Page 261

THE FÜHRER AND COMMANDER IN-CHIEF OF THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES

OKW/WFSt/Abt. L (I) Nr. 33 408/40 g K CHEFS.

MILITARY SECRET [Geheime Kommandosache]

TOP SECRET [Chef Sache]

BY OFFICER ONLY

FÜHRER's HEADQUARTERS,

December 18, 1940

The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign (Operation Barbarossa) even before the conclusion of the war against England.

For this purpose the Army will have to employ all available units, with the reservation that the occupied territories must be secured against surprise attacks.

For the Air Force it will be a matter of releasing such strong forces for the eastern campaign in support of the Army that a quick completion of the ground operations may be expected and that damage to Eastern German territory by enemy air attacks will be as slight as possible. This concentration of the main effort in the East is limited by the requirement that the entire combat and armament area dominated by us must remain adequately protected against enemy air attacks and that the offensive operations against England, particularly her supply lines, must not be permitted to break down.

The main effort of the Navy will remain unequivocally directed against England even during an eastern campaign.

I shall order the concentration against Soviet Russia possibly eight weeks before the intended beginning of operations.

[7] This document is from the German Wehrmacht archives. It is the only document in this collection derived from a source other than the German Foreign Office archives.

Page 261

Preparations requiring more time to start are to be started now-if this has not yet been done-and are to be completed by May 15, 1941.

It is to be considered of decisive importance, however, that the intention to attack is not discovered.

The preparations of the High Commands are to be made on the following basis:

I. General Purpose:

The mass of the Russian Army in Western Russia is to be destroyed in daring operations, by driving forward deep armored wedges, and the retreat of units capable of combat into the vastness of Russian territory is to be prevented.

In quick pursuit a line is then to be reached from which the Russian Air Force will no longer be able to attack German Reich territory. The ultimate objective of the operation is to establish a defense line against Asiatic Russia from a line running approximately from the Volga River to Archangel. Then, in case of necessity, the last industrial area left to Russia in the Urals can be eliminated by the Luftwaffe.

In the course of these operations the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet will quickly lose its bases and thus will no longer be able to fight.

Effective intervention by the Russian Air Force is to be prevented by powerful blows at the very beginning of the operation.

II. Probable Allies and their Tasks:

1. On the flanks of our operation we can count on the active participation of Rumania and Finland in the war against Soviet Russia.

The High Command will in due time concert and determine in what form the armed forces of the two countries will be placed under German command at the time of their intervention.

2. It will be the task of Rumania, together with the forces concentrating there, to pin down the enemy facing her and, in addition, to render auxiliary services in the rear area.

3. Finland will cover the concentration of the redeployed German North Group (parts of the XXI Group) coming from Norway and will operate jointly with it. Besides, Finland will be assigned the task of eliminating Hangö.

4. It may be expected that Swedish railroads and highways will be available for the concentration of the German North Group, from the start of operations at the latest.

Page 262

III. Direction of Operations:

A. Army (hereby approving the plans presented to me):

In the zone of operations divided by the Pripet Marshes into a southern and northern sector, the main effort will be made north of this area. Two Army Groups will be provided here.

The southern group of these two Army Groups-the center of the entire front-will be given the task of annihilating the forces of the enemy in White Russia by advancing from the region around and north of Warsaw with especially strong armored and motorized units. The possibility of switching strong mobile units to the North must thereby be created in order, in cooperation with the Northern Army Group operating from East Prussia in the general direction of Leningrad, to annihilate the enemy forces fighting in the Baltic. Only after having accomplished this most important task, which must be followed by the occupation of Leningrad and Kronstadt, are the offensive operations aimed at the occupation of the important traffic and armament center of Moscow to be pursued.

Only a surprisingly fast collapse of Russian resistance could justify aiming at both objectives simultaneously.

The most important assignment of the XXI Group, even during the eastern operations, will still be the protection of Norway. The additional forces available are to be employed in the north (mountain corps), first to secure the Petsamo Region and its ore mines as well as the Arctic Ocean route, and then to advance jointly with Finnish forces against the Murmansk railroad and stop the supply of the Murmansk region by land.

Whether such an operation with rather strong German forces (two or three divisions) can be conducted from the area of and south of Rovaniemi depends upon Sweden's willingness to make the railroads available for such a concentration.

The main body of the Finnish Army will be assigned the task, in coordination with the advance of the German northern flank, of pinning down strong Russian forces by attacking west of or on both sides of Lake Ladoga and of seizing Hangö.

The Army Group employed south of the Pripet Marshes is to make its main effort in the area from Lublin in the general direction of Kiev, in order to penetrate quickly with strong armored units into the deep flank and rear of the Russian forces and then to roll them up along the Dnieper River

Page 263

The German-Rumanian groups on the right flank are assigned the task of:

(a) protecting Rumanian territory and thereby the southern flank of the entire operation.

(b) pinning down the opposing enemy forces while Army Group South is attacking on its northern flank and, according to the progressive development of the situation and in conjunction with the Air Force, preventing their orderly retreat across the Dniester during the pursuit,

[and,] in the North, of reaching Moscow quickly.

The capture of this city means a decisive success politically and economically and, beyond that, the elimination of the most important railway center.

B. Air Force:

Its task wild be to paralyze and to eliminate as far as possible the intervention of the Russian Air Force as well as to support the Army at its main points of effort, particularly those of Army Group Center and, on the flank, those of Army Group South. The Russian railroads, in the order of their importance for the operations, will be cut or the most important near-by objectives (river crossings) seized by the bold employment of parachute and airborne troops.

In order to concentrate all forces against the enemy Air Force and to give immediate support to the Army the armament industry will not be attacked during the main operations. Only after the completion of the mobile operations may such attacks be considered-primarily against the Ural Region.

C. Navy:

The Navy's role against Soviet Russia is, while safeguarding our own coast, to prevent an escape of enemy naval units from the Baltic Sea. As the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet, once we have reached Leningrad, will be deprived of its last base and will then be in a hopeless situation, any larger naval operations are to be avoided before that time.

After the elimination of the Russian Fleet it will be a question of protecting all the traffic in the Baltic Sea, including the supply by sea of the northern flank of the Army (mine clearance!).

IV. All orders to be issued by the commanders-in-chief on the basis of this directive must clearly indicate that they are precautionary measures for the possibility that Russia should change her present attitude toward us. The number of officers to be assigned to the preparatory work at an early date is to be kept as small as possible;

Page 264

additional personnel should be briefed as late as possible and only to the extent required for the activity of each individual. Otherwise, through the discovery of our preparations-the date of their execution has not even been fixed-there is danger that most serious political and military disadvantages may arise.

V. I expect reports from the commanders-in-chief concerning their further plans based on this directive.

The contemplated preparations of all branches of the Armed Forces, including their progress, are to be reported to me through the High Command [OKW].

ADOLF HITLER [8]

[8] The document also bears four sets of initials, apparently those of Keitel, Jodl, Warlimont, and one unidentified.

Frame 112785, serial 104

St. S. Nr. 925

DECEMBER 31, 1940.

The Finnish Minister, whom I saw today on the occasion of the signing of a treaty, in connection with his New Year's wishes expressed hope for his country. He stated that in his homeland people were now reassured because they thought they knew that in a future conflict with Russia they would not stand alone.

In my reply I used the formula that the Russian Government certainly realized that Germany did not desire any new unrest in the North.

WEIZSÄCKER

Frames 112944-112945, serial 104

The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg), the German Ambassador in Turkey (Papen), the German Minister in Yugoslavia (Heeren), and the German Minister in Greece (Erbach-Schönberg)

STATE SECRET

BERLIN, January 7, 1941.

Pol I 1650 gRs

No. 36 to Moscow

No. 12 to Ankara

No. 11 to Belgrade

No. 81 to Athens

Page 265

I. For confidential information of the Chief of the Mission and the Military, Naval, and Air Attaches only.

Since early in January the movement of strong German troop formations to Rumania has been going on via Hungary. The movement of troops is being carried on with the full concurrence of the Hungarian and Rumanian Governments. For the time being the troops will be quartered in the south of Rumania.

The troop movements result from the fact that the necessity must be seriously contemplated of ejecting the English completely from all of Greece. German troops have been provided in such strength that they can easily cope with any military task in the Danubian Region and with any eventualities from any side. The military measures being carried out by us are aimed exclusively against British forces getting a foothold in Greece, and not against any Balkan country, including Turkey.

II. As for instructions for conversations, in general, a reserved attitude is to be taken. In case of urgent official inquiries, it is to be pointed out, depending on circumstances, that such inquiries are to be made in Berlin. In so far as conversation cannot be avoided, an opinion in general terms is to be given. In so doing, our having reliable reports regarding larger and larger reinforcements of English troops of all kinds in Greece may be given as a plausible reason, and the Salonika operation of the last World War may be recalled. Concerning the strength of the German troops, maintenance of the present vagueness is desired for the time being. Later on we shall presumably be interested in making known the full strength of the troops and, beyond that, in stimulating exaggeration. The cue for that will be given at the proper time.

This instruction also applies, by agreement with the High Command, to the Military, Naval, and Air Attaches. Strict reserve in answering inquiries is to be imposed upon the other members of the mission.

III. Should occasion arise, please report by wire concerning the attitude of the Government, the public and the press, any inquiries by the Government there, and any démarches of foreign missions with the Government there.

Reich Foreign Minister

Page 266

Frame 112945, serial 104

Pol. I 1650 g Rs

BERLIN, January 7, 1941.

No. 19. I request that the Japanese Foreign Minister be personally and confidentially informed that at present rather strong German troop contingents are being transferred to Rumania. The movements are carried on with the full concurrence of the Hungarian and the Rumanian Governments. These troop shipments are being carried out as a security measure for an intervention that may become necessary in Greece if English military forces gain a foothold and necessitate such intervention there.

Reich Foreign Minister

Frame 112942, serial 104

STRICTLY SECRET

Moscow, January 8, 1941-4:45 p. m.

Received January 8, 1941-6 p. m.

No. 46 of January 8

Reference your telegram of the 7th No. 36.

Numerous rumors are already circulating here concerning the sending of German troops to Rumania; the number of men in the movement is even estimated at 200,000 (two hundred thousand). Government circles here, the radio, and the Soviet press have not yet taken up the matter. Nothing is known concerning démarches by foreign missions with the Soviet Government.

The Soviet Government will take the strongest interest in these troop movements and will wish to know what purposes these troop concentrations serve and particularly to what degree Bulgaria and Turkey (Straits) might possibly be affected by them.

Please give me appropriate instructions or perhaps inform Herr Dekanosov there.

SCHULENBURG

Page 267

Frame 112966, serial 104

Teletype from Fuschl No. 12 of January 10, 11:45 p. m.

No. 1832

Reference your telegram No. 50 of January 8. [9]

I request you not to broach the question of increased German troop shipments to Rumania with the Soviet Government. Should you be approached regarding the matter by Herr Molotov or some other influential person in the Soviet Government, please say that according to your information the sending of German troops was exclusively a matter of precautionary military measures against England. The English already had military contingents on Greek soil and it was to be expected that they would further increase those contingents in the immediate future. Germany would not under any circumstances tolerate England's gaining a foothold on Greek soil. Please do not go into greater detail until further notice.

RIBBENTROP

[9] Not printed

Frames 333-334, serial F 15

The German Ambassador, Count von der Schulenburg, Plenipotentiary of the Government of the German Reich, on the one hand, and the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., V. M. Molotov, Plenipotentiary of the Government of the U.S.S.R., on the other hand, have agreed upon the following:

1. The Government of the German Reich renounces its claim to the strip of Lithuanian territory which is mentioned in the Secret Supplementary Protocol of September 28, 1939 [10] and which has been marked on the map attached to this Protocol;

2. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is prepared to compensate the Government of the German Reich for the territory mentioned in Point 1 of this Protocol by paying 7,500,000 gold dollars or 31,500,000 Reichsmarks to Germany.

The amount of 31.5 million Reichsmarks will be paid by the Government of the U.S.S.R. in the following manner: one-eighth, that is, 3,937,500 Reichsmarks, in non-ferrous metal deliveries within three months after the signing of this Protocol, the remaining seven-eighths,

[10] Ante, p, 107.

Page 268

or 27,562,500 Reichsmarks, in gold by deduction from the German gold payments which Germany is to make by February 11, 1941 in accordance with the correspondence exchanged between the Chairman of the German Economic Delegation, Dr. Schnurre, and the People's Commissar for Foreign Trade of the U.S.S.R., Herr A. I. Mikoyan, in connection with the "Agreement of January 10, 1941 concerning reciprocal deliveries in the second treaty period on the basis of the Economic Agreement between the German Reich and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of February 11 1940."

3. This Protocol has been executed in two originals in the German language and two originals in the Russian language and shall become effective immediately upon signature.

Moscow, January 10, 1941.

For the Government of the German Reich:

SCHULENBURG

(SEAL)

By authority of the Government of the U.S.S.R.:

V. MOLOTOV

(SEAL)

Frames 112984-112986, serial 104

SECRET

BERLIN; January 17, 1941.

St. S. Nr. 52

By Wire by fastest means to the Reich Foreign Minister (teletype or telephone).

The Russian Ambassador called on me this afternoon. On the basis of a memorandum which he handed me later on, he stated the following:

"According to all reports, German troops in great numbers are in Rumania and are now prepared to march into Bulgaria, having as their goal the occupation of Bulgaria, Greece and the Straits. There can be no doubt that England will try to forestall the operations of German troops, to occupy the Straits, to start military operations against Bulgaria in alliance with Turkey, and turn Bulgaria into a theater of operations. The Soviet Government has stated repeatedly to the German Government that it considers the territory of Bulgaria and of the Straits as the security zone of the U.S.S.R. and that it cannot be indifferent to events which threaten the security interests of the U.S.S.R. In view of all this the Soviet Government regards

Page 269

it as its duty to give warning that it will consider the appearance of any foreign armed forces on the territory of Bulgaria and of the Straits as a violation of the security interests of the U.S.S.R."

End of the remarks of the Ambassador.

Without taking this statement too seriously before Dekanosov, I replied that I should not like to answer him of my own accord at once, but would prefer first to inform the Reich Foreign Minister of his communication.

I then added that I should like to ask two more questions in order to understand the contents of his communication correctly, namely-

(a) From whom had the Soviet Government received the report that German troops concentrated in Rumania were aiming at the occupation of Bulgaria, Greece, and the Straits? Dekanosov replied that his Government's sources were not known to him. He referred to the fact that-as stated previously-all reports are to this effect, to which I replied-without intending to anticipate a later German statement-that it was correct that under no circumstances would we allow England to gain a foothold in Greece and that we were observing this matter closely. Besides, this was certainly nothing new for the Soviet Government, because this had already been stated to Herr Molotov some time ago.

(b) Why did the Soviet Government take it for granted that England, forestalling the operations of the German troops, would attempt to occupy the Straits? In this matter, too, Dekanosov referred only to his original communication. His Government did not know that anything of the sort would occur; however, it had no doubt regarding commensurate English measures if the condition mentioned, namely, the advance of German troops on Bulgaria, Greece, and the Straits, should materialize.

In conclusion, I again reserved the right to a reply to the démarche.

After I had made a few more remarks concerning German air successes against the British fleet in the Mediterranean, the Ambassador took his leave, hoping for an early reply.

WEIZSÄCKER

Page 270

Frames 112981-112982, serial 104

VERY URGENT

Moscow, January 17, 1941-8:46 p. m.

Received January 17, 1941-11:40 p. m.

STRICTLY SECRET

No. 122 of January 17

For the Reich Foreign Minister.

1. Molotov asked me to call on him this afternoon and stated the following:

Since the most important economic questions in the relations between Germany and the Soviet Union had been settled by the recently concluded treaties, it would now be in order to turn to purely political issues again. The Soviet Government was surprised that it had not yet received from Germany any answer to its statement of position of November 25 (cf. telegraphic report No. 2562 [2362] of November 25) concerning the issues raised during the Berlin discussions, and he would appreciate it if I would bring that fact to the attention of the Government of the German Reich with the remark that the Soviet Government was counting on an early German reply.

I replied to Herr Molotov that there was not the slightest cause for any surprise, since this was a matter of issues which must first be thoroughly discussed with Italy and Japan. As soon as these deliberations had been concluded the Soviet Government would certainly be informed of our position with regard to their reply.

2. Molotov then touched upon the Balkans and in that connection stated word for word as follows:

According to all reports available here, German troops in great numbers were concentrated in Rumania and ready to march into Bulgaria with the aim of occupying Bulgaria, Greece, and the Straits. There was no doubt that England would try to forestall the operations of the German troops, to occupy the Straits, to open military operations against Bulgaria in alliance with Turkey, and turn Bulgaria into a theater of war. The Soviet Government had repeatedly called the attention of the Government of the German Reich to the fact that it considered the territory of Bulgaria and the Straits as a security zone of the U.S.S.R. and that it could therefore not remain indifferent in the face of events which menaced the security interests of the U.S.S.R. Consequently the Soviet Government regarded it

Page 271

as its duty to call attention to the fact that it would consider the appearance of any foreign armed forces on the territory of Bulgaria and of the Straits as a violation of the security interests of the U.S.S.R.

Molotov added that he had instructed Dekanosov to make an identical démarche in Berlin. In my reply I confined myself to the statements prescribed by telegraphic instructions No. 36 of January 7 and No. 57 of January 10.

SCHULENBURG

Frames 112994-112997, serial 104

No. 38

FUSCHL, January 21, 1941-11:30 p. m.

Teletype through Office of Reich Foreign Minister to State Secretary von Weizsäcker, No. 31.

1. I request that you ask the Russian Ambassador to call on you Wednesday evening and that you give him in oral form the following reply to the statement made to you on January 17. Thereupon the text of the reply is to be handed to him in the form of a memorandum.

Text of the reply:

1. The Reich Government has not received any reports that England contemplates occupying the Straits. Nor does the Reich Government believe that Turkey will permit English military forces to enter her territory. However, the Reich Government is informed that England intends and is about to gain a foothold on Greek territory.

2. The Führer pointed out repeatedly to Chairman Molotov during his visit to Berlin in November that Germany would prevent by all military means any attempt by England to gain a foothold on Greek soil.

It is the inalterable intention of the Reich Government not under any circumstances to permit English military forces to establish themselves on Greek territory, which would mean a threat to vital interests of Germany in the Balkans. It is therefore carrying out certain troop concentrations in the Balkans, which have the sole purpose of preventing the British from gaining any foothold on Greek soil.

3. Germany does not intend to occupy the Straits. She will respect the territory under Turkish sovereignty unless Turkey on her part commits a hostile act against German troops. On the other hand, however, the German Army will march through Bulgarian territory

Page 272

should any military operations be carried out against Greece. The Reich Government has, of course, no intention of violating any Soviet Russian security interests nor would this by any means be the case if German troops march through Bulgaria.

4. For the action which may have to be undertaken against England in Greece, Germany is carrying on a troop concentration in the Balkans on such a scale that it will enable her to checkmate any English attempt at building up a front in those regions.

The Reich Government believes that in so doing it is also serving Soviet interests, which would be opposed to England's gaining a foothold in these regions.

5. The Reich Government-as it indicated on the occasion of the Berlin visit of Chairman Molotov-has an understanding of the Soviet interest in the Straits question and is prepared to endorse a revision of the Montreux Convention at the proper time. Germany on her part is politically not interested in the Straits question and will withdraw her troops from there after having carried out her operations in the Balkans.

6. As to the stand requested by Chairman Molotov concerning the question of continuing the political discussion begun some time ago in Berlin, the following may be stated:

The Reich Government still adheres to the ideas explained to Chairman Molotov during his presence in Berlin. The Soviet Government on the other hand made certain counterproposals at the end of November. At the present time the Reich Government is in touch with the Governments of its allies, Italy and Japan, concerning all those issues, and it hopes that after having further clarified the whole problem it will be able to resume the political discussion with the Soviet Government in the near future.

End of the reply.

2. Ambassador Schulenburg is receiving instructions from here to take corresponding action with Herr Molotov on Wednesday evening or Thursday morning. [11]

3. Furthermore, I request that, after the call of the Russian Ambassador, you hand Ambassador Alfieri a copy of the statement given to you by Herr Dekanosov on January 17, as well as a copy of our reply, for the confidential information of the Italian Government. The Duce and Count Ciano have already been informed by me here.

RIBBENTROP

[11] By telegram No. 129 of January 22, 1941, not printed, Ambassador Schulenburg was instructed to give an identical reply to Molotov.

Page 273

Frames 112998-112999, serial 101

St. S. Nr. 59

BERLIN, January 22, 1941.

I received the Soviet Russian Ambassador late this afternoon and informed him orally of the reply decided upon in answer to his statement of January 17. I then handed him the text of the reply in the form of a memorandum.

I also told Dekanosov that Count Schulenburg would hand a corresponding communication to Herr Molotov either this evening or tomorrow morning.

Dekanosov then inquired-for his own information, he said-about the purport of certain expressions in the reply given to him. He wanted to find out how soon German troops might be expected to march through Bulgaria against Greece-as mentioned therein-as well as whether this decision was to be considered as definite.

I referred the Ambassador in this connection to the text of paragraphs 1 and 3 of the memorandum.

Thereupon the Ambassador repeated from his communication of the 17th instant that the Soviet Government considered the appearance of any foreign military forces on Bulgarian territory as a violation of its security interests. Our statement at the end of paragraph 3 of the memorandum was not in agreement with that view.

I replied that our view was made clear in paragraph 3 and paragraph 4 of the memorandum. we believed that our plans would actually serve Soviet interests, which are opposed to England's gaining a foothold in these regions. Moreover, I asked the Ambassador to go over the memorandum again very carefully at home. He would then surely reach the conclusion that our answer removed his anxiety.

Submitted herewith to the

Reich Foreign Minister (by teletype).

WEIZSÄCKER

Page 274

Frame 113003, serial 104

VERY URGENT

Moscow, January 23, 1941-9:21 p. m.

Received January 23 [24], 1941-12:25 a. m.

SECRET

No. 161 of January 23

Reference your telegram No. 129 of the 22nd. [12]

Instruction carried out today.

Molotov stated that Soviet Government would examine and consider our communication, after which he would take a stand, if necessary. He understood the communication of the Government of the German Reich to mean that the transit of German troops through Bulgaria was in itself a matter that was definitely decided on, but only in the event that England should expand her military operations on Greek soil beyond their present scope.

For the rest, Molotov stated the well-known argument according to which the Soviet Government considered Bulgaria and the Straits as a security zone of the Soviet Union and that it was opposed to any spread of the war, particularly in the Black Sea, wherein it believed itself in agreement with the Government of the German Reich.

SCHULENBURG

[12] Not printed. For contents see footnote 11, ante, p 272.

Frame 218062, serial 426

No. 353 of February 21

BERLIN, February 22, 1941-6:25 a. m.

Received Moscow, February 22, 1941-11 a. m.

Confidential material. For chief of mission or his representative personally. State secret. To be decoded personally. Extremely secret. Reply by courier or secret code.

In Telegraphic Instruction No. 36 of January 7 the statement was made that, for the time being, vagueness with regard to the strength of the German forces was desirable and that at a given time word would be given for publication of the full strength of the troops. That time has now come.

Page 275

In Rumania there are 680,000 (six hundred eighty thousand) German troops in readiness. Among these troops there is an unusually high percentage of technical troops with the most up-to-date military equipment, especially armored units. Behind these troops there are inexhaustible reserves in Germany, including the permanent units stationed at the German-Yugoslav border.

I request the members of the mission and any available trusted persons [Vertrauensleute] to start, in suitable ways, to let this strength be known in an impressive manner-indicating that it is more than sufficient to meet any eventuality in the Balkans from any side whatsoever-and to do so not only in Government circles there but also in the foreign missions concerned. I leave it to your discretion not always to mention the exact figure given above. On the contrary, innuendo and circumlocution may also be used, as, for example, "almost 700,000," and the like.

RITTER

Frame 218061, serial 426

Multex No. 98 of February 22

BERLIN, February 23, 1941-3:10 a. m.

Received Moscow, February 23, 1941-9:50 a. m.

Confidential material. State Secret. Extremely secret. To be decoded only by official in charge of state secret documents. To be decoded personally. Extremely secret. Reply by courier or secret code.

Recently there have been frequent Greek assurances, intended for German ears, that, except for a number of British planes, there are no British forces in Greece and that the Greek Government has rejected and will reject British offers to send strong British forces to Greece. These assurances are apparently being made according to plan at the direction of the Greek Government directly through Greek diplomats and military attaches and indirectly through foreign governments and military attaches.

Please do not accept such assurances without rejoinder. The answer should be that the Government of the Reich had its own information regarding the numerical strength of the British troops in Greece and regarding the further intentions of the British. British Prime

Page 276

Minister Churchill himself revealed the intentions of the British when he declared in the House of Commons, in the course of statements on the British military situation in North Africa on December 19, 1940: "Marshal Sir Longmore experienced the most critical moment in his preparations when he saw how big a portion of his military forces was being withdrawn in order to be sent to Greece." The Reich Government attaches more importance to these and other statements of Churchill than to the assurances of Greece, whose purpose it is easy to see through.

Confirm receipt.

WEIZSÄCKER

Frames 113086-113087, serial 104

VERY URGENT

Fuschl, February 27, 1941-9:50 p. m.

Received Berlin, February 27, 1941-10:30 p. m.

No. 144 of February 27

Transmitted to Moscow as No. 403, February 27-10:58 p. m.

For the Ambassador personally.

Please go to see Herr Molotov on Friday, February 28, toward evening and communicate to him verbally the following:

1. As the Soviet Government knows, negotiations have for some time been in progress between the Government of the Reich and the Italian Government on the one hand and the Bulgarian Government on the other, regarding the accession of Bulgaria to the Three Power Pact. These negotiations have now been concluded, and it has been agreed that Bulgaria will accede to the Three Power Pact, and the Protocol regarding this accession will be signed on March 1. The Government of the Reich is anxious to inform the Soviet Government of this in advance.

2. I would ask you to go to see Herr Molotov again on March 1, toward evening, and to tell him the following:

Reports in our possession concerning British intentions in Greece have forced the Government of the Reich to take further security measures forthwith, making necessary the shifting of German troops to Bulgarian soil. Referring to the statement made to the Soviet Government on January 23d, please add that this is a precautionary

Page 277

measure taken to prevent the British from gaining a firm foothold in Greece. Should Herr Molotov go into the subject in any further detail, we remind you-for your guidance-that, in the first place, these security measures are taken exclusively to prevent British entrenchment on Greek territory; secondly, that the measures are not directed at Turkey, and that we shall respect Turkish sovereignty unless Turkey commits a hostile act against us; that, thirdly, these German troop concentrations are war measures, and that the elimination of the British danger in Greece will automatically result in the withdrawal of the German troops.

Please inform me by wire how Herr Molotov receives your communications.

For your personal information, you are further informed that the Bulgarian Minister in Moscow will also make similar communications from his Government on February 28th and on March 1.

RIBBENTROP

Frame 113094, serial 104

VERY URGENT

MOSCOW, March 1, 1941-12:25 a. m.

Received March 1, 1941-2:10 a. m.

No. 444 of February 28

In reference to your telegram of the 27th, No. 403.

I called on Herr Molotov this evening and carried out instruction (1).

Molotov received my communication with obvious concern and stated that the German Reich Government had been informed of the viewpoint of the Soviet Government on November 25, 1940 (see telegraphic report of November 25, No. 2562 [2362]). The position of the Soviet Government in the matter was still determined by the communication of that date. Then, the future position of Bulgaria was considered within the framework of certain particular circumstances. In the meantime, events had taken a different turn. The view of the Soviet Government, on the other hand, that Bulgaria came within the security zone of the Soviet Union, remained unchanged.

Despite my objections that the accession of Bulgaria was in no way prejudicial to the interests of the Soviet Union, Molotov held to his view, stating that the accession of Bulgaria was taking place

Page 278

under circumstances quite different than had been anticipated, and that it was unfortunately not evident to him that events were unfolding within the framework of the Soviet Government's démarche of November 25.

SCHULENBURG

NOTE: Transmitted under No. 744, to special train.

Telegram Control Office March 1, 1941, 2:55 A. M.

Frames 113100-113101, serial 104

VERY URGENT

Moscow, March 1, 1941-10:15 p. m.

Received March 2, 1941-2:20 a. m.

SECRET

No. 453 of March 1

Reference your telegram of the 27th, No. 403.

Instruction under (2) carried out at 6:30 p. m., Moscow time, today.

Molotov, who received my communication with great gravity, stated first of all that he was informed regarding the German decision, since the Bulgarian Minister had today already apprised Herr Vishinsky. Molotov thereupon expressed his deep concern that the German Government had, in a matter of such importance to the Soviet Government, made decisions contrary to the Soviet Government's conception of the security interests of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government had repeatedly stressed its special interest in Bulgaria to the German Government, both during the Berlin conferences and later. Consequently it could not remain indifferent in the face of Germany's last measures in Bulgaria and would have to define its attitude with regard thereto. It hoped that the German Reich Government would attach the proper significance to this attitude. Molotov in my presence drafted in his own hand a rough memorandum setting forth the position of the Soviet Government, had it copied, and handed it to me. The text of the note is as follows:

"1. It is to be regretted that despite the caution contained in the démarche of November 25, 1940, on the part of the Soviet Government, the German Reich Government has deemed it possible to take a course that involves injury to the security interests of the U.S.S.R. and has decided to effect the military occupation of Bulgaria.

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"2. In view of the fact that the Soviet Government maintains the same basic position as in its démarche of November 25, the German Government must understand that it cannot count on support from the U.S.S.R. for its acts in Bulgaria."

In my reply, I confined myself to your instructions, and stressed that there could be no question of an impairment of Soviet security interests.

SCHULENBURG

NOTE: Transmitted to special train under No. 771.

Telegram Control Office March 2, 1941.

Frame 24471, serial 34

STATE SECRET

Pol I M 653 g RS

General Warlimont and Naval Captain Bürkner bring up the point that for certain reasons a speedy termination of the activities of the various Russian Commissions at work on German territory in the east and their immediate despatch home is necessary. Such commissions are still on German territory in connection with the return of Lithuanian emigrants from Germany to Lithuania. The German-Russian boundary commission is also active, as well as several local sub-commissions. Of these sub-commissions some are located on Russian territory and others on German territory (and in fact south of Suwalki?). The work of these sub-commissions was to be completed by March 10th. For some reason, they have not yet begun their work. The OKW requests that everything be done to prevent this work from being begun.

The presence of Russians in this part of Germany can only be permitted up to March 25. In the northern sector strong elements of German troops are already being assembled. From the 20th of March on an even heavier massing will take place.

The question is raised in this connection as to whether the Russian consulate in Königsberg is occupied.

RITTER

BERLIN, March 13, 1941