

POLITICS OF OUR MILITARY
NATIONAL DEFENSE

HISTORY

OF THE

ACTION OF POLITICAL FORCES WITHIN THE
UNITED STATES WHICH HAS SHAPED OUR
MILITARY NATIONAL DEFENSE
POLICIES FROM 1783 TO 1940

TOGETHER WITH THE
DEFENSE ACTS OF 1916 AND 1920
AS CASE STUDIES



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Ordered, That the manuscript of the Politics of Our Military National Defense, with the Defense Acts of 1916 and 1920 as case studies, being the history of the action of political forces within the United States of America which has shaped our military national defense policies from 1783 to 1940, be printed as a Senate document.

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THE POLITICS OF OUR MILITARY NATIONAL DEFENSE

With the Defense Acts of 1916 and
1920 as Case Studies

E. BROOKE LEE, JR.

Senior Thesis submitted to the
Department of Politics
Princeton University
April 1940

In pace, ut sapiens, aptarit idonea bello * * *.—Horace, Satires, book II, No. II, line 111.

That nation is a murderer of its people which sends them unprepared to meet those mechanized and disciplined by training * * *.—Light Horse Harry Lee.

War is not an isolated or separate thing in itself. It is simply a special form of politics * * *.—Gen. Karl von Clausewitz.

Our culture must, therefore, not omit the arming of the man * * *.—Ralph Waldo Emerson.

In praise of three unusual and unsung patriots:

A military tactician and regular-line officer who always thought firstly of the well-being of American democracy and secondly of the United States Army—John McAuley Palmer, brigadier general, retired.

A United States Senator who was, in the end, unseated because he spent so much time in strengthening national defense, and so little time on personal defense in his own constituency—Blair Lee, of Maryland.

A remarkable journalist, formerly a devout American Socialist, who, after 6 disillusioning years among the Soviets, unmaskes forever this ideological enemy, to the benefit of his nation—Eugene Lyons.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This work, purely personal and academic in nature, has been written for the politics department of Princeton University, or any other consumption within this university. It is not to be published hereafter in whole or in part. Many personal interviews and opinions herein set down were procured with this understanding.

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PREFACE

The purpose of this thesis, as the title indicates, is a study of the political forces inside of this Nation which have a definite influence upon our military national-defense policy. Although the field treated stretches from 1783 to 1940, the two specific National Defense Acts of 1916 and 1920 are used as the principal case studies.

The scope and division of this work were arrived at under the advice of Senator James W. Wadsworth, Jr., and John McAuley Palmer, brigadier general retired, who were respectively chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee and chief technician, when the 1920 legislation was drawn up. Paul Page, Jr., at present Chief Attorney of the United States Maritime Commission, a recognized expert in diagnosing the political significance of present and past legislation, also lent valuable assistance. Former Senator Blair Lee, of Maryland, chairman of the Senate Coast Defense Committee in 1916, has offered the writer many helpful suggestions on the treatment of this field.

While the faculty adviser to this thesis for the department of politics of Princeton University is Prof. William Starr Myers, Prof. Harold Sprout has also directed the approach to certain chapters. The technique of sectional and party polling employed in chapters 4 and 5 of both parts II and III is the same used by Professor Sprout in his recent work on the Rise of America Naval Power.

Part I, chapter 2, on "Our Policy in Retrospect—Washington to 1914," has been written chiefly under the guidance of General Palmer. Chapter 1, of parts II and III, contains explanatory material belonging to the 1916 and 1920 Defense Acts, respectively. The following five chapters of each of these two parts concern themselves with these five political forces, in order: (1) The Administration; (2) the "Military," meaning the National Army; (3) geographical politics, of both the Government and the National Guard; (4) party politics; and, lastly, (5) varied and numerous "Public" lobbies. It may be asked, why this particular division? The answer is, a study of any of the Military Affairs Committee hearings of Congress soon shows this to be the most practical and all-inclusive arrangement.

The period in the history of our national-defense policy from 1920 to the present is treated with as much care as possible in part IV, chapter 2. A first-rate historian would not base any analysis purely upon personal interviews, but the writer has selected this method in chapter 3, because it remains the surest diagnosis of contemporary events not yet in print. Also, the above use of case studies has offered a sound foundation for this closing analysis of the present day national-defense policy of the United States.

The ultimate conclusions of this thesis have been adopted by the writer as his own. He is not at liberty to disclose the entire process of arriving at them, due to the present election year and second World War.

E. B. L., Jr.

Princeton, N. J., April 1940.

PART I

A Technical and Historical Background

CHAPTER I

National Defense Defined—The Navy, Army, and Air Corps

The national-defense policy of the United States Government should attempt to place all safeguards possible between the well-being of our great Nation and the devastating effects of civil, hemispherical, or world war.

Military thinkers set it down as an indisputable axiom that any conflict, regardless of its origin, should be prosecuted by offensive as well as defensive strategy and tactics, the offense frequently being the best defense. Mere passive defense permits the aggressive enemy to concentrate his forces for offensive action on his own initiative and in his own good time, and precludes the possibility of bringing about any cessation of hostilities by breaking his will to fight.¹

Such is the essence of national defense, to be later analyzed as the Navy, the Army, and the Air Corps. Since, in our case, the system is that of a republican form of government, we must immediately consider its political aspects. It is a well-founded hypothesis that such a republic as ours could function only with the assistance of political parties, since our Government, otherwise, lacks four of the five ingredients of complete republican government.

While our people are free to choose their representatives, the resulting representative assembly does not come face to face with the administrative branch. These representatives should be so circumstanced that they use their authority only on public account. Thirdly, the elections are not confined to a choice of representatives via the "short ballot." Lastly, the supervision and control by this representative assembly does not extend over the whole of the Government.²

These four failings, then, require the presence of the political party element, in order that our republican government be democratic in atmosphere. The title is thus explained: "The Politics of Our Military National Defense."

Much of the bulk of this thesis, employing the National Defense Acts of 1916 and 1920 as principal case studies, is based upon the House and Senate Military Affairs Committees' hearings. The content of these hearings in committee and the subsequent debate and voting on the two "floors" appears to fall very neatly into five political categories.

The first political force is referred to herein simply as the "administration." This includes the President, the Cabinet Secretaries concerned, and all their appointed staff. The second force is the "military," made up of the Regular Army, its General Staff and Organized Reserve officers. That political force termed "geography" is a divided one. It contains the militia lobby throughout the Nation, which

¹ David H. Popper, American Defense Policies, Foreign Affairs Association Report, May 1, 1939, p. 35. The same thoughts are expressed throughout the national defense material in the bibliography.

² Prof. William Starr Myers, Lecture X, March 5, of Comparative Government. Politics Department, Princeton University, 1940.

latter is known as the National Guard. It also covers the sectional tendencies in Congress. After "geography," comes, fourthly, "party," treating the problem of party lines in Congress. Last to be discussed is the "public," comprised of its multifarious lobbies.

Before these political forces can be treated practically in the two test cases, a complete definition of national defense must be presented. Such an analysis will break the present system down into the Navy, the Army, and the Air Corps. Next, the thread of our defense policy must be traced back to its first significant promoter, George Washington. Likewise must the particular stepping stones of 1914 and 1915, and 1917 through 1919 be scrutinized—before rushing headlong into the main task, the Defense Acts of 1916 and 1920.

Continuing now with an analysis of national defense, remember first:

* * * the United States is the only one of the great powers of the world which is in a position to pursue the old British policy, that is, a naval policy, in matters of national defense.³

THE NAVY

The three departments of our defense will now be discussed in order of their significance to our entire policy, with the Navy ranking first. To study the naval front of the United States, is first to analyze the strategic situation of the Nation. Secondly, the role of sea power in the national defense, and, lastly, the principles of our naval policy.⁴

Ours is a hemisphere set apart geographically by the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans, and in the mind of the American citizen we are defensively segregated from the Old World and the Far East by the Monroe Doctrine. While we are principally concerned with North America, a good offense remains the best defense; thus a study of offensive tactics calls on us to enlarge our scope to the inclusion of the Philippines, South and Central America, and as far eastward as the Azores.

When crises arise, real preparedness enables us to deal offensively with the enemy powers and thus preserve our foreign trade, our merchant marine, and our home shores, of which the northern industrial area of the Nation is most vital. This, too, is the most important financial and political area, resulting in the situation of our four eastern naval yards at Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Norfolk. Yet, this entire Atlantic Coast lacks sufficient harbor-defense and air bases. Fortunately enough, it would be exceedingly difficult for hostile fleets to take immediate advantage of this, because of their complete lack of a trans-Atlantic base.

In discussing our east coast, remember that were Great Britain to lose Bermuda in the present World War, it would not alone offer the enemy a naval base, but would imperil our eastern cities for the first time to serious bombing raids. Remember, too, that our east coast in wartime is somewhat protected by natural inland waterways and artificial canals.

Turning south, the Panama Canal and Caribbean area, while remote to the bulk of our population, is of the greatest strategical importance. We are dependent upon a large, unified navy which could

³ George Fielding Elliot, *The Ramparts We Watch*, p. 46.

⁴ Much of this analysis of the Navy, Army, and Air Corps is written with the aid of special papers of this author prepared for Professor Sprout of Princeton, last summer.

reach any point on our coast before the present coast defense would give out, but only if the Canal is kept open; hence it is now defended by every modern military means, its batteries powerful enough to cover our Navy far out at sea when on the attack. Of the two approaches to the Canal, the Caribbean is the weaker, since the Windward and Mona Passages entering upon that vestibule are too wide and deep to be effectively fortified or mined. The harbor of Guantanamo and Puerto Rico give a fair opportunity for adequate defense. But a first-rate base must be set up at Key West if our Gulf of Mexico territory is to receive its share of protection.⁵

Our Pacific Ocean strategy should be thought of in terms of distance. We have three naval yards, placed at Seattle, San Francisco, and San Diego. While the Panama Canal is 3,245 miles from San Francisco, it is 4,600 from Japan, which naval-minded nation is almost our only concern in the Pacific. The Aleutian Islands are the most direct pathway from Japan to our shores, but while they offer us excellent defensive facilities, they are not considered to be a good point of attack. Hawaii is rightly called the "key to the Pacific." At present we could always use the Hawaii-to-Guam chain for any necessary offensive against our island adversary, being then within 1,300 miles of Yokohama, while Japan holds no such conceivable threat over our heads. Defensively, in periods of crisis, we could furnish a constant air patrol along the Unalaska-Midway-Wake-Canton-Samoa route, parallel to our West coast, and far out to sea.⁶

Bear in mind that while our fleet assures control of all the above area for purposes of our maritime commerce, we at the same time are denying it to the enemy.

Turning back the pages of our history for a moment, the lessons of the War of 1812 should have taught this Nation the role of sea power in national defense once and for all time. But no:

* * * the power and efficiency of the Navy steadily declined until, in 1853, the United States possessed not one vessel that could have given battle with the prospect of victory against any first-class warship of the major European Powers.⁷

It was not until the squadrons of 1889, and Spanish War days, that any sort of real reform was carried out. Only the naval race of 1936 has actually remedied the weaknesses revealed in 1812. Gradually it was realized that it is not possible for a government to swiftly improvise sufficient naval forces in an emergency; that privateering was hopeless as an offensive against the convoy system; and that a large navy is required for such offensive tactics as blockading. Many such lessons were finally driven home by Alfred Thayer Mahan, with his conception of command of the sea. He merely restated the "capital-ship theory" in more clear and forceful exposition. Theodore Roosevelt carried these views to their proper conclusion, emphasizing that a navy's true function was not to defend the home shores, but rather to attack and destroy the enemy.⁸

The first World War reiterated the necessity of making the Nation's foreign and naval policies one and the same. It further suggested that preparedness should henceforth cost only the annual addition of a few modern ships. The post-war situation left America next to impregnable from sudden or prolonged attacks, with only her allies possessing

⁵ Elliot, *op. cit.*, pp. 142-157.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 162-175.

⁷ Harold and Margaret Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power*, p. 138.

⁸ Sprout, *op. cit.*, pp. 84, 164, 175, 279.

trans-Atlantic bases. But the first World War did hand over to Japan the control of the Far Eastern Hemisphere. Lastly, that war revealed that the battleship remains the backbone of a naval force, with neither the submarine, airplane, nor mine rendering the improved "floating fortress" obsolete.⁹

Since Revolutionary days, the Nation has been divided in a very natural way over the question of naval policy. The exposed seaboards, the traders, and the industrialists have always sought the protection of a large navy. The inland, agricultural sentiment will always be best depicted by Jefferson's ideas on what a navy should be—inexpensive and worthless flatboats.¹⁰ It will be noted later that the same marked geographical difference does not exist in America over the military policy.

In determining American naval policy, it has always been a point of dispute as to whether professional naval officers or civilian political representatives should have the final say. It would be best to have civilians, with the advice of the professionals, set the policy, to be administered by these professional men. This is the theory of the two Naval Affairs Committees of Congress.

THE ARMY

To analyze the roles of the Army and the air force in the national defense of the United States, again we first recall that the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans are our "ramparts," upon which we take our watch.

Our unified, one-ocean Navy is always accompanied by its quota of aircraft, the remainder assigned to Army control. Thus far, it appears wisest to have these three forces come under just the two heads, but not to carry it to the extreme of one Cabinet Department of National Defense.¹¹

At present, the Navy is both our only offensive weapon and our first line of defense, with our harbor, coastal, and antiaircraft defense the second line. The Army Air Corps, working in harmony with the mobile ground units, reenforced with the Organized Reserves, constitutes the third line.

Modern warfare requires a knowledge of mechanical and electrical appliances, and, secondly, a type of officer who is fitted to lead men. It is a comfort to realize that our highly industrialized, democratic Nation serves our defense program well in both these respects.¹²

The tactical missions of our Army are threefold. Firstly, there is the defense of our outlying possessions, necessary as strategical naval bases. Secondly, the Army watches over the home bases of the fleet, and, lastly, it has the general task of defending the home shores against invading or raiding forces. The most vital outlying posts are Hawaii and the Canal, the latter being vulnerable to neither a large-scale bombing attack or even a "tip-and-run" expedition. Its safety is chiefly insured by the complete lack of trans-Atlantic air bases. Raiding that objective with an airplane carrier would be incurring a loss that our enemies cannot afford at present.¹³

Hawaii need be fortified only to the extent of 5 weeks' endurance, within which period it would be relieved by the arrival of our concen-

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 303, 370, 183.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 372.

¹¹ Elliot, *op. cit.*, p. 326.

¹² Elliot, *op. cit.*, pp. 179-181.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 249-256.

trated naval force. Hawaii's present defense structure may be subdivided into its coast artillery, its mobile ground force, and its air force.¹⁴

Maj. George Fielding Eliot, popular author on the topic of national defense, suggests that our continental harbor defenses be supported by 20,000 troops, reenforced by 18,000 well-trained National Guard. The mobile ground force, responsible for the entire shore line, should never fall below 150,000 troops, or total over 200,000 Regulars. These figures are based upon careful study of the possible transport tonnage of our combined enemies.¹⁵

In the writer's opinion, it is an undisputed fact that a republic such as ours should strive for an efficient National Guard Reserve, as against a large, professional standing army. This National Guard must be completely removed from local politics, with the establishment of State police forces, inferring that Guardsmen are not to be used in strike breaking. With the Nation subdivided into nine corps areas, every Regular regiment should be reenforced by two National Guard reserve regiments. Thus, 200,000 men would be prepared for an emergency, with a sound reserve of 400,000—a structure wholly adequate for national defense, but in no way sufficient for any overseas expedition.¹⁶

THE AIR FORCE

The United States is out of reach of the air weapon as proceeding from any land base in the possession of a conceivably hostile power * * *¹⁷

Nevertheless, the Nation must possess an air force capable of warding off a "tip-and-run" invasion that could tie up much of our industry and transportation, taking a needless toll of lives, even though such a visit could not defeat us, or even leave a permanent scar. While our fighting air force is reaching adequate proportions, let no secret be made of our great scarcity of proper antiaircraft artillery and civilian equipment. This matter must be attended to with great haste, considering the state of the outside world.¹⁸

The General Headquarters Air Force (G. H. Q.) is our principal combat unit. It is centralized at March Field, Calif.; Langley Field, Va.; and Barksdale Field, La. The G. H. Q. may be considered as always prepared for an "M-day"—to take the offensive at a moment's notice.¹⁹

In closing this brief treatment of our national-defense structure as it stands today, remember that our policy should never need drastic reorganization, but should continue to undergo modernization to keep abreast of world progress in that field. Our national-defense policy and our foreign policy must be completely interdependent, determining the size, nature, and control of the armed forces of this Nation, based upon the missions to be required in peace and in war.

Whether our conception of national security is to embrace not only the military defense of our continental home and the strategic approaches thereto, but also the use of an armed force on a grand scale to enforce the status quo in Europe and Asia, is the crucial problem of American foreign policy today. * * * With reasonable military preparations on land, on the sea, and in the air, we

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 260.

¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 259-282.

¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 285-306.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 43.

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 270-272.

¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 273-274.

could repel any combination of enemies long before they could reach the shores of the continental United States. On this point the experts are practically unanimous. Whether we can protect all of our Nation's interests overseas—territorial, commercial, financial, and humanitarian—is open to grave doubt. Whether we can maintain an island of democracy in a world of totalitarian states is likewise open to question. And whether we can mobilize our vast national resources to hold the democratic front overseas, without at the same time destroying democracy at home, is the ultimate riddle of our problem of national defense today.²⁰

²⁰ Harold Sprout, *America's Problem of National Defense*, Alumni Lecture Series, 1939, p. 22.

CHAPTER II

Our Military Defense Policy in Retrospect, Washington to 1914

John McAuley Palmer, brigadier general, retired, of the United States Army, has proven the guiding force of this review of American national-defense policy from George Washington up to the two great acts of 1916 and 1920. In a personal interview of great length, he gave the writer the history of our defense, otherwise written up, by him, in Washington, Lincoln, and Wilson—war Presidents. At present his post is that of military adviser to the Library of Congress.

To establish the authenticity of General Palmer's research, one need only turn to Gen. John J. Pershing's introduction to the above book:

Although I had never met Palmer, his professional reputation was known to me and I selected him to accompany me to France as assistant chief of staff, in which capacity he gave valuable assistance. * * *

This act (1920) gave us, for the first time, a sound national-defense system, and Palmer holds a high place among those who helped to accomplish that important constructive reform. In 1921, when I became chief of staff, I appointed Palmer as an aide-de-camp on my staff to assist in putting the act into execution.

Pershing goes on to say how General Palmer has, since his retirement, pursued his studies of military history, discovering in the Library of Congress "a manuscript of great historical value which had been overlooked by all our historians." It contained a complete national-defense policy for the United States, written by Washington himself, at the close of the Revolutionary War. Pershing continues:

The discovery of this record throws a new light on Washington's military wisdom. Its absence furnishes an explanation of more than a century of unpreparedness. If our fathers had followed the scientific plan so carefully elaborated by Washington with the aid of Baron von Steuben and his other generals, we should have been better prepared in the beginning for the War of 1812, the Civil War, and the [first] World War.

General Pershing's above statements also form a very brief sketch of the defense history as personally rendered by Palmer for this thesis.

Volume 219 of the Washington Papers in the Library of Congress indicates that there was a remarkable unanimity among Washington's Revolutionary officers as to the future military needs of the country. They based their stand upon a "well-regulated militia," and, secondly, upon "a small Regular Army" that would "serve as a constabulary for the Indian frontier and for special duties that cannot be performed by a citizen army in times of peace." General Pickering, characteristic of the American citizen-soldier of the Revolution, termed the well-regulated and disciplined militia "the only palladium of a free people," granting at the same time the need of a small permanent establishment.

More impressive still is the reaction of Gen. Baron von Steuben, after he had assisted in the winning of our liberty. Von Steuben had served 20 years in the Prussian Army, throughout the Seven Years

War, had received direct training from Frederick the Great on his staff, and "had devoted his whole life to the close scientific study of military institutions and organization." Under Washington he had worked for 5 years as inspector general of the Continental Army. He was in a unique position, and this was his advice to Washington:

This I am certain of, that we have need of a regular force for the protection of our frontiers, that our Militia should be on a regular footing, and that the Establishment of military schools & manufactories will be the best means of providing for our security in the future, and that a system of this nature will make us more respectable with the powers of Europe than if we keep up an Army of fifty thousand men.¹

FROM THE BARRACK BOOK

George Washington's personal recommendations for a national-defense policy have long remained concealed within the covers of his Barrack Book for the month of May 1783, where it is written out as his "Sentiments On a Peace Establishment." It outlines a system to include a small Regular standing garrison, a well-organized militia, the establishment of arsenals, and, lastly, academies "for the instruction of the Art Military." He imagines the proposed small body of Regulars thus:

* * * while the men of this description shall be viewed as the Van and flower of the American Forces, ever ready for action and zealous to be employed whenever it may become necessary in the service of their Country, they should meet with such exemptions, privileges and distinctions, as might tend to keep alive a true Military pride, a nice sense of honour, and a patriotic regard for the public.

General Palmer is particularly enthusiastic that posterity should now understand Washington's true views on militia. He has been quoted for over a century, as disgusted with militia as a means of national defense. His statement after the Revolutionary Battle of Long Island is pointed to:

To place any dependence upon militia is assuredly resting upon a broken staff.

While retreating through New Jersey, previous to the Trenton episode, he wrote:

Short enlistments and a mistaken dependence upon militia, have been the origin of all our misfortunes and the great accumulation of our debt.

He firmly then believed that militia will: "come in you cannot tell how, go you cannot tell when, and act you cannot tell where, consume your provisions, exhaust your stores, and leave you at last at a critical moment." These were the contemporary neighborhood organizations of the time, unfit for prolonged and systematic operations.

When proposing a defense policy for the Nation's future, Washington showed no aversion at all to remolding this same clay—the militia—to shape it into a national system, much akin to the present National Guard. In a circular letter to the Governors of the States, June 1783, he substantiates this:

The militia of this country must be considered as the palladium [note Pickering's ideal] of our security, and the first effectual resort in case of hostility. It is essential therefore that the same system should pervade the whole: that the formation and discipline of the militia of the continent should be absolutely uniform.

¹ The original document is dated April 21, 1783, and signed. It remained hidden for over a century with the remainder of Washington's Newburg Memoir on National Defense.

VON STEUBEN'S PLAN

Early in 1784, Baron von Steuben submitted his final solution of the nation's military problem to George Washington, which, with the proposals on military education submitted the year previous, constituted a complete national-defense policy. Washington replied on March 15, 1784, that he highly approved of this suggestion of a continental legion "for training a certain part of the arms-bearing men of the Union, as a militia in times of peace." He went on himself to specify that:

A peace establishment ought to have two objectives in view: the one, present security of posts and stores, and the public tranquility; the other, to be prepared, if the latter is impracticable, to resist with efficacy the sudden attempts of a foreign or domestic enemy.

In 1784, the militia stood at 400,000, which Von Steuben desired to cut down to 21,000 Regulars and 42,000 capable of immediate enrollment. He also "proposed to pay these young men a small bounty, to arm and clothe them at public expense, and to call them into training camps for thirty-one days each year." This, he showed, was more economic than the present training of the entire militia and no standing force. The only essential difference between the present National Guard and Von Steuben's continental legion is that today armory training has supplanted the longer training-camp period.

Von Steuben must also be credited with anticipating our present national-defense system of corps areas, by 136 years. He planned for three national departments, of New England, the Middle, and the Southern States, to permit the "intelligent teamwork of infantry, cavalry, and field artillery," says General Palmer, "the importance of which was little understood outside of Prussia." Again, Von Steuben proposed a course of General Staff training, in fact if not in name, that would have aided us throughout intervening history, rather than having the reform put off until Elihu Root finally took the bull by the horns, in 1903.

The first Secretary of War, Gen. Henry Knox, in 1786, gave this Von Steuben proposal almost complete endorsement. Knox rewrote the plan, preserving its original content, in the form of a proposed bill, in 1790. The "Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union" ordered the plan into committee "to prepare and bring in a bill providing for the national defense." The Honorable Elias Boudinot, of New Jersey, presented this final draft, which, it is most important to note, was not based on the Knox plan. Why? Because many of these first Representatives felt that the Federal Government had already been allotted more than its share of coercive power by the Constitution. Secondly, the existing militia organizations acted as a strong lobby against alteration.

The militia problem was before the House of Representatives from July 1, 1790, until the final passage of the notoriously poor Militia Act of 1792. As late as March 2, 1792, a bill was offered by Representative Jeremiah Wadsworth, which still contained the essentials of Washington's "well-regulated militia." It is a phenomenal coincidence that Senator James W. Wadsworth, Jr., chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, was finally, in 1920, able to push through Congress almost the identical bill proposed by his forbear, after a lapse of 128 years.

On March 5, 1792, the militia bill was again taken up, and General Palmer describes the occasion:

On that day every constructive feature was amended out of it. The provisions for discipline and for federal inspection and supervision were cut out. The essential principle of separate organization and special training for the younger and more active men was eliminated. Indeed no requirement for training of any kind remained within the bill. As amended, the bill no longer provided for Washington's "well-regulated militia." On the following day the amended bill passed the House as the notorious Militia Act of 1792. Washington had proposed militia in terms of "gilt-edged" bonds. Congress issued it in terms of "watered stock."

Washington's only reason for ever signing such an act was that he was reluctant to employ his veto power, and because it at least offered a stopgap until the amendment he hoped for might be passed in the near future. Is not this the tenor of the "Farewell Address," where he stated:

If we remain one people under an efficient government, the period is not far off when we may defy material injury from external annoyance; when we may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve upon to be scrupulously respected; when belligerent nations under the impossibility of making acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation; when we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel.

SUCCESSIVE ADMINISTRATIONS

Presidents Jefferson and Madison argued strongly for the amendments that would produce a "well-regulated militia" foundation for our national defense, but to no avail. Madison even proposed to Congress the forerunner of the "Plattsburg system" of training camps, which never took concrete shape until the eve of America's entry into her first World War.

General Palmer insists that one of the greatest elements of politics in the struggle for preparedness, in the first half of the nineteenth century, was that created by the sectional minorities of Congress. For instance, Oliver Wolcott urged New England to secede in 1796, if Jefferson should win the election. In 1814, it was the Hartford Convention, and, for several decades to follow, the possibility of Southern secession. These minorities must have feared the creation of any strong defense policy that could coerce them. Palmer sums it up thus:

We may say that effective national defense was a delicate political issue until after the question of secession had been finally settled in the supreme court of Civil War.

THE NEW GOSPEL DIGS IN

Two battles of the War of 1812 tell us the whole story of American national defense. An unregulated militia was put to rout at Bladensburg before the British advance on Washington. While at the Capital, the "Red Coats" burned everything in sight, which included all of George Washington's official defense recommendations—leaving only the Barrack Book version. But the Battle of New Orleans indicated how well-regulated American militia could defeat even British regulars. Such would have been the fruits of the Washington-von Steuben plan.

After the War of 1812, practical soldiers took over the War Department, and, with no eye to historical fact, set up a new gospel. The

new era saw the Secretaryship of War bestowed upon John C. Calhoun. Advised by Generals Brown and Winfield Scott, Calhoun instituted the "expansible standing army," sometimes referred to as the "skeleton army," because its peacetime frame work was a completed structure. Wartime simply meant that you fed cannon fodder into the bottom of the machine. The divisions and officers were prepared, and the ranks would need only to be bolstered. Therefore, West Point was given a new and narrower mission—to train the professional soldier, who would lead the "Prussianized" army of the new gospel.

General Palmer points to the North's many military failures in the opening years of the Civil War, and brands them as "the legitimate offspring of Calhoun's fallacious scheme of 1820." It proved the rule, that a standing army in peacetime could never be sufficient to meet war needs, unless so large that it would bankrupt the Republic. So, to count on only a mediocre standing army and permit the militia system to go to seed utterly, is only to invite such reverses as the First Bull Run. In his message to Congress on May 27, 1862, Lincoln saw fit to confess:

There was no adequate and effective organization for the public defense. Congress had indefinitely adjourned. There was no time for me to convene them. It became necessary for me to choose whether, using only the existing means, agencies and processes which Congress had provided, I should let the Government fall into ruin, or whether, availing myself of the broader powers conferred by the Constitution in cases of insurrection, I would make an effort to save it, with all its blessings, for the present age and posterity.

GENERAL EMORY UPTON

On June 18, 1878, a joint committee was appointed by the House and Senate to study and report on our policy of military national defense. General Garfield, a member of the House, and General Sherman were studying with great intent the new manuscripts being turned out by General Emory Upton on the Military Policy of the United States. Palmer immediately notes that this work "is silent upon the official military policy repeatedly urged upon Congress by our first four Presidents in seven consecutive administrations." Upton had obviously failed to trace down Washington's aforementioned Newburg documents, of 1783. General Palmer adds further, "It is probable that no constructive statesman in history was ever more completely misrepresented than is George Washington in Emory Upton's book."

The Joint "Burnside" Committee received from General Sherman, Chief of the Army, a further ramification of the Scott-Calhoun plan of 1820. Instead of having only a 3-to-1 expansible quality, the new proposition was to raise it to 7-to-1. Sherman's proposal was fortunately not appreciated and the work of the committee was so much wasted time.

In his Military Policy of the United States, Upton lashes out at that "Anglo-Saxon prejudice against standing armies as a dangerous menace to liberty." He reasons:

If standing armies are dangerous to liberty, it ought to follow that officers of the army should be inimical to republican institutions. But here again, if the lessons of history be read and accepted, it will be admitted that of all forms of government, the republican, or democratic, is most favorable to the soldier. There is not a well-read officer in our service who does not know that monarchy

sets a limit to military ambition, while in republics military fame is frequently rewarded with the highest civic honors.²

Upton summarizes the weaknesses of the national-defense structure by naming as the first cause "the employment of militia and undisciplined troops commanded by generals and officers utterly ignorant of the military art."³ It is fantastic that such a general's mind could always run to a professional, standing, skeletonized army as the solution, rather than to train this entire militia body at less expense. Upton also raps "reliance on voluntary enlistments, instead of voluntary enlistments coupled with conscription." Most militaristic of his jibes is one at "the intrusion of the States in military affairs."

It is further held by General Upton that "troops become reliable only in proportion as they are disciplined; that discipline is the fruit of long training;" and training in its turn must be supervised by the officer who is at heart a professional soldier.⁴ General Palmer has at his fingertips a passage from Clausewitz which refutes such a stand utterly:

The principles of the Art of War are in themselves very simple, and are quite within the compass of sound common sense; * * * Learning and profound science are, therefore, not at all requisite, nor are even great powers of understanding. * * * The exact contrary has long been maintained, but merely from a misplaced feeling of awe regarding the subject, and from the vanity of the authors who have written on the subject.⁵

PROGRESS UNDER ELIHU ROOT

As Secretary of War, Elihu Root finally had passed, on February 14, 1903, "An Act to Increase the Efficiency of the Army," thereby establishing the new office of Chief of Staff. The new General Staff arrangement, for the first time, gave the Army an effective overhead organization. The President now had a responsible military agent to carry out his Constitutional powers.

Secondly, Root gave the Chief a General Staff Corps, which, for the first time, set up a body of officers charged with the planning of our national-defense tactics. Palmer states quite bluntly: "It was his official endorsement of Upton that defeated the completion of Secretary Root's constructive program," inferring that Root, through Upton, was blinded to the needs of a "well-regulated militia."

ANOTHER WAR PRESIDENT—WILSON

General Palmer is delighted with Wilson's December message to Congress in 1914. He feels Wilson acted very much like Washington when faced by a world crisis. Having first urged strict neutrality, they both turned to perfecting an effective national defense, and not by means of an Uptonian standing army, but by "a citizenry trained and accustomed to arms," which Palmer terms the true middle way between militarism and pacifism.

² General Emory Upton, *The Military Policy of the United States*, S. Doc., Vol. 25, 62d Cong. Document No. 494, Introduction, p. ix.

³ Upton, *op. cit.*, pp. xiii and xiv of introduction for summarized causes.

⁴ Upton, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

⁵ Colonel Maude (ed.), Colonel Graham's translation of von Clausewitz, *On War*, Vol. III, p. 221.

Wilson's ascension to the Presidency in 1913 was accompanied by one grave loss in the realm of national defense. In 1911, under Secretary of War Stimson, General Wood had worked with Palmer and other military technicians to evolve a new plan of defense. It was eventually contained in Stimson's annual report of 1912, and was very nearly a duplicate of the belated "Constitution of National Defense," arrived at in 1920. When Stimson went out with his administration, Palmer and his associates were removed from Washington to such faraway posts as China and the Philippines by Secretary Garrison.

The new Secretary of War believed that the Federal Government was lacking the constitutional power to bring into being Washington's "well-regulated militia." Instead, Garrison offered a strictly Federal force to be embodied in the pending national-defense legislation, his "Continental Army." Fortunately, Chairman Hay of the House Military Affairs Committee led the attack against this "Continental Army" proposal, and the National Guard became the proper cornerstone of our policy.

The Uptonian General Staff under Garrison prevented a complete reform. "Upton's expansible standing army was hastily wedded to Washington's National Guard." The final 1916 act afforded little real preparedness, because it failed to expand away from Uptonism in time for our entry into the war. It would have afforded us only 700,000 troops by 1920, so the intervention of the Overman legislation was sorely needed.

A WORD ABOUT GENERAL PALMER

Future chapters of this thesis will increase the reader's desire to know why Palmer stands out in such contraposition to General Upton in the above passages, and later will oppose Chief of Staff March's Prussianized standing-army proposals in the same fashion. Why should General Palmer, also a West Pointer, have adopted this unusually democratic doctrine of national defense?

The writer had the honor of hearing the reason revealed by General Palmer last February in a personal interview for this thesis. It hinges upon the fact that Palmer's father was a United States Senator upon the Military Affairs Committee from 1891 to 1897, from which advantageous seat the latter gained the democratic point of view, passing it on to his son. Thus General Palmer learned as a young man that a republican form of government cannot afford, financially, to support a standing army large enough to be its ultimate defense in wartime. Secondly, the burden of defense should rest upon the democratic citizenry, not upon professional soldiers. This being the case, the best bet is a national defense policy based upon a "well-regulated-militia."

* * * * *

Before closing this chapter, may the writer present Palmer's homely simile of the cause of the first World War—simple, brief, and fairly complete:

Herein lies the true cause of the World War. It was like the interaction of a "high area" and a "low area" in producing a typhoon. There was a "high barometer" of aggressive military organization in the region of autocracy. There was a "low barometer" of under-militarization in the region of democracy. Hence the inevitable storm.

CHAPTER III

Forces and Men That Broke Ground for the 1916 Act

From the outbreak of the first World War, in 1914, until the belated passage of our first great National Defense Act, on June 3, 1916, innumerable political forces and individual men were at work within this Nation, attempting to shape the course of that legislation.

The purpose of this chapter is to boil down this myriad of material to but 13 actual sources, which appear to be the most representative of the whole. For clarity's sake, let us establish three broad categories. The first shall contain characteristic "pacifists" and "anti-preparedness" advocates. In juxtaposition to these, let us place the militant, crusading, "preparedness" bloc, which was sick of the endless wrangling and red tape, and sought action. Thirdly must be remembered the democratic theorists and historians, who likewise made their presence felt, demanding that in the heat of action the ideological objectives be not lost sight of.

PACIFISM AND ANTIPREPAREDNESS

On December 3, 1914, an article entitled "the Preparedness Flurry" appeared in the Nation, which should be noted as characteristic of the pacifist and antipreparedness advocates.¹

This article congratulates President Wilson for "keeping his head," while under the pressure of this flurry of preparedness, "when the present conflagration in Europe is to be made the excuse for a wild raid on Congress for more soldiers, more sailors, and more ships," by such as the "Navy League," "our gun and armor makers, our Roosevelts, and our jingo generals." The article claims that this "raid," if successful, would check our internal development and rob our industry of thousands of workers. The ensuing paragraph is as fine an example of pacifist sentiment and style as can be found:

Surely, it is a cause for the utmost thanksgiving that the occupant of the White House sees and senses this, and is ready to bear if need be the criticisms of little minds who can see nothing more in all this horrible suffering and carnage, this breakdown of Christianity, than the need of preparation for slaughter.²

Only a few days following the publication of the above article, on December 18, 1914, Nicholas Murray Butler mounted the platform at a "Meeting to Organize a League for the Limitation of Armaments," and spoke upon the preparedness of America—with all the fervor and blind faith of a snowy-haired patriarch about to be fed to the lions on the Colosseum's sandy floor.³ This writer joins the Roman horde in putting thumbs down on a creed that, in the familiar terminology of 1916, was unconsciously "Jane Addamizing" this most virile of all nations.

¹ Nation, The Preparedness Flurry, December 3, 1914, 99:647.

² Ibid, pp. —.

³ Corinne Bacon (ed.), National Defense Handbook for Debaters, pp. 179-180.

Dr. Butler's argument possesses the characteristic ring of his school of thought: "Are we to arm to the teeth and draw our resources away from the much-needed social and industrial improvement?" He goes on to flay preparedness as a step backward into an "earlier and cruder militaristic stage of civilization." Most typical of the "Jane Addamizing," is that hope expressed by pacifists that world war might well leave all our enemies exhausted, so why arm? The crux of the matter is the "might." With his customary eloquence, Dr. Butler raises this same standard:

When our friends in every land are bleeding to death before our eyes, when nations of Europe are exhausting their manhood, impoverishing their resources, destroying their commerce and their trade, bankrupting their treasuries and using up the raw materials of armaments in the construction of the completed instrumentalities of death—why, when the nations of Europe are about to be reduced to helplessness through exhaustion and starvation should we arm ourselves against any one of them?⁴

By June 1915 the pacifist front was becoming more and more entrenched as an effective lobby. At Cornell University the World Peace Foundation conducted a conference under the guidance of Norman Angell.⁵

The conference contended that "adequate defense is not something absolute." Further armament by us, or any "have" power, was felt would bring a further defensive alliance among the enemy. It renounced militarism as a solution for the problems of international law, stating it only destroyed the latter. It decided that our position as a neutral demanded the creation of some international organization to govern international law, to which we would give our share of specific aid; "but in the absence of any such international policy, there should be no increase (in arms) except what is technically needed for repairs."

One last source will complete the treatment herein of the "pacifist" bloc. Charles Vale appears to have been one of their most active and objective writers. Such were his convictions in July 1915:

We do not want an enormous Army and an enormous Navy. It is an efficient Army and an efficient Navy that we require; and if the money that had been voted in the past had been properly expended, such an Army and Navy would now be at the service of the country *not as a menace* to other nations, but as *an adequate police force*.⁶ No country has a right to maintain a standing army of greater strength than would be needed for home defense. It would seem, in the light of recent events, that no country is justified at present in maintaining a standing army of less strength.⁷

CRUSADING FOR PREPAREDNESS

Officially, the preparedness forces were led by the Secretary of War, the Honorable Lindley M. Garrison. Let us turn to his annual report of 1914, and use it as a very constitution for this school of thought, which saw the need of swift action.⁸

Secretary Garrison states therein that he sees it as his clear duty "to set forth the facts, and the necessities growing out of the facts, and suggestions as to the ways and means of fulfilling such necessities." As a realist he demands that the public understand that the degree of undesirable militarism in each nation depends entirely upon that

⁴ Bacon, *op. cit.*, pp. 170-180.

⁵ Outlook, June 30, 1915, 110:306-9. Summary of Conference Activities.

⁶ Italics are the author's, for desired emphasis.

⁷ Charles Vale, Militarism and Sanity, Forum, July 1915, 64: 1-4.

⁸ Secretary Garrison, Report of the Secretary of War, Army and Navy Journal, December 12, 1914. 53: 457-8.

particular nation's surrounding circumstances, and varies accordingly. He does not see how any reasonable person could have "the slightest shadow of fear of military despotism" or "any interference whatever by military force in the conduct of civil affairs" in the United States.

Garrison believed that we in no way had an adequate national-defense system. He established the number of Reserves still fit, who were actually trained in the Army at "16 men." The total National Guard would equal only 148,492 troops and 9,818 officers, it requiring at least 6 months to fill these ranks from new volunteers. He warns that "reserve matériel" (stocks) "cannot be quickly improvised," and is "the absolute essential of modern warfare, and must be kept on hand if emergencies are to be prepared for."

The Congress in session had made the proper start of placing aviation on a substantial basis as an arm of our national defense. Garrison lauds this action, but insists that "this work should be followed up and consistently pressed," since he felt "the Aviation Corps has bid fair to become the eyes of the Army."

Another suggestion is that the present Regular Army quota be filled to the maximum, with 25,000 more men and 1,000 officers. Then the stage would be set for a belated concentration upon the Reserve forces. The Secretary terms the existing Reserve legislation worse than useless, since it has "produced in 24 months only 16 men." He recommends a system of training camps for civilian officers, with the colleges of the Nation assisting in the work.

The following two passages represent the slight paradox of this school's reasoning, and are almost the high points of this 1914 report:

It is always a part of wisdom, it seems to me, to select the best that is possible, out of what is obtainable, rather than reject that obtainable best because it is not perfection.

When one has reached the conclusion, as I have, that a minimum of military preparedness is essential, the question of its cost is secondary and cannot be permitted to be the determining factor. No citizen will or can possibly object to the expenditure of money for vital national purposes.

LEONARD WOOD

The life of Gen. Leonard Wood throughout these 2 years is the picture of a most adamant crusader for preparedness.⁹ Though very active in the cause, he was one of the less spiritual and more practical leaders.

Believing that "a man's value decreases pretty rapidly after 4 years of work" as chief of staff, Wood resigned that post on April 22, 1914. Remaining wide awake in the affairs of both the Army and the Nation, he was impressed at that time by the "old Anglo-Saxon story" being repeated in England, where the struggle to get men and train them in a hurry was under way. He felt, "all that saves England today is her Navy." He expressed his convictions thus, on September 26, 1914:

I have no faith that we are even approaching a general disarmament. Wars do not have their origins in personal likes and dislikes, but are brought about by commercial and race influences; and until competition for trade and land, and all other questions of race expansion are settled, I do not believe wars will pass off the field. Readiness to defend one's interests tends to preserve peace.¹⁰

⁹ Hermann Hagedorn, Leonard Wood, A Biography, vol. II, pp. 148-149.

¹⁰ Hagedorn, op. cit., pp. 148-149.

Though the administration was still swayed by Bryan's influence, Wood talked preparedness day and night. Wood's biographer, Hermann Hagedorn, pictures Wilson, at this juncture, still wishing "America's role to be one of pacific idealism, as far removed as possible from military preparation." Bryan did not want preparedness until the war was over. Theodore Roosevelt proclaimed the duty of self-defense, but Wilson, "moving amid shadows and dreams, could not hear of it, or hearing it, covered his ears."¹¹

According to Hagedorn, General Wood was the patron saint and guide of the new National Security League and the American Defense Society. Garrison was in the embarrassing position of supporting Wood inwardly, but having to reprimand him outwardly for launching such a wide-open campaign from his Army post. Theodore Roosevelt and former Secretaries of War Luke Wright, Dickinson, and Stimson all stood firmly behind Wood.¹²

With the training-camp system now picking up momentum, on Wood's invitation, Theodore Roosevelt spoke at Plattsburg late in August 1915. And such a speech he made that the administration deeply resented this "rocking the boat." Theodore Roosevelt offered a characteristic reply:

If the administration had displayed one-tenth of the spirit and energy in holding Germany and Mexico to account for the murder of American men, women, and children that it is now displaying in the endeavor to prevent our people from being taught the need of preparation to prevent the repetition of such murders in the future, it would be rendering a service to the people of the country.¹³

Hagedorn emphasizes the President's temporary change of heart in January 1916, as he toured the West in a move toward the November elections. At this time he came out for Garrison and Wood's views of federalizing the militia, so that it would no longer be just a "fifth wheel to our coach." With his return to the Capital, his outlook made a complete reverse to the former stand. Hagedorn says that this thoroughly outwitted the advocates of preparedness, leaving them "bewildered and sputtering," since it had turned out to be little more than a "political maneuver."¹⁴

These years of Wood's life continue to be, through the first three parts of this thesis, the story of preparedness. When the General was demoted in March 1917, it was, as might be expected, after he had made one of his greatest preparedness stands—this time before the subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs.¹⁵

THOMAS A. EDISON

Many individual citizens, of which group the inventor, Thomas A. Edison, is a fine example, proposed throughout these years that America not make the error of pursuing Europe-style national defense. Rather than a large standing force, it would be wiser to have industrial and farm labor well-trained, along with the required reserve officers, and then returned to their jobs. The armories would stand filled with emergency matériel, and at the same time the factories would be prepared to rapidly manufacture more stores, once the war arrived. This body of citizens should be congratulated for prematurely outlining the

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 149-160.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 152-157.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 166.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 177-179.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 210.

National Defense Act of 1920 and the industrial mobilization plan as it now stands.¹⁶

WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT

William Howard Taft was remarkably well fitted to sum up this national-defense controversy of 1914-16. He had held the role of both President and Secretary of War, as well as having an excellent legal mind. It is of some significance that he aired his views very completely in the *Saturday Evening Post*, through an article he entitled "The Military and Naval Defenses of the United States: What They Are—What They Should Be."¹⁷

He brushed aside the possibility of preparedness breeding militarism, feeling that certain constant factors in our political, social, and industrial structure made the creation and support of it "impossible." That policy, above termed "Jane Addamizing" the Nation, had a distinctly allergic reaction upon Taft. He sums up these sentiments in the words:

I venture to think that the views of the pacifists and of the anarchists and of the socialists are equally fallacious, and that nations are just as unlikely to become perfect, because of conduct assuming that they are so, as individuals. It is perfectly possible to have a suitable preparation for defense without maintaining a military and naval force and equipment calculated to tempt a policy of aggression and offense.

FOUR PHILOSOPHERS AND HISTORIANS

While the pacifists and the preparedness-seekers wrangled over what sort of legislation should be drawn up in 1916, it was fortunate for the sake of our democratic spirit that yet another group made itself heard. Not a still small voice crying in the wilderness, but an ever-increasing roar issued from these statesmen and ordinary citizens who demanded that ideological aims be not lost sight of, that history be consulted, that economists be not forgot, and that the means and the end were of equal weight.

Henry Cabot Lodge, Sr., while advocating preparedness in no uncertain terms, still built his argument upon a foundation of historical fact and sound reasoning. This is brought forth characteristically in his February 22 speech before the New Jersey Washington Association, in 1916.¹⁸ Considering that General Palmer had not yet discovered the "Newburg Papers" of Washington, Lodge had a remarkably accurate conception of the first President's views on preparedness.

Senator Lodge drives home the point that "most rights are the creation and offspring of prevented wrongs." He claims that the right every pacifist has of freedom of speech is in itself an enforced right. So with the individual, so with the Nation. Failure to prepare against invasion and outrage, is then but to forfeit peace and security. He upbraids the antipreparedness lobby in the following allegory to great effect:

They are like children playing upon the glittering surface of a frozen river, unconscious of the waters beneath. They are incapable of comprehending that, when the ice goes, all that holds the stream then rising in flood are the bridges and

¹⁶ *Current Opinion: What We Must Do to Provide Adequate Military and Naval Defenses*, July 1915, 29:5-8.

¹⁷ *Saturday Evening Post*, 187:3-5, 32-33, 36-38.

¹⁸ Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, *Washington's Policies of Neutrality and National Defense*, Senate documents vol. 42, 64th Cong., 1st sess., Document No. 343, Documents of a Public Nature II.

embankments which the power of man has erected. They are blind to the fact that if the dikes, which represent the force of the community, betrayed and weakened by neglect, shall break, the dark and rushing waves of the fierce torrent of human passions, of lawlessness, violence and crime will sweep over the fair fields reclaimed by the slow labors of civilization and leave desolation and ruin in their track.

George W. Alger wrote an article on Preparedness and Democratic Discipline in April 1916, that expressed so well the economic element of national defense that Senator Kern had it printed for posterity as a Senate document.¹⁹

Alger made clear that "the war which is going on in Europe is not merely one of soldiers but of nations." How would the discipline of America's social, industrial, and governmental structure hold up under a similar test he asks. Is not the power behind military Germany, industrial Germany? America's true problems of preparedness, still neglected, are named by Alger as sweatshops, child labor, industrial anarchy bred by exploitation and a poor policy of unregulated industrial disease and injury, not to mention the tenant farmer and immigrant problems, as well as the chaotic liquor legislation. Alger desired that our defenses extend from top to bottom, and all the way through the Nation—not present a hollow shell to the enemy.

Thirdly, let us consider the work of Senator Blair Lee, of Maryland.²⁰ Eighty pages of Senate documents contain the findings of his comparison of the Swiss military national defense with our system. The evolving theory supports preparedness, but a democratic preparedness by the "well-regulated militia," and not by a large standing force. Had General Palmer not been stationed in Asia at the time, he would have realized that here was a legislator who had guessed Washington's choice of defense policy more nearly than any other in over 100 years. While neither the "Newburgh Reports" from Washington's staff of Revolutionary generals, nor the Barrack Book program as outlined by Washington, were at Senator Lee's disposal, yet by an extensive use of a little-known letter addressed to these generals from "Headquarters, Newburgh, June 8, 1783,"—well, he guessed the rest, and employed the Swiss system as a fine parallel.

Fourthly, let us consider an address by the Honorable Sanford B. Dole in Hawaii on January 7, 1910, which, too, became a Senate Document.²¹ With his speech on "Military Service" based upon the Federal Constitution, Dole sets up as his hypothesis: "The Government of the United States is republican in its system and democratic in its spirit." It is even more than this, being a commonwealth organized solely for the common good of its citizens. Thus its policy of national defense must be drawn up for the benefit of the majority, and must willingly be supported by all, except the constitutionally exempt. While this Constitution preaches such a defense of its people and itself, let it be remembered that it nowhere sanctions an aggressive war, making the same unconstitutional.

Dole ideologically preaches true patriotism, and at the same time defeats the school supporting "my country, right or wrong." Not

¹⁹ George W. Alger, Preparedness and Democratic Discipline, Atlantic Monthly, May 16, 1916. Reprinted in Senate documents, vol. 42, 64th Cong., 1st sess., Document No. 443.

²⁰ Senator Blair Lee, The Military Law and Efficient Citizen Army of the Swiss—the Risk and Expense of a Great Standing Army Unnecessary. Senate documents, Vol. 42, 64th Cong., 1st sess., Document No. 360.

²¹ Hon. Sanford B. Dole, Military Service, S. Doc., loc. cit., Doc. No. 357.

only does a policy of aggression by the United States stand as unconstitutional, but also it must give way to the paramount force in the forum of a democrat's ideals, his conscience.

PREPAREDNESS AND WHAT ELSE?

Such were the forces and men that broke the ground for the first great National Defense Act of July 3, 1916. A fit conclusion to this period is the question raised by the *New Republic*: Preparedness and what else? ²² Had not the coming of the war destroyed the last vestige of our provincial isolation? The *New Republic* certainly believed so, and that our future national defense policy must include assuming "responsibility in a society of democratic nations."

The *New Republic* saw the light—which burns as bright today. Whether the juggernaut be "Prussianism" or "Nihilism," it remains, "we or they."

²² *New Republic*, Preparedness for What? June 26, 1916, 3:188-190.

PART II

The Politics of the National Defense Act of 1916

CHAPTER I

Committees, Reports, and Atmosphere

"The culmination of all previous (military) legislation was in the National Defense Act of 1916," states Oliver Lyman Spaulding, colonel in the United States Artillery, in *The United States Army in War and in Peace*.¹ Spaulding had spent 38 years in the Army, serving as brigadier general in the A. E. F., and for 5 years he had been Chief of the Historical Section of the Army War College.

The colonel felt that all previous legislation had been merely "fragmentary," treating specific problems or types of troops. At last, this act worked toward a comprehensive military policy. The peace strength of the Regular Army would be fixed at 220,000 officers and men, with the National Guard at 450,000. Unfortunately, these increases were to be spread over a 5-year period. He goes on:

Aside from the significant increases in the Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, Coast Artillery, and Engineer battalions, material increases were made in signal, medical, and other auxiliary troops. The mobile troops mentioned were to be formed into higher units. Each division was provided also with a signal battalion, and aero squadron, medical troops, and the necessary trains. * * * Both peace and war strengths were fixed.²

To help provide for the necessary crops of Reserve officers, the traditional practice of giving elementary military education at schools and colleges was expanded into the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (R. O. T. C.). The National Guard would now be more thoroughly organized, through the extension of Federal control. Moreover, Gen. Leonard Wood's plans for citizens' training camps were given serious consideration, and their organization provided for.

Spaulding stresses that "unfortunately all this organization was undertaken too late." Its fulfillment required 5 years—war overtook us in less than 1. Had the 5-year period been allowed to run its course, orderly and speedy mobilization would have been possible in 1917, without the adoption of "makeshifts and expedients, at great cost of time and effort." Thus is partially explained both the appearance and the necessity of the Overman Act.

To avoid any loopholes in this presentation, it must be pointed out that one category of national defense had reached its culmination before this act of June 3, 1916, and did not present a problem at that time. Senate Report No. 130 of February 9, 1916, offers a very clear exposition of the "Revision of the Articles of War." It was reported by Senator Lea, of Tennessee, of the Committee on Military Affairs; its purpose was to clarify, recodify, and expand martial law in the three fields of the courts martial, the punitive provisions, and the courts of inquiry.³

¹ Oliver Lyman Spaulding, *The United States Army in War and in Peace*, pp. 407-408.

² *Ibid.*, pp. _____.

³ Military Affairs Committee of the Senate, *Revision of the Articles of War*, Senate reports, vol. I, Miscellaneous I, 64th Cong., 1st sess., Report No. 130.

BAKER COMMUNICATES WITH CONGRESS

On May 24, 1916, the new Secretary of War, Newton Diehl Baker, addressed a letter of transmittal to Senator George E. Chamberlain, chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs. It accompanied certain memoranda which officially analyzed the meaning of the proposed Army reorganization bill (H. R. 12766), in answer to Chamberlain's request for the same. It is necessary here only to touch on a few points that Colonel Spaulding did not cover in his analysis of the completed act.

The letter of transmittal stated principally, "I fully endorse the statement made in one of the memorandums that the bill recently agreed to is one of the most comprehensive measures looking to military preparedness that has ever been passed by Congress—the bill is very satisfactory to me."⁴

The memoranda point out that under the old system in wartime the Government had to compete in the open market for its ammunition, arms, and supplies, as would any individual. The new law authorized the Commander in Chief "to exercise a sort of eminent domain over the various manufacturing plants in the country," guaranteeing Government right-of-way ahead of all other orders. It sets up a peacetime board of mobilization of industries, "essential for military preparedness." This board would investigate the Nation's privately owned plants, and the Ordnance Department was then authorized to prepare, in time of peace, "the necessary gages, jigs, dies, and other tools of special kinds that are required in the manufacture of arms, ammunition, etc." Is this not the gradual enactment of Horace's great proverb upon the title page?

"In pace, ut sapiens, aptarit idonea bello." It is the writer's firm belief that only through such constitutional measures as these can the United States hope to compete with either "Prussianism, Fascism, or Nihilism.

The memoranda also emphasized that we were then "practically dependent upon Chile as a source of supply for nitrates, which are essential to the manufacture of ammunition." Twenty million dollars, was proposed in the new bill for the establishment of an American plant, removing this state of dependency.

To pick up a few loose ends in the memoranda: The General Staff should prove more efficient now that only half of it was required to be in Washington. Next, a General Staff recommendation was closely followed that would cut down, in peacetime, the strength but not the number of organizations of the Army. This unanimous recommendation is the only Calhoun-Upton hang-over that this writer will sanction, and is passed upon only because the total standing forces—175,000 enlisted men—were far below what Secretary Calhoun would have demanded for "America, 1916." Other Staff recommendations to be carried out were the R. O. T. C. and the actual Reserve Corps, as well as an enlisted Reserve of technical men, as are engineers.

It is interesting to note that these memoranda do not fail to indicate that parts of this 1916 act "are more or less experimental. * * * If any part of the experiment does not work, that part can be corrected by new legislation," In short, before the 1916 act ever saw the light of day, the post-war, 1920, act was prophesied.

⁴ Secretary of War Baker to Mr. Chamberlain, Analysis of the Army Reorganization Bill, Senate Documents, vol. 42, 64th Cong., 1st sess., Documents of a Public Nature II, Document, No. 447.

COMMITTEE REPORTS

The next five chapters of this part II will analyze the political forces that influenced the drawing up of this 1916 act. At this juncture it appears sound to place the cart before the horse, to skip over those grueling weeks of committee hearings, and to turn directly to the House and Senate reports that issued from this committee work—to see what actually was drawn up.

Chairman Hay submitted the first report to be studied herein, which was to accompany H. R. 12766, above referred to. The Hay report recommended that this House resolution "do pass," now that "every phase of the subject" had been submitted to his Military Affairs Committee in its 7 weeks of hearings.⁵

The resolution, as it then stood, would increase the Army by 40,000 men and 7,450 officers, with a slight addition to the air force. It placed the full strength at 200,000, which differs very little from the figure of 175,000 that appeared in the final draft, since the latter omitted certain important details, as the Philippine Scouts. This figure, fixed by Chairman Hay and his henchmen, was of tremendous significance, as it dealt a death blow to former Secretary Garrison's "Continental Army," which would have required at least 500,000 men. This was a step in the right direction, and only later caused difficulty because the National Guard and R. O. T. C. did not have time to prove themselves before we joined in the first World War. It should be remembered, however, that Hay stressed these new Reserve Corps reforms because "the war in Europe has demonstrated the necessity for officers."

Hay's report included an explanation of the new Government production of nitrogen, claiming that it was due to the inability of such a private industry to materialize in the United States. It also stated that all the nations then at war possessed the proposed "mobilization of industries." The report closed with a full account of what the present and proposed armies would cost, respectively.

Ten days following the Hay report, Chairman Chamberlain gave his report on the Senate floor.⁶ His committee believed that "the bill provides for an adequate Regular Army in the true sense," but not large enough to arouse any reasonable fear of militarism, nor was the cost exorbitant. It was just that size sufficient to "meet the needs of the Nation in first-line troops, and form the nucleus for the national forces."

The single "minority" member of the Military Affairs Committee, Gilbert M. Hitchcock, of Nebraska, complained that the increase in the standing Army was "about twice as much as it should be." He stressed that the immediate force of 178,000 total would reach 250,000 after the 5 years of planned expansion. On the whole, Hitchcock termed the bill an "admirable measure for modernizing the Army." This writer believes Hitchcock's principal objection was unwarranted, and can be labeled "not surprising for the Midwest."

In discussing the Organized Reserve Corps, as proposed in 1916, mark well that the Chamberlain committee believed there was none other "from which the Government will receive so great a return for

⁵ James Hay, *Increasing the Efficiency of the Military Establishment*, House Reports, vol. I, 64th Cong., 1st sess., Miscellaneous I, Report No. 297, March 6, 1916.

⁶ George E. Chamberlain, *Preparedness for National Defense*, House Reports, vol. I, 64th Cong., 1st sess., Miscellaneous I, Report No. 263, March 16, 1916; *Ibid.*, pt. II, *Views of a Minority*.

the small expenditure involved." The National Guard total sanctioned by this report was fixed at 280,000 men. While this figure was immediately bolstered to 450,000 in the 1920 act, it is believed by Maj. George Fielding Eliot to be adequate today at approximately 400,000 men—provided that we remain within our hemisphere.

Because of failure to reach a complete compromise between the above Hay and Chamberlain reports, a joint committee of the two Houses was chosen to thrash out the differences. Hay, Dent, and Kahn represented the House; from the Senate, the managers were Chamberlain, Beckham, Broussard, Du Pont, and Warren. On May 16, 1916, the joint committee report was rendered, exactly 1 month following the above-mentioned Chamberlain report.⁷ It was a great blessing that such a nucleus as this joint committee was formed to compromise such tedious and controversial provisions, as those for "veterinarians," the "Porto Rico Regiment of Infantry," and the "terms of reenlistment." It need only be asserted further that the present, peacetime "first line" remained fixed at 175,000 enlisted men—one of the majority of Hay proposals to be accepted by the joint committee—which cut short Lindley Garrison's "Continental Army" pipe dream.

COMMITTEES

This chapter has thus far presented the atmosphere of this National Defense Act of June 3, 1916, as well as the interesting history of its "reports." Because succeeding chapters will deal more closely with the actual membership of the two congressional Committees on Military Affairs, the last service of the chapter will now be to list these 1916 committees⁸ in full:

SENATE MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

DEMOCRAT

George E. Chamberlain, Oregon (chairman).
 Gilbert M. Hitchcock, Nebraska.
 Luke Lea, Tennessee.
 Duncan U. Fletcher, Florida.
 Henry L. Myers, Montana.
 Charles S. Thomas, Colorado.
 James P. Clarke, Arkansas.
 Morris Sheppard, Texas.
 J. C. W. Beckham, Kentucky.
 Robert F. Broussard, Louisiana.

REPUBLICAN

Henry A. Du Pont, Delaware.
 Francis E. Warren, Wyoming.
 Thomas B. Catron, New Mexico.
 James H. Brady, Idaho.
 Nathan Goff, West Virginia.
 LeBaron B. Colt, Rhode Island.
 John W. Weeks, Massachusetts.

⁷ James Hay, To Increase the Efficiency of the Military Establishment of the United States, House Reports, vol. II, 64th Cong., 1st sess., Miscellaneous II, Report No. 695, from the joint committee, May 16, 1916.

⁸ The above roster is taken from the official Congressional Directory, 64th Cong., 1st sess., third edition, May 1916.

HOUSE MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

DEMOCRAT

James Hay, Virginia (chairman).
S. Hubert Dent, Jr., Alabama.
William J. Fields, Kentucky.
Kenneth D. McKellar, Tennessee.
Percy E. Quinn, Mississippi.
William Gordon, Ohio.
Adam B. Littlepage, West Virginia.
Ashton C. Shallerger, Nebraska.
Michael F. Farley, New York.
Charles Pope Caldwell, New York.
James W. Wise, Georgia.
Richard Olney, 2d, Massachusetts.
Samuel J. Nicholls, South Carolina.

REPUBLICAN

Julius Kahn, California.
Daniel R. Anthony, Jr., Kansas.
John C. McKenzie, Illinois.
Frank L. Greene, Vermont.
John M. Morin, Pennsylvania.
John Q. Tilson, Connecticut.
Thomas S. Crago, Pennsylvania.
Harry E. Hull, Iowa.
James Wickersham, Alaska.

CHAPTER II

The Administration Stand—Wilson and Garrison at Variance—Enter Baker

President Wilson and his first Secretary of War, Lindley M. Garrison, both had the same general objective in mind, which was "adequate national defense." From the beginning of the World War in 1914 right up to Garrison's resignation early in 1916, which amounted to dismissal, the two men drew gradually apart as to the means by which this goal should be gained. In the last analysis, the objective itself was shifting throughout 1916, with the question coming repeatedly to the front: "National defense for what—the Western Hemisphere or world democracy?"

Let it be made quit plain that the portfolio shift from Garrison to Baker was no quirk of Fate, or unexplainable chapter in the succession of our Secretaries of War. To the contrary, the incident was cloaked with as much political strategy as any other that will appear in this thesis. It is evident that Wilson did not, at the time, wish to go to war. But it cannot be proved that, even in these pre-election months of 1916, the President did not feel we would have to go to war, sooner or later, making it his first responsibility to see that a man of his international sentiments would be the Commander and Chief, when the storm broke. Baker was an excellent Secretary of War for peacetime, and his wartime record should not be disparaged, since he met the demands of the crisis very well. Garrison, in contrast, was not equipped as a peacetime Secretary in a republic, being of the Calhoun-Upton school, but would have made a top-notch wartime Secretary. To repeat, Wilson's three tasks lay before him in plain succession. Firstly, win the election; secondly, win the war; thirdly, insure that we had not fought in vain. Garrison's retention might well have lost the whole by losing the election.

ANNUAL ADDRESS, DECEMBER 7, 1915

In view of the above discussion, it is necessary to study certain sections of President Wilson's Annual Address to Congress, December 7, 1915,¹ Firstly, Wilson's definition of a national-defense policy stipulates that he regarded war "merely as a means of asserting the rights of a people against aggression." Also, a standing army is only to be supported in relation to the possible peacetime or wartime dangers threatening the Nation. He continued:

But war has never been a mere matter of men and guns. It is a thing of disciplined might. If our citizens are ever to fight effectively upon a sudden summons, they must know how modern fighting is done, and what to do when the summons comes to render themselves immediately available and immediately effective. And the government must be their servant in this matter. * * *

Turning from theory to fact, Wilson in this address sanctions the existing War Department plans, calling them "the essential first steps, and

¹ Stanton and Van Vliet Co. (Publishers), President Wilson's Great Speeches, and Other Documents, pp. 79-100.

they seem to me for the present sufficient * * *. We cannot do less." What were these particular plans he passed upon? Wilson himself outlines them as the 141,843-man standing army and 400,000 emergency reserves, which are to be discussed below as Garrison's "Continental Army." In later months, the congressional hearings properly interpreted the Continental Army not as a "well-regulated militia" system, but as the form nearest to Prussianism that Garrison dared to present to Congress. This writer believes that this new interpretation caused the overworked President to reconsider his hasty endorsement and subsequently to break with his Secretary of War.

The same address voices a demand that we rehabilitate our American merchant marine. "It is high time we repaired our mistake and resumed our commercial independence on the seas." To fulfill this writer's above analysis of the political strategy behind Wilson's movements, should it not be asked here: Were these new ships to be used solely for commerce, or also for troop transport?

The President is to be congratulated for writing into this address the principles of industrial mobilization, greatly needed at the time. He links together the entire problem: industry, agriculture, and banking.

What has been referred to above as Wilson's political strategy, appears as a marked paradox in this great address. Note the customary, campaign-year passage: "We have stood apart, studiously neutral. It was our manifest duty to do so." This is later reenforced by, "Great democracies are not belligerent. They do not seek or desire war." Then note the gradual shift:

We do not confine our enthusiasm for individual liberty and free national development to the incidents and movements of affairs that affect only ourselves. We feel it wherever there is a people that tries to walk in these difficult paths of independence and right * * * [we] must be fitted to play the great role in the world * * *.

To sum up, Wilson remained "on the fence" throughout election year, and the following discussion of Secretary Garrison should indicate that the War Department portfolio had to change hands, if the fence was to be straddled without falling on one side or other before November 4.

Prior to Garrison's representation of the War Department, let us examine a charge made by a "pulp writer" of that day; namely, Allan L. Benson, in his *Inviting War to America*. In a chapter entitled the "Politics of Preparedness," Benson writes that Oswald Garrison Villard, then publisher of the *New York Evening Post*, stated at a meeting of the Anti-Preparedness Committee, in January 1916: "Colonel House told me that the Wilson Defense Program was put up to be knocked down."² It is perfectly possible that House made the mistake of entrusting Villard with such a confidence. If the report is true, it bears out Hermann Hagedorn's and this writer's interpretation of Wilsonian strategy in the election year of 1916; but it does not bear out the second contention—that Wilson understood that our intervention would be forced some time after the elections, which called for preparedness.

² Allan L. Benson, *Inviting War to America*, p. 69.

GARRISON BEFORE THE HEARINGS

On January 6, 1916, Secretary Garrison appeared before Mr. Hay's House Committee on Military Affairs for an all-day session.³ With the Continental Army as his ace in the hole, Garrison stressed the need of action:

Mr. Chairman, the occasion is ripe for the Congress to perform a service of very greatest importance to the people of this country. The attention of the people has been directed toward the subject matter and is now concentrated upon it * * *. This opportunity will be lost unless a wise, sensible, and practical military policy is the result of the consideration and action of this Congress.⁴

Garrison demanded that certain general principles must be recognized as underlying the whole subject of national defense. In his eyes, the matter resolved itself into the necessity for a small, highly trained, highly effective Regular Army, which could be expanded in wartime with the "Federal Volunteers" who would be raised, officered, and trained in time of peace. This would leave the National Guard for purely State uses. Immediately we see that only an alarmist could call such a plan Prussianism; but, on the other hand, it is a gradual swing away from the "well-regulated militia" of General Washington, and points toward the professional soldier—eventually points toward Prussianism.

Certainly it was liberal enough of Garrison, in the course of his report, to officially permit all members of the Regular Army to appear before the hearings and not feel compelled to reiterate the Department's policy. He stated: "They are as free as the air * * *. They are bound merely by their vocabularies and their consciences." This precedent was to permit Colonel Palmer, in 1920, to discredit forever the Calhoun-Upton School, of which Garrison was a member in sentiment, if nothing else.

It was not difficult for the Secretary of War to prove that the existing, 1916, forces of 101,195 enlisted men and 4,798 officers were inadequate for defense. He proposed at this time that a Continental Army of 500,000 men be subject to instant call. While he believed that maintaining such a force as a peacetime standing army would be most effective, he was bound to recognize that accommodations were available for only 50,000, and that possibly it would be in the spirit of democracy to place the burden more upon the citizenry. But he felt that proper unity of the national forces could not be achieved under the constitutional provisions respecting Organized Militia and the National Guard. Such unity could be exerted in wartime, but the defense system, he emphasized, was undermined by the complete lack of Federal control over the State forces in time of peace. Garrison stated that the solution was to set up a system of Federal volunteers, leaving the National Guard men to the States as an added "Federal asset," that could "volunteer for service in time of war and be taken in as it exists." In this light he said he would increase the Federal aid to the National Guard. One has the feeling that he may have had his tongue in his cheek, it being election year.

In this hearing, Secretary Garrison made public the source of his plan for Federal volunteers, naming it as Gen. Emory Upton. The

³ Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, on a bill "To Increase the Efficiency of the Military Establishment of the United States," 64th Cong., 1st sess., Jan. 6-Feb. 11, 1916.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 1-16 of the uninterrupted report.

Secretary's entire discourse indicates, ahead of all else, a remarkable disregard for State boundaries—a militaristic tendency.

The first chapter of this thesis stated that midwestern citizens had very little enthusiasm for a strong naval defense. Since Garrison's appearance is the first hearing on military defense, let it be noted that the midwesterners have far more interest in that division of our national-defense policy. While they do have great interest, it is not equaled by intelligence on this subject. Representatives Shallenberger of Nebraska, McKellar of Tennessee, Littlepage, of West Virginia, and Anthony of Kansas peppered the Secretary with trivial questions, most of which were rhetorically answered in his uninterrupted introduction. In contrast, Kahn, of California, Caldwell, of New York, and Tilson, of Connecticut were the finest examples of combined interest in and knowledge of military national defense.

The following two quotations should be observed here, since they were the two most characteristic of Garrison in his full day of testimony:

My idea is this, to start with, to have a real military system in this country rather than the haphazard and utterly odd-ends way they have always treated this subject.

Unity of responsibility, authority, and control are absolutely essential to any military organization.

The writer has discovered that in most cases where the same party testifies before both the House and Senate Military Affairs Committees, the discussion in the one hearing adds very little new material to that of the other. In the case of Lindley M. Garrison, this rule does not hold true. His House testimony fell on January 6, 1916. The mere fact that the same strong emphasis is applied by him in his Senate testimony 12 days later was of some significance in that election year. Whatever reaction may have been stirred up among the antipreparedness lobbies, it had not the slightest effect upon the promoter of the Continental Army.

While before George Chamberlain's Committee, Garrison again calls for "a force of 500,000 men subject to instant call. There should be at all times in the country large numbers of men available. Nothing would so completely meet the situation as a regular standing army of professional soldiers enlisted for a long period of time and thoroughly drilled, trained, and disciplined." Again he modifies his outlook, afterward stating that in a democracy the burden of national defense is better borne by "the citizens"; but note he never suggests "the States." To the contrary, he remarks:

Until we entirely abandon the idea of relying upon the impossible system of State troops for national defense, we can never build a system on any foundation that will endure or that will stand the strain of war.

Referring to the National Guard, he even says: "The best I think you can expect is to have them come forward to supply *wastage* * * *." When the Secretary of War gets such a cannon-fodder complex, this writer believes that the A B C's of democracy are being left in the lurch.

In his Senate testimony, Garrison presses yet another reason for an expansion of our defense forces. The sanctity of the Philippines and the Tientsin to Peking railroad were placed on the same level with

* Italics author's own for emphasis.

Puerto Rico and the Panama Canal, which spread the burden of defense over two hemispheres.

For the first time the question of "elasticity" was raised. Garrison considered the existing arrangement inelastic, since Congress and its committees controlled both policy and administration. His drive for more elasticity meant that the Congress would only fix the "maximum to be required and then leave the President free to control the matter by proper regulations." This should be interpreted as a "free hand" for the executive branch on all matters of administrative detail.

Had Garrison's Continental Army, sometimes called the Federal Volunteers, been written into the Defense Act of 1916, it would not have converted us overnight into a militaristic Nation, but it would have been a step toward erasing our historic State and community loyalties, and, as such, would have tampered with the very foundation of our Republic.

BAKER ENTERS

With the departure of Garrison, Wilson found in Secretary Baker an assistant who would not upset his weaving of the Nation's foreign policy and national defense policy, as well as his party platform, into a unified political maneuver, as explained above. In chapter I of this part, Baker's letter of transmittal to Chamberlain was thoroughly discussed, showing that the new Secretary was in complete accord with the Hay-Chamberlain proposals, which were, inside of 2 weeks, to take final shape as the 1916 Defense Act.

CHAPTER III

The "Military" and its Continental Army

Scott, Bliss, Weaver, Wood, and Mills

The military bloc was represented at the congressional hearings in 1916 by the chief of staff, his assistant, and numerous other Regular Army officers. Ordinarily, the Secretary of War would be considered, in such an analysis as this, as part of the administration's lobby. But it has been conclusively shown above that Lindley M. Garrison proved an exception and a part of this military bloc, although his successor did abide by this proposed division of political forces.

The military had two particular objectives in mind, and many minor ones, that will be brought out in the following review of the testimonies of their five leaders. Its primary objective was to write "compulsory military service" into the 1916 act. This highly militaristic proposal is of great interest but was doomed to defeat from the very beginning. The second objective was Garrison's aforementioned Continental Army, which finally became a lost cause with the departure of its patron saint from the War Department, and the succession of Newton D. Baker.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF SCOTT

The chief of staff, Hugh L. Scott, made two appearances before Mr. Hay's Military Affairs Committee. Not until his second visit, on February 4, 1916, did General Scott deliver an uninterrupted testimony, to which the writer now turns.¹ The chief of staff believed that the military needs of preparedness should be met by two classes of soldiers, "a well-trained Regular Army, and a force of citizen soldiery partially trained in time of peace for service in war."²

Scott places the formation of the Reserve secondary to the main consideration, "which is to have a well-disciplined and well-trained Regular Army of professional soldiers."³ He feels, however, that such a professional organization can be relied upon only if the system of compulsory military service were instituted throughout the Republic. Every nation but England and the United States had already adopted this service, and the former was at the very moment regretting the lack of it. Scott firmly believed that:

The right of a citizen to the freedom of a republic and to the privileges and benefits arising therefrom involve a responsibility for certain military service in defense of the government.³

He also felt that such a required service would assist in the amelioration of the Nation's many different foreign elements of population.

¹ Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, Hearings, op. cit., January 6-February 11, 1916, pp. 1128-1269.

² *Ibid.*, p. 1128.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 1139.

Scott made a blunder to argue that such a system would offer American citizens the same "mental, moral, intellectual, and economic uplift given to the German people from the education they had received in the German Army." Such comparisons, at that time, only branded our "military" as all the more "Prussian" in spirit. But Scott was probably correct when he stated that universal military training would "teach Americans a respect for law far in advance of what they have now."

Replying to detailed inquiry from various members of the Hay committee, the chief of staff declared he wished compulsory military training in time of peace beginning "at this moment." It would cover all young men, not constitutionally exempt, from 18 to 21 years; Scott added that if the Federal Government could exert control over the Nation's school system, then the drilling should begin at 13 to 15 years of age. He was convinced that 2 months of intensive training at camp, with expenses cared for, but no pay from the Government, would prepare the Reserve better than a whole year of National Guard style armory drill.⁴

When the chief of staff proceeded to astonish the committee with the statement that such a system would produce the one to two million men and thirty to forty thousand officers required by the United States in wartime, Representative Kahn forced Scott to go on record as saying that compulsory military training was "simply a measure of self-defense," and that the general staff "was not anticipating war in any direction immediately."⁵

When asked point-blank if he favored Secretary Garrison's Continental Army, Scott replied that it was his second objective—in case compulsory military training failed to be adopted. He concurred with Garrison that the Continental system would function best with 400,000 Federal volunteers ready for instant call, while, at the same time, the Federal Government would encourage the National Guard as a potential asset beyond this.⁶ Different classes of citizens would be attracted into the two departments, but provision would be made for the National Guard men to join the Continental Army by the unit whenever they desired or particularly in time of crisis.

The chief of staff criticized the Hay bill on the grounds that, when through garrisoning the outlying possessions, sufficient troops would not be left to protect the Nation proper, nor provide for a skeletonized Army that need only be expanded and not reorganized in an emergency. Another individual point to arise was a plea for equality of promotion, which Scott felt caused more discontent and disharmony than any other existing evil. The customary demand for further expansion of the War Department staff and General Staff Corps was based by Scott upon the contemporary military history that was passing unrecorded and the international reports that the undermanned Department could not handle.⁷

With the assistance of Representative Kahn, the chief of staff arrived at the following cardinal law of all military national defense:

It is more economical to spend a little additional money in time of peace in order to have an efficient Army than to spend an enormous sum at the outbreak of war to make up for the lack of preparedness during the time of peace. And

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 83-07.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 96.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 1141-1143.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 1144.

in the second event you still may not get efficiency—your money is thrown away, and you must accept disaster.⁸

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF BLISS

Maj. Gen. T. H. Bliss, assistant chief of staff, appeared before the Hay committee on January 12.⁹ Having reiterated the General Staff's sentiments on a skeletonized Army that would be expansible in wartime, Bliss treated the problem of elasticity, stating that the War Department had no idea of drafting "a measure cut and dried in all of its details" for Congress. It rather expected Congress to lay down only the broad lines of policy, leaving the Department to write in the administrative details.

Bliss offered a splendid summary of coast-defense policy:

Any coast-defense system comprises three elements—a naval defense, a land coast defense by guns in position, and a mobile defense for the stretches of coast along which it is useless and unnecessary to construct permanent works.

He stressed the Navy's insistence that the highly populated or vital coastal areas be defended with fixed batteries, in order that popular clamor for naval defense would not cause the breaking down of a united, one-ocean naval policy.

General Bliss diverged a little from Scott in advocating a policy "which confines, as far as possible, the burden of war to the time of war."

BRIGADIER GENERAL WEAVER

The testimony of Brigadier General Weaver, chief of the Coast Artillery Division, was heard on January 20.¹⁰ His case was representative of many of the lesser investigations. It entailed an inquiry into how many men were required in his division of the Army, and what relation they had to the mobile section. The answer was, invariably, that the division was dangerously under manned; it could not spare any reductions and needed expansion; and it could no more be compared in assignment to the mobile army, than the mobile army to the fleet.

In short, Weaver's testimony was that of any Government bureau seeking to increase both its numbers and its importance.

LEONARD WOOD TESTIFIES

Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood, then commanding the Department of the East, believed that no other system but compulsory military training in time of peace should be considered; any other system could be only a makeshift or a stopgap, and would inevitably break down in time of emergency.¹¹

Any attempt to depend upon a volunteer system, pure and simple, admirable as is the volunteer spirit, will fail. It means the organization for war after war is upon us—no more unwise policy can be conceived.

Wood was striving not just for discipline of the physique and the will, but for real intelligence also. It seemed to him that 6 months of marching in the day and studying in the evening was a reasonable training camp period, after which 2 years should be served with the colors and 4 years in the reserve, with it all taking place in time of

⁸ Ibid., p. 97.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 143-201.

¹⁰ Ibid., 407-16.

¹¹ Ibid., 738-88.

peace, if a sound foundation was to be laid for adequate national defense.

More radical than his fellow generals, Wood felt that nothing at all should be paid to the militia that did not sign up with the Continental Army, which the War Department was then planning. He looked forward to a very material increase in the strength of the mobile army, the coast artillery, the engineers, and all the auxiliary arms. Wood set as his goal 220,000 men in the standing forces, with as many more Federal volunteers ready for call, and the remainder of the 500,000 made up of Reserve officers.

BRIGADIER GENERAL MILLS

In the next chapter, the militia, or National Guard, will be considered as a decentralized, "geographical" political force, in contraposition to the "military" lobby now being treated. It must be remembered that the Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs, Brig. Gen. A. L. Mills, was not the typical National Guard man but a member of the General Staff, possessed of all the Staff's militaristic and antimilitia prejudices. Such is the setting of Mills' testimony on January 31.¹²

He felt it was an error, under the present law, to list the Organized Militia as first-line troops, since their training, of less than 15 days a year, did not fit them for such a standard. At best, they were a potential and not an actual fighting force. The existence of dual control prevented any further progress until the system could be fully centralized in the hands of the Federal Government, since the various State Governors still had unconditional authority to disband their militia. Mills felt that the majority of military students favored the Continental Army, which would be supported by a federalized militia system. He was not as obsessed with the desire for compulsory military training as were most of the "military."

It was the bane of Mills' job that through him the Federal Government had the power to prescribe the standards for the size and discipline of the State militia forces, but had not the power to enforce the same. In peacetime it reduced him to the role of a mere adviser, from which he could not even demand that a State reimburse the Federal Government for its issued property which the militia might lose or destroy. The power of appointments was also reserved in peacetime to the States, where political expediency played a major role. Mills concluded:

The Organized Militia consists today, not in a single army functioning in all its parts in obedience to a single superior authority, but an aggregation of 48 little armies, the majority of which are organized without reference to national needs and each of which jealously clings to certain State rights. * * * The continuance of the attempt to develop along present lines the Organized Militia as a Federal force, can only mean that we expect to wage our future wars as a confederacy rather than as a nation.¹³

By means of combining a large standing Army with compulsory military training, or, as a second best, by the Continental Army of Garrison, the "military" made every effort to build the 1916 Defense Act upon a foundation of Calhoun-Upton principles. The Chamberlain and Hay committees stayed off the onslaught, creating at the same time a "well regulated" National Guard, which for the time being had to be wedded to the Uptonian expansible standing army.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 883-980.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 960.

CHAPTER IV

The Importance of Geographical Forces

SECTION 1—THE MILITIA LOBBY, LED BY FOSTER AND O'RYAN

"Geography" played a double role in the political struggle over the Defense Act of 1916. Firstly, there was the old State-rights argument, quarreled over by the militia and the "military." Secondly, there were the customary sectional forces within the United States Congress, which must be borne in mind whenever the political content of any national legislation is analyzed. These two will be pictured in this chapter as the struggle to resist militarism, and the struggle to place national security ahead of sectional interest.

The militia lobby which appeared before the Hay committee in early 1916 was led by Maj. Gens. J. Clifford R. Foster and John F. O'Ryan, who were, respectively, the adjutants general of the States of Florida and New York. Foster was also chairman of the executive committee of the National Guard Association of the United States. Their gospel was, do not abandon the militia, but federalize it; and, in so doing, preserve the community traditions necessary to this democracy. They believed, also, that the citizen-soldier was better equipped, psychologically, to endure the trials of a long or arduous war, than was the professional soldier. Lastly, they felt that, while West Pointers could train "green" militia more effectively, in the end the local troops should be led by local officers.

"OLD CLIFF" SPEAKS HIS PIECE

Representing the militia throughout the United States, General Foster remarked upon the "necessity for the formulation and acceptance of a definite military policy" for the Nation; but warned that such a formulation take notice of the place of the American citizen-soldier. In any event, the national militia lobby patriotically had pledged itself to support any "reasonable increase in the Regular Army that may be made by the President."¹

Foster relayed to the Hay committee certain unanimous opinions adopted at the Seventeenth Annual National Guard Association Convention on November 11, 1915, in San Francisco. The association desired Congress to make the Organized Militia effective both within and without the continental limits of the United States, under the same terms that controlled the Regular Army. Congress should also prescribe the discipline, equipment, and training, leaving to the Organized Militia the appointment of their officers in accordance with regulations to be fixed by Congress. Finally, to the several States should be reserved the right to control the organization and local arrangements of their militia forces, in time of peace. On this last reservation hinged the principal dispute. If the States were to have

¹ Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, Hearings, *op. cit.*, January 6-February 11, 1916, pp. 980-1011.

complete peacetime jurisdiction over training, then the War Department knew that the militia would be a weak staff to lean upon, when they were needed in a wartime emergency.

If the "military" had been permitted to draw up a defense act of their choosing, it has been above inferred by this writer that the State boundaries would have been erased, in a military sense, and only nine corps areas would remain. In combating such pressure, General Foster characteristically stated:

We believe that State pride and State officers make the best possible argument for recruiting, and that a force raised by that method would be in harmony with the traditions of the peoples in the various localities, because just regard must be had at all times for the sentiments and the prejudices of the people of the various States with regard to the forces to be armed, equipped, and trained within their borders.

The militia theory was that the Republic should not depend upon a standing army and an organized reserve alone, but "upon a citizenry trained and accustomed to arms." Foster did not exclude the possibility of universal military training, and suggested that a parallel to the Swiss system of citizen training be established. He lashed out at Garrison's Continental Army, saying that "the real purpose of this experiment is to demonstrate the weakness of the volunteer system and pave the way for service by conscription." Again, he called it "the establishment of a large force of highly trained professional soldiery, or some system of universal compulsory service."²

General Foster held that the militia system was only pronounced "impossible, because it is not completely and wholly under the control of the Federal Government at all times." He felt that the "Military's" offer to federalize the system was merely camouflaging a deep-seated desire "to abandon it to the States." Foster appeared wary of the National Guard as a means of federalization, fearing, no doubt, the withdrawal of the above-mentioned peacetime rights. Most brutal of the "Military's" tactics, claimed Foster, were the unjust rumors emanating from high official circles, which reported falsely of arms thefts by the militia, of wage embezzlement, and of raids upon the Public Treasury.

This disclosure by General Foster of the "Military's" underhanded methods in its search for centralization, made an immense impression upon the Congressional Committees, as later questions by the members clearly indicated.

O'RYAN OF NEW YORK

Maj. General O'Ryan reiterated many of Foster's views, at the same time refuting other charges made by the "Military."³

He argued, if Congress had the power to provide for mandatory training of the militia, it certainly must have power to punish those who did not meet such training requirements, and so might prevent a State Governor from disbanding his militia without Federal consent.

Representative Kahn, of California, characteristically put the following question to O'Ryan: "Do you find any difficulty in getting the men on account of the fear of having to perform police duty?" It was always Mr. Kahn who emphasized the benefit of the new State

² Note the difference between "training" and "service."

³ Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, Hearings, op. cit., January 6-February 11, 1916, pp. 1011-1032.

constabulary, as in Pennsylvania or Massachusetts, to remedy the previous fear of strikebreaking that had hung over the militiamen. O'Ryan replied that the current New York incidents were exaggerated; that the State militia and labor forces had recently talked matters over; and that labor was finally permitting the reserve battalions of the militia to fill up with the proper skilled workmen, such as engineers.

MANY STATES REPRESENTED

New Jersey's Organized Militia was represented by the testimony of Brig. Gen. Wilbur F. Sadler, Jr., who especially emphasized the growth of the number of responsibilities performed by militia organizations, an increase of 2 to 13 in the past 5 years, with no equivalent raise in appropriation from Congress.⁴

From Massachusetts, Brig. Gen. Gardiner Pearson warned that the entire foundation of our national-defense program was weak, since we were easily able to manufacture sufficient arms and supplies but were unable to maintain the enlisted strength.⁵ Pearson argued that if there could be any truth in the accusation that the militia could not be depended upon the rally in time of war, then how could the Continental Army possibly maintain its numbers in time of peace. Discussing current calls upon the militia in his State, Pearson presented a record of great patriotism in time of emergency, wondering if a professional calling could bring the same results.

General Pearson made the important point that, whether the State militia could equal the effectiveness of a conscript army at that time, or not, the militia should be reenforced at least until universal conscription was working smoothly. His greatest ambition would be to see the militia blend itself into a pattern of compulsory universal training, because he felt that that was the most democratic foundation for national defense which could be achieved:

It goes back to the old idea that behind every ballot should be a bullet, and the man who knows how to shoot the bullet.

Adj. Gen. C. I. Martin, of Kansas, gave a special disquisition upon the patriotic record of his State in all the American wars of its history, stressing at the same time that:

We in the [Mid-] West on the question of preparedness are perhaps a little more temperate than the people in the East or on the [West] coast, naturally, because we do not feel the immediate effect an attack upon this country might have. It does not quicken the thought of our people quite as much on that line as it does the people along the coast.⁶

Kansas expressed itself as in favor of preparedness along a "common-sense line." All our wars were eventually fought by the citizenry, so they must be trained; and the National Guard, in Kansas' eyes, was the best means to maintain an Organized Militia "in order to have it ready for the Federal Government."

The testimonies of Foster and O'Ryan were far from the most polished prose imaginable, yet it was interesting that no matter how illiterate the presentation became at these hearings, the militia lobby still presented a unified front against the smothering effects of

⁴ Ibid., p. 1038.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 1087-1095.

⁶ Ibid., pp. 1098-2000.

"militarism." Note the testimony of Adjutant General Chase, of Colorado:

We yearn with our whole souls for an opportunity to federalize. You can federalize us to any extent or do anything else on earth to make the National Guard an asset for the protection of the country, but I know that the guard is fit.⁷

SECTION 2—THE SENATE VOTE AS A WEATHERVANE

An analysis of the political forces behind a particular piece of congressional legislation, as the Defense Act of 1916, must include a study of the sectional forces in Congress. The most efficient technique, and by far the most difficult, is that employed by Prof. Harold Sprout, of Princeton University, in his recent work, *The Rise of American Naval Power*.

The Sprout method, herein employed, is to choose from the Congressional Record the "Yea-and-Nay" votes which, though sometimes on very minor sections of the legislation, are the actual test votes, and most truly indicate the division of sectional forces. In this fashion, Sprout polled both the Senate and the House, while this writer treats only the United States Senate, which, for the purposes of this thesis, indicates the sectional interests with completeness, the extreme local sentiment being unnecessary.

A QUICK SKETCH

Instead of turning directly to the actual voting, as recorded in terms of the Nation's principal sections, a brief sketch of the general trends to be expected will aid the reader's understanding immensely. The remarks of four men, from California, Nebraska, Minnesota, and Iowa, on the legislation in question are the best indicators of the whole.

Congressman W. P. Stephens of the Los Angeles district of California appeared before Chairman Hay's committee bearing a petition from his city's chamber of commerce. The petition firstly urged not only adequate, but strong national preparedness. Next was demanded a further Federal investigation of the existing defenses of the West coast, and lastly, the people of Los Angeles gave their endorsement to universal military training.

In contrast to the above coastline sentiments on our national defense policy, there is the aforementioned minority report of Senator Hitchcock of Nebraska, to the Chamberlain committee report. He wished to cut in half the suggested number of troops, claiming that such a total was unnecessary and uneconomical. Most violent was his opposition to the "Military's" desire for a large, professionalized defense force, which was already receiving support in some of the coastal States.

If, in the realm of military national defense, there exists any sectional difference over what the country's policy should be, these above two views well represent it. It is now the writer's purpose to demonstrate that such antipodes were the exception and not the rule. Let us study the sentiments of some of the older Senators of the Mid-West who were at that time looked upon as symbols not of just their section but of the Nation as a whole.

⁷ Pp. 1106-1107.

On January 31, Senator Knute Nelson, of Minnesota, gave a special testimony before the Chamberlain committee.⁸ He gave as the reason for his appearance, "I am vitally interested in an increase in the strength of our Army." Placing the desired standing Army at 200,000, he then turned to support a Washingtonian well-regulated militia reserve of 800,000. He would have young volunteers serve for 1 year under the colors and for 4 more as prepared Reserves, which he speaks of as "a moderate standing Army, and a large trained Reserve." Nelson's sensible system boils down to defense by means of a large Federal militia trained by professional soldiers.

On the following day, Senator Albert B. Cummins, of Iowa, came before the Chamberlain hearing. He was also a strong preparedness advocate, but at the same time opposed the Continental Army method. Realizing that the existing militia did not form an adequate second line, he proposed a thorough federalizing of those State forces. Cummins was adamant in his objection to universal military service, but sanctioned "the general idea" of universal military training. "I think it is the history of the world that we must depend upon patriotism in volunteering for that [the Army] service." In essence his views on preparedness were:

It [the United States] needs a fairly large force of men who are already under military organization, and who could be quickly mobilized or applied to the emergency, whatever that might be. Second, it needs a very large number of men between 18 and 30—for they are the men that fight the battles of any country—who have had military training.⁹

Thirdly, Senator Cummins endorsed a large Officers' Reserve Corps, which would be, "in times of war, quickly competent to command the troops of the United States." Let no man err by calling Cummins a "typical midwestern pacifist." He was typical of his section of the Nation all right, but he was far from a pacifist. One sentence of his testimony, for instance, reads: "It may be that there will come a time when we must take possession of Mexico."

THE FIRST YEA-AND-NAY POLL

By a study of two yea-and-nay roll calls of the United States Senate, the different types of sectional interest and their degree of intensity on the question of military national defense will be revealed. The first of these two tests concerned itself with Garrison's plan for a Continental Army, while the second vote was called over the struggle to determine exactly how many enlisted men should be had in the standing Army.

Before proceeding further, the reader must become fully acquainted with the nine divisions of the Nation which the writer has carved for this analysis, and which will be often referred to numerically. Division I is upper New England, meaning Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont. Division II includes New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland, and Delaware. Division III covers the South Atlantic States: Virginia, North and South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. The Gulf States of Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas make up division IV, while division V stretches from Washington through Oregon and California.

⁸ Committee on Military Affairs, Senate, on Bills for the Reorganization of the Army and for the Creation of a Reserve Army, 64th Cong., 1st sess., January 18-February 8, 1916, pp. 763-767.

⁹ Committee on Military Affairs, Senate, hearings, op. cit., January 18-February 8, 1916, p. 767. (Testimony 12 pages in length.)

The Great Lakes group of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan comprise division VI, with just Tennessee and Kentucky in division VII. The Rocky Mountain district is stretched a bit to contain Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Nevada, Utah, Arizona, and New Mexico in division VIII, which leaves just 11 States for the great midwestern bloc, division IX, which are North and South Dakota, Colorado, Minnesota, Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, and the string from Wisconsin down through Iowa, Missouri, and Arkansas.

The first of these two yea-and-nay votes is recorded in the official Congressional Directory as taking place on April 3, 1916. From the Senate floor, Senator Cummins proposed an addition to the General Staff of five officers of the National Guard, since the Iowa statesman, a great believer in a national-defense policy based on a well-regulated militia, wished to break down the growing endorsement for the militaristically bent Continental Army scheme.

George Chamberlain hopped to his feet, stating that both the Senate and House Military Affairs Committees had reported against such a proposal, emphasizing that it would be unconstitutional. Senator Sutherland broke in, and in a short time forced Chamberlain to admit that the guard could be federalized within the bounds of the Constitution, and that the disagreement was of a more general nature.

Chamberlain was eminently fair in his procedure, remarking that he was a National Guard captain himself, that he had great admiration for the work achieved by the guard in past years against great odds, and that the Militia Bureau would remain, in effect if not in name, to protect the interests of that group. He even inserted in the Congressional Record an immense diagram concerning "the peace organization and administration of the office of the Chief, Division of Militia Affairs," which, he believed,

* * * shows that under the system, as it now exists, the National Guard is just as nearly in touch with the War Department as is possible to make it by placing members of the National Guard on the General Staff, not to benefit the General Staff, but to impair the efficiency of the General Staff * * * The National Guard men want more than the safety of this country would warrant Congress giving them.

Senator Chamberlain reminded his friend from Iowa that the National Guard had lost over a million dollars' worth of Government property, as an indication of their discipline and efficiency. Senator Cummins changed the subject by accusing Chamberlain of attempting to bind all opinions outside of the majority report of his or any committee. While Cummins was here unjust, he was later correct in his assumption that Garrison's system of Federal volunteers would, in the end, undermine preparedness by the introduction of the professional soldier.

While the yea-and-nay vote to follow was only upon the original proposal to add five guardsmen to the General Staff, by the time it was called, its supporters had as their main objective, it seems, to discredit the entire theory of a Continental Army, and they did so by a vote of 35 to 30, with 31 Senators not voting.

The writer, employing the Sprout system, draws the following conclusions as to the sectional forces that went to make up this 35-to-30 decision against the theory of a constitutional Army. Firstly, let it be understood once and for all time that the sectional forces were not clean cut, even though definite tendencies were indicated.

The strongest Continental Army supporters were divisions I and II, meaning the Upper and Middle Atlantic States. Division V, the west coast, showed an even split, with California solidly for the Continental Army and Washington State dead set against it. Chamberlain, of Oregon, naturally felt he must still support the Garrison scheme. The Rocky Mountain division and Tennessee and Kentucky were slightly prejudiced for this strong professional army system.

The most pronounced opposition to the Continental Army came from the South Atlantic division III and the great midwestern bloc. The former voted for the Cummins-National Guard side by 6 to 1, and the latter by 11 to 3. They were the nucleus of a majority that finally succeeded in federalizing the National Guard, which was to come very near to answering George Washington's original desire for a "well-regulated militia" system of national defense. The remaining two divisions, the Gulf States and the Great Lakes area, favored the Cummins proposal by a 2-to-1 ratio.

THE SECOND TEST VOTE

Fifteen days later, April 18, to be exact, the second important test vote took place. While it was "an amendment to an amendment," the gist of it was that the total of the enlisted men in the standing Army, excluding such as the Philippines Scouts and the Medical Corps, should never exceed 250,000, except in time of emergency.

The proposal this time was presented by Senator Brandegee, of Connecticut, and of course inferred that the total figure would probably, as later legislated, be reached by gradual additions to the small standing Army, rather than by one sudden movement. Nevertheless, even such a gradual expansion meant that those favoring it would be classed as of the "preparedness" school. But they need not be thought of as Continental Army men, since even the militia lobby recognized the need of such a permanent force. While the previous vote concerned the problem of reserves, now it was not the Continental Army which was being voted into oblivion, but the antipreparedness lobby.

Senator Brandegee won his motion by a 43-to-36 margin. Before the yea-and-nay roll call was taken, we must remember the following as the standard raised by the Senator from Connecticut:

I regard it to be the first duty of this Congress to effectively increase the Arms and Navy strength of this country * * *. If there is any danger to the country from hostile sources, that danger will come fairly immediately and the emergency will arise suddenly. * * * I do not think that an Army of 275,000 or 300,000 can justly be called a large standing army for a country of 100,000,000 people, the richest country in the world, and weakest of any in comparison with its size.

This writer gives 100 percent endorsement to this preparedness point of view, delivered by Senator Brandegee just before the first World War. It should be repeated and adhered to again at this very time in that same body.

With all but 16 members of the Senate voting on the Brandegee "amendment to an amendment," it should be observed that the seven-vote victory was a narrow one to say the least. In that it was narrow, it is of all the more value to this thesis, since the sectional forces are most clearly indicated.

Excepting a New Hampshire Democrat, Henry F. Hollis, every Atlantic coast senator, from Maine through Maryland, voted for this expansion of the standing Army. The Rocky Mountain District voted 6 to 3 in accord with these Senators, while the West Coast States split evenly again, Chamberlain voting in favor of this greater preparedness.

The Midwest sounded an emphatic "No," opposing Brandegee by a 15-to-5 score. While the reader here sees a sectional force at work, let it be noted that the sectional lines are invariably broken by a significant minority. The Gulf States and the Great Lakes group edged toward antipreparedness, while the rest of the Southeast of the Nation showed that individual and not sectional opinions had been formed since the vote presented a draw.

IT MAY BE CONCLUDED

The Sprout-style analysis of these two yea-and-nay roll calls in the Senate offers several conclusions. The industrial East Coast States desired in the spring of 1916 a large professional Army for their national defense during the first World War, but the West Coast was still divided on the issue. On the other hand, the Midwest felt far less strongly about preparedness, but what reform might come; they believe, should be founded upon a reserve system of a federalized National Guard, and not a Continental Army.

The most unexpected conclusion reached is that the Southern Atlantic and Gulf States had a slight tendency to follow the Midwest, instead of divisions I and II, with Tennessee and Kentucky not seeming to care one way or the other. While the Great Lakes States were influenced a little by their Midwest neighbors, the Rocky Mountain area could be counted on for half-hearted support of the Atlantic industrial area.

In essence, the nearer to the first World War our industrial States were situated, the more they demanded a great degree of protection. To be a more remote State, or to be agriculturally inclined, brought, with regularity, a slackening of interest. No matter what the trend of a section might be, always, to this writer's knowledge, did some minority bolt sectional interests, with the North Atlantic bloc offering the nearest thing to a solid front.

CHAPTER V

How Did Party Lines Affect the Legislation?

One-half of the congressional picture has already been treated—the sectional forces, as diagnosed in the United States Senate. Turning again to the same two test votes in that body, of April 3 and 18, 1916, it will now be determined to what extent the Senators voted according to party lines.

While it would be interesting to contrast the effect of party organization in the House and Senate, there is no necessity for such a diversion. It is well known that Congressmen are called upon by the frequency of their elections to obey more closely the will of their caucuses; on the other hand, before this or any legislation became an act, it had to endure the Senate vote anyway, making the latter a sufficient test.

Returning now to Senator Cummins' 35-to-30 victory over the Continental Army scheme, it is first significant to remember that in the spring of 1916 there were 56 Democrats in the Senate, leaving but 40 Republicans. The case is very much as analyzed for sectional forces, since the party polling demonstrates certain tendencies, but in every case there is a substantial bolt from party regularity, as there was from sectional regularity. This is as it should be when determining a policy of national defense, since it indicates that there was a minimum of congressional politics going on.

The Republican Party leaned toward the Continental Army, with a total of 15 in favor of it, and 11 opposed. The Democrats, in their turn, show more of a united front, even though it was in support of Republican Senator Cummins' proposal. They stood 24 to 15 in favor of a reserve based upon a federalized National Guard, which was their characteristic stand in favor of State rights. Those Senators not voting are of small consequence, since the number from each party was approximately equal.

Considering, secondly, the party forces at work in the Brandegee vote on preparedness, the rule holds true again that party lines were not strictly adhered to. On this occasion it was the Republican Party instead that produced more of a unified front. By 22 votes to 11 the Republicans sought a policy of expansion of the standing army. The Democrats were in opposition by only 25 to 21, with those members not voting drawn equally from the two parties.

A comparison of the two votes boils the political forces down to these rules: the Republican Party was strong for defense, and preferred that it be attained through a Continental Army. The Democratic Party did not care for any further expansion, but did wish the new Defense Act to kill the continental army proposal, in favor of a new National Guard system.

Fourteen Enlightened Senators

In this writer's mind, only 14 enlightened Senators voted the correct ticket throughout, which was the same one that George Washington, Baron von Steuben, and General Palmer would have followed. These two-dozen men voted firstly for the National Guard over the Continental Army, and, secondly, for preparedness over pacifism.

This enlightened little nucleus, who chiefly dominated the writing of the final draft of the 1916 act, and whose opinions bore final fruit in 1920, had no candidates in northern New England. From the Middle Atlantic States there were Wadsworth, of New York, Martine, of New Jersey, and Smith and Lee, of Maryland. The South Atlantic States contributed Simmons, of North Carolina and Smith and Hardwick, of Georgia, while the Gulf States could add only Morris Sheppard, of Texas. Poindexter, of Washington, chose this enlightened ticket from the west coast division, while we see that Chamberlain fell by the wayside with his temporary backing of the Garrison scheme.

Warren G. Harding may have left something to be desired when he became President, but, interestingly enough, he was among this group as the only representative of Great Lakes division. While Kentucky and Tennessee drew a complete blank, the Rockies added Sutherland, of Utah, and Ashurst, of Arizona. From the Midwest only Husting, of Wisconsin, and Sterling, of South Dakota, joined these Democratic crusaders for preparedness.

After more than 100 years of the Calhoun-style policy, this little band of 14 Senators sought reform—a reform that nearly turned the clock all the way back to George Washington's original policy of national defense. Nine of the group were Democrats and 5 Republicans, drawn from throughout the Nation, which goes to prove once more the great blessing that our Senators placed national security first and sectional and party interests second. James W. Wadsworth, Jr., was destined to carry the torch onward as Senate chairman for the 1920 act, and Morris Sheppard was to be the chairman for Franklin D. Roosevelt's preparedness drive, when shadows crept across the Atlantic to engulf the United States in her second World War.

CHAPTER VI

The Public Speaks—Lobbies, Lobbies, Lobbies

Today many Americans are under the impression that congressional investigations and hearings are exemplified by Martin Dies, or his equivalent, demanding attendance of certain, appropriate persons before his congressional committee by means of the subpoena. If such is really the popular conception, it is a very incomplete definition of congressional hearings as they actually did and do exist.

Already this thesis has depicted the appearance of representatives of the Administration and the "Military" before the 1916 hearings, as well as the testimonies of interested Congressmen not on the committee rolls. These same witnesses would be found in attendance today as in 1916, the only conceivable difference being that the present tendency is not to permit a witness to begin with a lengthy, uninterrupted report, but for the chairman and his committeemen to proceed from the beginning by direct inquiries.

The closing weeks of almost any hearing are reserved for the appearance of the public, in the form of lobbies which are organized to various degrees of completeness. Members of Congress customarily have shown remarkable patience with these lobbies, understanding that they are the creation of, or bear influence upon, a great many of our voters.

THE FOUR HORSEMEN OF DEMOCRATIC COMPLAINT

The Senate and House hearings of the Committees on Military Affairs in 1916 cover well over 3,000 pages of records. From such a wealth of material this writer has selected those testimonies, by a process of elimination, which are most characteristic of public lobbying.

All of these public lobbies fit very nicely into four categories, which assists the coherence of this chapter to a large extent. First, there was a class of persons that came before the Hay or Chamberlain committees with the purpose of influencing or originating some one or two sections of the bill, and was constructive authority in the particular field. Second, there were the testimonies of the farm and the labor blocs that wished to influence the entire scope of the bill in relation to their personal interests. The writer believes that such lobbies are an essential ingredient of democracy, whether or not they carry any weight at the time.

The third class of lobbyist in 1916 was described as a force attempting to "Jane Addamize" the Nation, and it was to be expected that the great social worker was herself to be found among the witnesses. In this group are lumped together all of the pacifist, socialist, and anti-preparedness forces in the Nation, who had come to Washington to preach ideology, pure and simple. Their lobbies must be ranked as among the most sincere in their work, even though their success would have undermined any practical policy of national defense. Private

conversations with members of this "Jane Addams" school of thought invariably indicate that their beliefs are not founded upon personal security of a worldly nature, but upon a broader plane of the spiritual advancement of the human race. In theory, they are a very noble type of person; in fact, they err greatly, and work in contraposition to the spirit of this thesis.

The fourth group to appear before the hearings were the popular writers on national defense in 1916. To their ranks will be added the work of a characteristic "pulp writer" of the time, who represented yet another element at work on the political public opinion.

SPEAKING FOR A SPECIAL INTEREST

On January 21, 1916, the President of the Association of Military Schools and Colleges of the United States, Sebastian C. Jones, appeared before the Hay Committee.¹ Representing 42 institutions and a vested interest of \$14,000,000 in existing plants, Jones boomed the present form of Reserve Officers' Training Corps for all he was worth, since it meant growth or ruin to many of these institutions. His very words were: "We are being overlooked and are in a fair way to be forgotten."

This lobby offered the R. O. T. C. as the best compromise between the contemporary need for military training and the outspoken public hostility to compulsory training. It suggested that the Federal Government equip these 42 academies and colleges in modern fashion, create many \$400 scholarships, and guarantee a second lieutenancy by act of Congress for men graduating according to the standards which the Government might require. In essence, their theory was:

The basic idea upon which these institutions were founded was the conviction that our system of education should include not only instruction in those things that react to the benefit of the individual, but also training and instruction of a kind that would prepare our young men for the duties of citizenship, including a proper preparation to serve their country on the field of battle should that necessity arise.

Section 40 of the National Defense Act, treating the organization of the R. O. T. C., appeared as a direct answer to this lobby, showing that through their efforts they were not forgotten," and had saved for themselves a tremendous slice of Federal subsidization which might have also gone to State institutions.

Two weeks later Miss Mabel T. Boardman, chairman of the Executive Committee of the American Red Cross, came before Mr. Hay's Committee.² Miss Boardman requested that the new legislation should detail men from the Regular Army Medical Corps for the military relief duty of the Red Cross, and also that the Secretary of War be granted permission to allow the Red Cross to store supplies in Government buildings and reservations, "such supplies to be available for the aid of the civilian population in case of serious national disaster."

To further justify the work of her organization, Miss Boardman pointed out:

The great danger is that unless you have a well-organized and efficient Red Cross when such sudden interest in preparedness is aroused as at present, there

¹ Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, Hearings, op. cit., January 6-February 11 1916, pp. 445-462.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 1222-1232.

will arise all kinds of half-baked organizations, rushing into all kinds of plans of relief, without any definite experience or guidance.

Red Cross work also included the organization of field columns, hospital columns, supply columns, and an information section for the Government study of the wounded. Also, it accepted the responsibility of caring for families of the soldiers and for the refugees of war.

It is nothing short of amazing that Congress took no heed of this Red Cross plea, because it was not until the act of 1920 that Miss Boardman's two requests were set down as section 127, parts 4 and 5. It must have been the World War record of the Red Cross that swung public opinion.

Another fine example of an unselfish interest appearing before the Hay committee in hopes of influencing a particular part of the bill was the testimony of the representative of the National Rifle Association, Prof. William Libby, of Princeton University.³

According to Libby, there were in existence 700 rifle clubs under the association with 26,000 members, and he believed quite correctly that "the United States ought to be willing to provide guns and ammunition to any man who wants to get that training," suggesting one rifle for every five enthusiasts and 120 rounds of ammunition per individual per annum. Libby remarked that in Princeton town he had been able to bring together a local militia that had become so skilled, they "could be called out for riot duty and never be called upon to fire a shot." More significant was that he felt the experience had built up the personalities of the young men enrolled.

As a lobbyist, Professor Libby was comparatively successful, since the latter part of section 112 of the 1916 act was soon to read:

The Secretary of War shall be authorized to provide for the issue of a reasonable number of standard military rifles and such quantities of ammunition as may be available for use in conducting such rifle practice.

The 1920 act was truly a Magna Carta of national defense, because here again it finally arranged for a national board for the promotion of rifle practice that would fulfill to the letter all of Libby's original recommendations.

Another lobby of this quality should be remembered here, and that was the testimony of Mr. William Barclay Parsons, of New York, chairman of the committee representing the National Engineering Societies, which included the mining, mechanical, electrical, consulting and civil engineers.⁴ He wished to organize a reserve of the engineers along lines similar to that of the Medical Reserve, and he felt that, "the daily occupation of these men in civil life is the best training for the functions that they would perform in time of war."

This lobby for the engineers was a fine example of American patriotism, because these men, when on duty as Reserves, would be working at considerable personal sacrifice, and, at the application of the farsighted Mr. Kahn, they consented readily to enlistment "for the duration of the war."

The testimony of Harry T. Hunt, attorney at law and former mayor of Cincinnati, before Senator Chamberlain's committee is the last example to be used of that type of lobby which came to Washington to constructively back some legitimate interest. Mr. Hunt wished to

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 1261-1265.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 1104-1106.

write into the legislation "compulsory military service" believing it to be "adequate, democratic, economical, and beneficial as preparation for peace as well as for war."⁵

Mr. Hunt was both an Uptonian and an internationalist, because of his marked dislike for any dependence upon volunteers and his belief that "we must not only prepare for self-defense but for vigorous life among nations. The rotting influence of isolation from the commerce of the world, from competition among nations, will weaken our national character, reduce our efficiency, and ruin our prosperity, and we will tend to sink to an industrial condition worse than anything we have emerged from in the past."

Two more quotations from this address by Mr. Hunt will show the reader to the very best advantage the philosophy held by those who backed compulsory military service in 1916, and it was never better stated by General Wood or the other advocates:

The volunteer system is really most unfair. It takes the most patriotic, the most intelligent classes in the community, the most unselfish, the most enthusiastic, the very blood we ought to try to retain in being, and sends them forth, while the indifferent, the careless, and the ignorant remain at home to reduce the efficiency of succeeding generations.

As a politician and student of municipal affairs, I feel confident that universal service will serve to improve the quality of our Government, by improving the quality of the individual citizen. He would not be content to live in slums, in filthy or sordid or degraded surroundings. After returning from his service, he would insist upon cleanliness, order, and economy. The deficiencies of our local government, municipal and others, would in a large part be corrected. This education of the individual in healthy outdoor living would improve the health of the people. There would be a reduction in tuberculosis, which is due in large part to bad housing and lack of ventilation. We would thus become a far more efficient Nation.

These two quotations are of infinite value to this thesis, in that they indicate that Mr. Hunt and his fellow believers might be said to have their hearts in the right place. But more significant is the fact that the emphasis was upon the word "nation," and that these same, well-meaning arguments have been worked threadbare of late by none other than Mussolini and Hitler.

THE FARM LOBBY

The farm lobby, as well as the labor lobby, wished to influence the entire scope of the 1916 act for its especial interests. In a republic such a political force is most certainly legitimate, but at the same time it must be fully understood.

On February 7, Mr. L. J. Taber, master of the Ohio Grange and representative of the National Grange, gave his testimony.⁶ Taber made quite clear from the beginning that the Grangers were not for peace at any price nor were they opposing preparedness because they were afraid of a strong Federal force that would impose law and order over striking unions. He said that they believed "that at the present time the conditions surrounding us do not demand an increase of the Army and the Navy."

The Grangers also felt that the campaign for preparedness was being promoted by "special interests that will be financially benefited"; by those "who through special privilege have amassed great wealth

⁵ Committee on Military Affairs, Senate, Hearings, op. cit., January 18-February 8, 1916, pp. 559-564.

⁶ Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, Hearings, op. cit., January 6-February 11, 1916, pp. 1232-1236.

and who wish to increase the Army for their protection; by those who from training have a taste for militarism; and by metropolitan newspapers influenced by the foregoing powers and by their advertising patronage."

Taber laid down a six-point program which the grange lobby wished to see adhered to when the 1916 bill was drawn up. Firstly, the Government should take over the manufacturing of munitions. The Army and the Navy should not be increased, and the Grangers approved very highly of Wilson's contemporary policy of peaceful foreign relations. Fourthly, the Grange recognized the right of the draft and did not oppose an increase in the National Guard establishments. Next, this bloc wished Government control of transportation in wartime, and, lastly, the Grangers suggested that, after the first World War, there should be an international police force and court of arbitration until an eternal peace might be reached.

The other significant speeches from the farm bloc came from its leaders in Texas and Pennsylvania. The points made indicated the prevailing ignorance concerning the technical strategy and tactics of a sound national defense policy. It was believed, in true Jeffersonian style, that the use of mines off our coasts, plus a submarine defense, would be sufficient. The writer hopes that the first chapter of this thesis has proved such an assumption ridiculous.

The point was also made that war should be declared only after approval by the Nation, through some such scheme as the more recent Ludlow amendment, which, of course, this writer believes to be fine in theory but absolutely impossible in practice. Better taken was the Grangers' point that preparedness seekers should first look after the economic well-being of the farmers, so that they will have something to fight for. The frame of mind that the farmer was in is best represented by the following bit of advice to Mr. Hay's committee from one of their number:

The rank and file of the common people of this country are not afraid that war is really going to threaten this country, that we are not going to be attacked by any foreign nation for 6 or 7 months at least; and I think that you gentlemen, when you go back home, will not be eaten up because you understood and worked for the welfare of the people.⁷

THE OPINION OF ORGANIZED LABOR

The most prominent member of the labor bloc to appear before Congress was John B. Lennon, treasurer of the American Federation of Labor, who was heard by the Chamberlain committee.⁸

Lennon's speech remained upon a high spiritual plane, and was typified by the stand, "the time is here now that the American people can afford to give a fair trial to brotherhood and Christianity rather than to force." He said that while labor was opposed to the preparedness drive, it resented being thought a coward.

It was not surprising that labor, as the farm lobby, also suggested a direct referendum to prevent "subterfuge of any kind * * *. Submit the question to the people," said Lennon, "I am ready to go along with the majority, even though the majority takes a position against my own convictions." To labor, preparedness should begin from

⁷ Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, Hearings, op. cit., January 6-February 11, 1916, speech of John A. McSparran, president of the Pennsylvania State Grange, member of the Legislative Committee of the National Grange, pp. 1240-1248.

⁸ Committee on Military Affairs, Senate Hearings, op. cit., January 18-February 8, 1916, pp. 1026-1029.

within, by attempting to raise the wage standard and inaugurate woman suffrage. Lennon added:

I think that if this Nation will continue to set the highest example in the world of a high standard of living, build up on this continent a race of people, even though they do come from all parts of the world, it will build up here a citizenship that no nation on earth will want to attack.

Do not even Lennon's remarks hint that what labor was chiefly interested in was the status of labor, and that all other considerations were made in terms of this principal objective?

The president of the Pennsylvania Federation of Labor, James H. Maurer, was far more extreme in his testimony to the Chamberlain committee.⁹ He not only opposed preparedness but had a solution worked out, which turned out to be the same fruitless talk about "submarines and mines." He must have ruffled the dignity of the sedate group he addressed with these following opinions on individual rights:

This is harsh language, but here is the place to speak it. I want to be frank with you. We are sick and tired of being turned into fodder for cannon. Then you are going to raise the money by taxing us workers, and you are then going into our homes and take our fathers and brothers and sons out and make us do the fighting and also pay for the fight. * * * You want us to be patriotic. What about? You sicken me with your patriotic talk. I want to be a patriot only to the extent that I am fighting the battles of myself, my family and those who are dear to me. * * * We have a right to protest. If it is right to take a work-ingman's life, we say it is right to take a rich man's fortune.

While the above quotation was that of labor-leader Maurer before the Senate committee, it should be mentioned that a few hours after he had made his testimony to the House committee in much the same vein, Representative Anthony, of Kansas, obtained permission to have placed in the records that Maurer was a "prominent Socialist agitator in the State of Pennsylvania." Whether this was true or not seems to this writer of little importance, since Maurer was still president of a great State's Federation of Labor.

In juxtaposition to the opinions of the American Federation of Labor men, there should be recorded briefly the outlook of the United Mine Workers.¹⁰ Their testimony read very much like a current John Steinbeck novel, and was a bundle of complaints, rather than constructive suggestions. They demanded to know just how far the preparedness advocates intended to go, stating that they were fundamentally opposed to any plan "which advances one step in the direction of fastening upon the people of this country a military system which will eventually crush them." It may be inferred that strike-breaking was in the very front of their witness's mind.

It was not a contradiction that, while the United Mine Workers wished to take from the Federal Government all excessive power of coercion, they also wished to have the Government take from capitalism the production of armaments and munitions.

The fact cannot be emphasized too often that the farm and labor lobbies did not attend these congressional hearings in 1916 with the military defense policy of the Nation first in mind; rather, they were seeking to further their own political and economic well-being. Through this active exploitation of the democratic rights guaranteed to them, they were placing in jeopardy the security of the entire Nation.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 1034-1039.

¹⁰ Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, hearings, op. cit., Jan. 6-Feb. 11, 1916, speech of Mr. Percy Tetlow, representing the United Mine Workers of America, 600,000 members, pp. 1317-1323

LILLIAN D. WALD

Miss Lillian D. Wald was chairman of the Anti-Preparedness Committee which brought many appropriate witnesses before the congressional committees. Since several of the above labor representatives were introduced by her, and since her personal philosophy was based upon broad experience, it seems only just to mention her now, and not throw her in below with the general run of the "Jane Addams" thinkers.¹¹

The antipreparedness lobby was formed, said Miss Wald, "to protest against the attempt to stampede this Nation into a dangerous program of military and naval expansion." The principal objectives of her group were to investigate the existing waste of Government funds allocated to national defense, and reduce that waste to a minimum. Secondly, they would take the profit out of preparedness by Government ownership of munitions plants, and, lastly, they believed the wealthy should be taxed more heavily for a defense system that would guard their belongings. Miss Wald's testimony is well summarized in the following characteristic passage:

We believe that no danger of invasion threatens this country and that there is no excuse for hasty ill-considered action. * * * We protest no less against the effort being made to divert public funds, sorely needed in constructive programs for national health and well-being, into manufacturing engines of death.

"JANE ADDAMIZING" THE NATION

In a study of the popular forces with which committees of our elected representatives in Washington must cope, there are few more interesting case studies than the picture of Jane Addams, the famous social worker, testifying before Mr. Hay's committee on a proper defense policy for the Nation.¹²

Miss Addams' plea was a remarkable conglomeration of non-sequiturs. Over and over she marshalled many accurate facts and statistics to produce very mistaken conclusions. Her ability to feel was great; to reason, slight.

Representing the Women's Peace Party Miss Addams felt that the United States would be the obvious Nation, after the first World War was concluded, to lead the devastated and bankrupt powers toward disarmament, and that we must be able to take up such a crusade "with our hands clean." Her party's plea to Congress boiled down to this:

We suggest that you at least postpone this plan for a large increase of the Army and the Navy until the war is over.

Two fundamental weaknesses in this outlook are obvious to the student of national defense. In case the Nation had very suddenly been forced to fight in the war, we could not even have defended our home shores adequately, nor could we have prepared in time to save ourselves from capture. Secondly, international problems—disarmament being a fine example—are settled by force, or at least the possibility of force.

Another stand taken by Miss Addams stated that the world would never see an aggressive war again, "because the people will not back

¹¹ Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, hearings, op. cit., Jan. 6-Feb. 11, 1916, pp. 1209-1273.

¹² Pp. 201-213.

up the Government [any government] in making an aggressive war." Such a stand was refuted in 1916 by the existence of Prussianism, and has been continually disproved ever since by the advent of dictatorships.

The Women's Peace Party was a thoroughly legitimate lobby, and, as such, must always be heard by any committee hearings that are formulating a national-defense policy. But it certainly must have been a trial for Members of Congress who were well schooled in this professional field of the art military, to have to sit through such a testimony as Miss Addams', from which this last quote is the most characteristic:

If there should be a prolonged naval battle between the fleets of England and Germany it is *possible* that they would both be destroyed; if they destroyed each other that would relieve us of the necessity of spending our money for ships, as the United States would automatically be raised from the third naval power to the first.¹³

Rabbi Stephen Wise, of New York City, offered further spiritual opiates to "Jane Addamize" the Nation.¹⁴ A holder of several university degrees, the rabbi said he would nevertheless rather see these institutions abolished as "a menace to the welfare of the country," before they should become instruments to foster "military training" of the R. O. T. C. variety.

Dr. Wise came very near to turning Mr. Hay's committee hearing into a prayer meeting:

Instead of standing out like men, instead of saying, "Whilst I can fain clamour from this throat, I will tell you thou doest evil," the presidents of the great universities, yea, even Harvard and Princeton, one after another succumb to this panic and this hysteria.

Many of the antipreparedness advocates do not even merit mention, much less a quotation. For example, L. Hollingsworth Wood, as secretary of the League to Limit Armaments, repeated to the Chamberlain committee, almost verbatim, great sections of Miss Addams' stand.¹⁵ When Mr. William I. Hull, of Swarthmore College, took over the witness stand to represent the Society of Friends, it was the same sort of testimony, running, "warfare and preparation for warfare are wrong, both upon religious and moral grounds."¹⁶

The writer is here tempted to include a piece of reasoning from the testimony of the west coast's great Suffragist leader, Miss Sara Bard Field, not because it is correct, which it is not, but because it possesses a delightful spark of reality and is so devoid of the above sentimentality:

I have no use for the sickly sentimental and sob story stuff of women being opposed to war because they go down to the gates of death to bring life into the world. I do not believe that woman is opposed to a fight when the fight is for a good purpose. I do not believe that woman is opposed to preparedness when it is preparedness for something vital and real. Women have always been ready to give the life that they brought into the world when the giving of it meant a "life more abundant" for the Nation.

This writer would reemphasize that he has made every attempt not to disparage the sincerity of this "Jane Addamizing" lobby, but only to expose its shallow reasoning in a very technical field, upon which the security of this great Nation was dependent.

¹³ Italics by this writer, for emphasis.

¹⁴ Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, hearings, op. cit., January 6-February 11, 1916, pp. 1330-1337.

¹⁵ Committee on Military Affairs, Senate, Hearings, op. cit., January 18-February 8, 1916, pp. 867-876.

¹⁶ Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, hearings, op. cit., January 6-February 11 1916, pp. 1265-1266.

THE POPULAR WRITERS ON NATIONAL DEFENSE

The fourth and last group that came before the congressional committees to discuss the act of 1916, was made up of the currently popular writers on the subject of national defense. They were 1916's equivalent of 1940's George Fielding Eliot, Harold Sprout, Charles A. Beard, and Clarence Streit.

On February 7, Frederic Louis Huidekoper, author of *Military Unpreparedness of the United States*, was heard and questioned at length by the Chamberlain committee.¹⁷ Huidekoper bases his strong preparedness stand upon an extended survey of our national-defense history, and arrives at the following conclusion:

History established one fact which there is no gainsaying—that is, no nation has ever plunged into war unprepared without unnecessary slaughter, unjustifiable expense, and national peril. To place upon insufficiently trained men the main dependence of a country's defense is nothing more or less than to invite disaster. That is what the United States has done from the very start, and the record of our militia is not very flattering to American pride and conceit.¹⁸

Huidekoper tended toward the old Upton philosophy in wishing to change the existing militia into a National Guard in fact as well as in name, so that it would be a "purely Federal force." Referring back to the concurring testimonies of General Crowder and Senator Cummins, he argued that the militia could be completely federalized within the Constitution's limits, with the one exception of State appointment of officers, which was a right vested in the respective Governors. Huidekoper stated that military history had proved that even this last vestige of State control should be erased. "The only dependable force is one under the Federal control, wholly and absolutely."

Another division of preparedness treated by Huidekoper was the current creation of a businessmen's camp at Plattsburg. He felt that during the last summer the men attending that camp firstly realized that there was infinitely more to be learned by a soldier than they had dreamed; and, secondly, that a soldier cannot be made into an officer in just a few months of training. This point of view is, of course, anti-Palmer and not agreeable to this writer, as it overemphasizes the professional soldier. Huidekoper even went on to say:

* * * no principle is more in accord with a republican form of government, no doctrine is more truly democratic, than that which asserts that every able-bodied male citizen owes military service to his country. * * * The principle of universal service is no more a violation of the policy and traditions of the American people than is the payment of taxes under compulsion.¹⁹

Several days before Huidekoper's testimony, another current writer and journalist had been heard by the Chamberlain committee; namely, Oswald Garrison Villard, president of the *New York Evening Post*.²⁰

Villard spoke in behalf of antipreparedness, attacking the existing waste of national-defense funds; attacking the proposal for a Continental Army before the Dick militia law had had sufficient time to prove itself; attacking the demand for more equipment by men who would advance in the Army if their propaganda were successful; and, lastly,

¹⁷ Committee on Military Affairs, Senate, hearings, op. cit., January 18-February 8, 1916, pp. 967-993

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 969.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 993.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 856-867, 876-883.

attacking the current expenditure of 70 cents of the tax dollar for war, which the preparedness drive would raise to 80 cents, detracting the same from much-needed internal improvements. In all of these points, as well as in his argument to wait until the war was over before arming, Villard reiterates the doctrine of Jane Addams. His brand of pacifism was only exceptional because he went much further than Miss Addams dreamed of going.

In answer to questions from Senator Fletcher and Senator Weeks, Villard proposed that the Navy be allowed to dwindle away altogether, and he answered Senator Catron with the proposition that the Army be made only a small police force to preserve law and order. He would even employ the State militia for police duty, which would have to have included strike breaking, all of which was refuted in the first chapter of this thesis. Villard laid waste all existing naval theory by further suggesting that the Panama Canal be left unfortified, and that we should never actively defend the Monroe Doctrine. Villard's absolute ineffectiveness may be best understood by concluding this treatment of him with his remark to George Chamberlain:

I consider the greatest preparedness is the preparedness of unarmed righteousness.

Before concluding this study of popular writers on national defense, one author should be mentioned who was not present at the congressional hearings. He is included here only because he was an excellent example of the "pulp writers" who wrote for pacifism, and, as in this man's case, who were frequently subsidized by the National Socialist Party. The writer is Allan L. Benson, and the book concerning this 1916 preparedness struggle was, *Inviting War to America*.

Benson labeled the preparedness drive an attempt to "stampede a nation into committing an act of monumental folly." He claimed that the war in Europe "has been seized by our militarists as the club with which to drive us into camp. * * * Having talked love and failed, they are now talking fear."

This book was absolutely lacking in any authority for the monstrous charges it heaped upon Army and Government officials. It is only recognized in this thesis because thousands of our citizens, during a state of war hysteria, were reading it, making it one type of political force at work on our national-defense policy.

Benson suggested that the bankers and munitions makers bind themselves throughout the war to the meager \$15 salary paid to the soldiers, and that not until then could they prove their unselfish patriotism. Theodore Roosevelt was blamed for much of the prevalent fear, because of "a consuming desire to get back to and remain in the White House." Surveying Woodrow Wilson's election year politics, Benson charged that he "seeps through a situation instead of cutting through with a knife," feeling it necessary "to put himself in a position to swim with the tide—if there were a tide." Benson claimed that Wilson purposely sanctioned Garrison's Continental Army, for a time, in order that he might finally scuttle it.

In true Socialist style, author Benson wished to kill our preparedness campaign, and then after the World War might have been fought to a standstill, "we should be the friend of every part of Europe."

In their respective order, these three contemporary writers, Huidekoper, Villard, and Benson, represented the forces of preparedness, pacifism, and Socialism. Fortunately for the welfare of the Nation,

the path of preparedness was most closely adhered to by the 1916 act, and more fortunate still, our military policy was gradually working away from the Calhoun-Upton policy, back to the original Washington-von Steuben program, which General Palmer was to resurrect completely in the 1920 act.

Both this chapter and this part of the thesis have been necessarily long. Fortunately, they have now acquainted the reader with the form of analysis of the political forces, and will permit great condensation when this technique is repeated in part III, over the 1920 act. Secondly, this writer believes that many testimonies in the congressional hearings, herein included, deserve to be saved from the comparative oblivion of the dusty volumes in the Library of Congress. The myriad public lobbies that were granted a congressional hearing, and recognition herein, permitted Chamberlain quite honestly to report to the Senate on March 16, 1916:

This the committee has endeavored to do with entire impartiality and the results of long consultation and deep deliberation have finally been embodied in the Senate bill now submitted to your consideration.²¹

WILSON'S FAMOUS ADDRESS

On June 3, 1916, the first complete National Defense Act was finally concluded. It need only be said that when the United States entered the World War much of the act had not had time to become effective, and the passage of the substitute Overman legislation was altogether justified. The 1920 act would, in its turn, restore the Nation to a peace policy, and one that would remedy the weaknesses of the 1916 act as exposed by the years of war.

The historic incidents in our history between June 3, 1916, and Wilson's famous address at the opening of the War Congress, on April 2, 1917, are not a part of this particular thesis. But Wilson's actual address did concern the subject of a national-defense policy, especially in the following passages:

The present German submarine warfare against commerce is a warfare against mankind. It is a war against all nations. American ships have been sunk. American lives taken * * *. Armed neutrality, it now appears, is impracticable * * *. I advise that Congress take immediate steps not only to put the country in a more thorough state of defense, but also to exert all its powers and employ all its resources to bring the Government of the German Empire to terms and end the war * * *. We have no quarrel with the German people. We have no feeling toward them but one of sympathy and friendship * * *. The world must be made safe for democracy * * *. It is a fearful thing to lead this great people into war * * *. But the right is more precious than peace.²²

The United States became embroiled in the first World War. It was a war of victory for no nation concerned, only a war of waste—

Waste of Muscle, Waste of Brain,
Waste of Patience, Waste of Pain,
Waste of Manhood, Waste of Health,
Waste of Beauty, Waste of Wealth,
Waste of Blood, and Waste of Tears,
Waste of Youth's most precious years,
Waste of ways the Saints have trod,
Waste of Glory, Waste of God—War!²³

²¹ George E. Chamberlain, "Preparedness for National Defense," S. Repts., Vol. I, Miscellaneous I, Rept. No. 263, pt. I, 64th Cong., 1st Sess.

²² Stanton and Van Vliet Co., op. cit., pp. 11-22.

²³ Studdert Kennedy, British War Chaplain, *The Sorrows of God, and Other Poems*.

PART III

\ The Politics of the National Defense Act of 1920

CHAPTER I

The Policy of the War Years—Anticipatory Hearings—The Act Itself

The 4 years separating the passage of the 1916 and the 1920 Defense Acts form a vital period in the political and military history of the United States. The limited scope of this thesis excludes any treatment of American military participation in the European conflict, or of the later procedure at the Versailles Conference. This chapter will recognize only the broad lessons of the war, the domestic highlights of this period, the scattered congressional hearings immediately following the war, and the changed status of the Military Affairs Committees, as well as give a brief sketch of the final act itself. It is left to the remaining five chapters of part III to analyze the political forces at work in 1919 and 1920 which influenced the final drafting of this constitution of national defense, of June 4, 1920.

WILSON'S ROLE

For a hasty review of President Wilson's actions in 1916 and early 1917, it is best to turn to a passage written by Samuel Flagg Bemis:

Following the Allies' rebuff, the President turned back to an inveterately neutral policy. In the campaign of 1916 he permitted his supporters to appeal successfully to the electorate on the issue "He kept us out of war"; at the same time he weakened the aggressive Republican opposition by advocating rapid military preparedness, for all contingencies; particularly did he urge that the United States Navy be built up to be the most powerful on the oceans.¹

Once the United States had finally cast her lot with the Allies, the problem became a far broader one than mere naval preparedness, or even the molding of an American Expeditionary Force. Wilson expressed it very concisely in an official proclamation on May 18, 1917:

It is not an army we must shape and train for war—it is a Nation. To this end our people must draw close in one compact front against a common foe. The whole Nation must be a team, in which every man shall play the part for which he is best fitted.²

The creation of the "Council of National Defense" had taken place in August, 1916, by conferring the responsibility upon six members of the Cabinet and an advisory commission of seven. The Council set about coordinating industry and stimulating war necessities, as well as settling labor disputes. Under this body's supervision worked the General Medical Board and the Committee on Engineering and Education, and finally State councils of defense were created to oversee the work of smaller units and act as middlemen between the individual and the Federal Government.³

On July 28, 1917, the Council was reorganized as the War Industries Board, and the activities of the body underwent rapid extension in

¹ Samuel Flagg Bemis, *A Diplomatic History of the United States*, p. 603.

² Charles Seymour, *Woodrow Wilson and the World War*, pp. 150-151.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 154-156.

the autumn of 1917. Again in March 1918, the Board was reorganized under the new chairmanship of Bernard M. Baruch, and just as soon as Wilson was given blanket authority by the Overman Act he vested the War Industries Board with the centralizing powers it needed to exert strict control over all the Nation's industries. The Board went about fulfilling its job of supplying the Government and Allies with the goods essential for making war successfully, while at the same time it was protecting the civil needs of the country.⁴

Soon after our entry into the war, the Council of National Defense set up a committee on food supply, at the head of which was placed Herbert C. Hoover, as Food Commissioner.⁵ Some months later a Fuel Administrator, Harry A. Garfield, was decided upon, to stimulate production in that field, as well as to eliminate all possible waste.⁶ In order that faulty transportation would not upset the well-organized system of production and distribution, in December 1917, William Gibbs McAdoo was appointed director-general of the railroads. This trend of centralization continued with Edward N. Hurley named as chairman of the Shipping Board and Charles M. Schwab as director-general of the Emergency Fleet Corporation.⁷

With the creation of the War Trade Board under the able leadership of Vance McCormick, the Government received the necessary control over this Nation's foreign trade; essential products could be preserved; and trade tonnage could be manipulated for the purposes of economy or military strategy. On April 9, 1918, a National War Labor Board was placed in the hands of ex-President Taft to act as a final court of appeal for labor disputes, and a War Labor Policies Board fixed the standards by which this court should operate. The Government used a new Committee of Public Information as an organ for dissemination of the issues of the war and of its particular aims.⁸

Under such a system of emergency centralization, the final responsibility of the Nation's failures and achievements in military and economic fields lay with President Wilson.

He took no part in working out the details. Once the development of any committee or organization had been started, he left the control of it entirely to those who had been placed in charge. But he would have been untrue to his nature had he not at all times been determined to keep the reins of supreme control in his own hands.⁹

Americas' completed war machine transported and maintained one and a half million troops in Europe, keeping two million more in readiness at home, with preparations under way to raise and equip five and a half million more by June 30, 1920. With the assistance of the aforementioned emergency legislation, this unmilitary and peace-loving Nation had transformed itself into a war machine great enough to stop the Prussian juggernaut in its tracks.¹⁰ The principal credit belonged to the iron will of America's great prophet of international cooperation, who had waged war only in order to ensure peace.¹¹

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 153-157.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 161.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 166-167.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 172-177.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 179-186.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 190.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 190-191.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 353 and 359.

MILITARY POLICY ON THE HOME FRONT

Having now treated the wartime national defense policy, this thesis must turn the clock back a few years to cover several skirmishes on the home front over the question of the Nation's defense policy.

All of the political forces discussed in part II of this work continued to churn and bubble in the domestic kettle.¹² All of the militaristic forces which we saw at work in an attempt to influence the Defense Act of 1916 continued to preach conscription and compulsory service in early 1917. The following is an extraction from a newspaper editorial of that time:

Those Senators and Representatives who continue their opposition to compulsory training and selective conscription can have neither foresight nor hindsight * * *. Something is wrong with their mental processes. Something fine and vital is lacking in their conception of duty and patriotism.¹³

Whenever such an editorial was printed, either some lobby or the paper itself would mail copies to "those Senators and Representatives" at Washington.

The reliable New York Times published under its communications column a long appeal from Gen. Leonard Wood for universal military training, which, of course, he had been unable to write into the 1916 act. The Times accompanied this with an editorial comment reading as follows:

The time is ripe for this change in our military system, as every day bears evidence. Yesterday, for instance, another huge batch of resignations of commissions in the National Guard was reported, while there were reports from many States of the difficulty of obtaining recruits while the prosperity of the country continues and the wages of industry are so high. It ought to be obvious that in a rich nation of 113,000,000 population the Army and the Navy should not be compelled to compete in the labor market with private industries.¹⁴

Bearing in mind this above criticism of the National Guard, it is interesting to turn to a personal letter written a few days previously by Gen. J. Clifford R. Foster, executive chairman of the National Guard Association, to Senator Blair Lee, of Maryland, which letter has never before been published. Foster defended the cause of the guardsmen in the following correspondence to his friend in Washington:

Please notice the editorial in the Army and Navy Journal of last week on the guard. If any proof were required of the deliberate purpose of those in authority to disrupt the National Guard by means of the present mobilization and by the detention of our troops at the [Mexican] border, that editorial furnishes to me evidence that is conclusive.

I am curious to know whether or not our friends in Congress who have not been keeping in touch with the situation as closely as you have are being impressed by the anti-National Guard propaganda that is being carried on.

The guard not called into the Federal service has been systematically knocked out. I have been obliged to discharge two-thirds of our remaining [Florida] regiment and reduce it to a separate battalion because of methods of administration that were not only nonsympathetic but antagonistic.¹⁵

"Old Cliff's" letter goes to show that long before the emergency period of April 1917 came around, the "Military" was getting a death

¹² The material employed under this heading was all obtained from the private papers of former Senator Blair Lee, of Maryland, who figured very largely in the domestic proceedings.

¹³ The Spokesman-Review, Spokane, Wash., leading editorial, April 18, 1917.

¹⁴ The New York Times, editorial page, December 25, 1916.

¹⁵ This personal letter is now the property of the writer. It bears General Foster's personal signature to substantiate its validity. Written December 6, 1916, from St. Augustine.

grip on the power of the National Guard lobby and its ideal of a well-trained militia. As a last stand for State rights and the interest of local identity as exemplified by the National Guard, Senator Lee pressed a special hearing in the United States Senate, in which he personally cross-examined General Wood on January 1, 1917, and Chief of Staff Scott, on February 1.¹⁶ These leaders of the "Military" came out for complete federalization of the National Guard, demanding that State lines be erased in relation to military policy. Despite wide publication of these findings, their effect was snuffed out by the ever-increasing centralization that accompanied our entry into the war.

The active participation of the United States abroad brought no let-up in the domestic squabble over a national-defense policy. The National Guard lobby throughout the Nation held on tenaciously to its democratic right to defend the country in local regiments, officered by local men. The adjutants general kept in close touch with their friends in Washington, and to exemplify this, the writer offers a typical passage from such an appeal:

I want to express my sympathy with your efforts to retain to the States the right of local self-government, which I regard as necessary for the future welfare of this Republic. Many ancient landmarks are being deserted in the excitement which is at present occupying the mind of Congress. Your record and position in reference to this important matter will be remembered when we settle down to normal conditions.¹⁷

With the introduction of universal conscription, the old National Guard lobby was presented with an even greater objective to fight for, because the new system was separating State troops from their State officers, following their conscription into the Regular Army. This action on the part of the General Staff was direct Prussianization of the American defense policy. A characteristic protest in behalf of the disappearing State rights was that made by Senator Lee, of Maryland, to President Wilson on August 22, 1917, which ran:

The Constitution, our party and you, by most express utterance, are committed to a citizen soldiery, the great essential feature of which bulwark of freedom and defense is the local officer in command of local troops * * *. The fundamental principle involved seems of such great importance as to justify the immediate correction of this highly objectionable arrangement * * *. The separation of local officers from local troops is an Imperial German policy and inconsistent with the general practice of our Allies in this war.¹⁸

The administration's reply to the State rights lobby was well indicated by President Wilson's role in the growing wartime bureaucracy, as depicted in the beginning of this chapter. The Overman emergency legislation was unquestionably necessary to win the war, but it was a fortunate thing that the anti-Upton school won out over the "Military" in the final writing of the 1920 act.

A SKETCH OF THE 1920 DEFENSE ACT

With the aid of Col. Oliver Lyman Spaulding's book, the United States Army in War and in Peace, the writer believes it now necessary to give a brief sketch of just what the National Defense Act of 1920 amounted to.¹⁹

¹⁶ 64th Cong., 2d sess., subcommittee of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, Chamberlain presiding, questions by Blair Lee, of Maryland, 1917, 175 pp.

¹⁷ Private papers of Senator Blair Lee, letter from Adj. Gen. William Wilson Sale, of the Commonwealth of Virginia, May 10, 1917.

¹⁸ Private papers of Senator Blair Lee, letter to President Wilson, August 22, 1917.

¹⁹ Spaulding, *op. cit.*, pp. 458-465.

The end of the first World War brought about both the gradual discharge of the temporary force of our Army, and the problem of how large the permanent force should be. Nothing but temporary emergency legislation had been passed since the Defense Act of 1916, and many amendments now needed to be added to the post-war defense policy to maintain the advances made in military strategy during the war.

The first controversial question which had to be thrashed out in congressional hearings was the "Military's" desire for the adoption of compulsory military service, or at least compulsory training. This proposal finally lost out to the old volunteer system, but it was taken for granted that our entry into another World War would require conscription anyway.

Secondly, the National Guard, which had been taken over bodily into the Regular Army during the war, was now being gradually discharged, and its lobby pressed for its best interests in the 1920 revision. The former Division of Militia Affairs was converted into the National Guard Bureau, which would be headed by a guardsman, even though some of his assistants would be Regular Army men. The Guard was to remain available for State service under the order of the respective governors, but it had become the National Guard of the United States and was principally a reserve for the Regular Army. It could be brought directly into Federal service without the former red tape, and, to insure uniformity, Regular Army officers were detailed as instructors of the Guard.

The 1920 act provided for an Organized Reserve Corps to perpetuate the standing Army with a Reserve force that would be completely Federal. This trained in peacetime a quota of officers sufficient to lead an expanded Army in time of war. The United States was subdivided into nine corps areas aside from its overseas areas, to each one of which was assigned a certain number of standing and National Guard troops. This benefited the expansible army theory because it permitted each corps area to construct some sort of a skeleton foundation in time of peace.

The maximum peacetime force was fixed at 300,000 men, from which there had to be subtracted the officers, the instructors, and the overseas garrisons. The National Guard total was proportioned at a rate of 800 men for every Senator, Representative or Delegate in Congress. The R. O. T. C. was included as a means of continually pumping new blood into the Organized Reserves, with the new second lieutenants commissioned for 5 years, and only recommissioned if interest and progress were shown.

The age-old system of Regular Army promotion had stood for years as a major blight upon the profession. It had meant that promotion was only within the separate divisions of the Army, and that one arm would invariably speed its promotion more than another, causing constant discontent and desire to change divisions. The new act finally included a system of promotion by seniority on a "single list" which covered the entire Army. A man would receive his promotion when his turn came, no matter where he was stationed.

At the close of the war, the Army had two general staffs in existence. One was in Washington and represented the old style, while the new type was still in France under Pershing, running the A. E. F. Neither

was completely fitted for the existing peace requirements, but it was General Pershing's which the new act adopted, with certain modifications. It was to have five departments to supervise, respectively, personnel, administration, intelligence, operation, and supply and training:

Any reforms that might henceforth take place in the citizen army had to be determined by a committee on which the General Staff members would be balanced by citizens from the Reserves and the National Guard.²⁰ It should also be remembered that the new corps areas and training centers for the guard were the direct fulfillment of the original Washington-von Steuben policy of military national defense, and had also been proposed in the Stimson Annual Report of 1912, all of which has been previously alluded to.

The new legislation went a long way toward creating Washington's "well-regulated militia" through the extensive National Guard provisions. But it also retained a great deal of Uptonism by preserving the theory of the expansible skeleton army supported by a professional class of soldier, the Organized Reserve Corps.

For perfection, the national-defense policy should support not a skeleton army but complete standing units that would be sufficient for peacetime. Behind this there should be the National Guard Reserve, fully organized in case it was called upon. The Organized Reserve Corps should not be a mainstay, but merely a final reservoir beyond the guard, in case a gigantic army had to be mustered out.

THE STORY FIRST-HAND

To insure both the completeness and accuracy of this thesis, the writer now wishes to substantiate the above technical review of the 1920 act by Colonel Spaulding's book with a personal interview from former Senator James W. Wadsworth, Jr., of New York, who was chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee which drew up this constitution of our national-defense policy.²¹

This same presentation will be annotated by remarks selected from a personal interview with Senator Morris Sheppard, who represented the minority opinion of 1920, with his present chairmanship of the Military Affairs Committee giving his observations still more weight.²²

It is Senator Wadsworth's belief that:

The United States had no military policy prior to the National Defense Act of 1920. The original 1916 Act was merely a reservoir of former piecemeal legislation in the military field. The 1920 Act gave us one Army of the United States, made up of the Regular Army, the Organized Reserves, and the National Guard, only now it was the National Guard of the United States and not of the several States.

In a later interview, General Palmer, Wadsworth's personal friend and technical adviser in 1920, warned this writer not to forget that although this act did represent the first unified military policy to receive congressional approbation, the country should not forget that Washington and Von Steuben had compiled a complete policy one-hundred-and-thirty-odd years before, which, to the good fortune of the Nation, was largely duplicated by this new legislation.

²⁰ The remainder of this sketch is drawn from the book written by John McAuley Palmer, Washington, Lincoln, and Wilson—Three War Presidents, pp. 365-372.

²¹ February 1, 1940.

²² February 17, 1940; supplemented by letter signed by Sheppard.

Wadsworth stressed that after 1920 the Army's Reserve forces were in a position to permit Congress to call them to the colors in any fashion that an emergency might necessitate. The fact that a man could now belong to both the National Guard and the Organized Reserves further welded together the two organizations into one Reserve force; and greater cohesion was gained between the Regular Army and the Organized Reserve Corps, with officers of the former now supervising the training of the latter.

The former chairman then chose to give this writer a summary of the five major problems faced by his committee back in 1920. Firstly, the status of the National Guard had to be settled after the dislocation caused by the war. Wadsworth says that "under the 1916 system the guard had the Army in a strait jacket, dictating even the most technical points of organization." During the war the guard forces had been swept right into the Regular Army, and such emergency legislation as the Overman Act had removed all of its former rights, which had proved such a hindrance in recruiting an expeditionary force. Says Wadsworth:

We desired to write the 1920 Act so as to maintain the new order. The war had necessarily broken up the old local units of the National Guard, with a consequent injury to morale. Under our system of federalization, this will never again be necessary.

Speaking for the Democratic minority of the Wadsworth committee, after 20 years of reflection, Senator Sheppard stated to the writer last February:

This legislation permitted the introduction of advanced ideas without leading to the extreme [of Uptonism], and contained nothing suggestive of the ruthless autoocracy of Prussianism.

Secondly, the 1920 act provided the much-needed single list of promotion, which removed it from the separate branches. Promotion would be by seniority up to the rank of colonel, and a classification board was created to eliminate all inefficient cases arising under the new single list. The officers had to undergo a regular set of examinations. Speaking for the minority on this very technical matter of promotion reform, Morris Sheppard adds to Wadsworth's statements:

I did not object to the single promotion list for the line of the Army. It was necessary to improve morale in officer personnel.

Wadsworth named as the third reform the clarification of the duties of the General Staff, which led to what is well-termed "greater elasticity." In short, this means that Congress should continue to control all military policy, but that the Staff would be entrusted with the administrative details. An act of Congress would not be necessary for the future addition of a mere corporal to the Regular Army, which sort of red tape had been typical of the old regime.

Sheppard's stand on this issue reminds us that he was one of the 14 enlightened Senators of 1916. While he was ready to block any undemocratic domination by the "military," he did not wish to prevent the efficient working of the War Department. His present-day statement is:

I was and am in favor of the latitude allowed the General Staff by the Act of 1920.

One of the major conflicts was to arise again over the question of military training. Wadsworth says that the Senate Military Affairs Committee would have liked to have written in universal military training, and that Secretary Baker supported this stand. The Senate would probably have accepted it, but support would have been lacking in the House, the chief reason being that the expense entailed was very nearly prohibitive. Wadsworth adds today:

After surveying the success of our National Guard and Reserve training for the last twenty years, I am not now so convinced that universal training is a necessity.

It is most interesting to note Senator Sheppard's reaction to this same question, because it indicates the split that existed even within the Senate Military Affairs Committee in 1920:

I have never believed in mandatory universal military training in time of peace.

The last point of the 1920 act which Wadsworth feels called on to emphasize today is the matter of politics in the National Guard. He believes his bill has cured this former evil for good. The guard officers might still be appointed by the respective Governors, but now they have also to meet Federal requirements, and herewith the last of our national-defense weaknesses taught us by the first World War was remedied.

HEARINGS WHICH PRECEDED THE MAIN FEATURE

With the development of our national-defense policy during our years in the war, as well as a technical and personal survey of the 1920 act behind us, let us now make a closer scrutiny of the conflicting forces that grappled over the drafting of this constitution of our military policy in the early months of 1919. This same chapter will also include the congressional reports and committees which dealt with the final period of investigation, leaving to the following five chapters a detailed treatment of the actual 6,000 pages of hearings and speeches from the 2 floors, which cover completely the workings of the political forces in the final months, from August 7, 1919, through June 4, 1920.

During the third session of the Sixty-fifth Congress, Chairman S. Hubert Dent, of Alabama, who had succeeded Mr. Hay, presided over a hearing of the House Military Affairs Committee that received the testimonies of Secretary Baker and the new Chief of Staff, Peyton C. March.²³ The hearing was called on January 16, 1919, shortly before the close of the session, and its principal purpose was to provide for a temporary standing army until the new national-defense legislation could be worked out. Certain matters of political and military importance also arose, which must be included herein if the complete genealogy of the developments is to be maintained.

Secretary Baker suggested that a standing army of 500,000 be maintained by the United States, "for a more or less limited period to see that the terms of peace agreed upon are carried out."²⁴ When Representative Shallenberger, of Nebraska, argued that such a force would repudiate the future disarmament policy announced by President Wilson, Baker reemphasized that at present it was a necessary precaution. He said he had not yet any official opinion upon the

²³ Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, on H. Res. 14560, To Reorganize and Increase the Efficiency of the Regular Army, 65th Cong., 3d sess., January 16, 1919.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

question of universal military training for the national defense of the Nation, but that he knew the "military" was already pressing the issue again.²⁵

The Secretary of War insisted that the new order of military policy be preserved by legislation in the near future, and that the Nation must not revert to the inadequate 1916 act. He maintained:

As the result of the war we think we have discovered a better relationship of the staff to the Army and of the staff to the bureaus, a better organization of the War Department. It has been worked out in Europe by General Pershing and his staff [which meant, principally, Palmer] and in this country by the War Department and its staff.²⁶

Baker's other recommendations of importance were that the National Guard should now begin to build up their organizations again, according to the plans of federalization laid down by the Hay-Chamberlain bill, and that the War Department should help in the work. He stated also that the Air Service should remain simply a separate corps of the Army, in the same sense as was the Coast Artillery.²⁷

General March's testimony had the characteristic ring of the "military." He wished to permanently maintain much of the war-time structure which the 1916 legislation had not provided for. He wished changes in the General Staff Corps and the Adjutant General's Department; and new departments for finance, transportation, air service, and tanks. This was a fitting prelude to his testimony before the Wadsworth and Kahn committees over the 1920 act.²⁸

Mr. Dent proved himself a very poor chairman, and his ineffectiveness may well have been a great milestone in America's history of national defense. With 5 possible weeks remaining of his chairmanship, an aggressive chairman might possibly have seized the bull by the horns and pushed through the 1920 act early in 1919. The time was ripe for a chairman of the "military" school to legislate universal military training and replace the National Guard with some sort of continental army. Only immediately after the war was such an opportunity possible, but the slothful Mr. Dent from Alabama neither wished to take advantage of this offer, nor would he have been capable of doing so had his policy been otherwise.²⁹

March 4, 1919, changed the chairmen of the congressional committees in harmony with the shift of political-party control in the two Houses of Congress. It was most significant in the history of our military policy that Dent was forced to hand over the chair to that very capable student of national defense from California, Julius Kahn.

The House Military Affairs Committee came together July 22 for an official hearing of the Secretary of War on several very technical matters.³⁰ Amendments to the Articles of War were discussed, as well as the education of the Army and the storing of extra war supplies. Baker advised that the existing standing Army of 700,000 onlisted men be whittled down to 225,000 by September, because of a lack of appropriations. He hoped that the new legislation would permit a peacetime force of 250,000, which would afford security until the

²⁵ Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, hearings, op. cit., January 10, 1919, pp. 19-21.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 27 and 32.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 42-49.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 30 and 61-64.

³⁰ Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, on general Army legislation, July 22, 24, and 29, 1919.

League of Nation's disarmament drive materialized. It was decided that the actual hearings for the 1920 act should be postponed another month, so that the return of Pershing, Dawes, and many others from France would permit their participation.³¹

This problem of the temporary standing Army was raised again early in 1920, when the length of the committee hearings had prevented any new settlement, and the Nation was about to be without any army at all. Accordingly, on January 10, 1920, Chairman Wadsworth reported out a bill for the "Maintenance of a Temporary Army of 275,000 men." The final act on June 4 raised this quota of enlisted men by 5,000, to permanently set the maximum strength for peacetime.³²

THE REPORT OF THE WAR INDUSTRIES BOARD

Before taking up the actual reports from committee to the Congress over the 1920 act, one last official document must be inserted, which was to have its share of influence on the drawing up of the bill. Accompanied by President Wilson's letter of transmittal, dated December 17, 1919, the official report of the War Industries Board was sent to Congress.³³

Chairman Bernard M. Baruch outlined therein the history and results of the Board and climaxed the report with three specific recommendations for national defense.³⁴ Firstly, there should be a peacetime skeleton of the war-making agencies, which board would be ready to function in any time of crisis. This action was postponed by the United States until the approach of the second world war.

Secondly, Baruch believed that tariffs, bonuses, and exemptions should be used to stimulate those essentials of national defense in which this Nation was wanting, with manganese, tungsten, dyestuff, and other raw materials and byproducts to be included. The 1920 act was to offer a proper foundation for such precautions to be taken in the future.

Thirdly, the Government should encourage the maintenance of skeleton organizations in the industries producing the Army's guns, munitions, airplanes, etc., and the style of production should be kept up to date. This third emergency suggestion was paid very little attention by the United States or any of the Allied Powers for some years after the first World War, to their great embarrassment at a later date.

This thesis should also record a statement by Baruch on the quality of cooperation he met with from the citizens throughout his wartime work:

In my associates, chosen from the whole Nation because of their ability, I found my support to come as quickly from the Republicans as from the Democrats; from the man of German extraction as from the one whose antecedents were English. In the spirit of the service because of the world crisis and the national emergency, there were fused all differences of politics, of ancestry, and of religion; all were Americans and as such soldiers of the common good. To these men on the board, and to the American employer and employee, goes such praise as the organization may have earned.³⁵

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 27-28.

³² S. Rept. No. 362, Maintenance of a Temporary Army of 275,000 Men, Senate reports, vol. I, miscellaneous, 66th Cong., 2d sess., January 20, 1920.

³³ H. Doc. No. 633, Report of Chairman of the United States War Industries Board, House Documents vol. 97, Documents of a Public Nature, 66th Cong., 2d sess., 1919-20.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

THE HISTORY OF THE REPORTS FOR THE 1920 ACT

By reference to four specific reports, the history of the reports from committee to Congress which led to the passage of the 1920 act can be made quite clear.

On January 28, 1920, Chairman Wadsworth, of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, rendered the first report of the majority opinion of his body, which was accompanied by a lengthy minority report of Senators Morris Sheppard, of Texas, and Kenneth McKellar of Tennessee.³⁶ These reports should be analyzed in the light of the minority being midwestern and Democratic, and in the light of the personal statements by Wadsworth and Sheppard in February 1940, previously included in this thesis.

The attitude of the majority was summarized in the following words:

The bill seeks to establish a sound and economical military policy based upon equal opportunity and equal obligation with an organizational machinery through which all or any necessary part of the manpower of the Nation may be deployed in time to meet any national emergency. In order to accomplish these fundamentals of military policy, it proposes universal military training, an organized citizen army, and the minimum number of professional soldiers required to perform certain continuous military duties which cannot be performed by citizen soldiers.³⁷

The report stated that there would definitely be no form of compulsory military service in America in time of peace. While it fixed the peacetime strength of 280,000 enlisted men, and 18,000 officers, it asked for a gradual reduction of 70,000 and 2,000, respectively, once a system of universal military training had begun to function.³⁸

Sheppard and McKellar, the two dissenters, claimed that the proposed bill bestowed unlimited control over the Army upon the chief of staff; that it virtually repealed the 1916 act which should be kept as a foundation; that "one-man militarism along German lines" was replacing the time-honored and salutary control by Congress; and that it destroyed the National Guard of the various States to replace it by an unconstitutional federalization of the same. They charged that the President would now be able to alter the service on his own, and thus the expense; that it was a substantial reenactment of the Overman Act; and that compulsory military training would incur an unnecessary and disastrous expense when there were at the time 4,000,000 men in the country trained in the art military.³⁹ The outlook of the Senator from Texas seems to have mellowed with age.

On February 26, Mr. Kahn presented the House with his committee's report, To Amend the National Defense Act, which followed the 1916 act in most respects.⁴⁰ It wished to grant the War Department added flexibility, stating:

Thus, the military system of the country and the size and the cost of our Military Establishment are effectively controlled by Congress, while no vexatious limitations are imposed upon its organization.⁴¹

Three new Departments of Finance, Chemical Warfare, and the Air were suggested, and the existing Regular Army Reserve would give

³⁶ S. Rept. No. 400, Reorganization of the Army (including Minority Report), pts. I and II, Senate Reports, vol. I, Miscellaneous, 66th Cong., 2d sess., Jan. 28 and 31, 1920.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 2 and 5.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 1 and 2, pt. II.

⁴⁰ H. Rept. No. 680, "To Amend the National Defense Act" (including Minority Opinions), House Reports, vol. II, miscellaneous II, 66th Cong., 2d sess., 1919-20.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

way to a broader Reserve Corps, so that trained men of all kinds might enlist in it. The National Guard system was left unchanged in its essentials.⁴²

It is politically significant that 6 of the Democratic members of the committee led by Mr. Dent dissented from the majority report, leaving only 2 supporting the 14 Republican members behind Mr. Kahn. These dissenters claimed:

We see no reason why the principle that Congress itself should fix the strength of the Army by units of organization should be departed from. * * * [The present] principle leads to lump-sum appropriations. * * * We have reached the conclusion that rather than adopt the proposed bill it would be better to allow the national-defense act to come back into being, as it will do on proclamation of peace, with certain slight modifications. * * * We congratulate the committee, however, upon the elimination from the bill of universal compulsory military training in any form.⁴³

Since the two Houses of Congress could reach no agreement, the divergent bills were placed in the hands of a joint committee. The Senators on this body were Wadsworth, Sutherland, New, Chamberlain, and Thomas, while the House was represented by Kahn, Anthony, McKenzie, Dent, and Fields.

On May 18, 1920, it was Mr. Kahn's reluctant duty to report to the House that the committee members, "after full and free conference have been unable to reach an agreement thereon."⁴⁴

At last, on May 27, 1920, Representative Kahn was able to report the completed constitution of national defense. The final draft represented a thorough revision of the 1916 Act, as Kahn had originally planned. It was a great day for this committee chairman, because, with the aid of General Palmer's reasoning, he had fashioned for the United States its first complete military policy.⁴⁵

THE MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMITTEES OF 1920

This chapter has treated the high lights of our national-defense policy during the war years; it has outlined the principal points contained in the Defense Act of 1920; it has discussed the hearings held previously to the final 6-month investigation; and it has included the history of certain reports and documents that influenced this bill as well as of the actual reports from the Kahn and Wadsworth Committees to Congress. The next five chapters will analyze the political forces that were discerned in the final months of investigation and voting. The only remaining task for this chapter to fulfill is to offer summaries of the two committees on Military Affairs, in order that the membership⁴⁶ will be in the mind of the reader as he progresses.

SENATE COMMITTEE

REPUBLICAN

James W. Wadsworth, Jr., New York.	Hiram W. Johnson, California.
Francis E. Warren, Wyoming.	Philander C. Knox, Pennsylvania.
Howard Sutherland, West Virginia.	Irvine S. Lenroot, Wisconsin.
Harry S. New, Indiana.	Selden P. Spencer, Missouri.
Joseph S. Frelinghuysen, New Jersey.	Arthur Capper, Kansas.

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 2 and 3.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 21 and 22.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.* P. I. and H. Rept. No. 1000, National Defense Act, House Reports, vol. III, Misc. III, 66th Cong. 2d sess.

⁴⁵ H. Rept. No. 1010, National Defense, House Reports, vol. III, Misc. III, 66th Cong., 2d sess.

⁴⁶ The above roster is taken from the Official Congressional Directory, 66th Cong., 2d sess., May 1920.

DEMOCRAT

George E. Chamberlain, Oregon.
 Gilbert M. Hitchcock, Nebraska.
 Duncan U. Fletcher, Florida.
 Henry L. Myers, Montana.
 Charles S. Thomas, Colorado.

Morris Sheppard, Texas.
 J. C. W. Beckham, Kentucky.
 William F. Kirby, Arkansas.
 Kenneth McKellar, Tennessee.

HOUSE COMMITTEE

REPUBLICAN

Julius Kahn, California.
 Daniel R. Anthony, Jr., Kansas.
 John C. McKenzie, Illinois.
 Frank L. Greene, Vermont.
 John M. Morin, Pennsylvania.
 Thomas S. Crago, Pennsylvania.
 Harry E. Hull, Iowa.

Rollin B. Sanford, New York.
 W. Frank James, Michigan.
 Charles C. Kearns, Ohio.
 Alvan T. Fuller, Massachusetts.
 John F. Miller, Washington.
 J. Kuhio Kalaniana'ole, Hawaii.

DEMOCRAT

S. Hubert Dent, Jr., Alabama.
 William J. Fields, Kentucky.
 Percy E. Quin, Mississippi.
 Charles Pope Caldwell, New York.

James W. Wise, Georgia.
 Richard Olney, Massachusetts.
 Thomas W. Harrison, Virginia.
 Hubert F. Fisher, Tennessee.

CHAPTER II

Baker, Crowell, and F. D. Roosevelt Speak for the Administration

I, too, saw God through mud,—
The mud that cracked on cheeks when wretches smiled.
War brought more glory to their eyes than blood,
And gave their laughs more glee than shakes a child.

You shall not hear their mirth:
You shall not come to think them well content
By any jest of mine. These men are worth
Your tears. You are not worth their merriment.¹

The first World War had a very sobering effect upon the people and the Government of the United States. As a result, it required from August 1919 to June 1920 for the Sixty-sixth Congress to arrive at the final draft of our great National Defense Act.

The divisions of opinion that existed between the Wadsworth and the Kahn committees of Congress were, in this writer's mind, only secondary. The great conflict was between two schools of military thought which appeared before these committees, and in the way in which political Washington took sides in the struggle.

In part II of this thesis, the conflicting extremes were explained by comparing the successive Secretaries of War, Garrison and Baker; but here the division arose within the "Military" itself. Chief of Staff March carried the torch for the Calhoun-Upton school; while Col. John McAuley Palmer, Pershing's Assistant Chief of Staff in France, was the spearhead of that group desiring a national-defense policy based upon a "well-regulated militia." Palmer's philosophy so impressed the Wadsworth committee that the chairman had him appointed its technical adviser, and it may be assumed that in the end he wrote most of the act. We therefore may justly term the encounter that took place in these months of investigation Marchism vs. Palmerism.

Later chapters will be devoted to this split within the "Military," to the effect of geographical and party politics on the legislation, and to the appearance of public lobbies before the committee hearings. This chapter must turn now to the administration and the stand it assumed in this contest of defense policies.

Statements made last February by Senators Wadsworth and Shepard, especially for this chapter of the thesis, will aid us considerably in our interpretation of the administration's point of view. Says Wadsworth:

President Wilson all the while was a very sick man. We heard nothing from him, and Secretary of War Baker acted as the administration's spokesman. Being a very open-minded person, Baker was one of the best War Secretaries we have ever had, and, in the end, he endorsed our bill [based on the Palmer policy]. Of course, he had to represent General March's proposed bill in the beginning, but he did so only in a purely ministerial fashion.

¹ Edmund Blunden (ed.), *Poems of Wilfred Owen*.

Senator Sheppard speaks of Baker's record in these years as follows:

Mr. Baker, as Secretary of War, met every contingency and every demand with marvelous ability, foresight, and precision.

BAKER'S FIRST TESTIMONY

The Secretary of War made three appearances before the congressional committees, with the first one on August 18, 1919, before the Senate body.² For some time it was his ministerial duty to speak in behalf of the General Staff's proposed bill, but he let it be known from the beginning that his final conclusions would be his own:

At the outset I want to say that I am studying this problem just as you are. I think we are at a stage of it where nobody can rightly claim thoroughly matured ideas about it, so that in giving any expressions now, I more than usually reserve the right to change them upon subsequent inquiry and fuller consideration.³

The first important problem treated by Baker was the question of "elasticity." The Secretary firmly believed that this bill should not fix any set arrangement of the divisions of the Army, "[since] the whole thing is in a state of flux," and, as an example, he pointed to the striking increase of military dependence upon artillery. In other words, Baker believed that Congress should set the general course for our military policy and fix the maximum and minimum strengths, but that the responsibility for administrative details should rest with the General Staff, where a slight transition need only to be sanctioned by the executive department.

When faced with the second fundamental problem of policy, the peacetime strength of the Army, the Secretary said: "I feel some hesitancy about discussing that." However, due to the amount of political, economic, and nationalistic disturbance there was then in the world, he felt that he would not be fulfilling his duty unless he recommended "an adequate force that could be expanded into a suitable representation of the strength of the United States," should an emergency arise. In short, Baker sanctioned the Uptonian expansible army system, which provided for a complete skeleton force, requiring only multiplication to meet a crisis.⁴

Whether or not the Secretary would endorse General March's five-hundred-thousand-odd troops as the necessary foundation for such a skeleton army is best explained by quoting two passages that appeared in the process of the committee's cross-examination following his uninterrupted testimony:

SENATOR FLETCHER. Do you see any way whereby we can reduce the number from the estimate of 500,000 and still preserve the same efficiency?

SECRETARY BAKER. I am not expert enough in military matters to answer that. My guess would be that a somewhat smaller number would be adequate, but I would not like to put myself against the guess of these military men.⁵

SENATOR FRELINGHUYSEN. While I agree with you there [that we must have adequate preparedness], the figure of \$900,000,000 estimated cost is rather startling.

SECRETARY BAKER. It is a staggering figure.

SENATOR FRELINGHUYSEN. And I doubt if we could justify it.

SECRETARY BAKER. I think we ought to get together and help—and I certainly will do so as far as I can—to diminish expenses and cut out every useless thing.⁶

² Subcommittee of the Committee on Military Affairs, Senate, on Bills for the Reorganization of the Army, Vols. I and II, 60th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 147-214.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 147.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 148-149.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 175.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 214.

Mr. Baker came out squarely for a policy of compulsory military training, feeling that it benefited both the individual and the Nation; but he made quite clear that if the country as a whole objected to it, we should then only offer young men the voluntary opportunity, which meant leaving such items as the R. O. T. C. in force just as they were.⁷ The Secretary reasoned the problem of compulsory training this way: "I believe that the measure of civilization of any people is its capacity to cooperate." He felt that it had been "an invaluable social asset" to have 5,000,000 men unified under the Regular Army at the close of the war.⁸ He was not willing to have this training thought of only in physical terms, but felt that the intellectual plane should be considered as well. He referred to the thousands of Army men at the close of the war who went to colleges in Europe, and for whom the A. E. F. University of Beaune was created. Because of their cooperation in the war, he said, "they had all had a most remarkable experience; they realized the incapacities in themselves."⁹

It was to be expected that the Wadsworth Committee would not fail to ask the Secretary to give his sentiments on the age-old National Guard-Regular Army conflict. Baker, being a man of moderate temperament, wished to find some happy middle ground. He cited the better ability of the National Guard officer to understand psychological leadership, while the professional officer from West Point certainly would know the art he was instructing far better.¹⁰ Said Baker:

West Point, gentlemen, is a problem. It is a problem that I have thought as much about, perhaps, as any problem that the War Department has had before.¹¹

This showed a very healthy atmosphere existent in 1919, and one that was finally to find a middle ground. The professional men were, in the end, not permitted their large standing Army, and the National Guard was more thoroughly federalized. And no longer need a soldier be a West Pointer to rise high in the Regular Army—or even to be appointed Chief of Staff.

One of the greatest reforms to be prompted by this investigation was in the field of military promotion. Baker's testimony stated:

I am entirely committed in my own mind to the principle of promotion by selection, as it is provided in this bill. As a matter of fact, the only difference I have with General March on this subject is that he thinks that promotion by selection ought not to begin at the lowest grade, and I think it should. I will go further than General March.¹²

During this discussion Senators Harry S. New, of Indiana, and Howard Sutherland, of West Virginia, showed themselves to be competent students of military policy and its political ramifications. They insisted—quite correctly—that promotion by selection in the lower ranks particularly would breed political graft, which even had to be guarded against in the upper brackets. Baker, in this field, had been too idealistic, and the final bill properly included promotion on a single list by seniority up to the rank of colonel, despite the Secretary's protest that "promotion by seniority is an entirely illogical and unjustifiable method."

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 166-166.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 166-167.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 160-162.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 169.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 162.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 169 and 162.

The Baker hearing also covered the problem of "staff despotism." The "Military" naturally desired to have all of the strings of control in the Army lead directly to the desk of the Chief of Staff, and with this in mind, the March bill proposed the abolishment of the Inspector Generalship. Baker revolted against such a bureaucratic tendency even in this early testimony of August 18. He pointed out:

I have found the Inspector General's office of the very greatest value as a free lance, uncontrolled, independent agency, which reported directly to the Secretary of War, and could be sent here and there without notice to anybody, and without anybody controlling its actions, to investigate, and report delinquencies of one kind and another.¹³

Two last points should be remembered from the Secretary's testimony before the Wadsworth Committee. Firstly, Baker stated that he, generally speaking, was opposed to the idea of a separate air service in the national defense system, which might point later on to Government production in that field. He wished very much to have the United States possess a large airplane industry, but he felt such an undertaking should be left up to free enterprise. Senator New predicted that, without Government assistance, this would not be possible, and in the light of the following decade, Senator New again was correct.¹⁴

Lastly, Secretary Baker made the farsighted argument that very soon after 1920 we should rid ourselves of the responsibility of the Philippine Islands. What with Japan having gained control of the Far Eastern Hemisphere during the World War, the Secretary spoke like a sage.¹⁵

THE KAHN COMMITTEE HEARS BAKER

On September 23, Secretary Baker, escorted by General March, made his first testimony before Mr. Kahn's Committee.¹⁶ At the very opening, he must have given March rather a jolt by testifying that he had sent the Chief of Staff's bill down to Mr. Kahn only to serve as a basis for discussion. He repeated that his goal was that of an efficient minimum, and "there is nothing magical about the figure 500,000."

Following Mr. Baker's outline of an expansible army system, similar to his presentation in the Senate hearing, Chairman Kahn pounced upon the great expense of the March bill, which would be \$900,000,000 a year for the support of 509,000 men. Mr. Kahn stated:

This is a staggering amount of money in peacetimes. * * * I am frank to say that even if this Congress should desire to vote upon it and should pass it, it would become an issue in the next campaign and probably all our efforts to organize the army would be lost because of the great amount of money involved. When you come before this Committee again to testify in regard to this bill I hope that you will have given the matter of cost considerable consideration.¹⁷

Most of the eight separate points which have been referred to above in the Senate hearing were restated by Baker, and repetition here is unnecessary since remarkably little new material was presented.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 166.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 181-183, 187-190.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 212.

¹⁶ Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, on "Army Efficiency, Universal Military Training, Establishment of a Department of Aeronautics, and to Amend Defense Act of 1916," vols. I and II, 66th Cong., 1st and 2d sess., Sept. 3, 1919-Feb. 5, 1920, pp. 1771-1789.

¹⁷ Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, Hearings, op. cit., Sept. 3, 1919-Feb. 5, 1920, p. 1779.

THE SECOND HOUSE TESTIMONY

The Secretary's third and last appearance was before the House committee again, on February 4, 1920, 6 months after his first testimony.¹⁸ The particular purpose of this hearing was for the Secretary to express his opinion upon the proposed change of the post of Assistant Secretary of War. The change was blocked, but the discussion upon the point is of some value.

Baker believed that the post should always be filled by a man whose talents complemented those of his chief, whether they be legal, financial, or what not. Baker did not deny that some politics would play a part in such a selection, but he emphasized that his present assistant, Benedict Crowell, was appointed in wartime in completely nonpartisan fashion.

Baker remarked that it was greatly to the advantage of any Secretary of War to have complete reports within the Department pass through the assistant. This enabled him to study the completed reports submitted by his assistant and by the Chief of Staff, and then to compare them objectively. Final judgments on policy, said Baker, must always emanate from the Secretary himself, and on this particular point he took violent exception to the pending Wadsworth bill.

BENEDICT CROWELL

The testimony of The Assistant Secretary of War, Benedict Crowell, to Mr. Kahn's committee treated much of the same material as did the Secretary's second discussion there.¹⁹ In his judgment, the chief of staff should advise the Secretary of War on all matters of a military nature, while the Assistant should furnish reports on all questions of munitions and supply, these latter duties not warranting replacement of the post of Assistant Secretary with an Under Secretaryship.

We have noticed already Mr. Baker's insistence that the new legislation institute an expansible or skeleton army. Mr. Crowell, in his turn, demanded that there be a skeleton War Department, basing his argument on much the same theory. If it was to function efficiently in wartime, then in time of peace the many departments must not be merged but cut down, if necessary, to just a handful of men. While Mr. Crowell's intentions were of the best, his tendency toward bureaucratic government is to be deplored.²⁰

ACTING SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

As Acting Secretary of the Navy, Franklin D. Roosevelt appeared before the Wadsworth committee to testify upon the proposed creation of a Department of the Air, which would separate that arm of national defense from the Army and the Navy.²¹

Roosevelt unhesitatingly attacked the proposed change, believing that the existing status bred unity, the proposed status disunity.

Aviation as a whole is to use the air as an element which is intimately connected with the Army on the one side and the Navy on the other in totally different ways.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 2105-2125.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 1801-1835.

²⁰ P. 1803.

²¹ Subcommittee of the Committee on Military Affairs, Senate, hearings, op. cit., pp. 727-747.

The Army Air Force was for scouting, attacking, defending, or bombing on land, stressed Roosevelt, while the function of the Naval Air Corps "is exactly the same as the function of the Navy itself."²²

The Secretary advised steady progress in the field of air defense, because "standardization is just another term for standing still." He was very much in favor of Government support of at least one production plant for this purpose, and postgraduate work for Army and Navy officers in flying seemed reasonable to him; but under no condition were these two reforms to be made the excuse for setting up a Department of the Air and accordingly to disrupt the existing "unity of command" within the Army and the Navy.²³

THUMB NAIL SKETCH

Newton D. Baker, spokesman for the administration, was an outstanding Secretary of War, during these months of investigation, in two respects, but he fell short of the mark in a third.

He was placed in the embarrassing position of having to support, ministerially, a militaristic bill which later on he helped privately to scuttle; and with the defeat of the March bill, Uptonism received a mortal wound. Baker was also to be congratulated for his appreciation of the sociological values of universal military training, without forgetting at the same time that the issue must properly rest in the hands of the majority of the people's representatives, however they might decide it.

Secretary Baker's adherence to the policy of an expansible standing Army was one of the political forces that caused the final draft of the National Defense Act to fall short of complete reform. His views on the place of the National Guard were democratic enough, but he should not have topped the system off with a Prussian-style, expansible Regular Army. Baker would have done far better, in this respect, had he adopted Colonel Palmer's policy of an army with the minimum of complete and effective units necessary to do those things which could not be expected of citizen soldiers, instead of adopting an expansible standing force—an army of peace, not an army for war.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 731.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 727-728, 731, and 746.

CHAPTER III

The "Military" Lobby Is Ruptured Marchism Versus Palmerism

"General March was a strong-willed driver," remarked Senator Wadsworth to this writer last February, which was a fitting personality for the West Point man who attempted to carry Calhoun's and Upton's professional army to its logical conclusion. "March's bill did not recognize the place of the citizen soldier in a democracy," said Wadsworth, "and only with the aid of Col. John McAuley Palmer were we able to check this tidal wave of militarism." Such was the story of the rupture in the "military" lobby.

The Chief of Staff's Prussian-minded proposal demanded 509,000 men for the standing Army, to be reenforced by the draft and a system of promotion by selection. We had to use the March bill as a basis for discussion, but after Palmer testified before us, we called him back as technical military adviser to assist us in writing a new bill—

points out Wadsworth—

His was the most valuable Regular Army testimony we heard, with those of Pershing and Wood ranking close after.

Senator Sheppard feels that in studying this investigation for the 1920 act, we must not lose sight of the great work which March had performed during the war years. Sheppard recalls that—

Chief of Staff March showed a remarkable comprehension of the vital duty assigned to him, that is, the supply of our troops abroad with everything needed for efficient operations. He carried out these duties with outstanding success.

A WARNING FROM VON CLAUSWITZ

This struggle between Marchism and Palmerism represented a policy of national defense founded upon military practicalities, attacked by one based upon the political theory of a republican state. In the light of the advice handed down by the great military philosopher Gen. Karl von Clausewitz, it would seem that the United States was very fortunate to have had Palmerism win the day:

The only question, therefore, is whether in framing plans for a war the political point of view should give way to the purely military * * * or whether the political is to remain the ruling point of view and the military to be considered subordinate to it. * * * The subordination of the political point of view to the military would be contrary to common sense, for policy has declared the war; it is the intelligent faculty, war only the instrument, and not the reverse. The subordination of the military point of view is, therefore, the only thing which is possible.²⁴

PEYTON C. MARCH

In the investigation leading up to the 1916 act, the bulk of the testimonies were submitted by the public lobbies, but this post-war investigation emphasized testimonies from the "military." On August 7, 1919, the first witness before the Wadsworth committee

²⁴ Von Clausewitz, *op. cit.*, vol. III, pp.124-125.

was the chief of staff, Peyton C. March.²⁵ Although Colonel Palmer testified on October 9, his appearance will be treated as the last in this chapter, so that in between may fall the other significant speeches which form a middle ground between the two extremes.

General March contended that the bill he was proposing was "self-made," since it "embodies what has been learned by this tremendous fighting we have gone through." March himself stated that the greatest departure requested by the bill was its new degree of "elasticity," under which the Congress would only fix the total number of the standing Army and the total of every grade of officer. It would then be left to the "military" to organize such units of the expansible Army as it desired, and under the new lump-sum appropriation system, it could economize in one branch and expand in another. The final act did grant added elasticity, but never allowed the "military" the free rein requested by March.²⁶

The March bill revealed its Prussianism when it came to the age-old problem of the National Guard's status. Under this new system, the guard would not be local troops led by local officers, but merely cannon fodder, fed in at the bottom of a highly professional machine. The psychological worth of the citizen soldier was not recognized.²⁷

The result of the committee's cross-examining General March upon the expense of his system, showed that his standing Army of 500,000 would cost the country \$798,660,000 per annum, in contrast to \$240,000,000 before the war. With March's additional recommendation for universal military training, the total would leap to approximately \$900,000,000 without including the Federal appropriations to the National Guard or the R. O. T. C. It is easy to see how members of Congress stated that the cost of Marchism made it prohibitive from the start.²⁸

One purpose for having such a large standing force in peacetime, March believed, was in order that it could fulfill the training of 650,000 American youths every year, permitting each candidate a 3-month period in camp, scheduled not to conflict with school work or seasonal labor. The Chief of Staff stressed the mental, moral, and physical uplift that universal training would give the youth of the Nation, but a closer scrutiny showed that his interest was that of a militarist and not a sociologist:

Now, that is a very important thing for the country to train these young men physically, and when it comes to the military question, they will be an asset to the Nation later on if we are attacked or if we should attack.²⁹

Senator Frelinghuysen, in this August 7 hearing, gave March what was to be Congress' final answer to universal military training. Although personally in favor of the measure, Frelinghuysen said he knew that the Nation could be compared to a man with a dreadful hang-over after an all-night debauch, and just as surely as such a man would swear off alcohol, the country was swearing off on anything that smacked of militarism. This same symptom held true in answer to March's desire to train Reserve officers "without practically any limit."³⁰

²⁵ Subcommittee of the Committee on Military Affairs, Senate, hearings, op. cit., pp. 27-110.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 27-29.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 45-46.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 46-49, and 54.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 56 and 50.

On the question of Organized Reserves, March testified like a man possessed of an obsession:

The R. O. T. C. system is a very necessary thing to give us officers in time of war. When war is actually on you, the problem of supplying officers is the hardest problem which confronts the War Department. * * * A war does not mean that you would have to provide officers for the first million or the first two million, but we would have to mobilize five million to win the war.³¹

While the A. E. F. had been in France, General Pershing was granted the privilege of promotion by selection, instead of by seniority in the separate branches. March now wished this reform to be adopted in the new defense legislation, saying that "the principle itself has had the support of everybody responsible for the Army in many years." While the final act did allow, quite correctly, for selection in the upper ranks, we should remember this request as merely being a characteristic one for a militaristic Chief of Staff to emphasize.³²

Two final points which March referred to in his proposed bill concerned the General Staff and the Air Force. The duties of the former were clarified and expanded to include all the functions that the Staff was actually carrying on at the time under makeshift legislation. Concerning the current pressure for a separate Department of the Air, he remarked:

We have appointed a joint committee on aeronautics, the Navy and the Army people, and to them are referred every question where apparently there is a duplication of effort * * *. From a military standpoint it is out of the question, it seems to me, to put the training of military aviators in the hands of anybody except the Army, or to have anybody in control of Army aviators except the general officer in command of that force.³³

While these conclusions of the Chief of Staff were again not outstanding, they are indicative of a well-rounded militaristic policy—a Calhoun-Upton national defense system, strong, professional, expandible, bureaucratic, and very expensive.

MAJOR GENERAL McANDREW

A week following the March testimony, the Wadsworth committee heard the opinions of Maj. Gen. James W. McAndrew, General Pershing's Chief of Staff throughout the years in France. With Pershing overseas until his late appearance on October 31, the McAndrew report formed a necessary substitute for the committee's benefit.³⁴

On the matter of elasticity, the major general believed:

It seems to me essential to give the commander and chief of the Army some latitude in arranging the details of the different units provided for our Military Establishment. I believe that to be a very good feature of the [March] bill.³⁵

McAndrew was in complete agreement with March on the inclusion of universal military training, which he would have made 6 instead of just 3 months in length. But it is important that McAndrew balked on the figure of 500,000 for the standing Army, and named his personal opinion as 300,000.³⁶

³¹ Ibid., p. 76.

³² Ibid., p. 33.

³³ Ibid., pp. 29, 105, and 106.

³⁴ Ibid., pp. 128-145.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 130.

³⁶ Ibid., pp. 130-134.

Pershing's Chief of Staff showed himself to be a very progressive thinker, and the final draft of the Defense Act concurred with most of his proposals. He wished the new General Staff arrangement to be based on the system devised by Pershing in France, and he encouraged the training of soldiers particularly for General Staff duty. He felt that promotion should be a combination of seniority, selection, and elimination, which it eventually was. He believed that the Air Force should remain as it was, and he wished to preserve the local identity of American troops whenever possible.³⁷ On this last score, Chairman Wadsworth took the opportunity to sum up his own very sound opinion:

I have had distinguished officers contend that the only proper way of organizing the American Army was to mix the men from Maine with the men from California. But I do not believe that. I think that it leads to discontent and thereby we lose a great military asset for the Nation. We are very glad to have your opinion on that, General McAndrew.³⁸

LEONARD WOOD CARRIES ON

Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood, testifying on September 10, followed McAndrew's example of seeking a middle ground between Marchism and Palmerism.³⁹ While Wood had seemed an extremist back in 1916, in the light of Marchism he became a moderate. He supported thorough universal training of both the mind and the body of America's youth for a 6-month period, but he would limit the standing Army to no more than 250,000.⁴⁰

While Wood understood the value of preserving local identity of troops and their officers, he nevertheless believed, and correctly, that the National Guard could not successfully "serve two masters," and therewith proposed more complete federalization. His process of federalization recognized the worth of the citizen soldier, which March's professional machine would not have.⁴¹

Wood's views on the Air Corps and the reform of the promotion system were identical to McAndrew's, both concurring with the final act of 1920.⁴² It would be wise to include herein his treatment of the General Staff, since it was such a concise presentation by a former Chief of Staff:

The duties of the General Staff were very well defined in the original bill introduced by Mr. Root when he was Secretary of War. Broadly speaking, the duty of the General Staff is to study and prepare war plans, to ascertain available resources, to submit recommendations relative to supplies and equipment, to recommend lines of procedure which will coordinate the various staff corps and harmonize their work; in a word, to investigate the conditions as to the material and all other resources of the country, and recommend certain degrees of organization and preparation of these resources for war * * *. It should not do the administrative work in an extensive or too detailed way. A good General Staff would not do so * * *. The Chief of Staff is the technical expert and military adviser of the Secretary of War and of the President. He and the General Staff are the instrumentalities which enable them to make the best use of a highly technical organization, the Army.⁴³

In short, Leonard Wood's desire for military preparedness remained within democratic bounds. He wisely preached evolution instead of

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 130, 136-137, 142, and 145.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 145.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 619-608.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 620-636.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 626-628, 663-608.

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 638-645.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 652.

revolution, and in accordance with his testimony, the final act was merely a complete amending of the 1916 legislation, not a complete revolution.⁴⁴

THE "MILITARY" AND BUREAUCRACY

The congressional committees had to contend with scores of "military" representatives whose chief purpose seemed a desire to perpetuate, increase, or solidify the position of their particular division of the Regular Army. This writer chooses the testimony of Maj. Gen. William L. Sibert, Director of the Chemical Warfare Service, as a test case.⁴⁵

Sibert explained that his bureau must remain a separate branch of the Army; that it required continuous research and experimentation; that before the war the Army's treatment of gas warfare had been spread inefficiently through three departments; and, lastly, that the Army would not be able to obtain the proper experts at a moment's notice in time of emergency.⁴⁶ Sibert argued:

All nations are studying gas warfare. It would be a serious mistake not to keep up in every phase of it * * * [both the offense and the defense].⁴⁷

General Sibert's plea for the permanency of his bureau met with approval by Congress, and the 1920 act allocated 125 officers and one regiment of troops to a permanent Chemical Warfare Service.

GENERAL JOHN J. PERSHING

Upon his return from France, Gen. John J. Pershing addressed the combined Military Affairs Committees of the Senate and the House on October 31, with Senator Wadsworth as chairman.⁴⁸

Pershing was a strong but democratic believer in military preparedness. At the very beginning, he stated:

Our success in the war was not due to our forethought in preparedness, but to exceptional circumstances which made it possible for us to prepare after we had declared war. It is my belief that if America had been adequately prepared, our rights would never have been violated; our institutions would never have been threatened.⁴⁹

This writer believes that General Pershing's testimony on the twin problems of peacetime strength and universal military training was, with Palmer's, the very best of the entire period of investigation.

Pershing was convinced that our traditions were opposed to the maintenance of a large standing army, but that at the same time we had an inherent weakness for neglecting to train our citizen soldiery until after the emergency had arrived. He would replace this evil by compulsory military training, "a debt that falls upon all alike."

The General believed that "such training would develop the physical vigor and manliness of our youth and sharpen their mentality." It would teach self-discipline and respect for constituted authority; it would encourage initiative and give young men confidence in themselves; "it increases their patriotism;" it "is thoroughly democratic." Pershing felt that if the alien groups, through this training, "were taught our language and were made familiar with the spirit of

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 663.

⁴⁵ Ibid., pp. 537-567.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 537.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 539.

⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 1571-1704.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 1572.

our institutions we should have less lawlessness, and fewer I. W. W.'s." He favored military training, but not military service, and therewith he recommended a standing army of only 275,000 to 300,000 men.⁵⁰

Pershing treated the National Guard problem very adequately. After 6 months of military service, the General wished the youth of the Nation to bolster the ranks of the local Guard units, and for the whole to be at the call of the Federal Government.⁵¹

They would be citizens, locally attached by name to a particular organization, which would be officered locally, but would be a part of some larger unit, which in turn would be a part of a division, or perhaps a corps.⁵²

The future Chief of Staff also covered the matter of "elasticity" in the light of a democratic preparedness. He believed that the first World War had demonstrated that the organization of the corps and department should rest with the executive branch of the Government, and not require continual endorsement by Congress. While this elasticity would not permit the creation of new bureaus or the elimination of the old, it should have jurisdiction to alter the lines of the organizations, and thus maintain our forces in complete preparedness for an emergency.⁵³

It need only be added that the final plans for the General Staff, the jurisdiction of the Air Force and of West Point, and the crusade for promotion reform, appeared in the National Defense Act of 1920 in very similar fashion to the recommendations of General Pershing on October 31.⁵⁴ His complete testimony showed that long years of leading the army of a republic against the forces of banditry and Prussianism had fixed in Pershing's mind the worth of the citizen soldier—of preparedness founded upon a "well-regulated militia."

CHARLES G. DAWES

The testimony of Charles G. Dawes, brigadier general of the engineers and Chairman of the A. E. F. Purchasing Board, reiterated much of the Pershing report.⁵⁵ One piece of this hearing, however, should be included, so that it may be compared to Wood's and Pershing's views on the place of the General Staff. There was remarkable similarity between the policies of these three men, but it was with the congressional assistance of Senator Chamberlain that this part of the final act was drawn up so well.

General DAWES. I do not think that the General Staff should have, generally speaking, administrative duties. I mean to say, you should not substitute the General Staff for the administrative-service departments. But that does not mean that you should not give the General Staff unlimited power in the matter of coordinating and controlling the independent service.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN. That is what I should have. But the General Staff—at least, that is the opinion of some of us—gradually assumed administrative function and did the duties, or attempted to do the duties, that the service bureaus were intended to do.

General DAWES. Yes, I agree with you, Senator.⁵⁶

The last five testimonies treated by this thesis have all stood approximately halfway between the philosophies of the militaristic General March and the democratic exposition of Colonel Palmer which is to

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 1572, 1596, and 1648.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 1590-1591, 1654-1655.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 1591.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp. 1574 and 1577-1578.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 1575-1576, 1618-1621, 1573, 1577-1578.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 1705-1762.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 1714.

follow. While many other testimonies were read by this writer in an attempt to weed out all original material, very little worth mentioning was found at this time in the reports of the seven following officers of the Regular Army in France: Maj. Gen. William B. Haan; Maj. Gen. William Murray Black, Chief of Engineers; and Brig. Gen. William Mitchell, United States Air Chief, who all appeared before the Wadsworth committee; or from Maj. Gen. Henry Jervev, Director of the Operations Division of the General Staff Corps; Brig. Gen. Marlborough Churchill, Director of Military Intelligence; Maj. Gen. George W. Burr, Director of Purchase, Storage and Traffic; and Maj. Gen. William J. Snow, Chief of the Field Artillery, who all testified before Mr. Kahn's committee.

A NEW DAVID FELS THE OLD GOLIATH

On October 9, a new David came forth to fell the old Goliath; Col. John McAuley Palmer, Chief of the War Plans Branch of the General Staff, delivered a testimony before the Wadsworth committee that mortally wounded General March's War Department bill, tearing the mask from Calhoun-Upton militarism and discrediting it forever in this republican country.⁵⁷

Palmer stated from the start that a national-defense policy "is very largely a political question and depends upon a consideration of the general system of national institutions." In his mind complete preparedness entailed a consideration of the Nation's entire manpower, to which there were two approaches:

One is the professional or standing army type. In this the manpower is drawn into the Army very largely in the lower grades. The function of the citizen is ordinarily to be a private in war. Reserve officers are to be used, but generally in the lower grades and subordinate capacities. Under this system leadership in war and conduct of preparation in peace are concentrated very largely and necessarily in a professional class.⁵⁸

Such a system was branded by Palmer as belonging to continental Europe and principally Germany. It produced great military efficiency, but he had many serious political objections. For instance, under such a scheme the intelligent opinion of the country on military policy would be concentrated into the hands of a few professionals; the general run of the people would exert very small influence; the military structure would be both large and expensive; and—

only the brawn of the people is prepared for war, there being no adequate provision for developing the latent military leadership and genius of the people as a whole. The evils of this system may be summarized under the term "militarism."⁵⁹

The second type of a military institution is a citizen army, formed and organized in peace, with full opportunity for competent citizen soldiers to rise by successive steps to any rank for which they can definitely qualify, and with specific facilities for such qualification and advancement as an essential and predominating characteristic of the peace establishment.⁶⁰

Under this system the military leadership was not exclusively concentrated; the peace establishment of professional personnel was logically reduced; intelligent and widespread public opinion was produced; and the entire citizenry was an organized army always at war strength and prepared to function under tested mobilization plans. As an

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 1173-1232.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 1175.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 1175-1176.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 1176-1777.

exact antithesis, the March bill relied essentially upon a large Regular Army, and provided universal military training only as a means to produce cannon fodder for the lower ranks, instead of local officers for local troops. Palmer upbraided the War Department bill as—

incomplete preparedness at excessive cost and under forms that are not in harmony with the genius of American institutions.⁶¹

The very essence of the Palmer attack against Marchism is found in these words:

Universal military training, an organized citizen army, and the minimum regular establishment necessary to carry that policy into effect. These recommendations, in my opinion, are diametrically opposed to the policy outlined in the War Department bill.⁶²

Under the Palmer system, the trained citizen army should be organized territorially into divisions, army corps, and field armies, so that immediate mobilization would be possible for an emergency. Each year the organization would be mustered for 2 weeks of inspection and team training.

During this mobilization period, maneuvers and terrain exercises should be provided on a sufficient scale to test the effectiveness of mobilization plans and the capacity of commanding officers and staff officers.⁶³

Naturally, a small standing force would have to carry on between these periods of mobilization. The coast artillery and overseas garrisons, for instance, would have to be manned by whatever number of professional soldiers they required. For the absolute minimum of professionals there should be a proper goal to strive for, which would be the General Staff; but the professionals would have to attend firstly a special General Staff school, which tutelage they would in turn redistribute among the citizen soldiery.⁶⁴

Colonel Palmer produced just the right answer to the National Guard problem:

Those gentlemen of the National Guard have done an immense public service in this country by keeping alive the tradition of the citizen army, but they have done it under an immense handicap—it is impossible to organize an efficient army for war purposes under the militia clauses of the Constitution. * * * I believe that the solution is to form a citizen army under the constitutional clause that authorizes Congress to create and support armies. The service in many respects would be like your National Guard Service. The present National Guard personnel should be received into the new force and should be an important element in starting it. They should have the fairest chance.⁶⁵

Three other items which appeared in the Palmer testimony must be cited very briefly here. The colonel was for moderate reform of the existing status of promotion, and he was also in favor of a moderate shift from inelasticity to elasticity, for the sake of continued military progress and efficiency. Thirdly, he made a very specific attack upon the expense of the proposed War Department bill and the relative inexpensive quality of a citizen army. He computed that his system would cost just one-half of March's, while the returns were to be measured in diametrically opposite terms. When his system functioned it increased the mental, moral, and physical capacity of the Nation's entire manpower. It was an investment. The support of

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp. —.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 1177.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 1181.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 1181, 1187, 1221.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 1184-1185.

Marchism was just dumping so much capital down the drain in the form of protection money.⁶⁶

Last February, Palmer, now a retired brigadier general, remarked to this writer that Senator Wadsworth was "tremendously disappointed in 1920 when his committee was unable to convince Congress to adopt the universal military training clause of its bill." It must have been small in comparison to Palmer's own disappointment; but both men believe that they provided for the next best system, which has functioned very well ever since; and, most important, the new David had slain the old Goliath.

In closing this chapter, this writer imagines that throughout the period of investigation a poem hung framed over the desk of Peyton C. March in the offices of the Chief of Staff, and it must have read thus:

ARMS AND THE BOY

Let the boy try along this bayonet-blade
How cold steel is, and keen with hunger of blood;
Blue with all malice, like a madman's flash;
And thinly drawn with famishing for flesh.

Lend him to stroke these blind, blunt bullet-heads
Which long to nuzzle in the hearts of lads,
Or give him cartridges of fine zinc teeth,
Sharp with the sharpness of grief and death.

For his teeth seem for laughing round an apple.
There lurk no claws behind his fingers supple;
And God will grow no talons at his heels,
Nor antlers through the thickness of his curls.⁶⁷

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 1186, 1189, 1232.

⁶⁷ *Poems of Wilfred Owen*, op. cit., p. 58.

CHAPTER IV

Geographical Influence

SECTION I. THE NATIONAL GUARD, LED BY O'RYAN

In 1916 we saw the National Guard lobby fighting for its life against the adoption of Lindley M. Garrison's Continental Army. In the investigations for the 1920 act, there appeared to be no question about the life or death of the Guard system, but there had arisen a quarrel over whether the Guard should be mere cannon fodder to feed the March military machine, or whether it was to form the backbone of a citizen army of local troops, officered by local men.

The representatives of the National Guard to appear before the Wadsworth and Kahn committees agreed on three major points. They all wished to see a further federalization of the Guard; they wanted universal military training written into the 1920 act; and they believed that the Nation should have a strong and efficient national-defense policy. Beyond this, I repeat, they hoped that after its training period the youth of the Nation would join the Federalized Guard and make it the basis for a citizen army in the new military policy.

THE TESTIMONY OF JOHN F. O'RYAN

Senator Wadsworth states today that the testimony of Maj. Gen. John F. O'Ryan before his committee on September 2, 1919, was far and away the most constructive of all the National Guard hearings.⁶⁸ O'Ryan should already be well known to us as Foster's coworker on the Guard lobby in 1916, and as major general of the 27th Division in France.

O'Ryan reported that his 1916 views on the importance of local units and local officers were all the more strengthened by his World War experiences:

I have had men with my division who had not been wounded, sent as replacements to other divisions, and who deserted and left those divisions and worked their way successfully over the South of France without detection up to the British area, where they rejoined their old unit.⁶⁹

Since this matter of local spirit is the very lifeblood of the National Guard theory of national defense, it would be wise to include two more of O'Ryan's war experiences in this field.

We knew that in a company of men largely or wholly from a particular section of a State, that in battle when there came the temptation for some of those men to quit and lie in shell holes—and that temptation comes to everybody at some time or other—and not go on, the great deterrent in relation to that kind of action was the fear, not of being shot by somebody, but of being missed on the check roll after the show was over, and having comrades write home to their families that he was missing during the scrap * * *. I recall that some of them [the

⁶⁸ Subcommittee of the Committee on Military Affairs, Senate hearings, op. cit., pp. 511-541.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p 513.

replacements] were from New York, but not very many of them, and they all came to us like lost sheep. I did not see a single man, as the British would say, with his tail up.⁷⁰

General O'Ryan said he was against the theory of a large standing army because it immediately meant abandonment of true preparedness by means of a well-regulated citizen army, nor did such large professional armies have any true peacetime function and it was "essentially and unavoidably wasteful of funds." The existence, however, of a large number of Army officers in time of peace was completely justifiable, believed O'Ryan, since one of their major duties would be the training of the citizen Army. He was convinced that the logical end of training a professional army was for self-interest and war, while "the primary interests of the citizen soldier are vested in the institutions of peace."⁷¹

The National Guard's proposed system was precisely this: 500,000 young men should receive military training each year at the hands of capable officers drawn from the Regular Army, the Reserve Corps, or the Guard ranks. After 3 months of intensive training, these lads would be enrolled in the National Guard, which by then would have been completely Federalized under the constitutional right of Congress to raise and support armies. As guardsmen, they would get an additional 2 weeks drill each summer and 80 hours of rifle practice, instruction and drill in weekly installments throughout the year. After 6 years, such a system would offer the Nation "an organized army of 1,500,000 men ready to drop their work and mobilize in a few hours, and 1,500,000 in reserve, all of whom would be products of the same training camps and the 3-year period of drill, instruction and maneuvers."⁷²

No matter what else the 1920 legislation might accomplish, General O'Ryan said that the one thing which it must transform was the exaggerated State control that then existed:

At the present time the National Guard is fundamentally and primarily a State force with a secondary and subordinate Federal role in time of peace. I would like to see that changed, so that its Federal role would be the dominant role, and its State role the servient role, but not under Regular Army auspices.⁷³

A NATION-WIDE REPRESENTATION

It cannot be repeated too often that the National Guard wished principally to be Federalized, with the exception of a handful of representatives who placed universal military training as the first reform they sought from Congress. Whichever of the two they ranked primus, they were to be one and the same under what the guardsmen hoped would be the new order. The National Guard of the United States would become the citizen army, fed by the products of the training-camp courses. At the same time, they asked for the redoubled efficiency and meticulous preparedness of a small Regular Army as a bulwark against the most sudden sort of crisis.

This general philosophy was not only endorsed by the New York National Guard, but by all parts of the country as well. The testimonies included those of Maj. Gen. Francis A. Macon, from North

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 524 and 525.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 514-516.

⁷² *Ibid.*, pp. 516 and 517.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 523.

Carolina; Col. Henry J. Reilly, representing Illinois; Brig. Gen. Charles I. Martin, of Kansas; and Col. Milton A. Reckord, of Maryland. Maj. Gen. Jesse McI. Carter, Chief of the Militia Bureau, was one of many to speak before the Kahn committee with almost the identical convictions which General O'Ryan had addressed to the Senate committee.

The case of the National Guard at these investigations was an example of democracy functioning as it should. It came out in the testimonies that immediately after the armistice the veteran guardsmen did not care if they never saw a rifle or a drill again. But after a few months of reflection on their war experiences, they rallied from all parts of the land, demanding for America a strong policy of national defense—and one builded upon a citizen army.

SECTION 2. ANALYZING THE VOTE SECTIONALLY

We recall that in 1916, the test votes in the Senate upon the first National Defense Act⁷⁴ indicated that the northeastern section of the Nation desired a strong military policy founded upon the Garrison Continental Army. The Southeast and Mid-West combined to successfully defeat the Garrison theory in favor of combining a moderate standing army with the National Guard system, while the West Coast was very little concerned one way or the other. More important still, we discovered in 1916 that the sectional differences were not pronounced; there always existed a healthy minority no matter what the geographical location.

This 1920 sectional analysis will employ the same nine divisions of the Nation and the same Sprout system of polling. Only this time, because of the greater significance of the bill, we will survey the results of three, instead of just two, "yea-and-nay" votes of the United States Senate.

MCKELLAR'S ATTEMPT AT SABOTAGE

On April 12, 1920, in the opinion of this writer, Senator McKellar did his best, on the floor of the Senate, to sabotage the Wadsworth bill.⁷⁵ We have previously noted that the Senator from Tennessee was a minority member of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs; now we see him harrying the middle-of-the-road Wadsworth bill from two flanks.

Firstly, McKellar demanded that each recruit undergoing universal military training be forced to take vocational training also, and secondly, he argued that this field be placed under the jurisdiction of the General Staff. Wadsworth was naturally in favor of voluntary academic or craft training, but he did not wish to press it upon everyone, knowing that, aside from other objections, the added expense would scuttle his bill. Secondly, to place this new field completely under the General Staff would be a case of excessive "elasticity," and here Mr. McKellar's action could be considered rank duplicity when we bear in mind his State and party.

Senator McKellar made this demand for "vocational education, either in agriculture or in the mechanic arts," believing that young

⁷⁴ Cf. supra, pt. II chs. IV and V.

⁷⁵ Official Congressional Record, April 12, 1920, 66th Cong., 2d sess.

men joined the Army generally to procure a temporary form of subsistence, and that therein they should be allowed to provide for the future by learning some sort of trade. He argued that such compulsory headwork would make them all the better soldiers and citizens. McKellar would grant each soldier the right to select his course of study, and would place the control of the entire system in the hands of the General Staff.

Senator Wadsworth was quick to defend his bill, stating that the proposed standard of vocational education at the soldier's own choice was far superior to a compulsory standard, and that on many fronts it would be impossible for practical and financial reasons to maintain McKellar's amendment. Without saying as much, he pointed to McKellar's duplicity on the other flank:

In spite of the avalanche of abuse in which the Senator from Tennessee has been inclined to indulge with reference to the General Staff of the Army, I notice that this amendment of his puts all of the educational work of the Army under the much hated General Staff.

The McKellar amendment was decisively defeated by a vote of 37 to 9, with only the South Atlantic States strongly supporting it, and the Gulf States and Kentucky and Tennessee splitting on the issue. Even at that, Senator Glass of Virginia did not follow the South Atlantic bloc, and 6 out of their 10 Senators declined to vote. Upper New England gave McKellar not one vote, and the Middle Atlantic States voted 7 to 0 in opposition.

The west coast evidently had received a considerable jolt from the World War and the new Japanese threat in the Pacific, because it was no longer noncommittal, voting 4 to 0 against the McKellar sabotage of adequate defense. The Rocky Mountain area and the Great Lakes group of States followed this same example, giving a total of 10 "nays" and only 1 "yea" for McKellar, the one rebel being none other than William E. Borah. The greatest change from the 1916 status came about in the Midwest, where adequate defense had been nearly undermined in 1916. Following the World War, this area voted 11 to 3 for the Wadsworth bill on this particular McKellar amendment.

Before passing on to the next yea-and-nay poll, the writer wishes to commend Senator Sheppard for his vote against the McKellar sabotage. Sheppard was the other minority member of the Wadsworth Committee, and, in the direct votes upon his committee's bill, he opposed it, but he did not sanction this questionable subterfuge.

WADSWORTH FIGHTS INELASTICITY

Four days later, the debate on the Senate floor was between Senator Dial of South Carolina and Wadsworth.⁷⁶ The latter was stressing the need of an amendment which would strike out of the existing bill a restriction that gradually would whittle down the Regular Army from 300,000 to a force of 210,000 inside of 5 years. Dial remarked that the peacetime total was far larger and more expensive than necessary, to which Wadsworth rejoined that in the existing, unstable state of international affairs, the Senate should not legislate concerning the strength of the Army 6 years hence, but let it be decided at that time.

The Wadsworth amendment won a thumping, 35-to-12 victory over the protests of the South Carolinian. Again, northern New England

⁷⁶ Official Congressional Record, April 16, 1920, 66th Cong., 2d sess.

voted a straight ticket for Wadsworth's middle-of-the-road preparedness, and the Middle Atlantic States gave him a 6-to-1 backing, with only Walsh of Massachusetts supporting Dial. The Great Lakes States also voted solidly for Wadsworth, while Charles L. McNary was the only dissenting vote on the west coast, Senator John F. Nugent of Idaho, the only Rocky Mountain protest, since Borah did not vote, and in the great Midwest Asle J. Gronna of North Dakota opposed 13 "yeas."

Again it was the southeastern section of the United States that resisted the Wadsworth amendment and bill as a whole. This area included the Atlantic States from Virginia to Florida, all of the Gulf States, and Kentucky and Tennessee.

THE REBELLIOUS JAMES A. REED OF MISSOURI

This third and last yea-and-nay vote on April 20 was by far the most consequential of the three, since it was upon Wadsworth's proposal to substitute his own committee's bill in place of Mr. Kahn's House Resolution 12775.⁷⁷ As we learned in chapter I, the eventual compromise finally took place in a long conference of a joint committee of the two houses.

The debate on the Senate floor which surrounded this particular vote was not upon the entire Wadsworth bill, but upon a most important provision of it—the total peacetime strength. Senator James A. Reed, of Missouri, made a violent attack upon the 300,000 total, saying it did not cut down March's original 576,000 to the proper mark of only 200,000. Reed took the opportunity to drag the chief of staff over the coals, calling him a professional soldier of the most extreme type, who desired a million men in his Regular Army if he could get them.

Reed called the standing Army named by Wadsworth a crime against the taxpayer, and promised that it would offer no solution to the prevalent epidemic of strikes and lockouts. Lastly, he called upon the Senate to spend the appropriation for these extra 100,000 soldiers "to feed starving women and children." In this writer's mind, James A. Reed's melodrama, at this stage, sank to the low level of ham acting.

It was not surprising that Reed yielded the floor to McKellar, who in his turn labeled the bill Prussianistic and not what our boys had gone to France to fight for. Had Reed and McKellar been referring to March's War Department bill in these terms, they would have been quite justified. But in this case they were opposing what was no more than an adequate national defense.

The Wadsworth bill replaced the Kahn version by a yea-and-nay vote of 45 to 10. Upper New England gave Wadsworth 5 votes and the Middle Atlantic States gave him 10; again, in both these divisions there was not 1 opposing vote. The west coast and the Rocky Mountain bloc voted the straight Wadsworth ticket, and, while only 4 out of the 10 Great Lakes Senators cast a ballot, they all favored Wadsworth. Throughout the entire Midwest only James A. Reed and Asle J. Gronna voted "nay."

Once more the support of the minority was to be found in the Southeast, where only Carter Glass of the Southern Atlantic Senators

⁷⁷ Official Congressional Record, April 20, 1920, 66th Cong., 2d sess.

voted for Wadsworth. While the minority carried Kentucky and Tennessee, they received something of a set-back when their other stronghold, the Gulf States, voted 3 to 2 for Wadsworth.

IT MUST BE CONCLUDED

To compare these test votes of the spring of 1916 and the spring of 1920 is to understand the extent to which sectional political forces influence the Nation's policy of national defense. Although the first World War was in full swing during this writer's polling of the Senate in 1916, nevertheless, those areas of the country which were not extremely vulnerable to that war were comparatively apathetic about the subject of military defense. The attitude of the segregated Midwest and agricultural Southeast verged upon antipreparedness, and the Far West remained squarely on the fence.

The fact that the United States had taken part in the first World War altered the entire picture. Apathy had disappeared and the Northeast of the Nation voted in one solid block for a strong defense policy—a tremendous sectional force. The west coast was roused from her daydreaming, and with the new threat of the Japanese Navy, she fell in with the North Atlantic States. Instead of anti-preparedness, in the spring of 1920 just a handful of noted rebels could be found throughout the great Midwest who did not adopt the strong defense standard.

Only the agricultural Southeast still dissented, and even here the Gulf State Senators sometimes bolted the sectional ranks.

The reader may justly ask if the 1920 preparedness backing can be thought of in terms of sectionalism, or whether it was just a Nation-wide sentiment for self-defense after the experiences of the first World War. The writer answers that the forces must be considered as sectional, because this was the first time that entire areas had cast one solid vote, pro or con.

The results of this 1916 and 1920 polling can be directly compared to the place of the United States in 1940. President Roosevelt is meeting with the same antipreparedness forces today that Garrison's Continental Army policy of strong national defense had to contend with in 1916. But if we once enter the second World War, then all sections but the Southeast can be counted on to vote for strong national defense, and the vote from Maine through Maryland and Washington through California will be cast in solid sectional blocks.

CHAPTER V

The Effect of the World War on Party Regularity

Our participation in the first World War caused American public opinion to take keen interest in the debate upon our new national-defense policy of 1920. In the last chapter it was seen that the interest of the home constituencies in what their representatives at Washington were deciding about the military system made sectionalism a more predominant political force in Congress. Now we see that, because of the war, aroused public opinion forced the party lines to be drawn tighter, so that in Congress the party element also became a controlling political force.

Although party politics grew more partisan and the extremists made even more extreme speeches, the nucleus of first-rate men in Washington worked more assiduously and more coolly than ever in their attempt to write the best possible defense act.

An example of the fine work being done by the clear-thinking men in Washington was the appearance of Henry L. Stimson before the Wadsworth Committee. He had been a Republican Secretary of War, a colonel of the Artillery in France, and for 9 years a National Guard man of New York State. Stimson's testimony before the Senate Military Affairs Committee on October 16 was devoid of party politics and set a standard equaled only by Palmer and Pershing.⁷⁸

Those of the former Secretary's convictions to be included in the final act were his opinions upon peacetime strength, the promotion reform, elasticity, and the status of the General Staff and of the Air Force. His desire for a citizen army based upon a system of universal military training was sound enough but was turned down by Congress, though not by the committee.

The party coordination within the Senate Military Affairs Committee itself was exemplary of the good work being done by the first-rate men. In the important test votes on the Senate floor, Senators Wadsworth and Chamberlain saw eye to eye all the way through. Wadsworth told this writer last February that when the election results of November 4, 1918, shifted the majority in the Senate from the 56 Democrats and 40 Republicans, as of June 1916, to 49 Republicans and 47 Democrats, as of June 1920, "George Chamberlain and I just changed seats and worked as closely as ever."

Probably, one force which drew together these first-rate men in the two parties was their common opposition to Marchism. Senator Chamberlain took upon himself the task of writing An Analytical and Explanatory Statement of the Army Reorganization Bill, which was, of course, the March proposal.⁷⁹ When he released this statement on September 5, he remarked that inasmuch as many of the same radical

⁷⁸ Subcommittee of the Committee on Military Affairs, Senate hearings, op. cit., pp. 1234-1235.

⁷⁹ Subcommittee of the Committee on Military Affairs, Senate, Hearings, op. cit., a supplement of 57 extra pages at the end of the 2 volumes of hearings.

and revolutionary proposals might again some day be pressed upon Congress by the "Military", his disclosure had been written for posterity as well as for the Sixth-sixth Congress. Several quotations at this point will indicate the common ground upon which Chamberlain, Wadsworth, and many others met to oppose this General Staff militarism:

The only recourse is to prepare an entirely new bill.⁸⁰

The enactment of this section would put an end to the long-established practice of Congress, undoubtedly annoying to the proponents of this measure, to specify the maximum amounts that may be expended for particular military purposes and to place other restrictions and safeguards upon and around such expenditures. It would be useless for appropriating committees to make their customary careful inquiries into these purposes, because the "total amount of money authorized" would have to be appropriated in "one item"—a lump sum.⁸¹

The opportunities afforded by such legislation for the exercise of political, military, social, and personal favoritism would be simply immense.⁸²

The Czar of all the Russias never had more despotic control over his armies in these respects than it is proposed by this bill to give the President nominally but really to the Chief of Staff.⁸³

Surely the most uncompromising militarist could not ask for more than this.⁸⁴

PARTY VOTING IN THE SENATE

Even though the nucleus of first-rate men did show splendid cooperation in drawing up the 1920 act, the important test votes in the Senate indicated that party politics was to play a principal role in the passage of the legislation. In 1916, we remember that never more than two-thirds of either party could be mustered behind any one proposition in the yea-and-nay voting. It was not so in 1920.

The McKellar amendment of April 12, described in detail in the previous chapter, was a good weathervane. Of the 49 Republicans, only 2 favored it, 25 voted "nay," and 22 cast no vote at all. The two rebels were Borah and Gronna, from Idaho and South Dakota, respectively, neither of whom could be termed characteristic of his party. In effect, the entire Republican Party voted "nay." Of the 47 Democrats, only 19 voted at all and 7 of those were in favor of the McKellar sabotage of the Wadsworth bill.

This first test vote told the observer that the Republicans gave complete endorsement to a policy of strong national defense, while only a handful of enlightened Democrats were willing to endorse it. The strictly agricultural Democrats were opposed to it or did not appear on the Senate floor.

Four days later, in a second test vote, the Republicans again voted 25 in favor of and 2 opposed to the Wadsworth-style defense system. Again Gronna could be discounted, and the objection on the part of Senator McNary of Oregon did not need to be considered as stepping over party traces since he swung back into line for the later voting. In this second vote, 3 more Democrats opposed the Wadsworth bill. Only 10 gave it their sanction, and the majority of 27 did not cast a ballot. This second poll suggested exactly the same political-party workings as did the first.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 27.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

The third yea-and-nay vote was the most important, since it proposed to replace the House defense bill with that one drawn up by the Senate. This was indeed what the British would call a "Government bill"; it determined the life or death of the Military Affairs Committee's work. For the third consecutive time, 25 Republicans voted for the Wadsworth bill, and only Asle J. Gronna voiced a "nay." While 9 Democrats still opposed the bill, the constituents of many of the nonvoting Democrats (to call it their consciences is to be naive) got after them, and they cast 20 votes in favor of the Wadsworth bill. For example, the Democrats from the Northeast had been avoiding the issue by not voting at all, but now they were forced into affirmation of this more significant proposal.

It may be concluded, without question, that in 1920, because of the recent participation in the war, party lines were drawn very tightly. In effect, the Republican Party voted solidly for a policy of strong national defense. Nine Democrats voted regularly against it, and only five enlightened Democrats voted for adequate national defense throughout the above three ballots. These men deserve to be congratulated, but it was no coincidence that they all hailed from the North and West sections of the country: Alter Pomerene of Ohio, John B. Kendrick of Wyoming, Charles S. Thomas of Colorado, Marcus A. Smith of Arizona, and George E. Chamberlain of Oregon. Of the 20 Democrats finally to vote for the Wadsworth bill, most of them had to be prodded out of the nonvoting column by their northern constituents. The Democratic Party, on its own accord, probably would have discarded the Wadsworth policy of national defense by a 3-to-1 majority.

In 1916 we saw that the Republican Party leaned toward strong preparedness, just as the Democrats leaned away. It can be concluded that our participation in the first World War tightened these party lines considerably, so that in 1920 both sectional and party forces in Congress could be considered as playing a major role in setting the new policy of national defense.

Again we may compare 1940 to 1916. Sectional and party forces in Congress today are no more predominant than they were in 1916 on the question of national defense. Were we to become entangled in the second World War, once more an awakened public opinion would draw the lines taut.

CHAPTER VI

The Public and the Hearings

Once more the Congressional Committees on Military Affairs spent long and patient days permitting the public lobbies to have their say. Again there appeared those who bore a constructive proposal about some particular section of the bill. Again there were those who would influence the entire breadth of the bill to their best interest. And again there were the "Jane Addamizers," with their great store of emotion and small store of reason.

LOBBYING FOR UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING

One of the many lobbyists to approach the Kahn committee with a plea that compulsory military training be included in the 1920 act was Howard H. Gross, president of the League for Universal Military Training.⁸⁵

Gross emphasized that the very best insurance a nation could have against war would be three or four million trained citizen soldiers. Also, military training would benefit national health, efficiency, and manhood, which physical development would increase our manpower and cause our economy to turn over faster, automatically defraying the expense of the undertaking. Such was the reasoning of the military training lobby, which felt it was only asking the country to help itself:

Self-preservation is the first law of nature, and the first duty of a government is to protect itself. The obligation of military service already exists upon every able-bodied man between given ages. Training does not add to this liability. If the Government needs him, it will take him, as we know, trained or untrained.⁸⁶

Other outstanding members of this large lobby to testify before the Kahn committee were Tompkins McIlvaine, chairman of the Executive Committee of Military Training Camps, and Dr. George L. Meylan, president of the American Physical Education Association. While these men made a deep impression upon the Wadsworth committee, they unfortunately did not convince the lower Chamber of the necessity or value of universal military training, because on the floor of the House it met its worst opposition. This writer believes that both in 1920 and today it would be to the benefit of both American youth and our national-defense policy if the Government were to pay the expenses of this military training. It would be democratic and a sound investment; but we must never permit compulsory military service in the United States in time of peace.

Another example of a legitimate lobby interested in a particular phase of the bill was the appearance of Clement M. Keys and Glenn L. Martin before the Wadsworth Committee.⁸⁷ These men were,

⁸⁵ Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, hearings, op. cit., September 3, 1919-February 5, 1920, pp. 608-703.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 699.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 477-495, 567-575.

respectively, vice president of the Curtiss Airplane Corporation and designer of the Martin bomber, their interest being to have Congress create a separate Department of the Air. They were in a business that would not only be benefited but possibly saved from ruin by such action, and although their efforts were of little avail, they are to be commended for lobbying in the approved manner, and not from behind the scenes.

Father Duffy, chaplain of New York's "Fighting Sixty-ninth," was the principal figure in a lobby that was eminently successful.⁸⁸ The veteran chaplain argued that their work in the Regular Army deserved more distinction and permanency than the rank of an "also ran in the Medical Corps." The final National Defense Act granted all of the requests justifiably registered by the chaplains.

LOBBYING WITH A BROAD INTENT

In 1916 the Chamberlain and Hay committees were stormed by the representatives of the laborer and the farmer. The absence of these broad national lobbies in 1920 can be explained only by the fact that these groups were still contented with their state of economic prosperity stimulated by the World War, which removed temporarily the conditions of distress they had depicted so vividly 4 years previously to the committee members. Secondly, they then had stood for anti-preparedness which was no longer an issue once we decided to enter the war in 1917. These farmers and laborers had either remained at home and prospered, or had gone abroad to be killed, or to return and join the American Legion.

The principal representative of the American Legion before the Hay committee was Thomas W. Miller, chairman of its National Legislative Committee.⁸⁹ Miller had complete authority to represent the Legion as a whole, then the Nation's most powerful lobby, because its platform had just been drawn up on November 10, at its annual convention.

Miller emphasized that a large standing army was uneconomic and un-American, a national citizen army being the proper solution with equality of both obligation and opportunity. The Legion was dead set against compulsory military service, but endorsed universal military training, with the provision that it not be dominated by the "Military." Miller was convinced also that the military policy must be based upon local troops led by local officers, and that the General Staff should have citizen soldiers as 50 percent of its membership.

The Legion agreed with Palmer's philosophy that the National Guard should be an integral part of the new citizen army, which would all be under Federal jurisdiction. Also, the legionnaires believed there should be a separate Department of the Air, and the overseas garrisons should be adequately fortified. Lastly, Miller suggested that vocational training accompany military training and that the original course be for 4 months after which time the recruit would be a prepared reserve for 5 years in the National Guard.

All in all, the Legionnaires commented on every phase of the proposed National Defense Act in the hearings, and they, as a lobby, were partially successful.

⁸⁸ Ibid., pp. 1906-1909.

⁸⁹ Ibid., pp. 1837-1866.

Another example of the lobbyist who would temper the entire legislation was the testimony of W. W. Atterbury, vice president of the Pennsylvania Railroad and director general of the A. E. F.'s Transportation Department.⁹⁰ He explained to the Wadsworth committee the entire range of his opinions from military training to promotion; most strenuously of all he demanded that there be more economy in the Army. Typical of this hearing was the following conversation:

Mr. ATTERBURY. This bill contemplates the expenditure of \$800,000,000 a year. In civil life a business of such magnitude would have the highest type of efficient organization. In my experience of two years I saw no evidence that the dollar had any value to the Army. It meant nothing. It was not a thing that in any way entered into their calculations of their everyday life.

Senator NEW. In other words, you do not think it would take the Army long to break the Pennsylvania Railroad?

Mr. ATTERBURY. I am sure, Senator, that the Pennsylvania Railroad or any other business organization would be broken unless the Army officers themselves and the Army itself is so organized as to take care of the dollar.⁹¹

There exists a cardinal weakness in the philosophy of that group of which Atterbury was, and still is, an example. Their class owns, or at least controls, much of the wealth of the Nation, and yet they are oftentimes among the most reluctant to support a policy of adequate national defense. The Senate voting analyzed in this thesis indicated that in 1916, and even more so in 1920, this group was eager to spend part of its wealth to secure the whole of it. It should always be so.

POST-WAR "JANE ADDAMIZERS"

In 1916 those lobbies in the country which preached unarmed righteousness as the surest way to preparedness were popularly termed "Jane Addamizers." When these groups realized that lobbying for pacifism was hopeless once we had entered the war, they took on the role of conscientious objectors.

On this score, Stanley R. Yarnell appeared before the Kahn committee as representative of the Society of Friends.⁹² His society appreciated its past exemption from the draft, but now wished to protest against the prospect of there being no such possible avoidance of the proposed universal military training. Yarnell argued that exemptions were of no worth unless they consistently covered all possibilities. He pleaded not only for his own society but in behalf of all conscientious objectors.

In this writer's opinion, it all goes to show that you could never make a "Jane Addamizer" completely content no matter how much you were willing to concede. Conscientious objectors are, unknowingly, hypocrites and should be treated accordingly. They are willing to live off a system which they are not willing to protect. Once the majority, or the representatives of the majority, have made the law, conscientious objectors should toe the mark unless they have constitutional exemption. There is no reason why they should not legitimately appear as an organized lobby before such hearings and seek the extension of their rights, but, on the other hand, Congress was not, nor is today, under any obligation to extend such exemptions.

⁹⁰ Subcommittee of the Committee on Military Affairs, Senate, hearings, op. cit., pp. 371-446.

⁹¹ Ibid., p. 435.

⁹² Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, hearings, op. cit., September 3, 1919-February 5, 1920, pp. 2132-2134.

STEEPED IN SELF-INTEREST

Some of the lobbyists approached Congress in 1919 and 1920 with a particular proposal or grievance, wishing the same to be included in or stricken from the bill. Some of the lobbyists attempted to influence the entire bill in behalf of personal policy or gain. And yet others cloaked the favors they sought in religious and idealistic language, but they were still favors. The lobbyists in 1920 were all horses of the one color, in that they were steeped in self-interest to the last man.

Too easily had they forgotten that their first duty was to those "doughboys" who had died in France, to assure that they had not died in vain.

What passing-bells for these who die as cattle?
 Only the monstrous anger of the guns.
 Only the stuttering rifles' rapid rattle
 Can patter out their hasty orisons.
 No mockeries for them from prayers or bells,
 Nor any voice of mourning save the choirs—
 The shrill, demented choirs of wailing shells;
 And bugles calling for them from said shires.
 What candles may be held to speed them all?
 Not in the hands of boys, but in their eyes
 Shall shine the holy glimmers of good-byes.
 The pallor of girls' brows shall be their pall;
 Their flowers the tenderness of silent minds,
 And each slow dusk a drawing-down of blinds.⁶³

⁶³ Poems of Wilfred Owen, op. cit., p. 80.

PART IV

The Last Twenty Years

CHAPTER I

Thus Far Have We Come

The National Defense Act of 1920 is the constitution of our military policy. Over a hundred years before it was passed Gen. George Washington, with the aid of Baron von Steuben and his other officers, had drawn up very nearly the identical bill in the former's Barrack Book, which never was discovered until well after 1920 by Brigadier General Palmer in the personal papers of the first President at the Library of Congress.

Washington's theory of a "well-regulated militia" was repeatedly sabotaged or misrepresented by Congress until the War of 1812. At this point a new Calhoun doctrine of a strong, expansible army was originated partly out of a desire for militarism and partly through misinterpretation of Washington's original plans. Whereas Secretary of War Calhoun was the founder of this school of military theory, Gen. Emory Upton became its patron saint.

Decade after decade the conflict of policy was supported by the Prussian-minded Regular Army nucleus on one hand and by the State militias on the other. Elihu Root's creation of the General Staff in 1903 only centralized the forces of the militarists. Not until 1916 did the first comprehensive National Defense Act serve as a reservoir for all former piecemeal legislation, while its months of congressional hearings acted as a forum in which the contesting forces might air their policies, to have them accepted, rejected, or compromised.

The 1916 act was in many ways inadequate. While it discarded the Garrison proposal for a Continental Army and thereby checked the advance of the Calhoun-Upton school, it did preserve the militaristic expansible or skeleton army, which it wedded to a National Guard system that owed its first allegiance to the several States instead of to the Federal Government. The Reserve Officers Corps also made its appearance, but too late to be of assistance for April 1917.

The Constitution of National Defense, passed June 4, 1920, completely federalized the National Guard and placed it in a position with the Organized Reserves so that some day it might be possible for the United States really to base its policy of defense upon a citizen army, and, for the time being, this arrangement was the nearest thing to a citizen army dependent upon universal military training that could be pushed through Congress. With the old State-rights militia now the National Guard of the United States, this 1920 act was truly the first official annunciation of an American military policy. It was the synchronization of many former elements, and in some cases the reform of the old elements. If future advances were required in increased mechanization, in use of the air, in quality instead of quantity of troops, or in a gradual industrial mobilization, they need only be builded upon this all-comprehensive foundation.

Only one serious weakness remained, and we have high hopes that this will remedy itself after the present term of world militarism has run its course. Soon after the 1920 act had authorized a Regular Army of 280,000 enlisted men, it was realized in 1921 and 1922 that this was slightly more than the country's military policy called for.

The reduction could very easily have been made by the President in a Washingtonian fashion, by merely reducing the nine corps areas to seven or six, but instead the President decided upon the Upton principle of maintaining the nine divisions by cutting them to skeleton organizations which could always be expanded in wartime.¹

General Palmer criticizes this Uptonian action as being contrary to the intentions of the congressional framers of the Defense Act, and bearing in mind that Palmer wrote much of the legislation, we should consider this complaint as valid. His objection was not registered only because of the extra expense of an expansible type of army or because it was designed for promoting war instead of peace; the objection struck at a far more vital question—it was the entire training system of a citizen army, the “well-regulated militia” of Washington, that was being placed in jeopardy.² Palmer imagines that Washington’s policy in 1922 and the years ensuing would have been something like this:

Washington would abolish the skeletonized organization entirely and would maintain complete and effective units only, enough of them to do those things that citizen soldiers cannot be expected to do in time of peace—so many and no more * * *. The officers and the non-commissioned officers of the Organized Reserves would be men who had had their training earlier in the National Guard. It would therefore be unnecessary to provide elaborate and expensive training facilities for them. Washington would make the National Guard an entirely sufficient training school for the whole citizen army * * *. Most of Washington’s military aviators would be citizen soldiers like Colonel Lindbergh. He would maintain no more professional air soldiers than would be absolutely necessary to accomplish the primary object.³

Palmer demands that a final choice be made, which, of course, he hopes would prevent Uptonism from ever creeping back into our national-defense policy by means of the skeleton army. He leaves the decision in the hands of Congress, knowing that this body is likely to follow Washington rather than Calhoun, Sherman, Upton, Garrison, March, or any other Prussian-minded thinker.

In the opinion of this writer, the evil emphasized by Palmer may be remedied at this very time under the executive leadership of Franklin D. Roosevelt. The authorized maximum Army is being filled up to its limit once more, and whether we enter the second World War or not, once it is over we may diminish our peacetime strength by reducing the nine corps areas to about six, and never again skeletonize the Regular Army in Upton style.

While we have the 1920 act and the second World War in this close relation, the writer would broach one last conclusion about the all-inclusive legislation of 20 years ago. If that Constitution of National Defense ever needs to be seriously altered, instead of amended, it will be because we will learn from our probable participation in the second World War that the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force require consolidation into one Department of National Defense. This still remains unnecessary, but the necessity might very likely be created by wartime emergency legislation. Just as General Pershing’s American Expeditionary Force General Staff was written into the 1920 act, so would the Department of National Defense be made permanent after the second World War. Its original creation in wartime would be to speed efficiency, to increase economy, and to prevent the further burdening of an already overworked President.

¹ Palmer, *op. cit.*, pp. 366-367.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 368-369.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 371.

CHAPTER II

Our Policy Branches Out

Thus far this thesis has offered a definition of national defense; it has traced the political history of America's military defense from 1783 up to 1914; it has analyzed the political forces which influenced the drafting of the National Defense Act of 1916; and it has drawn a similar political outline of the Constitution of National Defense of 1920. The gap remaining in its procedure is that period from 1920 up to where the original definition of national defense offers a sketch of the contemporary military scene. This span of 20 years must be studied diligently, since it is the proving ground for the 1920 act.

The most comprehensive treatment of these years of our national defense was written by David H. Popper for the May 1, 1939, issue of *Foreign Policy Reports*.⁴ This writer will use his article as a guide through this 20-year maze of military policy.

We recall that the 1920 act provided for 280,000 enlisted men, 18,000 officers, and 450,000 National Guardsmen. The last chapter suggested that by 1922 the Nation no longer required such peacetime strength, and the system was accordingly cut down to 118,750 enlisted soldiers, 12,000 commissioned men, and 190,000 in the National Guard. Only the R. O. T. C. was increasing its ranks, so that it soon boasted a commissioned strength of 100,000.

Finally, in 1935, Chief of Staff MacArthur capitalized upon the current state of international unrest, and his active "military" lobby convinced Congress that the Nation's existing unpreparedness offered grave potentialities for disaster. The net result of the campaign for preparedness was the hiking of the peacetime strength to 165,000 enlisted men, 14,000 officers, and 210,000 in the guard, with the R. O. T. C. and the Citizens' Military Training Camps equipped to train 20,000 more school and college men per year.

Since this reform had been spread over a period of 4 years by Congress, upon its expiration in 1939 President Roosevelt launched still another campaign which raised the enlisted figure to 202,500 and the commissions to 16,719. All the while the Nation was divided into 9 Corps Areas for War Department administration, and 4 Field Army districts for actual mobilization.

During the same period military tactics were gradually changing. Emphasis was being placed upon the training and equipment of small, highly mechanized and motorized forces with mobility and "fire-power" the primary objectives. The unwieldy 27,000-man division of the first World War had given way to the use of semiautonomous squads of only 12 men deployed in depth and equipped with the most rapid-firing weapons available, with antitank guns, and with the added support of antiaircraft batteries. The new Mechanized Cavalry either sent tanks to assist an Infantry concentration in

⁴ Popper, *op. cit.*, pp. 34-48.

assaulting defended lines, or it was employed in scouting and flanking movements.

The protective mobilization plan was another interesting peacetime preparation for emergency recruiting. This system would have the entire Regular Army, National Guard, and enlisted Reserve at full war footing of 379,000 men and 21,000 officers inside of 30 days, while at the same time a secondary tier of 1,000,000 reserves would be coming up with 67,000 officers.

In more recent years the Procurement Division of the War Department has received increasingly more appropriations from Congress to set the stage in readiness for a recruitment of the above type in order that no time would be wasted in the crisis. The industrial mobilization plan has prepared the way, by means of "educational orders," for 248 separate industrial plants throughout the Nation to begin producing the 55 military essentials at a given signal from the War Department, all of which supplies are noncommercial in character. At the most, it would take 6 months for the new munitions to be flowing in to reenforce the depleted reserve stocks.

The growth of the Air Corps is a story in itself. After several years of apathy, in 1926 a 5-year program was adopted to increase the air strength to 1,800 planes, while 10 years later a further increase to 2,320 was passed by Congress. Many misfortunes beset the Air Force and by 1939 their total number of planes was barely 2,000. The difficulties encountered in this field were the lack of sufficient appropriations to attain the authorized maximum strength as well as the rapidity with which technological changes occurred in the industry.

On January 12, 1939, President Roosevelt directed Congress' attention particularly to the weak state of the Air Force; the ensuing appropriation should raise the number of our planes to 5,500 by 1941. If this figure is consistently adhered to in terms of modern fighting planes, the Nation will possess a far greater number of aircraft of varying degrees of efficiency than just the 5,500. It is believed by many that the United States' final adoption of this strong air policy was due to our witnessing the humbling of Great Britain and France at Munich before the air armada of Nazi Germany. If such hostile forces were on the warpath, we could not afford to have to equal their strength in a short time.

From a military point of view, the United States has never been in a more secure position, provided that it would be willing to draw a circle around the Western Hemisphere and let the other world democracies fend for themselves. Any great alteration in the present national defense policy will only be taken if and when America feels that her long-range strategy of national defense necessarily makes her a party to the second World War.

While the Nation's military might grows stronger every day, as the Roosevelt preparedness program runs its course, America's political democracy grows weaker by the day. In 1916 and 1920 we saw that competent students of national defense, such as Kahn, Wadsworth, Chamberlain, and New, were able to give the "military" lobbies a thorough questioning as to the details of peacetime strength and appropriation. The past 20 years have made the veil of secrecy ever more difficult to penetrate. The \$500,000,000 War Department appropriation bill of 1940 passed the House of Representatives with

very little inquiry and not one amendment. In the committee hearings, the "military" lobby furnished what was almost a united front, and the committee members seldom took upon themselves the opportunity to challenge the official reckonings.

This writer would be the last person to desire a return to the old pre-1916 days of complete inelasticity, where Congress determined all the administrative details of the defense policy; yet it will be a great falling off of our republican form of government if that day arrives when our legislative branch fails to check and balance the executive department. Possibly the writer is unduly alarmed; possibly the answer is to be found in the introduction to the Industrial Mobilization Plan, which reminds us that war is no longer simply a battle between armed forces in the field, but a struggle in which the opponents bring to bear the coordinated power of every individual and material resource at their disposal.

The Industrial Mobilization Plan is certainly the most progressive implement with which this democratic Nation ever has attempted to compete with autocratic powers abroad. This plan explains itself as follows:

The Industrial Mobilization Plan, as its name implies, is a study. It is a guide to be available in time of major war. It would apply only for the duration of such a war. It attempts to anticipate the difficulties experienced by the United States during the World War. It aims to overcome such difficulties promptly and effectively in any future war in which our country may unfortunately become engaged * * *. This plan does not propose the modification of any of our constitutional processes. Indeed, the prime purpose of the procurement planning and the Industrial Mobilization Plan is the preservation of these processes for the people of the United States.³

THE VIEWS OF CONTEMPORARY WRITERS

A survey of the current worth while writers who directly or indirectly treat our national defense policy offers significant conclusions. The entire gamut of military reasoning is included between the two poles of Oswald Garrison Villard and Lewis Mumford, but there are as yet among the writers very few such complete pacifists or out-and-out interventionists. It is interesting to discover that the majority of authorities who have worked in this field in the last year or two have favored a policy of remaining strictly within the Western Hemisphere. This writer suggests that the reason why the book stores and periodicals are not offering more works of the variety of Mumford's *Men Must Act* or Rauschnig's *Revolution of Nihilism* is because the Allies have not yet shown signs of losing, and, secondly, because the United States is in the midst of a very uncertain election year. The real proponents of intervention know that they would only injure their cause by sounding off before they have been able to establish a war-minded Chief Executive in the White House.

The works of Charles A. Beard, Stuart Chase, and many others tend more toward the problems of neutrality and international trade than military national defense. Nevertheless, they advise us to draw a circle around our hemisphere, and remain within it. Let us now turn to several writers who cover our field of national defense in particular.

³ Senator McCarran, Industrial Mobilization Plan revision of 1939, S. Doc. No. 134, 76th Cong., 2d sess., October 24, 1939, introduction and preface.

MAJ. GEORGE FIELDING ELIOT

Maj. George Fielding Eliot is today one of the most authoritative and prolific writers on the national-defense policy of the United States.⁶ In his opinion, we must take one of three alternatives.⁷ Firstly, we might defend just our continental possessions as far south as the Panama Canal. This policy would place us in the uncomfortable and uncalled-for position of the British Isles' proximity to her continental enemies, because we would be permitting the enemy to claim whatever bases it chose in this hemisphere. It would soon necessitate a gigantic air force and standing army to maintain our territorial integrity.

Secondly, the United States might join the European struggle. Eliot believes that we would undergo the same disillusioning experience we did in former days when we realized that to save the Allied cause at great personal sacrifice did not also mean we would have our rightful influence in the writing of a peace covenant openly arrived at. Eliot's third alternative is the one outlined in chapter I of this thesis; it is the doctrine of hemispherical defense from Canada as far south as Brazil and Bolivia, which alternative is endorsed by Eliot himself. Previously, he has demonstrated to us that our Navy is impregnable in our own waters; now he summarizes the threat by air:

It is not yet possible for airplanes carrying military loads to fly across the Atlantic Ocean, much less the Pacific. Even if advanced aeronautical science renders it possible within a few years to carry heavy bombloads in trans-Atlantic hops, it will still be beyond the realm of possibility to control and coordinate the operation of air forces flying great distances overseas in such a way as to produce that continuity of massed effort which is essential to any real success from distant bombing operations.⁸

OSWALD GARRISON VILLARD

In his current book on *Our Military Chaos*, Oswald Garrison Villard continues his many decades of pacifistic teaching.⁹

He condemns the administration's hour-to-hour policy and its failure to specify its strategy and implements of war as defensive or offensive. He harrangues Congress for being a rubber stamp to Roosevelt's preparedness, and he accuses Assistant Secretary of War Louis Johnson of being a political climber. While much of his abstract approach is unimpressive, Villard's clever use of facts and figures is more convincing. He emphasizes the jump in military appropriations in the last 6 years from \$540,356,000 to \$1,734,342,253, stating that this vested interest of the "military" is gradually "harnessing all industry to the Government military machine, and the wider open is the road to the totalitarian state."¹⁰

Villard favors a Department of National Defense in order that the military appropriations may be more closely checked; also he endorses a popular amendment for the declaration of war, as well as a national inquiry into the expenditure of the current defense appropriations. He charges that the United States Maritime Commission was not created by the administration to maintain fair competition for our trade, nor to insure commerce in wartime, nor to offer gainful occupa-

⁶ *Bombs Bursting in Air*, *The Ramparts We Watch*, *Defending America*, World Affairs Pamphlets No. 4, March 1939.

⁷ George Fielding Eliot, *Defending America*, loc. cit.

⁸ Eliot, *Defending America*, op. cit., pp. 14-15.

⁹ Published in 1939.

¹⁰ Villard, op. cit., p. 110.

tion, nor to secure national prestige, but to "maintain a great reserve merchant fleet for the uses of its Army and Navy if it becomes engaged in war and desires to fight overseas."¹¹

We must remember Mr. Villard as the "Jane Addamizer" of 1916 who proposed that unarmed righteousness was the greatest form of preparedness, and discount his teachings as such. Most remarkable of his 1939 writings is the reasoning:

The Army goes far beyond that and under its Protective Mobilization Plan it proposes to increase the 400,000 to 1,000,000 in short order. Obviously, there will be no abandonment of the plan to raise millions by immediate conscription until the National Defense Act, which controls the development of our land forces, is altered or repealed.¹²

HAROLD SPROUT

Prof. Harold Sprout, whose conclusions may be considered as somewhat similar to those of Eliot, does not deny that "the war in Europe is affecting the life in America" or that we have important economic and cultural ties with the Allied Powers.¹³ He goes on to picture the current interventionist pressures thus:

Men in high places are suggesting that we may become the Poland of the next war. Civic officials hint gravely at the need for air-raid shelters in our great metropolitan cities. And it is widely asserted that we must help stop the Nazi juggernaut on the Rhine, or else we will have later to stop it on our own shores or in the neighboring countries of this hemisphere.¹⁴

Sprout argues that we must pierce through this interventionist propaganda and understand that the United States remains the most secure country in the world, provided that we do not deplete our material and human resources in overseas wars. Having assured us of our naval supremacy in this hemisphere, he adds that, providing we prevent hostile powers from establishing trans-Atlantic bases, "even sporadic raids by the air or by the sea will remain negligible," at least until the naval and air radius of effective operations is considerably increased in the future.

HERBERT HOOVER

We have seen that a great majority of present-day writers on national defense find a common ground between pacifism and intervention, which was called by one of them the defense of the "new western front." It is a school which preaches hemispherical isolation, except for possible cash-and-carry trade, in order that we will not become embroiled in the Second World War.

Former President Herbert Hoover, although very sympathetic with the small European countries now being overrun by the great dictatorships, asks America to remember its last participation in European war, before it rushes in to help again.¹⁵ It is not a pleasant picture which Hoover recalls from 20 years past, but he does his people a service in reminding them now, before they make their final decision:

There was the ruthless killing of civilians, executed by firing squads who justified their acts, not by processes of justice, but by mere suspicion of transgression of

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 168-173.

¹² *Ibid.*, close of ch. V.

¹³ *Daily Princetonian*, October 19, 1939, special article.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, —.

¹⁵ *Shall We Send Our Youth to War?*

the laws of war. Still worse was the killing of men, women, and even children to project terror and cringing submission. To the winds went every sense of decency. To the winds went every sense of tolerance. To the winds went every sense of mercy. The purpose of every army is to win. They are not put together for afternoon teas. They are not made up to bring good cheer, or justice, or tolerance. They are made up of men who are sent out to kill or be killed. Whatever the theory, the act that wins is justified in war * * *. There were the terrors of the air—subjugation by starvation—food blockades versus ruthless submarine warfare * * *. After the armistice came famine and pestilence, in which millions perished and other millions grew up stunted in mind and body. That is war. Let us not forget it.¹⁶

¹⁶ Hoover, op. cit., pp. 11-15.

CHAPTER III

Hearing the Story First-Hand—From the Army, Navy, Senate, Press, and Writer

To dip into the political history of our national defense, is but to wish that one might become more closely acquainted with those characters who fashioned the first century and a half of the military policy of the United States. There is much one can read about Washington, Von Steuben, Calhoun, and Upton, or Wilson, Wood, Scott, Garrison, Baker, and March, and we are fortunate to have the opportunity to learn the story first-hand from some of the more outstanding figures in the last 20 years of our political national defense.

To hear the story first-hand was precisely why the writer spent many days in Washington, D. C., early this spring, interviewing all of the important men in this field who could be reached at their convenience. Their generous contribution to a humble undergraduate thesis is an indication in itself of the present functioning of the democratic spirit.

Gen. John McAuley Palmer lent personal assistance to very nearly every chapter of this work. Senator James W. Wadsworth, Jr., and Senator Morris Sheppard rendered invaluable aid in the above treatment of the Defense Act of 1920. It should be remembered that at that time these three men were, respectively, military adviser to, chairman, and leader of the dissenting minority of the United States Senate Committee on Military Affairs. Today, General Palmer is the retired officer acting as military adviser to the Library of Congress. Mr. Wadsworth still represents his State of New York in the lower chamber at Washington, while Mr. Sheppard has been elevated to the present chairmanship of the Senate Military Affairs Committee.

WADSWORTH AND SHEPPARD

Before taking leave of these men, one portion of the interviews with Wadsworth and Sheppard should be mentioned. This has been withheld by the writer until this time in order that it may be compared with the convictions expressed in the following interviews. It is the subject of geographical and party influence in Congress on military national-defense legislation.

This writer has attempted to show, by means of the Sprout System of Congressional polling employed in Chapters IV and V of parts II and III, that in normal years-sectional residence and political party lines have very little effect upon the drafting of our military national-defense legislation. It has also been shown, by the analysis of the Senate voting in the spring of 1916, that the existence of a great war in another hemisphere has little effect upon this rule of congressional behavior, provided that the United States is not directly a party to that war.

Once the United States becomes entangled in a grave military crisis like the first World War, the writer concludes that the political party

lines in Congress are markedly tightened; and in many cases the sectional voting is seriously influenced. This result is to be expected when the constituents of most of the Members of Congress become vitally interested, after many years of apathy, in the subject of the Nation's military national defense.

Senators Wadsworth and Sheppard believe that this rule for normal times is completely correct. Sheppard wishes to go on record as stating emphatically that "There are no divisions, geographical or political, in Congress on the subject of national defense." Wadsworth desires to qualify his convictions on this question:

I do not believe there exists the same geographical differences in Congress over the Army as there does concerning the Navy. The Midwest is very much aware of the Army's existence as a quantity in its life.

Wadsworth is not in agreement with the further conclusion of this thesis, that in times of military crisis an additional influence of these two political forces takes place. It should be remembered that he based this opinion upon the fact that Mr. Chamberlain and he had been congenial coworkers on the legislation, despite their leadership of the Democratic and Republican forces, respectively, in the Military Affairs Committee in 1920. This friendship has already been recognized above, but it does not cover the results of the Sprout polling which indicate that many second-rate Senators were pulled hither and yon by sectional and party political forces. Chamberlain and Wadsworth happened to be two first-rate Senators and profound students in their field.

Bearing in mind that Morris Sheppard is the present chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, this writer also requested him to go on record with a statement of what he believed the present sentiment of the American public might be regarding preparedness. He replied:

The attitude of the public is for an adequate national defense. By 1942 our existing plans will enable us to operate adequately in case of any emergency or attack.

GEORGE C. MARSHALL, CHIEF OF STAFF

Eleven months ago, President Roosevelt appointed Brig. Gen. George Catlett Marshall Chief of Staff of the United States Army to succeed Malin Craig, which meant that Marshall was now in full command of the Army and was answerable only to the Secretary of War and the President.

He received the responsibilities of this post in the most critical years since the first World War. Moreover, under his supervision the greatest rearmament program the Nation has ever known must move forward to completion. The modernization of the Army and the promotion of active service may mean the laying off of many of the older officers who are no longer fit for their posts. Our air force is being made the equal of any in the world; new air bases are being constructed in the Caribbean, on the continental coast lines, and in Alaska; the Panama Canal is being refortified insure passage of our fleet in wartime. Most of the other arms of the service are undergoing modernization. These are a few of the problems which President Roosevelt had to bear in mind when he selected his new Chief of Staff.

Concerning General Marshall's personal history, it should be remembered that he is the second non-West Pointer to hold the post of Chief of Staff, Leonard Wood being the first. Marshall was General Pershing's aide for 5 years and was complimented as being the best organizer Pershing ever had serve under him. In the World War he went to France with the First Division and was made Chief of Staff of Operations under Pershing's leadership. From 1924 through 1927, he served in China with the Fifteenth Infantry at Tientsin, and is known as one of the Army's most informed officers on Far-Eastern affairs. In 1936, he was elevated to the rank of brigadier general, and in 1939 he was appointed Chief of Staff. A most pleasant personality, Marshall is nevertheless a careful disciplinarian, but by no means a martinet.¹⁷

General Marshall began his interview for this thesis by expressing his sentiments upon the National Defense Act of 1920. Said he:

I believe that the 1920 National Defense Act was a great and sound piece of legislation. Once such an act has been drawn up by Congress it is a considerable risk to attempt to redraw it. I am for evolution instead of revolution.

This thesis has already disclosed that Senator Wadsworth, one of the foremost proponents of universal military training in 1920, now believes that such a measure was unnecessary to our national defense policy. Marshall also voices an opinion in retrospect upon this subject.

Firstly, we are limited by the location of the schools and colleges; secondly, the demands we can make upon the separate institutions are in direct relation to the importance our Federal appropriation makes to their finances. At Princeton, the Reserve Officers, Training Corps is only secondary in your life; at the University of Florida, for instance, it approaches the other extreme. All in all, the Reserve Officers' Training Corps is our most valuable personnel agency, and is still in the stage of evolution.

Of all the points discussed by Marshall, most emphasis in tone of voice was used when he spoke of the peacetime strength of our standing Army. Said he:

I want an Army! The 280,000 maximum enlisted men may seem too expensive to some people, but it was a terrible situation a while ago when the figure dropped to 115,000—with much of that garrisoned in Panama and Hawaii, or required for the increase in the Air Corps.

For one studying only the strategy of military warfare, the most pertinent statements in this interview were those made by Marshall regarding the place of the infantry soldier today.

In studying American military policy, remember this: War will start for Europe in the air—for us, on the sea. [Speaking this spring, he inferred that the real fighting of the second World War had not yet begun.] But, wherever it may start, always, anywhere, it ends on the ground with an Army corps. You will decide it on the ground and you will probably have to occupy that ground. Public enthusiasm runs away from this cardinal rule—runs away to new aeronautical, chemical, and submarine inventions. These latter are only the back-field men on your football team. To be victorious, your team must also have a strong line. And that is your ground army.

Broadly speaking, the Chief of Staff has only two major bodies with which to be concerned—the Regular Army and the Army Air Corps. In discussing the all-important subject of peacetime procurement, it is significant how his mind reasons in logical and systematic fashion:

We must first remember two axioms when studying military preparedness. On the ground it takes longer to acquire material than to train men. In the air

¹⁷ Speers, L. C., Our New Army Chief, New York Times, May 14, 1939, Magazine Section.

it takes longer to train your men. Likewise, on the ground your material will serve you a long time. In the air there is great obsolescence and as great upkeep. On the contrary, a skeleton organization on the ground, a mere nucleus, can absorb raw men at a great rate. The logical exception to these axioms is the mechanized divisions on the ground, where the men must be trained as if they were pilots.

As to the particular problem of procurement, you must have more material on hand than just your educational orders.

The Chief of Staff's epigrammatic pronouncement on the amount of politics in our national-defense system was a vital contribution to this thesis:

Every department of a democratic government has its share of politics. But I can say that our national-defense field is the most Simon-pure of them all.

Only because this work is written for university consumption, was General Marshall willing to go on record concerning the present state of international affairs, and our domestic military relation to this struggle.

What the Allies want from us is not men but material, planes, anti-aircraft guns, and, of course, flyers. These are just the things we cannot afford them yet. We must look out for our own people first. What is more, we must act as a stabilizing influence over the entire Western Hemisphere.

When the Chief of Staff turned to the all-important question of the United States' possible participation in the second World War, he particularly urged that his words remain off the record except for their appearance in this work, lest he be misquoted, by unthinking or unfriendly persons.

ADMIRAL WILLIAM V. PRATT

Retired Admiral William V. Pratt, former Chief of Naval Operations, will represent the United States Navy in this chapter of personal interviews.

In treating the problem of "elasticity" which runs all the way through this work, Admiral Pratt believes that, provided the Navy Department brings before the congressional committees completely fair and understandable demands for increase or maintenance, it always receives proper treatment at the hands of these groups.

Pratt stated that to his knowledge there existed no party lines in Congress over the national-defense policy; these are broken by the Congressmen expressing their personal opinions. Here again let us remember that the admiral was speaking of peacetime years in the Nation's life. He admitted that the sectional differences were more noticeable in Congress on Navy issues than on Army ones, since the latter has its vested interests in the form of garrisons throughout the country. He pointed to the Atlantic and Pacific coast States as the Navy's greatest source of support.

Speaking objectively on current naval policy, Admiral Pratt states that our first duty is to protect the Western Hemisphere with our continental defense, a smaller task within the larger one. In naval-treaty terms, the admiral remarked that if the Allies win the war we will need a 5-5-3 ratio for the navies of the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, if we decide to protect only North America. If we are to be responsible for the entire hemisphere, our force must be enlarged one-third above that ratio. And if the Allies lose this war,

the retired Chief of Naval Operations is convinced that we must have a two-ocean Navy, each department of which would be strong enough to oppose any hostile combination that could possibly be sent against it.

OSWALD GARRISON VILLARD

Oswald Garrison Villard has been discussed twice before in this thesis; as one of the oldest and most outspoken "Jane Addamizers" in the country, he deserves this attention as a test case. His opinions expressed to this writer a month ago differ very little from his book of last year, or even from his congressional testimony of 1916. He reminds one today of a phonograph needle stuck in the same groove of a record, pouring out a repetitious doctrine of antipreparedness, pacifism, and "unarmed righteousness."

He maintains that there is no need for preparedness, since the warring nations will exhaust themselves completely. We may arm, if need be, after the war with those instruments which have proven most effective. Exactly the same reasoning, or lack of reasoning, was used by Jane Addams herself in 1916.

Villard wishes to tie the hands of the War Department by returning us to a state of pre-1916 "inelasticity." He hopes also that the un-American and militaristic drive for universal military training will never be raised again. His present national defense policy would include only Hawaii, Panama, and our continental possessions as a theater of operation. Feeling that the American people are determined never to fight overseas again, he proposes that the Organized Reserve be abolished. In the meantime, he would also have a combined civilian and military investigation of defense appropriations, upon which he claims there exists no proper check. His opinion of the present preparedness drive is the following:

A murder caste is altogether dominating the civilian officials in their field. It is interested solely in maintaining and increasing its present standards. Great armaments produce a vested interest, and it will produce war scares to fatten itself. We will become a Nation in arms, and then we are headed straight for fascism.

THE UNITED STATES MARITIME COMMISSION

Antipreparedness advocates of the Villard type have accused the administration of organizing the United States Maritime Commission for the specific purpose of providing troop ships to aid in overseas aggression. Defense writers of the variety of David H. Popper even stop to comment on this as being the likely reason. Therefore, this writer has procured a special interview from the Commission's chairman, Admiral Emory S. Land, to investigate the validity of the charges against this Roosevelt policy.

Admiral Land points to the introduction of the act which created the Commission. Firstly, it is to stimulate and protect foreign trade. Land states that during the first World War the Nation lost two and a half billion dollars on excessive shipping rates. It lost another three and a half billion in the high prices of emergency building which tried to offset this primary evil. In 1946 the Commission will have completed the 500 merchantmen necessary, of which 150 are already riding the seas.

The Commission secondly is to provide for national defense. In answer to the above "troop ship" charges, Land replies:

The Merchant Marine is the life line of the Navy. It feeds it, fuels it, repairs it. In addition, it can afford transports for troops.

In short, Admiral Land proves that for the antipreparedness advocates to single out this secondary purpose and call it the Commission's only object would, in the end, cripple the entire Navy.

Even if we never set foot outside of the hemisphere, even if we defended only our continental coastline and forsook our territories and insular possessions, still the Navy must have auxiliaries which we must build. A dreadnought stands guard off the coastline in time of crisis; it cannot be always returning to special ports for those necessities an auxiliary should carry to it. We must build high-speed merchant vessels that can accompany the fleet, slower ones for the train, and large, fast passenger vessels capable of conversion into aircraft carriers—an extremely important auxiliary. Our program represents the minimum requirements only.

POLITICAL FORCES IN CONGRESS

Much of this thesis has been devoted to studying the sectional and party forces within Congress in their relation to America's national-defense policy. In order that the analysis be more than the inanimate polls, three current interviews are herewith offered as a more personal approach to this field. The following United States Senators are all members of the Military Affairs Committee today, and rank very high in committee seniority: Sherman Minton, of Indiana, represents an inland New Dealer who backs the Roosevelt national-defense policy. Warren R. Austin, of Vermont, belongs to that group of coastline Republicans who favor very little of the New Deal, except for its national-defense and foreign policies. Gerald P. Nye, of North Dakota, is an inland Republican, dead set against all New Deal national-defense and foreign policy. This trio should convince the reader that a good New Dealer will back Roosevelt's national-defense policy no matter what his sectional affiliations may be, while a Republican (or a conservative Democrat) will vary according to the geographical location of his constituency. This is very much the case in relation to naval national defense, and is a consistent though not deeply significant political force in military national defense.

SHERMAN MINTON OF INDIANA

Let us remember Senator Sherman Minton as a New Dealer from Indiana, in which case the sectional quality amounts to very little because of his strict party loyalty. He is, in fact, his party's whip in the Senate.

Minton backs the maximum standing army provided by the 1920 act, to be supplemented by a strong National Guard and organized Reserve. He believes the Government should procure large quantities of reserve materials; keep the industrial mobilization plan up to the minute; maintain a strong force at the Panama Canal; and organize our national-defense forces on a hemispherical basis. In brief, he desires that the Nation be able to expand rapidly in time of crisis.

The Army should be allowed to decide upon all matters of military tactics and administrative detail. Minton feels the trend of the 1920 act away from "inelasticity" was quite correct, and in no way fosters militarism.

According to Minton, the midwestern National Guard recruits a very sound type of man and in general is devoid of party politics.

The Senator admits that his stand does not represent his constituents in toto and that his endorsement of preparedness is due to party affiliations and not to the local sentiments in Indiana.

Minton believes that the public is today overwhelmingly in favor of adequate military national defense, and he proposes that we let the General Staff interpret the word "adequate." He feels it would be extremely difficult to arouse the American people into sending another expeditionary force to Europe, but that the circumstances of this war could conceivably develop so as to repeat our entrance into the first World War.

WARREN R. AUSTIN, OF VERMONT

Senator Austin, of Vermont, is a coastline Republican who favors the national-defense policies of the New Deal. He advocates a standing army of 300,000 which "must be a mobile one, flexible enough to move from coast to coast, if necessary." He would store up large stocks of strategic materials, but feels that "educational orders"—the capacity for immediate production—are a sounder policy than piling up stores of munitions and arms that soon become obsolete.

Austin wishes Congress to decide upon the "major and primary policies" of our national defense, leaving all the scientific details to the General Staff.

He is not aware of any politics now being played in the National Guard, which reaffirms the fact that the federalizing of that body removed all further need for its former role in the politics of military national defense.

Upon the problem of party and sectional forces, Austin believes:

There is no political party identified clearly with the division in Congress over national defense. Ever since I came here in 1931 there have been men on both sides of the aisle who sincerely believed in pacifism * * *. It is not a simple matter to throw contours of a geographical description around a sentiment which is variously described as pacifism, nationalism, and isolationism, etc. But as an observer, I have the impression that, generally, it is Mid-Western.

Senator Austin believes that "the American people today are by a large majority in favor of strong national defense." As for the second World War, he wishes to go on record as convinced that "we are not prepared to go to war again, either morally or materially." He is convinced that:

Right now, with the world full of selfishness and reckless disregard for the rights of others, we require more arms and men than at any other time in our history.

GERALD P. NYE, OF NORTH DAKOTA

Senator Nye, of North Dakota, is an inland Republican, making him sectionally and politically opposed to the Roosevelt program of national defense. An outstanding isolationist, Mr. Nye defines his congressional bloc as chiefly interested in international affairs and national defense.

The basis of our isolationist view is that we believe there is only a remote possibility of our ever having to call on our national precautions again, therefore we advocate the greatest conceivable economy in that field. We believe that our adherence to the Monroe Doctrine must be a two-way measure. Keep Europe out of America, and keep America out of Europe.

Nye proposes a highly motorized and very small Regular Army—nothing even approaching the 1920 act maximum of 300,000. Procurement should be followed only to the extent of “educational orders,” and a general policy of strict economy should be adhered to. He looks forward to our relinquishment of the Philippines in 1946, and goes further than most Congressmen by suggesting we also rid ourselves of Guam.

Senator Nye’s policy represents the very antithesis of “elasticity.” While he will endorse emergency measures in actual time of war, at all other times he would have Congress receive only “recommendations” from the General Staff, leaving it up to the congressional committees to decide both the policy of military national defense and the administrative details.

He feels that politics is forever out of the National Guard, and any which might exist unknown to him could not begin to approach the politics he knows is played in the higher defense circles in Washington. “Party lines always have and always will be cut by the issue of national defense. It is not a party matter.” Nye also contends that “the Army has a natural Nation-wide lobby because of its military establishments in almost every State.” He reprimanded the writer for oversimplifying the geographical issue. While its lobby was Nation-wide on account of the Army posts, it was keenest on the coastlines where “people are spurred on by economic considerations of foreign trade, feeling they must be equipped to play the game dangerously.” Nye, of course, would forsake foreign trade today, believing it not worth the bills we would incur were it to drag us into the second World War.

The Midwest, says Nye, is convinced that the Roosevelt program of preparedness has gone “insane over national defense, and that need has been lost sight of in a swell of devotion.” It also believes that the preparedness drive has jeopardized many domestic problems. The Senator’s closing comments were upon the war abroad:

I believe that the present European War offers us no challenge in any respect. If there is to be any democracy preserved, it must be right here. It will only be undermined by our involvement in that terrible waste over there. * * * But there is more to this question of the war. We should all be permitted to know what is going on behind the scenes. And I speak of our own administration’s closed doors. There are agreements going on which we know nothing about and should be informed of.

MILLARD E. TYDINGS, OF MARYLAND

An interview with Millard E. Tydings, of Maryland, chairman of the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Possessions, reminds us that a policy of military national defense must take into account a great deal more than the continental United States.

Tydings eagerly endorses our departure from the Philippines in 1946, but advises that we retain our other Pacific possessions for strategical reasons, particularly in the case of Guam. He stresses the great significance of our possession of the Panama Canal, our control in Caribbean waters, and our protection of Latin America from foreign invasion. Our hemispherical defense must extend into South America to a distance beyond the cruising radius of hostile navies or air forces.

Millard Tydings is convinced that the imperialistic days of the United States are concluded. As a "satiated" power, we possess no further acquisitive ambitions. During the present war in Europe we will not even further our economic imperialism into Latin or South America. What we will do is aid these nations in their self-defense, and thereby obey the Monroe Doctrine to the letter.

THE DISSEMINATION OF NATIONAL DEFENSE NEWS

The average American citizen receives much of his scant knowledge of national defense from what he sees on the motion picture screen. He is not interested in reading official military reports, but does enjoy a news reel on National Guard maneuvers, new bombers, or the fleet at its war games. It is obvious that the motion picture, because of its pictorial quality, impresses the average citizen far more than the medium of the radio or the press. Bearing this in mind, the writer interviewed Will H. Hays, for 18 years president of the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors, to discover just what forces encouraged the showing of battleships and tanks on the local cinema screens.

Mr. Hays' interview is very gratifying to a student of democratic national defense:

The motion picture industry has received as yet no pressure of any kind from the Government or its defense branches concerning our use, increase or cutting of national defense shots. This part of the industry acts precisely as the rest—for the entertainment of the public, and is guided by the box office returns.

Will Hays remarked that standard motion pictures of the type of *The Confessions of a Nazi Spy* had been filmed because of the timeliness of the subject. This particular one was so timely that the press and the public all over the Nation accused Hollywood of attempting to foment war, which Hays points out was farthest from the industry's intentions.

OPINIONS OF A POLITICAL COLUMNIST—FRANK KENT

Many of the first-rate columnists and correspondents at Washington for the metropolitan newspapers throughout the country, have spent years in the Senate gallery, cloakroom, and private offices, and are believed by many to be the best authorities available on the broad workings of democratic politics at the Capital. One thing is certain, those men continually have their fingers on the pulse of Congress when decisions are being made on such policies as military national defense, and they know a great deal more than they are permitted to tell us in their news stories and columns.

Frank Kent, of the *Baltimore Sun*, told the writer recently that he felt "the General Staff should, in all details, determine our military policy and that the power of Congress should be limited to appropriations. Congress is ignorant of details and incompetent to decide." A firm hold on the purse strings is all Congress needs to check a radical General Staff. As to the divisions in Congress, Kent states:

I do not believe that there is a party division in the matter of national defense. If there is a division, it is a geographical division, in that the people of the Atlantic Coast States are willing to spend more for national defense than those of the West and Middle West States. Pacifist sentiment is stronger in the interior than on the coast. It was the middle of the country in the last war which wanted least to go in. It always is.

Columnist Kent feels that there is "very little" politics left in the National Guard. This conclusion is generally agreed upon in this brace of personal interviews. It was essential that the writer settle the issue, since it was apparent that in 1916 Clifford Foster and John F. O'Ryan led one of the strongest lobbies to Washington that Congress had ever been confronted with on the question of military defense.

Frank Kent believes that the Nation is still "grossly unprepared—particularly in guns, ammunition, etc., for participation in the war." He feels we also have "far from a modern mechanized army." In reference to the relation of military national defense to the election year, he remarks:

I do not think the issue of national defense will be a major issue in the 1940 campaign. It probably will not be an issue at all.

OPINIONS OF A POLITICAL CORRESPONDENT—TURNER CATLEDGE

Turner Catledge, the New York Times political correspondent in the Senate press gallery, agrees with much of Frank Kent's analysis. Concerning "elasticity," Catledge believes:

The importance of most congressional committee work in the field of military national defense is gradually on the wane. In the end, the technicalities of national defense today must be left up to the General Staff. Such matters of broad policy as conscription or universal military training must and will always be determined by Congress.

In Mr. Catledge's opinion, the National Guard is at present a very small political factor in Washington.

He concurs with Kent upon the divisions of Congress, "they are far more determined by geography than by party lines." He uses as an example the large constituencies of second and third generation immigrants from Europe, who reside securely in our Mid-West, are ardent pacifists, and want no more of European militarism. He says the "coast and interior" distinction is defeated in the case of the Army by "its vested interests in terms of forts, air fields, ordinance depots, industries, and general pay rolls." Says Catledge: "You ought to see these Congressmen jump into action when their interests are threatened."

Mr. Catledge took time out to explain to the writer the presence of Morris Sheppard as chairman of the Military Affairs Committee. As dean of the entire Congress, the Senator from Texas could claim the chairmanship of almost any Senate committee. Why did he choose Military Affairs? Because there are over a dozen military camps in Texas and this connection serves the Senator as a very large and very direct asset.

Turner Catledge disagrees with Frank Kent's statement that national defense will not be an issue at all in the coming months of the election year. Says Catledge:

Throughout this election year, both major political parties will be expounding upon adequate national defense. The Congressmen will emphasize their stand according to the particular district they are addressing. The talking point will always be the President's figure. I would be greatly surprised to see Mr. Roosevelt's estimate go through as it now stands. It would call for one of two things—levying new taxes or raising the national debt—either of which in election year spells political suicide.

THE MASTER OF POLITICAL STRATEGY—JAMES A. FARLEY

If we concede that Frank Kent and Turner Catledge forever have their fingers on the pulse of Congress, then let us also admit that no man in the history of the United States has ever had more of an understanding of the political pulse of the Nation as a whole than James A. Farley. If the War Department has Nation-wide vested interests in its scattered air fields, ordnance posts, and R. O. T. C. units, Farley has a vested interest in every hamlet large enough to support a post-mistress or a "ward heeler." Even his personal correspondence reaches into every corner of the Nation and sounds out each changing political trend.

When this Postmaster General and national Democratic campaign manager also runs for President, his statements may be expected to tell "Mr. and Mrs. America" just what they most wish to hear. Let us turn to Mr. Farley's contribution to this thesis, in the light of such a campaign opinion on a subject of Nation-wide interest:

There is a sharp warning for the United States and other peaceful countries in the world-shattering events of the past few years. We must face the fact that good will and peaceful policies are not enough to protect a Nation against assault and invasion. China certainly did nothing to provoke the kind of attack which that unhappy country has suffered; neither has Finland. Moral force alone could not save them.

Therefore, it is imperative that the armed defenses of the United States should be maintained at a high level of efficiency. The Roosevelt administration has built up the fleet and helped along the mobilization of the Army. These are wise policies. Air power, so vital in its adaptability to national-defense needs, has been developed in a satisfactory manner.

I see no danger of the United States becoming militaristic in spirit because of this emphasis on defense. The wish for peace is deep in the conscience of the people. A sane policy of national security will not affect it in any way.

Conceding that Farley's view is meant to be, and thus is, no more than an election-year lullaby to please the majority of American voters, just what is it that the great political strategist has said? He has come out unreservedly for a strong policy of national defense, capitalizing upon human nature's desire for self-protection. He has tempered this treatment with a little palaver about a "wish for peace," and his two concrete examples adroitly brand Japan and Russia as the ruthless aggressors. In omitting any mention of Italy or Germany in terms of Ethiopia and Czechoslovakia, he avoids the war in continental Europe. It being election year, the master of all political strategy gingerly sidesteps the issue of the relation of the United States to the Second World War. This writer concludes that Farley understands a Presidential candidate in a satiated Nation cannot talk war without committing political suicide.

CHAPTER IV

Yes! History Will Repeat Itself

We have completed a long journey. Having first defined the entire field of national defense, we then restricted the subject to the politics of our military defense which we traced from 1783 down to the first World War. Next we analyzed the five principal political forces, which influenced, in varying degrees, the first important Defense Act, of 1916. These political forces were the Administration, the "Military," Sectionalism, Party Lines, and, lastly, Public Lobbies. Having then sketched our national-defense policy of the war years, we turned immediately to analyze, by these same five criteria, the Constitution of National Defense, of 1920. Following this, we covered the growth of military national defense in the last 20 years. Finally, with a brace of interviews, we fulfilled a long-standing ambition to "get the story first-hand."

What is there left to do? Firstly, the writer feels obliged to boil down into as few words as possible a set of rules he feels should make the best possible policy of military national defense. Then we must compress another set of rules about the politics of military national defense as this thesis has brought them forth. Lastly, confident that we have acquired in our journey an adequate knowledge of the politics of military defense, we will dare to gaze into the crystal ball—and speak of the future.

CERTAIN RULES OF MILITARY NATIONAL DEFENSE

The United States must firstly set its mind upon adopting a policy of strong military national defense. This would not automatically assure us of a state of eternal peace and concord, but it would measurably lessen the likelihood of foreign aggression against us. It checks such aggression by forcing it to be a very expensive proposition.

The United States should have a standing army of 300,000 officers and men, and each Regular Army regiment should be reenforced by two National Guard regiments. As a third tier of defense, the Organized Reserve Corps of trained officers would be prepared to muster out a still greater army, which should never be needed.

The problem of "elasticity" should remain as reformed by the spirit of the 1920 act. Congressional committees should set the board policies of military national defense; the General Staff should decide upon all administrative details.

The ultimate goal of our military national-defense policy should be that originally planned by George Washington and Baron von Steuben. We should no longer call it a "well-regulated militia," because it would be better christened the "Citizen Army of America." Thus would we make the final decision between the Washingtonian and the Uptonian way, and Prussianism would be therewith discredited and disbanded forever in America, which means that we

would abolish the last remnants of the expansible skeleton army of Emory Upton. Our new standing Army would be a Washingtonian Army of complete and effective units, and just enough units to do those things which the Citizen Army of America could not be expected to do, such as manning the coast defenses and garrisoning the outposts.

The Citizen Army of America should be trained by a system of universal military training, which would be expected to include approximately 500,000 young men each year. After 4 months of training and drill in the day, and vocational or academic work of the recruits' own choosing in the evenings, these young men would be offered voluntary posts in the federalized National Guard. Here they would receive 2 weeks of summer training or 80 hours annually of armory drill for a period of 5 years. During this period, by a system of selection, the best men would be picked and offered regular commissions in the Organized Reserve Corps, from which point they would either rest upon their past training until called out in time of emergency, or they could accept posts as instructors of the original flight of 500,000 raw recruits.

At any rate, in time of war the complete and effective units of the standing army of 300,000 would be on hand for the sudden shock of an "M Day." Inside of 1 week, the entire National Guard should be able to be mustered up in full strength. Inside of 1 month the Organized Reserve Officers would have reassembled the ranks of the general run of the Nation's manpower—and each sound man now would be an efficient citizen soldier. He would be a democrat by birth and learning, an effective soldier by his compulsory training, and a Galahad in his own right. He would be the cornerstone of the Citizen Army of America.

The Congress of the United States should appropriate such funds as are needed by the General Staff to purchase the vital strategical materials for wartime, and all appropriations would be later checked by a congressional committee. The industrial mobilization plan would be kept up to date, with the great industries prepared with their "educational orders" to turn out nothing but arms and munitions if so ordered by the War Department in an emergency. Enough reserve stores would be laid aside to provide for all possible operations between the beginning of the war and the arrival of fresh supplies.

The Air Force would remain as it stands today, divided between the Navy and the Army. The total number of fighting planes would never fall below 5,000, and when the young men are trained under the Civil Aeronautics Authority there should be none of the present camouflaging of true motives. They would be trained as peacetime commercial or private pilots, if they choose, but in wartime they would be drafted into the air force as quickly as needed, and should realize this from the beginning.

Promotion in the Regular Army would proceed by seniority, accompanied by elimination machinery, up to the grade of colonel, after which time the appointments would be made by selection.

West Point would be maintained as a training ground for future Regular Army men whose aspiration would be a position upon the General Staff. West Point would become a glorified General Staff school.

The theater of our naval and military national defense would be the Western Hemisphere; the principles those of the Monroe Doctrine.

While the Philippines would be released, the other Pacific possessions would be retained for purposes of strategy. Such would be our policy of national defense in a period when other hemispheres were aflame with war, permitting us a breathing period in which to decide upon our long-term program.

RULES OF THE POLITICS OF MILITARY NATIONAL DEFENSE

Five political forces will continue to operate upon our military national defense legislation and general policy. The first force, the administration, will vary according to the platform of the popularly elected Chief Executive. The second force will still be the "Military," which will continue to be personified by the General Staff Corps. It would be an excellent reform to have 50 percent of the voting strength of the "Military" rest in the hands of the Regular Army chiefs, with one quarter the decision of members of the National Guard, and the remaining one quarter that of the Organized Reserve Corps.

The third political influence, sectionalism, will remain a secondary force in the drawing up of our defense policy. In times of military crisis, it will become a more predominant force in framing the congressional bills.

Political party lines, the fourth force, is believed by many experienced observers in Washington to be nonexistent in Congress. The very carefully organized polls in this thesis indicate otherwise. True enough, in normal times the two parties lean only very gently in their traditional directions. But it has been noted that with the intensification of public interest in the military national-defense policy of the Nation, the party lines tend to be drawn more taut in direct proportion to the degree of that interest. This is explained by Turner Catledge, who writes:

The first law of officeholding is not far from the first law of nature. Self-preservation motivates all life. With a politician that means not only preserving his own office—that is of first importance, of course—but continuing his particular party in power so his own position may be augmented with an extra measure of prestige.¹⁸

The fifth and last political force upon our national-defense policy is the appearance of the public lobbies in the official hearings before the congressional committees writing the legislation. One group of lobbyist will come to influence a particular section of the bill, another group will hope to color the entire bill in its best interests. A third group will come, made up of the Nation's sentimental reformers who have never been able to set their own houses in order, but who do have a little advice to give just the same.

Such are the five political forces, and they are all lobbies of one sort or another. Moreover, they are all legitimate lobbies and are to be encouraged, since the final bill will very likely be, and should be, the compromise of their extremes.

WE DARE TO GAZE INTO THE CRYSTAL BALL

While we are taking this present opportunity to contemplate upon the future of our political national-defense policy, we should remain secure within the hemispherical system of defense sketched above by the Rules for Military National Defense.—Being a peace-loving

¹⁸ Turner Catledge, *Genus Politico: Temp. 101° (or Higher)*, New York Times, March 31, 1940, magazine section.

people, we do not like to deal in the implements of war, and being a businesslike people, we do not wish to spend our taxes on unproductive war machines. But, being a very rational people, we perceive that ours is the only industrial nation on the earth that can make herself next to impregnable without an excessive financial burden. So we adopt this strong national-defense policy knowing it to be the surest course to peace and, at the same time, a sound business deal.

While we progress through the months of this election year under the protective wing of the above-imagined perfect policy of hemispherical defense, some of us will be tremendously upset by the political speeches we shall hear. The candidates for the Presidential election of November 4 will realize the full significance of Stephen Raushenbush's statement:

It will probably never happen that the United States will elect to the Presidency a man who wants war.¹⁹

So each candidate will speak only of strong national defense, of peace, of security and of how "he kept us out of war." This time the Chief Executive will not ask us to be neutral in thought as well as in deed, but he will disclaim the war in very emphatic language:

The fact of the international situation—the simple fact, without any bogey on it, without any appeals to prejudice—is that the United States, as I have said before, is neutral and does not intend to get involved in war.²⁰

We will be upset because we will know that the candidate is saying one thing and thinking another. The candidate should probably not be blamed. He knows that his election depends in large part upon the marginal votes of the twenty-odd percent of the population comprised of a union of the pacifists, antipreparedness advocates, and "Jane Addamizers." It is believed by some of the Nation's most practical politicians whom the writer is not at liberty to name, that this 20 percent of the vote is enough to break or make the clever candidate. So, up to November 4, 1940, we shall hear much about "peace and security" over the radio; we will read it in the press; and see it on the screen.

Once the polls close on November 4, no matter who the next President may be, we will hear no more palaver about isolation; instead, we will be fed large doses of international cooperation, outlining our duty among a society of democratic nations.

To make a long story very short, our military history is all primed to repeat itself—to retrace the 2 years of 1916 and 1917. Quite naturally, there is one important reservation in such a diagnosis—we will be called on again to stand behind the Allies only if they themselves are unable to batter down the rampaging juggernaut of "Nihilism."

Once this second World War is over, whether the Allies' victory has kept us out or whether their demise has brought us to their side, once the war is over we would do well to store away our policy of hemispherical isolation for another rainy day, and chart our course according to the words of Newton D. Baker:

Complete economic isolation is impossible, and as the United States has now become one of the greater creditor nations of the world, the financial arrangements which will render the interchange of commodities between us and other people possible are a matter of primary and continuing concern to us. Such financial

¹⁹ Stephen and Joan Raushenbush, *The Final Choice—America Between Europe and Asia*, p. 110.

²⁰ Address of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, broadcast from the White House to the Herald Tribune Forum on October 28, 1939. Reprinted in the *New York Herald Tribune*, October 29, 1939, sec. XI, p. 1.

arrangements mean financial and economic stability in all parts of the world with which we must trade or where it is to our advantage to trade. From this it results that our own economic well-being urges us to an interest in everything which can foster the growth of international relations generally of a character to make peaceful and profitable commerce possible.

The constructive friends of peace seem to be those who attack the problem of war, not with negatives and denials, but with an energized good will that looks long in advance of the occasion of the conflict and so is prepared to relieve tensions before they accumulate strength enough to snap the strings which restrain them.

I am not unaware that this program looks long years ahead, that it can see only through a veil of trouble, and that there will be many stumblings, perhaps some disasters, before the world can be gotten to change the habit of its reliance on power to a reliance on the rational, but each crisis teaches its own lesson.²¹

E. BROOKE LEE, Jr.

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²¹ Newton D. Baker, *War in the Modern World*, pp. 55, 61, and 62.

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Palmer, John McAuley, retired brigadier general of the United States Army. Special technician to the Senate committee drawing up 1920 act. Currently military adviser to Library of Congress.

Page, Paul Jr., Chief Attorney to the United States Maritime Commission. Expert in diagnosing political significance of present and past legislation.

Pratt, William V., retired Chief of Naval Operations of the United States Navy.

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Tydings, Millard E., United States Senator from Maryland. Chairman of Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs.

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