Page 79

III. THE PACT EXECUTED AND AMENDED, AUGUST 23-SEPTEMBER 28, 1939

Frames 221102-221103, serial 439

ROME, August 23, 1939.

MY DEAR HERR VON RIBBENTROP: First, my cordial and sincere congratulations on the great success attained with the Russian pact.

This morning at 10 o'clock I had a conversation with Count Ciano and in accordance with our agreement I herewith report the contents.

After the usual words of salutation Count Ciano immediately talked about foreign policy and stressed the importance of your trip to Russia. Nevertheless, in case of Germany's intervention in Poland, England and France would, in his opinion, immediately participate in the war. The Ambassadors of both powers had just confirmed this to him expressly and very seriously. This created a very serious situation. For actually the Axis was not yet sufficiently prepared, above all, economically. Only in three to four years-Count Ciano corrected himself and said with strong emphasis "in three years"-would it be ready for war. We would certainly have initial military successes; but the enemy would recover and would wage a war of attrition of long duration along economic lines. Upon my objection that the Führer was of a different opinion and did not believe in a war with England and France, Count Ciano replied that he was aware of that, but that he was afraid that the Führer would not be proved right this time. Upon my reply that it was completely intolerable for a great nation to look on passively any longer at the systematic [mis?] treatment of Germans by Poles, and that therefore a solution of the Polish problem was absolutely necessary and that the whole German people was of one mind on that score, Count Ciano replied that a great deal would depend upon the attitude of the Axis peoples. For it would be necessary to fight with utmost tenacity, since in case of a defeat we would have to count on a peace which would practically mean the end of the Axis Powers. Count Ciano concluded the conversation by stating that de-

Page 80

spite the great diplomatic success of the Russian pact he considered the situation as very serious.

My audience with the Duce will take place tomorrow at 7 p. m. On Friday morning I shall return to Berlin.

Heil Hitler

Sincerely yours,

COUNT SCHWERIN-KROSIGK

[In handwriting]

MY DEAR HERR von WEIZSÄCKER: In view of the absence of Herr von Ribbentrop, I am sending, you directly a copy of my letter addressed to him.

SCHWERIN-KROSIGK

Frames 78822-78825, serial 147

DUCE: For some time Germany and Russia have been engaged in an exchange of views about a new attitude on both sides in regard to their political relations.

The necessity of arriving at some conclusions of this sort was increased by:

(1) The general situation of world politics as it affected both of the Axis Powers.

(2) The necessity of securing a clear statement of position from the Japanese Cabinet. Japan would probably agree to an alliance against Russia, which would have only a secondary interest, under the prevailing circumstances, for Germany, and in my opinion, for Italy also. She would not, however, undertake such definite obligations against England, and this, from the standpoint not only of Germany, but also of Italy, was of decisive importance. The intention of the military to force the Japanese Government in a short time to take a similarly clear position with respect to England had been stated months ago, but had never been realized in practice.

(3) The relation of Germany to Poland, not through the blame of the Reich, but as a result of the activity of England, has become considerably more unsatisfactory since spring and in the last few weeks the position has become simply unbearable. The reports about the persecution of the Germans in the border areas are not invented press reports but represent only a fraction of the terrible truth. The customs policy of Poland, resulting in the throttling of Danzig, has brought about a complete standstill in Danzig's entire economic life for the past several weeks and would if it were continued for only a brief length of time, destroy the city.

These grounds led me to hasten the conclusion of the German-Russian conversations. I have not kept you informed in detail, Duce,

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since I did not have an idea of the possible extent of these conversations, or any assurance of the possibility of their success.

The readiness on the part of the Kremlin to arrive at a reorientation of its relations with Germany, which became apparent after the departure of Litvinov, has become ever stronger in the last few weeks and has made it possible for me, after successful preparation, to send my Foreign Minister to Moscow for the conclusion of a treaty which is the most extensive non-aggression pact in existence and whose text will be made public. The pact is unconditional and includes also the obligation for consultation about all questions affecting Russia and Germany. I may tell you, Duce, that through these arrangements the favorable attitude of Russia in case of any conflict is assured, and that the possibility of the entry of Rumania into such a conflict no longer exists!

Even Turkey under these circumstances can only envisage a revision of her previous position. But I repeat once more, that Rumania is no longer in a situation to take part in a conflict against the Axis! I believe I may say to you, Duce, that through the negotiations with Soviet Russia a completely new situation in world politics has been produced which must be regarded as the greatest possible gain for the Axis.

About the situation on the German-Polish frontier, I can only inform Your Excellency that we have been for weeks in a state of alarm, that as a result of the Polish mobilization German preparations have naturally also been increased, and that in case of an intolerable Polish action, I will act immediately. The assertion of the Polish Government that it is not responsible for these inhuman proceedings, for the numerous border incidents (last night alone there were twenty-one Polish border violations), and for the firing on the German airplanes, which had already received orders to travel to East Prussia over the sea in order to avoid incidents, shows only that the Polish Government has its excitable soldiery [Soldateska] no longer under control. Since yesterday Danzig has been blockaded by Polish troops, a situation which is unendurable. Under these circumstances no one can say what the next hour may bring. I can only assure you there is a limit beyond which I will not be pushed under any circumstances.

In conclusion I can assure you, Duce, that in a similar situation I would have complete understanding for Italy and that in any such case you can be sure of my attitude.

ADOLF HITLER

Page 82

Frames 78820-78821, serial 147

FÜHRER: I am replying to your letter which has just been delivered to me by Ambassador won Mackensen.

(1) Concerning the agreement with Russia, I approve of that completely. His Excellency Marshal Goring will tell you that in the discussion which I had with him last April I stated that a rapprochement between Germany and Russia was necessary to prevent encirclement by the democracies.

(2) I consider it desirable to try to avoid a break or any deterioration in relations with Japan, since that would result in Japan's return to a position close to the democratic powers. With this in mind, I have telegraphed to Tokyo and it appears that after the first surprise of public opinion passed, a better psychological attitude prevails.

(3) The Moscow treaty blockades Rumania and can alter the position of Turkey, which accepted the English loan, but which has not yet signed the treaty of alliance. A new attitude on the part of Turkey would upset all the strategic plans of the French and English in the Eastern Mediterranean.

(4) As regards Poland I have complete understanding for the German position and for the fact that such strained relations cannot continue permanently.

(5) As for the practical position of Italy, in case of a military collision, my point of view is as follows:

If Germany attacks Poland and the conflict remains localized, Italy will afford Germany every form of political and economic assistance which is requested.

If Germany attacks, and Poland's allies open a counterattack against Germany, I want to let you know in advance that it would be better if I did not take the initiative in military activities in view of the present situation of Italian war preparations, which we have repeatedly previously explained to you, Führer, and to Herr von Ribbentrop.

Our intervention can, therefore, take place at once if Germany delivers to us immediately the military supplies and the raw materials to resist the attack which the French and English especially would direct against us.

At our meetings the war was envisaged for after 1942 and at such time I would have been ready on land, on sea, and in the air according to the plans which had been arranged.

[35] Translated from German Foreign Office's translation of Italian original.

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I am also of the opinion that the purely military preparations which have already been undertaken and the others which will be entered upon in Europe and Africa will serve to immobilize important French and British forces.

I consider it my implicit duty as a true friend to tell you the whole truth and inform you about the actual situation in advance. Not to do so might have unpleasant consequences for us all. This is my point of view and since within a short time I must summon the highest governmental bodies of the realm, I ask you to let me know yours as well.

MUSSOLINI

Frames 24058-24061, serial 34

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

W IV 3296

The German-Soviet Trade Agreement concluded on August 19 covers the following:

1. Germany grants the Soviet Union a merchandise credit of 200 minion Reichsmarks. The financing will be done by the German Golddiskontbank. This method of financing includes a 100 percent guarantee by the Reich. It is a credit based on bills of exchange. The bills of exchange are to be drawn for each individual transaction and have an average currency of 7 years. The interest is 5 percent. Under a secret final protocol, one-half percent of this is refunded to the Russian special accounts in Berlin, whereby the actual interest rate is reduced to 4 1/2 percent.

2. The credit will be used to finance Soviet orders in Germany. The Soviet Union will make use of it to order the industrial products listed in schedule A of the agreement. They consist of machinery and industrial installations. Machine tools up to the very largest dimensions form a considerable part of the deliveries. And armaments in the broader sense (such as optical supplies, armor plate and the like) will, subject to examination of every single item, be supplied in smaller proportion.

3. The credit will be liquidated by Soviet raw materials, which will be selected by agreement between the two Governments. The annual interest will likewise be paid from the proceeds of Soviet merchandise, that is, from the special accounts kept in Berlin.

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4. In order that we might secure an immediate benefit from the credit agreement, it was made a condition from the beginning that the Soviet Union bind itself to the delivery, starting immediately, of certain raw materials as current business. It was possible so to arrange these raw-material commitments of the Russians that our wishes were largely met. The Russian commitments of raw materials are contained in schedule C. They amount to 180 million Reichsmarks: half to be delivered in each of the first and second years following the conclusion of the agreement. It is a question, in particular, of lumber, cotton, feed grain, oil cake, phosphate, platinum, raw furs, petroleum, and other goods which for us have a more or less gold value.

5. Since these Soviet deliveries made as current business are to be compensated by German counter-deliveries, certain German promises of delivery had to be made to the Russians. The German industrial products to be supplied in current business as counter-deliveries for Russian raw materials are listed in schedule B. This schedule totals 120 million Reichsmarks and comprises substantially the same categories of merchandise as schedule A.

6. From the welter of difficult questions of detail which arose during the negotiations, the following might also be mentioned: guaranteeing of the rate of exchange of the Reichsmark. The complicated arrangement arrived at appears in the confidential protocol signed on August 26 of this year. In order not to jeopardize the conclusion of the agreement on August 19 of this year, the question was laid aside and settled afterwards. The questions of the liquidation of the old credits, the shipping clause, an emergency clause for the event of inability to deliver of either party, the arbitration procedure, the price clause, etc., were settled satisfactorily despite the pressure of time.

7. The agreement, which has come into being after extraordinary difficulties, will undoubtedly give a decided impetus to German-Russian trade. We must try to build anew on this foundation and, above all, try to settle a number of questions which could not heretofore be settled, because of the low ebb which had been reached in our trade relations. The framework now set up represents a minimum. Since the political climate is favorable, it may well be expected that it will be exceeded considerably in both directions, both in imports and exports.

Page 85

8. Under the agreement, the following movement of goods can be expected for the next few years:

The movement of goods envisaged by the agreement might therefore reach a total of more than 1 billion Reichsmarks for the next few years, not including liquidation of the present 200 minion credit by deliveries of Russian raw materials beginning in 1946.

9. Apart from the economic import of the treaty, its significance lies in the fact that the negotiations also served to renew political contacts with Russia and that the credit agreement was considered by both sides as the first decisive step in the reshaping of political relations.

SCHNURRE

BERLIN, August 29, 1939.

Frame 111568, serial 103

VERY URGENT

Moscow, September 2, 1939-5:49 p. m.

Received September 2, 1939-6:10 p. m.

No. 254 of September 2

With reference to your telegram No. 233 of the 30th and No. 241 of the 1st. [36]

To my probing as to whether Istanbul rumors were correct, in accordance with which Turkey was already negotiating with the

[36] Neither printed.

Page 86

Soviet Union, Molotov replied that the Soviet Government was actually engaged in exchange of opinion and was in contact with Turkey.

After consultation with Stalin, Molotov informed me at a second conference at 3 p. m., that there was only a non-aggression pact between the Soviet Union and Turkey and relations were good in general; the Soviet Government was prepared to work for permanent neutrality of Turkey as desired by us. Our conception of the position of Turkey in the present conflict was shared by the Soviet Government.

Please make no use of the above statements of Molotov in dealing with the Turks.

SCHULENBURG

Frame 69855, serial 127

No. 253 of September 3

BERLIN, September 3, 1939-6:50 p. m.

Received MOSCOW September 4, 1939-12:30 a. m.

Very Urgent! Exclusively for Ambassador. Strictly secret! For Chief of Mission or his representative personally. Top secret. To be decoded by himself. Strictest secrecy!

We definitely expect to have beaten the Polish Army decisively in a few weeks. We would then keep the area that was established as German sphere of interest at Moscow under military occupation. We would naturally, however, for military reasons, also have to proceed further against such Polish military forces as are at that time located in the Polish area belonging to the Russian sphere of interest.

Please discuss this at once with Molotov and see if the Soviet Union does not consider it desirable for Russian forces to move at the proper time against Polish forces in the Russian sphere of interest and, for their part, to occupy this territory. In our estimation this would be not only a relief for us, but also, in the sense of the Moscow agreements, in the Soviet interest as well.

In this connection please determine whether we may discuss this matter with the officers who have just arrived here and what the Soviet Government intends their position to be.

RIBBENTROP

Page 87

Frames 69848-69849, serial 127

VERY URGENT

Moscow, September 5, 1939-2:30 p. m.

STRICTLY SECRET

No. 264 of September 5

Reference my telegram No. 261 of September 4. [37]

Molotov asked me to call on him today at 12:30 and transmitted to me the following reply of the Soviet Government:

"We agree with you that at a suitable time it will be absolutely necessary for us to start concrete action. We are of the view, however, that this time has not yet come. It is possible that we are mistaken, but it seems to us that through excessive haste we might injure our cause and promote unity among our opponents. We understand that as the operations proceed, one of the parties or both parties might be forced temporarily to cross the line of demarcation between the spheres of interest of the two parties; but such cases must not prevent the strict execution of the plan adopted."

SCHULENBURG

Frame 111576, serial 103

No. 266 of September 5

Moscow, September 5, 1939-5:02 p. m.

Received September 5, 1939-6 p. m.

Reference your telegram No. 262 of the 4th. [37]

Today at 12:30 p. m. I again asked Molotov to have the Soviet Government continue to work on Turkey with a view to permanent neutrality. I mentioned that rumors were current to the effect that England was putting pressure on Rumania to take active part and was holding out a prospect of aid from British and French troops. Since this aid might come by sea, it was in the interests of the Soviet Government to prevail upon Turkey to close the Dardanelles completely.

[37] Not printed.

Page 88

Molotov replied that the Soviet Government had considerable influence with Turkey and was exerting it in the sense desired by us. Molotov added that there was only the non-aggression pact between the Soviet Union and Turkey; conversations regarding the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact had, it is true, been carried on at one time but had borne no fruit.

He would have rumors about Rumania looked into through the Soviet Embassy in Bucharest.

SCHULENBURG

Frames 211568-211569, serial 388

Pol. V 8924

Moscow, September 6, 1939-5:46 p. m.

Received September 6, 1939-8:15 p. m.

No. 279 of September 6

Reference your telegram No. 267 of the 5th. [39]

Since anxiety over war, especially the fear of a German attack, has strongly influenced the attitude of the population here in the last few years, the conclusion of a non-aggression pact with Germany has been generally received with great relief and gratification. However, the sudden alteration in the policy of the Soviet Government, after years of propaganda directed expressly against German aggressors, is still not very well understood by the population. Especially the statements of official agitators to the effect that Germany is no longer an aggressor run up against considerable doubt. The Soviet Government is doing everything to change the attitude of the population here toward Germany. The press is as though it had been transformed. Attacks on the conduct of Germany have not only ceased completely, but the portrayal of events in the field of foreign politics is based to an outstanding degree on German reports and anti-German literature has been removed from the book trade, etc.

The beginning of the war between Germany and Poland has powerfully affected public opinion here, and aroused new fear in extensive groups that the Soviet Union may be drawn into the war. Mistrust sown for years against Germany, in spite of effective counter-propaganda which is being carried on in party and business gatherings, cannot be so quickly removed. The fear is expressed by the population

[39] Not printed. ([38] not used? LWJ)

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that Germany, after she has defeated Poland, may turn against the Soviet Union. The recollection of German strength in the World War is everywhere still lively.

In a judgment of conditions here the realization is of importance that the Soviet Government has always previously been able in a masterly fashion to influence the attitude of the population in the direction which it has desired, and it is not being sparing this time either of the necessary propaganda.

SCHULENBURG

Frame 211562, serial 388

VERY URGENT

MOSCOW, September 9, 1939-12:56 a. m.

Received September 9, 1939-5 a. m.

No. 300 of September 8

I have just received the following telephone message from Molotov:

"I have received your communication regarding the entry of German troops into Warsaw. Please convey my congratulations and greetings to the German Reich Government. Molotov."

SCHULENBURG

Frame 69816, serial 127

URGENT

BERLIN, September 9, 1939-12:50 a. m.

Received Moscow, September 9, 1939-12:10 p. m.

STRICTLY SECRET

No. 300 of September 8

For the Ambassador personally.

Reference your telegram No. 261. [40]

We are of course in accord with the Soviet Government that the validity of agreements arrived at in Moscow is not affected by local extension of our military operations. We must and will defeat the Polish Army wherever we meet it. Nothing in the Moscow arrangements is thereby altered. Military operations are progressing even beyond our expectations. The Polish Army, from all indications, is

[40] Not printed.

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more or less in a state of dissolution. Under these circumstances, I consider it urgent that you resume the conversation with Molotov regarding the military intentions of the Soviet Government. It may be that the summoning of the Russian Military Attaché to Moscow indicates that decisions are in preparation there. I would therefore ask you to speak to Molotov on the subject again in an appropriate manner and to wire result.

RIBBENTROP

Frame 69815, serial 127

VERY URGENT

MOSCOW, September 9, 1939-4:10 p. m.

STRICTLY SECRET

No. 308 of September 9

Reference your telegram No. 300 of September 8.

Molotov told me today at 3 p. m. that at a Soviet military action would take place within the next few days. The summoning of the Military Attaché to Moscow was in fact connected with it. Numerous reservists would also be called.

SCHULENBURG

Frame 69814, serial 127

VERY URGENT

Moscow, September 9, 1939-8:40 p. m.

STRICTLY SECRET

No. 310 of September 9

Supplementing my telegram No. 3 of September 9.

The Red Army has admitted to Lieutenant General Köstring [41] that the Soviet Union will intervene. Moreover, external evidence is multiplying of imminent Soviet military action: calling a large number of reservists up to 40 years of age, in particular technicians and physicians, sudden disappearance of important foods, preparation of schoolrooms as hospitals, curtailment in issuance of gasoline, and the like.

SCHULENBURG

[41] Military Attaché of the German Embassy in the Soviet Union.

Page 91

Frames 69811-69813, serial 127

VERY URGENT

Moscow, September 10, 1939-9:40 p. m.

STRICTLY SECRET

No. 317 of September 10

Supplementing my telegram No. 310 of September 9 and with reference to telephone conversation of today with the Reich Foreign Minister.

In today's conference at 4 p. m. Molotov modified his statement of yesterday by saying that the Soviet Government was taken completely by surprise by the unexpectedly rapid German military successes. In accordance with our first communication, the Red Army had counted on several weeks, which had now shrunk to a few days. The Soviet military authorities were therefore in a difficult situation, since, in view of conditions here, they required possibly two to three weeks more for their preparations. Over three minion men were already mobilized.

I explained emphatically to Molotov how crucial speedy action of the Red Army was at this juncture.

Molotov repeated that everything possible was being done to expedite matters. I got the impression that Molotov promised more yesterday than the Red Army can live up to.

Then Molotov came to the political side of the matter and stated that the Soviet Government had intended to take the occasion of the further advance of German troops to declare that Poland was falling apart and that it was necessary for the Soviet Union, in consequence, to come to the aid of the Ukrainians and the White Russians "threatened" by Germany. This argument was to make the intervention of the Soviet Union plausible to the masses and at the same time avoid giving the Soviet Union the appearance of an aggressor.

This course was blocked for the Soviet Government by a DNB report yesterday to the effect that, in accordance with a statement by Colonel General Brauchitsch, military action was no longer necessary on the German eastern border. The report created the impression that a German-Polish armistice was imminent. If, however Germany concluded an armistice, the Soviet Union could not start a "new war."

I stated that I was unacquainted with this report, which was not in accordance with the facts. I would make inquiries at once.

SCHULENBURG

Page 92

Frame 69805, serial 127

URGENT

BERLIN, September 13, 1939-5:50 p. m.

Received Moscow, September 14, 1939-1:10 a. m.

No. 336 of September 13

For the Ambassador personally.

As soon as the exact outcome is known in the great battle in Poland, now approaching its end, we shall be in a position to give the Red Army the information it asked for regarding the various parts of the Polish Army. But even now, I would ask you to inform Herr Molotov that his remark regarding Colonel General Brauchitsch's statement was based on a complete misunderstanding. This statement referred exclusively to the exercise of executive power in the old territory of the Reich as regulated before the beginning of the German action against Poland, and had nothing whatever to do with a limitation of our military operations toward the east on former Polish territory. There can be no question of imminent conclusion of an armistice with Poland.

RIBBENTROP

Frames 69806-69808, serial 127

VERY URGENT

Moscow, September 14, 1939-6 p. m.

SECRET

No. 350 of September 14

Reference your telegram No. 336 of September 13.

Molotov summoned me today at 4 p. rm. and stated that the Red Arm had reached a state of preparedness sooner than anticipated. Soviet action could therefore take place sooner than he had assumed at our last conversation (see my telegram No. 317 of September 10). For the political motivation of Soviet action (the collapse of Poland and protection of Russian "minorities") it was of the greatest importance not to take action until the governmental center of Poland, the

Page 93

city of Warsaw, had fallen. Molotov therefore asked that he be informed as nearly as possible as to when the capture of Warsaw could be counted on.

Please send instructions.

I would direct your attention to today's article in Pravda, carried by DNB, which will be followed by a similar article in Izvestia tomorrow. The articles serve [to prepare] the political motivation mentioned by Molotov for Soviet intervention.

SCHULENBURG

Frames 69788-69790, serial 127

VERY URGENT

BERLIN, September 15, 1939-8:20 p. m.

Received MOSCOW, September 16, 1939-7:15 a. m.

STRICTLY SECRET

No. 360 of September 15

For the Ambassador personally.

I request that you communicate the following to Herr Molotov at once:

1) The destruction of the Polish Army is rapidly approaching its conclusion, as appears from the review of the military situation of September 14 which has already been communicated to you. We count on the occupation of Warsaw in the next few days.

2) We have already stated to the Soviet Government that we consider ourselves bound by the definition of spheres of influence agreed upon in Moscow, entirely apart from purely military operations, and the same applies of course to the future as well.

3) From the communication made to you by Molotov on September 14, we assume that the Soviet Government will take a hand militarily, and that it intends to begin its operation now. We welcome this. The Soviet Government thus relieves us of the necessity of annihilating the remainder of the Polish Army by pursuing it as far as the Russian boundary. Also the question is disposed of in case a Russian intervention did not take place, of whether in the area lying to the east of the German zone of influence a political vacuum might not occur. Since we on our part have no intention of undertaking any political or administrative activities in these areas, apart from what is made

Page 94

necessary by military operations, without such an intervention on the part of the Soviet Government there might be the possibility of the construction of new states there.

4) For the political support of the advance of the Soviet Army we propose the publication of a joint communiqué of the following content:

"In view of the complete collapse of the previous form of government in Poland, the Reich Government and the Government of the U.S.S.R. consider it necessary to bring to an end the intolerable political and economic conditions existing in these territories. They regard it as their joint duty to restore peace and order in these areas which are naturally of interest to them and to bring about a new order by the creation of natural frontiers and viable economic organizations."

5) We assume in proposing such a communiqué that the Soviet Government has already given up the idea, expressed by Molotov in an earlier conversation with you, of taking the threat to the Ukrainian and White Russian populations by Germany as a ground for Soviet action. The assignment of a motive of that sort would be out of the question in practice. It would be directly contrary to the true German intentions, which are confined exclusively to the realization of well-known German spheres of interest. It would also be in contradiction to the arrangements made in Moscow and, finally, would-in opposition to the desire for friendly relations expressed on both sides expose the two States before the whole world as enemies.

6) Since the military operations must be concluded as soon as possible because of the advanced season of the year, we would be gratified if the Soviet Government would set a day and hour on which their army would begin their advance, so that we on our part might govern ourselves accordingly. For the purpose of the necessary coordination of military operations on either side, it is also necessary that a representative of each Government, as well as German and Russian officers on the spot in the area of operations, should have a meeting in order to take the necessary steps, for which meeting we propose to assemble at Bialystok by air.

I request an immediate reply by telegraph. The change in text agreed upon by Gaus with Hilger has already been taken care of.

RIBBENTROP

Page 95

Frames 69777-69778, serial 127

VERY URGENT

Moscow, September 16, 1939.

STRICTLY SECRET

No. 371 of September 16

Reference your telegram No. 360 of September 15.

I saw Molotov at 6 o'clock today and carried out instructions. Molotov declared that military intervention by the Soviet Union was imminent-perhaps even tomorrow or the day after. Stalin was at present in consultation with the military leaders and he would this very night, in the presence of Molotov, give me the day and hour of the Soviet advance.

Molotov added that he would present my communication to his Government but he believed that a joint communiqué was no longer needed; the Soviet Government intended to motivate its procedure as follows: the Polish State had collapsed and no longer existed; therefore all agreements concluded with Poland were void; third powers might try to profit by the chaos which had arisen; the Soviet Union considered itself obligated to intervene to protect its Ukrainian and White Russian brothers and make it possible for these unfortunate people to work in peace.

The Soviet Government intended to publicize the above train of thought by the radio, press, etc., immediately after the Red Army had crossed the border, and at the same time communicate it in an official note to the Polish Ambassador here and to all the missions here.

Molotov conceded that the projected argument of the Soviet Government contained a note that was jarring to German sensibilities but asked that in view of the difficult situation of the Soviet Government we not let a trifle like this stand in our way. The Soviet Government unfortunately saw no possibility of any other motivation, since the Soviet Union had thus far not concerned itself about the plight of its minorities in Poland and had to justify abroad, in some way or other, its present intervention.

Page 96

In conclusion, Molotov urgently asked for an explanation of what was to become of Vilna. The Soviet Government absolutely wanted to avoid a clash with Lithuania and would, therefore, like to know whether some agreement had been reached with Lithuania regarding the Vilna region, particularly as to who was to occupy the city.

SCHULENBURG

Frames 69772-69773, serial 127

VERY URGENT

Moscow, September 17, 1939.

SECRET

No. 372 of September 17

Reference my telegram No. 371 of September 16.

Stalin received me at 2 o'clock at night in the presence of Molotov and Voroshilov and declared that the Red Army would cross the Soviet border this morning at 6 o'clock along the whole line from Polozk to Kamenetz-Podolsk.

In order to avoid incidents, Stalin urgently requested that we see to it that German planes as of today do not fly east of the Bialystok-Brest-Litovsk-Lemberg Line. Soviet planes would begin today to bomb the district east of Lemberg.

I promised to do my best with regard to informing the German Air Force but asked in view of the little time left that Soviet planes not approach the above-mentioned line too closely today.

The Soviet commission will arrive in Bialystok tomorrow or day after tomorrow at the latest.

Stalin read me a note that is to be handed to the Polish Ambassador tonight, to be sent in copy to all the missions in the course of the day and then published. The note contains a justification for the Soviet action. The draft read to me contained three points unacceptable to us. In answer to my objections, Stalin with the utmost readiness so altered the text that the note now seems satisfactory for us. Stalin stated that the issuance of a German-Soviet communiqué could not be considered before two or three days.

In future all military matters that come up are to be handled by Lieutenant General Köstring directly with Voroshilov.

SCHULENBURG

Page 97

Frame 111596, serial 103

URGENT

Moscow, September 17, 1939-8:23 a. m.

Received September 17, 1939-8:45 a. m.

No. 374 of September 17

Reference your telegram of the 16th, No. 358. [42]

On the occasion of my visit of today, Stalin informed me that the Turkish Government had proposed to the Soviet Government the conclusion of an assistance pact that was to apply to the Straits and the Balkans. The Turkish Government desires a pact with a restrictive clause whereby Turkey in rendering aid to the Soviet Union would be obligated only to such actions as are not directed against England and France.

The Soviet Government is not greatly edified by the Turkish proposal and is considering proposing a clause to the Turkish Government to the effect that the Soviet Union on its part would not be obligated to any action directed against Germany. Stalin requested our reaction to this idea, but made it clearly evident that he considered the conclusion of the assistance pact in suitable form as very advantageous, since Turkey would in that case surely remain neutral. Voroshilov, who was present, added that such a pact would be a "hook" by which Turkey could be pulled away from France. Request instructions.

SCHULENBURG

Frame 111597, serial 103

BERLIN, September 18, 1939.

To the Office of the Reich Foreign Minister with the request to transmit the following to the train for the Reich Foreign Minister:

Reaction to telegram No. 374 from Moscow regarding Turko-Russian assistance pact:

The matter should be discussed openly with the Italians. If they agree the Soviet Government could be told that we concur in the basic idea, but parity would be preserved only if the Soviet Government were not obligated to action against Germany, Italy, and Bulgaria.

WEIZSÄCKER

[42] Not printed.

Page 98

Frame 23373, serial 34

VERY URGENT

Moscow, September 18, 1939-3:59 p. m.

Received September 18, 1939-5:45 P. m.

STRICTLY SECRET

No. 385 of September 18

In the course of the conversation which I had this evening with Stalin about the dispatch of a Soviet commission to Bialystok, as well as the publication of a joint communiqué, Stalin said, somewhat suddenly, that on the Soviet side there were certain doubts as to whether the German High Command at the appropriate time would stand by the Moscow agreement and would withdraw to the line that had been agreed upon (Pissa-Narew-Vistula-San). I replied with emphasis that of course Germany was firmly determined to fulfill the terms of the Moscow agreements precisely, and I referred to point 2 of the communication made by me to Molotov on September 16 in accordance with the instructions of the Reich Foreign Minister (see telegram No. 360 of September 15 from there). I declared that it would be suitable for the High Command to withdraw to the line which had been agreed upon since, in this way, troops could be made available for the western front. Stalin replied that he had no doubt at all of the good faith of the German Government. His concern was based on the well-known fact that all military men are loath to give up occupied territories. At this point the German Military Attaché here, Lieutenant General Köstring, interjected that the German armed forces would do just as the Führer ordered. In view of Stalin's well-known attitude of mistrust, I would be gratified if I were authorized to make a further declaration of such a nature as to remove his last doubts.

SCHULENBERG

Frames 69766-69770, serial 127

Re: Publication of joint Soviet-German communiqué.

On September 17 at 3 p. m., the draft of a joint German-Soviet communiqué was transmitted by telephone with instructions to obtain the consent of the Soviet Government to the publication of such a com-

Page 99

muniqué on September 18. The text of this draft is enclosed (enclosure 1).

On September 17 at 11:30 p. m., the Ambassador submitted the draft to Herr Molotov for approval. The latter stated that he would have to consult with Herr Stalin on the matter. Herr Stalin, who was called on the telephone by Herr Molotov, declared that in his opinion, too, a joint communiqué had to be issued, but that he could not entirely agree to the text proposed by us since it presented the facts all too frankly [da es den Tatbestand mit allzu grosser Offenheit darlege]. Thereupon Herr Stalin wrote out a new draft in his own hand and asked that the consent of the German Government be obtained to this new draft. (See enclosure 2.)

On September 18 at 12:30 a. m., I communicated to Under State Secretary Gaus the text of the Soviet draft. Herr Gaus stated that he could not of his own accord declare himself on the matter and had to ascertain the decision of the Reich Foreign Minister.

On September 18 at 12 o'clock noon, the Chief of the Office of the Minister, Herr Kordt, called up on the telephone and informed me as follows:

"We agree to Russian proposal concerning communiqué and shall publish the communiqué in this form Tuesday in the morning papers. Ribbentrop."

I immediately transmitted the above communication by telephone to Herr Molotov's secretary.

On September 18 at 2:05 p. m., Herr Kordt called up again and informed Counselor of Embassy von Tippelskirch as follows:

"The communiqué will be published by us in some of the evening papers. Please advise the offices concerned."

I immediately apprised Herr Molotov's secretary of the above-mentioned communication also.

Two hours later the text of the communiqué appeared on the teletype and was also broadcast over the German short-wave radio.

Moscow, September 18, 1939.

Herewith most respectfully submitted

to the Ambassador

to the Counselor of Embassy

HILGER

On September 18 at 7:15 p. m., Herr Gaus called up and asked whether the communiqué would be published today in the Russian

Page 100

evening papers. If not, it should be broadcast today over the Soviet radio. The Reich Foreign Minister was very anxious that this be done. I told Herr Gaus that today, because it was the Russian Sunday, no evening papers had appeared; that I would inform them further regarding the radio. At 8:00 p. m. I was able to let Herr Gaus know that the Soviet radio had broadcast the communiqué several times since 4:00 p. m.

HI[LGER]

SEPTEMBER 18.

In view of the internal incapacity of the Polish State and of the dissension of the populations living in its former territory, the Reich Government and the Government of the U. S. S. R. consider it necessary to bring to an end the intolerable political and economic conditions existing in these territories. They regard it as their joint duty to restore peace and order in these areas which are naturally of interest to them and to bring about a new order by the creation of natural frontiers and viable economic organizations.

In order to avoid all kinds of unfounded rumors concerning the respective aims of the German and Soviet forces which are operating in Poland, the Government of the German Reich and the Government of the U. S. S. R. declare that the operations of these forces do not involve any aims which are contrary to the interests of Germany and of the Soviet Union, or to the spirit or the letter of the Non-aggression Pact concluded between Germany and the U. S. S. R. On the contrary, the aim of these forces is to restore peace and order in Poland, which had been destroyed by the collapse of the Polish State, and to help the Polish population to reconstruct the conditions of its political existence.

[43] A note in Schulenburg's hand reads: "Stalin draft. September 18, '39."

Page 101

Frame 23374, serial 34

BERLIN, September 19, 1939.

(Sent from Special Train September 19-4:37 p. m.)

For the Ambassador personally.

Reference your telegram No. 385.

I request that you tell Herr Stalin that you reported to Berlin about your conference with him, and that you are now expressly directed by me to inform him that the agreements which I made on the authorization of the Führer at Moscow will, of course, be kept, and that they are regarded by us as the foundation stone of the new friendly relations between Germany and the Soviet Union.

RIBBENTROP

Frame 111608, serial 103

STRICTLY SECRET

Moscow, September 20, 1939-2:23 a. m.

Received September 20, 1939-4:55 a. m.

No. 395 of September 19

Molotov stated to me today that the Soviet Government now considered the time ripe for it, jointly with the German Government, to establish definitively the structure of the Polish area. In this regard, Molotov hinted that the original inclination entertained by the Soviet Government and Stalin personally to permit the existence of a residual Poland had given way to the inclination to partition Po]and along the Pissa-Narew-Vistula-San Line. The Soviet Government wishes to commence negotiations on this matter at once, and to conduct them in Moscow, since such negotiations must be conducted on the Soviet side by persons in the highest positions of authority, who cannot leave the Soviet Union. Request telegraphic instructions.

SCHULENBURG

Page 102

Frames 69721-69722, serial 127

STRICTLY SECRET

BERLIN September 23, 1939-3:40 a. m.

Received Moscow September 23, 1939-11:05 a. m.

No. 417 of September 22

Reference your telegram No. 295 [395?]. For the Ambassador personally.

We, too, consider the time now ripe to establish by treaty jointly with the Soviet Government the definitive structure of the Polish area. The Russian idea of a border line along the well-known Four-Rivers Line coincides in general with the view of the Reich Government. It was my original intention to invite Herr Molotov to Germany in order to formulate this treaty. In view of your report that the leading personages there cannot leave the Soviet Union, we agree to negotiations in Moscow. Contrary to my original purpose of entrusting you with these negotiations, I have decided to fly to Moscow myself. This particularly because-in view of the full powers granted me by the Führer, thus making it possible to dispense with counter-inquiries, etc.-negotiations can be brought to a speedier conclusion. In view of the general situation, my sojourn in Moscow will have to be limited to one or two days at the most. Please call on Herren Stalin and Molotov and wire me earliest proposed date.

Frame 111625, serial 103

VERY URGENT

Moscow, September 25, 1939-10:58 p. m.

Received September 26, 1939-12:30 a. m.

STRICTLY SECRET

No. 442 of September 25

Stalin and Molotov asked me to come to the Kremlin at 8 p. m. today. Stalin stated the following: In the final settlement of the Polish question anything that in the future might create friction be-

Page 103

tween Germany and the Soviet Union must be avoided. From this point of view, he considered it wrong to leave an independent Polish rump state. He proposed the following: From the territory to the east of the demarcation line, all the Province of Lublin and that portion of the Province of Warsaw which extends to the Bug should be added to our share. In return, we should waive our claim to Lithuania.

Stalin designated this suggestion as a subject for the forthcoming negotiations with the Reich Foreign Minister and added that, if we consented, the Soviet Union would immediately take up the solution of the problem of the Baltic countries in accordance with the Protocol of August 23, and expected in this matter the unstinting support of the German Government. Stalin expressly indicated Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, but did not mention Finland.

I replied to Stalin that I would report to my Government.

SCHULENBURG

Frame 111637, serial 103

VERY URGENT

BERLIN, September 27, 1939.

No. 435

For Reich Foreign Minister in person!

Telegram from Tallinn No. 163 of the 26th for Army High Command, Attaché Section:

The Estonian Chief of Staff informed me of the Russian demand for an alliance. He stated that a naval base at Baltischport and an air base on the Estonian islands were demanded by Russia. The General Staff recommended acceptance of the demands as German aid was most unlikely, hence the situation could only become worse. On September 25 and 26, Russian aircraft carried out extensive flights over Estonian territory. The General Staff gave orders not to fire on aircraft in order not to prejudice the situation. Rössing. [44] Frohwein. [45]

BRÜCKLMEIER

[44] German Military Attaché in Estonia.

[45] German Minister in Estonia.

Page 104

Frames 111638, serial 103

VERY URGENT

BERLIN, September 27, 1939.

No. 436

For Reich Foreign Minister in person.

Telegram from Helsinki No. 245 of the 26th:

The Foreign Minister notified me of demands made by Russia on Estonia and observed that Finland was prepared to improve her relations with Russia, but would never accept such demands and would rather let it come to the worst.

I pointed to the difference between the position of Estonia and that of Finland and advised the Foreign Minister to seek the security of his country in good relations with Germany and Russia.

The Foreign Minister agreed and emphasized complete elimination of English influence from the Baltic area. Blücher. [46]

[46] German Minister in Finland.

BRÜCKLMEIER

Frames 111639-111640, serial 103

VERY URGENT

BERLIN, September 27, 1939.

No. 437

For Reich Foreign Minister in person.

Telegram from Reval No. 164 of the 26th:

The Foreign Minister conveyed a request to inform the Reich Foreign Minister of the following, if possible before his departure for Moscow:

The Estonian Government, under the gravest threat of imminent attack, perforce is prepared to accept a military alliance with the Soviet Union. Minister Selter with staff will fly to Moscow tomorrow, Wednesday, to negotiate. Aim of negotiation: Framing of a treaty in such manner that the sovereignty and internal security of the country are preserved and the Estonian non-aggression pact kept intact. Hence they intended to propose, in connection with the mutual assistance obligation of the contracting parties, to except the existing non-aggression pacts with third countries. It is further desired that naval and air bases should be made available only in case of war, when assistance obligation comes into play; in peace time as far as possible only preparation of the bases. The Russians first demanded Reval as a naval base, but seem prepared to agree to Baltischport or a port on Ösel. The Estonians wish if possible to grant air bases only on island.

Page 105

The general tendency is to meet the demands only as far as necessary to prevent an attack and maintain existing good relations with Germany. Frohwein.

BRÜCKLMEIER

Frame 281527, serial 838

[47] Found in the papers of Under State Secretary Hencke.

Frames 0332-0331 [sic], serial F 2

The Government of the German Reich and the Government of the U.S.S.R. consider it as exclusively their task, after the collapse of the former Polish state, to re-establish peace and order in these territories and to assure to the peoples living there a peaceful life in keeping with their national character. To this end, they have agreed upon the following:

ARTICLE I.

The Government of the German Reich and the Government of the U.S.S.R. determine as the boundary of their respective national interests in the territory of the former Polish state the line marked on the attached map, which shall be described in more detail in a supplementary protocol. [48]

[48] Not printed here.

Page 106

ARTICLE II.

Both parties recognize the boundary of the respective national interests established in article I as definitive and shall reject any interference of third powers in this settlement.

ARTICLE III.

The necessary reorganization of public administration will be effected in the areas west of the line specified in article I by the Government of the German Reich, in the areas east of this line by the Government of the U.S.S.R.

ARTICLE IV.

The Government of the German Reich and the Government of the U.S.S.R. regard this settlement as a firm foundation for a progressive development of the friendly relations between their peoples.

ARTICLE V.

This treaty shall be ratified and the ratifications shall be exchanged in Berlin as soon as possible. The treaty becomes effective upon signature.

Done in duplicate, in the German and Russian languages.

MOSCOW, September 28, 1939.

For the Government of the German Reich:

J. RIBBENTROP

By authority of the Government of the U.S.S.R.:

W. MOLOTOW

Frame 0319, serial F 2

The Government of the U.S.S.R. shall place no obstacles in the way of Reich nationals and other persons of German descent residing in the territories under its jurisdiction, if they desire to migrate to Germany or to the territories under German jurisdiction. It agrees that such removals shall be carried out by agents of the Government of the Reich in cooperation with the competent local authorities and that the property rights of the emigrants shall be protected.

A corresponding obligation is assumed by the Government of the German Reich in respect to the persons of Ukrainian or White Russian descent residing in the territories under its jurisdiction.

MOSCOW, September 28, 1939.

For the Government of the German Reich:

J. RIBBENTROP

By authority of the Government of the U.S.S.R.:

W. MOLOTOW

Page 107

Frames 0326-0325 [sic], serial F 2

The undersigned Plenipotentiaries declare the agreement of the Government of the German Reich and the Government of the U.S.S.R. upon the following:

The Secret Supplementary Protocol signed on August 23, 1939, shall be amended in item 1 to the effect that the territory of the Lithuanian state falls to the sphere of influence of the U.S.S.R., while, on the other hand, the province of Lublin and parts of the province of Warsaw fall to the sphere of influence of Germany (cf. the map attached to the Boundary and Friendship Treaty signed today). As soon as the Government of the U.S.S.R. shall take special measures on Lithuanian territory to protect its interests, the present German-Lithuanian border, for the purpose of a natural and simple boundary delineation, shall be rectified in such a way that the Lithuanian territory situated to the southwest of the line marked on the attached map should fall to Germany.

Further it is declared that the economic agreements now in force between Germany and Lithuania shall not be affected by the measures of the Soviet Union referred to above.

Moscow, September 28, 1939.

For the Government of the German Reich:

J. RIBBENTROP

By authority of the

of the U.S.S.R.:

W. MOLOTOW

Frame 0329, serial F 2

The undersigned plenipotentiaries, on concluding the German-Russian Boundary and Friendship Treaty, have declared their agreement upon the following:

Both parties will tolerate in their territories no Polish agitation which affects the territories of the other party. They will suppress in their territories all beginnings of such agitation and inform each other concerning suitable measures for this purpose.

MOSCOW, September 28, 1939.

For the Government of the German Reich:

J. RIBBENTROP

By authority of the Government of the U.S.S.R.:

W. MOLOTOW

Page 108

Frame 0330, serial F 2

After the Government of the German Reich and the Government of the U.S.S.R. have, by means of the treaty signed today, definitively settled the problems arising from the collapse of the Polish state and have thereby created a sure foundation for a lasting peace in Eastern Europe, they mutually express their conviction that it would serve the true interest of all peoples to put an end to the state of war existing at present between Germany on the one side and England and France on the other. Both Governments will therefore direct their common efforts, jointly with other friendly powers if occasion arises, toward attaining this goal as soon as possible.

Should, however, the efforts of the two Governments remain fruitless, this would demonstrate the fact that England and France are responsible for the continuation of the war, whereupon, in case of the continuation of the war, the Governments of Germany and of the U.S.S.R. shall engage in mutual consultations with regard to necessary measures.

Moscow, September 08, 1939.

For the Government of the German Reich:

J. RIBBENTROP

By authority of the Government of the U.S.S.R.:

W. MOLOTOW

Frames 211596-211597, serial 388

Moscow, September 28, 1939.

MR. CHAIRMAN: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter of today, in which you communicate to me the following:

"With reference to our conversations I have the honor to confirm herewith that the Government of the U.S.S.R. is willing on the basis and in the sense of the general political understanding reached by us, to promote by all means the trade relations and the exchange of goods between Germany and the U.S.S.R. To this end an economic program will be drawn up by both parties, under which the Soviet Union will supply raw materials to Germany, for which Germany, in turn, will make compensation through delivery of manufactured goods over an

Page 109

extended period. Both parties shall frame this economic program in such a manner that the German-Soviet exchange of goods will again reach the highest volume attained in the past.

Both Governments will at once issue the necessary directives for the implementation of the measures mentioned and arrange that the negotiations are begun and brought to a conclusion as soon as possible."

In the name and by authority of the Government of the German Reich I am in accord with this communication and inform you that the Government of the German Reich in turn will take the necessary steps for this purpose.

Accept, Mr. Chairman, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

VON RIBBENTROP

Frames 0322-0321 [sic], serial F 2

CONFIDENTIAL

Moscow, September 28, 1939.

MR. CHAIRMAN: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter of today, wherein you communicate to me the following:

"Implementing my letter of today about the formulation of a common economic program, the Government of the U.S.S.R. will see to it that German transit traffic to and from Rumania by way of the Upper Silesia-Lemberg-Kolomea railroad line shall be facilitated in every respect. The two Governments will, in the framework of the proposed trade negotiations, make arrangements without delay for the operation of this transit traffic. The same will apply to the German transit traffic to and from Iran, to and from Afghanistan as well as to and from the countries of the Far East.

"Furthermore, the Government of the U.S.S.R. declares that it is willing. in addition to the quantity of oil previously agreed upon or to be agreed upon hereafter, to supply a further quantity of oil commensurate with the annual production of the oil district of Drohobycz and Boryslav, with the proviso that one half of this quantity shall be supplied to Germany from the oil fields of the aforesaid oil district and the other half from other oil districts of the U.S.S.R. As compensation for these supplies of oil, the U.S.S.R. would accept German supplies of hard coal and steel piping."

I take note of this communication with satisfaction and concur in it in the name of the Government of the German Reich.

Accept, Mr. Chairman, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

VON RIBBENTROP