222 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT KERMIT A. TYLER, AIR CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you state your full name, Lieutenant?

Lieutenant TYLER. Kermit A. Tyler.

The CHAIRMAN. And your rank?

Lieutenant TYLER. First Lieutenant, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What was your assignment prior to December 77 1941?

Lieutenant TYLER. I was assigned to the Eighteenth Pursuit Squadron.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you at any special duty on or about December 7, 1941?

Lieutenant TYLER. MY special detail was pursuit officer at the interception control board, Fort Shafter.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right here on this reservation?

Lieutenant TYLER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Tell us all that happened that Sunday morning?

Lieutenant TYLER. On Sunday morning I reported, in compliance with my instructions, to the interception control board, at four o'clock in the morning. There was no activity observed on the board, as near as I remember, until, I suppose, 6:10 or thereabouts. At that time a number of plots or indications, some arrows, appeared on the board to show that there was aircraft flying around the islands. I noted that there [369] was one in the vicinity south of Kauai and there was also one south of Molokai shortly after seven o'clock in the morning at a distance of-I think it was-130 miles north of Oahu. A couple of plots appeared on the board.

This activity gradually increased in the general direction of the Island. I think it was just about seven o'clock.

All the plotters that put these arrows on the board folded up their equipment-they have headsets to receive their information-and folded up their equipment and went out to breakfast. All the rest did as they were doing.

At that time, just prior to this folding up, I noted that there was a man on the drafting board and was completing this thing. I did

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not know what he was doing. I asked him what his job was, as to what he was doing and he told me he makes a historical record of the plots that appear on the board. In other words, if they were practicing something, generally to find out what it was so that we can trace it back.

I don't remember that these two plots north of the Island were on the main board. They were some distance out, but I know they were on the drafting board, because I saw they were side by each.

The CHAIRMAN. Is this the plot (handing a document to Lieutenant Tyler)?

Lieutenant TYLER. This does not look to me like the one, but it may have been.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, at any rate, it was a plot something like that?

Lieutenant TYLER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the idea of the plot?

Lieutenant TYLER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. When you looked at it you saw what?

Lieutenant TYLER. I saw those two little plots. It was right after that that the operator, or all the fellows and [370] this draftsman also left.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you do anything about the plots?

Lieutenant TYLER. No, sir. I had previously only once seen the board in operation, and it looked to me like the usual thing. I had seen just the same setup on the board, saw these plots all over the place, and I had no reason to suspect, so far as I am concerned, that there was anything irregular going on.

The CHAIRMAN. You thought these might be friendly planes?

Lieutenant TYLER. Yes, sir. That is my thought. I did not know they were anything else. I thought that is what they could be, or possibly some friendly craft.

About seven-twenty the operator from Opana contacted the station.

The CHAIRMAN. You were still in the control room?

Lieutenant TYLER. Yes, I was detailed from four to eight a. m.

The CHAIRMAN. Why would you stay there after the headset operators had left?

Lieutenant TYLER. Well, I was detailed to be there those hours, so I just stayed.

The CHAIRMAN. And you stayed?

Lieutenant TYLER. Yes. About seven-twenty, I believe, the operator of the Opana radio direction finding station told me that he had followed these plots and that there was a large number of aircraft, he thought.

Well, perhaps I should have done something. I don't know, but it seemed to me that there was still nothing irregular, that they probably might be friendly craft. So I thought about it for a moment and said, "Well, don't worry about it," and went back awaiting the hour and time until the next relief.

At about between ten and five minutes of eight I heard some noise outside and went out to see what was going on, and saw what I thought to be Navy bombers in bombing practice over [371] at Pearl Harbor. Thereafter I heard a few bursts of antiaircraft fire.

About a little after eight Sergeant Starry from Wheeler Field called me and said, "There is an attack at Wheeler Field," and I told

222 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

the operator to remain on duty, so I immediately told him to recall the plotters and receivers of this information.

They came back and it was at about that time that Major Tindal, one of the controllers, came in and took charge of the situation.

From then on I just assisted him in communications and whatever I could do. I still did not know very much about the setup because of my first experience.

The CHAIRMAN. You attempted to trace back the Japanese planes?

Lieutenant TYLER. They were plotted, I believe, on this historical record. I did not oversee it, because there was quite a bit going on and it was lots doing.

The CHAIRMAN. You got the impression that they did trace the planes going to the north after the attack?

Lieutenant TYLER. The stations were all operating. The plotters were there; so I thought the operators certainly got them.

The CHAIRMAN. Lieutenant, was the information that these stations received, which was coordinated at the control room, to your knowledge transmitted by telephone to the air force so as to direct the air force to get the pursuit planes in the air after the air bombardment? The stations were kept running in tracing these Japanese planes?

Lieutenant TYLER. Yes, sir, as soon as the call was made.

The CHAIRMAN. No one from the control room would have sent to the particular officer of the air force whatever information you got?

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Lieutenant TYLER. I did not personally call anyone.

The CHAIRMAN. Did they send any command there?

Lieutenant TYLER. I was the only officer there, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And the men?

Lieutenant TYLER. Yes, until Major Tindal got there.

The CHAIRMAN. When did he get there?

Lieutenant TYLER. Eight-fifteen or eight-twenty.

The CHAIRMAN. Then when you started to trace the receding planes, didn't Major Tindal call up the air force base, to your knowledge, and direct them, tell them in which direction they had gone?

Lieutenant TYLER. I don't know that. Major Bergquist and Major Tindal were really in charge, as they had training on the mainland and were working with the installation.

The CHAIRMAN. And you were more or less an observer after that?

Lieutenant TYLER. That is correct, yes.

General McCoy. Was there any other officer there at that time?

Lieutenant TYLER. No, sir. I was the only officer there until the Major came or it may have been a signal corps officer before that, but I don't know. He didn't have anything to do.

General McCoy. Didn't you transmit this information of the plotted planes to anyone?

Lieutenant TYLER. No, sir

General McCoy. Why not?

Lieutenant TYLER. The historical record was there, and I felt if they had anything left to fight with, it would be there to use. As a matter of fact, it didn't occur to me to do anything about it at the time, sir. I was so confused with the situation.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you perhaps misunderstood General McCoy's question. As I understand your testimony, it was that [373] before you knew of the actual attack you thought that this was a normal movement of friendly planes?

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Lieutenant TYLER. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Therefore you did not communicate with anyone?

Lieutenant TYLER. That is right. I communicated with no one.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, you would have if you had thought these were enemy planes?

Lieutenant TYLER. Yes.

General McCoy. Did you know of the coming in of the friendly planes from the mainland?

Lieutenant TYLER. No, sir, I did not. However, I suspected they were coming because as a matter of fact on coming to work from two-thirty to four I heard the station so I thought these were B-17's coming in, and that confused me still more.

The CHAIRMAN. You thought they were friendly planes?

Lieutenant TYLER. I thought they were off course and that they were maybe working out some problem, and it confused me.

The CHAIRMAN. And on this particular morning the Navy may have had a task force in that neighborhood?

Lieutenant TYLER. The movement of the Navy was usually secret, more so than we are, sir. I do not know what they are doing.

The CHAIRMAN. DO you know whether there is a closer liaison between the Army and the Navy than there was before December 7th with respect to the direction and location of Navy scouting forces?

Lieutenant TYLER. I do not know that, sir. That is under bombardment. I am in pursuit, so I do not know that.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not under your province?

[374]

Lieutenant TYLER. No.

General McCoy. You are attached to the detector service?

Lieutenant TYLER. I worked for two days after the raid and then I went to the subordinate unit at Wheeler Field and worked there up until another week, and I was on flight patrol with my pursuit squadron for four days after that. I am now back down here. I have been here for three days working in the control unit.

The CHAIRMAN. You are in the control room?

Lieutenant TYLER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

General McNARNEY. Was there a controller on duty that Sunday morning?

Lieutenant TYLER. Major Tindal was one of the controllers.

General McNARNEY. What time did he get there?

Lieutenant TYLER. He got there at eight-twenty.

General McNARNEY. I mean prior to that time, before 7 a. m.?

Lieutenant TYLER. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. There was no controller there then?

Lieutenant TYLER. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. Were you acting both as controller and as pursuit officer?

Lieutenant TYLER. Well, sir, I did not know what my duties were. I just was told to be there and told to maintain that work.

General McNARNEY. That is your experience as controller or pursuit officer, or did you have any experience?

Lieutenant TYLER. I had once previously seen this being made around the Island. We walked through the installation and had the situation explained to us.

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General McNARNEY. You had no experience as controller or pursuit officer?

Lieutenant TYLER. I was detailed once before as pursuit officer.

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General McNARNEY. You really had no conception of what your duties were?

Lieutenant TYLER. I had very little, sir.

General McNARNEY. This was purely a practice run, to your knowledge?

Lieutenant TYLER. Yes sir.

General McNARNEY. There was actually no one stationed in readiness that morning, the 7th, Sunday?

Lieutenant TYLER. No.

General McNARNEY. There was nothing in readiness?

Lieutenant TYLER. No, sir.

General McCoy. Did you report afterward any of these plots to anyone?

Lieutenant TYLER. I reported, sir, I believe, to Major Tindal. This may be all wrong, but I know someone asked, "Why didn't we plot this thing?" and I remember reporting in the confusion to, I think it was Major Tindal or Major Bergquist, and I think General Short also saw me, but I can't think what it was, and I told someone, and I think he gave it to him.

Admiral REEVES. Who detailed you to this duty?

Lieutenant TYLER. I was detailed by order of the Fourteenth Pursuit Wing operations officer, who is Major Bergquist.

Admiral REEVES. He did not tell you what you were to do there or what your duties were?

Lieutenant TYLER. I was instructed to become acquainted with the situation, and the previous Wednesday I had reported there for duty, and there was an operator there, and I called and he said, "We are getting this in Saturday and we have to have someone there," and I was looking around finding out what I could do.

Admiral REEVES. How long have you been in the air service in the Army?

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Lieutenant TYLER. Four years and two months, sir.

Admiral REEVES. No other questions.

Admiral STANDLEY. You say you were detailed from four to eight that morning?

Lieutenant TYLER. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. If nothing had happened in the ordinary course of events, would you have stayed for relief at eight o'clock?

Lieutenant TYLER. I believe there was another relief detailed, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. But you don't know?

Lieutenant TYLER. The thing seemed to be that it was shifted because I was previously detailed Saturday afternoon, and then it was shifted to Sunday, and I don't know whether we had any detail scheduled or not, so far as there was relief.

Admiral STANDLEY. What about on Wednesday?

Lieutenant TYLER. I was detailed on Wednesday from twelve thirty to sixteen hundred-four o'clock.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were you relieved then?

Lieutenant TYLER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The station closed?

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Lieutenant TYLER. Yes.

General McCoy. In other words, this was just a drill?

Lieutenant TYLER. Yes.

General McCoy. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Lieutenant, our inquiry is such that we will ask you not to discuss the testimony that has been given here by you or anything said while you have been in the room. Do not discuss it With anyone.

Lieutenant TYLER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank You very much.

We will take a recess for a few minutes.

(There was a brief recess. The following then occurred:)