A Fruitful Approach to a Prolonged Peace

National-Self-Interest Requirements

By Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., Senator from Massachusetts

Delivered in Senate of the United States, June 18, 1943

Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. IX, pp. 682-688.

MR. PRESIDENT, it has become plain as day and it is common sense to recognize that our British and Russian allies are not only dedicated to the broad purpose of crushing Naziism and Fascism, but that they have a number of very definite and very practical national aims which have been frankly revealed to the world. These great nations are not only committed to defeat of the common enemy and to cooperation for peace thereafter; one of them—Britain—frankly intends to maintain the Empire, and the other one—Russia—has clear intentions regarding eastern Europe.

We in the United States, on the other hand, are committed to speedy victory and to effective measures to preserve peace thereafter. But in the field of definite and practical aims there seems to be a vacuum. Why this vacuum exists, I cannot say; but I suggest that it is not because there is any lack of matters lying outside our borders in which we have a vital interest I further submit that the clear statement of these aims is not only in our own interest, but is also a frank act to which our Allies and our own people are entitled, and is an essential step—nay, the most fruitful approach—toward discharging the overshadowing obligation of effective post-war collaboration.

What are some of these matters outside our borders in which we must have a definite interest?

It will, for example, come as a surprise to many Americans to be told that we are actually facing the prospect of an America materially depleted of some of its magnificent natural resources. The great demands of our own fighting forces and those of our allies have cut deeply into our reserves of vital, basic materials. We are not in the habit of regarding the United States as a "have not" nation—and now is the time to think of steps to avert such a catastrophe. These thoughts are also expressed in an article appearing in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch for Sunday, January 10, 1943, and written by Richard L. Stokes, its Washington correspondent, from which I desire to quote certain excerpts:

Another legend exploded since Pearl Harbor was the idea that the United States had inexhaustible natural resources. The country has been at war for only 13 months, but the fury with which its material wealth is being ransacked has already perturbed the Government's scientific agencies.

Chairman Donald M. Nelson, of the War Production Board, predicted recently that manufacture of armament goods in the current twelve-month will surpass that of 1942 by two-thirds. He defined 1942 as the year of the battle of facilities, which was won, and promised that 1943 would bring victory likewise in the battle of materials.

If so, the triumph may be a Pyrrhic one, because of the headlong greed with which Mars is rifling the Nation's material stocks, even of clay and sand.

On the presumption that World War No. 2 will continue several years and that the depletion of this country's natural reserves will accelerate rather than decline, the following question, of portentous significance for the destiny of the American people, is now being raised:

Is the United States headed toward an economy of scarcity, which will replace its historic economy of abundance?

And, if the answer to the first question is yes, there are these further considerations: Must regimentation of materials become national policy in time of peace as well as war? Will there be a leveling down of American wage and living standards, with a proportionate leveling up of such standards in countries from which essential supplies are imported? Is a revolution in our trade and tariff systems bound to follow? Will the United States, out of its own resources, ever again be able to fight a big-time war?

On the verge of exhaustion or serious impoverishment, according to scientists in the Department of the Interior, are the domestic stores of materials having such ultra-vital combatant importance as lead, zinc, mercury, and iron, for which there are no substitutes; and copper, bauxite, and petroleum as well. Alternatives for the last three are known, but they are either at a primitive stage of development, exorbitant in cost or relatively inefficient.

In the Reader's Digest for April appears a condensation of an article from the United States News entitled "Will War Make Us a 'Have-Not' Nation?"

We are digging deep into our natural resources to make bombs and bullets that will be shot away; to make tanks, planes and ships some of which will never return. As a result, the United States may become a "have not" Nation in many material basic to our economy.

The vast expenditure of irreplaceable riches is leading thoughtful people in and out of the Government to ask if the United States will be left with enough basic resources to fight another big-time war. They ask if present material shortages aren't just the forerunners of permanent shortages in the future. They ask whether this country should sot eventually develop resources in other areas of the world and conserve its own.

War costs astronomical amounts of all materials. Copper is a good example. A 37-millimeter anti-aircraft gun shoots away a ton every twenty minutes of action. The Army Signal Corps uses 5,000 tons a month in communications equipment. Once plentiful deposits of high-grade copper ore are now reduced to a single big deposit near Butte, Mont. The same applies to oil. Until recently, 60 per cent of the supplies going to the African front were petroleum products. Government officials warn that our oil supply is not inexhaustible. In 1942, output of oil was greater than reserves discovered. This is a reversal of a trend that lasted until 1938, and comes just when oil reserves are subjected to the greatest strain in history. While new fields have been found, they average less than half the size they did before. There seems to be little question that the United States eventually will be dependent on foreign sources.

We are running out of high-grade ores in certain metals. Supplies of bauxite, best source of aluminum, may be used up within 3 years. The great Mesabi Range of iron ore in Minnesota, which supplies 80 to 85 per cent of our needs, may be exhausted by 1950. Lead deposits in the tri-State area centering at Joplin, Mo., are nearing their end. Mercury deposits are expected to be exhausted for good before this war is finished. The possibility of opening new zinc minesis small. Depletion of these ores is the price paid for all-time record production of metals and minerals.

I, therefore, undertook an investigation of my own. I addressed an inquiry to Dr. R. R. Sayers, Director of the Bureau of Mines, in which I asked him to give me the facts bearing on the exhaustion of our supply of vital minerals. Under date of March 2, 1943, Dr. Sayers wrote me as follows:

March 2, 1943.
Hon. H. C. Lodge, Jr.,
United States Senate.

Dear Senator Lodge: In your letter of February 17 you made inquiry concerning the status of domestic resources of ores of some of the common metals and of petroleum, and to what extent depletion has been accelerated by war production.

The volume of our mineral resources cannot be evaluated with precision because of the multitude of factors that affect the definition of ore, price being usually the major consideration. Under wartime conditions even that factor may be of subordinate importance, need being the governing criterion. However, a reflection of the relative reserve positions of the minerals you named is provided by the classification given in the list of material substitutions and supply issued by the Conservation Division of the War Production Board, February 1, 1943.

Iron ore and petroleum as such are not listed but numerous iron and petroleum products are in the extremely short-supply category and are completely subject to allocation, That is, currently and for the near future raw material resources are ample to meet anticipated demands although the rapid depletion of direct shipping open-cut iron ores and restrictions of wildcat oil drilling are causing some concern. The immediate problems connected therewith are primarily those of conversion and distribution. Our internal ability to meet the requirements now does not however imply that the current high rates of production can long be maintained unless discovery be kept in pace with extraction.

Lead is now among the non-critical materials and is available in sufficient volume to serve as a substitute for scarcer materials. In the early part of last year shortages were feared. Thus it may be a border-line case as far as domestic supply is concerned. Mercury remains in the critical class, with supply approximately in balance with war and essential civilian needs. Although domestic production rose approximately one-third from 1940 to a half-century peak in 1942, it is doubtful if that rate, which was just about sufficient to meet domestic needs, can be maintained for more than a year. The relatively satisfactory and fair current positions of these metals are in large measure owing to substantial volumes of imports from Canada and Mexico during the past year.

The situation with respect to the other minerals is in varying degree precarious. Aluminum, copper, and zinc are, respectively, second, third, and sixth in the most critical metals group, viz., those essential for war, but in insufficient supply for war and essential civilian demands and in many cases, including those named, insufficient for war purposes alone. We are highly dependent on overseas resources for major portions of our total supply, and since ocean transport has become increasingly difficult while demand pyramided domestic production capacity has been strained and appears about to reach its peak or a point of rapidly diminishing returns. Ore reserves in a major zinc-producing area are close to exhaustion, and reserves of bauxite that can be treated in existing plants will last but a few years atthe contemplated rate of extraction; a condition so serious that this Bureau has recently proposed a greatly expanded exploration and research program. Although our copper store has a potentially longer life, its concentration in a few large ore deposits precludes further expansion of output except at the expense of production of war end products.

The exploratory programs of the Bureau of Mines and Geological Survey and the Bureau's research work with those that could be carried out by industry have indeed added much to our known natural resources, but although these results are impressive they still have failed to keep step with extraction, and it is to be noted that for virtually all the minerals most of the deposits explored have been smaller in size and lower in tenor than those being exploited. Except for petroleum and iron ore there have been also marked declines in grade of ore mined, another definite marker of impoverishment. Thus our ore reserves are being depleted at a rate even greater than accelerated production might indicate because in more normal times much of what remains may be sub-marginal.

In the attached pages are given more detailed statements concerning each of the minerals you named. Since virtually all the data have been furnished in confidential reports to the Bureau, you will understand, I am sure, that their use is restricted.

Sincerely yours,
R. R. Sayers.

I then became interested in discovering the minerals which the United States needed but which it did not possess within its own borders. I requested the Bureau of Mines to make a compilation listing these minerals together with principal world sources. The list includes antimony, arsenic, asbestos, bauxite, beryllium ore, chromite, graphite, industrial diamonds, lead, manganese ore, mercury, mica, natural nitrates, nickel, platinum, quartz crystals, tin, titanium ore, tungsten, vanadium, and zinc

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this tabulation be printed in the Record at this point as a part of my remarks.

Deficient minerals of the United States and principal world sources of supply

Deficient minerals of the United States and principal world sources of supply—Continued

Deficient minerals of the United States and principal world sources of supply—Continued

Deficient minerals of the United States and Principal world sources of supply—Continued

¹ These percentages do not take into account the large synthetic nitrogen industry of the United States. After this war there will be sufficient synthetic nitrogen fixation capacity available to more than replace pre-war natural nitrate purchases. Nitrate imports would then be unnecessary except for diplomatic reasons. ² All platinum metals.

Mr. President, the tabulation shows all the foreign countries from which these articles can be obtained.

In a letter accompanying this tabulation, Dr. Sayers made the following remarks:

March 15, 1943.
Hon. Henry C. Lodge, Jr.,
United States Senate.

Dear Senator Lodge: In response to your recent request for a list of minerals of which the United States has an inadequate supply, and information as to the principal world sources of these deficient minerals, I am pleased to submit the enclosed tabulation. The data shown are based on pre-war conditions rather than the present disturbed relationships because it is believed the former will reflect more accurately the state of affairs after the war is concluded. The 21 commodities listed include all the important minerals, substantial quantities of which were imported for domestic consumption in the immediate pre-war years.

Not included in the list are the major industrial minerals—coal, iron ore, copper, and petroleum. The United States has abundant reserves of coal. Deposits of iron ore and copper appear to be adequate to meet our peacetime requirements for several years, although a small proportion of our total iron-ore demand doubtless will continue to be imported by our seaboard blast furnaces due chiefly to lower freight rates on ocean shipping. In 1939, 4 per cent of the iron ore consumed in domestic blast furnaces was foreign ore, over half of which was obtained from Chile and the remainder chiefly from Cuba and Scandinavia. The outlook for continued self-sufficiency in petroleum is less favorable. Unless current trends in prospecting and discovery are reversed, present rates of production cannot be assured for more than a few years. In recent pre-war years the United States was a net exporter of crude petroleum. In the event of a decline in domestic production it would seem logical for the United States first to reduce its export trade and then to draw on those sources that have supplied important crudes in the past. These include Venezuela, Mexico, and

Colombia. Less accessible reserves exist in southwest Asia and the Netherlands Indies.

If the Bureau of Mines can be of further assistance at any time, please let me know.

Sincerely yours,
R. R. Sayers, Director.

It is undoubtedly true that we can improve our position by using low-grade ores, of which we have a large supply in the case of certain metals. We have, during our short national life, lived off the cream. We may not be able to skim off the cream much longer. We must take careful stock of our domestic resources and stand ready to develop them. Military considerations indicate that these resources should be freely available and that at the same time we should encourage importations and stock piles of scarce materials.

In the case of those metals of which we are entirely deficient, however, we have no choice but to import them.

While considering this subject of matters outside our own borders in which the welfare of the American people compels us to have a strong national interest, let us take a somewhat longer look at oil.

The importance of insuring a supply of oil adequate to maintain the domestic economy of this country is painfully apparent to every citizen today. Competent opinion is that our domestic reserves are inadequate. The world supply of oil is ample for all if efficiently developed and distributed. Present American concessions abroad are sufficient for our needs and trade, if preserved. Responsibility for this preservation could be left with the oil companies as in the past, or could be taken in some degree by the Government. History does not give us confidence that private company policy alone will adequately safeguard the national public interest, particularly with the prospect of circumstances in the future even more difficult than those which the private companies have failed to cope with in the past. How should this Government move to achieve the security of so important a factor in our national life? This responsibility is a real one, and those entrusted with it cannot dismiss it with fair promises.

The importance of oil from the standpoint of the armed forces is also vital. Responsible and forward-looking Navy officers, experienced in oil-supply problems, have been asking what assurance have we—if any—that our fleet and air forces will have certain supplies for maintenance or police duty. This question extends itself to include supplies for such cargo shipping as this Government may choose to keep under its own administration following the war for implementation of its security or economic policies until a stabilized world economy makes this unnecessary. These officers bear and keenly feel a high responsibility. They know better than most the price paid for empty bunkers and do not intend to find them empty. They are waiting impatiently for our solution.

I shall not enter into the details of what the answers are to these two challenging questions. The suggestion has been made by thoughtful men that a petroleum reserve corporation should be established to provide an agency in which many related functions could be centered and through which much might be accomplished. Certain it is, however, that we must have oil, that the average citizen insists that he have oil, and that he looks to us who are public servants to see that he gets it.

In my remarks up to this point I have listed some of the mineral resources which are vital to our existence and for which we are to a greater or lesser degree dependent on the outside world.

Then, of course, there are vast vegetable resources, such as rubber, coffee, and quinine. I wish to emphasize that we are also vitally interested in the world outside our borders for other things—for services as well as goods. Think of the merchant marine which we have so suddenly built. Think of radio, telegraph, and telephone communications, a field in which we have a natural proficiency, and in which I do not think we are on an equality throughout the world. Think of aviation. After the war we shall have at least 3,000,000 young men who will be well versed in the fields of aviation, merchant marine, and communications. They will probably look to their Government to give them an opportunity to exercise these skills. These are activities which rest on international agreements if they are to exist at all. You cannot have free air transportation without international understanding. You cannot have a large merchant marine without agreements. You cannot operate either of these things without a communications system at least on an equal basis with that possessed by other countries. In these fields, therefore, other countries have things to give, things which we want to get. I hope we can get them—of course, by just, peaceful means, for under no condition can this war ever become an imperialistic one.

Then there arc the broad questions of currency, international exchange, and beyond these the still broader questions of international commerce as a whole.

These are vital matters in the long view, as we well know. They will also have great immediate urgency. There is a deep conviction in men's minds today that the powers of government, now being used to win the war, can and must be used after the war to promote prosperity, while at the same time preserving and encouraging free enterprise.

I think we can all agree that there will be no patience with a post-war world of doles and bread lines. There must be a gradual transition from a war to a peace footing. In all this the goods and services which we must get from abroad will play a vital part—a part which cannot be postponed.

Mr. President, we pride ourselves on having the highest material living standard of any nation in the world, and we boast of it not merely in a materialistic spirit. We know that a society of free men, with free speech, free worship, free institutions, and equal opportunity cannot exist in a country which is in a state of abject poverty. If you are to have democracy you must have a certain amount of prosperity.

Therefore, both our standard of living and our spiritual freedom are based on the fact that Providence has blessed us with so many natural resources.

In this war some of us have been privileged to observe our young American fighting man. In a very true sense he represents the justification of our democratic system, for his hardihood, his quickness of thought, his self-reliance, and his courage under the most severe tests life holds are the results not only of the food and clothing which he received as a child, but of the education which he received and the spiritual climate in which he grew to manhood. All these things rise and fall together. An America without a plentiful supply of natural resources would not be the America of democracy. It would be a bitter irony if we were to shoot away our natural resources in the name of democracy and lose democracy while we were doing it.

After the last war ft was stated many times that the United States wanted nothing, and we magnanimously refused to accept any territory. If it is true that we are becoming a "have-not" Nation, it is a very open question indeed whether we should not at the end of this war seek to acquire, in a just and peaceful manner, some things which

we might lack. We hear it often said—and with admiration in some quarters—that our allies know exactly what they want out of this war. Should we not be equally definite in making our wants known? Is not such frankness on all sides the best guarantor of fruitful agreement and true understanding?

What will be the result of a conference at which two parties know exactly what they need whereas the third wants everything in general and nothing in particular? As a fervent believer in the pressing need of effective international collaboration after the war, I submit that the United States owes it to the world as well as to herself to define her needs.

Mr. President, these are the questions which bring me to the last part of this speech.

In the part just ended I tried to list the goods and services which we must obtain from outside our borders if we are to maintain either our democratic life or a respectable military establishment, or our influence for peace in the family of nations.

I now submit that if these problems are solved—if we have a satisfactory set of treaties assuring us, for example, proper supplies of oil and tin and our fair share of our ship-pink and communications rights, that the framework of our relationship with the rest of the world would be fixed—and that it would be fixed on a sound basis, a true basis, a basis which took into account the differences between nations, a basis which saw the different needs of different peoples and sought to satisfy those needs—instead of a basis which assumed that all nations and peoples are alike when actually they are not.

Mr. President. I have very little faith in what I call cosmic or transcendental approach to the question of American foreign relations. I cannot see why it is necessary to treat the relations between peoples of different nationalities on a highly theoretical, political, and emotional basis when the relations between peoples of the same nationality are not treated that way. True, the airplane has changed commerce and revolutionized military science; it has not, however, automatically created a universal state of brotherly love. I have some good friends, of whom I am personally fond, both in and out of the Senate who believe in the cosmic approach, and I respect their sincerity. But the more I think about it the more convinced I become that it is an approach which can only do harm to the very cause which its proponents espouse.

One method produces agreement on the part of the American people; the other method divides the American people. And have we not learned by this time that one of the first considerations in forming any foreign policy in this country is that it must be a policy on which the American people can unite?

Such a policy must be based on national interest, guided by justice. Would that we had had a clear policy of national interest to guide us in the past. I am very much afraid that we have not had such a policy for quite a little time. We have had momentary policies based on emotion, such as the Neutrality Act, the purpose of which was to keep us out of war by legislation and which circumstances then caused us to repeal. We then had a vacuum instead of a true policy based on national interest, and that was all too often—and all too naturally—-filled by old hatreds and old attachments relating to countries in the Old World. I do not hesitate to say that if a policy based on national interest had been in existence in the past in the pre-war period it would have been wholeheartedly supported by all Americans regardless of racial extraction. Such a policy in the future would weld Americans together—regardless of racial differences—more than any other single act of government.

In his book entitled "U. S. Foreign Policy," Walter Lippmann makes some true observations on the mentality prevailing in the administrations of two Presidents holding office before and during the First World War. He says:

Both were idealists who habitually rejected the premises of the politics of power. Both disliked armaments. In them the idealism which prompts Americans to make large and resounding commitments was combined with the pacifism which caused Americans to shrink from the measures of force that are needed to support the commitments. Neither promoted the preparation of armaments in time of peace. Both accepted reluctantly and tardily the need to arm. Both abhorred as inherently vicious and unnecessary, and as contrary to American principles, the formation of alliances. But both favored a league of nations in which the United States assumed the obligation to enforce peace.

This eagerness to accept commitments and reluctance to arm also characterized our conduct before World War No. 2.

In a later discussion of the failure of the United States to enter the League of Nations, Mr. Lippmann says:

The United States did not go to war because it wished to found a league of nations; it went to war in order to preserve American security. And when the war was over, the Nation would almost certainly have accepted in some form or other the scheme of the League of Nations if President Wilson had been able to demonstrate to the people that the League would perpetuate the security which the military victory had won for them. Mr. Wilson failed to make this demonstration. He failed because in leading the Nation to war he had failed to give the durable and compelling reasons for the momentous decision. The reasons he did give were legalistic and moralistic and idealistic reasons, rather than the substantial and vital reason that the security of the United States demanded that no aggressively expanding imperial power, like Germany, should be allowed to gain the mastery of the Atlantic Ocean.

Mr. Lippmann here points out the danger of what he calls a legalistic, or a moralistic, or an idealist policy, rather than a substantial and vital policy. I have used the phrases cosmic, transcendental, theoretical, and political. We both mean the same thing.

I believe we have made some progress toward a truly national policy. For instance, we are determined that never again shall we find ourselves unprepared as we were on the outbreak of this war, and that we must have a military force which is manifestly ready to function at any moment. We believe that if we had had such a force Hitler might never have started. We hold that there must be practical plans for a rapid expansion of our Army and Navy, that there will have to be limited compulsory military training, that never again must we be dependent on others for essential war materials, and that the approaches to the United States must be safeguarded.

Robert Moses has expressed this new feeling about the foreign policy of the future in these words:

We will go along with feeding the starving and undernourished everywhere, binding up the world's wounds, canceling debts and making loans, perhaps with some kind of League and World Court which do not require the surrender of our sovereignty and which frankly separate ultimate from immediate objectives, with moderate tariff barriers not involving the lowering of our living standards, and with immigration restricted in order to prevent the

rushing in of the vast hordes who will attempt to seek escape from painful readjustments abroad.

Our people will favor cooperation with other nations in the many benefits to be derived from improvement of communications, but they won't give up nationalism. They will be for sufficient American armament to insure respect, and for an internal economy which will not again make us dependent on others for vital needs. They will be for spreading democratic doctrine by example rather than by forcing conformity upon those to whom democracy is still a new experience. Does any sane person seriously contend that with the signing of the peace our armed forces should be quickly reduced to skeletons and stripped of appropriations and respect? Not after this war. This time we shall be more prudent. We shall not disarm until we see how sincere the rest of the world is about the new Utopia.

Uncle Sam is neither a skinflint nor a fool. The middle road in world affairs may not be melodramatic, but it has always looked good to him. He knows this at least—that in the long run he will win the widest respect by refusing to over-promise and by being scrupulously careful to keep his word.

Mr. President, I do not mean to ignore or belittle the fact that thorny military and political decisions will have to be made. They will be difficult decisions, no matter how successfully we settle our material questions about which I have been speaking. The matter of control of any international military organization and our reaction to the continuation, resurrection, and extension of imperialism are two out of many thorny questions from which we cannot escape. The question of restoring small nations without also restoring the European crazy-quilt of quarreling nationalities is another. There are many more.

But the fact still remains that the approach is important. The more matters are agreed on, the easier agreement becomes even on these thorny problems. And it is so very plain that there are things we need in the world outside our borders, things which we must have in order to maintain not only our material standard of living but our democratic way of living—things which we need to maintain our influence for peace in the family of nations. These are the things which should be the basis of prompt agreements based on national interest, because these are the things on which Americans can agree among themselves and regarding which reasonable men of differing nationalities should be able to come to terms. For 50 years the American people have been divided on questions of foreign policy. I submit that the test of a sound foreign policy is "that those who have disagreed are brought toward agreement."

Let me summarize:

First. It is a sacred duty to achieve effective international collaboration after the war to prevent the recurrence of these slaughters. Only thus can we be worthy of the sacrifice of our fighting men.

Second. The political and theoretical approach to the peace divides the people and defeats its own purpose. We cannot assume that the aeroplane has automatically created a state of universal brotherly love. The touchstone of any American foreign policy must be that it unites the American people.

Third. We must develop a policy based on national interest guided by justice which will bring people together as Americans regardless of racial differences.

Fourth. Such a policy can be based on those things which we must have from outside our borders to maintain our democracy, our Military Establishment, and our influence for peace in the family of nations.

Fifth. Some of the things which should be the objects of international agreement are:

(a) Vital natural resources which we either lack completely or of which our supply is growing scarce. For example, we will soon be dependent on the rest of the world for oil.

(b) Equality with other nations in international radio, telegraph, and telephone.

(c) An opportunity for free competition in international aviation.

(d) A real chance for our new, big merchant marine.

(e) Equitable arrangements in the field of international exchange.

(f) Naval, military, and air bases to safeguard the approaches to the United States.

Sixth. Agreement on these practical matters will make

agreement easier on the great political problems. It is a fruitful approach which will unite the people.

Indeed the challenge of making a conclusive peace is too compelling to be met in any other spirit. The sacrifices made by American fighting men impose the duty of developing world relations which will work, which will be accepted, and which will meet the issues of our time. We simply cannot afford the pride of opinion which says that it must be done a certain way or not at all. That the cosmic approach is attractive to many people cannot be denied. Certain aspects of it are attractive to me. In a less important cause we might tolerate it. But in the vital, soul-stirring task of making a just and lasting peace for our children and grandchildren we cannot afford this dubious luxury. We have the stern duty of being practical, of making a peace which will work. Only thus can we be worthy of the sacrifice of our fighting men.