PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 2289
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MUNITIONS BUILDING.
Washington, D. C.
The Board, at 4 p. m., pursuant to recess, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.
Present: Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President; Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell and Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, Members.
Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder; Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder; and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.
General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel WEST. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.
Colonel TINDAL. Lorry N. Tindal; Colonel, Air Corps; station, headquarters, Ninth Air Force, APO 696.
2. General GRUNERT. Colonel, in this particular part of our investigation, General Frank, assisted by Major Clausen, will develop what we hope to get from you. General Frank.
3. General FRANK. On what duty were you in December 1941?
Colonel TINDAL. I was the S-2 and assistant S-3 of the bomber command, at Hickam Field, sir.
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4. General FRANK. When had you been with the fighter command, at Wheeler Field?
Colonel TINDAL. About a month previous to that. I had the Fifteenth Fighter Group, and they decided to put in younger fighter group commanders, so they relieved the two group commanders they had and put in youngsters.
5. General FRANK. On what date were you relieved from the Fighters?
Colonel TINDAL. I don't remember that. It was about the 1st of November, I believe-October or November-I do not remember.
6. General FRANK. So you had been away from there just about a month when the attack came?
Colonel TINDAL. Yes, sir; about a month, or six weeks, something like that.
7. General FRANK. You had had some education in the organization and operation of an interceptor command, had you not?
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Colonel TINDAL. Yes, sir.
8. General FRANK. Where?
Colonel TINDAL. At New York.
9. General FRANK. You went to the First Air Force School?
Colonel TINDAL. I went to the First Air Force School. No, it was not called the First Air Force School, then. It was called the Air Defense Command School.
10. General FRANK. And when did you go to that school?
Colonel TINDAL. In March 1941.
11. General FRANK. You know that, when the attack came on Pearl Harbor there was in effect a No. 1 Alert, in the Hawaiian Department?
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Colonel TINDAL. I don't exactly understand what you mean by the "No. 1 Alert," General.
12. General FRANK. The alerts were numbered, No. 1, No. 2, and No. 3, and the No. 1 Alert was the lowest type of alert. It was an alert against sabotage, only.
Colonel TINDAL. That is correct, sir.
13. General FRANK. When you were with the Fighter Command, had there been these three systems of alert?
Colonel TINDAL. As well as I remember, there were.
14. General FRANK. When the No. 1 alert was in effect, were there any fighter planes that were on an alert of more readiness than four hours?
Colonel TINDAL. I don't remember, General. I don't think so; but I don't know for sure; I don't remember.
15. General FRANK. It seems that we have testimony some place in the record to the effect that, notwithstanding the fact that the No. 1 Alert was called for, for the planes to be brought in on the apron and "herded," so to speak, nevertheless, a certain percentage of them were loaded with ammunition, and the pilots kept on an alert of greater readiness than four hours. Do you know whether or not that was true?
Colonel TINDAL. No, sir; I don't.
16. General FRANK. Had it been true when you were group commander?
Colonel TINDAL. There was always a rule that not more than fifty percent of the personnel would be away from the post, but, as well as I remember, that is the extent of the alertness, as to available planes and personnel.
17. General FRANK. Do you know what the situation was, on the [4490] morning of December 7, with respect to the number of fighter planes that had ammunition?
Colonel TINDAL. There were two squadrons on the outlying fields that were doing gunnery, one, at Haleiwa, and one at our regular gunnery field, at Mokuleia-not at Mokuleia-at Bellows Field. They were loaded.
18. General FRANK. Were the other airplanes loaded, do you know?
Colonel TINDAL. The ones at Wheeler Field, I do not know about, sir. I only know that the ones at Haleiwa and Bellows Field were loaded, because it was a habit to load those airplanes after each mission, so that they would be constantly loaded, and to load them the night before, for the next morning's missions At that time I had no connection with the Fighter Command, but I knew that those were the habits that were in force at that time.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 2291
19. General GRUNERT. Did that apply to the Saturday night?
Colonel TINDAL. Oh, yes, sir!
20. General FRANK. Do you know what fighter action these planes in the outlying fields participated in, on the morning of December 7?
Colonel TINDAL. Yes, sir.
21. General FRANK. Will you tell us.
Colonel TINDAL. The outfit, the squadron that was at Haleiwa was not attacked, except for one strafing plane, and they were not hurt, and they took off. The pilots, some of them were at Wheeler Field, some were at Haleiwa, and they took off and made such interceptions as they could, returning to Haleiwa for arms and fuel. The ones at Bellows Field were [4491] attacked, and suffered quite heavily, but they also got some planes off, and also intercepted and attacked such Japanese planes as they could.
22. General FRANK. Did you have anything to do with the organization and construction of the information center?
Colonel TINDAL. Yes, sir.
23. General FRANK. What was it? Will you tell us your experience, there.
Colonel TINDAL. After I came back from the school in New York, Colonel Bergquist, who was also with me at the school, and Colonel-the signal corps man-I forget his name, now.
24. General FRANK. Powell?
Colonel TINDAL. No, no; not Powell. This Signal Corps man was subsequently sent to the Philippines, where he died.
25. General FRANK. Murphy?
Colonel TINDAL. Murphy. Murphy was also at the school. The three of us, with the help of all the other signal people we could get hold of, tried to put together, with what materials we could get our hands on by "beg, borrow, and steal," an interception center. We first built one at Wheeler Field in the basement of the headquarters building there, and, later on, after searching around a good bit for a place to put one, we found a storage shed in the cable yard.
26. General FRANK. At Schafter?
Colonel TINDAL. At Shafter. There, we built the one that was in use until they finished the tunnel under the mountain. The one in the cable yard worked very well, as a makeshift, but it was not the best in the world, by any means.
27. General FRANK. That did operate, immediately following [4492] the attack of December 7, did it not?
Colonel TINDAL. Oh, yes, sir! That was operating before the attack on December 7, sir.
28. General FRANK. And it operated successfully for a period of time after the attack?
Colonel TINDAL. Yes, sir.
29. General FRANK. Until the one in the tunnel was completed?
Colonel TINDAL. It operated until the tunnel was completed and the installation made, there.
30. General FRANK. That was about when, do you remember?
Colonel TINDAL. About five months later
31. Major CLAUSEN. You were at the information center on the morning of 7 December 1941, sir?
Colonel TINDAL. That is where I went when the bombing started.
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32. Major CLAUSEN. And could you describe the condition that you observed when you arrived at the information center? Was it in operation?
Colonel TINDAL. It was in operation, but it was in quite a turmoil. The suddenness of the attack and the shock of the attack I suppose kind of threw them off their feet.
33. Major CLAUSEN. What time did you arrive, sir?
Colonel TINDAL. I arrived at about 8:20, I imagine.
34. Major CLAUSEN. Did you assist in the work at the information center at that time?
Colonel TINDAL. Yes. That is what I went there for.
35. Major CLAUSEN. Did you observe attempts being made by the operators and the men stationed there to ascertain the direction of the planes that were returning to their carriers?
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Colonel TINDAL. The men on the plotting board were working. They were carrying out their duties, I believe, to the best of their ability.
36. Major CLAUSEN. And did you observe the various plots that were being made?
Colonel TINDAL. Yes.
37. Major CLAUSEN. Were you able to ascertain the direction of the returning planes, returning to their aircraft carriers?
Colonel TINDAL. There were so many plots on the board, all at once, that it was hard to ascertain any single path, or any definite pattern of airplanes returning. However, to the southwest of the island, there were very definitely two tracks to the southwest, ending in a couple of circles, oh, about 30 to 60 miles away.
38. Major CLAUSEN. Were these stations that were then the source of the information mobile stations?
Colonel TINDAL. Yes.
39. Major CLAUSEN. And, from your experience in Hawaii and other places, could you tell the Board whether, if the permanent, higher stations had been constructed, you would have been able to have ascertained this information more accurately?
Colonel TINDAL. The mobile stations that were then operating were in the positions that they were going to put their permanent stations in, I believe; and the mobile station is exactly the same equipment that your permanent station is.
40. Major CLAUSEN. If the higher stations had been completed, do you know if the direction of these returning planes could have been ascertained more accurately?
Colonel TINDAL. Yes.
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41. Major CLAUSEN. And is it a fact they could have been obtained more quickly?
Colonel TINDAL. Yes, in my opinion.
42. Major CLAUSEN. I have nothing else.
43. General RUSSELL. Who was operating this information center when you reached it on Sunday morning, Colonel?
Colonel TINDAL. The plotters around the board, who were connected by wire to the radar stations, were operating the board. There was a man on the balcony who was making a record of the plots, and those records I think have been maintained; they are in the files, somewhere.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 2293
44. General RUSSELL. The point is this, that there were people who had been trained and designated to operate this information center, is that correct?
Colonel TINDAL. Yes, sir
45. General RUSSELL. And you regard them as people who were capable of operating it that morning?
Colonel TINDAL. Yes, sir.
46. General RUSSELL. About how many people were used under the plan at that time to operate the information center?
Colonel TINDAL. To operate the information center, on a regular operating basis, with the number of radar stations we had at that time, which I think was four, it would take one man for each radar station, and it would take four on the Island of Oahu.
47. General RUSSELL. Assuming that they had six stations, then they would have to have six operators?
Colonel TINDAL. They would have to have one listener and one plotter for each radar station.
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48. General RUSSELL. Well, would the listener and the plotter be the same fellow?
Colonel TINDAL. Oh, yes! Yes, sir. The operator of the radar talks continually to this man at the board, and he makes the plots as he is told, on the board, and then your fighter officer and your artillery officer and your Navy officer in the balcony above, and the bomber officer, handle their respective jobs.
49. General RUSSELL. Were they all there, that morning?
Colonel TINDAL. No, sir.
50. General RUSSELL. These people you are talking about?
Colonel TINDAL. No, sir.
51. General RUSSELL. None of those people got there, at all?
Colonel TINDAL. The fighter man was there, sir.
52. General RUSSELL. Now, you have not seen the set-up they have got in the information center out there now, have you?
Colonel TINDAL. Yes.
53. General RUSSELL. How many people have they got running these 26 stations, now, do you know, in that information center?
Colonel TINDAL. Oh, I don't know how many are in there, now.
54. General RUSSELL. Are there a hundred?
Colonel TINDAL. I don't know how many are in there, now.
55. General RUSSELL. There are a lot of folks around there?
Colonel TINDAL. Yes; there are a lot of folks.
56. General RUSSELL. Do you know why they put 26 radar stations on the island out there, at this time?
Colonel TINDAL. 26? They are a different type of radar, General. There are some long-range and some short-range.
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57. General RUSSELL. That is all I have.
58. General GRUNERT. What is the procedure for the SOP as to the fighter squadrons going up to fight? Do they go up individually, in flights, or what?
Colonel TINDAL. General, it depends on what they are going up to fight. If they are going up to fight a small force, they will send a flight. They do not send a great big force to tangle with a small one, it is not necessary, and they are told they may be dispatched in flights, individually, or by squadron or group.
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59. General GRUNERT. What I want to get at is, on the morning of the 7th, how did they go up? Were they organized to fight, or did they go up as individuals, to do the best they could?
Colonel TINDAL. They went up as individuals, sir.
60. General GRUNERT. And then they just went up to do the best they could under the circumstances?
Colonel TINDAL. Yes, sir.
61. General GRUNERT. As to the information center, in plotting the flights of the planes in the air, could they tell whether the flight was enemy or friendly?
Colonel TINDAL. No, sir.
62. General GRUNERT. Then it was not a well organized, functioning information center as we know it now?
Colonel TINDAL. Well, our fighters at that time, in Hawaii, did not have the identification, friend or foe.
63. General GRUNERT. Then all they could do was plot what was in the air?
Colonel TINDAL. Yes.
64. General GRUNERT. And the ones on the balcony could not [4497] tell whether they were friend or foe?
Colonel TINDAL. Yes, sir. The Navy people, the Navy officer, there, should know where the Navy planes are. He is in direct communication with his own headquarters, who keep him informed as to where his planes are. The bomber people are kept informed from the bomber headquarters where the bombers are.
65. General GRUNERT. But, on the morning of the 7th, there was no such organization?
Colonel TINDAL. No, sir.
66. General GRUNERT. There was no Navy representative there, no liaison officer?
Colonel TINDAL. No.
67. General GRUNERT. Was there a bomber representative?
Colonel TINDAL. No, sir. They had, as well as I remember, one officer on duty. They kept one officer on duty in the place, at all times, and that one was on duty, at the time.
68. General GRUNERT. In your opinion, was the radar station plus the information center about as well along in the organization as could be expected at that time? In other words, you were there assisting in setting it up, and was it satisfactory to you? Had they made satisfactory progress, as far as you could determine? If they didn't, do you know what caused delays, and why were they not in better shape?
Colonel TINDAL. I don't believe that the information center was functioning at its best efficiency.
69. General FRANK. When?
Colonel TINDAL. At that time.
70. General GRUNERT. Define it a little more.
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Colonel TINDAL. I would say in a period of time before and after December 7-I mean before December 7, anyway; due primarily I think to the lack of knowledge, the lack of knowledge of the people; I mean all the forces concerned, in what radar could do if properly applied.
71. General GRUNERT. That was one handicap. Now, how about the "push" that was back of them in getting them started? Was there
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 2295
a lack of interest, or was there a lack of realization as to the functions, or what?
Colonel TINDAL. In my opinion there was, sir.
72. General GRUNERT. There was what?
Colonel TINDAL. A lack of push, a lack of interest, and a realization of what the thing would do.
73. General GRUNERT They didn't have the liaison officers necessary, detailed, and properly instructed?
Colonel TINDAL. On the 7th? No, sir.
74. General GRUNERT. But they could have had, had they "doped" the situation as being as serious as it turned out to be; they could have had them there and had them instructed, could they not?
Colonel TINDAL. Yes, sir.
75. General GRUNERT. You have had practices, in tests and exercises, in which the center functioned fairly well?
Colonel TINDAL. Yes, sir.
76. General GRUNERT. And at that time they showed an interest because of the exercise, was that the idea?
Colonel TINDAL. Well, it is sort of a "new toy," you know, General.
77. General FRANK. And the Service had to be sold on it?
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Colonel TINDAL. It had to be sold; yes, sir.
78. General GRUNERT. But, had they "doped" the situation properly, that selling would not have taken long, if they thought something was imminent?
Colonel TINDAL. I don't believe if the situation had been "doped" properly, that the station would have been quite so empty as it was at that time, sir.
79. General GRUNERT. In your opinion, was it possible to get these liaison officers, to instruct them, and to be able to know of the various components in the air, so that the thing could have been made to function in case an enemy raid came in, that they could locate it at a reasonable distance and report it?
Colonel TINDAL. Yes, sir.
80. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions?
81. General FRANK. Had those people been present in the exercises that they held along the first part of October or November?
Colonel TINDAL. Now, which people is that, General?
82. General FRANK. These liaison people.
Colonel TINDAL. Liaison people?
83. Colonel FRANK. Yes.
Colonel TINDAL. Yes, sir; they had them present at those exercises.
84. General GRUNERT. Is there anything else that you think of that you might tell the Board, that would give us a better understanding, or would give us a better opportunity to come to conclusions, primarily as to the air warning service and the information center?
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Colonel TINDAL. I believe that the air warning service and the information center-the air warning service was on the job. They were doing a good job. They were operating their equipment, and the time of operating this equipment, as well as I remember it, at that time, was an hour before sunrise to an hour after sunrise, the maintaining of a watch, and the equipment was operating it, as the record of the plots during that period show. I think if more interest had been put in the building up and the making of an information
2296 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
center, that probably it would have gotten along a lot faster, and people would have been better trained.
85. General GRUNERT. And if they had had that interest, the training would have followed, and if they had had a 24-hour service, then you think it would have been of great value?
Colonel TINDAL. Yes; I do.
86. General GRUNERT. Are there any more questions? Thank you very much for coming.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
(Thereupon, at 4:35 p. m., the Board, having concluded the hearing of the testimony of the witness, took up the consideration of other business.)