication center.
23. General FRANK. And could they all be operated with commercial current?
Commander TAYLOR. That I do not know, sir. I think they were almost all operated at that time with auxiliary power.
24. General FRANK. Yes. When was the first test at which time an effort was made to determine whether or not they could operate as a system, an integrated system?
Commander TAYLOR. There was never a complete test run, sir, until after the attack, because we never had all the positions manned. We had practice tests; I don't remember from what date.
25. General FRANK. That is what I mean.
Commander TAYLOR. I can approximate it from the date of a meeting that I have the briefs of here (referring to papers).
On the 24th of November we had a meeting consisting of Colonel Murphy, Acting Signal Officer of the Hawaiian Department; Lieutenant Commander Coe, from Patrol Wing 2; Major Tindal, 18th Bombardment Wing; myself; Captain Bergquist, 14th Pursuit Wing; Lieutenant White, Signal Corps, Hawaiian :Department; Lieutenant Harville, 53rd Coast Artillery; and Lieutenant Thomas, 86th Observation Squadron (Support Command).
At the time of this meeting on 24 November the five 270s were operating with a skeleton crew. Communication lines were [1075] established between the 270s and the information center itself, but there were no communication lines from the information center itself to the various outlying activities.
26. General FRANK. That is, to the operating?
Commander TAYLOR. The operating. They had one main line to the switchboard at Wheeler Field, but the other lines were not in. They had positions for all of the liaison officers.
27. General FRANK. There were no lines in to the Navy and to the Anticraft and to Hickam Field, and so forth?
Commander TAYLOR. No, sir. We had, I think, a sufficient number of plotters to man two watches only, who were untrained, and the number one object was to get those men to start training at once.
The first difficulty we found with the setup at the information center was, it was too large for the area that we could cope with. In
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 557
other words, it was set up very much like the Boston or the New York information center, which is a general air warning system rather than a combination air warning system and interception system. The main plotting table had the-I think they had a radius of roughly 200 miles, which was well outside of the radar search area. The plotting table itself was too small in scale to make interceptions on; so that we first of all had to make an overlay on a smaller scale of the Oahu area, and I imagine that it took something in the neighborhood of another week after 24 November before we got the new overlay painted on the table and got the plotters in for our first practice. From that time on we spent as much time plotting the aircraft in the vicinity, [1076] giving the plotters practice, giving the radar operators at the different 270s practice. We went to each one of the 270s in turn and discussed the method of reporting to the information center.
28. General FRANK. Were positive, vigorous efforts being made to train as rapidly as possible all of the people concerned with the operation of the A. W. S.?
Commander TAYLOR. As much as then Captain Paul Bergquist and myself could do. We had to spend a great deal of time in conferences with practically every activity in Hawaii, trying to get a general liaison between all of the activities that were being tied in with the information center, and to get the manpower to run it.
29. General FRANK. Were the plotters enlisted or civilian?
Commander TAYLOR. They were enlisted, sir.
30. General FRANK. Was any effort made to get girls?
Commander TAYLOR. Not at that time, sir. I do not think the question of bringing in girls had come up at that point.
31. General GRUNERT. I am afraid I shall have to butt in here with one thing. I am afraid I will miss the opportunity.
Had you known that war was in the offing or that the enemy might strike early in December, by working day and night or what was necessary to get that thing in shape, could it have been in shape?
Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir. In this brief here we figure that if we had the manpower and the effort behind it we could have had the information center going satisfactorily within two weeks' time. There was only one weak point.
32. General FRANK. Within two weeks' time from when?
[1077]
Commander TAYLOR. From the date of this conference, which was on 24 November.
33. General FRANK. That would have put the ultimate date when?
34. General RUSSELL. December 8th.
35. General FRANK. With respect to this meeting that you had for the purpose of organizing the details of the A. W. S. and coordinating its activities, will you give us a resume of what was covered at that meeting?
Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir. It was decided that, although considerable equipment was on order and planned for the operation of the information center, the equipment would not be available for some time to come. Therefore every effort should be made to make the best use of the equipment on hand by the proper coordination of all various military and naval and civilian activities and equipment.
558 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
36. General FRANK. What equipment was it that was not going to be available?
Commander TAYLOR. It was mainly the proper permanent communications system for the air warning system, the permanent derax stations, the permanent communication lines, and mainly the physical communications throughout the radar equipment.
It was felt that the information center could be made to function adequately within the next two weeks. We found after that, after this, to qualify it, that that would be except for the air-to-ground radio communications. We learned that we could not keep contact with the fighter aircraft more than five miles offshore with the communication equipment we had at that time.
37. General FRANK. That was for intercepts?
[1078]
Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir. It was agreed that the function of the Information Center was of sufficient importance that the watch officers representing the various activities in this area should be carefully selected as principal, rather than excess officers, when assigned. In other words, they were willing to give us their excess officers if they could find them, but we wanted principal officers.
38. General FRANK. You wanted good ones?
Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir. It was felt that intelligence and training in the Information Center, rather than age, rank and experience, would be desirable in the selection of these officers.
It was realized that a great deal of detail work is necessary to get the Information Center coordinated with outlying activities. It was therefore desirable to have the Information Center manned at the earliest possible moment so that all hands would be trained.
It was felt that the then present mobile R. D. F. equipment was not all that might be hoped for, and it was agreed that the antiaircraft equipment might be tied in to it.
It was brought out that considerable confusion during recent exercises had been caused by the great number of airplanes operating around the Island at all times. They were not identified. It was felt that this could be brought under control in three ways:
(a) By having all aircraft flights reported to the Information Center by parent units through their Operations Rooms.
(b) By enforcing the Aircraft Approach Procedure.
(c) By requiring all planes approaching the Island of Oahu to report their position at least 60 miles at sea, before [1079] coming in.
39. General FRANK. In other words, to bring them under permissive control of the Interceptor Command?
Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir. There was no other means of identifying him.
In this connection, it was brought out that the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, had ordered radio silence of all aircraft during joint exercises. It was suggested that this be discussed with the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, for decision as to the value of radio silence as security.
The question of IFF was raised as a possible solution to eliminate confusion in determining whether aircraft approaching the Island were friend or foe.
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 559
40. General FRANK. "IFF" means Identification, Friend or Foe?
Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir. It was realized that it would be a very long time before all aircraft could be equipped with IFF, in addition to which it was believed that the present IFF did not operate on all these RDF frequencies, and it was therefore decided that this was not a reliable solution for some time to come.
It was brought out that considerable equipment had been withdrawn from the Interceptor Command and the Hawaiian Air Force for the use of the Ferry Command. This was mainly radio equipment.
41. General FRANK. I do not believe it is quite plain about IFF. Will you explain that very briefly as to the use of IFF so as to clear up the fact that through IFF you could identify the airplanes?
Commander TAYLOR. The airborne IFF is an electrical transmitting device used for the purpose of identifying friendly [1080] aircraft. In November, 1941, there were several various types of IFF in use, each one taking a special type of interrogating or challenging device.
It was decided of value to investigate the possibility of using the Information Center to operate Ferry Command, to eliminate any duplication and make available as much of this equipment as possible
42. General FRANK. What was the nature of the equipment?
Commander TAYLOR. It was mainly radio equipment powerful enough to operate the device offshore. It also had direction-finding equipment.
43. General GRUNERT. By whose authority was this equipment so changed?
Commander TAYLOR. I do not really know who did it, sir
44. General GRUNERT. You do not know whether it was the Commanding General of the Air Force or the Commanding General of the Department?
Commander TAYLOR. No, sir. I do remember that at that time the Ferry Command enjoyed a very powerful and secret position and was able to get better equipment and that the Interceptor Command was not.
Without knowing all of the details of the Ferry Command's problems, the possibility of using the Information Center for this purpose was not clear. However, it was felt that the Information Center was probably better equipped to handle Ferry Command flights. In this connection it was brought out that Ferry Command operations are carried on under conditions of great secrecy. This was held to be no obstacle, as the Information Center could be operated with the greatest degree of security at all times.
[1081]
The questions of gun control of ships in the harbor during air raids was discussed, and it was decided that this question should be taken up with the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet.
It was felt that the air-to-ground radio equipment at present available was not the best that could be hoped for, and it was therefore decided to investigate the possibility of utilizing other Army, Navy, Coast Guard or civilian radio facilities in the event of an emergency, if not at present.
560 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
As there had been some difficulties in the procedure for requesting telephone circuits for the Information Center, that is, requests had to be made of each of the many activities on the far end of the circuits, this question was presented to Colonel Murphy. Colonel Murphy agreed that all requests for circuits should and could be made by the Information Center.
It was agreed that all air-to-ground and air-to-ship radio procedure, of fighters at least, should be standardized. In view of a recent Bureau of Aeronautics, Navy Department letter to this effect, it was believed that all naval fighter squadrons were using the British system.
It was decided that communications liaison was vitally important and therefore all activities should be approached with a view of coordinating communications facilities to the best advantage of all concerned.
It was decided to investigate the probability or possibility of using naval ship-board radar to supplement the land-based RDF under all conditions of emergency; also to determine the most efficient method of communications between the Ships Warning Net and the Information Center.
45. General FRANK. Generally speaking, what was the situation [1082] with respect to equipment and training, on December 7, with respect to the A. W. S.?
Commander TAYLOR. On December 7 the plotters were reasonably well trained to watch and able to do checking without any controller on the plane. The only source of controllers we could find was to see the Squadron Commander of the Pursuit Squadrons at Wheeler Field. They were themselves very busy training their squadrons and had just received new, green pilots and were trying to get them into shape and, therefore, could not spend much time learning their complicated organization. We had no liaison people to man any of the positions. Therefore none of them were trained.
46. General FRANK. What about equipment?
Commander TAYLOR. The equipment itself? On December 7 all the communication lines were in; the radar stations; the Derax equipment was working satisfactorily enough to give air warning and possibly to make interceptions. The air-to-ground radio equipment was not satisfactory for interception work, but it was possible that enough advance information could be given to pilots so that they could come back without being intercepted.
47. General FRANK. The radio equipment that would have enabled control through interception a reasonable distance offshore had been given to the Ferry Command?
Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir.
48. General FRANK. What was the situation with respect to the supply of spare parts and spare tubes for the radar equipment?
Commander TAYLOR. That I do not know, sir. The Derax station seemed to be operating satisfactorily during the periods we were operating. There were a few Marines Corps 270's on the Island, which we later got hold of and put into place the train- [1083] ing. We put one of them actually into operation. They had some source of supply there. I do not know how great their source of materials and supplies was at the time.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 561
49. General FRANK. Generally speaking, then, the situation with respect to the organization and operation of the A. W. S. system was that it was about two weeks off?
Commander TAYLOR. Two weeks off. The only thing that was not carried through after this meeting to bring the thing into operation at the end of two weeks was the manpower to operate it.
50. General FRANK. And the training of that manpower?
Commander TAYLOR. And the training of the manpower; yes, sir
51. General FRANK. Do you feel that under the circumstances it was proceeding under normal conditions in a satisfactory manner?
Commander TAYLOR. Not entirely, sir. We had a great deal of difficulty getting the proper impetus to get any material or personnel. We had nobody to head it up, and we ourselves then did not carry enough power to get the equipment and get the manpower we wanted.
52. General FRANK. Was that because that at that time it was operating under both the Signal Corps and the Air Corps?
Commander TAYLOR. That could be, sir, except that the two junior officers of the Signal Corps and the Air Force were both working very closely together; but it was never headed enough by enough power to give it impetus so they could get it going.
53. General FRANK. What about General Davidson?
Commander TAYLOR. He was in the United States the early part of the time. I do not remember what date he got back to [1084] Hawaii.
54. General FRANK. I think it was the fifth.
Commander TAYLOR The fifth of what?
55. General FRANK. December.
Commander TAYLOR. It was pretty late by that time.
56. General FRANK. What was the general attitude toward the necessity for use of this against the enemy?
Commander TAYLOR. I do not think that anybody except possibly officers Bergquist and Powell, who had been to the Information Center School at Mitchel Field, realized exactly how important it was It was something new. They did not understand a great deal about it, and it was sort of a foster child at that time, we felt.
57. General FRANK. Was there any feeling among the rank and file as to the immediate possibility of war?
Commander TAYLOR. It is very hard to recall. You would find that quite a good deal of it with the young aviators and with some staff officers, but each department had some special job they were preparing for, and this was a sideline. As an example, the Bomber Command, air support, or antiaircraft would be mainly concerned with training and the Information Center was another thing that took more of their manpower and more of their time.
58. General FRANK. The time had not arrived when the aircraft warning service and the Information Center were ready to go into operation on a regular schedule; is that correct?
Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir.
59. General FRANK. It had not?
Commander TAYLOR. No, sir.
60. General FRANK. Did you know that on the morning of [1085] December 7 a flight offshore a distance of about 130 miles had been picked up by the Opana Station?
562 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Commander TAYLOR. I knew that afterwards; yes, sir. I did not get to the Information Center that morning until about 8:30 or 9 o'clock.
61. General FRANK. The report on that flight was made to the Information Center, but because of the fact that it was on a training basis rather than on a regular operating basis, the people to handle it were not there, and they had not even been regularly assigned to the organization. Is that correct?
Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir. There ordinarily would be just a skeleton crew, a house-cleaning crew after 7 o'clock, because of instructions which came, which I understood General Short gave, to operate the Derax station only between 0400 and 0700, and the flight was picked up after that time by an operator that was operating the equipment in violation of orders, and the officer who picked up the information in the Information Center was a Squadron Commander serving his first tour of duty and he knew nothing about the set-up in any sense of the word. In addition to that, it would be impossible for anybody to decide whether a flight picked up 130 miles away was a Japanese attack, one of our own carrier groups coming in, or a flight of bombers from the United States. As a matter of fact, one of them did come in at the same time and just added to the confusion. If we had had the information center completely manned there would have been some method of identification. Anybody could have told what that flight was.
62. General GRUNERT. I believe that in your testimony before the Roberts Commission you said something to the same effect, that this flight, if it was made, would not have meant anything [1086] to you?
Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir.
63. General GRUNERT. Was it not sufficiently organized at that time so that the representatives of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Corps knew what flights they had in the air and could tell whether or not the interception of the flight meant that that was one of theirs.
Commander TAYLOR. No, sir. At the time of the attack we had no liaison officers for the different aviation activities at all, and there was no liaison between their own operations and the Information Center. There was no procedure or system of identification established.
64. General GRUNERT. You were talking about your conference. This conference was held about November 24?
Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir.
65. General GRUNERT. Why was it not held on August 24 or September 10? Why November 24? Why did they wait that long to hold a conference on this important matter?
Commander TAYLOR. I do not know, sir. I called this conference.
66. General GRUNERT. When did they call on the Navy to give them assistance?
Commander TAYLOR. I think, not more than a week before that, sir.
67. General GRUNERT. Then you had no connection with it before about the middle of November, at the earliest?
Commander TAYLOR. No, sir
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 563
68. General GRUNERT. And then you did not know what should have been done or what might have been done before you got there?
[1087]
Commander TAYLOR. NO, sir. As a matter of fact, when I arrived I went straight to Wheeler Field, and the Information Center itself had just been completed. It was a question of two or three days one side or the other
69. General GRUNERT. Who did you find there that knew enough about it to take action before you got there?
Commander TAYLOR. There were only two officers, Captain Powell and Captain Bergquist who had been through the Information Center School of Mitchel Field. But that school was at that time fairly sketchy for the scope of the work they had to accomplish.
70. General GRUNERT. Then it would not have made much difference if all the material had been on hand and all the stations ready; there was no personnel to actually organize it and operate it?
Commander TAYLOR. No sir.
71. General GRUNERT. What caused you to say you would be ready in two weeks? Was there any one cause that determined two weeks? Why not ten days? Why not five days?
[1088]
Commander TAYLOR. We took a wrong figure. We probably could have had it going in two weeks or ten days, probably less. It is mainly a question of the minimum time we thought we could train people in order to get it going. In two weeks it would have meant a great deal of improvising.
72. General GRUNERT. But if somebody came down there and said "We have got to get this thing going; anything is liable to pop any minute, you might have shortened up the time?
Commander TAYLOR. I think that both Bergquist and Powell had that attitude, but, unfortunately, we could not get that much interest out of the people we dealt with
73. General GRUNERT. Could not Bergquist or Powell, or you, as far as the Navy was concerned, have had access to the Chief of Staff and said, "The most important thing is lagging, we have got to get it operating"?
Commander TAYLOR. We saw every Chief of Staff, but we found that somebody else was always responsible.
74. General GRUNERT. So they were not sufficiently impressed to make this their business or push it in comparison with all the other things they had to do?
Commander TAYLOR. No, sir. They lacked the powerful backing to get it going.
75. General GRUNERT. General Short expressed himself as most concerned about getting this in. It seems to me, if you had approached him, he would have been able to do something about it. Do you know whether or not permanent radar equipment had been on the Island awaiting construction projects, such as roads, cables, and so forth?
[1089]
Commander TAYLOR. It could be, sir, but not according to the Signal Corps. My information is from the Signal Corps officers on the station.
76. General GRUNERT. You could not have operated those permanent ones, anyway, unless they were in position?
Commander TAYLOR. No, sir.
564 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
77. General GRUNERT. There were no naval officers attached to that center at that time, were there?
Commander TAYLOR. No, sir.
78. General FRANK. Other than yourself?
Commander TAYLOR. I was just loaned to help set it up.
79. General GRUNERT. There was one remark that set me back when I saw it in your testimony. You said you never saw Short. Was he not the Commanding General and was he not around there?
Commander TAYLOR. I saw his Chief of Staff. I saw his Operations Officer. We were very closely tied in with his staff and the Air Force staff.
80. General GRUNERT. You also were afraid it was breaking down, and I think you said you changed to the auxiliary power equipment?
Commander TAYLOR. I did not say that, did I, sir?
81. General GRUNERT. It states in the record that the auxiliary power equipment was breaking down, and General Short's order was that the operation should be from 4 to 7 in the morning.
They did not install the commercial power?
Commander TAYLOR. I had forgotten that. I do not remember it now, sir.
[1090]
82. General GRUNERT. You did operate with the auxiliary power?
Commander TAYLOR. I know we operated with auxiliary power in at least three of the places, because there were no land lines out there.
83. General GRUNERT. I understand from your testimony that the permanent sets were the same as the mobile sets?
Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir.
84. General GRUNERT. And it was some time before commercial power would be put in. Was there no commercial power hook-up for radio stations at that time?
Commander TAYLOR. No, sir.
85. General GRUNERT. You said that telephone equipment had not arrived from the United States and that it would take two weeks to a month. That was equipment in addition to the complete radar itself?
Commander TAYLOR. That was the permanent telephone equipment necessary for intercommunication within the information center itself.
86. General GRUNERT. Could not that equipment have been taken out of some less important place and used?
Commander TAYLOR. The equipment we were using was more or less the last war type, field service equipment which, although not perfect, could be made to work.
87. General GRUNERT. Were you aiming at the ultimate, or only the best of what you had?
Commander TAYLOR. We were improvising; we had to improvise.
88. General RUSSELL. Where had you gotten your experience?
Commander TAYLOR. My experience, General, was mainly [1091] from the point of view of a fighter pilot, two years in England, one year with the British Navy, and one year with the Air Force.
89. General RUSSELL. In the American Army this was a new development, was it not?
Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 565
90. General RUSSELL. And the only people you found around the Hawaiian Islands who were capable, from the standpoint of training, to carry on, were those two men whose names you gave?
Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir.
91. General RUSSELL. Did you know that General Davidson, together with other officers, had been sent to the mainland to study this very thing and work out plans to set up what you were working out when you got there?
Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir; I did know that.
92. General RUSSELL. There was not very much impetus at all being given to the establishment of this center until you arrived on the scene and organized it?
Commander TAYLOR. No, sir.
93. General RUSSELL. So far as you know, everything was awaiting the return of General Davidson?
Commander TAYLOR. I would like to qualify that, sir, because the impetus was actually supplied, what there was it, by Colonel Bergquist, at whose request I was loaned from the Navy.
94. General RUSSELL. You were sent up there simply because you knew the subject and they did not?
Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir; at the request of Captain [1092] Bergquist.
95. General RUSSELL. It has occurred to me in reading the testimony that General Grunert referred to, and in hearing your testimony this afternoon, that you have taken the position that a condition precedent to the successful operation of this system in picking up enemy planes at sea was the existence of some means for identifying aircraft?
Commander TAYLOR. I do not understand your question.
96. General RUSSELL. In other words, if you picked up ships and did not know whether they were friendly or hostile, the information was of little value?
Commander TAYLOR. That is correct.
97. General RUSSELL. YOU did state that there was a type of equipment by which this could be done?
Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir.
98. General RUSSELL. Do you know when that equipment reached the Hawaiian Department?
Commander TAYLOR. The equipment at that time was of two or three different types, so that it would be of very little value. The Army was sure that the equipment could be delivered from the Army equipment, but it would not work the Navy equipment, and vice versa.
99. General RUSSELL. How long did you stay out there?
Commander TAYLOR. I was out there for four months, November to February.
100. General RUSSELL. When you left in February had equipment for identification purposes been received in the Islands?
Commander TAYLOR. No, sir
[1093]
101. General RUSSELL. It had not been?
Commander TAYLOR. No, sir.
102. General RUSSELL. Therefore in February you did not have a satisfactory air warning service out there?
Commander TAYLOR. No, sir.
566 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
103. General GRUNERT. Was it not possible in the information center, through organization and having liaison officers there, to know what was in the air, after it was well organized?
Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir. That was organized and did work once the emergency was there.
104. General RUSSELL. The people who were to give the information indicated by General Grunert could only give you information on their planes, the ones they knew about, could they not?
Commander TAYLOR. Yes; but we had to get all the activities together and get some coordination. We could not get them together.
[1094]
105. General GRUNERT. Could there be any friendly planes that somebody did not know about?
Commander TAYLOR. Occasionally. after the attack, when we had the identification system; but occasionally a friendly airplane would come in, in violation of the proper approach system, and they would then send an interceptor out to intercept it. In any case, we did not let it come in, and we would not use the air-raid siren ordinarily. It was not working 100%, but it worked very satisfactorily.
106. General RUSSELL. It was not essential?
Commander TAYLOR. No, sir; it was not essential.
107. General RUSSELL. All right. I asked you if it was essential, and you said Yes.
Commander TAYLOR. I am sorry, sir.
108. General FRANK. As a matter of fact, that is true, even in England, where it is very highly organized?
Commander TAYLOR. Even now, it doesn't work.
109. General RUSSELL. That is all I have.
110. General GRUNERT. Is there anything else?
111. General FRANK. No.
112. General GRUNERT. Thank you, Commander. We appreciate your coming in and helping us out.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
(Brief recess.)