

DOCUMENTS ON  
GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY  
1918-1945

UNITED STATES  
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE  
WASHINGTON : 1954

JX  
691  
A45  
Ser. D  
V. 13

*This series is also published in Great Britain by  
Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PUBLICATION 7682

For sale by the  
Superintendent of Documents  
Government Printing Office  
Washington, D.C., 20402  
Price \$4.00 (Buckram)

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DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY  
1918-1945

SERIES D (1937-1945)

VOLUME XIII

THE WAR YEARS

June 23-December 11, 1941

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## PREFACE <sup>1</sup>

This volume concludes the work of the Tripartite Project which originated with the agreement of June 1946 between the United States Department of State and the British Foreign Office and to which the French Government adhered in 1947. The agreement provided for the publication of selected documents from the archives of the former German Foreign Ministry in order "to establish the record of German diplomacy preceding and during World War II," and it stipulated that the editorial work was to be performed "on the basis of highest scholarly objectivity." The editors have made their selections of documents for publication on this basis alone. They have exercised complete freedom in the selection of documents and in their editing of this volume and of all volumes published under the terms of the Project. The editors, therefore, accept full responsibility for the volumes as published.

Microfilming of the files of the German Foreign Ministry archives was begun in Marburg in 1945 by American and British experts for intelligence purposes and was continued in Berlin by teams of historians representing the three Governments in the Project. In 1948 the collection was moved to Whaddon Hall, Buckinghamshire, England where it remained for ten years in the custody of the British and United States Governments. Before the archives were moved from Berlin over 800,000 pages of documents for the period since 1914 had been recorded on film. By the end of 1958, when the last of the archives were made ready for restoration to the German Federal Republic, almost three million microfilm frames had been made. Each document printed in this publication bears a microfilm serial and frame number in the upper left-hand corner. The microfilm copy of the original German text can be located by reference to Appendix II, "List of German Files Used."

It was originally intended to complete the entire publication for the period 1918-1945 in some twenty volumes. When, however, the preliminary work on the selections for the years from 1933 to 1945 was completed in 1954 it became apparent that an adequate selection of the documents for this period would require a publication on a scale approximately double the size which had been anticipated at the out-

<sup>1</sup> In each of the first four volumes published in the series there appears a "General Introduction" which describes some of the principles which have guided the editors in their work.

set. After considering the length of time it would take to carry out a program on this enlarged scale, the participating Governments decided to limit the publication in English to the years 1933 to 1941—beginning January 30, 1933, when Hitler became Reich Chancellor and ending in December 1941 with the German declaration of war on the United States. Series D comprises 13 volumes. Series C, in six volumes, covers the period 1933 to 1937.

In the exchange of notes with the custodial Governments which provided for the restitution of the political archives of the former German Foreign Ministry, the Federal Republic gave assurance that it would "keep the returned files in an orderly manner and grant German and foreign scholars access to the files at all times."

In 1952 the custodial Governments decided to permit universities, private foundations, and even individuals to sponsor filming programs in the pre-1920 files. Thus it came about that a very large portion of the files of the Political Department for the period before 1920 were put on film. After these various projects were completed a grant by the Ford Foundation enabled the Committee for the Study of War Documents of the American Historical Association to publish *A Catalogue of Files and Microfilms of the German Foreign Ministry Archives 1867-1920* (Oxford University Press, 1959).

All of the microfilms made by the Project are now freely available to public research at the National Archives in Washington and at the Public Record Office in London. Scholars who wish to check the translation of any printed document, or to consult the full language of a document which is summarized or referred to by footnote, can identify the desired German text by serial and frame number. Those who might wish to test the selection of documents printed can consult the films of the files listed in the appendix according to serial number. After the completion of the microfilming program at Whaddon Hall the Historical Office of the Department of State undertook the preparation of a comprehensive guide of the official filming: *A Catalog of Files and Microfilms of the German Foreign Ministry Archives 1920-1945*. Compiled and edited by George O. Kent, and published as a joint project of the Department of State and the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, volume I was issued by the Hoover Institution in the summer of 1962.

Volume XIII of the *Documents on German Foreign Policy*, Series D, covers German foreign policy for the second half of the year 1941. It opens on June 23, the day following announcement of the attack on the Soviet Union, and it ends on December 11 with the German declaration of war following Pearl Harbor. The relations of Germany

with the United States and with the Imperial Japanese Government constitute the principal topics of this period. The editors have endeavored to present all of the German diplomatic evidence of how Hitler came to his decision to declare war on the United States. Certain of the crucial documents in this story are classified in the Analytical List under the subject, Tripartite Pact.

There is a decided shift of emphasis between the previous volume and this one. Until June 22 negotiations with the Soviet Union constitute a large fraction of the work of the German Foreign Ministry. As German policy toward Russia after that date is continued by other means, the diplomatic relations sink to the level of those of belligerent powers without direct connection. Moreover, in the period of volume XII the Balkans constitute an area of intense diplomatic activity. For volume XIII the area becomes predominantly one of occupation, veiled or overt. Although the line between foreign policy and occupation policy is not always obvious, the editors have tried to restrict their selections of documents to the field of diplomacy. Where the policies of Germany as an occupying power affect her relations with other states the occupation policy needs to be illustrated. Under the heading, Yugoslavia, are comprised documents relating both to the government established by the Axis in Croatia and to the occupational regime in Serbia.

A generous selection of documents illustrates the Rome-Berlin Axis relationship. Here the editors have continued to present the texts of all known letters of Hitler and Mussolini. The Axis in the period of this volume begins to show considerable strain: because of the inadequate deliveries of raw materials to Italy; because of the treatment of Italian laborers in Germany; because of friction in the Balkans; and because of the German failure to achieve quick victory, an Axis article of faith in which the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, ceases to believe. German relations with France, with the government at Vichy and through the office at Paris, are also fully portrayed in this period of collaboration under handicap.

With the cutting off of the flow of raw materials and other supplies from Russia, the economic relations of Germany with Rumania, Sweden, Turkey, and the Iberian Peninsula loom larger. It has not been possible to cover these topics with complete satisfaction or to illustrate fully the economic negotiations of Germany with Italy and with Japan because of gaps in the record arising from the absence of the files of the Economic Policy Department.

In accordance with past practice in this series all of the numbered Führer Directives issued in this period have been printed although some are almost completely tactical and have little foreign policy content.

The documents are printed in chronological order but the Analytical List at the beginning of the volume presents them by subject for the convenience of the reader. Here will be found in alphabetical order additional important topics of German policy covered by this volume.

The documents have been selected jointly by United States, British, and French editors, but the United States editors have had full editorial responsibility for this volume. The editors wish to express their appreciation to various officials of the Department of State for cooperation and assistance, and particularly to G. Bernard Noble, former Director of the Historical Office, to his successor William M. Franklin, and to members of the American Advisory Committee: Sidney B. Fay, Hans W. Gatzke, Oron J. Hale, Hajo Holborn, William L. Langer, and Raymond J. Sontag. Bernadotte E. Schmitt, a former editor-in-chief, has most generously rendered guidance on an informal basis.

The translations were drafted by the Division of Language Services of the Department of State, but the editors have final responsibility for the translations as well as full responsibility for the footnotes and other editorial matter.

The American editors are particularly grateful to Dr. Vincent Kroll and other members of the German Editorial Group within the Quadripartite Project for the publication of the documents on the foreign policy of the Weimar Republic; they undertook the onerous task of comparing the completed typescript text with the original documents and thereby prevented many an error.

Valuable aid in preparing the typescript was rendered by Barbara A. Griffith and by Elizabeth Baird, Linda Swauger, and Willa Mae Kuhn. The technical preparation of edited copy for the printer was done in the Division of Publishing Services of the Department of State under the direction of Jerome H. Perlmutter; the editors acknowledge gratefully the assistance of Elizabeth Vary, Collie E. Halbert, and other members of the staff of that Division.

ANALYTICAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS<sup>1</sup>

AFGHANISTAN			
Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 June 29	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Records the Foreign Minister's instructions for Hentig, the Minister designate to Afghanistan: to ascertain the British strength; to consolidate the German position; to establish contact with frontier tribes and with India; and to support the national independence movements in Afghanistan and Iran.	44	51
July 14	<i>The Legation in Afghanistan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports regarding German and Italian financial support for the Fakir of Ipi.	107	136
July 31	<i>The Minister in Afghanistan to the Foreign Minister</i> Reports that the Afghan Minister President asked in connection with the recent shooting of two Abwehr agents on the Afghan frontier that such operations be abandoned because they achieved nothing and only gave the British a pretext for increasing their pressure.	169	269
Aug. 9	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Afghanistan</i> Directs that all Germans be warned to observe complete restraint in order not to aid and abet British and Soviet Russian efforts to induce the Afghan Government to proceed against the Germans in Afghanistan.	190	301
Aug. 16	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legations in Iran and Afghanistan</i> Directs the Legations to request amounts in gold currency provided these can be usefully employed for political purposes.	206	318
Sept. 8	<i>The Minister in Afghanistan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that sentiment in Afghanistan is hostile to Britain and Russia as a result of events in Iran but that there is increasing pressure on the country. Suggests authorization for offering financial help to the Afghan Government for counteracting with money unrest fomented by the British among the tribes.	289	463
Oct. 12	<i>The Minister in Afghanistan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the British Minister and the Soviet Ambassador have presented notes regarding the German and Italian communities but that at Afghanistan's request their free departure across British territory to a neutral country was promised.	398	640

(See also under "India" and "Middle East.")

<sup>1</sup> The documents in this volume have been arranged chronologically. For the convenience of readers who wish to trace topics through the volume this analytical list of documents has been arranged alphabetically by countries or regions, with the addition of three subject headings: "Anti-Comintern Pact," "Directives for the Conduct of the War," and "Tripartite Pact."

## ANTI-COMINTERN PACT

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Aug. 12	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a conversation with the Finnish Minister, Kivimäki, who expressed the view that Finland's accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact was not necessary and that her accession to the Tripartite Pact would not be useful.	197	310
Oct. 17	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy</i> Explains that Ambassador Ott has been instructed to propose to Japan that a protocol for the extension of the Anti-Comintern Pact be signed in Berlin. Directs that the Italian Government be asked to agree.	405	650
Nov. 2	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy</i> Suggests that Rumania, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Croatia might wish to join the Anti-Comintern Pact and that Finland and Denmark should also be considered.	442	727
Nov. 3	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy</i> Suggests that the representatives for the German, Italian, and Japanese Governments approach the Governments of Hungary, Manchukuo, and Spain and invite them to sign the document for the extension of the Anti-Comintern Pact.	443	728
Nov. 15	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Finland</i> Explains that other governments, in addition to the original signatories, have agreed to join the Anti-Comintern Pact and directs that the Finnish Government be urged to join in the accession and extension.	472	783
Nov. 15	<i>The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister</i> Transmits a report by Grundherr on his conversation with the Finnish Minister about Finnish accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact. Kivimäki stated, as his personal opinion, that while he was in favor of Finland's joining the Pact he considered the present moment unsuited.	474	785
Nov. 15	<i>Memorandum by the Minister to Portugal</i> Explains the position of Portugal on the Anti-Comintern Pact: her opposition to Bolshevism is well known but adherence to the Pact would involve great risk because of her economic dependence on Britain.	476	787
Nov. 17	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to telegram No. 1469 (document No. 472) and reports on his conversation with President Ryti regarding Finland's accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact. Ryti stressed the great difficulties Finland was having at the time and said that the moment did not seem propitious for Finland to join the Pact. Blücher pointed out that Finland's accession would only formalize existing policies.	477	788
Nov. 20	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the President has decided to empower the Foreign Minister to adhere to the Anti-Comintern Pact.	485	804

## ANTI-COMINTERN PACT—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Nov. 24	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Legal Department</i> Records meeting with Kase for the exchange of notes concerning the Secret Additional Agreement to the Anti-Comintern Pact (document No. 498) and with whom it was agreed that secrecy of the pertinent document would be maintained.	496	818
Nov. 25	<i>Protocol on the Extension of the Period of Validity of the Agreement Against the Communist International</i> Text.	498	820
Nov. 25	<i>The Japanese Ambassador in Germany to the Foreign Minister</i> States that Japanese and German Governments are in agreement in considering the Secret Additional Agreement to the Anti-Comintern Agreement of 1936 to be no longer in force with the signing of the new Protocol (document No. 498).  (See also under "Bulgaria," "Italy," and "Rumania.")	502	834
BALTIC STATES			
1941 June 23	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI</i> Records having been told by the former Lithuanian Minister Skirpa that the Kaunas radio station announced the formation of a Lithuanian government headed by him. He admitted having been in contact with the Abwehr.	3	3
June 23	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI</i> Records receiving unofficially M. Kreewinsch, the former Latvian Minister. No hope was offered regarding fulfillment of his wish to be recognized again as Latvian Minister in Berlin.	4	5
June 23	<i>Kazys Škirpa to the Führer and Chancellor</i> States that he is willing to head the national Lithuanian government which has been proclaimed by the Lithuanian activist movement following the advance of the German troops into Lithuania.	6	7
June 25	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Refers to Grundherr's memorandum of June 23 (document No. 3) and records the Foreign Minister's decision that no contact whatever is to be established with Skirpa.	18	22
June 28	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy to the Holy See</i> Directs that no contact be established with the Missions of the former Baltic States; that any discussion of the political future of the Baltic area is undesirable.	37	42
June 28	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI</i> Records that the Foreign Ministry in a communication sent to the OKW welcomed the cooperation of local elements in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia with the German troops, requesting, however, that political promises to these elements be avoided.	39	43



## BALTIC STATES—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Aug. 21	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Department for German Internal Affairs</i> Requests that the Foreign Minister be informed of a proposal by the former Estonian Minister President regarding the formation of an Estonian government and army.	223	348
Oct. 7	<i>The Acting Deputy Director in the Political Department to the Legation in Finland</i> Directs that the political reorganization of the Baltic states not be discussed with foreigners. Explains that it is intended to bring these states into very close association with the Reich, but that the details have not as yet been worked out.  (See also under "U.S.S.R.")	386	620

## BELGIUM

1941 Oct. 13	<i>The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the Chief of the Reich Chancellery</i> Lists the military, political, economic, and administrative reasons why the current military administration in Belgium should not be replaced by a civil administration.	401	643
Oct. 21	<i>Memorandum by the Chief of the Reich Chancellery</i> Records that Hitler, who intended to set up a civilian administration in Belgium, dismissed Keitel's reasons against this procedure as stated in his report of October 13 (document No. 401).	416	672

## BULGARIA

1941 July 9	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records a visit of the Bulgarian Minister who explained the changes desired by the Italians in the Albanian-Bulgarian frontier as drawn in Vienna. Recommends encouraging the Bulgarians to resist the Italian claims.	87	107
July 11	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records giving the Bulgarian Minister a map of the Vienna boundary line between Albania and Bulgaria and suggesting the argument be used with the Italians that a change in the line would need German consent.	94	120
July 14	<i>The Legation in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> Confirms that the Vienna boundary line of Albania and Bulgaria was deliberately drawn so that the Jesse-rina mine would fall to Bulgaria; King Boris was informed of this; the Italians were aware of it.	106	135
July 31	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records having been informed by the Bulgarian Minister regarding the visit of the Bulgarian Foreign Minister to Rome.	170	271

## BULGARIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Sept. 20	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Bulgaria</i> Directs that a noncommittal attitude be taken in the question whether or not Bulgaria should break off relations with the Soviet Union.	341	537
Oct. 31	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records mentioning to Draganov the Bulgarian maltreatment of the Greek population in Thrace.	435	718
Nov. 22	<i>German-Bulgarian Secret Additional Protocol to the Tripartite Pact Regarding the Press, News, and Propaganda</i> Provision for German-Bulgarian cooperation in the sphere of press, news, and propaganda support of the Tripartite Pact; specialists from each country will be attached to its Legation in the other country to consult on appropriate steps to be taken.	490	811
Nov. 27	<i>Memorandum by the Dirigent of the Political Department</i> Record of a conversation between Ribbentrop and Bulgarian Foreign Minister Popov on November 26; discussion of the possibility for increased Bulgarian grain deliveries to Germany, Bulgarian methods in putting down an uprising in Thrace, Bulgarian demands for more protection by the German military against the Greeks in Macedonia, and the difficulties in carrying out anti-Jewish laws in Bulgaria.	504	840
Nov. 29	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff</i> Record of Hitler's reception on November 27 of the Bulgarian Foreign Minister Popov. Hitler contrasted Germany's policy with England's; described his plans for European reconstruction; and denounced Russian Communism.  (See also under "Anti-Comintern Pact.")	509	858

## CHINA

1941 June 25	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Matsuoka, in compliance with a request by Wang Ching-wei, has instructed the Japanese Ambassadors in Berlin and Rome to obtain German and Italian recognition of the Nanking government.	13	17
June 27	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in China to the Foreign Ministry</i> States that the reasons heretofore arguing against German recognition of the Wang Ching-wei government still exist and urges that no decisive steps regarding recognition be taken before the conclusion of the German-Russian conflict.	27	29
June 27	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Japan</i> Informs Ott that Ribbentrop told Oshima that Hitler had decided to recognize the Wang Ching-wei regime on July 1. States that he himself has discussed with Oshima the details regarding recognition.	32	35

## CHINA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 June 28	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in China</i> Sends instructions to hand Wang Ching-wei the Foreign Minister's telegram recognizing his government.	38	42
June 30	<i>Circular of the State Secretary</i> States that Germany does not intend to break off automatically relations with Chungking following recognition of the Wang Ching-wei government.	47	53
June 30	<i>The State Secretary to the Field Office in Chungking</i> Tells of his conversation with the Chinese Ambassador regarding the effects of a German recognition of the Wang Ching-wei government. Gives instructions not to notify the Government in Chungking of Germany's impending recognition of Wang Ching-wei.	48	53
July 3	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records his conversation with the Chinese Ambassador who stated orally that the Government of Chiang Kai-shek was breaking off relations with Germany following German recognition of Wang Ching-wei.  (See also under "Anti-Comintern Pact.")	68	79

## DENMARK

1941 July 23	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter</i> Recommends compliance with a Danish request for an increase of their Army which has the approval of General Fromm on condition that a regiment of the Danish Army participates in the war against Soviet Russia.	142	204
Aug. 12	<i>The Commander of German Troops in Denmark to the High Command of the Army</i> Transmits the reply of the Danish General Staff regarding an increase of effectives of the Danish Army and a memorandum giving some reasons for the Danish reply. From this reply it appears that the Danish Ministry of War in agreement with the Government disapproved the request of the General Staff.	198	311
Nov. 4	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI</i> Examines the attitude of the Danish Government and people toward Germany and concludes that while there is much cooperation with German policy many Danes would prefer to have the war between Germany and Great Britain end in a draw.	447	737
Nov. 10	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Foreign Minister</i> Informs Ribbentrop of the renewed Danish request for a revaluation of the Danish currency and asks authorization for its approval.	459	762
Nov. 17	<i>Memorandum by the Dirigent of the Political Department</i> Informs Weizsäcker that Hitler approved a continuation of German policy toward Denmark as set forth in an enclosed memorandum by the Foreign Minister.	479	795

## DENMARK—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Nov. 27	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff</i> Records Hitler's remarks on the economic future of Europe, and on American and British economic policy on the occasion of the visit of Danish Foreign Minister Scavenius at Hitler's headquarters.	510	861
Nov. 30	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Records a conversation between Ribbentrop and Scavenius in Berlin on November 28. Ribbentrop talks about German-Danish relations and about the progress of the war in general.  (See also under "Anti-Comintern Pact" and "Iceland.")	518	887

## DIRECTIVES FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR

1941 July 19	<i>Führer's Directive No. 33: Continuation of the War in the East</i> Outlines the aims and operations for the next phase of the campaign against Soviet Russia.	128	181
July 30	<i>Führer's Directive No. 34</i> Modifies directive No. 33 (document No. 128) in view of changes in the situation.	164	235
Sept. 1	<i>The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the Reichsmarschall and Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe, to the Commander in Chief of the Navy, to the Commander in Chief of the Army, and to the Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs</i> Forwards a memorandum of August 27 entitled "The Strategic Situation in Late Summer 1941 as Basis for Further Political and Military Plans."	265	422
Sept. 6	<i>Führer's Directive No. 35</i> Outlines the next operations on the various sectors of the front.	283	456
Sept. 13	<i>Directive of the High Command of the Wehrmacht</i> Directs that in view of the situation in Norway far stricter punishments, including the death penalty, be administered for offenses committed directly or indirectly against Germany.	312	496
Sept. 16	<i>Führer's Directive</i> Assigns to Field Marshal List the tasks of crushing insurrections in southeastern Europe and outlines the necessary measures; all army units in the area of insurrection are to be concentrated under the command of General Boehme.	326	517
Sept. 20	<i>Circular of the Foreign Ministry</i> Forwards text of a directive of September 16 by Keitel regarding the suppression of insurrectionary movements in the areas under German occupation.	344	541

## DIRECTIVES FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Sept. 22	<i>Führer's Directive No. 36</i> Outlines operations to be conducted by the forces operating on the Finnish front against Soviet Russia.	349	549
Oct. 7	<i>Directive of the High Command of the Wehrmacht</i> Hitler's decision that no capitulation be accepted from Leningrad or Moscow.	388	623
Oct. 10	<i>Führer's Directive No. 37</i> Directs a shift from the offensive by the forces operating in Finland.	395	634
Dec. 2	<i>Führer's Directive No. 38</i> Provides for the transfer of a Luftwaffe Corps to the Mediterranean theater under Command of Field Marshal Kesselring as Commander in Chief, South.	535	938
Dec. 8	<i>Führer's Directive No. 39</i> Directs a shift to the defensive on the eastern front because of early winter weather.	564	984

## EGYPT

1941 June 30	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Iran</i> Instructs Ettel to continue with the Egyptian Ambassador in Iran the discussions which had been begun in April 1941.	49	54
July 3	<i>The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conference with the Egyptian Ambassador who stated that on instruction he had informed the Shah that King Farouk had definite information of a plan by the British General Staff to occupy the Iranian oil region.	66	77
Oct. 6	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on a conversation with an emissary of King Farouk who also represents three Egyptian political parties. He wished to clarify Germany's plans with regard to Egypt in case of a German victory in Africa and also sought to induce the Axis to treat Cairo as an open city.  (See also under "Middle East.")	385	618

## FINLAND

1941 June 25	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Russian air attacks had created a new situation for Finland, and that he had pointed out to the Finnish Foreign Minister that there now existed a state of war between Finland and Russia. The Finnish Cabinet will issue a new governmental declaration.	15	19
June 27	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with Foreign Minister Witting who mentioned the possibility of a break with England or America but stated that Finland would prefer the initiative for such to come from the other side.	29	32

## FINLAND—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 July 1	<i>The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister</i> Transmits a letter from the Finnish President to Hitler in which Ryti expressed his appreciation for Germany's military assistance and the hope that it would lead to a successful conclusion of Finland's fight for independence.	52	60
July 9	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Finland</i> Directs that the Finnish Government be urged to break off diplomatic relations with Great Britain in view of her close cooperation with the Soviet Union.	85	105
	<i>Editors' Note</i> Reference to a letter of Hitler to Ryti urging that Finland break relations with Great Britain.		185
July 22	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Finnish Cabinet has authorized the Foreign Minister in dealing with England to go as far as breaking off diplomatic relations.	140	202
July 28	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Finnish Foreign Minister informed the British Minister that Finland, because of British-Soviet cooperation, would close her Legation in London. Blücher requests that the German press minimize the matter.	160	227
Aug. 22	<i>Field Marshal Keitel to Field Marshal Mannerheim</i> Explains his views on the military situation regarding the northern part of the Russian front and suggests where Finnish and German troops could cooperate most profitably in their struggle to defeat the Soviet Union.	228	355
Aug. 26	<i>Field Marshal Mannerheim to Field Marshal Keitel</i> Replies to Keitel's letter of August 22 (document No. 228) and gives his views on the current military operations and the conditions of the Finnish armed forces.	248	395
Sept. 1	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Explains that the official version is that Finland is fighting a defensive war which is connected with the German-Russian war only operationally, and that although no official aims have been announced by the Government, some circles would like to acquire Eastern Karelia.	262	417
Sept. 1	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports differences within the Finnish Government about the future conduct of the war, especially on the question of advancing beyond the former boundary.	264	421
Sept. 11	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with President Ryti who denied rumors of a separate peace, mentioned the need for a reduction of the army in order to alleviate the economy, and outlined Finland's territorial aims.	301	477
Sept. 18	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Finland</i> Refers to Blücher's telegram of September 11 (document No. 301) and informs him that the German attitude toward Finland's territorial wishes was positive but that Germany herself was interested in the Kola Peninsula.	331	527

## FINLAND—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Sept. 24	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the former Norwegian Minister delivered to Witting a communication of the British Government stating that Finland waged aggressive war against England's ally, Russia, and that if Finland continued to invade purely Russian territory England could be compelled to treat her as an open foe.	353	558
Oct. 25	<i>The Legation in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the main economic preoccupation of the Finnish Government to be the food situation which shows a deficit of 175,000 tons of bread grains.	423	685
Oct. 28	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on a proposal made to the Finnish Government regarding reorganization of the nickel concession. The plan for a German-Finnish company was approved in principle by the President.	429	705
Oct. 31	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Division W IV in the Economic Policy Department</i> Records a conversation with President Ryti who talked about Finnish territorial aims, the forthcoming winter campaign, and Finnish attitude toward Great Britain and Sweden.	436	719
Nov. 4	<i>Memorandum by Minister Leitner</i> Records the statements of Ramsay, Finnish Minister of Supply, regarding Finland's overseas ships and the Finnish wish to sell a portion of these to Sweden.	448	740
Nov. 10	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a brief discussion with the Finnish Minister regarding the new American memorandum in regard to the Finnish campaign against Russia.	461	768
Nov. 14	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with the Foreign Minister who is opposed to a change in the existing arrangements for the Petsamo nickel mines.	469	780
Nov. 23	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the German promise of 75,000 tons of grain has brought great joy although the grain deficit is now estimated to be much larger than was thought earlier.	493	814
Nov. 28	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff</i> Records the conversation at a reception of the Finnish Foreign Minister by Hitler on November 27. Hitler explained the strategic and political situation, his future plans in the east, and his determination to support Finland in all circumstances.	507	849
Dec. 2	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Finnish Cabinet continues to discuss the British ultimatum but that the reply is certain to be negative.	533	936
Dec. 2	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with the Foreign Minister who complained about the treatment of Finnish volunteers in German military units.	534	937

## FINLAND—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Dec. 4	<i>The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Finnish reply to the British ultimatum is expected to be handed to the American Minister this evening. The wording is polite and is designed to place the blame for a declaration of war on England.  (See also under "Anti-Comintern Pact," "Directives for the Conduct of the War," and "Sweden.")	540	949
FRANCE			
1941 June 26	<i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Darlan wished to break off relations with the Russian Government but needed a suitable pretext for reasons of domestic policy.	20	24
June 26	<i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits Pétain's letter of June 25 to Hitler requesting that members of the Gardes Territoriaux not be treated by the German military authorities as snipers.	23	25
June 26	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter</i> Presents his views regarding French occupation costs, advocating: (1) the reduction to the figure of 10 million reichsmarks effective with fulfillment of German demands regarding Bizerte and Dakar; and (2) renunciation of the transfer of securities, foreign exchange and gold.	24	27
June 27	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht</i> In reply to Keitel's letter of June 15 (Volume XII, document No. 633) explains the need to secure Germany's military interests by negotiation with France and discusses the need for Bizerte and Dakar.	31	33
July 2	<i>The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the Foreign Minister</i> Replies to Ribbentrop's letter of June 27 (document No. 31) agreeing with Ribbentrop's conceptions; explaining the intended routing of transports to Bizerte; and indicating that the exploitation of Dakar by the German Navy should precede its use as a German air base.	61	70
July 5	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Paris</i> Replies to telegram No. 1909 of June 26 (document No. 23) directing Abetz to inform Darlan that Germany would be willing to consider a pardon for the French territorial guards provided that Reynaud and Mandel be imprisoned for life by the French Government.	74	88
July 6	<i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having convoked the leaders of certain French groups to facilitate the organization of French volunteers in the struggle against Russia.	78	94

## FRANCE—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 July 8	<i>Ambassador Abetz to the Foreign Minister</i> Reports a conversation with Darlan on problems concerning the Mediterranean area, particularly those relating to supply transports through Bizerte and the possibility of British attacks on Dakar.	82	99
July 12	<i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports receiving a communication from the French Cabinet stating that it is unable to carry out further military cooperation because the political negotiations which constitute the framework have not been concluded.	100	127
July 15	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Instructs Abetz to expedite the shipments via Bizerte but to treat other questions with France in a dilatory manner. Explains that a meeting of the Foreign Minister with Darlan would not be opportune.	110	139
July 16	<i>Memorandum for the Führer</i> Ribbentrop submits to Hitler the French note verbale of July 14 with the notation that with Hitler's approval it was to be returned to Abetz as not received. The note verbale urges that recent developments have changed the conditions under which the Paris Protocols of May 27 and 28 (Volume XII, document No. 559) were concluded; proposes a meeting of Darlan and Ribbentrop; and outlines a new Franco-German policy to take account of the changed situation.	113	142
July 30	<i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with Benoist-Méchin in which Abetz informs him of Germany's rejection of the French note of July 14 (see document No. 113) and reproves him for the uncooperative attitude of the French Government.	162	231
Aug. 7	<i>An Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the Embassy in Paris</i> Transmits a communication from the Military Commander in France with a report of de Brinon about his recent conversations with Pétain, Darlan, and Huntziger, on the current French political crisis. Ribbentrop asks that Abetz check the report.	186	293
Aug. 8	<i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i> Corroborates General Stülpnagel's report (document No. 186). Cites additional reasons for the delay in French cooperation regarding Bizerte and explains the difficult position of Darlan.	189	300
Aug. 13	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Paris</i> Instructs Abetz to tell Darlan that because of the eastern campaign a personal meeting could not be arranged at the moment but that the German Government was anxious to reach a sincere understanding with the French as soon as possible.	199	312
Aug. 18	<i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with Darlan on Franco-American relations and British and Free French intrigues. Darlan reasserted his intention to proceed forcefully against these elements.	211	326

## FRANCE—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Aug. 21	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Reviews the course of negotiations with the French Government over occupation costs explaining the French unilateral action in reducing the daily rate of payment to 15 million reichsmarks. Discusses various courses and suggests a note which would reserve Germany's rights to full payment.	222	345
Sept. 16	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Résumé of Hitler's remarks to Ambassador Abetz: The French a decent people but no change in their tactical treatment while the eastern campaign lasts; occupation troops to be increased; territorial claims; Italian claims excessive; the question of occupation costs and of uniforms for the militia; the Führer's plans for the east.	327	518
Sept. 19	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Paris</i> Instructs Abetz to support in every way the strong military measures against Communist intrigues which have been ordered by the OKW.	338	534
Oct. 21	<i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports Weygand's unwillingness voluntarily to resign and requests instructions as to what to reply to Darlan who will formally ask about the German attitude toward Weygand.	415	671
Oct. 22	<i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits text of a letter from Pétain to Hitler, expressing hopes for a fruitful German-French collaboration in the future.	417	673
Oct. 24	<i>The Dirigent of the Political Department to the Embassy in Paris</i> Directs Abetz to tell Darlan that Weygand does not in any way enjoy the confidence of the Reich Government.	419	676
Oct. 25	<i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i> Abetz reports having maintained complete reserve regarding the reprisals for the recent assassinations of members of the Wehrmacht. He discusses the possible political consequences of the reprisals; relates Pétain's plan to turn himself over to German authorities; and recommends that further shootings of hostages be suspended.	422	682
Nov. 4	<i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on the French Government's problem regarding Weygand and of the maneuvers of Weygand's supporters in the Ministerial Council. Explains that Pétain would be willing to dismiss Weygand but wishes concessions to compensate for the loss of prestige such as a trip to the occupied area and the opportunity to meet Göring.	445	730
Nov. 10	<i>Chancellor Hitler to Marshal Pétain</i> Replies to Pétain's letter (see document No. 417) and states his views regarding Franco-German cooperation, the shooting of French hostages, and Germany's war against the Soviet Union.	460	764

## FRANCE—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Nov. 12	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Paris</i> Directs that the French Government be informed that the Reich Government has already stated its lack of confidence in Weygand.	463	770
Nov. 17	<i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on a trip to Vichy on the occasion of the funeral of General Huntziger and on conversations with Pétain and Darlan regarding Hitler's letter to Pétain (document No. 460) and the dismissal of Weygand.	478	791
Nov. 18	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Paris</i> Instructs Abetz to inform Pétain that Göring would be willing to meet him secretly in the course of the coming week.	481	800
Dec. 3	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of the conversation between Reichsmarschall Göring and Marshal Pétain on December 1, 1941, in Florentin-Vergigny. Pétain presented a note verbale of the French Government (document No. 531) which was read in translation. Darlan was drawn into the discussion. Göring rejected the note but suggested it be modified before being presented to Hitler.	529	914
[Dec. 1]	<i>Note Verbale From the French Government</i> Explains the desire of the French Government to collaborate with Germany but that the policy needs the support of the French people which cannot be expected unless they can see positive advantages from the policy. France needs to defend her empire and requires the means for this. Other necessary concessions are listed.	531	930
Dec. 10	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division IM</i> Records the decision of Hitler to have a meeting arranged among Göring, General Juin, and Admiral Platon for the discussion of defense plans for the French colonial possessions in Africa.  (See also under "Indochina," "Italy," and "Middle East.")	573	1000

## GREECE

1941 July 25	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Delineates the critical food situation in Greece and discusses possible solutions.	155	218
Aug. 14	<i>Ambassador Ritter to the Foreign Ministry and to the Reich Plenipotentiary in Greece</i> Explains that in deference to Italian wishes no Greek volunteers will be permitted on the Russian front. Directs that the decision be tactfully explained to the Greeks.	201	313
Aug. 18	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Reich Plenipotentiary in Greece</i> Directs that policy in the Mediterranean area must be subordinate to the basic principle of the alliance with Italy.	212	328

## GREECE—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Aug. 26	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Reich Plenipotentiary in Greece</i> Directs Altenburg to maintain complete reserve regarding reorganization of the Greek Government leaving every initiative in the matter to his Italian colleague.	246	394
Sept. 15	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Discusses the situation of Greece with regard to the food supply in view of recent unfavorable developments.	323	512
Oct. 24	<i>Memorandum by Minister Eisenlohr</i> Records the breakdown of German-Italian plans to supply Greece with grain from Turkey and Bulgaria. The German military provide supplementary allowances to Greeks who work for them.	420	676

## HUNGARY

1941 June 24	<i>The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Hungarian Minister President requested clarification as to whether Germany desired Hungarian participation in the advance against the Soviet Union in view of statements to that effect made by the German General with the Hungarian High Command.	10	13
June 24	<i>The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a discussion with General Himer who declared that the statements attributed to him by Minister President Bárdossy (see document No. 10) were not in accordance with the facts. Forwards text of General Himer's note to Colonel Laszlo.	11	15
June 26	<i>The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Bárdossy inquired whether the Government had sent a reply to his inquiry (documents Nos. 10 and 11) regarding Hungarian participation in the German operation against the Soviet Union.	21	24
June 26	<i>The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the statement of Bárdossy that Russian planes had bombed a train and town in Hungary in consequence of which Hungary considered herself at war with the Soviet Union.	22	25
June 26	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records receiving from the Hungarian Minister a memorandum regarding efforts to incorporate the former Yugoslav Banat into the German Reich.	25	28
June 28	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a statement by the Hungarian Minister that he was not misled by the Foreign Ministry regarding developments leading to the German-Russian conflict but that there was a certain confusion in the military field.	40	43
July 1	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I</i> Records text of General Himer's report of June 23 to the OKW regarding Hungarian participation in the campaign against Soviet Russia.	54	63

## HUNGARY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 July 1	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a complaint by the Hungarian Minister regarding the treatment of the Hungarian population in Banat.	55	65
July 1	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records having received from the Hungarian Minister a letter from Horthy to Hitler.	56	66
Aug. 16	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Records his negotiations with Hungarian Minister President Bárdossy leading to German controlling interest in the Maort oil company.	208	319
Sept. 6	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records that the Foreign Minister would postpone conclusion of a frontier treaty with Hungary.	284	459
	<i>Editors' Note</i> Reference to the visit of Minister President Bárdossy and Field Marshal Szombathelyi at Hitler's field headquarters in East Prussia on September 8 and 9.		466
Sept. 16	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a request by the Hungarian Minister that Hungary occupy points in the former Yugoslav Banat inasmuch as Rumanian troops are said to have occupied the right bank of the Danube opposite the Iron Gate.	328	520
Sept. 18	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a discussion with Sztójay in regard to his démarche of September 16 (document No. 328). The Hungarian Government was asked to drop the idea of occupying points in the former Yugoslav Banat.	333	528
Nov. 27	<i>Memorandum by the Dirigent of the Political Department</i> Record of a conversation between Ribbentrop and Bárdossy on November 26. Ribbentrop urged increased Hungarian grain and oil deliveries to Germany; advised the greatest possible calm in Hungary's relations with Rumania; and inquired about Bárdossy's ideas regarding a ban on listening to foreign broadcasts.	503	835
Nov. 28	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff</i> Record of Hitler's reception of Bárdossy on November 27; Hitler expressed optimism about the prospects of the war in the east and in North Africa.	508	856
Dec. 7	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records that Sztójay inquired about the possibility of issuing an officially inspired press report concerning the cancellation of Ribbentrop's visit with Horthy.  (See also under "Rumania" and "Slovakia.")	556	973

## ICELAND

1941 July 13	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Denmark</i> Directs the Legation to induce the Danish Government to protest against the occupation of Iceland by American troops.	102	129
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## ICELAND—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 July 17	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports his conversation with Scavenius on the landing of American forces in Iceland and his attempt to persuade the Minister President to issue a strong declaration of protest against this undertaking.  (See also under "United States.")	118	161

## INDIA

1941 July 17	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records a conversation with Subhas Chandra Bose who stated with respect to the German-Russian war that Indian sympathies were on the side of Russia as an anti-imperialist power. He urged that the proclamation regarding a free India be issued at once.	120	165
Aug. 18	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records a conversation with Bose who presented a letter for the Foreign Minister and urged that the declaration regarding free India be issued soon. Bose argued that the declaration was necessary as a weapon of the nationalists against Gandhi's willingness to compromise under Anglo-American influence. Recommends that the Foreign Minister write to Bose.	213	328
Sept. 6	<i>Minute by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records a decision by Hitler that a declaration regarding India is to be postponed for the time being lest the British have a pretext for invading Afghanistan.	286	461
Sept. 10	<i>The Dirigent of the Political Department to the Director of the Political Department</i> Refers to Woermann's memorandum of August 18 (document No. 213) and forwards the instruction of the Foreign Minister that Bose be told that a declaration regarding free India should be postponed until German operations in the east have made a greater impact.	296	472
Oct. 4	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the establishment of a special office in Rome where all activities connected with the Indian liberation movement are to be coordinated.	379	611
Oct. 16	<i>Memorandum by the Dirigent of the Political Department</i> Transmits Ribbentrop's request for examination of propaganda possibilities regarding Indian prisoners of war, the Pan-Turanian movement and South African opposition to the Smuts Government. Keppler is to deal with India, Hentig with Pan-Turanian matters, and Karlowa with South Africa.	404	649
Nov. 29	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of the conversation of Ribbentrop with Bose in Berlin. Ribbentrop stated that Germany did not want to issue a declaration regarding India until German power had a firm basis in the Near East. Bose pointed to the effectiveness of British propaganda and to the importance of letting the Indian people know Hitler's views regarding their country.	521	896

## INDIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Dec. 1	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Japanese Counselor of Embassy stated that his Government was willing to issue a declaration on Indian independence upon the outbreak of war between Japan and Great Britain which he said was imminent.  (See also under "Afghanistan.")	526	909

## INDOCHINA

1941 July 19	<i>The Dirigent in the Political Department to the Embassy in Japan and to the Embassy in Paris</i> Transmits the text of a memorandum and appendix, handed to Ribbentrop by Oshima, setting forth the Japanese demands regarding Indochina which had been presented to the French Government. Directs the Embassies to observe restraint in the matter.	126	178
July 24	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having been told by the Japanese Foreign Minister of the conclusion of a Japanese-French agreement on the occupation of bases in Indochina.	146	208
Oct. 6	<i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having been told by Benoist-Méchin that Japan's aggressive actions against French sovereignty in Indochina have caused doubts within the French Government regarding the correctness of Darlan's policy.	382	616

## IRELAND

1941 Aug. 24	<i>Memorandum by SS-Standartenführer Veessenmayer</i> Outlines the details of an intelligence operation in Ireland with the aim of establishing liaison with the Irish Republican Army, transmitting military information, and preparing underground resistance in case of an Anglo-American occupation of Ireland.	234	363
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## ITALY

1941 June 23	<i>Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler</i> Supports Hitler's decision in declaring war on the Soviet Union and states his views on common policy toward Turkey, France, Spain, Great Britain, and the United States.	7	8
June 30	<i>Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini</i> Replies to Mussolini's letter of June 23 (document No. 7); describes the military action on the eastern front, suggests arrangements for the Italian army corps, and proposes a new meeting.	50	55

## ITALY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 July 2	<i>Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler</i> Replies to Hitler's letter of June 30 (document No. 50), reaffirms his belief in an Axis victory, and accepts the proposal for a meeting at Hitler's headquarters.	62	72
July 20	<i>Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini</i> Refers to Mussolini's letter of July 2 (document No. 62), and discusses France, North Africa, Spain, Turkey, Japan, and the war in the east.	134	190
July 26	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits the text of a letter dated July 24 from Mussolini to Hitler in reply to Hitler's letter of July 20 (document No. 134). Mussolini gives his views on France, Spain, Turkey, Japan, and Russia.	156	220
Aug. 2	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports discussion with Greifelt and Bene regarding the South Tirol. Because Buffarini's deputy, who is also Prefect of Bolzano, combines tasks which tend to impede a radical, ethnic solution, the proposal was made for the appointment of a special Commissioner on the Italian side.	175	279
Aug. 25	<i>Record of the Duce's Conversation With the Führer</i> Hitler discussed the campaign against Soviet Russia indicating surprise at the Russian equipment but expressing confidence in defeating the Red Army by October. He briefly mentioned England and France. In a second conversation there was a discussion of Turkey, Crete, Spain, France, the neutrals, Japan, and the United States; the war in the Mediterranean; and Italian participation in the Russian campaign.	242	383
Aug. 26	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits text of a letter from Riccardi to Clodius complaining of the German failure to maintain the agreed schedule of deliveries of critical materials to Italy.	245	392
Sept. 2	<i>The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with Giannini about Italian complaints concerning arrearages of German imports of certain critical materials. Clodius belittled these complaints in the meeting with the Italians but in the report admits the seriousness of the situation.	268	435
Sept. 2	<i>The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that with reference to Riccardi's recent letter (see document No. 245) it was explained to the Italians that the apparent passive trade balance with Italy was a matter of bookkeeping since war materials were a separate account.	269	436
Sept. 5	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Mussolini was painfully affected over a report by an Italian official in Germany according to which Kreisleiter Goldbeck of Recklinghausen had signed a circular expressing preference for interbreeding of German women with Norwegians, Danes, and even Englishmen over that with Italians.	281	453



## ITALY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Sept. 13	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of the conversation between the Reich Foreign Minister and Ambassador Alfieri at General Headquarters on September 12. Subject: The war in the east, the Greer incident and German-US relations, Japanese policy, Italian workers in Germany, and shortages of strategic raw materials in Italy.	308	483
Sept. 24	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Forwards a memorandum by an informant regarding Ciano's views on the war: Neither the Axis nor England can win, and a compromise peace is necessary.	354	560
Sept. 25	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with Ciano who showed him a copy of an Italian report (document No. 356) describing maltreatment of Italian laborers in Germany.	355	562
Sept. 25	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits the text of the Italian report referred to in telegram No. 2315 (document No. 355).	356	563
Sept. 27	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports in detail on the situation in the South Tirol, the problem of the resettlement of the German population, the attitude of the Italian authorities, and the future tasks of the German High Commissioner.	362	575
Oct. 2	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a conversation with Alfieri who mentioned the complaints of the Italian laborers in Germany and suggested the possibility of returning all Italian laborers in Germany to Italy.	375	605
Oct. 11	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a conversation with Alfieri about the treatment of Italian laborers in Germany. While many of the Italian complaints appeared to be unfounded, there were enough discrepancies to deserve investigation by experts from both sides. Alfieri was sensitive regarding the circular attributed to Kreisleiter Goldbeck of Recklinghausen (see document No. 281).	397	639
Oct. 18	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of the conversation between the Foreign Minister and Ambassador Alfieri at Headquarters on October 17. Ribbentrop discussed the Russian campaign, the prospects for England and America, the case of Kreisleiter Goldbeck, the problem of Italian workers in Germany, Alfieri's report on Hitler's latest speech.	409	653
Oct. 18	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy</i> Explains that the alleged circular of Kreisleiter Goldbeck has been investigated and the document proved to be the work of two delegates of the Italian Government. Directs the Ambassador to request a copy of the document; to submit the German report on the matter to Ciano or Anfuso; and to insist that Mussolini be fully informed.	410	662

## ITALY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Oct. 19	<i>Ambassador Alfieri to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop</i> Refers to his recent meeting with Ribbentrop (see document No. 409) and defends his reports about complaints of Italian workers in Germany. Alfieri also stated that the sentiment of the German people, in general, was not favorable to Italy.	411	664
Oct. 25	<i>The Legation in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry</i> Clodius reports about his recent conversations in Rome regarding the dwindling Italian supplies of oil and grain. According to Admiral Riccardi 54,000 tons of oil were needed immediately; otherwise transport operations to Libya would have to be suspended during November.	421	679
Oct. 26	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Records the conversation at Headquarters on October 25 between Hitler and Ciano. Hitler reviewed the campaign in Russia, and his plans for the future. Ciano mentioned the food situation in Italy, Italian workers in Germany, and increased Italian military participation in the war in the East.	424	687
Oct. 29	<i>Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini</i> Explains the latest military developments on the eastern front; lists all possible moves by Britain against Germany and his own countermeasures; and suggests to Mussolini more effective methods of operations in North Africa.	433	709
Nov. 1	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Reports having refused the request of Riccardi for German consent to his purchase of 100,000 tons of Rumanian grain for Italy.	440	725
Nov. 3	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Department for German Internal Affairs</i> Records a discussion with Brigadeführer Müller regarding the treatment of Italian laborers in Germany. Those guilty of infractions are no longer to be sent to labor training camps but sent back to Italy.	444	730
Nov. 4	<i>Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to Ambassador Alfieri</i> Replies to Alfieri's letter of October 19 (document No. 411), minimizes the seriousness of the complaints of Italian workers in Germany and asserts that, contrary to Alfieri's information, the attitude of the German people toward Italy is friendly.	446	733
Nov. 6	<i>Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler</i> Replies to Hitler's letter of October 29 (document No. 433) and reaffirms his belief in victory over Bolshevism. He is convinced that America will actively intervene and land an expeditionary force in Egypt; he examines the various possibilities of enemy action and declares that Italy is well prepared for all eventualities. He gratefully accepts Hitler's offers of raw materials, weapons, and of the X German Air Corps.	454	749

## ITALY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Nov. 7	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with Ciano who drew attention to certain anti-Italian activities in the Mitrovica area which allegedly enjoyed German support.	456	758
Nov. 24	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the Military Commander in Serbia</i> States that incoming reports indicate a tendency of the military administration in the Mitrovica area to sympathize with anti-Italian Albanian elements. Directs that the problem be taken up with the Military Commander to prevent the area from becoming a source of Italo-German friction.	495	817
Nov. 25	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Italy</i> In response to telegram No. 2828 (document No. 456) directs Mackensen to assure Ciano that there is no support of anti-Italian elements by the German military in the Mitrovica area. There should be no response to the earlier suggestion of Italian incorporation of Mitrovica.	497	819
Nov. 28	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Records a conversation held on November 25 between Ribbentrop and Ciano which Serrano Suñer joined at a later stage. They discussed relations with France, Croatia, Greece, the campaign in Russia and its significance for England and for Turkey.	501	826
Nov. 30	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Records a conversation of November 29 between Hitler and Ciano in which Hitler explained the military operations and problems in the east. Ciano transmitted a request of Mussolini to contribute additional Italian divisions to the eastern front. Both agreed on the stability of the domestic situation in Germany and Italy.	522	900
Dec. 2	<i>The Military Attaché in Italy to the General Staff of the Army, Attaché Department</i> Reports a conversation on December 1 with Mussolini who insisted that the only possibility of radically improving the supply traffic with Libya lay in the use of the harbor of Bizerte.	532	934
Dec. 4	<i>The High Commissioner of the Reich Government for the South Tyrolese Resettlement to the Ambassador in Italy</i> Writes that a discussion with the Italian High Commissioner, Signor Podestà, brought out that the resettlement had reached a dead point. Podestà urged that the Reich designate a resettlement area but it appears that he wishes to push the German side into applying for a moratorium on the resettlement.	544	954
Dec. 7	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy</i> Explains the intention of Mussolini, as expounded to Rintelen (see document No. 532), to gain use of Bizerte as the only means to relieve the supply situation of North Africa. Directs Mackensen to tell Ciano that the French should not be approached on the matter until the Axis had reestablished command of the sea and air in the Central Mediterranean.	552	967

## ITALY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Dec. 7	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having spoken about Bizerte to Ciano who had not yet received instructions for the Turin meeting. Ciano stated that he would not enter into concrete discussion of a matter like Bizerte without first reaching full agreement with Germany.	557	974
Dec. 10	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Records a conversation between Ribbentrop and Alfieri on December 9. Alfieri asked about Germany's position regarding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and about the contents of the Göring-Pétain conversation at Florentin-Vergigny (see document No. 529). Ribbentrop expressed his great satisfaction over Japan's entrance into the war and stated that information about the Florentin meeting had already been sent to Rome.  (See also under "Anti-Comintern Pact," "Bulgaria," "Directives for the Conduct of the War," "France," "Greece," "Tripartite Pact," and "Yugoslavia.")	569	994

## JAPAN

1941 June 23	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with Matsuoka in order to explain the German attack on Soviet Russia. Matsuoka asked if Germany reckoned on a quick collapse of the Stalin regime and mentioned that Oshima's reports indicated that Hitler and Ribbentrop did not expect the active participation of Japan against Russia.	1	1
June 25	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a visit by Matsuoka who stated that the Russian Ambassador had asked if Japan would remain neutral in the Russo-German war. Matsuoka had intentionally left Smetanin in the dark in order to prevent Russian troop withdrawals from the Far East.	14	18
June 28	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on the discussion in Japanese Government and Army circles as to whether Japan should attack the Soviet Union or take vigorous military action in the South.	33	36
June 28	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan</i> Explains that he has arranged with Oshima to influence his Government in favor of speedy military action against the Soviet Union. Instructs Ott to use all his influence toward the same end and suggests seven arguments to be used.	35	40
June 28	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan</i> States that Russian military resistance may collapse sooner than previously expected and that his earlier advice that Japan should intervene actively against the Soviet Union therefore assumes special importance.	36	41

## JAPAN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 July 1	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan</i> Directs Ott to deliver to Matsuoka a personal telegram in which Ribbentrop states that Russia is on the verge of collapse and urges that Japan take the opportunity to seize Vladivostok and advance westward so that the defeat of Russia would free both Europe and the Far East, prepare the final defeat of England, and paralyze any tendency of the United States to intervene.	53	61
July 3	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to the instructions from Ribbentrop (documents Nos. 35 and 36) and reports that he has brought influences to bear on the Japanese leaders in favor of a rapid action against the Soviet Union. Reports that Matsuoka gave him a statement for Ribbentrop and that he explained that Japan was not at present in a position to enter the war against the Soviet Union.	63	73
July 3	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to his telegram of July 2 (document No. 63) and transmits a statement from Matsuoka informing Ribbentrop that Japan, while preparing for all possible eventualities regarding the U.S.S.R., has also decided to secure points d'appui in French Indochina in order to increase her pressure on Britain and the United States which will constitute a contribution to the common cause no less vital than Japanese intervention in the German-Soviet war.	64	75
July 3	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having carried out the instructions conveyed in telegram No. 942 (document No. 53) whereupon Matsuoka expressed full agreement with Ribbentrop and regretted that his opinions could not prevail in the Cabinet.	65	76
July 5	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan</i> Offers a correction of the account which Matsuoka gave Ott in May 1941 regarding his discussions with Ribbentrop in Berlin prior to the conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact of April 1941. Explains that conclusion of the Pact was not appropriate and came as a surprise.	72	84
July 10	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having been told by Matsuoka that no American reply to Japan's latest proposals had been received but that he had learned from an informant that an American reply was verbally received. Requests information on this new American move to counteract the pro-American clique in the Japanese Government.	88	108
July 10	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan</i> Requests more detailed information on Japanese-American relations, on the Japanese attitude toward the landing of American forces in Iceland, and on Japanese reactions to his message of July 1 to Matsuoka (see document No. 53). Expresses confidence that the Japanese Government will seize this unique opportunity for settling the Russian and the Chinese problems and securing Japan's southward expansion.	89	110

## JAPAN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 July 12	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> States that his report of July 10 based on confidential information regarding the receipt of an American reply to the latest Japanese proposals (document No. 88) was confirmed by Deputy Foreign Minister Ohashi who supplied additional details on the subject.	95	121
July 14	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Replies to the instructions of July 10 (document No. 89) and refers to his previous reports on Japanese-American relations. States that the Japanese Government, including Matsuoka, views the possibility of an American entry into the war with concern. Emphasizes that he is using all his influence to bring about an early participation of Japan in the war.	105	131
	<i>Editors' Note</i> Reference to Hitler's conversation with Ambassador Oshima on July 15.		141
July 17	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports regarding discussions with influential leaders of the Japanese Army military who emphasized the need for making extensive preparations for any campaign against Soviet Russia, in view of the strength of the Soviet forces facing Japan.	117	158
July 18	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Summarizes the main points of the American reply to the Japanese proposals of May 1941 (see volume XII, of this series, document No. 512) and of the Japanese counterproposals about to be sent to Ambassador Nomura, both of which had been communicated to Ambassador Ott by an official of the Japanese Foreign Ministry.	123	169
July 18	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Stahmer</i> Comments in a brief for Ribbentrop and Hitler on the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet and considers it likely that the next Cabinet will have a Foreign Minister who will promote developments in accordance with the Tripartite Pact.	124	173
July 19	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan</i> Refers to the negotiations between Japan and the United States and directs Ott to express as his own the view that the toning down in the Japanese counterproposals of passages of importance to the powers of the Tripartite Pact would only encourage further demands by the United States.	127	179
July 20	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Forwards the text of a statement by the new Japanese Foreign Minister Toyoda addressed to the Ambassadors of Germany and Italy assuring them that Japan's attitude will not change and that Toyoda will continue Matsuoka's foreign policy.	130	185
July 20	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Discusses the composition and policies of the new Japanese Cabinet and states that the elimination of Matsuoka was the aim of the resignation of the previous Cabinet. Does not expect the new Cabinet to pursue a vigorous policy with respect to the United States or to the Soviet Union or China.	131	186

## JAPAN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 July 21	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan</i> Refers to Ott's telegram of July 19 (document No. 131) and asks for clarification regarding the part played in Matsuoka's dismissal by his negotiation of the Neutrality Pact with Russia.	136	197
July 21	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to the instruction of July 19 (document No. 127) and reports having told the Deputy Foreign Minister of his personal objections to the toning down of passages in the Japanese counterproposals to the United States. Reports that the counterproposals had already been sent before Matsuoka's resignation.	137	198
Aug. 5	<i>Memorandum by an Officer in the Intelligence Department of the Army General Staff</i> Records the visit on August 4 at the Intelligence Department of Japanese Military Attaché General Banzai who, on instructions from the Japanese General Staff, stated that the Japanese Army and Government were determined to enter the war against Soviet Russia as soon as the strategic concentration of the forces would permit.	177	282
Aug. 20	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Reviews the course of the negotiations with Japan regarding rubber and general economic matters and emphasizes the difficulties raised by the Japanese with regard to Germany's imports of rubber. Suggests that the Foreign Minister discuss these issues with Oshima.	216	338
Aug. 22	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the announcement of American shipments of aviation gasoline has placed the Japanese Government in a dilemma in the face of which no decision has been reached, for the Navy tends to exaggerate the dangers of an operation in the North and the Army feels greater misgivings about an early war with the Soviet Union.	225	351
Aug. 24	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter</i> Forwards a report of August 22 from the Naval Attaché in Tokyo based on conversations with leading Japanese Naval officers. The Japanese Navy believes that there will be no Japanese attack on Russia but that Japan, after consolidation of her bases in Indochina, will occupy Thailand and the Dutch oil-fields, attack Manila, and blockade Singapore.	235	367
Aug. 25	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan</i> Refers to Ott's report of August 22 (document No. 225) and outlines several arguments with which Ott is directed to counter the irresolution of the Japanese Government: the Red Army is practically destroyed; the United States has reacted with economic sanctions and words only to Japan's occupation of Indochina; Japan now has a freedom of choice; and can end the threat of encirclement by an active policy.	239	375
Aug. 29	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having learned from Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Amau that Prime Minister Konoye had sent a message to President Roosevelt. Ott expressed serious doubts about the advisability of a conciliatory gesture by Japan.	256	410

## JAPAN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Aug. 30	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to the instruction of August 25 (document No. 239) and reports having given the Japanese Foreign Minister a picture of the situation. Toyoda declined to give particulars about Konoye's message to President Roosevelt and acted with reserve.	259	414
Sept. 4	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on the Japanese domestic situation which led to Konoye's message to President Roosevelt. Expresses the opinion that the attempt of the circles around Konoye to seek a modus vivendi with the United States cannot succeed in view of the deep-seated conflicts of interest between the two countries.	276	446
Sept. 4	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a discussion with Oshima regarding the German-Japanese negotiations relating to rubber and raw materials and having urged that the important economic questions not be decided by departmental particularism detached from joint policy.	278	450
Sept. 8	<i>Extract From the Notes of the Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the High Command of the Army</i> Record of Weizsäcker's view that Japan should be pressed to attack Vladivostok and of Hitler's view opposing such pressure lest it be interpreted as a sign of weakness.	291	466
Sept. 13	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having been assured by Foreign Minister Toyoda that the recent messages exchanged between Roosevelt and Konoye merely meant a resumption of Japanese-American talks that had broken off and that Japan would not assume any commitment contrary to the Tripartite Pact. Toyoda, however, refused to reveal the texts of these messages.	310	490
Sept. 14	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan</i> Refers to President Roosevelt's speech of September 11 and directs Ott to criticize it and to explain that Germany will not be deflected from the policy followed so far. Refers to the negotiations of Japan with the United States and directs Ott to urge Japan to state clearly in Washington that further acts of aggression by the United States will evoke the case of the alliance under the Tripartite Pact.	316	503
Sept. 16	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> With reference to the instruction of September 13 (document No. 316) reports that Toyoda gave assurances that Japan would come to the aid of the Axis Powers in case of an American attack and that he would submit the German suggestions to the Cabinet.	324	515
Sept. 16	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Japan</i> Explains that Oshima was received by Ribbentrop at Headquarters on August 23, and that he was informed of the Japanese-American conversations by Weizsäcker on September 4. Oshima was grateful because he had been kept in the dark by his own Government.	325	516

## JAPAN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Sept. 20	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the text of the Japanese Government's reply to the German suggestion for a Japanese statement to be addressed to the United States. It assures Germany that in the negotiations thus far, Japan, in accordance with the Tripartite Pact, has fulfilled her task of restraining America from entering the war. Ott considered the statement as far from precise.	342	537
Sept. 21	<i>The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a discussion with the Japanese Military Attaché, General Isoda, who on instruction discussed the possibility of British or American intervention if Japan should attack Russia or occupy Thailand or the Netherlands Indies. Bötticher presented the views given in his own reports, pointing to weaknesses in the British position and in America.	345	543
Sept. 26	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Forwards the text of the Japanese statement intended for the United States which points out that the threat of a German-American war would cause grave concern to Japan as a signatory to the Tripartite Pact. Reports having told Amau that it seemed doubtful that the statement would deter the United States from further aggressive action.	359	569
Oct. 4	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Presents a picture of Japan's position as sketched by leaders of the Army: a disinclination to consider an attack against Soviet Russia before next spring; a preference for an attack against the Anglo-Saxon position in the south which would not be dependent on the time of year; a tendency to regard the British Empire as the enemy and to ignore the possibility of intervention by the United States, yet with a growing feeling that conflict with the United States is unavoidable.	378	608
Oct. 6	<i>The Embassy in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Recommends that for economic as well as political reasons consideration be shown for Japan's wishes. Argues that a halt in the production or a confiscation of goods ordered by Japan would result in the cessation of Japanese deliveries of strategic materials, would frustrate hopes in the Tripartite Pact and increase the danger of a Japanese-American détente.	381	613
Oct. 20	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Comments upon the members of the new Tojo Cabinet and emphasizes that certain Ministers who represented conservative and business elements are no longer in the government.	413	667
Oct. 31	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with Foreign Minister Togo who stated that no decision had yet been taken regarding an intensified warning to the United States and who asked how the German Government visualized the further conduct of the war. Ott explains his impression that the Japanese Government is still uncertain about the policy to be adopted.	434	717

## JAPAN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Nov. 6	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with Foreign Minister Togo regarding the dispatch of Ambassador Kurusu to Washington. Togo stated that instructions for a warning to Roosevelt which Japan had promised had not been issued, but explained that definite limits had been set for Kurusu's negotiations which he might not exceed.	451	744
Nov. 9	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan</i> Directs Ott to make use in his conversations of an appraisal of American-Japanese relations based on the reports from the Military Attaché in Washington. This appraisal emphasizes that America is unable to support a war in the Pacific and Atlantic and that Japan, therefore, should not fail to act at such a favorable moment.	458	760
Nov. 18	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Military Attaché was told that the Japanese General Staff is not reckoning on a peaceful settlement with the United States; that the Japanese thrust to the south will come before Germany shifts her main effort from Russia to the Near East; and that the Japanese General Staff wishes a mutual obligation by Germany and Japan not to conclude any separate peace or armistice.	480	798
Nov. 21	<i>The Embassy in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Military Attaché reports that the objectives of any Japanese operations in the south are possibly the occupation of Thailand and the oil fields of British and Dutch Borneo and a surprise attack on the Philippines "in the event of a threatening American attitude about which there can hardly be any doubt."	486	805
Nov. 21	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan</i> Directs Ott to inform the Head of the Department of Foreign Armies of the Japanese General Staff that Germany considered it a matter of course that in case Germany or Japan became involved in a war with the United States they would only conclude a peace or armistice jointly.	487	806
Nov. 22	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having been assured by Foreign Minister Togo that Japan was taking a firm attitude in the negotiations with the United States and having received confidential information regarding these discussions.	488	807
Nov. 23	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having carried out the instruction of November 21 (document No. 487) and that General Okamoto asked whether Germany would consider herself at war with the United States if Japan opened hostilities against that country.	492	813
...	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Record of a conversation between Ribbentrop and Oshima on November 28. Ribbentrop inquired about the state of the Japanese-American conversations, and about Japanese intentions regarding Thailand and Indochina. He expressed the view that it might be best for Japan to have a showdown with the United States at this most favorable moment.	512	868

## JAPAN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Nov. 30	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having been informed by the Japanese Foreign Minister that the American note of November 26 indicated a wide divergence of the respective positions in the Japanese-American negotiations. States that Foreign Minister Togo emphasized that American efforts to make the Tripartite Pact inoperative were a principal obstacle to success in the negotiations.	524	906
Dec. 5	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports Japanese determination following the receipt of the American note of November 26. States that he has so far advised against an attack on the United States and requests instructions.	545	956
Dec. 6	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having been informed by the Japanese Foreign Minister of the Japanese reply to a recent American inquiry regarding concentration of Japanese forces in Indochina. States that the Foreign Minister's line of conversation indicated the resistance which Japan has to overcome while she is reaching a decision.	550	964
Dec. 6	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan</i> Refers to Ott's telegram of December 5 (document No. 545) and states that it would be inappropriate to suggest to the Japanese Government a particular course of action with regard to the United States. Directs Ott to tell the Japanese that the Axis Powers and Japan must fight this struggle together regardless of the tactical moves of one or the other partner in the individual case.	551	966
Dec. 9	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Foreign Minister Togo personally informed him about Japan's decision to enter the war and of his expectation that Germany would promptly declare war on the United States. Says that he made the statement as directed in Ribbentrop's telegram of December 6 (document No. 551).  (See also under "Anti-Comintern Pact," "China," "Indochina," "Tripartite Pact," and "United States.")	567	990

## LATIN AMERICA

1941 July 5	<i>The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with the Argentine Foreign Minister who explained that after Russia's impending defeat neither Germany nor England would be able to defeat the other and who urged a mediation by President Roosevelt. Reports that he objected that Roosevelt was unsuitable.	73	86
July 11	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in Brazil</i> Directs that the Brazilian Government be informed that the execution of the Krupp contract regarding deliveries of war material would be upheld and a new production plan would be worked out.	93	119

## LATIN AMERICA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 July 16	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Argentina</i> Refers to the report of July 5 (document No. 73) and expresses agreement with the Ambassador's view toward the suggestion of mediation by Roosevelt. Directs Thermann not to touch on the idea of good offices of the Argentine Government.	112	142
July 20	<i>The Minister in Bolivia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that a state of siege has been proclaimed by the Bolivian Government which has declared him to be persona non grata.	135	195
July 25	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in Argentina</i> Transmits the text of a memorandum about Germany's attitude toward the proposed Argentine-Brazilian customs union. Germany favored it because it would increase South American resistance to United States political and economic encroachments and because it would provide a greater market for a future greater German economic area.	154	217
July 27	<i>The Director of the News Service and Press Department to Various Missions</i> Explains that Major Belmonte, Bolivian Military Attaché, will brand the letter allegedly written by him to Minister Wendler as a falsification. Directs that the "Belmonte Case" be prominently publicized.	158	224
Aug. 14	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records Ribbentrop's view that the arrest of five Party members in Chile automatically justified official reprisals and notes that preparations for these were being made.	202	314
Aug. 27	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a conversation with the Argentine Ambassador in which he protested about various incidents in Argentina which had worsened the relations between the two countries.	251	401
Sept. 3	<i>The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports an interpellation in the Chamber of Deputies suggesting that the German Ambassador be declared persona non grata.	274	443
Sept. 4	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records a conversation with the Argentine Ambassador who inquired about the arrest of 11 Argentinians in Paris and whether these were reprisals for the arrest of Germans in Argentina. Woermann denied any relationship between the two actions.	279	451
Sept. 9	<i>The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with the Argentine Foreign Minister who suggested the possibility that the German Government itself bring about the recall of Ambassador Thermann.	293	469
Sept. 23	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records that the arrest of Chileans in Germany has had an effect on the Chilean Government, especially in connection with the arrest of Germans in Chile. To prevent a further deterioration of the relationship between the two countries, Woermann suggests an elastic use of reprisals and at least a temporary release of the arrested Chilean citizens.	351	555

## LATIN AMERICA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Nov. 6	<i>The Embassy in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that General Miller, Chief of the U.S. Military Mission, demanded cooperation of the Brazilian Minister of War for the establishment of U.S. bases in Brazil, but that the Minister of War refused and the American Ambassador disavowed General Miller.	450	743
Nov. 29	<i>The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with Colonel Benjamin Vargas, the brother of the President, who conveyed the President's desire to remain on good terms with Germany and explained that concessions made to the United States did not mean any fundamental change in Brazil's foreign policy.	520	895
Dec. 1	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Argentina</i> Directs Ambassador Thermann to explain that now that the agitation against his person has subsided, the German Government would be willing to consider a simultaneous replacement of its Ambassador in Buenos Aires and of the Argentine Ambassador in Berlin.	528	912
Dec. 10	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassies in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, and to the Legation in Peru</i> Instructs the German representative to inform the Foreign Minister of the state of war between the United States and Germany, Japan, and Italy; to explain that this was entirely due to the policy of the United States; and was the exclusive responsibility of President Roosevelt.	570	996
Dec. 11	<i>The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to the Foreign Minister's instruction of December 10 (document No. 570) and reports his conversation with the Argentine Foreign Minister who explained that future German-Argentine relations would have to take account of Argentina's adherence to the principles of Pan-American solidarity, assistance and defense.  (See also under "Portugal," and "United States.")	575	1002

## MIDDLE EAST

1941 June 25	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Notes the suggestion from the French Government that in case of a French request for military aid in Syria, Germany issue a declaration recognizing French rights there. Advises against an unqualified declaration which would run counter to German policy toward the Arabs.	19	22
July 4	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with French State Secretary Benoit-Méchin dealing with Turkish wishes with regard to occupation of Syria, German-French relations, and German intentions with regard to the occupied countries.	71	82

## MIDDLE EAST—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 July 9	<i>The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Iran is taking military measures to defend herself against any English attack and that she would appeal to Germany for help if such an attack should be made.	84	103
July 12	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Italy and to the Embassy in Paris</i> Explains that Minister Cosmelli has been informed that the English have proposed to General Dentz a suspension of hostilities, and that the German Government, while warning the French of English insincerity, left the decision to them.	101	128
July 20	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Directs all Foreign Ministry personnel concerned with Arab propaganda to support henceforth Arab wishes for unlimited political freedom; the collapse of French resistance in Syria has eliminated the hitherto existing reasons for German reserve in this matter.	132	188
July 30	<i>Memorandum by Minister Rahn</i> Report on the German mission in Syria from May 9 to July 11, 1941: I Mission (p. 237); II Journey (p. 238); III First Meeting with High Commissioner General Dentz (p. 239); IV Damascus (p. 242); V First Arms Transports (p. 243); VI Additional Arms Transports (p. 244); VII War Preparations in Syria (p. 245); VIII Representatives of the Wehrmacht in Syria (p. 248); IX The "Arab Movement" (p. 250); X German Intervention in Syria (p. 251); XI The English Attack (p. 253); XII Economic Matters (p. 256); XIII Supplies (p. 258); XIV "Desert War" (p. 260); XV The Armistice (p. 264); XVI Conclusion (p. 265).	165	237
Aug. 1	<i>The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the British Minister presented a note to the Iranian Foreign Ministry recommending the removal of Germans from the country.	171	272
Aug. 5	<i>Memorandum by Minister Grobba</i> Reviews Gaylani's proposal for German-Iraq cooperation. Recommends that Germany aim for his reinstatement as Iraq Minister President. Proposes that Germany negotiate agreements with Iraq which would become effective when German occupation of Iraq is imminent.	180	285
Aug. 6	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Refers to Grobba's memorandum of August 5 (document No. 180) and explains that some degree of Italian participation will be necessary. Recommends careful internal preparation prior to discussions with Gaylani.	183	288
Aug. 19	<i>The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with the Iranian Minister President regarding the British demand for the removal of Germans from Iraq. Agrees with the Minister President that an organized, official departure of German residents would have a devastating effect on Iranian morale.	215	335

## MIDDLE EAST—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Aug. 21	<i>The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having been told by the secretary of the Grand Mufti of Italian attempts to induce the Grand Mufti and Gaylani to conclude political and economic agreements with Italy at this time.	221	344
Aug. 23	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Iran</i> Instructs Ettel to convey to the Shah a message expressing hope that he will continue to resist encroachment on Iran's sovereignty for a short while longer and explaining that Germany meanwhile was advancing farther into the Ukraine and that Russia's power to resist was plainly ebbing.	230	358
Aug. 25	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> Record of interministerial conference of August 23. Agreement was reached on the basic principles for the economic provisions of a German-Iraq draft treaty to be discussed with Gaylani on his forthcoming visit to Germany.	233	361
Aug. 25	<i>The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having conveyed Hitler's message to the Shah (see document No. 230) who stated that the Soviet Ambassador and British Ambassador had presented a note explaining that their troops were entering Iran because of failure of her Government to expel the Reich Germans. The Shah asks that Turkey be approached to bring about a cessation of hostilities.	240	379
Aug. 25	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Notes foreign reports of an Anglo-Russian invasion of Iran. Proposes a seven-point program for immediate action.	243	388
Aug. 28	<i>The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Shah has ordered the Iranian troops to make no further use of arms.	252	402
Sept. 1	<i>The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with the Foreign Minister and Minister President regarding the fate of the German colony in Iran and that he warned against expulsion of the Reich Germans without assurances of safe conduct to Turkey.	263	419
Sept. 4	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff</i> Records having discussed with Hitler the situation of the German colony in Iran. Hitler approved the proposal by the Foreign Minister that the German Legation not be withdrawn until the fate of the Germans in Iran had been decided.	280	452
Sept. 7	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Iran</i> Advises Ettel that internment of the members of the German colony in Iran by the British is to be preferred over their surrender to the Bolsheviks. Informs Ettel of a communication for the British Government by way of Switzerland threatening reprisals against English residents of the Channel Islands in case of refusal to grant safe conduct to the German colony in Iran.	287	461

## MIDDLE EAST—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Sept. 9	<i>The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Iranian Foreign Minister made public an exchange of notes indicating that the Allies were demanding the surrender of the German colony to the British or Russians.	295	471
Sept. 12	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> States with respect to a Soviet demand for the surrender of a number of Germans in Iran that reprisals will be taken against Soviet citizens in areas under German control.	305	482
Sept. 12	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff</i> Records Hitler's wish that 10 Englishmen be deported from the Channel Islands to the Pripet Marshes for every German deported from Iran.	306	482
Sept. 13	<i>The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on his negotiations with Iranian Foreign Ministry officials requesting an extension of the time limit for the deportation of the German colony. States that he informed the men of the colony that their departure could be no longer delayed lest the safe conduct promised for the women and children be jeopardized.	311	494
Sept. 14	<i>The Dirigent of the Political Department to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reiterates that for every German from Iran interned by the British, 10 British subjects from the Channel Islands are to be interned in the Pripet Marshes. Directs that such measures be prepared for execution at a moment's notice but that the effective date will be given later.	317	506
Sept. 15	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records that Ribbentrop rejected a proposal by Bohle that Stalin's son and high-ranking Russian officers who had been taken prisoner be used as bargaining points in negotiations with the Soviet Union regarding the Germans in Iran.	322	512
Oct. 13	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having been told by Anfuso in strictest secrecy that the Grand Mufti had arrived in Italy a short while ago.	399	641
Oct. 28	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having been told by Anfuso that the Grand Mufti had made a favorable impression on Mussolini and had told him that his aim was political independence for Palestine, Syria, and Iraq.	428	704
Nov. 5	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Anfuso handed Bismarck the text of a declaration agreed upon by Mussolini, Ciano, and the Grand Mufti which was to be issued by the Grand Mufti after German consent had been obtained.	449	742



## MIDDLE EAST—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Nov. 6	<i>Memorandum by Minister Grobba</i> Records the arrival of the Grand Mufti in Berlin and the discussions held with him and Alberto Mellini of the Italian Foreign Ministry with regard to the text of the proposed declaration transmitted in Mackensen's telegram of November 5 (document No. 449).	452	746
Nov. 13	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Submits to Hitler a summary of developments in the Arab, Indian, and Pan-Turanian questions together with proposals for German activities in these matters. Recommends that the Grand Mufti be received by Hitler.	468	774
Nov. 15	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff</i> Records Hitler's comments on Ribbentrop's memorandum of November 13 (document No. 468). Notes that Hitler will receive the Grand Mufti but regards the Pan-Arab question as pertaining to the Italian sphere of influence and that he considers it contrary to German interests to promote a Pan-Turanian feeling.	475	786
Nov. 19	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Italy</i> Asks Mackensen to ascertain the views of the Italian Government concerning the idea under consideration in Berlin that a council of Arab leaders with headquarters in Rome should be set up.	483	803
Nov. 23	<i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i> States that the projected German-Italian declaration on the independence of the Arab states in the Near East would adversely affect German-French collaboration and weaken the will to resist in French North and West Africa. Urges that the French be informed beforehand of the declaration and that its issuance be postponed until a later date.	494	815
Nov. 28	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of a conversation between Ribbentrop and the Grand Mufti. The Foreign Minister promised support for the Arab cause but expressed doubt, in spite of the Grand Mufti's insistence, whether an Axis declaration in favor of Arab independence should be issued right away.	514	876
Nov. 30	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of the conversation between Hitler and the Grand Mufti on November 28. Hitler promised to announce the hour of Arab liberation once the German armies stood south of the Caucasus but suggested that the declaration requested by the Mufti be put off for a few months.	515	881
Nov. 28	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records that following the Grand Mufti's reception by Hitler the decision was made to postpone the declaration on Arab Freedom; also a suggestion was to be made to the Italians that a communiqué be issued concerning the Grand Mufti's reception by Mussolini which would be followed by a similar communiqué on his reception by Hitler.	516	885

## MIDDLE EAST—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Dec. 2	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records the visit of the former Iraq Minister President Gaylani who expressed the wish to be recognized immediately as Iraq Minister President and to conclude with Germany a comprehensive treaty proceeding for various forms of cooperation.  (See also under "Egypt," "India," and "Turkey.")	536	940
NETHERLANDS			
1941 June 30	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands</i> Instructs Bene to inquire if the Dutch have expressed any desire to organize volunteer units to fight against the Soviet Union.	45	51
July 3	<i>Reichsleiter Bormann to Reich Minister Lammers</i> Informs Lammers that, as a result of the radio speech of Queen Wilhelmina in support of Russia, Hitler had approved the confiscation of the property of the Netherlands Royal House.	69	80
July 5	<i>The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on the political situation and the attitude of the population following the outbreak of the war against the Soviet Union, and discusses the measures undertaken and planned by the Reich Commissar.	75	89
Oct. 1	<i>The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports Seyss-Inquart's account of his meeting with Hitler on September 26. Hitler expressed satisfaction over the current German policies and requested that Mussert and his NSB should become the only political party in the occupied Netherlands.	373	598
Oct. 13	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Legal Department</i> Records a conversation with the Swedish Minister who requested permission to visit the Mauthausen concentration camp where 400 Dutch Jews had died since February 1941.	400	642
Oct. 20	<i>The Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands to the Chief of the Reich Chancellery</i> Request a decision about the transfer of Dutch hostages from concentration camps in Germany to camps in the Netherlands to prevent an investigation by the Swedish Legation.	412	666

## PORTUGAL

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 July 2	<i>The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with Salazar on the possibility of sending Portuguese volunteers to the eastern front. Salazar did not consider this feasible but indicated his intention publicly to express his sympathy with Germany in the fight against Bolshevism.	60	69
July 13	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Portugal</i> Directs the Minister to call the attention of the Portuguese Government to statements by American politicians urging American occupation of the Azores and to report the Portuguese evaluation of this matter.	103	130
July 20	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that President Roosevelt has for the present postponed plans for the occupation of the Cape Verde Islands, Azores, and Dakar and provides details about the President's policy and attitude.	133	189
July 22	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records a conversation with the Portuguese Minister about the United States' attitude toward the Azores; Portuguese-Spanish relations; and economic conditions in Spain.	141	202
July 31	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having learned of American plans for the occupation of the Azores.	168	267
Aug. 21	<i>The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on the tungsten situation in Portugal and the activities of German firms in acquiring interests in tungsten mines.	224	349
Sept. 2	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records a conversation with the Portuguese Minister regarding attempts by the United States to interest Brazil in the occupation of the Azores; Portuguese-Brazilian relations; and the general attitude of Spain and Portugal to Latin America.	271	439
Sept. 21	<i>The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having been assured that no official communication has been transmitted to the Portuguese Government by Brazil regarding the Azores, but that the United States would inform Brazil prior to any American action in the Azores.	346	545
Sept. 30	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I M</i> Records statements by State Secretary Santos Costa as reported by the Air Attaché: Portugal intended to maintain strict neutrality; she would call on Germany for help in case of an English or American landing, but would call on England in case of a German invasion.	370	594

## PORTUGAL—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Nov. 22	<i>The Head of Division W II in the Economic Policy Department to the Legation in Portugal</i> Informs the Legation of discussions with representatives of the Ministry of Economics and of the OKW leading to a plan for a guaranteed monthly supply of tungsten from Portugal in return for certain manufactured products from Germany.  (See also under "Spain.")	489	808
RUMANIA			
1941 July 1	<i>General Antonescu to Adolf Hitler</i> Discusses the joint military operations against the Soviet Union.	57	66
July 2	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that General Antonescu wants a common German-Rumanian frontier and that he opposes the employment of Rumanians and Hungarian troops side by side.	58	68
July 27	<i>Adolf Hitler to General Antonescu</i> Expresses praise for the performance of the Rumanian troops and satisfaction over the course of the operations in Russia; urges Antonescu to advance with his forces into the area southwest of the Bug river and places under his command the LIV Army Corps.	159	225
July 30	<i>General Antonescu to Adolf Hitler</i> Expresses thanks for Hitler's appreciation of the Rumanian military achievement in the war against Soviet Russia and promises to carry out the military tasks requested by Hitler in his letter of July 27 (document No. 159).	167	266
Aug. 6	<i>The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that a roundup of 60,000 Jews for road-building in Bessarabia severely damaged the Rumanian economy. Mihai Antonescu was advised to proceed slowly with elimination of the Jews.	182	287
Aug. 10	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of Hitler's remarks on August 7 on bestowing the Knight's Cross on General Antonescu. Antonescu's reply.	188	296
Aug. 14	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Rumanian Government has reports of the intention of Hungary to occupy the Banat on August 16. Rumania refers to an intention of Hitler to settle that question only after the war.	200	312
Aug. 14	<i>Adolf Hitler to General Antonescu</i> Expresses his views on the future conduct of operations. Suggests that Rumanian forces occupy the area between the Dneister and the Dnieper and that Rumanian mobile units participate in operations east of the Dnieper.	204	316

## RUMANIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Aug. 16	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a request by General Antonescu that German military authorities be prevented from moving Jews back from the Ukraine into Bessarabia.	207	318
Aug. 17	<i>General Antonescu to Adolf Hitler</i> In reply to Hitler's letter of August 14 (document No. 204) states that Rumanian forces will occupy the area between the Dniester and the Dnieper but that Rumania can assume responsibility for the administration and economic exploitation of the area between the Dniester and the Bug only.	210	324
Aug. 21	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Rumania</i> In response to telegram No. 2588 (document No. 200), directs Killinger to remain entirely noncommittal regarding the Banat.	218	342
Sept. 18	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Legation in Rumania</i> Informs the Legation of the order by the OKW forbidding any intervention by the German military for moving Jews from Rumanian territory to the occupied territory or vice versa.	332	528
Sept. 30	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports strong complaints by Mihai Antonescu of the economic and military sacrifices made by Rumania and his urging of radical change in Germany's economic policy.	369	592
Oct. 17	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a discussion regarding Rumania's economic difficulties with Marshal Antonescu who complained especially about purchases by the German troops contrary to existing agreements.	406	651
Oct. 21	<i>Ambassador Ritter to the Legation in Rumania</i> In response to telegram No. 3346 (document No. 406), explains that the whole problem of German expenditures in Rumania is under review; that some Rumanian complaints appear to be unfounded; that a long-term financial plan will be sought which will protect Rumanian interests.	414	669
Oct. 27	<i>The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a discussion with Mihai Antonescu regarding the relationship of the Rumanian Government and the Legion; increased tension between Marshal Antonescu and the Legion; unwillingness of Mihai Antonescu to continue the role of conciliation.	426	700
Nov. 8	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Italy</i> Mentions the mutual Hungarian and Rumanian accusations. Directs Mackensen to inquire if these come to the Italian Government also and if it has any idea of how to deal with them.	457	759

## RUMANIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Nov. 13	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Rumanian Government would leave it up to Germany to deport the Rumanian Jews to the Ghettos in the east.	466	773
Nov. 30	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Record of a conversation between Göring and Mihai Antonescu, apparently held on November 26, regarding German-Rumanian economic relations. Göring urged the greatest possible increase of Rumanian petroleum production even at the risk of exhausting the oil wells.	505	844
[Nov. 28]	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of conversation between Ribbentrop and Mihai Antonescu on November 28. Ribbentrop discussed the course of the war, urged Rumania to increase her deliveries of oil and food to Germany, and asked that the peace be kept between Rumania and Hungary.	513	870
Dec. 3	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of the conversation between Hitler and Mihai Antonescu on November 28; Antonescu promised increased Rumanian deliveries of petroleum and grain to Germany; Hitler promised a reduction of German troops and support for Rumania's currency.	519	891
Dec. 5	<i>Marshal Antonescu to Adolf Hitler</i> Suggests several ways for increasing the export of Rumanian oil to Germany and Italy. Asks that a German expert be sent to examine the situation on the spot.  (See also under "Hungary" and "U.S.S.R.")	549	963

## SLOVAKIA

1941	<i>Editors' Note</i> Reference to conversations of President Tiso and Minister President Tuka with Hitler on October 20.		669
Nov. 1	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Slovakia</i> Directs that Tuka be advised against an official visit to Rumania in view of recent Rumanian efforts toward establishing closer ties between Rumania, Slovakia, and Croatia which aroused concern in Hungary.	438	723
Nov. 26	<i>Memorandum by the Dirigent of the Political Department</i> Record of the reception on November 25 of the Slovak Minister President Tuka by the Foreign Minister in Berlin. They discussed Slovakia's attitude toward Germany, the war against Soviet Russia, Slovak-Hungarian relations, the activities of the former Minister Durčanský, and Tuka's relations with President Tiso.	500	823

## SPAIN

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 June 25	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Serrano Suñer was pleased that Germany agreed to the expedition of Spanish volunteers against Russia, but that as regards a declaration of war against Russia, he feared an economic blockade by England and possibly by America.	12	16
June 28	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that a series of recent moves by Serrano Suñer, such as winning over Franco for sending volunteers against Russia, indicate clearly the intention of preparing Spain's entrance into the war.	34	38
July 4	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that 40 times the number needed volunteered for the Blue Division which is soon to be moved to Germany. The division is to comprise 641 officers, 2,272 noncommissioned officers, and 15,780 men.	70	81
July 18	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I M</i> Records that the English have closely observed the supplying of a German submarine by a German tender in the Canary Islands; although the Spaniards would probably not be deterred by the English protest, the German Naval Attaché has discontinued these supply operations for the next months.	122	168
July 27	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a long conversation with Serrano Suñer on the Spanish attitude toward the Allies and his fears of English or American landings in the Azores, North Africa, or Portugal.	157	222
Aug. 22	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with the Spanish Foreign Minister who was distressed that the new Spanish Ambassador, Count Mayalde, had not yet been received by Hitler.	226	353
Aug. 22	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Adds to his earlier telegram (document No. 226) that Serrano Suñer was hurt that his confidant, Mayalde, had not been received after 4 weeks whereas the former Ambassador, Espinosa, had twice been received in farewell visits at Hitler's headquarters.	229	357
Aug. 23	<i>An Official of the Embassy in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the signing of the agreement concerning employment of Spanish workers in Germany.	231	360
Sept. 2	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits a report of the Military Attaché regarding a discussion with General Asensio, Chief of Staff, who advocated an operation against Gibraltar by Spain alone. Comments that this idea is probably inspired by Minister of War, Varela, who is Anglophile. Urges that a new approach to Spain for military cooperation would probably be successful and asks for instructions.	273	441

## SPAIN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Sept. 3	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Records a conversation with Carceller who argued that a more moderate tone of the Spanish press toward Britain and the United States would result in increased imports of raw materials from overseas. He urged that this would not mean an abandonment of Spain's pro-German policy.	275	444
Sept. 6	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Refers to his earlier memorandum of September 3 (document No. 275) and records a conversation between Carceller and Brandau, of the Protocol Division, according to which the Spanish Minister of Commerce had emphasized that it was up to Germany to decide if she wanted Spain to participate in her European policy as an equal partner.	285	459
Sept. 11	<i>Minister Eisenlohr to the Embassy in Spain</i> Directs Stohrer to make preparations and get permission to increase the loading capacity of the railroad station at Irun.	302	478
Sept. 13	<i>The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the Foreign Ministry</i> States the view of the OKW, which was approved by Hitler, that political and military relations with Spain are to be expanded, yet military action on the Iberian Peninsula is considered undesirable until conclusion of the Russian campaign. A reserved attitude is recommended in economic discussions.	314	498
Oct. 4	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a visit by the Spanish Ambassador who stated that his Government was for some time without news of the Blue Division and who requested permission to make a personal visit to the Division.	380	612
Oct. 6	<i>State Secretary Weizsäcker to Ambassador Stohrer</i> Explains the situation in regard to Mayalde. With both Hitler and Ribbentrop away from Berlin it is exceptional if Chiefs of Mission are able to see either of them.	383	617
Oct. 10	<i>Ambassador Ritter to the Embassy in Spain</i> Expresses resentment over Spanish compliance with a British protest over two German ships supplying German submarines in Las Palmas. Asks Stohrer to arrange with Spanish authorities to have this operation continued as had been agreed upon with the Spanish Government in 1939.	391	628
Oct. 10	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on the internal political crisis and especially the opposition to Serrano Suñer and to his pro-German foreign policy.	392	630
Oct. 10	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the gist of the conversation between Franco, Serrano Suñer, and Weddell as told to him by the Foreign Minister. Weddell suggested far-reaching economic concessions in return for a friendlier policy on the part of Spain regarding Britain and America.	394	633

## SPAIN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Oct. 14	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to the instruction of October 9 (document No. 391) and explains the action of the Spanish Minister of the Navy in regard to the two German supply ships at Las Palmas.	403	647
Nov. 6	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Embassy in Spain</i> Records that recruitment of Spanish workers for Germany has come to a standstill; that not a single worker has left for Germany.	453	748
Nov. 13	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Spain</i> Directs that no discussions about joint military action or the entry of Spain into the war be undertaken with members of the Spanish Government.	467	774
Nov. 15	<i>The Embassy in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits a report according to which Franco stated in a letter to Don Juan that he considered the restoration of the monarchy in Spain the coronation of the revolution.	471	782
Nov. 30	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Records the conversation of Hitler, Ciano, Suñer, Ribbentrop, and Stohrer on November 29 in which Hitler discussed American and Turkish attitudes toward the war, and Serrano Suñer talked about the problems of Spanish policy.	523	904
Dec. 9	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Protocol Department</i> Records a conversation between Hitler and General Moscardo on December 7 about Spanish-Portuguese relations, and Spanish economic difficulties. Hitler expressed his regrets that he was unable to do anything regarding the capture of Gibraltar at that time.  (See also under "Anti-Comintern Pact" and "Portugal.")	555	971
SPANISH MOROCCO			
1941 Aug. 23	<i>An Official of Political Division II to the Consulate at Tetuán</i> Directs that in view of the needs of Germany's allies there should be no discussion in Morocco of Germany's policy regarding the Arabs.	232	361
Nov. 7	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with the Spanish Foreign Minister and Spanish High Commissioner in Morocco regarding German propaganda in Spanish Morocco. Asks for more personnel and funds to counteract extensive American and British activities.	455	756
Nov. 25	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Information Department</i> Records a meeting of November 14 in the German Embassy, Madrid, in which details of future propaganda activities for Spanish Morocco were discussed.	499	822

## SWEDEN

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 June 24	<i>The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that although no definite reply has been received, the Swedish Government will most likely agree to the German military requests, particularly for the transit of one division from Norway over Sweden to Finland.	8	11
June 24	<i>The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Finland's emphasis on her neutrality respecting the German-Russian war is having a retarding effect on conversations with Sweden on political and military questions.	9	12
June 25	<i>The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with the King who expressed his satisfaction that the principal German request for the transit of one division had been accepted by the State Council and who indicated his personal support in this matter.	16	20
June 25	<i>The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Swedish Foreign Minister has stated that the Swedish Government granted the request for the transit of one division from Norway to Finland.	17	21
June 27	<i>The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the wishes of the OKW regarding Swedish cooperation in the campaign against Soviet Russia, as listed in the OKW letter of June 17 (volume XII, document No. 638), have in large measure been granted.	28	30
June 27	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Sweden</i> Directs that the Government's thanks and satisfaction be conveyed to the Swedish Foreign Minister for Sweden's understanding attitude toward Germany's wishes in connection with the war in the East.	30	33
June 29	<i>The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Swedish Foreign Minister assured the Minister of Finland that Sweden would supply arms and ammunition to Finland.	41	44
June 29	<i>The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on the agreement made with the Swedish Air Force for its cooperation with the Luftwaffe as regards: forced landings; courier flights; withholding of fire against German or Finnish aircraft; possible intermediate landings in the transfers of Luftwaffe units; and weather reports.	42	45
June 29	<i>The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on the agreement negotiated with the Swedish Government for cooperation of the Swedish Navy with the German Navy.	43	48
July 2	<i>The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Forwards the list of war materials and equipment requested by the Swedish Government.	59	68

## SWEDEN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 July 6	<i>The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Discusses a possible request to Sweden to accede to the Tripartite Pact. Points out that the concessions already made to Germany have strained the coalition government and that only a minority government could support Sweden's accession. Suggests that Sweden's relationship to Germany could best be defined by a special treaty.	77	93
July 7	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Sweden</i> Acknowledges the argument in the Legation's telegram of July 5 (document No. 77), but reserves a final instruction regarding Swedish accession to the Tripartite Pact. Points out that a bilateral pact with Sweden is out of the question.	79	95
July 10	<i>The Head of Division W VI of the Economic Policy Department to the High Command of the Wehrmacht and other Offices and Ministries</i> Forwards an Official Minute of July 9 which records the agreed conditions for Swedish overseas trade through the harbor of Göteborg.	91	115
July 10	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Division W V of the Economic Policy Department</i> Records a telephone message from Major Radtke (of the OKW, Wi Rü) that he will go to Stockholm. Lists the general answers he will bring in regard to Sweden's wishes for war materials, as forwarded in the Legation's telegram of July 2 (document No. 59).	92	118
July 12	<i>The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to his telegram of July 2 (document No. 59) and complains that instead of the negotiator with full powers which he had requested, Major Radtke appeared with a negative answer and not even the power to grant the few concessions considered in Berlin. Reports having called off the negotiations of today, and having decided to handle aerial questions separately.	98	124
July 15	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Sweden</i> Directs the Legation to decline the offer of the Swedish Government to detail a select group of officers to the Wehrmacht because such officers would command no cadres of volunteers.	109	138
July 25	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a discussion with the Swedish State Secretary regarding the Norwegian ships in Swedish harbors. Boheman stated that the ships were being sharply watched; that they would need at least 2 weeks for preparations to run out; but that Swedish law could not prevent their departure if their papers were in order.	151	214
Aug. 1	<i>The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Swedish Government refused permission for the overland transit of an additional German division to Finland and suggested that the sea route be used instead.	172	272

## SWEDEN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Aug. 2	<i>The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a discussion with Hägglöf regarding the Norwegian ships in Swedish harbors. As a means of preventing the ships from running out to England Hägglöf proposed that the Oslo shipping firms send captains to bring the ships to Norway. Objection by the Norwegian Legation would put the matter into the courts which in any case would involve long delays and provide that the ships remain in Göteborg.	174	277
Aug. 4	<i>The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having expressed the regrets of the German Government over Sweden's refusal to permit the passage of another German division across Swedish territory, and having emphasized the need for secrecy.	176	281
Aug. 5	<i>The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the Swedish Government's assent to analogous application of the agreement of July 1940 which would permit unrestricted transport of war materials over Swedish railroads to Haparanda, Narvik, and Trondheim and the shipment of a few thousand men to Narvik and Trondheim.	178	283
Aug. 6	<i>The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a communication from Söderblom that the Swedes had discovered a captured British officer on a German furlough train.	181	287
Aug. 28	<i>Minute by the Head of Division W V of the Economic Policy Department</i> Records the discussion at Ministerialdirektor Wiehl's office on August 28 concerning economic negotiations with Sweden: the need for a clearing credit from Sweden; the need to maintain civilian exports to Sweden, to centralize Wehrmacht purchases in Sweden, and for relaxation in the matter of exports of war materials to Sweden.	254	405
Sept. 2	<i>The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the announcement in Sweden of the official ban on the recruitment of Swedish volunteers for foreign armies.	270	438
Sept. 8	<i>The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a discussion with Günther regarding the Norwegian ships in Swedish harbors. Günther stated that it was impossible for the Swedish police to change the crews without a court order; he insisted that the validity of the Norwegian decree of May 1940 had to be decided judicially before any action took place; and maintained that Sweden had to operate according to law. He promised finally to re-examine the complex of questions.	290	465
Sept. 11	<i>The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports receiving the final answer of the Swedish Government regarding the Norwegian ships: the recommendation that the Norwegian shipowners institute legal action in order to place their own captains and crews aboard the ships. The Legation recommends either following that course or letting the ships escape and be brought in by German naval vessels.	300	475

## SWEDEN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Sept. 15	<i>The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports regarding conclusion of a new agreement with the Swedish Air Force permitting an increase in the number of flights over Swedish territory by German courier planes.	319	508
Sept. 17	<i>The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that today's conversation revealed the surprising fact that the Norwegian ships have been chartered to England and are at England's disposal. Reports having insisted that the ships be turned over to their rightful owners, the Norwegian shipowners, and without recourse to judicial proceedings, and that pending such restoration no ships be allowed to escape.	329	522
Sept. 19	<i>Ambassador Ritter to the Legation in Sweden</i> Refers to the Legation's telegram of September 17 (document No. 329) and directs that the Swedish Foreign Minister be informed that the facts indicate that the Swedish Government has not dealt openly with Germany; that Sweden has taken an unneutral attitude toward the legal claims of the Norwegian owners for their ships; that the licensing for loading war materials for England throws a peculiar light on the attitude of the Swedish Government.	334	529
Sept. 19	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation in Sweden</i> Refers to the Legation's telegram of September 17 (document No. 329) and states that the Foreign Minister wishes a memorandum on economic relations with Sweden, with special regard to possibilities of putting the thumbscrews on the Swedes.	335	531
Sept. 19	<i>The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> In response to the Reich Foreign Minister's request (document No. 335) submits a memorandum outlining the present status of economic relations with Sweden. Argues that to put pressure on the Swedes by cutting off coal and other deliveries would disrupt the Swedish-German trade on which Germany is more dependent than Sweden. Urges that Sweden is most sensitive in her overseas trade, the Göteborg traffic.	336	532
Sept. 20	<i>The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a new discussion regarding the Norwegian ships with Günther who insisted there had been no changes in the position of the Swedish Government, protested against the imputation of acting behind Germany's back, and denied that war materials were being shipped to England. He explained his policy as one of aid to Germany and neutrality toward England and recounted all that he had done for Germany. The Legation suggests the Göteborg traffic as a possible point for sanctions against Sweden.	343	539
Sept. 22	<i>The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on the significance of the results of the negotiations concluded this day by the governmental committees. The Swedes expressed willingness to negotiate on a credit of 100 million kronor which in part would cover existing and anticipated clearing deficits.	347	546

## SWEDEN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Sept. 25	<i>The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with Hägglöf who explained certain factors regarding the Swedish truck market. The British had cut off the importation of parts from the U.S.A. on learning that Sweden delivered 500 trucks to Finland just as they had cut off the importation of chocolate through Göteborg. Hägglöf also urged the importance of the Göteborg traffic not only for Sweden but also for Germany.	357	565
Sept. 28	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Records a conversation of September 26 with the Swedish Chargé d'Affaires regarding German-Swedish relations: criticism of Germany and of Hitler in the Swedish press; refusal to permit Swedish volunteers to serve with the German colors; the pro-English attitude of the Swedish Government regarding Norwegian ships in Swedish ports.	364	583
Oct. 1	<i>The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Chief of the Legal Department explained the current status of the litigation regarding the Norwegian ships: that the <i>Rigmor</i> was under arrest by order of the Court of Appeal; that the other cases would probably be settled in accordance with the precedent of the <i>Rigmor</i> case.	371	594
Oct. 23	<i>The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that two important problems regarding the supply of the German troops in Finland have been resolved by Sweden's agreement to sell 2,000 tents and to lease 300 trucks equipped with tires.	418	674
Oct. 28	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with the King who expressed his fears of Bolshevism, his admiration for Hitler in the fight against Soviet Russia, and who spoke of his desire to maintain good relations with Germany.	430	706
Nov. 1	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Reich Commissar for Occupied Norway</i> Explains German policy on Nordic congresses in Sweden: Norwegian participation is out of the question; but as regards Finland and Denmark a distinction must be drawn between political and nonpolitical congresses.	437	722
Nov. 20	<i>The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a discussion with Günther regarding Sweden's refusal to supply woolen goods to the German Army in Finland. Günther explained that the raw materials for such goods came from overseas and that the British Government would cut off the Göteborg traffic if Sweden provided such goods to Germany.	484	803
Dec. 1	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Division W IV of the Economic Policy Department</i> Draws the attention of Ribbentrop to a memorandum prepared by the Swedish Government which lists in detail Swedish services on behalf of Germany since July 1940.	530	927

## SWEDEN--Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Dec. 7	<i>Adolf Hitler to King Gustav V of Sweden</i> Refers to the King's message (document No. 430) and expresses his appreciation for the King's sympathy with Germany's anti-Bolshevist struggle. He points out that Germany is fighting for all of Europe and that the Swedish public should realize this more fully than it apparently does.	554	969
Dec. 7	<i>Minister Wied to State Secretary Weizsäcker</i> Mentions that in November Sweden rejected the German requests brought by Schnurre. Predicts that in the new situation resulting from the English declaration of war on Finland it will be necessary to make new demands of Sweden. Suggests that these would best be made through Finland or through the regular route of the Legation rather than by Schnurre as a special envoy.	558	975
Dec. 8	<i>The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports in regard to the consequences of the English declaration of war on Finland which is not expected to change Sweden's attitude toward Finland. Suggests that if special demands have to be made on Sweden they be made through Finland.	561	981
Dec. 8	<i>German-Swedish Agreement Regarding the Delivery of War Materials</i> Secret protocol listing a number of items of arms, ammunition, and military equipment to be delivered by German firms to Sweden, providing for methods of payment and specifying periods for delivery.	565	988
Dec. 11	<i>The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having delivered Hitler's letter (document No. 554) to the King who was rather negative toward Germany's present wishes in regard to the transportation of men on leave and exchange of troops from northern Finland.  (See also under "Finland.")	574	1001
SWITZERLAND			
1941 Aug. 19	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff</i> Submits a report by an agent on the Swiss domestic situation; the report deals with effects of the war in the east, German-Swiss economic relations, opinions in Swiss military circles, and British propaganda in Switzerland.	214	331

## TRIPARTITE PACT

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Dec. 3	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having been informed by Ciano that the Japanese Ambassador had handed Mussolini a communication regarding the breakdown of the Japanese-American conversations, stating that a war of Japan against the United States and Great Britain is regarded "as possible and imminent." Japan requested an Italian declaration of war in such an event as well as a mutual agreement committing the two countries not to conclude an armistice or separate peace with the United States and the British Empire.	537	941
Dec. 4	<i>Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Italy</i> Records a discussion with Marchese d'Ajeta regarding the Japanese démarche of December 3 (document No. 537). D'Ajeta remarked that Berlin was apparently examining very carefully the reply to be made to Japan, and mentioned that opinions in the Palazzo Chigi were divided on whether the outbreak of a Japanese-American conflict at this time would be advantageous to the Axis.	543	953
Dec. 5	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy</i> Forwards the draft text of an agreement of the Tripartite Powers providing for a joint entry into a state of war with America and excluding any separate peace. Directs Mackensen to secure the approval of the Italian Government so that the text may be handed to Oshima.	546	958
Dec. 5	<i>Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy</i> Records a series of conversations in connection with carrying out Ribbentrop's instructions of December 5 (document No. 546). Ciano and Mussolini approved the German draft of an agreement to be concluded with Japan and the proposal that a similar statement be handed to the Japanese Ambassador in Rome.  <i>Editors' Note</i> Reference to the conversations of Oshima and Ribbentrop on December 7.	548	960 977
Dec. 8	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan</i> Forwards the draft of a German-Italian-Japanese agreement which had been discussed with Oshima. Requests that the assent of the Japanese Government be obtained in time for the signing to take place on December 10.	562	982
Dec. 8	<i>Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy</i> Records that Ciano and Mussolini agreed to the draft of the German-Italian-Japanese agreement (document No. 562).	563	983
Dec. 9	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the text of the draft agreement forwarded in the instruction of December 8 (document No. 562) was submitted to Foreign Minister Togo who requested changes in articles 3 and 4 for the sake of the Privy Council. Togo also asked when Germany would declare war on the United States.	568	992



## LATIN AMERICA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Nov. 6	<i>The Embassy in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that General Miller, Chief of the U.S. Military Mission, demanded cooperation of the Brazilian Minister of War for the establishment of U.S. bases in Brazil, but that the Minister of War refused and the American Ambassador disavowed General Miller.	450	743
Nov. 29	<i>The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with Colonel Benjamin Vargas, the brother of the President, who conveyed the President's desire to remain on good terms with Germany and explained that concessions made to the United States did not mean any fundamental change in Brazil's foreign policy.	520	895
Dec. 1	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Argentina</i> Directs Ambassador Thermann to explain that now that the agitation against his person has subsided, the German Government would be willing to consider a simultaneous replacement of its Ambassador in Buenos Aires and of the Argentine Ambassador in Berlin.	528	912
Dec. 10	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassies in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, and to the Legation in Peru</i> Instructs the German representative to inform the Foreign Minister of the state of war between the United States and Germany, Japan, and Italy; to explain that this was entirely due to the policy of the United States; and was the exclusive responsibility of President Roosevelt.	570	996
Dec. 11	<i>The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to the Foreign Minister's instruction of December 10 (document No. 570) and reports his conversation with the Argentine Foreign Minister who explained that future German-Argentine relations would have to take account of Argentina's adherence to the principles of Pan-American solidarity, assistance and defense.  (See also under "Portugal," and "United States.")	575	1002

## MIDDLE EAST

1941 June 25	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Notes the suggestion from the French Government that in case of a French request for military aid in Syria, Germany issue a declaration recognizing French rights there. Advises against an unqualified declaration which would run counter to German policy toward the Arabs.	19	22
July 4	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with French State Secretary Benoit-Méchin dealing with Turkish wishes with regard to occupation of Syria, German-French relations, and German intentions with regard to the occupied countries.	71	82

## MIDDLE EAST—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 July 9	<i>The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Iran is taking military measures to defend herself against any English attack and that she would appeal to Germany for help if such an attack should be made.	84	103
July 12	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Italy and to the Embassy in Paris</i> Explains that Minister Cosmelli has been informed that the English have proposed to General Dentz a suspension of hostilities, and that the German Government, while warning the French of English insincerity, left the decision to them.	101	128
July 20	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Directs all Foreign Ministry personnel concerned with Arab propaganda to support henceforth Arab wishes for unlimited political freedom; the collapse of French resistance in Syria has eliminated the hitherto existing reasons for German reserve in this matter.	132	188
July 30	<i>Memorandum by Minister Rahn</i> Report on the German mission in Syria from May 9 to July 11, 1941: I Mission (p. 237); II Journey (p. 238); III First Meeting with High Commissioner General Dentz (p. 239); IV Damascus (p. 242); V First Arms Transports (p. 243); VI Additional Arms Transports (p. 244); VII War Preparations in Syria (p. 245); VIII Representatives of the Wehrmacht in Syria (p. 248); IX The "Arab Movement" (p. 250); X German Intervention in Syria (p. 251); XI The English Attack (p. 253); XII Economic Matters (p. 256); XIII Supplies (p. 258); XIV "Desert War" (p. 260); XV The Armistice (p. 264); XVI Conclusion (p. 265).	165	237
Aug. 1	<i>The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the British Minister presented a note to the Iranian Foreign Ministry recommending the removal of Germans from the country.	171	272
Aug. 5	<i>Memorandum by Minister Grobba</i> Reviews Gaylani's proposal for German-Iraq cooperation. Recommends that Germany aim for his reinstatement as Iraq Minister President. Proposes that Germany negotiate agreements with Iraq which would become effective when German occupation of Iraq is imminent.	180	285
Aug. 6	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Refers to Grobba's memorandum of August 5 (document No. 180) and explains that some degree of Italian participation will be necessary. Recommends careful internal preparation prior to discussions with Gaylani.	183	288
Aug. 19	<i>The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with the Iranian Minister President regarding the British demand for the removal of Germans from Iraq. Agrees with the Minister President that an organized, official departure of German residents would have a devastating effect on Iranian morale.	215	335

## MIDDLE EAST—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Aug. 21	<i>The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having been told by the secretary of the Grand Mufti of Italian attempts to induce the Grand Mufti and Gaylani to conclude political and economic agreements with Italy at this time.	221	344
Aug. 23	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Iran</i> Instructs Ettel to convey to the Shah a message expressing hope that he will continue to resist encroachment on Iran's sovereignty for a short while longer and explaining that Germany meanwhile was advancing farther into the Ukraine and that Russia's power to resist was plainly ebbing.	230	358
Aug. 25	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> Record of interministerial conference of August 23. Agreement was reached on the basic principles for the economic provisions of a German-Iraq draft treaty to be discussed with Gaylani on his forthcoming visit to Germany.	233	361
Aug. 25	<i>The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having conveyed Hitler's message to the Shah (see document No. 230) who stated that the Soviet Ambassador and British Ambassador had presented a note explaining that their troops were entering Iran because of failure of her Government to expel the Reich Germans. The Shah asks that Turkey be approached to bring about a cessation of hostilities.	240	379
Aug. 25	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Notes foreign reports of an Anglo-Russian invasion of Iran. Proposes a seven-point program for immediate action.	243	388
Aug. 28	<i>The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Shah has ordered the Iranian troops to make no further use of arms.	252	402
Sept. 1	<i>The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with the Foreign Minister and Minister President regarding the fate of the German colony in Iran and that he warned against expulsion of the Reich Germans without assurances of safe conduct to Turkey.	263	419
Sept. 4	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff</i> Records having discussed with Hitler the situation of the German colony in Iran. Hitler approved the proposal by the Foreign Minister that the German Legation not be withdrawn until the fate of the Germans in Iran had been decided.	280	452
Sept. 7	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Iran</i> Advises Ettel that internment of the members of the German colony in Iran by the British is to be preferred over their surrender to the Bolsheviks. Informs Ettel of a communication for the British Government by way of Switzerland threatening reprisals against English residents of the Channel Islands in case of refusal to grant safe conduct to the German colony in Iran.	287	461

## MIDDLE EAST—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Sept. 9	<i>The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Iranian Foreign Minister made public an exchange of notes indicating that the Allies were demanding the surrender of the German colony to the British or Russians.	295	471
Sept. 12	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> States with respect to a Soviet demand for the surrender of a number of Germans in Iran that reprisals will be taken against Soviet citizens in areas under German control.	305	482
Sept. 12	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff</i> Records Hitler's wish that 10 Englishmen be deported from the Channel Islands to the Pripet Marshes for every German deported from Iran.	306	482
Sept. 13	<i>The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on his negotiations with Iranian Foreign Ministry officials requesting an extension of the time limit for the deportation of the German colony. States that he informed the men of the colony that their departure could be no longer delayed lest the safe conduct promised for the women and children be jeopardized.	311	494
Sept. 14	<i>The Dirigent of the Political Department to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reiterates that for every German from Iran interned by the British, 10 British subjects from the Channel Islands are to be interned in the Pripet Marshes. Directs that such measures be prepared for execution at a moment's notice but that the effective date will be given later.	317	506
Sept. 15	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records that Ribbentrop rejected a proposal by Bohle that Stalin's son and high-ranking Russian officers who had been taken prisoner be used as bargaining points in negotiations with the Soviet Union regarding the Germans in Iran.	322	512
Oct. 13	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having been told by Anfuso in strictest secrecy that the Grand Mufti had arrived in Italy a short while ago.	399	641
Oct. 28	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having been told by Anfuso that the Grand Mufti had made a favorable impression on Mussolini and had told him that his aim was political independence for Palestine, Syria, and Iraq.	428	704
Nov. 5	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Anfuso handed Bismarck the text of a declaration agreed upon by Mussolini, Ciano, and the Grand Mufti which was to be issued by the Grand Mufti after German consent had been obtained.	449	742

## MIDDLE EAST—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Nov. 6	<i>Memorandum by Minister Grobba</i> Records the arrival of the Grand Mufti in Berlin and the discussions held with him and Alberto Mellini of the Italian Foreign Ministry with regard to the text of the proposed declaration transmitted in Mackensen's telegram of November 5 (document No. 449).	452	746
Nov. 13	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Submits to Hitler a summary of developments in the Arab, Indian, and Pan-Turanian questions together with proposals for German activities in these matters. Recommends that the Grand Mufti be received by Hitler.	468	774
Nov. 15	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff</i> Records Hitler's comments on Ribbentrop's memorandum of November 13 (document No. 468). Notes that Hitler will receive the Grand Mufti but regards the Pan-Arab question as pertaining to the Italian sphere of influence and that he considers it contrary to German interests to promote a Pan-Turanian feeling.	475	786
Nov. 19	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Italy</i> Asks Mackensen to ascertain the views of the Italian Government concerning the idea under consideration in Berlin that a council of Arab leaders with headquarters in Rome should be set up.	483	803
Nov. 23	<i>The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry</i> States that the projected German-Italian declaration on the independence of the Arab states in the Near East would adversely affect German-French collaboration and weaken the will to resist in French North and West Africa. Urges that the French be informed beforehand of the declaration and that its issuance be postponed until a later date.	494	815
Nov. 28	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of a conversation between Ribbentrop and the Grand Mufti. The Foreign Minister promised support for the Arab cause but expressed doubt, in spite of the Grand Mufti's insistence, whether an Axis declaration in favor of Arab independence should be issued right away.	514	876
Nov. 30	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of the conversation between Hitler and the Grand Mufti on November 28. Hitler promised to announce the hour of Arab liberation once the German armies stood south of the Caucasus but suggested that the declaration requested by the Mufti be put off for a few months.	515	881
Nov. 28	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records that following the Grand Mufti's reception by Hitler the decision was made to postpone the declaration on Arab Freedom; also a suggestion was to be made to the Italians that a communiqué be issued concerning the Grand Mufti's reception by Mussolini which would be followed by a similar communiqué on his reception by Hitler.	516	885

## MIDDLE EAST—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Dec. -2	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records the visit of the former Iraq Minister President Gaylani who expressed the wish to be recognized immediately as Iraq Minister President and to conclude with Germany a comprehensive treaty proceeding for various forms of cooperation.  (See also under "Egypt," "India," and "Turkey.")	536	940
NETHERLANDS			
1941 June 30	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands</i> Instructs Bene to inquire if the Dutch have expressed any desire to organize volunteer units to fight against the Soviet Union.	45	51
July 3	<i>Reichsleiter Bormann to Reich Minister Lammers</i> Informs Lammers that, as a result of the radio speech of Queen Wilhelmina in support of Russia, Hitler had approved the confiscation of the property of the Netherlands Royal House.	69	80
July 5	<i>The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on the political situation and the attitude of the population following the outbreak of the war against the Soviet Union, and discusses the measures undertaken and planned by the Reich Commissar.	75	89
Oct. 1	<i>The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports Seyss-Inquart's account of his meeting with Hitler on September 26. Hitler expressed satisfaction over the current German policies and requested that Mussert and his NSB should become the only political party in the occupied Netherlands.	373	593
Oct. 13	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Legal Department</i> Records a conversation with the Swedish Minister who requested permission to visit the Mauthausen concentration camp where 400 Dutch Jews had died since February 1941.	400	642
Oct. 20	<i>The Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands to the Chief of the Reich Chancellery</i> Request a decision about the transfer of Dutch hostages from concentration camps in Germany to camps in the Netherlands to prevent an investigation by the Swedish Legation.	412	666

## PORTUGAL

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 July 2	<i>The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with Salazar on the possibility of sending Portuguese volunteers to the eastern front. Salazar did not consider this feasible but indicated his intention publicly to express his sympathy with Germany in the fight against Bolshevism.	60	69
July 13	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Portugal</i> Directs the Minister to call the attention of the Portuguese Government to statements by American politicians urging American occupation of the Azores and to report the Portuguese evaluation of this matter.	103	130
July 20	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that President Roosevelt has for the present postponed plans for the occupation of the Cape Verde Islands, Azores, and Dakar and provides details about the President's policy and attitude.	133	189
July 22	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records a conversation with the Portuguese Minister about the United States' attitude toward the Azores; Portuguese-Spanish relations; and economic conditions in Spain.	141	202
July 31	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having learned of American plans for the occupation of the Azores.	168	267
Aug. 21	<i>The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on the tungsten situation in Portugal and the activities of German firms in acquiring interests in tungsten mines.	224	349
Sept. 2	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records a conversation with the Portuguese Minister regarding attempts by the United States to interest Brazil in the occupation of the Azores; Portuguese-Brazilian relations; and the general attitude of Spain and Portugal to Latin America.	271	439
Sept. 21	<i>The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having been assured that no official communication has been transmitted to the Portuguese Government by Brazil regarding the Azores, but that the United States would inform Brazil prior to any American action in the Azores.	346	545
Sept. 30	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I M</i> Records statements by State Secretary Santos Costa as reported by the Air Attaché: Portugal intended to maintain strict neutrality; she would call on Germany for help in case of an English or American landing, but would call on England in case of a German invasion.	370	594

## PORTUGAL—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Nov. 22	<i>The Head of Division W II in the Economic Policy Department to the Legation in Portugal</i> Informs the Legation of discussions with representatives of the Ministry of Economics and of the OKW leading to a plan for a guaranteed monthly supply of tungsten from Portugal in return for certain manufactured products from Germany.  (See also under "Spain.")	489	808
RUMANIA			
1941 July 1	<i>General Antonescu to Adolf Hitler</i> Discusses the joint military operations against the Soviet Union.	57	66
July 2	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that General Antonescu wants a common German-Rumanian frontier and that he opposes the employment of Rumanians and Hungarian troops side by side.	58	68
July 27	<i>Adolf Hitler to General Antonescu</i> Expresses praise for the performance of the Rumanian troops and satisfaction over the course of the operations in Russia; urges Antonescu to advance with his forces into the area southwest of the Bug river and places under his command the LIV Army Corps.	159	225
July 30	<i>General Antonescu to Adolf Hitler</i> Expresses thanks for Hitler's appreciation of the Rumanian military achievement in the war against Soviet Russia and promises to carry out the military tasks requested by Hitler in his letter of July 27 (document No. 159).	167	266
Aug. 6	<i>The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that a roundup of 60,000 Jews for road-building in Bessarabia severely damaged the Rumanian economy. Mihai Antonescu was advised to proceed slowly with elimination of the Jews.	182	287
Aug. 10	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of Hitler's remarks on August 7 on bestowing the Knight's Cross on General Antonescu. Antonescu's reply.	188	296
Aug. 14	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Rumanian Government has reports of the intention of Hungary to occupy the Banat on August 16. Rumania refers to an intention of Hitler to settle that question only after the war.	200	312
Aug. 14	<i>Adolf Hitler to General Antonescu</i> Expresses his views on the future conduct of operations. Suggests that Rumanian forces occupy the area between the Dneister and the Dnieper and that Rumanian mobile units participate in operations east of the Dnieper.	204	316

## RUMANIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Aug. 16	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a request by General Antonescu that German military authorities be prevented from moving Jews back from the Ukraine into Bessarabia.	207	318
Aug. 17	<i>General Antonescu to Adolf Hitler</i> In reply to Hitler's letter of August 14 (document No. 204) states that Rumanian forces will occupy the area between the Dniester and the Dnieper but that Rumania can assume responsibility for the administration and economic exploitation of the area between the Dniester and the Bug only.	210	324
Aug. 21	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Rumania</i> In response to telegram No. 2538 (document No. 200), directs Killinger to remain entirely noncommittal regarding the Banat.	218	342
Sept. 18	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Legation in Rumania</i> Informs the Legation of the order by the OKW forbidding any intervention by the German military for moving Jews from Rumanian territory to the occupied territory or vice versa.	332	528
Sept. 30	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports strong complaints by Mihai Antonescu of the economic and military sacrifices made by Rumania and his urging of radical change in Germany's economic policy.	369	592
Oct. 17	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a discussion regarding Rumania's economic difficulties with Marshal Antonescu who complained especially about purchases by the German troops contrary to existing agreements.	406	651
Oct. 21	<i>Ambassador Ritter to the Legation in Rumania</i> In response to telegram No. 3346 (document No. 406), explains that the whole problem of German expenditures in Rumania is under review; that some Rumanian complaints appear to be unfounded; that a long-term financial plan will be sought which will protect Rumanian interests.	414	669
Oct. 27	<i>The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a discussion with Mihai Antonescu regarding the relationship of the Rumanian Government and the Legion; increased tension between Marshal Antonescu and the Legion; unwillingness of Mihai Antonescu to continue the role of conciliation.	426	700
Nov. 8	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy in Italy</i> Mentions the mutual Hungarian and Rumanian accusations. Directs Mackensen to inquire if these come to the Italian Government also and if it has any idea of how to deal with them.	457	759

## RUMANIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Nov. 13	<i>The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Rumanian Government would leave it up to Germany to deport the Rumanian Jews to the Ghettos in the east.	466	773
Nov. 30	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Record of a conversation between Göring and Mihai Antonescu, apparently held on November 26, regarding German-Rumanian economic relations. Göring urged the greatest possible increase of Rumanian petroleum production even at the risk of exhausting the oil wells.	505	844
[Nov. 28]	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of conversation between Ribbentrop and Mihai Antonescu on November 28. Ribbentrop discussed the course of the war, urged Rumania to increase her deliveries of oil and food to Germany, and asked that the peace be kept between Rumania and Hungary.	513	870
Dec. 3	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of the conversation between Hitler and Mihai Antonescu on November 28; Antonescu promised increased Rumanian deliveries of petroleum and grain to Germany; Hitler promised a reduction of German troops and support for Rumania's currency.	519	891
Dec. 5	<i>Marshal Antonescu to Adolf Hitler</i> Suggests several ways for increasing the export of Rumanian oil to Germany and Italy. Asks that a German expert be sent to examine the situation on the spot.  (See also under "Hungary" and "U.S.S.R.")	549	963
SLOVAKIA			
1941	<i>Editors' Note</i> Reference to conversations of President Tiso and Minister President Tuka with Hitler on October 20.		669
Nov. 1	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Slovakia</i> Directs that Tuka be advised against an official visit to Rumania in view of recent Rumanian efforts toward establishing closer ties between Rumania, Slovakia, and Croatia which aroused concern in Hungary.	438	723
Nov. 26	<i>Memorandum by the Dirigent of the Political Department</i> Record of the reception on November 25 of the Slovak Minister President Tuka by the Foreign Minister in Berlin. They discussed Slovakia's attitude toward Germany, the war against Soviet Russia, Slovak-Hungarian relations, the activities of the former Minister Durčanský, and Tuka's relations with President Tiso.	500	823

## SPAIN

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 June 25	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Serrano Suñer was pleased that Germany agreed to the expedition of Spanish volunteers against Russia, but that as regards a declaration of war against Russia, he feared an economic blockade by England and possibly by America.	12	16
June 28	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that a series of recent moves by Serrano Suñer, such as winning over Franco for sending volunteers against Russia, indicate clearly the intention of preparing Spain's entrance into the war.	34	38
July 4	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that 40 times the number needed volunteered for the Blue Division which is soon to be moved to Germany. The division is to comprise 641 officers, 2,272 noncommissioned officers, and 15,780 men.	70	81
July 18	<i>Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I M</i> Records that the English have closely observed the supplying of a German submarine by a German tender in the Canary Islands; although the Spaniards would probably not be deterred by the English protest, the German Naval Attaché has discontinued these supply operations for the next months.	122	168
July 27	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a long conversation with Serrano Suñer on the Spanish attitude toward the Allies and his fears of English or American landings in the Azores, North Africa, or Portugal.	157	222
Aug. 22	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with the Spanish Foreign Minister who was distressed that the new Spanish Ambassador, Count Mayalde, had not yet been received by Hitler.	226	353
Aug. 22	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Adds to his earlier telegram (document No. 226) that Serrano Suñer was hurt that his confidant, Mayalde, had not been received after 4 weeks whereas the former Ambassador, Espinosa, had twice been received in farewell visits at Hitler's headquarters.	229	357
Aug. 23	<i>An Official of the Embassy in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the signing of the agreement concerning employment of Spanish workers in Germany.	231	360
Sept. 2	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits a report of the Military Attaché regarding a discussion with General Asensio, Chief of Staff, who advocated an operation against Gibraltar by Spain alone. Comments that this idea is probably inspired by Minister of War, Varela, who is Anglophile. Urges that a new approach to Spain for military cooperation would probably be successful and asks for instructions.	273	441

## SPAIN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Sept. 3	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Records a conversation with Carceller who argued that a more moderate tone of the Spanish press toward Britain and the United States would result in increased imports of raw materials from overseas. He urged that this would not mean an abandonment of Spain's pro-German policy.	275	444
Sept. 6	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department</i> Refers to his earlier memorandum of September 3 (document No. 275) and records a conversation between Carceller and Brandau, of the Protocol Division, according to which the Spanish Minister of Commerce had emphasized that it was up to Germany to decide if she wanted Spain to participate in her European policy as an equal partner.	285	459
Sept. 11	<i>Minister Eisenlohr to the Embassy in Spain</i> Directs Stohrer to make preparations and get permission to increase the loading capacity of the railroad station at Irun.	302	478
Sept. 13	<i>The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the Foreign Ministry</i> States the view of the OKW, which was approved by Hitler, that political and military relations with Spain are to be expanded, yet military action on the Iberian Peninsula is considered undesirable until conclusion of the Russian campaign. A reserved attitude is recommended in economic discussions.	314	498
Oct. 4	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a visit by the Spanish Ambassador who stated that his Government was for some time without news of the Blue Division and who requested permission to make a personal visit to the Division.	380	612
Oct. 6	<i>State Secretary Weizsäcker to Ambassador Stohrer</i> Explains the situation in regard to Mayalde. With both Hitler and Ribbentrop away from Berlin it is exceptional if Chiefs of Mission are able to see either of them.	383	617
Oct. 10	<i>Ambassador Ritter to the Embassy in Spain</i> Expresses resentment over Spanish compliance with a British protest over two German ships supplying German submarines in Las Palmas. Asks Stohrer to arrange with Spanish authorities to have this operation continued as had been agreed upon with the Spanish Government in 1939.	391	628
Oct. 10	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on the internal political crisis and especially the opposition to Serrano Suñer and to his pro-German foreign policy.	392	630
Oct. 10	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the gist of the conversation between Franco, Serrano Suñer, and Weddell as told to him by the Foreign Minister. Weddell suggested far-reaching economic concessions in return for a friendlier policy on the part of Spain regarding Britain and America.	394	633

## SPAIN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Oct. 14	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to the instruction of October 9 (document No. 391) and explains the action of the Spanish Minister of the Navy in regard to the two German supply ships at Las Palmas.	403	647
Nov. 6	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Embassy in Spain</i> Records that recruitment of Spanish workers for Germany has come to a standstill; that not a single worker has left for Germany.	453	748
Nov. 13	<i>The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Spain</i> Directs that no discussions about joint military action or the entry of Spain into the war be undertaken with members of the Spanish Government.	467	774
Nov. 15	<i>The Embassy in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits a report according to which Franco stated in a letter to Don Juan that he considered the restoration of the monarchy in Spain the coronation of the revolution.	471	782
Nov. 30	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Records the conversation of Hitler, Ciano, Suñer, Ribbentrop, and Stohrer on November 29 in which Hitler discussed American and Turkish attitudes toward the war, and Serrano Suñer talked about the problems of Spanish policy.	523	904
Dec. 9	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Protocol Department</i> Records a conversation between Hitler and General Moscardo on December 7 about Spanish-Portuguese relations, and Spanish economic difficulties. Hitler expressed his regrets that he was unable to do anything regarding the capture of Gibraltar at that time.  (See also under "Anti-Comintern Pact" and "Portugal.")	555	971
SPANISH MOROCCO			
1941 Aug. 23	<i>An Official of Political Division II to the Consulate at Tetuán</i> Directs that in view of the needs of Germany's allies there should be no discussion in Morocco of Germany's policy regarding the Arabs.	232	361
Nov. 7	<i>The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with the Spanish Foreign Minister and Spanish High Commissioner in Morocco regarding German propaganda in Spanish Morocco. Asks for more personnel and funds to counteract extensive American and British activities.	455	756
Nov. 25	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Information Department</i> Records a meeting of November 14 in the German Embassy, Madrid, in which details of future propaganda activities for Spanish Morocco were discussed.	499	822

## SWEDEN

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 June 24	<i>The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that although no definite reply has been received, the Swedish Government will most likely agree to the German military requests, particularly for the transit of one division from Norway over Sweden to Finland.	8	11
June 24	<i>The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Finland's emphasis on her neutrality respecting the German-Russian war is having a retarding effect on conversations with Sweden on political and military questions.	9	12
June 25	<i>The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with the King who expressed his satisfaction that the principal German request for the transit of one division had been accepted by the State Council and who indicated his personal support in this matter.	16	20
June 25	<i>The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Swedish Foreign Minister has stated that the Swedish Government granted the request for the transit of one division from Norway to Finland.	17	21
June 27	<i>The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the wishes of the OKW regarding Swedish cooperation in the campaign against Soviet Russia, as listed in the OKW letter of June 17 (volume XII, document No. 638), have in large measure been granted.	28	30
June 27	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Sweden</i> Directs that the Government's thanks and satisfaction be conveyed to the Swedish Foreign Minister for Sweden's understanding attitude toward Germany's wishes in connection with the war in the East.	30	33
June 29	<i>The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Swedish Foreign Minister assured the Minister of Finland that Sweden would supply arms and ammunition to Finland.	41	44
June 29	<i>The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on the agreement made with the Swedish Air Force for its cooperation with the Luftwaffe as regards: forced landings; courier flights; withholding of fire against German or Finnish aircraft; possible intermediate landings in the transfers of Luftwaffe units; and weather reports.	42	45
June 29	<i>The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on the agreement negotiated with the Swedish Government for cooperation of the Swedish Navy with the German Navy.	43	48
July 2	<i>The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Forwards the list of war materials and equipment requested by the Swedish Government.	59	68

## SWEDEN--Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 July 6	<i>The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Discusses a possible request to Sweden to accede to the Tripartite Pact. Points out that the concessions already made to Germany have strained the coalition government and that only a minority government could support Sweden's accession. Suggests that Sweden's relationship to Germany could best be defined by a special treaty.	77	93
July 7	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Sweden</i> Acknowledges the argument in the Legation's telegram of July 5 (document No. 77), but reserves a final instruction regarding Swedish accession to the Tripartite Pact. Points out that a bilateral pact with Sweden is out of the question.	79	95
July 10	<i>The Head of Division W VI of the Economic Policy Department to the High Command of the Wehrmacht and other Offices and Ministries</i> Forwards an Official Minute of July 9 which records the agreed conditions for Swedish overseas trade through the harbor of Göteborg.	91	115
July 10	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Division W V of the Economic Policy Department</i> Records a telephone message from Major Radtke (of the OKW, Wi Rü) that he will go to Stockholm. Lists the general answers he will bring in regard to Sweden's wishes for war materials, as forwarded in the Legation's telegram of July 2 (document No. 59).	92	118
July 12	<i>The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to his telegram of July 2 (document No. 59) and complains that instead of the negotiator with full powers which he had requested, Major Radtke appeared with a negative answer and not even the power to grant the few concessions considered in Berlin. Reports having called off the negotiations of today, and having decided to handle aerial questions separately.	98	124
July 15	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Sweden</i> Directs the Legation to decline the offer of the Swedish Government to detail a select group of officers to the Wehrmacht because such officers would command no cadres of volunteers.	109	138
July 25	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a discussion with the Swedish State Secretary regarding the Norwegian ships in Swedish harbors. Boheman stated that the ships were being sharply watched; that they would need at least 2 weeks for preparations to run out; but that Swedish law could not prevent their departure if their papers were in order.	151	214
Aug. 1	<i>The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Swedish Government refused permission for the overland transit of an additional German division to Finland and suggested that the sea route be used instead.	172	272

## SWEDEN--Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Aug. 2	<i>The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a discussion with Hägglöf regarding the Norwegian ships in Swedish harbors. As a means of preventing the ships from running out to England Hägglöf proposed that the Oslo shipping firms send captains to bring the ships to Norway. Objection by the Norwegian Legation would put the matter into the courts which in any case would involve long delays and provide that the ships remain in Göteborg.	174	277
Aug. 4	<i>The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having expressed the regrets of the German Government over Sweden's refusal to permit the passage of another German division across Swedish territory, and having emphasized the need for secrecy.	176	281
Aug. 5	<i>The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the Swedish Government's assent to analogous application of the agreement of July 1940 which would permit unrestricted transport of war materials over Swedish railroads to Haparanda, Narvik, and Trondheim and the shipment of a few thousand men to Narvik and Trondheim.	178	283
Aug. 6	<i>The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a communication from Söderblom that the Swedes had discovered a captured British officer on a German furlough train.	181	287
Aug. 28	<i>Minute by the Head of Division W V of the Economic Policy Department</i> Records the discussion at Ministerialdirektor Wiehl's office on August 28 concerning economic negotiations with Sweden: the need for a clearing credit from Sweden; the need to maintain civilian exports to Sweden, to centralize Wehrmacht purchases in Sweden, and for relaxation in the matter of exports of war materials to Sweden.	254	405
Sept. 2	<i>The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the announcement in Sweden of the official ban on the recruitment of Swedish volunteers for foreign armies.	270	438
Sept. 8	<i>The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a discussion with Günther regarding the Norwegian ships in Swedish harbors. Günther stated that it was impossible for the Swedish police to change the crews without a court order; he insisted that the validity of the Norwegian decree of May 1940 had to be decided judicially before any action took place; and maintained that Sweden had to operate according to law. He promised finally to re-examine the complex of questions.	290	465
Sept. 11	<i>The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports receiving the final answer of the Swedish Government regarding the Norwegian ships: the recommendation that the Norwegian shipowners institute legal action in order to place their own captains and crews aboard the ships. The Legation recommends either following that course or letting the ships escape and be brought in by German naval vessels.	300	475



## SWEDEN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Sept. 15	<i>The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports regarding conclusion of a new agreement with the Swedish Air Force permitting an increase in the number of flights over Swedish territory by German courier planes.	319	508
Sept. 17	<i>The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that today's conversation revealed the surprising fact that the Norwegian ships have been chartered to England and are at England's disposal. Reports having insisted that the ships be turned over to their rightful owners, the Norwegian shipowners, and without recourse to judicial proceedings, and that pending such restoration no ships be allowed to escape.	329	522
Sept. 19	<i>Ambassador Ritter to the Legation in Sweden</i> Refers to the Legation's telegram of September 17 (document No. 329) and directs that the Swedish Foreign Minister be informed that the facts indicate that the Swedish Government has not dealt openly with Germany; that Sweden has taken an unneutral attitude toward the legal claims of the Norwegian owners for their ships; that the licensing for loading war materials for England throws a peculiar light on the attitude of the Swedish Government.	334	529
Sept. 19	<i>The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation in Sweden</i> Refers to the Legation's telegram of September 17 (document No. 329) and states that the Foreign Minister wishes a memorandum on economic relations with Sweden, with special regard to possibilities of putting the thumbscrews on the Swedes.	335	531
Sept. 19	<i>The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> In response to the Reich Foreign Minister's request (document No. 335) submits a memorandum outlining the present status of economic relations with Sweden. Argues that to put pressure on the Swedes by cutting off coal and other deliveries would disrupt the Swedish-German trade on which Germany is more dependent than Sweden. Urges that Sweden is most sensitive in her overseas trade, the Göteborg traffic.	336	532
Sept. 20	<i>The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a new discussion regarding the Norwegian ships with Günther who insisted there had been no changes in the position of the Swedish Government, protested against the imputation of acting behind Germany's back, and denied that war materials were being shipped to England. He explained his policy as one of aid to Germany and neutrality toward England and recounted all that he had done for Germany. The Legation suggests the Göteborg traffic as a possible point for sanctions against Sweden.	343	539
Sept. 22	<i>The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on the significance of the results of the negotiations concluded this day by the governmental committees. The Swedes expressed willingness to negotiate on a credit of 100 million kronor which in part would cover existing and anticipated clearing deficits.	347	546

## SWEDEN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Sept. 25	<i>The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with Hägglöf who explained certain factors regarding the Swedish truck market. The British had cut off the importation of parts from the U.S.A. on learning that Sweden delivered 500 trucks to Finland just as they had cut off the importation of chocolate through Göteborg. Hägglöf also urged the importance of the Göteborg traffic not only for Sweden but also for Germany.	357	565
Sept. 28	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Records a conversation of September 26 with the Swedish Chargé d'Affaires regarding German-Swedish relations: criticism of Germany and of Hitler in the Swedish press; refusal to permit Swedish volunteers to serve with the German colors; the pro-English attitude of the Swedish Government regarding Norwegian ships in Swedish ports.	364	583
Oct. 1	<i>The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Chief of the Legal Department explained the current status of the litigation regarding the Norwegian ships: that the <i>Rigmor</i> was under arrest by order of the Court of Appeal; that the other cases would probably be settled in accordance with the precedent of the <i>Rigmor</i> case.	371	594
Oct. 23	<i>The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that two important problems regarding the supply of the German troops in Finland have been resolved by Sweden's agreement to sell 2,000 tents and to lease 300 trucks equipped with tires.	418	674
Oct. 28	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with the King who expressed his fears of Bolshevism, his admiration for Hitler in the fight against Soviet Russia, and who spoke of his desire to maintain good relations with Germany.	430	706
Nov. 1	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Reich Commissar for Occupied Norway</i> Explains German policy on Nordic congresses in Sweden: Norwegian participation is out of the question; but as regards Finland and Denmark a distinction must be drawn between political and nonpolitical congresses.	437	722
Nov. 20	<i>The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a discussion with Günther regarding Sweden's refusal to supply woolen goods to the German Army in Finland. Günther explained that the raw materials for such goods came from overseas and that the British Government would cut off the Göteborg traffic if Sweden provided such goods to Germany.	484	803
Dec. 1	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Division W IV of the Economic Policy Department</i> Draws the attention of Ribbentrop to a memorandum prepared by the Swedish Government which lists in detail Swedish services on behalf of Germany since July 1940.	530	927

## SWEDEN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Dec. 7	<i>Adolf Hitler to King Gustav V of Sweden</i> Refers to the King's message (document No. 430) and expresses his appreciation for the King's sympathy with Germany's anti-Bolshevist struggle. He points out that Germany is fighting for all of Europe and that the Swedish public should realize this more fully than it apparently does.	554	969
Dec. 7	<i>Minister Wied to State Secretary Weizsäcker</i> Mentions that in November Sweden rejected the German requests brought by Schnurre. Predicts that in the new situation resulting from the English declaration of war on Finland it will be necessary to make new demands of Sweden. Suggests that these would best be made through Finland or through the regular route of the Legation rather than by Schnurre as a special envoy.	558	975
Dec. 8	<i>The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports in regard to the consequences of the English declaration of war on Finland which is not expected to change Sweden's attitude toward Finland. Suggests that if special demands have to be made on Sweden they be made through Finland.	561	981
Dec. 8	<i>German-Swedish Agreement Regarding the Delivery of War Materials</i> Secret protocol listing a number of items of arms, ammunition, and military equipment to be delivered by German firms to Sweden, providing for methods of payment and specifying periods for delivery.	565	988
Dec. 11	<i>The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having delivered Hitler's letter (document No. 554) to the King who was rather negative toward Germany's present wishes in regard to the transportation of men on leave and exchange of troops from northern Finland.  (See also under "Finland.")	574	1001

## SWITZERLAND

1941 Aug. 19	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff</i> Submits a report by an agent on the Swiss domestic situation; the report deals with effects of the war in the east, German-Swiss economic relations, opinions in Swiss military circles, and British propaganda in Switzerland.	214	331
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## TRIPARTITE PACT

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Dec. 3	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having been informed by Ciano that the Japanese Ambassador had handed Mussolini a communication regarding the breakdown of the Japanese-American conversations, stating that a war of Japan against the United States and Great Britain is regarded "as possible and imminent." Japan requested an Italian declaration of war in such an event as well as a mutual agreement committing the two countries not to conclude an armistice or separate peace with the United States and the British Empire.	537	941
Dec. 4	<i>Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Italy</i> Records a discussion with Marchese d'Ajeta regarding the Japanese démarche of December 3 (document No. 537). D'Ajeta remarked that Berlin was apparently examining very carefully the reply to be made to Japan, and mentioned that opinions in the Palazzo Chigi were divided on whether the outbreak of a Japanese-American conflict at this time would be advantageous to the Axis.	543	953
Dec. 5	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy</i> Forwards the draft text of an agreement of the Tripartite Powers providing for a joint entry into a state of war with America and excluding any separate peace. Directs Mackensen to secure the approval of the Italian Government so that the text may be handed to Oshima.	546	958
Dec. 5	<i>Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy</i> Records a series of conversations in connection with carrying out Ribbentrop's instructions of December 5 (document No. 546). Ciano and Mussolini approved the German draft of an agreement to be concluded with Japan and the proposal that a similar statement be handed to the Japanese Ambassador in Rome.	548	960
	<i>Editors' Note</i> Reference to the conversations of Oshima and Ribbentrop on December 7.		977
Dec. 8	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan</i> Forwards the draft of a German-Italian-Japanese agreement which had been discussed with Oshima. Requests that the assent of the Japanese Government be obtained in time for the signing to take place on December 10.	562	982
Dec. 8	<i>Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy</i> Records that Ciano and Mussolini agreed to the draft of the German-Italian-Japanese agreement (document No. 562).	563	983
Dec. 9	<i>The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the text of the draft agreement forwarded in the instruction of December 8 (document No. 562) was submitted to Foreign Minister Togo who requested changes in articles 3 and 4 for the sake of the Privy Council. Togo also asked when Germany would declare war on the United States.	568	992

## TRIPARTITE PACT—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Dec. 10	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan</i> Agrees to the Japanese proposals for changes in the draft agreement as reported in Tokyo telegram of December 9 (document No. 568) and directs Ott to urge that full powers to sign be issued to Oshima without delay.	571	998
Dec. 11	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legations in Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Slovakia</i> Directs the Minister to inform the Government to which he is accredited of the view of Germany and Italy that article 3 of the Tripartite Pact now applies and that the Government should therefore declare war on the United States. Croatia, Bulgaria, and Slovakia are asked also to declare war on Great Britain.	576	1003
Dec. 11	<i>Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy</i> Records a series of telephone calls with Berlin and conversations with Mussolini and officials of the Italian Foreign Ministry so that the diplomatic steps and public statements by Germany and Italy would be synchronized in the matter of declaring war on the United States.  (See also under "Japan" and "Sweden.")	578	1005

## TURKEY

1941 June 23	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Saracoglu is willing to cooperate with Germany with regard to the passage of Soviet ships through the Straits.	2	3
June 30	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department</i> Records a conversation with the Turkish Counselor of Embassy who offered his Ambassador's cooperation in the preparation of a new German-Turkish trade agreement.	51	59
July 9	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Requests instructions regarding a suggestion by Saracoglu that Germany should consent to Turkish occupation of Northern Syria.	86	106
July 12	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey</i> Replies to the telegram of July 9 (document No. 86) and states that in view of the loyal attitude of the French it is not possible for Germany to support a Turkish occupation of Northern Syria.	97	123
	<i>Editors' Note</i> Reference to conversation between Ribbentrop and Turkish Foreign Ministry official M. C. Açikalin on July 12.		129
July 18	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Explains the sympathy of the Turks for Germany in the struggle against Bolshevism and their hope that a prompt defeat of Russia will permit a German compromise peace with the West. Indicates Turkey's antipathy toward Arab liberation movements. Suggests psychological exploitation of the situation to bring Turkey to Germany's side.	125	174

## TURKEY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 July 24	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey</i> Refers to American and British press reports of a peace offensive by von Papen. Points out the similarity of such reports with some of the ideas of Papen's dispatch of July 14 (document No. 125). Directs the Ambassador to refrain from any talk regarding Turkey as a mediator except on authorization from the Foreign Ministry.	145	207
July 28	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Replies to Ribbentrop's telegram of July 24, (document No. 145); denies having discussed peace offers by Germany with foreign diplomats; and defends his policy of influencing Turkey by diplomatic means.	161	228
Aug. 5	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a conversation with the Turkish Ambassador who brought up the question of the nationalities of Turkic ethnic origin in Soviet Russia and suggested the possibility of a Caucasian buffer state.	179	284
Aug. 11	<i>The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister</i> Suggests letting the Turks have the text of Molotov's proposal of November 1940 regarding Soviet bases on the Straits.	193	304
Aug. 11	<i>Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to Ambassador Papen</i> Replies to Papen's report of July 23 (document No. 161) and denies any lack of confidence in Papen. States that he had mainly wished to point out the danger of giving the impression that Germany was making peace offers through Turkey and outlines the goals of German diplomacy with regard to Turkey.	194	305
Aug. 22	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey</i> States that Germany expects Turkey to intern Russian military personnel escaping to Turkish territory and to obstruct and delay the passage of Russian merchant vessels through the Dardanelles.	227	354
Aug. 24	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Political Department</i> Records an account by Minister Kroll of the Embassy in Turkey of his visit in the Special Train where he had conversations with Ribbentrop, Ritter, and Jodl regarding the problem of Turkey. Kroll outlined a program toward Turkey which was approved by those present.	236	368
Aug. 25	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey</i> Informs Papen of his conversation with the Turkish Ambassador at Headquarters on August 19 in which they discussed Roosevelt's policy, the Anglo-Russian guarantee to Turkey, and Russia's aims as revealed in Molotov's statement of November 1940, the text of which was shown to Gerede. Ribbentrop asked about Turkey's attitude toward the border peoples in the Caucasus and eastward.	238	373
Aug. 28	<i>Ambassador Ritter to the Embassy in Turkey</i> Transmits the Foreign Minister's instruction that every effort be made to bring about a change in Turkey's position toward the passage of Russian merchant vessels through Turkish waters.	253	403

## TURKEY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Aug. 29	<i>The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister</i> Explains with regard to the forthcoming German-Turkish economic negotiations that Turkey will agree to deliver chromium and copper only in return for war materials and asks that Clodius be authorized to arrange for such German deliveries.	258	413
Sept. 9	<i>The Embassy in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that in negotiations for a new trade and clearing agreement the Turks do not want to make deliveries in advance and are resolved to obtain at least a part of the war materials immediately.	294	470
Sept. 10	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a conversation with Nuri Pasha, a leader of the Pan-Turanian movement in Turkey, who offered to advise Germany in matters relating to the Caucasus.	298	473
Sept. 24	<i>The Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a conversation with Menemencioglu who said that the English Ambassador insisted on the maintenance of Turkey's agreement which required the delivery to England of the total annual production of chromium ore, limited to 250,000 tons. States that he rejected the suggestion of a treaty excluding deliveries of chrome ore and war materials.	352	556
Sept. 26	<i>The Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports regarding the economic negotiations that Menemencioglu insisted that it was impossible for Turkey to make deliveries of chrome ore prior to January 8, 1943. Explains that the alternatives are: to break off negotiations, or to conclude a treaty with the promise of future chrome ore deliveries.	358	566
Sept. 26	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records the results of three discussions with the Turkish champion of the Pan-Turanian movement, Nuri Pasha, who advocated the creation of certain independent states, based on the Turkic ethnic element, which would be carved out of the Soviet Union. Recommends that, in accordance with Nuri Pasha's suggestion, the Mohammedan elements be separated out from the other Russian prisoners.	361	571
Sept. 28	<i>Memorandum by Minister Eisenlohr</i> Comments on Clodius' report of September 26 (document No. 358) and argues in favor of acceptance of the Turkish suggestion for future deliveries of chromium ore. Requests permission to take steps to secure the consent of the Chief of OKW to that program.	366	587
Sept. 29	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports a discussion with Menemencioglu and Clodius on the economic and political situation; how Menemencioglu felt about Turkey's interest in the defeat of Bolshevism but that Turkey had to maintain her agreement with England regarding chromium. Urges a decision on the Turkish proposal for a comprehensive agreement with chromium deliveries beginning in 1943.	367	589

## TURKEY—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Oct. 2	<i>Ambassador Ritter to the Embassy in Turkey</i> Lists three groups of armament deliveries which can be stipulated in the economic negotiations. Explains that the third group consisting of howitzers and cannons can be promised, item by item, in return for chromium after January 8, 1943. Points out the need for chromium deliveries from Turkey even after the proposed terminal date of the treaty, March 31, 1943.	374	602
Oct. 9	<i>German-Turkish Exchanges of Letters</i> Regarding Turkish exports of raw materials in exchange for German war material and manufactured goods. It is stipulated that before March 31, 1943, a German-Turkish agreement is to be concluded providing for the delivery of 180,000 tons of chromium from January 15, 1943, to December 1944.	390	626
Oct. 10	<i>The Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports, on the basis of discussions of Turkish foreign policy with Saracoglu and Menemencioglu, that Turkey desires the total defeat of Russia in the east and a compromise peace between Germany and England in the west.	393	632
Oct. 13	<i>Minister Kroll to Ministerial Director Wiehl</i> Comments on the German-Turkish Commercial Agreement (document No. 390) and explains that he was surprised at Turkey's negative attitude in the matter of chromium which was in contrast with Menemencioglu's initial promises. Criticizes Clodius for failing to make use of Kroll's experience in the negotiations with the Turks.	402	645
Oct. 28	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records the action taken in the Pan-Turanian question: Hentig has been called to the Foreign Ministry to deal with the matter; the OKW has been asked to separate the Turkic and Mohammedan prisoners of war; Papen has been asked to report on the attitude of the Turkish Government.	431	707
Nov. 12	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey</i> Requests Papen's opinion whether Turkey should accede to the Anti-Comintern Pact.	462	769
Nov. 12	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Replies to Ribbentrop's instruction of November 12 (document No. 462) and explains that Turkey's accession at this time to the Anti-Comintern Pact would be interpreted as an option in favor of the Axis which Turkey is not yet prepared to make.	464	771
Nov. 18	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports having been informed by Saracoglu and Menemencioglu that Turkey would receive materials directly from the United States under the Lend-Lease Law. Suggests an appropriate propagandistic treatment of the matter.  (See also under "Middle East.")	482	801

## UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 June 23	<i>Wolodymyr Stachiw to the Führer and Chancellor</i> On behalf of Stepan Bandera requests Hitler's support in the establishment of an independent Ukrainian State.	5	6
June 26	<i>Reichsleiter Rosenberg to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to Hitler's decree entrusting him with the "central handling of the questions of the eastern European area" and requests that all material concerning this area be submitted to him.	26	28
July 3	<i>The State Secretary to the Legation in Rumania</i> Directs that Russian émigrés who volunteer for the fight against the Soviet Union are not to be accepted.	67	79
July 6	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Paris</i> Directs that Grand Duke Vladimir be told not to disseminate his proclamation to the Russian people and to refrain from all political activity lest he be interned.	76	92
July 12	<i>Circular by Ambassador Ritter</i> Sets forth the essentials of the guidelines drawn up in consultation with the OKW and SS for the employment of foreign volunteers in the struggle against the Soviet Union.	96	122
July 15	<i>State Secretary Weizsäcker to Reichsleiter Rosenberg</i> Communicates the Foreign Minister's standpoint regarding the functions of the Foreign Ministry representatives in the eastern European areas under German occupation.	111	140
July 16	<i>Unsigned Memorandum</i> Record of Hitler's conference with Rosenberg, Lammers, Keitel, Göring, and Bormann regarding policies, administration and personnel in the occupied areas of the Soviet Union.	114	149
July 16	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Submits a letter from Wolodymyr Stachiw addressed to the Foreign Minister and stating that a Ukrainian government was established in Lwów on June 30.	115	156
July 17	<i>Führer's Decree of July 17</i> Provides for the civil administration under Reichsleiter Rosenberg of the occupied eastern territories which are to be divided into Reich Commissariats and subdivided into general regions and districts.	119	163
July 21	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Department for German Internal Affairs</i> Refers to Bruns's memorandum of July 16 (document No. 115) and explains that no reply should be given to the letter of Wolodymyr Stachiw. Encloses a memorandum describing the action of the Bandera group of Ukrainian nationalists in Lwów on June 30.	138	198
July 24	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Records a discussion with the Rumanian Minister who expressed the wish that the future Ukrainian state be not too large.	147	209
July 30	<i>Memorandum by the Head of Political Division I M</i> Records a decision by the Department of National Defense excluding establishment of a Ukrainian national militia within the framework of the Wehrmacht.	166	265

## UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Aug. 1	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Legal Department</i> Encloses a Swedish note indicating the willingness of the Soviet Government to apply The Hague Rules of Land Warfare on condition of reciprocity. Explains the standpoint of the OKW on the matter and the considerations of foreign policy which are involved.	173	274
Aug. 6	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Department for German Internal Affairs</i> Records expressions of discontent on the part of Ukrainian individuals and organizations as a result of the transfer of eastern Galicia to the administration of Governor General Frank.	184	289
Aug. 14	<i>Stepan Bandera to Reich Minister Rosenberg</i> States on behalf of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists that he will accept Germany's conditions for cooperation by the OUN, but not the demand for dissolution of the Ukrainian Government proclaimed in Lwów on June 30.	203	315
Aug. 24	<i>Memorandum by Counselor of Embassy Hilger</i> Records proposing to the Foreign Minister a compromise solution for the propaganda against Soviet Russia. Although the Russia Committee favored assurances of abolition of the kolkhoz system it recommended the compromise in view of the opposition from other ministries.	237	370
Aug. 26	<i>Circular of the Foreign Minister</i> Issues guidelines for conversations emphasizing Germany's victory over the Soviet Union which will soon permit Germany to turn her entire strength against England while Roosevelt will be unable to wage a war on two fronts.	244	389
Aug. 26	<i>Circular of the Foreign Ministry</i> Explains that Germany is not interested in the services of émigrés from eastern Europe who may offer to aid in the establishment of a new order in Russia.	247	395
Sept. 4	<i>The State Secretary to the Permanent Deputy of the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories</i> Refers to earlier correspondence of the two ministries (see document No. 111) regarding the representatives of the Foreign Ministry with the Reich Commissars and forwards a memorandum regarding their appointment and their functions.	277	449
Oct. 1	<i>Memorandum by the Chief of the Reich Chancellery</i> Records a conference on September 29 in which Rosenberg reported to Hitler about the political situation in the occupied eastern territories. Hitler favored a gradual return of the kolkhozes to private property; envisaged a 25-year German protectorate over the Ukraine; and opposed a return of Russian émigrés.	372	596
Oct. 2	<i>The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry</i> Forwards an account of a visit of Seyss-Inquart with Hitler on September 26 in the course of which Hitler expressed his views regarding the exploitation of Soviet Russia's economic resources for the benefit of Germany.	377	606

## UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Oct. 8	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Legal Department</i> Records receiving from the Swedish Legation a pro memoria of the views of the Soviet Government which denied any departure from The Hague Rules of Land Warfare in its treatment of German prisoners of war and demanded of Germany merely the reciprocal application of those rules.	389	624
Nov. 30	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the News Service and Press Department</i> Records that Hitler ordered the greatest possible propaganda use of the "Testament of Peter the Great" in spite of the objection that German scholars had characterized it as a forgery even at the time of the last war.	525	908
Dec. 1	<i>Circular of the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to the circular of August 26 (document No. 247) and reiterates that émigrés from former Russian territory are not to be used in the newly occupied areas. Forwards a memorandum to be used in replying to émigrés.  (See also under "Baltic States," "Directives for the Conduct of the War," "Finland," "Hungary," "Rumania," "Spain," "Turkey," and "Vatican.")	527	910

## UNITED STATES

1941 July 7	<i>The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Submits an appraisal by the Military Attaché of American strategic thinking following the outbreak of the German-Russian war.	80	96
July 7	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on the arrests of a number of Germans for espionage and sharply criticizes the employment of such people by German counterintelligence agencies.	81	98
July 9	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Comments upon the landing of American forces in Iceland and upon the effect of President Roosevelt's foreign policy on public opinion. States that Roosevelt's policy aims at strengthening Britain and her allies and at prolonging the war until America can intervene decisively.	83	101
July 12	<i>The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Submits an appraisal of American rearmament by the Military Attaché; he warns against underestimating American efficiency and states that the American Officers' Corps in general meets high requirements.	99	125
July 13	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Submits an appraisal of American foreign policy after the occupation of Iceland, explaining that the President does not want a formal declaration of war on Germany which would commit him to a total war effort but that he is determined to wage undeclared war.	104	130

## UNITED STATES—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 July 14	<i>Memorandum by Dr. Karl Megerle</i> Proposes a program to Ribbentrop for propaganda themes emphasizing the defense of Europe against Anglo-American aggression and the concept of a European Monroe Doctrine.	108	137
July 18	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Comments on Roosevelt's explanation of the necessity for occupying Iceland for the defense of the United States and the Western Hemisphere and on the views of the noninterventionist opposition.	121	167
July 22	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the United States</i> Directs the Chargé d'Affaires to circulate the idea in the United States that America's entry into the war would be most disadvantageous to the American Jews.	139	201
July 24	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Expresses the wish that mendacious reports about Roosevelt and Churchill be circulated as a countermove against British and American falsifications.	144	206
July 25	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to Ribbentrop's instruction of July 22 (document No. 139) and reports having discussed its ideas with leaders of the opposition. States that some intelligent Jews fear that they may be the scapegoats in case of America's entry into the war.	150	213
July 25	<i>The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Submits an evaluation of the military situation indicating that the American fleet is dispersed, leaving Japan free in the Western Pacific. The United States must therefore seek an accommodation with Japan. Entry into the war against Germany is unlikely.	153	216
July 30	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on a "particularly effective" propaganda action organized and financed by the Embassy; postcards containing attacks on Roosevelt and his Cabinet have been sent out in great numbers under the letterheads of members of the Congress.	163	234
Aug. 7	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that in spite of propaganda efforts by "warmongers" Roosevelt will maintain the course of "nonbelligerent means," the median course between war and isolation.	185	291
Aug. 10	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that American foreign policy is faced with a dilemma resulting from various foreign and domestic pressures; considers it likely that an Anglo-American peace program will be formulated to anticipate any possible German peace offer after victory in Russia.	192	302

## UNITED STATES—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Aug. 12	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that American policy aims at appeasement of Japan because America cannot risk a two-front war in view of her needs of strategic materials from overseas. Reports also that isolationist leaders have approached the German Embassy asking that it exert its influence on Japan lest an incident in the Pacific precipitate war.	196	309
Aug. 17	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Submits to Hitler an appraisal of the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting; states that the eight "Wilson" points of the Atlantic Charter will not impress anybody and expresses the opinion that there will be no active American intervention in the war once Germany has attained her goals in the east.	209	321
Aug. 27	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> States that a Japanese attack on Manila would bring about an American declaration of war on Japan which would not be in Germany's interest.	249	399
Sept. 1	<i>Memorandum by Minister Eisentrohr</i> Refers to the Washington report of July 5 regarding espionage (document No. 81) and records that a delay in the investigation ensued because the OKW objected to the Embassy's harsh criticism of the Abwehr activities. Of those 17 who were arrested, four were from the Abwehr and one from the SD.	266	433
Sept. 6	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the United States</i> Transmits the text of the German press announcement regarding the encounter of the American destroyer <i>Greer</i> with a German submarine, and instructs Thomsen to make it clear to "leading isolationist members of Congress" that the incident provides a unique opportunity to expose Roosevelt's war-mongering policy.	282	454
Sept. 9	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Refers to the Foreign Minister's instruction regarding the <i>Greer</i> incident (document No. 282) and reports that Germany's handling of the matter has had effect, and that contact has been made with certain Senators and Congressmen who expect to press for a Congressional investigation.	292	467
Sept. 11	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Senator Nye introduced a resolution in the Senate calling for an investigation of the <i>Greer</i> incident.	299	474
Sept. 12	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Comments on President Roosevelt's speech of September 11 and states that it will aggravate the situation in the Atlantic, the more so as the United States Atlantic fleet, in interpreting the new orders, will not merely wait for Axis naval units to appear but will hunt them down.	304	480

## UNITED STATES—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Sept. 15	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Secretary of the Navy Knox stated in a speech that the American Navy after September 16 would protect ships of all flags carrying lend-lease war material between the American Continent and Iceland.	321	511
Sept. 19	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the receipt of an American note demanding \$2,967,092 in reparation for the sinking of the <i>Robin Moor</i> by a German submarine in May 1941.	337	533
Sept. 22	<i>The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister</i> Submits a draft instruction for Washington in reply to Thomsen's telegram of September 19 regarding the American note on the <i>Robin Moor</i> (document No. 337). Thomsen is rebuked for having acknowledged receipt of the note.	348	548
Sept. 28	<i>Minute by the Director of the Political Department</i> States that reprisals against Jews and Freemasons in Germany, as suggested in a memorandum forwarded by Bohle, would not improve the situation of German citizens in North and South America.	365	586
Oct. 6	<i>Minute by the State Secretary</i> Asks the Press Department for information on the way in which the use of uranium for blasting has recently been dealt with in the foreign press, especially the American press.	384	617
Oct. 7	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports his view that President Roosevelt will proceed with caution in his endeavor to achieve repeal of the Neutrality Act.	387	621
Oct. 10	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Dieckhoff</i> Comments upon President Roosevelt's message to Congress of October 9 urging repeal of article 6 of the Neutrality Act which prohibits the arming of merchant vessels.	396	638
Oct. 17	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Comments on the likely reaction of the American Government and of the opposition as well to the torpedoing of the United States destroyer <i>Kearney</i> near Iceland.	407	652
Oct. 27	<i>Minute by Ambassador Dieckhoff</i> Records that on request from the Foreign Minister's Secretariat he submitted a memorandum on the situation in the United States Senate with regard to the pending bill providing for changes in the Neutrality Act.	427	702
Nov. 1	<i>Circular of the Foreign Minister</i> Directs each Mission to notify the given Government by note verbale that the Reich Government absolutely denies the assertions made in a speech by President Roosevelt regarding a map showing German plans for the control of Latin America and regarding plans for the abolition of all existing religions.	439	724

## UNITED STATES—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Nov. 2	<i>Circular of the Foreign Minister</i> Refers to a second statement prepared in Berlin in addition to that issued in Multex No. 887 (document No. 439) and directs each Mission to make appropriate use of the statement in refuting Roosevelt's charge in his speech of October 27 regarding Germany as the aggressor.	441	726
Nov. 13	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> States that as a result of Roosevelt's continued drive against the opposition leading members of the America First Committee may be intimidated into resigning.  <i>Editors' Note</i> Reference to a conference on November 13 at Hitler's headquarters where new directives were approved for the conduct of German surface forces on encountering American forces.	465	772 779
Nov. 14	<i>Memorandum by Ambassador Dieckhoff</i> Comments on the changes in the Neutrality Act voted by the House of Representatives and emphasizes the small size of the vote in favor of the changes.	470	781
Nov. 15	<i>The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> The Military Attaché expresses the opinion that the arrival of the Japanese negotiator Kurusu poses for the United States the question of how to extricate itself from the dilemma between its "megalomania" and the actual power situation in the Far East.	473	784
Nov. 27	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the American note handed to the Japanese negotiators amounts to an ultimatum but that it is impossible to say whether the Americans intend to make good this threat.	506	848
Dec. 4	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Suggests certain considerations which argue against an American-Japanese war in spite of alarmist articles to the contrary in the American press.	539	948
Dec. 4	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Comments on the publication in the <i>Chicago Tribune</i> and <i>Washington Times Herald</i> of a secret report of the American High Command which confirms that American combat power will not be ready before July 1943, and which indicates that Germany and her allies can be conquered only by an American expeditionary force which would require enormous sums of money.	541	950
Dec. 7	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Japanese attack on Hawaii and the Philippines came as a complete surprise to the American Government and people and caused all American war plans based on the expectation of gaining time for one or two years to be abandoned.	553	968

## UNITED STATES—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Dec. 8	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Roosevelt will have the support of the whole nation in the war against Japan and will be able to obtain full war powers from Congress. Considers it uncertain whether the President will also ask that a state of war with Germany and Italy be declared.	559	978
Dec. 8	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Congress declared war on Japan following Roosevelt's short speech which did not mention Germany or Italy; that all segments of American political life are united; and that American losses in the Pacific pose most difficult problems for the conduct of American military operations.	560	980
Dec. 10	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the United States</i> Directs the Chargé d'Affaires to deliver to the American Government on December 11 a note which declares a state of war to exist between Germany and the United States.	572	999
Dec. 11	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Records the delivery by the Foreign Minister to the American Chargé d'Affaires of the German declaration of war.  (See also under "Finland," "Iceland," "Japan," and "Latin America.")	577	1004
VATICAN			
1941 July 19	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Formulates certain guidelines in regard to the treatment of German church matters abroad.	129	183
July 23	<i>An Official of the Department for German Internal Affairs to the Foreign Minister</i> Notes the impending announcement of the appointment of Rosenberg as Reich Minister and advises that the Dienststelle Rosenberg claims the right to regulate church questions. Indicates some impending problems.	143	205
July 24	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department</i> Urges that the right of State control in the appointment to offices in the Catholic Church be extended within the territory of the old Reich and expanded in the new areas under German sovereignty. Proposes a note to the Vatican explaining the Government's position.	148	210
Aug. 25	<i>The State Secretary to the Embassy to the Holy See</i> Explains the view of the Reich Government regarding appointments to high Church offices in the so-called new Reich area and regarding other appointments within the Old Reich. Forwards the text of a note verbale setting forth the position of the Reich Government regarding such appointments and directs that it be delivered to the Cardinal Secretary of State.	241	381



## VATICAN—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Aug. 28	<i>Note Verbale From the Apostolic Nunciature</i> Refers to the note verbale of May 19 of the Foreign Ministry (Volume XII, document No. 567) and explains the right of the Church to church property. Protests that the confiscations of church properties in the occupied eastern territories are contrary to international law.	255	408
Aug. 30	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a visit of the Nuncio during which he was told that the legal theory of the latest note verbale of the Nunciature was not accepted.	260	415
Sept. 2	<i>The Apostolic Nuncio to the Foreign Minister</i> Complains about the closing of churches in the Warthegau and asks that the Foreign Minister intercede in the matter with the competent authorities.	272	440
Sept. 12	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a conversation with the Nuncio who inquired about the confiscation of monasteries in Germany and about a directive that was said to restrict further confiscations.	307	483
Sept. 12	<i>Counselor of Embassy Menshausen to State Secretary Weizsäcker</i> Discusses the attitude of the Holy See toward the war against Russia: The Pope would have expressed his sympathies with Germany to a much greater extent had it not been for the reported anti-Christian tendencies in Germany.	309	489
Sept. 13	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits a report by Attolico, the Italian Ambassador to the Holy See, concerning the conversation of Myron C. Taylor with the Pope.	315	499
Sept. 17	<i>The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry</i> Transmits a further report of Attolico regarding his conversation with the Pope in connection with Myron Taylor's visit to the Vatican.	330	523
Sept. 19	<i>An Official of the Reich Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs to the State Secretary</i> Transmits a copy of Hitler's order of August 6 concerning the conduct of the Wehrmacht in religious questions in the eastern areas and a copy of Hitler's directive of July 30 concerning the suspension of the confiscations of church and monastic property.	340	535
Sept. 29	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records the receipt from the Apostolic Nuncio of a note verbale protesting against a decree of the Reichstatthalter of the Warthegau which ignores the existing hierarchy of the Church in that area and sets up new religious communities.	368	590
Dec. 4	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Ministry</i> Explains why Orthodox priests had been allowed to enter the formerly Russian areas and Catholic priests had been denied such permission.	542	952
Dec. 5	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Records a conversation with the Nuncio who complained once more about conditions in the Warthegau.	547	959

## YUGOSLAVIA

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 June 30	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Croatia</i> Directs that Pavelić be told that Hitler accepts his offer of a contingent of Croatian volunteers in the struggle against Soviet Russia.	46	52
July 10	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Croatia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that General Glaise von Horstenau expressed to Pavelić Germany's concern over the excesses against the Serbs in Croatia committed by the Ustaše.	90	113
July 17	<i>The Director of the Department for German Internal Affairs to the Legation in Croatia</i> States that the resettlement of Slovenes and Serbs in the territory of the former Yugoslav state is to be arranged by an exchange of notes between the German and Croatian Governments rather than by a formal treaty.	116	157
	<i>Editors' Note</i> Refers to the visit of Marshal Kvaternik to Hitler's headquarters on July 22.		203
July 24	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Department for German Internal Affairs</i> Requests the Foreign Minister to determine whether or not Hitler decided that the Volksdeutsche in southeastern Europe were to be resettled in Germany.	149	212
July 25	<i>An Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the Foreign Ministry</i> States that a report from Belgrade regarding increased communist activity was passed on to Ribbentrop and Hitler. Ribbentrop ordered Veessenmayer to Belgrade.	152	215
Aug. 7	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Department for German Internal Affairs</i> Records information from Himmler of Hitler's decision postponing the resettlement of Volksdeutsche from southeastern Europe until after the war. Kočevje in Italian-occupied territory is not affected.	187	295
Aug. 10	<i>The Chargé d'Affaires in Croatia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the insurrectionary movement in Bosnia, now on the wane, is partly to be attributed to the ruthless methods of the Ustaše.	191	301
Aug. 12	<i>The Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the Military Commander in Serbia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports deterioration of the situation with regard to the insurrectionary movement in Serbia.	195	308
Aug. 15	<i>The Deputy Director of the Legal Department to the Legations in Croatia and Hungary</i> Forwards Red Cross reports of executions of Serbs on Croatian and Hungarian territory. Suggests that measures be taken to counteract propagandistic exploitation of such incidents.	205	317
Aug. 20	<i>Memorandum by the Foreign Minister</i> Records the Italian demand of Croatia that she hand over to the Italian military all executive authority in the Adriatic littoral.	217	341

## YUGOSLAVIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Aug. 21	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Croatia</i> Directs that in regard to the Italian demand on Croatia (see document No. 217) the Croatian Government be advised to reach a friendly agreement with Italy. The alliance with Italy is of paramount interest to Germany in the Mediterranean.	219	342
Aug. 21	<i>The Minister in Croatia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that Mussolini has accepted a Croatian proposal regarding the dispute over administration of the Croatian littoral.	220	344
Aug. 27	<i>The Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the Military Commander in Serbia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports on the spread of insurrection in Serbia and the disintegration of the provisionally appointed government; installation of a new Serbian government willing to fight Communism is being attempted.	250	400
Aug. 29	<i>The Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the Military Commander in Serbia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports the attempt to have the Communist insurrection crushed by the Serbs themselves. General Milan Nedić, a former Yugoslav War Minister, has been charged with forming a government.	257	411
Aug. 30	<i>The Director of the Department for German Internal Affairs to the Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the Military Commander in Serbia</i> Inquires about the number of Serbs thus far deported from Croatia.	261	416
Sept. 2	<i>The Foreign Minister to the Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the Military Commander in Serbia</i> States that he has no objections to the formation of the Nedić government but that he should have been informed beforehand. The Nedić government must be prevented from turning against Germany.	267	434
Sept. 8	<i>The Office of the Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the Military Commander in Serbia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Proposes that 8,000 male Jews be moved from Serbia and put on an island in the Danube delta.	288	463
Sept. 10	<i>The Office of the Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the Military Commander in Serbia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Requests instructions so that the question of a quick and Draconian settlement of the Jewish question in Serbia can be taken up with the Military Commander, Serbia.	297	472
Sept. 12	<i>The Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the Military Commander in Serbia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the Nedić government is unable to put down the insurrectionary movement and that Germany will have to crush it solely with her own forces.	303	479

## YUGOSLAVIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Sept. 13	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Department for German Internal Affairs</i> Opposes the deportation of Serbian Jews to Poland or Russia and considers it possible to keep them in camps in Serbia if the necessary harshness and determination are applied.	313	497
Sept. 14	<i>Ambassador Ritter to the Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the Military Commander in Serbia</i> Gives notice of the decision of the OKW to transfer one division from France to Serbia.	318	507
Sept. 15	<i>Ambassador Ritter to the Legation in Bulgaria</i> Directs that the agreement in principle of the Bulgarian Government be requested for cooperation in blocking off outside aid to the insurgents in Serbia.	320	509
Sept. 19	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Italy</i> Forwards text of Hitler's Directive of September 16 (document No. 326) and requests that the Italian Government be informed of Field Marshal List's impending journey to Zagreb for discussing joint German-Croatian action against the Communist uprisings in Serbia.	339	535
Sept. 22	<i>The Minister in Croatia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Forwards the minutes of a conference concerning problems of resettlement from and to the areas of former Yugoslavia. Requests instructions in view of the Croatian reluctance to accept more Slovenes.	350	552
Sept. 26	<i>SS-Obergruppenführer Heydrich to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop</i> Asks that influence be brought to bear on Croatia to accept the Slovenes who are to be removed from Germany in order to make room for the Volksdeutsche from Kočevje.	360	570
Sept. 28	<i>The Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the Military Commander in Serbia to the Foreign Minister</i> Requests the Foreign Minister's support in bringing about the removal of 8,000 Jews from Serbia as the prerequisite for eliminating Freemasonry and a hostile intelligentsia.	363	582
Oct. 2	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Department for German Internal Affairs</i> Comments on Benzler's telegram No. 701 (document No. 363) and opposes the removal of Serbian Jews to the Rumanian Danube delta. Requests authorization to discuss the matter with Heydrich.	376	605
Oct. 17	<i>The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Italy</i> Requests comments on an enclosed letter of September 24 from the OKW which urges that the Foreign Ministry not get involved in cases where death sentences are passed against nationals of occupied countries.	408	653
Oct. 25	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Department for German Internal Affairs</i> Record by Counselor Rademacher of his trip to Belgrade to study the problem of the disposition to be made of the Serbian Jews.	425	697

## YUGOSLAVIA—Continued

Date	Subject	Doc. No.	Page
1941 Oct. 29	<i>The Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the Military Commander in Serbia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reports that the wholesale execution of Serbs as reprisals for killings of members of the Wehrmacht have effects which are contrary to Germany's political objective.	432	708
Nov. 22	<i>Memorandum by the State Secretary</i> Explains that while Benzler's appointment as Plenipotentiary authorizes him to deal with the deportation of Jews from Serbia, the handling of this problem by the military authorities within Serbia is outside the sphere of his responsibility.	491	812
Nov. 28	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff</i> Record of a conversation between Hitler and Croatian Foreign Minister Lorković on November 27; Hitler expressed satisfaction at developments in Croatia.	511	865
Nov. 30	<i>Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat</i> Record of a conversation between Ribbentrop and Croatian Foreign Minister Lorković on November 28. Ribbentrop advised Croatia to conduct a wise policy with respect to Italy because Italy and Germany were allies.	517	886
Dec. 3	<i>The Office of the Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the Military Commander in Serbia to the Foreign Ministry</i> Reviews the situation in Serbia after the insurrection had largely been suppressed. Recommends that future police action be chiefly entrusted to such Serbs as General Nedić whose actions have earned a degree of German trust.	538	944
Dec. 8	<i>Minute by an Official of the Department for German Internal Affairs</i> Records having told Benzler that compliance with his request for an early removal of the Serbian Jews to the east was impossible because deportation of the Jews from Germany had priority.  (See also under "Directives for the Conduct of the War" and "Italy.")	566	990

No. 1

177/85202-03

*The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Tokyo, June 23, 1941—12:35 a. m.

No. 1012 of June 22

Received June 22—10:15 p. m.

With reference to your telegram Multex No. 401 of June 21.<sup>1</sup>

For the Foreign Minister.

Today at 7:00 p. m., Japanese time, after receiving the telegram mentioned above, I called on Foreign Minister Matsuoka. I explained to him in detail the memorandum of the German Government and moreover handed to him the proclamation of the Führer.<sup>2</sup>

The Foreign Minister accepted my explanation with understanding and told me that Ambassador Oshima had been informed by the Reich Foreign Minister, after 4:00 a. m., German time, corresponding to 11:00 a. m., Japanese time, that war with the Soviet Union had begun. He thereupon asked me for information whether there had been a formal declaration of war. I answered in the negative and referred him to the text of the memorandum, where mention is made of the removal of a threat made against the German Reich. Matsuoka described my explanation as valuable, but requested me to ask Berlin for information on this point. Precise wording of the question is without decisive significance for the attitude of the Japanese Government. However, he requested precise information on the German point of view.

Matsuoka remarked further:

1. A meeting of the leadership committee of the Cabinet, consisting of the Prime Minister,<sup>3</sup> Foreign Minister, the Army Chief [*Wehrmachtschef*]<sup>4</sup> and the Finance Minister<sup>5</sup> will take place tomorrow afternoon. He would report on the situation and hoped to be able to inform the German Government expeditiously of the opinion of the Japanese Government.

<sup>1</sup> Vol. XII of this series, document No. 663.<sup>2</sup> See vol. XII of this series, Editors' Note, p. 1073.<sup>3</sup> Fumimaro Konoye.<sup>4</sup> Gen. Hajime Sugiyama, Chief of the Army General Staff.<sup>5</sup> Isao Kawada.

2. The Japanese Government would adopt no measures without detailed consultation with the Government of the Reich.

3. For himself he could once again assert that the United States would not be in a position to deliver military supplies to the Soviet Union by the Pacific route. The Japanese Cabinet would certainly be of the same opinion.

4. He had requested all departments to refrain from giving their own views on the situation to the press through spokesmen; the Bureau of Information had recommended to the Japanese press that it observe restraint. Matsuoka then asked me for information whether Germany reckoned on a quick collapse of the Stalin regime. He had always seen a threat to it only in foreign war. When I answered that the German considerations were not known by me in detail, he asked me to inquire in Berlin.

Matsuoka further stated that he had gained the impression from the report of Ambassador Oshima, that the Führer and the Foreign Minister did not expect active Japanese participation against the Soviet Union on the basis of the Tripartite Pact. He personally was of the same opinion as before, that in the long run Japan could not remain neutral in this conflict. In the event of the entry of the United States of America into the war, as a result of the Russo-German war, he personally considered that the alliance would become operative for Japan under the Tripartite Pact.

Toward the end of the interview Matsuoka received another telegram from Oshima wherein the Reich Foreign Minister called attention to an alleged Russian withdrawal of troops from the Far East. Matsuoka stated spontaneously that he would immediately propose appropriate countermeasures. Matsuoka was thoroughly positive and cordial throughout the whole interview. He denied emphatically that the existence of the Cabinet was in danger, and he repeatedly expressed his confidence that the German operations would meet with quick success. With regard to the current economic negotiations, he advocated that they should be carried on steadily.<sup>6</sup>

Request telegraphic instructions to the question raised by Matsuoka.<sup>7</sup>

OTT

<sup>6</sup> See document No. 216.

<sup>7</sup> In telegram No. 886, dispatched June 26 (177/85205), Ribbentrop replied to this request for instructions as follows: "Please tell Mr. Matsuoka in reply to his question whether Germany is counting on an early collapse of the Stalin regime that we expect the Stalin regime to collapse in the not-too-distant future."

No. 2

265/173013

*The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ANKARA, June 23, 1941—9:55 p. m.

SECRET

Received June 24—6:00 a. m.

No. 790 of June 23

With reference to telegram No. 726 of June 22.<sup>1</sup>

Today I discussed with Saracoglu the question of Russian shipping. Passage of Russian naval vessels is completely out of the question. The Bosphorus and the Dardanelles are closed by net defenses and sown with mines. Passage of Soviet merchant vessels appears to the Foreign Minister not very likely at this time because in the initial phase of the war Russia undoubtedly would not want to divest herself of her merchant tonnage for the benefit of England. In any event, he is apparently willing to cooperate with us in this matter also, and he promised that he would promptly inform me of any Russian démarche in that regard.

PAPEN

<sup>1</sup> This telegram (1099/318819-21) contained instructions by Ritter that Papen take up with Saracoglu the question of the passage of Soviet ships through the Straits. According to this instruction Turkey could refuse to let Soviet warships pass through the Straits under the Montreux Convention of 1936 although there would be freedom of passage for merchant vessels under this Convention. "We are very anxious, however," he stated, "to have Turkey cooperate with us to prevent the passage of Soviet merchant vessels, too. The reason is, first of all, that we do not want the considerable Soviet merchant tonnage of about 400,000 tons in the Black Sea to get away, and, secondly, that we want to prevent any cooperation between the Soviet Union and England in the field of merchant shipping in the Mediterranean. In view of the well-known English shortage of shipping space in the Mediterranean the Soviet Union could perhaps render England substantial aid."

The instruction then suggested that the Turks might lay minefields to protect themselves against the passage of warships through the Straits in accordance with the Montreux Convention, a measure which would at the same time hamper and delay the passage of merchant vessels which could not be denied passage.

No. 3

616/249802-04

*Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

BERLIN, June 23, 1941.

Pol. VI 3369 g.

At 1:00 p. m. today former Lithuanian Minister Škirpa called on me and informed me that at 11:30 a. m. today the Kaunas radio—which accordingly must be in the hands of the Lithuanian activists—had proclaimed a general uprising against the Red Russian occupa-

<sup>1</sup> Marginal note at the head of the document: "Führer portfolio" (Führer Mappe).

tion and called on the Lithuanian people to fight for their freedom and political independence. At the same time the radio had announced the composition of a new activist Lithuanian government with Škirpa as Minister President at the head and General Rastikis, who is likewise living here in Germany as an émigré, as Minister of National Defense.

While M. Škirpa was still with me the Gestapo (Herr Gräfe) also informed me that this announcement by the Kaunas radio had been picked up.

M. Škirpa tried to describe to me the advantages for Germany if we would immediately recognize this new Lithuanian activist government and thereby the right to existence of little countries, too; this would perforce make a particularly favorable impression on world opinion.

I asked M. Škirpa how it happened that the new government had been proclaimed under him—and thus doubtless at his instigation—without his having informed the Foreign Ministry in advance about such an intention in a straightforward manner. During his private visits with me I had pointed out to him every time very emphatically that we could not tolerate political activity from him, who was enjoying our hospitality here. M. Škirpa replied in some embarrassment that after all he had submitted a memorandum here on June 19<sup>2</sup> and he had tried yesterday to reach the Ministry by telephone but had not been able to get anyone! When I objected that I could have been reached very easily by telephone at home all day he admitted that he had not made this attempt. He then asserted that he was of course ready to bear the responsibility for everything.

When I asked whether he had dealt in this matter with a German authority, and if so with which one, he replied as follows:

For some time he kept in connection with the High Command of the Wehrmacht Abwehr (Lt. Col. Graebe), who, like the Abwehr office in Königsberg, was accurately informed of his activity. With the consent of the High Command of the Wehrmacht he had kept close contact with the activists in Lithuania with the aid of agents, and prepared everything for an uprising against the Soviet forces in the country for the occasion which had now arrived.

Škirpa then evidently promoted also the plan of forming a Lithuanian government under him. I cannot judge to what extent the Abwehr Department itself (Lt. Col. Graebe) knew about this plan. It is significant, however, that there was a communication from Herr Gräfe stating that he had repeatedly warned the military authorities

<sup>2</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 650 and footnote 2.

against getting involved with the all too active and somewhat fanatical Škirpa in matters of a political nature.

M. Škirpa gave me a copy of the Kaunas radio announcement,<sup>3</sup> here enclosed, as well as the statement of the commitment of the agents employed by him.<sup>4</sup>

GRUNDHERR

<sup>3</sup> Not printed (616/249805-06).

<sup>4</sup> Not printed (616/249807).

#### No. 4

323/193896-97

#### *Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI*

BERLIN, June 23, 1941.

Pol. VI 3382 g.

This afternoon the former Latvian Minister, M. Kreewinsch, called on me. I told him immediately at the start of the conversation that I could receive him only as a private person.

M. Kreewinsch stated the following:

He had never recognized the new situation created by the actions of the Soviet Union in Latvia. As indicated by the note of the Reich Government of day before yesterday,<sup>1</sup> the Russian actions in Latvia had occurred also without the consent and knowledge of the German Government. He assumed that in Riga the same thing would soon occur that had happened in Kaunas, namely the proclamation of a Latvian government.<sup>2</sup> He was making the request that he again be recognized as the Latvian Minister in Berlin, that his former officials be able to operate once more as officials of the Legation, and that he be given back the two buildings of the former Latvian Legation at Burggrafenstrasse 13 and Einemstrasse 5. This was particularly important because numerous Latvian refugees, some of whom had now been released from German internment camps, still had no living quarters in Berlin.

I replied to M. Kreewinsch that I could only take cognizance of his statements privately, and that moreover I could not give him any hope that his wishes would be granted.

From what followed it became evident that particularly the former Latvian Military Attaché, Colonel Plensners, who is in Königsberg at the moment, has kept close contact with the High Command of the Wehrmacht Abwehr. Moreover about 200 Latvian refugees have been called up by the High Command of the Wehrmacht as interpreters, etc., and some of them have already been dispatched to East Prussia. The connection with Latvia was probably organized through these

<sup>1</sup> For text see *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, July 1941 (Essen, 1941), pp. 551-563; cf. vol. XII of this series, Editors' Note, p. 1073.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 3.

agents by M. Plensners in cooperation with the High Command of the Wehrmacht Abwehr.

After consultation with Under State Secretary Woermann, Pol. I M took up contact with the Abwehr in Königsberg in order to make sure that in connection with the welcome *military* activity of the agents of the High Command of the Wehrmacht Abwehr there will not be any *political* accomplished facts brought about in the Baltic region that could be inconvenient to us.

Incidentally M. Kreewinsch seems to have been much less active than the Lithuanian Minister Škirpa.<sup>3</sup> On the other hand Colonel Plensners probably played a more active role in these matters.

GRUNDHERR

<sup>3</sup> See documents Nos. 3 and 6.

### No. 5

1531/374226

*Wolodymyr Stachiw to the Führer and Chancellor*<sup>1</sup>

BERLIN-WILMERSDORF, JUNE 23, 1941.

Rk. 9380A.

YOUR EXCELLENCY, highly honored German Reich Chancellor: The leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists—OUN, Stepan Bandera, has honored me with the mission to submit to Your Excellency, as the leader of the German nation now fighting victoriously for the new order of Europe, a memorandum by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists for the solution of the Ukrainian question.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Marginal note: "Stachiw, who brought this, states that the Foreign Ministry, the OKW, the Reichsführer SS, and Reichsleiter Rosenberg will receive copies of this letter and the enclosures. M[eerwald?], June 23."

<sup>2</sup> The memorandum has not been found. A Reich Chancellery minute of June 26 (1531/374227), presumably by Lammers, describes this memorandum of the Ukrainian organization in the following terms:

"The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) has submitted along with the letter of June 23, 1941, addressed to the Führer, a memorandum on the Ukrainian question. The memorandum advocates the restoration of an independent Ukrainian national state in the sense of the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Considering the urge of the Ukrainians for independence, peaceful conditions, politically speaking, could be brought about in Eastern Europe in the long run, only if the Ukrainian state were politically independent. Likewise the Ukraine would in the long run become an organic component and a valuable supplement to the European economy only if the Ukrainian state were economically independent. Finally, the best guarantee of a German-Ukrainian alliance and the best protection against Russian pressure on Europe would be an independent Ukrainian armed force. A solution of the Ukrainian question corresponding to the solution of the Slovakian and Croatian questions did not appear advisable. Appended to the memorandum are programmatic, political and military decisions of the second congress of the OUN, which took place at the beginning of 1941."

The OUN, which leads the Ukrainian masses in their revolutionary struggle to establish the Ukrainian state, is deeply convinced that the present passage at arms against Moscow will destroy the subversive Jewish-Bolshevist influence in Europe and permanently break Russian imperialism.

The reestablishment of the independent Ukrainian national state in the sense of the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk will consolidate the new ethnic order in Eastern Europe and contribute to the peaceful and beneficial development of this area.

Confident that Your Excellency, as the champion of the ethnic principle, will support our ethnic struggle, I remain,

Yours, etc.

WOLODYMYR STACHIW  
Department Head in  
the Political Office of the OUN

### No. 6

616/249799-800

*Kazys Škirpa to the Führer and Chancellor*<sup>1</sup>

BERLIN, JUNE 23, 1941.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: In this historic hour in which the Lithuanian people are regaining their freedom I take the liberty as Minister of the former constitutional Lithuanian Government in the German Reich to express to you and the victorious German Army my most profound thanks for saving Lithuania from the Bolshevist occupation.

At the same time I have the great honor very humbly to lay before you the following:

After Lithuania was last year incorporated into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics through the act of force of the Moscow Government, the Lithuanian activist movement was formed in the face of the Bolshevist terror from the most active and energetic elements in the country under my leadership, with the objective of shaking off the Bolshevist rule and fighting to regain the political independence of Lithuania.

After attainment of this objective the Lithuanian activist movement is striving to gain the new internal organization of the Lithuanian state on an ethnic basis and its incorporation into the community of destiny and solidarity of the new Europe. A more detailed presentation of Lithuania's attitude and wishes is set down in a memorandum which I submitted to Minister von Grundherr in the Foreign Ministry on June 19, 1941.<sup>2</sup> It stresses the fundamental realization, proved by past experience, that a close political, economic, and cultural cooperation of Lithuania with the German Reich is in the vital interest of the Lithuanian people.

<sup>1</sup> This letter was accompanied by a cover note of June 23 (616/249801) in which Škirpa asked Ribbentrop to transmit the letter to Hitler.

<sup>2</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 650 and footnote 2.

Now the Lithuanian activist movement has eliminated the Soviet regime through the revolution on June 22, 1941, made possible by the heroic advance of the German troops. It has proclaimed the restoration of Lithuania's national independence, and formed a national government which I have been called upon to head.

Hoping for your kind benevolence I am willing, from a feeling of patriotic responsibility, and I feel duty-bound as leader of the Lithuanian activist movement, to comply with the summons of my fatherland and to place myself at its service.

I therefore consider it my first task at the moment—assuming the consent of the German Reich Government—to go to my homeland at once in order to proclaim before all the world, on the occasion of taking over the business of the government, on behalf of the entire Lithuanian people their thanks to you and the German people for making it possible to restore the Lithuanian state, and to proclaim Lithuania's alliance with the German people.

I should be exceedingly grateful to you if you would do me the honor [of permitting me] to demonstrate in a personal discussion my full devotion to you and the German Reich.

KAZYS ŠKIRPA

No. 7

F19/404-05;  
F20/051-44

*Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler*<sup>1</sup>

ROME, June 23, 1941/XIX.

FÜHRER: On the occasion of our talk on the Brenner on June<sup>2</sup> I gave you my views regarding Russia and told you that the Russian question now called for a radical solution: either a military alliance or war. You explained to me that the former solution was out of the question because Stalin could never forget the failure of his policy in the Danube-Balkan area, and because the agreement with Belgrade, which he concluded in the eleventh hour,<sup>3</sup> had revealed his true intentions. Consequently there remained only the second solution and with respect to it there was only one problem, that of timing. From what you have said in your proclamation to the German people<sup>4</sup> I am

<sup>1</sup> The letter here printed is translated from the German text.

The Italian original with Mussolini's signature is filmed on F20/043-309. This Italian text is the same as that which is printed in *Hitler e Mussolini: lettere e documenti* (Rome-Milan, 1946), pp. 104-108 except for two differences in paragraphing. The sentence on p. 107 which is enclosed within brackets does not appear on the original received in Berlin.

Weizsäcker's memorandum, St.S. 417 of June 25 (B12/B001010), records that Alfieri handed him the letter that day in a sealed envelope.

<sup>2</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 584.

<sup>3</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 265.

<sup>4</sup> For text see *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, July-Dec., 1941, pp. 545-551.

convinced that any further postponement of the solution by the use of arms, for which there is now no alternative, would have imperiled our cause. Here, too, the knot had to be cut.

I fully appreciate that your decision must have been preceded by long reflection, because the war against Russia is primarily a struggle against the breadth of space. But all those who would point to historical precedents should be reminded that today the motors of tanks and airplanes, and the extraordinary maneuvering skill of both your generals and your soldiers, have overcome space.

The solution of the Russian problem results, I believe, in the following advantages:

a. It deprives Great Britain of her last hope on the European Continent;

b. It relieves us of any concern for the immediate future;

c. It brings us back to our political doctrine, which for tactical considerations we temporarily abandoned;

d. All anti-Bolshevist tendencies throughout the world, including the Anglo-Saxon countries, will again turn toward the Axis;

e. The new Russia, diminished in territory and liberated from Bolshevism, may be returned to the practice of sincere economic collaboration with the rest of Europe, and make raw materials which we need available to us, especially if the Anglo-Saxons should impose upon us a war of unforeseeable duration.

Everything I have said will show you, Führer, what enthusiastic approval your decision to take Russia by the throat has met with in Italy and especially among the old guard of the party, which would have accepted only with a heavy heart any other solution of the problem. In a war of this nature Italy cannot remain on the sideline. I therefore thank you, Führer, for having accepted the participation of Italian ground and air forces,<sup>5</sup> in numbers and for a sector yet to be determined by the General Staff. At the same time every effort will be made to consolidate our position in North Africa, both in the west, to watch Weygand, and in the east, in order to forestall any British attempt at a counterthrust—an attempt, moreover, which is unlikely after the latest severe defeat of the English Army. Concurrently we shall do everything in our power—notwithstanding the enormous transport difficulties—in order to prepare the 10 to 12 divisions necessary for an offensive against Egypt. This attack cannot be undertaken until late autumn after Tobruk has been captured.

As regards the various states, Führer, Turkey is an extremely important card in our game. If Turkey should permit the passage of our troops so that they could attack Egypt from the east as well, Egypt's fate would be sealed and the backbone of the British Empire broken. The resulting consequences for the British East, as far as

<sup>5</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 660 and Editors' Note, p. 924.

India, would be incalculable. In this estimate of Turkey's significance it gave me deep satisfaction to take note of the recent conclusion of the German-Turkish accord,<sup>6</sup> and I have formally proposed to the Turkish Government the conclusion of an analogous or even stronger accord, if acceptable to Ankara.

*France-Spain.* You know, Führer, my views on France and the French, views which are based on an accurate knowledge of that nation and its psychology. Without indulging in any illusions, it will be useful to pay with appropriate concessions for any advantages that Darlan's policy can offer us, especially in the fundamental question of our transports to North Africa.<sup>7</sup> If we were to play our French card for all it is worth we would lose Spain; conversely, if we played the Spanish card, that is, yielded to the demands of Spain, the situation in North Africa would immediately be endangered. France is playing with the idea of regaining North Africa, but France also knows that her doing this would entail the complete occupation of the mother country, and consequently she will be careful. I believe, Führer, that the best policy toward France or Spain is the one we have pursued up till now, namely, to prevent both the one and the other from creating difficult and perhaps irremediable situations for us.

*Great Britain-United States.* Mr. Roosevelt cannot do us more damage than he has done already, even if he formally declares war on us. The declaration of war would therefore have the purpose of giving a lift to morale in England, which is at present very depressed. However, the effect of such a stimulant would be of short duration.

Before closing this letter, Führer, I should like to say the following to you:

a. With respect to the unfolding of the operations, I wish to ask you, Führer, to keep me informed to the extent that appears desirable to you, just as you did in the recent campaign in the Balkans. I know that our General Staffs are collaborating in the most comradely solidarity and harmony.

b. I should like to thank you for the recently concluded economic agreement,<sup>8</sup> which was signed by Clodius and Giannini. This agreement enables me to overcome a number of difficulties and to intensify our armament production.

c. The harvest of 1941 is richer than that of last year. I shall not announce the figures to the nation, so as not to arouse any false hopes and cause a relaxation of consumer discipline.

d. The "morale"<sup>9</sup> of the Italian people is excellent, as you, Führer, probably have heard from other sources as well. Above all, the Italian

<sup>6</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 648.

<sup>7</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 633.

<sup>8</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 652.

<sup>9</sup> "Stimmung" in the Italian original.

people are consciously determined to march with the German people to the end and to bear all sacrifices necessary to achieve victory.

I am certain that the campaign against Bolshevik Russia will culminate in a dazzling victory, and that this victory will be the prologue to the total victory over the Anglo-Saxon world.

In this conviction, which is for me a certainty, I ask you, Führer, to accept my always sincere and comradely salutations.

MUSSOLINI

## No. 8

205/142735-36

*The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 723 of June 24

STOCKHOLM, June 24, 1941—12:30 a. m.

Received June 24—2:25 a. m.

With reference to our telegram No. 705 of June 22.<sup>1</sup>

No definite decision by the Swedish Government has as yet been received on the list of military wishes presented by me. The Swedish Government is aware that compliance with the German military wishes marks the abandonment of its former policy of neutrality and for that reason, and in order to preserve unity in Sweden's domestic politics, it is anxious not to bypass the Foreign Relations Committee and the Parliament. The questions will be considered in the Foreign Relations Committee today, and a secret session of the Riksdag is set for Wednesday morning.<sup>2</sup> As to the Swedish Government's decision toward the over-all German program, particularly the German demand for transit of the German Oslo division,<sup>3</sup> there seems to be hardly any ground for doubt according to what Günther has told me in further talks. I hope to have the definite decision as early as tomorrow afternoon or evening, so that the Swedish Riksdag would only have to give retroactive sanction to the Government's decision.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Vol. XII of this series, document No. 668.

<sup>2</sup> June 25.

<sup>3</sup> The German 163d Infantry Division.

<sup>4</sup> The clock time of the dispatch of this telegram indicates that it was drafted on June 23.

A memorandum by Kramarz dated June 25, Pol. I M 1958 g. Rs (205/142739) records that the Military Attaché in Stockholm on June 23 reported directly to the Attaché Department, OKW, that final Swedish approval of Germany's wishes in regard to transportation was expected the next day, June 24; that the attitude of the King and of the Government was positive.

In telegram No. 725 of June 23, sent 1:10 a. m. June 24 (205/142737) Schnurre and Wied further reported that the Swedish Government had agreed in principle to the laying of mine fields by the Swedish Navy in cooperation with the German Navy, and that the attitude of Sweden toward the other wishes expressed by the German Naval War Staff in its communication of June 18 was positive.



Minister President Hansson, whose attitude has decisive importance, has already declared himself in favor of acceptance, as I was informed confidentially. The Minister President and the Foreign Minister are making it their business to win over for acceptance several members of the Cabinet and of the Foreign Relations Committee, who are still in the opposition, in order to make Sweden's decision a unanimous one.

Thus, subject to Sweden's political decision, which is still outstanding, I have tentatively informed the Swedish Government that departure of the Oslo division will start as early as Wednesday evening. The transport experts on both sides started tonight with the preparatory technical planning.

The positive impression gotten from the attitude of the Swedish Government and the Swedish authorities, reported in the preceding telegram,<sup>5</sup> has been substantiated in my subsequent discussions.<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, the effort to reorient the Swedish press in our favor has apparently been successful.

SCHNURRE  
WIED

<sup>5</sup> No. 705 of June 22. See footnote 1.

<sup>6</sup> In a memorandum of June 25 (205/142740) Ritter recorded a telephone message from Schnurre in Stockholm according to which the Swedish Government had that afternoon given its consent to the transit of one German division which started to move out from Norway.

See also documents Nos. 16 and 17.

### No. 9

205/142738

#### *The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 728 of June 24

STOCKHOLM, June 24, 1941—1:45 p. m.

Received June 24—3:45 p. m.

For Ambassador Ritter.

In reply to your telephone message of this morning<sup>1</sup> and with reference to our telegram No. 709 of June 22.<sup>2</sup>

The fact that Finland at every opportunity is emphasizing her neutrality and even with respect to the Swedish Government is not making it clear enough that she will of her own free will join the German campaign against Russia is having a retarding effect on our conversations with regard to political and military questions. The Finnish Minister here,<sup>3</sup> it is true, at my urging finally secured by telephone the

<sup>1</sup> No record of this telephone message has been found.

<sup>2</sup> In this telegram (260/170036) Schnurre and Wied reported that the Finnish Minister in Stockholm had received no instructions from Helsingfors.

<sup>3</sup> Dr. Jarl de Vasastjerna.

agreement of his Government to the most urgent measures, but up to this moment he has not received telegraphic instructions along the lines proposed by us. As a result his manner of expression in dealing with the Swedish Foreign Minister is even now not emphatic enough, which, in view of the meetings of the Riksdag committees which are now taking place, and in view of tomorrow's meeting of the Riksdag, is very regrettable. It would work in support of us if the Finnish Minister at Stockholm were immediately instructed to inform the Swedish Government confidentially that the entry of Finland into the war against Soviet Russia on our side was imminent. The defensive character of any Finnish move, which was emphasized yesterday and today in the Swedish press, need not be affected by such a step.<sup>4</sup>

SCHNURRE  
WIED

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 15.

In telegram No. 513 of June 26 (260/170054) Blücher reported from Helsinki that the situation of the Swedish negotiators in Stockholm was quite changed as a result of the outbreak of the Finnish-Russian war, and that new instructions had been sent to them the previous night to put pressure on the Swedes for compliance with Finland's requests.

### No. 10

93/103746-48

#### *The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 695 of June 24

BUDAPEST, June 24, 1941—3:45 p. m.

Received June 24—5:35 p. m.

The Minister President<sup>1</sup> summoned me in order to clarify the question of the participation of Hungarian troops in the advance against the Soviet Army. He gave a historical account of how the Hungarian Government in recent weeks had time and again tried to find out our position in this regard in order at this opportunity also to make known the Hungarian position. At the Foreign Ministry, however, the Hungarian Minister had been told even until recently that there was no Russian problem. I, too, in my démarche of June 16 had stated only that the German Government considered it necessary for Hungary, too, to undertake steps for securing her borders with respect to the Soviet Union.<sup>2</sup> On June 19 General Halder had told the Chief of the Hungarian General Staff<sup>3</sup> in Budapest that it would perhaps have been better if Hungarian troops had been reinforced to a greater

<sup>1</sup> László de Bárdossy.

<sup>2</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 631 and footnote 1.

<sup>3</sup> Gen. Henrik Werth.

degree along the Russian border; he advised, however, that now nothing more be done so as not to alarm the Russians.<sup>4</sup> Nor was there any mention in the Führer's letter which I gave the Regent on June 22<sup>5</sup> that Germany considered an active Hungarian participation in the action against the Soviet Union to be desirable.

Yesterday the German General with the High Command of the Hungarian Armed Forces<sup>6</sup> had informed the Chief of the Hungarian General Staff that the participation of Hungarian troops in the advance into the Soviet Union was desired. He, the Minister President, considered this to be primarily a political question, and therefore asked for clarification whether there was actually a German wish to this effect and if so to what extent Hungarian participation was desired.

The position of the Hungarian Government was determined by the following political and economic factors: The Hungarian Government had submitted in advance to the recent Vienna Award<sup>7</sup> in the hope of thereby bringing the Transylvanian question to a resting point. It had indeed done everything to achieve this, and had shown self-control and patience in the face of the continuing Rumanian provocations. It had likewise not replied to the Rumanian press campaign. It was impossible, however, to overlook the strong Irredentist movement in Rumania. The situation was so tense that the portions of Transylvania awarded to Hungary had to expect later to become the object of Rumanian aggression. The Hungarian Government knew that the Reich Government would not approve such a Rumanian action, but nevertheless it had to reckon with such independent actions, which possibly might not originate with the leadership of the Rumanian state. The new line of the frontier was not only unfavorable economically but was also difficult to defend militarily, particularly the connection with the Szekler region, so that initial successes of the Rumanian Army, which was well equipped with German war material, were not impossible; but they would be absolutely intolerable for any Hungarian Government, especially since the Szekler region had a purely Hungarian population. Furthermore the Hungarian Government believed that it was fulfilling an obligation toward the Axis Powers by providing for the use of military defense measures in order to prevent such a situation from arising as would be contrary to the interests and prestige of the Axis Powers.

The Hungarian Government also could not disperse its military forces too much for the reason that the Slovak Government still cher-

<sup>4</sup> Cf. C. A. Macartney, *A History of Hungary, 1929-1945* (New York, 1957), vol. II, pp. 20-21.

<sup>5</sup> Vol. XII of this series, document No. 661.

<sup>6</sup> Gen. Kurt Himer.

<sup>7</sup> See vol. X of this series, document No. 413.

ished revisionist ambitions. Thus the Slovak Minister President<sup>8</sup> had officially informed the Hungarian Minister, who had suggested to him the convening of a commission for the final settlement of the Hungarian-Slovak border, that the Slovak Government intended to make revisionist claims on Hungary at a final settlement of the frontiers in Southeast Europe. He [the Hungarian Minister President] had let him be answered that the Slovak Government should not indulge in any sort of empty hopes and illusions in this regard.

Furthermore the Hungarian Government had to take into account the impending start of the harvest in view of the very serious food situation, as well as the fact that it had made the Hungarian railroad network available to the needs of the Wehrmacht to the greatest possible extent—and this willingly. He also wanted to point out that Germany had not expected the Rumanians either to proceed actively against the Yugoslav Army. The Bulgarians, too, had only later moved in to occupy without fighting the areas awarded to them.

All of these considerations changed nothing in the fact that the Hungarian Government felt united with the Axis Powers in loyalty and full solidarity. He therefore wished to emphasize that the Hungarian Government would be willing to review the question of participation by parts of the Hungarian Army in the advance against the Soviet armies, and to submit this to the Regent, in case this were desired by Germany and he were informed of this wish through me.

The Minister President concluded his remarks by again requesting that he be informed through diplomatic channels whether and in what strength a participation by the Hungarian Army was desired.

ERDMANNSDORFF

<sup>8</sup> Vojtech Tuka.

## No. 11

93/103750

*The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 698 of June 24

BUDAPEST, June 24, 1940—10:45 p. m.

Received June 25—12:25 a. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 695 of June 24.<sup>1</sup>

General Himer told me that the Minister President's assertion mentioned in the telegram cited above, that he had informed the Chief of the Hungarian General Staff that participation by Hungarian troops in the advance into the Soviet Union was desired, was not in-

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 10.

this form in accordance with the facts. Rather, he had left with the Chief of the Operations Group of the Hungarian General Staff<sup>2</sup> a note on June 22 with the following text:

"Every Hungarian assistance will be accepted at any time. We do not wish to *demand* anything, but everything that is offered voluntarily will be gratefully accepted. There is no question of our not wanting participation by Hungary."

He had spoken in the same sense yesterday with the Chief of the Hungarian General Staff;<sup>3</sup> it was possible that the gentlemen had passed on his statements in a stronger form to the Minister President in order to exert pressure on him, as the department chiefs in the General Staff were urging participation by Hungary in the campaign against the Soviet Union.

ERDMANNSDORFF

<sup>2</sup> Col. H. László.

<sup>3</sup> See, further, document No. 54.

## No. 12

136/75001

### *The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 2179 of June 24

MADRID, June 25, 1941.

Received June 25—4:30 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 1422 of June 24.<sup>1</sup>

The Foreign Minister was very pleased that we had agreed to the expedition of Spanish volunteers against Russia. He promised at once to bring up the matter at today's meeting of the Council of Ministers and afterwards to arrange everything with the Chief of the Falange Militia, General Moscardo, for the immediate issuance of a call for enlistments. I would then receive further communications to enable the military agencies of both Governments to discuss the necessary arrangements.

Because of jealousies between the Falange and the Army, volunteers would be accepted not only from the Falange but also from the Legion associated with the Army. The Minister assured me that the response would surely be extraordinarily large.

When I remarked that for the reasons stated in the telegraphic instructions, a public declaration that Spain was in a state of war with the Soviet Union would be appropriate and desirable, the Minister replied that he would have to discuss this question with the Generalis-

<sup>1</sup> Vol. XII of this series, document No. 671, footnote 2.

simo. Personally he was inclined to believe that England and possibly America would react to such an announcement if not by a declaration of war on Spain, then undoubtedly by the imposition of a blockade, which would entail cutting off of all supplies now in transit as well as seizure of the Spanish ships now held in the United States under the order blocking Spanish assets (cf. my telegram No. 2178 of June 24<sup>2</sup>). Complications for Spain would also be detrimental to Germany during the Russian campaign. It was not impossible that the sending of Spanish volunteers alone might have similar consequences, but, if so, the course of events could no longer be changed.<sup>3</sup>

STOHRER

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram No. 2218 of June 26 (136/75010) Stohrer reported that a decision had not yet been taken regarding a Spanish declaration of war on Russia; that it would in great measure depend on the reaction to the expedition of Spanish volunteers. The British Government had already reacted by prohibiting all imports of gasoline into Spain.

## No. 13

191/138736

### *The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOKYO, June 25, 1941—8:15 a. m., summer time.

SECRET

Received June 25—5:10 p. m.

No. 1033 of June 25

The Foreign Minister<sup>1</sup> just called on me and informed me that Wang Ching-wei had asked the Japanese Government to obtain recognition of the Nanking Government by the Governments of Germany and Italy. Matsuoka had passed on this request to the Japanese Ambassadors in Berlin and Rome with the instruction to advocate recognition with the German and Italian Governments and to ask that recognition be accorded by July 1. The Foreign Minister also stated that on the same day the Japanese Government (clear text evidently missing) the grant of a loan of 300,000,000 yen to Wang Ching-wei. I suggest on the basis of our experience in Manchukuo that we link recognition of the Wang Ching-wei Government with prior settlement of our economic position in China.<sup>2</sup>

The same text is being sent to Peiping.<sup>3</sup>

OTT

<sup>1</sup> Yosuke Matsuoka.

<sup>2</sup> See vol. I of this series, documents Nos. 571, 575, and 606.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 27.

## No. 14

177/85228-29

*The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOKYO, June 25, 1941—8:15 a. m. summer time.

SECRET

Received June 25—5:50 p. m.

No. 1034 of June 25

Foreign Minister Matsuoka called on me today and informed me as follows:

As he had already telegraphed Ambassador Oshima, Russian Ambassador Smetanin called at the Japanese Foreign Ministry yesterday on instructions from his Government and asked whether Japan, in accordance with the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Agreement of April 13, 1941,<sup>1</sup> would remain neutral in the present conflict. He, Matsuoka, had first called the Russian Ambassador's attention to the statement he made in Tokyo after his return from his European trip. According to that, the Neutrality Pact would be without effect in the event that Japan should have to fulfill her obligations under the Tripartite Pact.<sup>2</sup> He had also made it clear to Stalin and Molotov that the Tripartite Pact was still the basis of Japanese policy. Smetanin had then asked whether Japan considered the Tripartite Pact applicable to the present conflict. He had not given Smetanin any clear reply to that, but had stated that the Neutrality Pact was limited *in force and scope*<sup>3</sup> by the Tripartite alliance. The Japanese Cabinet would soon *decide* on the position to be taken and also enter into consultations with Japan's allies.

He had intentionally left Smetanin completely in the dark. He believed he had thereby done what was best to prevent troop withdrawals from the Far East.<sup>4</sup>

Matsuoka stated further that a strong current against [*in favor of?*] Japan's entry into the war against the Soviet Union is making itself felt in the Cabinet, in branches of the armed forces, and among the people. It was also being advocated by Minister of the Interior Hiranuma. He was well aware that part of this group wants a conflict with Russia in order to prevent Japan from striking in the south. Although he realized this clearly, he intended to advocate the policy of war against Russia before the Cabinet, being convinced that the need for a Japanese operation in the south would become

<sup>1</sup> For text see *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, selected and edited by Jane Degras (London, 1953), vol. III, pp. 486-487.

<sup>2</sup> According to the *New York Times* of Apr. 23, 1941 (p. 7, col. 1), Matsuoka upon his return made various statements, reported by the Japanese press and radio, saying that the Tripartite Pact remained the immutable basis of Japanese foreign policy.

<sup>3</sup> The italicized words are in English in the original.

<sup>4</sup> According to a memorandum by Kramarz of June 28 (177/85213) the Military Attaché in Tokyo had briefed Matsuoka on June 23 about military developments. On that occasion Matsuoka remarked that "Japan would make difficult the transfer of further Russian forces from the Far East to Europe and could not tolerate assistance by America through Vladivostok."

increasingly strong once Japan had entered the war. He hoped that the Cabinet would now decide to propose to the Emperor that Japan enter the war at the appropriate time. As soon as such a decision had been taken he would get in touch with Germany and Italy. In his opinion Japan's entry into the war would have to come at a time when the outcome of the war was still uncertain, for a participation that involved no risk would be morally objectionable and intolerable.

In his opinion the United States would not at the present time move any closer toward participation in the war. A strong stand by Japan appeared to him to be the means of confirming America in that attitude.

OTT

## No. 15

260/170047-48

*The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

HELSINKI, June 25, 1941—6:10 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received June 25—9:20 p. m.

No. 503 of June 25

1) I had a talk with the Foreign Minister<sup>1</sup> as soon as the air raid alarm was over.<sup>2</sup>

2) The Russian air attacks have completely changed the situation since this morning. The declaration prepared for today's session of the Parliament is no longer relevant.<sup>3</sup>

3) I explained to the Foreign Minister that air attacks were Russia's answer to the Finnish protests.<sup>4</sup> Now war had been started by the Russian side through a plain act of aggression. A *de facto* state of war now existed between Finland and Russia. Finland now had to act accordingly.

4) The Foreign Minister did not deny this. He stressed that the Russian attack was especially brutal, considering that only yesterday Molo[otov] (1 group missing) had sent for the Finnish Chargé d'Affaires<sup>5</sup> and had told him the following: Finland should not begin

<sup>1</sup> Professor Rolf Witting.

<sup>2</sup> The American Minister reported on June 25 that he had been informed at 4:35 p. m. that up to 3:00 p. m. that day "some 16 Soviet aircraft had been shot down in various parts of the country and one seaplane captured by a coast guard vessel after a forced landing. Bombing had been widespread in nearly all parts of the country with civilian casualties considerable, Soviet forces having been used in some places including groups of as many as 50 planes." Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. I (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1958), p. 42.

<sup>3</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 675; *The Memoirs of Marshal Mannerheim*, translated by Eric Lewenhaupt (London, 1953), p. 413.

<sup>4</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 675.

<sup>5</sup> P. J. Hynninen.

any war with Russia. Otherwise 200 million Russians would become the enemies of Finland and that would lead to the extinction of Finland.

5) The Foreign Minister, together with the other Cabinet Ministers, will now draft a new governmental declaration.<sup>6</sup>

6) I suggested to the Foreign Minister to present Finland in all foreign countries as the victim of an unprovoked Russian aggression.

7) I asked the Foreign Minister that, on the basis of the Russian attack, he instruct his two negotiators in Stockholm not to mince words and to take a strong line.<sup>7</sup> The Foreign Minister agreed.

BLÜCHER

<sup>6</sup> In telegram No. 508 of June 25 (260/170049) Blücher reported that in a secret session of the Parliament that evening the Minister President issued the new governmental declaration which "culminated in the confirmation of the fact that 'now it is war' and concluded with the hope that Finland by her participation could make a significant contribution for Europe and for the world."

In telegram No. 509, dated June 25 but sent shortly after midnight (260/170050) Blücher reported that in a second secret session Parliament gave the Government a unanimous vote of confidence which signified its adherence to the concept of war with Russia.

In telegram No. 510 of June 26 (260/170053), as a result of the discussion in the morning newspapers Blücher forwarded the exact words of M. Rangell: "Finland on Wednesday morning [June 25] was subjected to an attack on the part of the Soviet Union which initiated operations of war against Finland. On the basis of this Finland has begun to defend herself with all the military means available to her."

<sup>7</sup> See documents Nos. 9 and 41.

## No. 16

205/142742

### *The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

STOCKHOLM, June 25, 1941—7:20 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received June 25—9:30 p. m.

No. 736 of June 25

For the Foreign Minister.

The King of Sweden summoned me this afternoon in order to inform me that Germany's principal request, for transit of one division, had just been accepted in the State Council.<sup>1</sup> The King's words conveyed the joyful emotion he felt. He had lived through anxious days and had gone far in giving his personal support to the matter. He added confidentially that in so doing he had found it necessary to go even so far as to mention his abdication. The King then expressed the hope that Germany would make no demands on Sweden going beyond these limits. If the issue had been for

<sup>1</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 688 and footnote 1.

instance the occupation of Gotland, as he was afraid for a time, he would have been compelled to refuse such a demand.

Form and substance of this statement by the Head of the Swedish State indicated to me once more how much affection the King felt for Germany and, on the other hand, the distinct limitations of his personal influence on decisions.

WIED

## No. 17

205/142743-44

### *The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

STOCKHOLM, June 25, 1941—10:10 p. m.

No. 737 of June 25

Received June 25—11:15 p. m.

The Swedish Foreign Minister has just asked me to see him in order to tell me that the Swedish Government has granted our request for the transit of a division from Norway through Sweden to Finland.<sup>1</sup> The Foreign Minister emphasized the significance for the domestic policy as well as for the foreign policy of this decision for Sweden and expressed his joy that in spite of the great difficulties it had been possible to bring about a unified decision of the King, the Cabinet, and the Riksdag. Regarding the other wishes in the military field which I had brought up he could at the same time inform me of Swedish agreement in principle subject to further discussion regarding the individual points.<sup>2</sup> The Swedish Government intends to inform the Swedish public of the decision of the Government by means of an official communiqué. He intends to inform the Soviet Minister, Mme. Kollontay, this afternoon.<sup>3</sup>

The decision of the Swedish Government encountered extraordinary internal political difficulties. The negative views within the Cabinet itself and in the parties of the Riksdag almost led yesterday evening to a Cabinet crisis. The joint intervention of the King, of Minister President Hansson, and of Foreign Minister von Günther finally succeeded in bringing about the unity in reaching the decision. The differences of view had their origin in this that the Government on the one hand wishes to maintain the earlier policy of keeping out of the war of the Great Powers and on the other hand it would like to do what is possible in the way of rendering aid in the struggle against Bolshevism within the framework of this policy.

<sup>1</sup> See documents Nos. 8 and 16.

<sup>2</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 638, and document No. 28 in this volume.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 42 and footnote 5.

After this final decision the first train leaves Oslo this afternoon with the Division Commander.<sup>4</sup>

SCHNURRE  
WIED

<sup>4</sup>In telegram No. 764 of June 27 (205/142754-55) the Legation reported that the first train, bearing the divisional staff, regimental staffs, and the reconnaissance staff of the 163d Division, had crossed the Norwegian-Swedish border early in the morning of June 26. At the noon pause at Krylbo the train was greeted by Wied, Schnurre, and Major General von Uthmann.

### No. 18

616/249808

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat*

BERLIN, June 25, 1941.

With respect to memorandum D IX 9 g. from Senior Counselor Grosskopf<sup>1</sup> concerning the attempt of former Lithuanian Minister Škirpa in Berlin to establish contact with the Reich Government, the Foreign Minister has decided that no contact whatever is to be established with Škirpa.<sup>2</sup>

Submitted herewith through the State Secretary to the Department for German Internal Affairs (Senior Counselor Grosskopf).

LOHMANN

<sup>1</sup>This memorandum of June 24 (616/249814) forwarded to Ribbentrop the memorandum printed as document No. 3.

<sup>2</sup>Unsigned marginal note: "Was made known in the meeting of the Russia Committee on July 3, 1941."

### No. 19

587/243586-88

*Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

U. St.S. Pol. 584

BERLIN, June 25, 1941.

According to an unnumbered telegram of June 21 from Paris,<sup>1</sup> the French Government has requested information on whether, in the event of a French call for help through German military action in Syria, the German reply "might be combined with a declaration cleared for publication that, in contrast to England, Germany does not call in question French rights in Syria".

In view of our Arab policy any declaration would be undesirable that would create the impression that the Arabs in Syria should remain under French rule for an unlimited period.

The French mandate over Syria was based, as is well known, on the principle that Syria and Lebanon were to obtain independence at

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (70/50488).

a certain time. French policy has really taken this circumstance continuously into account, to a certain extent. Thus General Dentz stated in a broadcast on April 2:<sup>2</sup>

"The independence of Syria remains the goal to which the Syrians aspire. France has never ceased to be in favor of it, but this goal can be attained only in a definitive world situation that settles the status of Syria;

"Public opinion desires a Government that has more extensive powers;

"It is necessary to put an economic and social program to work."

General Dentz stated further that he had taken the following decisions:

1. . . . (There follow specific provisions.)<sup>3</sup>

If a German declaration regarding French rights in Syria should become unavoidable in the circumstances, it would be necessary to include in it somehow a statement that Syria's later independence is itself one of the aims of French policy.

The declaration which the French Government would publish at a proper time should therefore be worded approximately as follows:

"The French Government has been authorized to declare that the German Reich, as well as France, recognizes the right of the Syrian population to independence, but that like France it is convinced that that goal cannot be realized at this moment and that Germany, therefore, in contrast to England, does not call in question the French rights in Syria."

Herewith sent to Ambassador Abetz in accordance with our conversation.<sup>4</sup>

I did not submit this specially to the Foreign Minister, but would be grateful to you for mentioning these points in your conference with him.<sup>5</sup>

I am attaching a memorandum on various French declarations concerning Syria<sup>6</sup> but would like to have it back.

WOERMANN

<sup>2</sup> The following citations from this broadcast are in French in the original.

<sup>3</sup> Thus in the original.

<sup>4</sup> No record found.

<sup>5</sup> According to a memorandum of June 20 by Schwarzmann (386/211099) Abetz had requested by telephone that he be permitted to make an oral report to the Foreign Minister about matters concerning France "especially on Syria, the question of occupation costs and the implementation of the Paris Protocols."

<sup>6</sup> Marginal note: "Pol. VII 573/41 g.—Encl. 1: *Temps* of January 1, 1941 (Radio address of General Dentz). Encl. 2: *France de Bordeaux* of April 3, 1941 (Radio address of General Dentz to Syrian population)."

Pol. VII 573/41 g. was an unsigned memorandum submitted to Woermann on June 12 (587/243579-82) which dealt with French-Syrian relations and recent French statements on that subject. The two enclosures to that memorandum which are cited above have not been found.

## No. 20

386/211130

*The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

PARIS, June 26, 1941.

No. 1910

Received June 27—1:00 a. m.

For Ambassador Abetz.

Admiral Darlan told me today that he would like to sever relations with the Russian Government and get rid of the Russian Ambassador.<sup>1</sup> But he could [undertake] such a measure only with a suitable pretext and he asked for our support.<sup>2</sup>

Darlan is especially anxious not to wait until the country is almost conquered to break off relations with Russia, in order not to incur the suspicion that he was profiting by a military defeat.<sup>3</sup>

SCHLEIER

<sup>1</sup> Alexander Efremovich Bogomolov.<sup>2</sup> In telegram No. 1925 of June 28 (386/211147-48) Schleier reported that he had secretly supplied Darlan with information of materials discovered in the Soviet Russian Embassy and consular department. This information was to be used by Darlan in the ministerial council but without revealing its origin.

A memorandum attached to telegram No. 1925 (386/211149) indicates that it was to be withdrawn.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram No. 1939 of June 28 (386/211159) Schleier reported that a council of ministers held on that day had decided in principle to break off relations with the Soviet Union and that this should take effect within 48 hours.

## No. 21

93/103751

*The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

BUDAPEST, June 26, 1941—5:35 p. m.

MOST URGENT

No. 710 of June 26

Received June 26—6:10 p.m.

With reference to my telegrams Nos. 695<sup>1</sup> and 698<sup>2</sup> of June 24.

The Minister President asked me whether a reply by the Reich Government had arrived to the question which he had asked me regarding a possible participation of Hungarian troops in the German advance against the Soviet Union. I replied negatively.

Bárdossy asked me to report that he would be grateful for an immediate reply because the Hungarian Government attached the greatest importance to being guided by our wishes in this question.<sup>3</sup>

ERDMANNSDORFF

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 10.<sup>2</sup> Document No. 11.<sup>3</sup> No reply has been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry. The Halder Diary has the following entry for June 25, 1941: ". . . Hungary's participation would be desirable. Hungary, however, wants to be asked officially. For political reasons the Führer does not want this."

## No. 22

93/103758

*The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

BUDAPEST, June 26, 1941—6:50 p. m.

MOST URGENT

No. 713 of June 26

Received June 26—10:40 p. m.<sup>1</sup>

The Minister President has just summoned me and informed me that this afternoon Russian airplanes had bombed an express train running on the line from Körösmezö to Budapest and the town of Košice, and there had been some killed and some wounded.

The Hungarian Government therefore considered itself to be in a state of war with Soviet Russia.<sup>2</sup> The Hungarian Air Force would react appropriately to the attack this very day. Hungary intended to publish a communiqué regarding the state of war with Russia only after the Hungarian air attack had been carried out. He therefore urgently requested that the German press not publish reports on the affair before the Hungarian communiqué had been issued.

The Minister President stated further that his statements transmitted in telegram No. 695 of June 24<sup>3</sup> had become pointless owing to the new situation.

ERDMANNSDORFF

<sup>1</sup> Marginal note: "Received by telephone."<sup>2</sup> For the background of this Hungarian decision, cf. Nikolaus von Horthy, *Ein Leben für Ungarn* (Bonn, 1953), pp. 285-287; Antal Ullein-Reviczky, *Guerre Allemande, Paix Russe* (Neuchâtel, 1947), pp. 106-109; C. A. Macartney, *A History of Hungary, 1929-1945*, vol. II, pp. 25-32.<sup>3</sup> Document No. 10.

## No. 23

4661/E211348-50

*The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 1909 of June 26

PARIS, June 26, 1941.

Received June 26—10:40 p. m.

Foreign Ministry through Dr. Schwarzmann for Ambassador Abetz.

When Admiral Darlan visited me today, he gave me a letter signed by Marshal Pétain personally, and addressed to the Führer.

The text, in translation, follows:<sup>1</sup>

Marshal Pétain, Chief of State

Vichy, June 25, 1941.

TRANSLATION

Herr Reich Chancellor, I have just learned that the high German military authorities have apparently decided to place the *Gardes Territoriaux* (the detachments of the Home Guard), which during hostilities had occasion to proceed against German parachutists behind the French lines, on a par with the snipers. Some of my compatriots come under this general ruling and are in danger of incurring the death penalty. Two of them, the MM. Pellerin and Andrieux, have already been sentenced on these grounds and shot.

I have the honor to draw the attention of Your Excellency to the fact that the *Gardes Territoriaux*, in contrast to the snipers, carried out express orders of French official agencies.

Inasmuch as the French Government confirmed these orders and set up the formations of the *Gardes Territoriaux* by legal decrees of June 18, 1940,<sup>2</sup> it was of the opinion that such an organization was absolutely admissible with reference to articles 1 and 2 of the Regulations annexed to the Fourth Hague Convention of October 18, 1907.<sup>3</sup>

If this legal opinion were contestable, and I believe it is not, even if mistakes on the part of certain local authorities could be determined, it is nonetheless inhuman to turn against those who carried out the orders and whose patriotic duty it was to obey without contradiction.

If, on the other hand, some of them can be reproached for sometimes having lost their heads and committed unfortunate acts, they could be called to account for this reason and sentenced only for this reason.

I therefore consider it my duty as Chief of the French State, to appeal to Your Excellency in the last resort in order that you may decide that in no event should the *Gardes Territoriaux* be placed on a par with snipers.

At a time when I am trying to obtain from the French people the faithful execution of the directives which I give them, I should consider it very important to obtain from your Excellency a pardon for those men who, in carrying out their operations, only rendered obedience to the government of their country and their superiors.

Please accept, dear Herr Reich Chancellor, the assurances of my highest esteem. Ph. Pétain.

Close of the text.

Darlan declared himself, with reference to the proposal discussed previously,<sup>4</sup> in agreement with the surrender of former Ministers

<sup>1</sup> A copy of the French original has been filmed on 4661/E211352-53.

<sup>2</sup> The decree for the establishment of the *Gardes Territoriaux* bears the date May 17, 1940. For the text see *Journal Officiel de la République Française: Lois et Décrets*, mai 1940, p. 3692.

<sup>3</sup> For text see *The American Journal of International Law*, supp., vol. 2, 1908, pp. 1-215.

<sup>4</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 135. For Ribbentrop's reply to Darlan's proposal see document No. 74.

Reynaud and Mandel, who were responsible for this order of the French Government. He would surrender them at any time if such a demand were made by the German Government for criminal prosecution by German authorities in exchange for the holding of separate trials of members of the *Gardes Territoriaux*.

SCHLEIER

No. 24

386/211122-23

Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter

BERLIN, June 26, 1941.

Subject: The Present State of Negotiations Concerning the Reduction of French Occupation Costs.<sup>1</sup>

I have been informed only belatedly of Ministerialdirektor Wiehl's memorandum—Dir. Ha Pol No. 158—of June 24.<sup>2</sup>

From the military point of view, I have to differ on two points with the conception of Wiehl.

The first point is that I advocate granting to the French the reduction of occupation costs to 10 million reichsmarks right now, effective at the time when the French will have fulfilled the German demands in regard to Dakar and Bizerte.<sup>3</sup> I share the point of view of the OKW and of the three armed services that Bizerte is more important for the supply of the Africa Corps and Dakar for the employment of German naval and air forces than the highest possible monetary contributions.

The second point is that I advocate the renunciation of the transfer of securities, foreign exchange, and gold at the present time.<sup>4</sup> This demand has not been fully justified from the beginning. Such a demand could perhaps have been justified toward a France that was to be treated only as a vanquished foe. But France is now to be treated as an incipient ally. Such demands should not be maintained toward a prospective ally. In this connection I point out that the French

<sup>1</sup> For previous developments see vol. XII of this series, document No. 475, footnote 3.

<sup>2</sup> In this memorandum (378/209741-43) Wiehl outlined the German position, French objections, and his own recommendations. For further details, especially on the French view, see *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice* (Paris, 1957), vol. IV, pp. 590-596.

<sup>3</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 559.

<sup>4</sup> In telegram No. 569 of June 30 from Olymp (386/211169) Abetz reported that Hitler had agreed "to a revision of the occupation costs to the figure of a daily sum of 10 million marks under the condition that 3 million marks of the 60 billion deposited with the Bank of France would be transferred daily in gold, foreign exchange, and securities."



Government is about to employ very strong French naval units off Syria, that is, against the English fleet.<sup>5</sup>

To be submitted to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary for the prospective presentation by Ambassador Abetz and Minister Hemmen.

RITTER

<sup>5</sup> See document No. 31 and footnote 3.

## No. 25

93/103754

### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

St.S. 425

BERLIN, June 26, 1941.

The Hungarian Minister<sup>1</sup> gave me today the appended memorandum concerning efforts in the Banat to bring this area into the Reich in some form or other.<sup>2</sup> The Minister remarked in this regard that he and his Government had no doubts for a single moment concerning the future fate of the Banat as a part of Hungary.<sup>3</sup> They would be grateful, however, if the data contained in the memorandum were investigated.

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>1</sup> Döme Sztójay.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (93/103755-56). The memorandum dealt with alleged activities in this matter by the leaders of the German minority in the Banat.

<sup>3</sup> For the background of German-Hungarian discussions regarding the former Yugoslav Banat see vol. XII of this series, documents Nos. 340, 353, 366, 371, and 564.

## No. 26

2800/548214-16

### *Reichsleiter Rosenberg to the Foreign Ministry*<sup>1</sup>

Institute for Continental European Research

Abt. II No. 074

BERLIN, June 26, 1941.

D IX 18 g. Rs.

On the basis of the special assignment given me by the decree of the Führer of April 20, 1941, in regard to the *central handling of the questions of the eastern European area*,<sup>2</sup> I request the following:

<sup>1</sup> This letter was also sent to a number of other Ministries and departments concerned which are listed on the first two pages of this document. The copy sent to the Foreign Ministry was for the attention of Senior Counselor Grosskopf of the Department for German Internal Affairs.

<sup>2</sup> For text see *Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal* (Nuremberg, 1948), vol. xxvi, document No. 365-PS (U.S. Exhibit 143), pp. 383-384.

1. All publications planned in matters of the eastern area,<sup>3</sup> also all directives and orders which concern the political or propaganda activities with respect to the eastern area, as well as all orders and decisions which concern the political organization of this area, are to be submitted to me for my opinion.

2. Special caution is in order in the employment of members of the nations of the Soviet Union in the eastern territories. In case an office intends to utilize such persons in the eastern areas for purposes touching on policy, my consent must be procured in advance.

A. ROSENBERG

<sup>3</sup> Marginal note in Ribbentrop's handwriting: "?".

The following notes in Ribbentrop's handwriting are appended to the document printed on a separate page (2800/548217):

"F[ührer], 'Eastern European area'."

"Area outside German troops is responsibility of Foreign Ministry."

## No. 27

191/138752-53

### *The Chargé d'Affaires in China to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

PEIPING, June 27, 1941—8:50 a. m.

No. 299 of June 26

Received June 27—10:50 a. m.

With reference to telegram No. 1033 of June 25 of the Embassy Tokyo<sup>1</sup> and my telegram No. 262 of June 13.<sup>2</sup>

1. All the reasons which have heretofore argued against the recognition of the Wang Ching-wei Government still exist unaltered. I refer to my earlier reports.

2. Negotiations on the occasion of Wang Ching-wei's recent Tokyo visit<sup>3</sup> are considered in political circles here mainly as representing an internal *Chinese-Japanese* conflict about an extension of the powers to be accorded to Nanking, and this is correctly termed by the press a "domestic quarrel." There are as yet no concrete results of the negotiations. Evidently, however, neither party has made any important concessions and the total absence of practical results can now only be compensated by increasing the prestige of Wang Ching-wei at the expense of third countries. This is here considered a helpless attempt at getting out of the big muddle into which they have gotten

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 13.

<sup>2</sup> This telegram (191/138734) reported a conversation with a "leading member of the North China government" about Wang Ching-wei's negotiations with Japan concerning recognition by the Axis Powers. Altenburg quoted the informant as saying that the Chinese people would be able to understand a recognition of the Nanking regime by Germany only "in the event that Chiang Kai-shek would have put himself unconditionally into the hands of the Americans and English, which so far was by no means certain . . ."

<sup>3</sup> June 16-25.

themselves by their own lack of discipline. A final success can hardly be counted on.

3. I wish to warn urgently against fulfilling the ultimatum-like Japanese wishes in favor of Wang Ching-wei. In view of the advance of Soviet-Russian influence in western China, bitterly resented for a long time, and of the continued tense relationship with their own Communist party, the military success in the German-Russian war (evidently one group missing) change at one stroke the relationship of Chungking to Germany as well as the Chungking inclination toward a compromise in the direction of a direct Chinese-Japanese total solution of the China conflict. I therefore suggest that before conclusion of the German conflict with Russia no decisive steps be taken in the matter of recognition.

ALTENBURG

No. 28

205/142757-58

*The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 769 of June 27

STOCKHOLM, June 27, 1941—9:02 p. m.

Received June 27—11:05 p. m.

With reference to my telephone conversation with Ambassador Ritter of this afternoon.<sup>1</sup>

The following is the report on the status of the specific questions raised in the OKW letter of June 17:<sup>2</sup>

II, 1: Transit of the Engelbrecht Division is now in progress. The volume of traffic totals 100 trains. The question of using the railroad lines leading to Trondheim and Narvik has been deferred since the German interests are for the present assured by last year's transport agreement. Once this transport route is utilized to maximum capacity, there is nothing to bar a suitable interpretation of last year's transport agreement.<sup>3</sup>

II, 2: The movement of supplies to Finland on every technically practical scale has been approved by the Swedish Government. Technical discussions are now in progress. In addition to the route used at present via Denmark, southern Sweden, to Haparanda and Tornio, preparations are now being hastened to organize a route to Finland over Swedish railroads to the Swedish ports of Gävle and Sundsvall on the Gulf of Bothnia. From Gävle or Sundsvall by ship across the Gulf of Bothnia to the corresponding Finnish ports. The new route

<sup>1</sup> No record of this telephone conversation has been found.

<sup>2</sup> Vol. XII of this series, document No. 638.

<sup>3</sup> Vol. X of this series, document No. 132.

is contingent on the early closure of the Åland passage by mines, which the Naval Operations Staff has put off for the present for reasons unknown to us here. I would appreciate it if the second route mentioned above were taken into account for transport planning and developed as quickly as possible.

II, 3: No objections on the Swedish side. The case is of no practical importance at this time.

II, 4: Sweden has agreed. The question of the Norwegian ships has not been raised by me for the time being. I have asked the Finnish Minister, Ramsay, to see what he can do about Finnish chartering of the Norwegian ships. The question is not urgent because the vessels are only motor ships.<sup>4</sup>

II, 5: The transport questions will be handled on a continuing basis by the transport experts already or still to be assigned to the Military and Naval Attachés.

II, 6: Sweden has agreed to all wishes expressed so far. Oberpostrat Harder has been designated by me as the expert of the Military Attaché for signal communications.

II, 7 and IV, 5: Sweden has agreed to assign airfields suitable for forced landings and will disclose instructions insuring flight safety. Details will be furnished to the Air Attaché tomorrow morning.<sup>5</sup> Compliance with the German wishes regarding aircraft and crews involved in forced landings. Discussion concerning flight of individual aircraft across Swedish territory is still going on at present. Sweden requests timely advance notice for flights across Swedish territory.

<sup>4</sup> A memorandum of Feb. 9 by Ritter, zu Ha. Pol. II b 374 (205/142869-73) lists and describes the Norwegian ships lying in Swedish harbors as follows:

"name of ship	gross tonnage	deadweight tonnage	speed in knots	harbor
SS <i>Gudvang</i>	1,470	2,550	9.5-10	Göteborg
" <i>Charente</i>	1,282	1,815	9-10	"
" <i>Rapid II</i>	714	1,000	9	Strömstad
" <i>Solgry</i>	559	750	8.5	Trelleborg
" <i>Skytteren</i> (whale reducer)	12,358	15,650	12	Göteborg
" <i>Vesta</i>	1,310	unknown	10	"
" <i>Carma</i>	1,234	"	unknown	"
" <i>Bygdöy</i>	1,252	1,800	8	Halmstad
MS <i>Fjeldberg</i>	332	380	9	Malmö
MT <i>Rigmor</i>	6,305	9,610	11	Göteborg
" <i>Buccaneer</i>	6,222	9,525	unknown	"
" <i>Storsten</i>	5,343	8,000	10.5	"
" <i>Lind</i>	461	600	9	"
MS <i>Karin</i>	30	unknown	unknown	"
" <i>Lionel</i>	5,653	8,825	10.25	Gullmarsjord
" <i>Dicto</i>	5,263	unknown	13.75	"
" <i>Realf II</i>	5,069	unknown	unknown	Göteborg
" <i>B. P. Newton</i>	10,324	unknown	13.75	Malmö

All ships lie without cargo (except for the *Bygdöy*, *Vesta*, and *Carma*).<sup>5</sup>

See, further, document No. 151.

<sup>5</sup> See document No. 42.

The question of a permanent regular courier service from Rovaniemi to Norway still requires clarification with Army Headquarters in Rovaniemi.

III: Regarding the status of Swedish assistance to Finland and of the German-Swedish negotiations on nonmilitary supplies, I refer to detailed telegraphic reports Nos. 734<sup>6</sup> and 740<sup>7</sup> of June 25. With Sweden herself being short in most of the supplies requested, the negotiations must be expected to be difficult. The questions are being pursued by me in consultation with the Finnish negotiators.<sup>8</sup>

IV, 1-5: Sweden has agreed. A separate report will follow tomorrow on the special questions contained in OKM's supplementary letter of June 18.<sup>9</sup> The German wishes have been complied with on all substantial points. Military administrative questions are not immediately pertinent at this time since there are no German troops on Swedish territory except the Engelbrecht Division in transit, for which quite satisfactory special arrangements have been made. The Swedish Government has today, in a separate memorandum, served notice of its counterrequests in the domain of civilian and military supplies, which will be separately reported.<sup>10</sup>

SCHNURRE  
WIED

<sup>6</sup> Not found.

<sup>7</sup> Not printed (205/142748-49).

<sup>8</sup> See document No. 41.

<sup>9</sup> See document No. 43.

<sup>10</sup> See document No. 59.

### No. 29

260/170058

*The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

HELSINKI, June 27, 1941—10:40 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received June 28—1:30 a. m.

No. 524 of June 27

1. The Foreign Minister told me that Finland had entered a new phase of her policy. If a break with England or America should result from it, the Finnish Government would prefer that the other side should initiate the break.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> On June 28 the Finnish Minister in the United States, Hjalmar J. Procopé, handed Sumner Welles a statement containing the following declaration:

"The Government of Finland desires to maintain unaltered its relations with Great Britain. The Government of Finland is a co-belligerent with Germany solely against Russia." Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. 1, p. 44.

2. In regard to England I followed the guidance of conversation of telegram No. 511.<sup>2</sup>

3. The Foreign Minister does not yet see his way clear, but has by way of precaution instructed Gripenberg<sup>3</sup> to proceed to Dublin in the event of a break with England.

4. The British Legation here has evacuated the women and children, and has reduced the staff. The Foreign Minister has grounds for believing that the British Minister<sup>4</sup> has been authorized to decide for himself whether or not he would stay.

BLÜCHER

<sup>2</sup> In this telegram of June 19 (260/170023) Ribbentrop agreed with Blücher's point of view and instructed him to work for a break of relations between Finland and Great Britain.

<sup>3</sup> Finnish Minister in Great Britain.

<sup>4</sup> George Gordon Medlicott Vereker.

### No. 30

205/142751

*The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Sweden*

No. 896 of June 27

BERLIN, June 26, 1941<sup>1</sup>

Sent June 27.

For Minister Schnurre.

Please call on the Swedish Foreign Minister and inform him that you have been instructed by me to convey to the Swedish Government the thanks of the Reich Government together with its satisfaction over the understanding attitude Sweden has shown toward Germany's wishes<sup>2</sup> occasioned by the conflict with Russia. Also, that it was my conviction that this attitude conforms to the essential interests of the Swedish people.

RIBBENTROP

<sup>1</sup> This telegram also bears the number 558 and the notation, "received June 26, 10:40 p. m." It was presumably sent to Berlin from Ribbentrop's temporary headquarters.

<sup>2</sup> See documents Nos. 8, 16, and 17.

### No. 31

F1/0582-85

*The Foreign Minister to the Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht*

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, June 27, 1941.

DEAR HERR FIELD MARSHAL: I have noted the contents of your letter of June 15, 1941 (WFSt/Div. L IV/K No. 00113741 Top

Secret)<sup>1</sup> on the implementation of France's military obligations as laid down in the "Paris Protocols",<sup>2</sup> and reply as follows:

The premise from which we proceed in our attitude toward the French Government is that we can only secure to ourselves our military interests in this sphere by negotiating with France, and this premise underlies a policy which, as you well know, I have advocated from the beginning and which has since been consistently followed. For it is obvious that any coercive action against France would have led to the defection of the French colonies and their joining forces with de Gaulle.

On the other hand it is important to handle matters in such a way that no open war between France and England should break out at a time when this did not suit us. If open warfare should break out between these two countries now that we are committed in Russia it could lead to an English attempt to take possession of French bases on the west coast of Africa without our being able to help France effectively in warding off such attempts at these not easily accessible points.

In the meantime the Führer's decision about having the French fleet put out to sea with troop transports for Syria<sup>3</sup> has in this connection produced a new situation; this decision is no doubt based on considerations of a military nature in the Mediterranean region which could, however, advance the likelihood of a general state of war arising between France and England and of an English attack against specific French bases. Since, as you emphasize, it is becoming increasingly urgent to utilize Dakar as a base for our navy while it would be impossible for us to seize this base by force once the English had gained a firm footing there, it seems to me to be of primary importance that we deploy, as soon as practicable from the military standpoint, units of the German Air Force there which would be capable, in concert with local French forces, to repulse any English attack. In this connection it should be borne in mind that under the Paris agreements the obligations of the French with respect to Dakar do not become effective until July 15 at the earliest. I would appreciate learning if it would be possible to send German squadrons to Dakar by this date.

As far as the use of the port of Bizerte is concerned I am of course fully aware of its importance for supplying the German Africa Corps as well as of the urgency of this question. In this regard the arrangements entered into by Ambassador Abetz with the French

<sup>1</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 633.

<sup>2</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 559.

<sup>3</sup> In memorandum Pol. I M 1972 of June 26 (70/50516-17) Grote recorded Hitler's decision to permit the transport of four French battalions from France to Syria under the protection of the French naval task force "Strassbourg."

Government in the supplementary Protocol of May 28, 1941,<sup>4</sup> are so worded that the obligations which France assumes on this score are not contingent upon any political or economic concessions to France. We can therefore demand of the French Government—and the latter is in principle agreeable to this—that it meet these obligations at once. As a result of the events in Syria there is, however, a greater danger than there was last May of an English attack as a reaction to our use of Bizerte for our supply line. The French Government is understandably anxious to be able, in such event, to show its people some tangible German counterconcessions. I will therefore propose to the Führer to make some political and financial concessions to the French at this time.<sup>5</sup>

Heil Hitler!

Yours, etc.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>4</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 559.

<sup>5</sup> For Keitel's reply see document No. 61.

<sup>6</sup> The file copy of this letter is not signed.

No. 32

191/138737-39

*The State Secretary to the Embassy in Japan*

Telegram

BERLIN, June 27, 1941.

SECRET

No. 907

With reference to your telegram No. 1033 of June 25.<sup>1</sup>

For the Ambassador personally.

For the time being for your confidential information.

The Foreign Minister informed Ambassador Oshima, after the Führer had consented, and in agreement with the Italian Government, that we had decided to recognize the Wang Ching-wei Government on July 1.

I have discussed with Ambassador Oshima the details of recognition in the following way:<sup>2</sup>

1. I told Oshima that on July 1 we would send Wang Ching-wei a telegram recognizing his government.<sup>3</sup> It would also state that we were establishing diplomatic relations. We would get in contact with Wang regarding the special questions arising from the recognition.

2. I have arranged with Oshima that we would instruct our Missions with the Governments of the Tripartite Pact in Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia, and Croatia in the course of this day to

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 13.

<sup>2</sup> Weizsäcker's memorandum of June 27 (191/138745-47) is a record of this conversation and of some of the steps subsequently taken in this matter.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 38 and footnote 2.

support the impending Japanese step regarding the recognition of Wang Ching-wei, in accord with the Italian Mission.<sup>4</sup>

3. Oshima asked that nothing be done for the time being in the way of approaching the Spanish Government.<sup>5</sup> He was expecting further instructions in this regard from Tokyo.

4. Regarding our economic wishes I said the following in the course of the conversation :

Following recognition of the Wang Chang-wei government we intended to instruct the Wohlthat delegation<sup>6</sup> to negotiate and conclude within the framework of its negotiations in Tokyo a special agreement with the Wang Ching-wei government regarding German-Chinese trade. In this we proceeded from the assumption, in accordance with the Fuschl conversation of February 23, 1941,<sup>7</sup> that Germany in her trade with China would enjoy a preferential treatment over third countries.

Oshima received this remark willingly and with understanding. He said he intended to inform Tokyo accordingly on his own initiative, too, and obtain confirmation of the reception given my observation.

5. Oshima asked whether our relations with Wang Ching-wei should be considered as having been established de jure with our telegram of recognition of the first of next month. I confirmed this and added that we would then appoint very soon a Chargé d'Affaires to Wang and would later presumably also send an Ambassador.

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>4</sup> An unnumbered draft of this instruction dated June 29 (191/138771) is in the files. According to the reply telegrams, Nos. 1932 of June 30 from Bucharest (191/138791), 670 of June 30 from Sofia (191/138790), 730 of June 30 from Budapest (191/138787), 675 of July 1 from Bratislava (191/138805) and 631 of July 1 from Zagreb (191/138795) the instruction had been carried out and letters of recognition had been or were being sent to Wang Ching-wei.

<sup>5</sup> An unnumbered draft instruction of June 29 (191/138769-70) informing Stohrer of the forthcoming recognition of the Wang Ching-wei regime and asking him to support the Japanese demand for recognition by Spain is also in the files.

Stohrer's telegram No. 2274 of June 30 (191/138788), apparently the reply to this instruction, indicated that Spain would recognize the government of Wang Ching-wei the following day.

<sup>6</sup> For the Wohlthat mission see vol. XI of this series, documents Nos. 341 and 424, and vol. XII of this series, document No. 429.

<sup>7</sup> Between Ribbentrop and Oshima; see vol. XII of this series, document No. 78.

### No. 33

177/85220-21

*The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

SECRET

TOKYO, June 28, 1941—11: 45 a. m.

No. 1069 of June 28

Received June 28—10: 10 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 1034 of June 25.<sup>1</sup>

Within the last few days the leadership committee of the Cabinet has repeatedly met in the presence of the Chief of Staff, the entire

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 14.

Cabinet, and advisory committees without reaching a clear-cut decision as to Japan's future attitude regarding the German-Russian war. As far as could be found out, only preparatory measures for the various possible actions on the part of Japan have been ordered thus far. As the Wehrmacht memorandum<sup>2</sup> confirms, preparatory measures have indeed begun with zest. In the circumstances the preparations for intervention against Russia will take at least 6 weeks, unless Russia is weakened materially and morally in a decisive manner in the Far East beforehand. According to reliable, confidential information, Prime Minister Konoye and the majority of Cabinet Ministers, to be sure, seem to adhere to the view that nothing must be undertaken that would injure Japan's military position in China. Hence, the Cabinet seems thus far merely to have resolved on tightening their grip on French Indochina for which purpose three divisions are allegedly being prepared.

In public and behind the scenes discussions concerning the attitude to be taken are in full swing. Noted nationalists, who always work closely together with the Embassy, have held various confidential discussions—cf. DNB No. 244 of 26 June—in which caution toward the Soviet Union and vigorous action in the south was advocated.

The danger exists that the southern expansion desired by this group will at first be limited to French Indochina, while their efforts (clear text evidently missing) could hinder Japan's activity in the north. In these circumstances, the question arises whether the general directive, given to me in Berlin,<sup>3</sup> to see to it in the first place that Japan takes action in the south while neglecting the Soviet Union, is still valid if a successful move to the south beyond Indochina cannot be counted on at present. According to confidential reports coming to me from the Japanese Foreign Office, Ambassador Oshima is said urgently to have advised the Japanese Government to attack Russia soon.

I request telegraphic instructions.<sup>4</sup>

Ott

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

<sup>3</sup> Ott was in Berlin during Matsuoka's visit in March and April 1941 as is indicated in vol. XII, documents Nos. 218 and 222 but no record has been found of such a directive given to him at that time. See, however, vol. XII, document No. 100.

<sup>4</sup> Not found. See, however, document No. 53.

## No. 34

136/75022-24

*The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry*

## Telegram

TOP SECRET MADRID, June 28, 1941—2:35 p. m., special summer time.  
No. 2251 of June 28 Received June 28—6:10 p. m.

The moves of Serrano Suñer in the last few days show even more clearly than hitherto that he is with clear aim preparing Spain's entrance into the war.

The sending of Spanish volunteers against Russia, which must bring Spain into sharper opposition to our foes, is to be attributed to his initiative. Only a few hours after the outbreak of the war with Russia he won Franco over for this plan which was immediately explained to us in order to bind the easily influenced Chief of State.<sup>1</sup> The reported jealousy and protest by the Army which vetoed the dispatch of Falange formation had a more serious background in so far as the military attempted to oppose the whole project because it would bring Spain to the brink of war.

The incident at Algeciras, which according to the representations of the Foreign Minister involved a heavy encroachment of English flak, and which was made the subject of a very energetic note of protest to the British Embassy (telegram No. 2220 of June 26<sup>2</sup>), takes on a different light in the description by the responsible General Munoz Grandes (telegram No. 2242 of June 27<sup>3</sup>) and far less significance. The same thing is evident in the affair of the gasoline blockade by England, which the Foreign Minister caused to be published and commented upon in aggressive form (*Arriba* article, telegram No. 2218 of June 26<sup>4</sup> and No. 2236 of June 27<sup>5</sup>). Again the account of the facts of the case given by the relevant office presents a different picture (telegram No. 2241 of June 27).<sup>5</sup>

In both cases it is clear that Serrano Suñer consciously exaggerated matters in order to sharpen antagonism toward England and to stir up public opinion against England.

<sup>1</sup> In telegram No. 2206 of June 25 (136/75003) Stohrer reported that some 40 to 50 trained pilots of the Spanish Air Force were to be sent as volunteers in addition to the infantry.

In telegram No. 2217 of June 26 (136/75009) Stohrer reported that Serrano Suñer had informed him of the various points regarding the volunteers which had been decided by the Spanish Government.

<sup>2</sup> In this telegram (136/75011) Stohrer reported having heard that an English plane from Gibraltar had flown over Spanish territory near Algeciras evoking Spanish flak and that thereupon the English flak positions had fired upon the Spanish guns.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed (136/75018).

<sup>4</sup> Not printed (136/75010).

<sup>5</sup> Not found.

The sharp oral and written arguments with the English and with the American Ambassador (telegram No. 2184 of June 24<sup>6</sup> and No. 2213 of June 26<sup>7</sup> and No. 2129 of June 19<sup>8</sup>) tend in the same direction.

The dilatory answers of the Foreign Minister to the Italian Foreign Minister in regard to adherence to the Tripartite Pact and his initial negative view toward the question of an official declaration of war against Russia should not deceive us regarding the intention of the Foreign Minister within a short time to make Spain's entry into the war unavoidable. Serrano Suñer wishes war, but he wants it at a moment most favorable for Spain, that is to say after making sure of a series of important imports which are already on the way and after appropriate preparation of public opinion. In the pursuit of his aim he has to reckon with strong opponents—above all, with the military who have an influence with Franco. That this party is itself more and more convinced of the necessity of entrance into the war I have reported at various times; but they seek to postpone for the longest time possible the entry into the war because of lack of economic and military preparation. For this reason they would oppose any step taken now which might be decisive, of which they might hear from Franco (the Tripartite Pact, declaration of war on Russia) and in view of Franco's indecisiveness they would probably win out as they did this past winter. For these reasons Serrano Suñer makes his preparations for war in areas where an interference is not easily possible and where at the most Franco's assent is necessary, which will be possible for the more significant of the two brothers-in-law to achieve after the restoration of harmony between them.

How nervously the military party observes the operations of the Foreign Minister within his sphere are clear from the fact that the lively exchange with England in *Arriba* because of the gasoline blockade stirred up strong discontent with certain of the military so that the especially anxious Minister of Air, Vigón, suggested to me that I exercise a moderating influence because otherwise Spain would be involved in the war within a very short time.

Serrano Suñer apparently operates in accordance with the words which he once uttered according to which a provocation on the part of the English was necessary for bringing about Spanish unity and that if necessary such a provocation had itself to be provoked.<sup>9</sup>

STOHRER

<sup>6</sup> Not found.

<sup>7</sup> Not printed (136/75008).

<sup>8</sup> Not printed (136/74983).

<sup>9</sup> This telegraphic report crossed the instruction from Berlin of June 28 (136/75029) which is cited in vol. XII of this series, document No. 574, footnote 15. The instruction warned Stohrer to make no moves on his own part regarding Spanish entry into the war because the repeated suggestions of Suñer's desire to enter the war were not to be taken seriously.

## No. 35

177/85214-15

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 560 of June 28 SPECIAL TRAIN, June 28, 1941—8: 10 p. m.  
from the Special Train Received Berlin, June 28—8: 30 p. m.

No. 916 of June 28  
from the Foreign Ministry Sent July 28—9:30 p. m.

No. 267/R RAM

Secret for the Chief of Mission.

I have arranged agreement with Ambassador Oshima that he will influence his Government in the direction of a speedy military action against Soviet Russia, and I ask you now to utilize on your part all the possibilities that present themselves to influence the government at your post and the other influential circles in such a direction. In this connection I ask you to make use of the following points:

1) War between Germany and Soviet Russia will not only bring with it the solution of more or less limited individual problems, but will bring as a consequence a solution of the Russian question in its entirety through a final battle.

2) The destruction of Russian power by our military action, which is to be expected within a comparatively short time, will also make Germany's victory over England an irrevocable fact. If Germany is in possession of the Russian oil wells and grain fields, a sufficient supply for the whole of Europe will thereby be ensured so that the English blockade will on the whole be of absolutely no avail. The direct land connection with East Asia will likewise be established on this occasion.

3) In this way all the preconditions are given which will render possible the new organization of the European sphere as intended by the Axis Powers.

4) The present situation also presents a unique chance for Japan. As Germany does this with respect to Europe, so can Japan now through a military action against Soviet Russia create the prerequisites for the new order in East Asia planned by her. After the removal of the Soviet power in the Far East also, the solution of the Chinese question will be achieved in the way desired by Japan without encountering any more difficulties.

5) From the standpoint of Japanese interests, the idea of a drive toward the south in the direction of Singapore, to be sure, is and remains also of great importance. As Japan is not yet prepared for this and as a possibility for such a drive has not yet been presented in the

present phase of the war, it is in the urgent interest of Japan not to leave unused this chance now offered to her for solving the Russian question in the Far East too. By doing this she would also free her rear for a drive toward the south.

6) In view of the speedy course of events to be expected, Japan should come to a decision in favor of a military action against Soviet Russia without hesitation. A Japanese action against a Soviet Russia already beaten to the ground would be quite prejudicial to the moral and political position of Japan.

7) It can be expected that the swift defeat of Soviet Russia, especially if Japan participates in it from the East, will be the best means for convincing the United States of the absolute senselessness of entering the war on the side of England, who will then be completely isolated and confronted by the mightiest combination in the world.

RIBBENTROP

## No. 36

177/85216

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan*

Telegram

TOP SECRET SPECIAL TRAIN, June 28, 1941—8: 45 p. m.  
No. 623 from the Special Train Received Berlin, June 28—9: 10 p. m.  
No. 917 from the Foreign Ministry Sent June 28—10: 20 p. m.

For the Ambassador personally.

Although there have been some hard battles, military operations are developing so favorably and rapidly that Russian resistance as a whole may perhaps be expected to collapse much sooner than we had thought up to now. The advice given in my previous telegram of June 28<sup>1</sup> that the Japanese Government should decide as soon as possible in favor of intervening actively against the Soviet Union assumes special importance in this connection. In the last few days I have kept Ambassador Oshima continuously informed about the favorable development of the military situation and have just spoken to him again on the telephone, with particular emphasis on the foregoing. I hope that Mr. Matsuoka's recently expressed conviction, that in the event of a German conflict with Russia Japan of necessity will have to attack Russia on Germany's side,<sup>2</sup> will now very soon become a reality.

RIBBENTROP

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 35.<sup>2</sup> See vol. xii of this series, documents Nos. 512 and 596.

## No. 37

5146/E303517

*The State Secretary to the Embassy to the Holy See*

Telegram

Multex No. 424 of June 27<sup>1</sup>      BERLIN, June 28, 1941—12: 25 p. m.  
 Received June 28—2: 00 p. m.

Please do not establish any contact—or as the case may be cease any contact—with the former diplomatic and consular missions of the former Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Every discussion of the question of the future political organization of the Baltic area is undesirable at the present time.

Please confirm receipt.<sup>2</sup>

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>1</sup> The Multex number indicates that this instruction was a circular sent also to various other Missions; however, no other copies of this telegram or lists of addresses have been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

## No. 38

191/138758-59

*The State Secretary to the Embassy in China*

Telegram

SECRET

No. 281

BERLIN, June 28, 1941.

Drafting Officer: Minister Boltze.

With reference to your telegram No. 299 of June 26.<sup>1</sup>

For the Chargé d'Affaires personally.

The Reich Government has decided to recognize the Wang Ching-wei government on July 1. It has been arranged with the Italian Government that on July 1 the Reich Foreign Minister and the Italian Foreign Minister will send Wang Ching-wei telegrams recognizing his government and informing him that we will soon establish diplomatic relations with him.

The text of the Reich Foreign Minister's telegram will be forwarded to you as soon as the wording is definitively settled.<sup>2</sup> Please see to it that Consul General Gipperich hands Wang Ching-wei the Reich Foreign Minister's telegram on July 1.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 27.

<sup>2</sup> Sent in Weizsäcker's telegram No. 282 of June 29 (191/138767-68).

<sup>3</sup> In telegram No. 314 of July 2 from Peiping (191/138811) Altenburg reported that Gipperich, the Consul General at Nanking, had carried out these instructions in the afternoon of July 1.

The matter must be kept completely secret until July 1. Please inform Gipperich also accordingly. Furthermore, please inform the Mission in Chungking confidentially from your post (Peiping) only on June 30.

Further directives for the guidance of your conversation will follow.<sup>4</sup>

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 2.

## No. 39

616/249809

*Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI*

BERLIN, June 28, 1941.

zu Pol. VI 3405 g.<sup>1</sup>

Submitted through U.St.S. Pol. to Pol. I M with the request that the following communication be forwarded to the OKW:

"The Foreign Ministry welcomes the cooperation of activist elements and groups of the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian populations with the German troops in the struggle against Soviet Russia.

"Strictly confidential and only for your information and attention:

"The Foreign Ministry requests, however, that political promises of any kind to these elements and groups, and in general all conversations of a political kind with those mentioned, be avoided in all circumstances."

GRUNDHERR

<sup>1</sup> Pol. VI 3405 g.: Not found.

## No. 40

105/113623

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

St.S. 441

BERLIN, June 28, 1941.

The Hungarian Minister once more stressed to me today that he personally had not been misled by the Foreign Ministry in regard to the developments leading to the German-Russian conflict. On the other hand, a certain confusion in the military field had arisen because of the fact that Colonel General Halder had asked the Hungarian military on June 18 during his short sojourn in Budapest not to sound an alarm in order not to arouse the attention of the Russians, nor to take an offensive position.<sup>1</sup> General Himer had spoken somewhat differently.

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 10.



For the rest we agreed that these things all belong to the past, now that the state of war between Hungary and Russia has been provoked and brought about by the Russian attack.

I told the Minister that for my part I would only try to find out also whether any kind of steps through diplomatic channels were still necessary with regard to Hungary's military action.

So far as I knew this was not the case.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 41

205/142761

*The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 784 of June 29

STOCKHOLM, June 29, 1941—3:00 a. m.

Received June 29—6:00 a. m.

With reference to your telegrams No. 784 of June 25<sup>1</sup> and No. 769 of June 27<sup>2</sup> and with reference to the telegram from Helsinki of June 27 in your file.<sup>3</sup>

The Swedish Foreign Minister informed the Finnish Minister yesterday that the Swedish Government is prepared in principle to supply arms and ammunition to Finland and to discuss Finland's various supply requests.<sup>4</sup> Concrete Swedish-Finnish negotiations will accordingly be initiated today, the prospects of which are viewed by the Finnish negotiators much more favorably than they were in the past.<sup>5</sup>

Repeated to Helsinki.

SCHNURRE  
WIED

<sup>1</sup> Not found.

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 28.

<sup>3</sup> Not identified.

<sup>4</sup> In telegram No. 897 of July 10 (319/192472) the Legation reported that in response to Finland's request for 1,000 trucks, Sweden would offer only 500 and these without tires. According to the Finns the British Government had threatened Sweden with cutting off her overseas imports, the Göteborg traffic, if Sweden were to export rubber or tires to Finland. The British control over the imports from overseas was so strict that Sweden saw no possibility of an evasion (eine Ausnahme zu konstruieren).

<sup>5</sup> In a further report on the Swedish-Finnish economic negotiations (No. 961 of July 16: 319/192450-51), Schnurre emphasized that the Swedes feared, in case they delivered rubber to Finland, that Sweden's overseas trade would be completely cut off.

See document No. 357.

<sup>6</sup> In telegram No. 1883 of Nov. 5 (205/143080) Dankwort reported that the negotiations had been concluded in Helsinki. The Swedes declined to make the loan which the Finns wished as the Swedish delegation had no such authorization. The Swedes further were dubious that Finland would be able to make the stipulated counterdeliveries.

No. 42

205/142762-65

*The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

STOCKHOLM, June 29, 1941—3:30 a. m.

No. 785 of June 29

Received June 29—6:00 a. m.

For the Air Ministry, Attaché Group.<sup>1</sup>

Following earlier general clarification of the German wishes by Minister Schnurre with the Swedish Government,<sup>2</sup> the following arrangements have been agreed with the Swedish Air Force.

1. *Forced landings.*

A. For forced landings by German aircraft, the following airfields have been designated, to be used preferably whenever possible: Torslanda, Bulltofta, Varberg, Ljungbyhed, Skavsta near Nyköping, Roma and Fårösund on Gotland, civilian airfield Visby, 2 km north of the city, Norrtälje, Frösön near Östersund, Romehed northwest of Säter, Vännäs, Kalaxheden, 5 km south of Luleå, Kalix. No field available on Öland.

B. Size of the fields. Skavsta, runways 1000 & 1000; Roma and Fårösund approximately 1000 & 1000, in Fårösund in one direction only 850; Vännäs 900 & 600; Kalaxheden 1200 & 1200; Kalix 900 & 900.

C. The designated fields can be directly approached by aircraft in distress. Red distress flares must be fired if possible. The Swedish authorities will afford every aid and assistance, including fueling and repairs, to aircraft making forced landings on these fields or elsewhere. Attention is called to use of international emergency frequencies.

D. No internment. No general agreement has been concluded on this point; disposition will be from case to case in our favor.

E. Maps on which the airfields are marked will be forwarded at the earliest opportunity to the Luftwaffe Operations Staff, Fifth Air Force, Headquarters Army in Norway, and to Major General Lorenz.

2. *Courier routes and courier aircraft.*

A. For the time being, the following routes have been agreed on with the Swedish Air Force: Oslo-Hamar-Skellefteå-Kemi-Rovaniemi, and Trondheim-Skellefteå-Kemi-Rovaniemi. Courier planes must fly a pennant—color immaterial—on each air foil and are then considered civilian aircraft regardless of type. They will not be fired at, not even by way of warning. No restrictions as to cruising altitude.

<sup>1</sup> Typed marginal note at the end of the document: "Forwarded by the telegraph office by means of closed circuit coded teletype to the Reich Ministry of Air, June 29."

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 28.

Maximum altitude desired by the Swedish side. The prescribed course must be followed. The fortress areas of Hemsjö and Boden, as well as other restricted areas, must not be flown over. As far as possible, a regular flight schedule must be established and will be communicated to the Swedish Air Force by this office. The schedule arranged at the present calls for one plane over each route and in each direction, or two planes on one route in each direction, daily. The flight schedule will be established by this office in consultation with Fifth Air Force and Headquarters of the Army in Norway. The Luftwaffe Operations Staff will be informed.<sup>3</sup>

B. An alternate courier route, Oslo-Pori, has been discussed to allow for contingencies. This office can make definite arrangements if need arises for this route.

C. Courier flights and special flights operated outside the flight schedule must be announced in advance—if possible 2 hours before starting time—to this office, which will arrange for notification of the Swedish Air Defense Command. Such flights must also follow the designated routes.

### 3. *Firing on aircraft.*

A. Aircraft in distress will not be fired at. Fire international red flare.

B. Scheduled courier planes or previously announced courier or special purpose planes will not be fired at.

C. Beginning June 29, other aircraft will receive warning shots and, if they fail to change course, fire for effect; this is the same procedure followed in the past pursuant to Annex 3 Z L, Dispatch 8/41 Stockholm-Berlin.<sup>4</sup> The Swedish Air Defense Command considers this provision essential for effective action against Russian aircraft flying over Swedish territory or attacking German rail transports to Finland. Sweden anticipates the possibility of Russian air attacks,<sup>5</sup> particularly since the German side has demanded that German anti-aircraft machine guns be emplaced on top of transport trains.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram No. 863 of July 6 (205/142797-98) the Legation reported the definitive agreement on two routes for couriers and transport purposes: Rovaniemi-Pori-Bromma-Oslo and return; Germany-Bromma-Finland and return. Furthermore arrangements were made for fueling of the planes at Bromma; the flying into Swedish air space on other routes was to be restricted to a minimum; every flight was to be preceded by a 2-hour warning with the office of the Air Attaché, Stockholm; and each plane was to signal the field at Bromma before flying over Swedish territory but the indication of courier planes by means of pennants was no longer an absolute requirement.

<sup>4</sup> Not found.

<sup>5</sup> In telegram No. 751 of June 26 (205/142753) Wied reported having learned from a private Swedish source that Mme. Kollontay had said that the consequences of the Swedish concession to transport German troops would be that Russian planes would try to attack not only the German troops on Swedish trains but Swedish territory as well.

D. The Swedish Air Defense Command will not fire at German and Finnish aircraft, but would prefer not to issue a general order to this effect. Since the arrangement arrived at, despite the good will in evidence, is not entirely satisfactory and fails to rule out the possibility of aircraft being fired at by mistake, Minister Schnurre will ask of the Swedish Government an explicit order that German aircraft be not fired at by anti-aircraft artillery and fighters.<sup>6</sup> For the time being I recommend that all aircraft flying across Swedish territory be equipped with red distress flares for use in case they are fired at.

E. In the conference this evening with the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces<sup>7</sup> and the Chief of the Air Force Staff,<sup>8</sup> I repeatedly and emphatically called attention to the incalculable consequences that in my opinion would ensue from the loss of German aircraft from gunfire from Swedish flak or fighters. On the Swedish side it was pointed out that no untoward incident had occurred since the coming into effect of the agreement under Annex 3 (Section 3 C).<sup>9</sup> It was further stated by the Swedish side that such incidents are believed impossible even now.

4. The Swedish Air Defense Command has proposed to Finland the sending to Turku, the Åland Islands, and to Aulu of liaison officers in order to report as promptly as possible to the Swedish Air Defense on German or Finnish planes coming from the east.

5. Attention is called to Swedish restricted areas indicated in the maps that will follow.

### 6. *Intermediate landings.*

In the event that contrary to past instructions the military situation should require transfer of a unit, e.g., fighters, to Finland, it will be necessary to notify this office of the number of aircraft, of the type, of the course, as well as of any intermediate landing places envisaged, in order to enable Minister Schnurre or the Legation to obtain the consent of the Swedish Government.<sup>10</sup>

### 7. *Weather reports.*

A. Weather reports are now being broadcast only in a form sufficient for the needs of agriculture. Russia receives no weather reports. If there is interest on the German side for detailed Swedish weather reports, I would request instructions to this effect, together with a list of the desired stations and specification of the channels and codes by

<sup>6</sup> In unnumbered telegram of July 1 (205/142790) Schnurre reported that his request had been granted: the Swedish Government gave assurances that in no case would German or Finnish planes be fired upon but at the most warning shots would be fired.

<sup>7</sup> Gen. O. G. Thörnell.

<sup>8</sup> Col. B. G. Nordenskiöld.

<sup>9</sup> Not identified.

<sup>10</sup> A new arrangement regarding German transit flights over Swedish territory was concluded on Sept. 12, 1941. See document No. 319.

which transmission is to be effected. The closed circuit coded teletype of this Legation seems to be the best method of transmission; reciprocal exchange of weather information might be a matter for consideration.

B. Request study of question and decision whether weather reports from this office are actually still necessary.<sup>11</sup>

Air Attaché<sup>12</sup>  
WIED

<sup>11</sup> No reply to this request has been found in the files of the Foreign Ministry.

<sup>12</sup> Col. J. P. Petersen.

### No. 43

205/142767-70

#### *The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry*<sup>1</sup>

Telegram

MOST URGENT  
No. 791 of June 29  
For OKM.

STOCKHOLM, June 29, 1941—2:56 p. m.  
Received June 29—4:45 p. m.

Subject: Wishes of the Navy respecting Sweden.

After Minister Schnurre created the political prerequisite, the negotiations on the wishes of the German Navy<sup>2</sup> have been brought to a close. For these negotiations the Swedish Government had designated the Staff of the Commander in Chief of the Swedish Armed Forces. As has already been reported,<sup>3</sup> the positive attitude of the Swedish Government and Navy, also in military matters, found expression during the conferences, which were characterized by full understanding for the situation by the Swedish side.

It is obvious that the Swedish public is daily becoming more aware of the importance of the decisive decision by the Riksdag and that these ideas are popular not only in the armed forces but also in other circles of the population. There must also be no doubt, however, that this change of Swedish public opinion is being facilitated by the Scandinavian idea and in good part can be attributed to the announcement of Finland's entry into the war against Russia.<sup>4</sup>

Swedish desire to cooperate as a matter of fact with Germany in the military field found expression in the instruction issued with the

<sup>1</sup> Typed marginal note at the end of the document: "Forwarded by the Telegraph Office to OKM by closed circuit coded teletype. June 29."

<sup>2</sup> The letter of the OKM of June 18 to the Foreign Ministry which formulated the specific requests of the German Navy has not been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry.

See vol. XII of this series, document No. 668, footnote 1.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 8, footnote 4.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 15.

aid of the Government to the effect that with the elimination of the Defense Ministry which is under parliamentary control [*parlamentarischen Verteidigungs ministeriums*] which is competent for the armed forces Attachés accredited to Sweden, all military questions for the duration of the hostilities in the east are to be settled directly through the armed forces Attachés with the Staff of the Commander in Chief of the Swedish Armed Forces and the three branches of the service.

In particular the following is to be reported concerning the German naval wishes, on the basis of the letter B.No.1.Skl. (JC) 001103/-41 Op.Chefs. of June 18, 1941, from the High Command of the Navy to the Foreign Ministry:<sup>5</sup> 1. Swedish mine field. a.) Blocking of passage west of the Åland Islands; the Swedish Navy is willing at any time to close the passage with an effective mine field as soon as a time is given for this by the German side. The wish was expressed that this mining be undertaken as soon as possible. Reference is made to telegraphic report No. 723 of June 23 from Minister Schnurre to the Foreign Ministry<sup>6</sup> as well as telegram No. 1420 g. of June 24 from the Naval Attaché<sup>7</sup> to the OKM.<sup>8</sup> b.) Mine field connected on the west with the German mine field at Öland. The Swedish mine field was laid on June 28 in accordance with the wishes of the German Naval War Staff. The announcement of warning to shipping was issued on June 29. The High Command of the Navy received the text of the announcement by telephone from the Naval Attaché, No. 1454 of June 28, 1941. The gap in the Swedish Öland field is being guarded. Details regarding emphasis [*zonung*]<sup>9</sup> and pilot service are contained in the announcement of warning to shipping.

According to a decision of the Crown Council on June 28, 1941, passage through the gap in the mine field has been closed to warships of all nations, so that the German request for refusal of passage to warships of the U.S.S.R. has therewith been complied with. The Crown Council decision amending the Constitution will probably be published on June 30, 1941. For German warships see below under "Treatment of German naval forces".

2. Protection of territorial waters. The maintenance of shipping traffic in Swedish territorial waters under the protection of Swedish warships was recognized as the main task of the Swedish Navy as a matter of course. The Swedish Navy, whose floating forces have so

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 2.

<sup>6</sup> Document No. 8.

<sup>7</sup> Lt. Comdr. P. von Wahlert.

<sup>8</sup> The message to the OKM has not been found. See, however, document No. 8 and footnote 4.

<sup>9</sup> The German text reads "Betonung" which apparently is a typographical error for "Bezonung."

far mainly been employed in the patrol service to protect the Swedish territorial waters, has announced the first regular convoy service for June 30, for the time being in the region of the Gulf of Bothnia. At the proper time the German ships still detained or only sailing in the inter-island waters can join these convoys depending on the safety from enemy action to be decided upon by the Naval War Staff.

The German request to prevent the possibility that enemy submarines utilize the Swedish inter-island waters as a base or refuge is taken care of by the stipulation in the Swedish Constitution according to which both the inner and the outer territorial waters are blocked to submarines of other nations. Exceptions can be brought about only through diplomatic channels (Swedish constitutional compilation of 1938, No. 187, par. 2). German naval forces see below.

For other non-German and non-Finnish surface naval forces the inner territorial waters are blocked in the same way as for submarines. For the outer territorial waters there will be, in accordance with the neutrality policy of Sweden as stressed in her foreign relations, no publication of a blockade, which would be contrary to the stipulations of international law. Assurance was given, however, that if Russian naval forces should cross the borderline of the territorial waters they would be forced away and prevented from remaining there. The Naval Attaché is of the opinion that owing to the particularly outspoken dislike of Russia in the Swedish Navy this measure will be carried out emphatically and the German request will thus also be complied with.

3. Treatment of German naval forces. The wish expressed in the letter of the Naval War Staff, that German naval forces not be interned when they exceed the period of stay in Swedish territorial waters permitted by international law, will be complied with. Assistance too was promised in case of need. The Swedish side desires that German naval forces entering Swedish territorial waters (even if the time period is not exceeded) be unmistakably recognizable as German warships with the aid of special agreements to be arranged between the two navies. A special telegram on this subject with the Swedish proposal will follow.<sup>10</sup> Questions arising in connection with entrance into Swedish territorial waters and in connection with exceeding the period of stay are not to be settled through diplomatic or political channels, but on the spot in each case by the commandants or commandants on the two sides. The wish was likewise expressed that all matters belonging to this area be handled between the two navies.

This report has been checked with Minister Schnurre.

Naval Attaché 81 g. Kdos  
WIED

<sup>10</sup> Not found.

## No. 44

329/195547—48

*Unsigned Memorandum*

SPECIAL TRAIN, June 29, 1941.

*Instructions of the Foreign Minister for the newly appointed Minister Dr. von Hentig to Kabul, Afghanistan.*<sup>1</sup>

1. Ascertainment of the English strength and positions
  - a. in Afghanistan itself,
  - b. in India.
2. Consolidation of the German position
  - a. with respect to the Afghan Government,
  - b. with respect to the English Government,
  - c. with respect to the Russian Government,

by coordinating, among other things, all instruction and Abwehr officers on the spot, doctors and teachers in our schools, engineers of the Todt Organization, and organizations of the nationalist circles in Afghanistan in order to employ them within the country or, if necessary, against the government. Coordination of the local intelligence services of all agencies operating abroad.

3. Contact with the frontier tribes and their nationalist leaders. Establishment of communications with India in order to obtain news and exert influence politically and by means of propaganda.

4. Observation of the military measures taken by the English in Baluchistan and along the Iranian border.

5. Observation of and support for the national independence movements in Iran and Afghanistan, particularly in so far as these are connected and cooperate with one another.

<sup>1</sup> Hentig actually did not assume this post. The reason may have been opposition to his appointment on the part of the Aussenpolitisches Amt of the NSDAP. See vol. VIII of this series, document No. 470, footnote 7.

## No. 45

173/84437

*The Foreign Minister to the Representative of the Foreign Ministry  
With the Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands*

Telegram

No. 563 of June 30      SPECIAL TRAIN, June 30, 1941—12: 15 a. m.  
from the Special Train      Received Berlin, June 30—12: 45 a. m.  
No. 229 of June 30 from the Foreign Ministry      Sent June 30.  
RAM 271/R

From almost all the countries of Europe the wish to participate in the fight against the Soviet Union by providing volunteer contin-

gents has been communicated to us. This wish will be granted by Germany.

After consultation with Reich Commissar Seyss-Inquart please send me a telegraphic report on whether the desire to provide such volunteer contingents has also been expressed by the Dutch, particularly by Dutch organizations such as, for example, the Mussert movement. I ask you, however, not to undertake anything yourself with the Dutch in this matter for the time being.<sup>1</sup>

RIBBENTROP

<sup>1</sup> In his reply telegram No. 206 of June 30 (173/84438), Bene reported that from the 8,000 men who had lately come from the NSB (Mussert) and NSNAP (Rappard) movements, 4,000 were in the SS division Wiking and an equal number of members of the NSKK were in other units at the eastern front. He also reported that some Netherlanders had expressed a desire to organize a Netherlands Legion.

No. 46

116/66952-53

*The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Croatia*

Telegram

No. 624 from Special Train Heinrich R ON THE TRAIN, June 29, 1941.  
Received Berlin, June 30—12:15 a. m.

No. 549 from the Foreign Ministry Büro RAM 272/R Sent June 30.

For the Minister.

1. In a letter to the Führer<sup>1</sup> the Poglavnik has requested that Croatia be also permitted to participate in the struggle against Soviet Russia by supplying a contingent of volunteers.

Please tell the Poglavnik that the Führer gladly accepts the offer and will also inform him of this in a personal letter of reply.<sup>2</sup> The execution of the plan would then have to be settled through the usual official channels.

2. As regards the invitation to Field Marshal Kvaternik,<sup>3</sup> please tell him that I would be particularly happy to see him soon, but that I could not receive him as yet at Headquarters, in view of the war situation at the moment; and as soon as this was possible I would have a communication sent him through you concerning the time of the visit.

RIBBENTROP

<sup>1</sup> Dated June 23 (116/66917-18).

<sup>2</sup> Sent on July 1 (2315/485002-04). In this letter Hitler informed Pavelić that Croatian volunteers would be organized within each of the three branches of the Wehrmacht.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram No. 512 of June 23 (116/66919) Rintelen informed the Legation in Zagreb that on the occasion of Croatia's accession to the Tripartite Pact in Venice on June 15, Ribbentrop had invited Kvaternik to a visit in Germany.

No. 47

191/138777

*Circular of the State Secretary*<sup>1</sup>

Telegram

MOST URGENT  
Multex No. 434

BERLIN, June 30, 1941.

With the recognition of Wang Ching-wei we do not intend to break off automatically our relations with the Chungking Government, but want to wait for the time being to see how Chiang Kai-shek reacts to such a recognition. Please inform the government at your post accordingly.

Confirm receipt.

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>1</sup> Sent to the Embassies in Italy and Spain, and to the Legations in Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Slovakia.

No. 48

191/138784-85

*The State Secretary to the Field Office in Chungking*

Telegram

MOST URGENT  
TOP SECRET  
No. 47

BERLIN, June 30, 1941.  
Pol. VIII 951.

For the Chief of the Office personally.

I. The Chinese Ambassador<sup>1</sup> called on me on June 28 and told me it was believed in Chungking that the Japanese Government was trying to put through recognition of Wang Ching-wei in Berlin and Rome. The Ambassador recalled that he had always had instructions in case the question of recognition of Wang Ching-wei should come up here to point to the statement by his Foreign Minister on November 30, 1940.<sup>2</sup> The Foreign Minister had stated at that time that the Chinese Government would consider recognition to be a very unfriendly act and would be forced to break off relations. The Ambassador pointed to the efforts made by him and his Government to maintain the German-Chinese relations so far as possible in consideration of the time after the war, when the natural, 100-year-old, excellent relationship between Germany and China would have to be restored automatically. The Ambassador described with emotion the material and ideal values which were at stake on both sides. He

<sup>1</sup> Chen Chieh.

<sup>2</sup> For text of this statement of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Chung-hui, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941*, vol II, pp. 122-123.

spoke of the patient Chinese character that clung closely to friendships but also remembered for a long time if its feelings were injured.

I replied to Mr. Chen that the Japanese Government had repeatedly brought up the question of recognition of Wang Ching-wei with us, but that at the moment I was not in a position to say more on the subject. If in case of recognition the Chinese Government should resort to the measures mentioned in the statement by the Chinese Foreign Minister, it would have to make the decision itself. Incidentally, the 100-year German-Chinese friendship had experienced a breach in 1917 quite without our doing. Referring to the tremendous German successes I finally stressed that those who intended to commit themselves definitely to the Anglo-Saxon cause were at any rate badly advised.

Mr. Chen received my statements with understanding; indeed, the whole discussion was calm, although the conversation affected him very much.<sup>3</sup>

II. Please do not of your own accord notify the Government at your post of the recognition of Wang Ching-wei which will take place tomorrow. However, if you should be approached regarding the recognition, please conduct the conversation by making use of the foregoing ideas.<sup>4</sup>

III. The same text is being sent to Tokyo and Peking.

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>3</sup>The foregoing portion of this instruction is a somewhat abbreviated version of Weizsäcker's memorandum of June 28 (191/138760-62) recording his conversation with the Chinese Ambassador.

<sup>4</sup>In telegram No. 51 of July 1 (191/138806) Weizsäcker instructed the Mission in Chungking "to observe the greatest possible reserve toward Chungking government circles" and for the time being "not to ask for talks with leading people in the Government."

## No. 49

1000/305670-71

*The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Iran*

Telegram<sup>1</sup>

No. [351]

BERLIN, June [30,] 1941.

[Pol VII 3532 g.]

With reference to your telegram No. 331 of May 4.<sup>2</sup>

It had been intended to send a special deputy to Tehran to carry on the discussions with the Egyptian Ambassador there.<sup>3</sup> In con-

<sup>1</sup>The file copy of this telegram is a draft; the date, telegram number, and file number have been supplied from the reply telegram, document No. 66.

<sup>2</sup>Vol. XII of this series, document No. 448.

<sup>3</sup>According to Woermann's memorandum, U.St.S.Pol. 589 of June 26 (1000/305668-69), the original intention had been to send Hentig to Tehran ostensibly for the purpose of economic negotiations with the Iranian Government but actually in order to continue there the discussions with the Egyptian Ambassador, Zoufifkar Pasha.

sideration of the situation that has developed in Iraq in the meantime we do not consider the time to be appropriate for more detailed discussions. I therefore request you to carry on the discussions with the Egyptian Ambassador yourself and to ask him in the first place how the King had received the Führer's message<sup>4</sup> and whether there were any further details concerning a continuation of the discussions, in particular whether there were any specific wishes for cooperation.

Furthermore please point out in the talks that the group of Ali Maher, Azzam, and Azis Al Masri has evidently been recognized and treated there by the English as opponents,<sup>5</sup> and ask in what manner the aspirations represented by them can be carried on. Also please ask for information about the fate of the two.

Report by wire.<sup>6</sup>

RIBBENTROP

<sup>4</sup>Vol. XII of this series, document No. 427.

<sup>5</sup>These references probably are to Ali Maher, Egyptian Minister President, August 1939-June 1940, and to Abdur-Rahman Azzam, and Aziz Ali al-Misri, who had served under Ali Maher as Minister of Social Affairs and Chief of Staff, respectively. Al-Misri tried to leave Egypt at the time of the fighting in Iraq in May 1941 and was courtmartialled and interned.

<sup>6</sup>Document No. 66.

## No. 50

F19/396-403

*Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini*<sup>1</sup>

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, June 30, 1941.

DUCE: First of all, please let me thank you cordially for your last letter.<sup>2</sup> I am overjoyed that our views in the great questions affecting the destinies of our people coincide so completely. I believe that the past week—from a political point of view—has given striking confirmation to our opinions. What I myself at the first moment did not even dare to hope for has happened. Large parts of Europe have been roused from a truly lethargic disinterestedness. Many countries now find themselves obliged in this, our battle against Bolshevism, to take an attitude that will be the beginning of a better understanding of our common policy which, in the last analysis, is a truly European one.

<sup>1</sup>In telegram No. 1481 of July 2 (100/65276) Mackensen reported that the letter, which came by special plane, had been delivered to Mussolini at 11:15 a. m.

<sup>2</sup>In telegram No. 1483 of the same date (B12/B001033-34) Mackensen reported that Mussolini read the letter aloud in his presence, expressing his general satisfaction. He made the remark that he could send three more divisions to the eastern front if they were desired, and he promised a reply at once. See document No. 62.

<sup>3</sup>Of June 23, document No. 7.

The struggle which has now been raging for a week, Duce, already makes it possible for me to give you a general picture in a few strokes and to tell you of our experiences.

The most important realization that I and my generals have gained is, despite all our suspicions, the positively alarming one, Duce, that if this battle had not come now, but only a few months, not to speak of a year later, we would—however horrible the thought may be—have lost the war!

The Russian Army was about to complete a troop concentration with resources far in excess of what we knew or had even considered possible. For 8 days now one armored brigade after another has been attacked, beaten or annihilated—and despite this there seems to be almost no decrease either in their numbers or in the ferocity of their attack. Only since June 27 have we had the feeling that things are easing up, that the foe is slowly tiring, and that in spots there are signs of disintegration. Like the English with their Mark II infantry tank the Russians came here with a surprise of which we unfortunately had no idea at all. A monster tank, weighing some 52 tons, with the best of armor, 75 mm. thick, a 7.6 cm. gun, and three machine guns. Without our new 5 cm. antitank gun, the 8.8 antiaircraft gun, as well as the new armor-piercing grenades of our field artillery, even we would be powerless against this tank which is surely the strongest at present in existence.

The Russians had stationed two huge offensive armies in the large pocket of Bialystok as well as in that of Lwów. Numerous motorized and armored units were assigned to the infantry divisions, almost all of which, however, had their own armored units. We executed a flank attack on these two armies after breaking through extremely deep fortifications, which in some places are hardly inferior to those of the West Wall. The battles that have been taking place here for the past 8 days are among the most difficult that German troops have thus far had to experience. The Russians fight with a truly stupid fanaticism. On the first day there were hardly any prisoners at all. It was a struggle to the death in which numerous Russian officers and especially commissars in the end escaped threatened capture by suicide. Pillbox crews whose position was hopeless chose to blow themselves up rather than surrender. The Russian counterattacks did not take place in accordance with any general plan, but rather with the primitive brutality of an animal that sees itself trapped and then in wild rage beats against the walls of its cage. These soldiers, who are very stolid to begin with, have, in addition, been insanely incited. Their commissars tell them that if they are captured, they will be tortured and then killed anyway. They therefore fight to the last ditch, and if the worst comes, prefer their own death to the torments they have been

made to believe in. Only in the last few days of battle has this morale begun to waver and the number of prisoners and deserters is now, to be sure, increasing by the hour.

Almost all Russian counterattacks are made with tanks only. After being attacked by 100 to 200 tanks, which individual divisions have often shot up in one day, the latter are again attacked by new tanks the next morning. I believe, Duce, that Europe was threatened with a danger here, of the gravity of which no one, unfortunately, had any proper conception.

The Russian Air Force is bad. Fanatically as the Russian fights as a land soldier, he has always been inept as a seaman, and apparently now also as a flier. As far as the Russian Air Force is concerned, the German fliers have wrought terrific havoc even in the first 7 days. Here the superiority is now not only unmistakable but absolute. Russian planes still try only occasionally to reach the front. In general, every such flight is also the last.

The Russian infantry are thrown into the battle in tremendous numbers, regardless of the sacrifice involved. Machine guns, mortars, infantry guns, and hand grenades cause terrible losses. Despite this the attacks are repeated again and again at very short intervals.

Russian leadership is, on the whole, bad. One exception to this, at least in the first few days, was the Russian Southern Army. The leadership of the individual divisions or regiments is not in accordance with any military standards. The training of the so-called officers is in no way comparable to the requirements in European nations. Nevertheless it is impossible to tell whether in the course of years an improvement might not perhaps have taken place in this respect also. But in view of the brutality of this type of warfare, the value of the individual is not so important from the very outset as the danger of the instrument in itself. This danger lies in the tremendous number of units, the enormous development of the tank arm, the stolid fanaticism of the individual soldier, as well as the complete indifference with which the leaders themselves sacrifice men and materials.

When I now report quite briefly on the outcome of the struggles, Duce, naturally only the external gains are to be seen at the moment, while the internal state of the now battered Russian units still remains concealed from us for the present. After an 8-day campaign we have the following situation:

North of the Pripet Marshes—these divide the zone of operations for the time being into the northern half, the Baltic States, and White Russia, and the southern half, Galicia and Bessarabia—the enemy's armies massed near the border are already completely beaten. In the pockets formed along the front of the Central Army Group two armies are enclosed by the rapid advance of armored wedges between Bialy-

stok and Minsk, while other mobile forces are already pushing to the east over the Berezina.

In front of the Northern Army Group the enemy, after having suffered heavy losses between the border and the Drina, is trying to save the remnants of his northern armies through a retreat to the northeast. Daugavpils and Riga are in the hands of the German armored forces.

In southern Finland Field Marshal Mannerheim, to whom I am also sending a German division via Sweden,<sup>3</sup> is deployed on both sides of Lake Ladoga, ready to attack starting July 2. In central and northern Finland German-Finnish forces have the mission to attack eastward and block off Murmansk, which is of importance as a launching point for possible English or American assistance.

South of the Pripet Marshes the armored group of the Southern Army Group is advancing in the general direction of Zhitomir, while the enemy on both sides of Lwów is trying to escape the threat of encirclement by withdrawing to the east. It may well be the intention of the Soviet Russians to reach their old line of fortifications and there to put up resistance. I therefore plan—in order to facilitate the frontal drive from the west—to have the Eleventh Army, which is concentrated in Rumania, together with the attached Rumanian forces, attack the line of Red fortifications from the rear, over the Pruth, early in July.

On the Carpathian front, Hungary is preparing to advance with a mobile corps against Kolomyya and Stanislawów. Advance units have already crossed the border.

The enemy's air force units have already sustained such losses that our supremacy in the air is complete. The Luftwaffe can therefore be withdrawn in increasing measure from fighting the enemy's air force and utilized for direct support of the Army.

The Red Navy has so far remained passive both in the Baltic and in the Black Sea.

I accept with thanks your generous offer, Duce, to dispatch an Italian corps and Italian fighter pilots to the eastern war theater. The fact that our allied armies are marching side by side precisely against the Bolshevik world enemy seems to me a symbol of the war of liberation that you and I have waged.

As I understand the arrangements between our two transport departments, the transports are to be carried out via the Brenner-Innsbruck-Salzburg-Linz-Vienna-Bratislava-Budapest line and are to discharge in eastern Hungary. Notification of the beginning of the transport movement should be made at least 3 days in advance because of the preparations necessary in Germany. The place of commit-

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 16.

ment—probably within the framework of the German Eleventh Army—must be decided in accordance with the development of the situation. I shall take the liberty, Duce, of communicating to you more detailed suggestions on this point at the proper time.

The following seems to me to be of special significance: The transportation routes out of Rumania are very much congested at present because of the Rumanian and Hungarian troop concentrations. I have notified both countries that the deliveries of Rumanian oil, which are of vital importance to the Axis Powers, must nevertheless continue to be made according to schedule. Our transport chiefs have already taken this point of view into account in their joint handling of the Italian troop transports.

During the eastern campaign too, the war against England will be waged with adequate commitment of forces. The German Navy is hardly being used against Soviet Russia in the Baltic Sea, which we have sealed off. Above all, however, the siege of England is to be intensified by an appropriate commitment of the Luftwaffe even during the eastern operations.

And now, Duce, permit me to express one more thought in conclusion. I have considered whether it would not perhaps be psychologically right if, in the course of this struggle, the two of us could meet sometime, somewhere at the front. The most suitable place would, of course, be my own quarters or one of the places provided for it, for the conditions exist there for the apparatus from which it is very hard for me to absent myself—for any length of time, at any rate. In matters of transportation and communication I am, unfortunately, a slave of technology. But I believe that—if it could be done sometime—quite apart from the personal exchange of ideas, the psychological effects for both our peoples would also be only beneficial.

I believe furthermore that this would also be properly appreciated by the rest of the world.

I close this long letter by greeting you most cordially, Duce, as an old comrade.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> No typed signature appears on this version of the letter which is the film of a carbon copy of the original.

## No. 51

265/173048

*Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department*

BERLIN, June 30, 1941.

Ha. Pol. VII 2419.

At a luncheon on June 28, to which the Turkish Counselor of Embassy Alkend had invited me, I was told by him that he had instructions from Ambassador Gereide to ask me whether the Turkish



Embassy could be of any help to us in the preparations for the planned German-Turkish trade agreement.<sup>1</sup> I replied to M. Alkend that our preparations for that agreement were only being started now and that for that reason it seemed to me premature to consider the substantive aspects of that obliging offer of cooperation.

Alkend requested that I inform the Foreign Minister regarding the offer of cooperation of his Ambassador and let them know through him (Alkend) what our position was.

In that connection, M. Alkend told me of the deep impression which Ambassador Gereide had received at a recent interview with the Führer, when he presented to the Führer in accordance with his instructions a personal letter from the Turkish State President.<sup>2</sup> On that occasion the Führer had very strongly stressed the fact, without any reference to political considerations, that close economic cooperation between Germany and Turkey was both necessary and possible. At the same time he had expressed the readiness of the Reich Government to conclude at the earliest possible date a new trade agreement with Turkey covering the widest possible range.

In view of this attitude on the Führer's part, the Turkish Ambassador Gereide in turn was anxious to do everything possible to pave the way for a genuinely satisfactory solution concerning German-Turkish economic cooperation. He was prepared to adopt as his own the German wishes regarding the development to be given to the German-Turkish trade. He would appreciate it if he could receive a German formula to this effect.

I assured M. Alkend that I would present the Ambassador's proposal and would come back to the inquiry.

RIPKEN

<sup>1</sup> According to a Weizsäcker memorandum of June 30 (2153/469462-64) the provisional economic agreements with Turkey were due to expire soon. For this reason as well as for political reasons the opening of new economic negotiations around July 20 was advisable. See further, document No. 294.

<sup>2</sup> See vol. XII of this series, Editors' Note, p. 1052.

## No. 52

260/170063-64

### *The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister*

Teletype Message

BERLIN, July 1, 1941.  
Sent July 1—1:40 p. m.<sup>1</sup>

The Finnish Minister just transmitted to me a letter in a sealed envelope personally addressed to the Führer from the Finnish President. The letter will be transmitted by the Minister's Secretariat in the quickest possible manner.

<sup>1</sup> The date and time of the dispatch are supplied from a marginal note.

The Minister delivered to me at the same time a copy of the letter's content which reads as follows:

"Your Excellency: While I thank you for the cordial letter addressed to me,<sup>2</sup> in which you recall the memory of the friendship, sealed in blood, between Finland and Germany, I should like to give the assurance at the same time that the common fate with Germany is felt more strongly here than ever before at a time when our soldiers stand side by side as comrades in arms to ward off the threatening danger from Finland's traditional enemy.

"Your message that, come what may, Germany would never desert Finland, finally guarantees a successful conclusion of Finland's long fight for independence. I am sincerely gladdened by the fact that the heroes of the mighty German Army are, in this battle, the brothers-in-arms of the Finnish warrior. At the same time I express the firm hope that this final battle against Bolshevism will guarantee the prosperity and the peace of the new Europe. Yours, etc. Risto Ryti."

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>2</sup> Hitler's letter to Ryti has not been found. In telegram No. 490 of June 23 (260/170040) Blücher reported, "Copy of Führer's letter to President Ryti has been delivered immediately. M. Ryti acknowledged contents with satisfaction." See also John H. Wuorinen, editor, *Finland and World War II, 1939-1944* (New York, 1948), pp. 111-112.

## No. 53

82/60234-37

### *The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

EUROPA, July 1, 1941—5:35 p. m.

PRIORITY

No. 634 from the Special Train Received Berlin July 1—6:40 p. m.

No. 942 from the Foreign Ministry Sent July 1.

Secret for officer in charge.

I request that you deliver to the Foreign Minister at your post, as soon as you possibly can, the following telegram, which I have addressed to him personally. The telegram should be written at your end on white sheets, without any letterhead, over my signature. The text of the telegram is as follows:

"To His Excellency the Japanese Foreign Minister, Mr. Matsuoka, Tokyo.

Personal.

When Your Excellency was in Berlin we envisaged that we would get in touch with each other personally if occasions of special importance to the welfare of our two countries should arise. Such a moment has now come, and I have the honor to inform Your Excellency of the following:

(1) As a result of the heavy blows dealt by the Wehrmacht it has been possible in the first week of the German-Russian campaign to break the back of the Russian Army. A considerable part of the best

combat divisions of the enemy has partly been destroyed, partly captured, and partly so battered that the remnants will hardly operate effectively any more during this war. The enemy air force is almost completely smashed, so that on the main battle front German air supremacy has been complete since yesterday. A vast amount of material has been captured or destroyed; the German army communiqués give specific figures for this.

In the meantime the German armies are driving farther and farther to the east all along the front. I have no doubt that the impending operations of the German army will destroy the enemy forces still engaged in battle in the same manner, and it is to be expected that Russian resistance, in the entire European area of the Soviet Union, will be broken—perhaps in only a few weeks. As I have already informed Your Excellency a few days ago through Ambassador Ott,<sup>1</sup> this in turn will most probably lead before long to a final collapse of the Bolshevik regime.

(2) These historically unparalleled military successes, which are due primarily to the bravery of the German soldiers and which have eliminated the great military threat to which Europe was exposed, create for Germany's leadership the obligation to bring about in the future a political situation in the East that will once and for all prevent a repetition of such occurrences. Moreover, it is our conviction that so long as Russia remains as the germ cell of Bolshevism, neither Europe nor East Asia nor the world as a whole will ever have tranquillity. Germany is resolved to take the action called for by the realization of these facts. In this, she hopes for Japan's cooperation, as a definitive settlement of the Russian question can be brought about most quickly and effectively by Japan and Germany acting jointly.

(3) The impending collapse of the Russian's main military power, and thereby presumably of the Bolshevik regime itself, offers Japan the unique opportunity to free herself also from the Russian threat and give the Japanese empire the security in the north which is a necessary condition for its vitally important expansion in the south. It therefore seems to me that the need of the hour is for the Japanese Army to seize Vladivostok as soon as possible and penetrate as deeply toward the west as possible. The goal of these operations should be to have the Japanese Army in its march to the west meet the German troops advancing to the east halfway, even before the cold season sets in; then to establish a direct connection between Germany and Japan over Russian territory, both by way of the Trans-Siberian Railway and by air; and finally to have the whole Russian question settled by Germany and Japan jointly in such a way as to eliminate for all time the Russian threat to both Germany and Japan.

(4) Only after the Soviet Union has been defeated by Germany and Japan will it be possible to develop truly the actual power of the states joined together in the Tripartite Pact. Germany and Italy will thus be the absolutely dominant factor in the whole European-African hemisphere. They will then be in a position to intensify enormously their pressure on England by air raids and submarines, and by appropriate action to bring about the final defeat of England. For her part, Japan, free in the rear, will be able to employ all her power to bring about a final settlement of the problems of interest to her in the south. In passing, it might be mentioned that the elimina-

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 36.

tion of the Soviet regime will of itself facilitate the settlement of the Chinese problems.

As far as America is concerned, I hope that after Russia has been brought to her knees, the weight of the Tripartite Pact nations, Germany, Italy, and Japan and the powers aligned with them, which I hope will soon be joined by a number of other European states, will suffice to paralyze any tendency toward intervention in the war that may still arise in the United States.

In summary I should like to say the following:

It is my conviction that the victory of German arms in the past week has now given Japan the historic opportunity, which may never come again, to settle the Russian problem jointly with Germany and to free our peoples for all foreseeable time from any threat from this large area, whether it be of an ideological-political or of a military nature. The fact that our nations will simultaneously be able, in pursuance of the joint anti-Comintern policy which we have always followed, to strike the decisive blow for the elimination of Bolshevism, this archenemy of mankind, will be for the two nations and their leaders the classical confirmation of their common political ideas and their greatest claim to fame for all time.

I believe, moreover, that the defeat of Russia will substantially hasten the defeat of England by the Axis Powers. This would establish the necessary conditions for the new order in Europe and East Asia which our nations desire, and no one in the world, which in its battle against Bolshevism is already rallying with ever-increasing solidarity behind the Axis, will be able any longer to dispute the states of the Tripartite Pact the right to create a new and just world order. Ribbentrop."

End of the telegram.

RIBBENTROP

## No. 54

105/113635-37

### *Memorandum by an Official of Political Division I*

BERLIN, July 1, 1941.

Pol I M 2051 g. Rs.

General Himer, German General with the Hungarian High Command, reported to the OKW under the date of June 23 as follows:

"On the basis of the telephone conversation with General of Artillery Jodl at 6:00 p. m. on June 22, I immediately got in touch with the Hungarian General Staff. It then developed that the Hungarian Chief of the General Staff<sup>1</sup> could not be reached, the Defense Minister<sup>2</sup> had gone fishing, the Regent was at a polo game on Margaret Island.

"According to the Minister President's statement to the Minister today, the members of the Government could not be assembled because it was Sunday. Only General László,<sup>3</sup> who is still very much in need of consideration, could as always be reached and was ready to

<sup>1</sup> Gen. Henrik Werth.

<sup>2</sup> Gen. Karl Bartha.

<sup>3</sup> Chief of the Operations Group of the Hungarian General Staff.

lend every support. General László passed on my communications to General Werth that very evening. I asked for a personal talk with General Werth, which unfortunately took place only today from 12:50 to 1:15 p. m., as the Chief of the General Staff went to the country in the morning. In this very plain and emphatic conversation between the Chief of the General Staff and me, I once again personally transmitted the view of the OKW and of General Halder, that every support by Hungary was most welcome to Germany.<sup>4</sup> However, no demand would be made. I stressed in particular the necessity that the German transport traffic to Rumania must not be disturbed by any Hungarian movements that might be made. General Werth said that he did not know what was in the Führer's letter to the Regent.<sup>5</sup> If it did not particularly mention the request for participation in the fight against the Soviet Union, the politicians would hardly go along.

"He regretted that no hint had been given by political quarters as early as 4 weeks ago. Then they would now stand ready with an army and could have crossed the frontier with it yesterday. At his instigation, about 10 days ago a political inquiry had been made regarding Hungarian participation, but the Führer did not seem to want to let Hungary participate. General Werth stressed again and again the lack of political preparation of the matter, whereupon I replied that now the soldiers were speaking.

"I again pointed to my personal view, which I had set forth to him some time ago. I rejected the Chief of the General Staff's remark that the Führer had said that Hungary had no claims on Russia and consequently had other tasks, pointing out that this most probably involved a remark by Ambassador Oshima. Whether it was actually made in that form is not certain. Furthermore, General Werth pointed out that General Halder had asked on June 19 that nothing be done so that Russia would not be alarmed prematurely. Now, in Werth's opinion, any intervention by Hungary came too late in any case. In answer to this I stressed that it was still a little before 12:00 o'clock, and Hungary could still participate in the crusade against Bolshevism in the otherwise solid front.

"In the course of the conversation I had the impression that General Werth is after all not equal to the greatness of the hour. The result of the talk was that my statements were passed on to the Government. After talking with the Chief of the General Staff and the Defense Minister, the Minister President went to see the Regent at Kenderes. The decision is still to be taken."

*Supplement by the Military Attaché:*<sup>6</sup>

"In oral statements to me General Himer stressed the urgency with which he had given expression to the views of the OKW in the conversation with General Werth.

"General Werth had expressed astonishment that Rumania and Finland were informed at an early date concerning the planned operations, but not Hungary."

KRAMARZ

<sup>4</sup> The Halder Diary has the following entry for June 23: "12:00: Conversation with Himer: We accept gratefully any participation by Hungary if it does not impair our transport communications with Rumania."

<sup>5</sup> Vol. XII of this series, document No. 661.

<sup>6</sup> Col. G. Krappe.

No. 55

93/103765

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*<sup>1</sup>

St.S. 446

BERLIN, July 1, 1941.

The Hungarian Minister again complained to me today that life in the Banat was at present being made difficult for the inhabitants of Hungarian ethnic origin. Great numbers of such inhabitants of the Banat were applying to the Hungarian mission in Belgrade so that their transfer to Hungary may be facilitated.

I replied to Minister Sztójay that as it happened I had spoken just yesterday with our representative in Belgrade, who was here for the present, concerning the repeated Hungarian complaints about the Banat. In this connection Herr Benzler had told me two things:

1. The Hungarians were already engaged in a quiet deportation of Serbs from the Banat<sup>2</sup> to Old Serbia.

2. It had been ascertained by dispatching a member of our mission in Belgrade to the Banat and was confirmed by the signatures of inhabitants of the Banat who were Volksdeutsche or of Hungarian ethnic origin that the latter were not doing badly in the Banat but very well. However, I did not yet have the pertinent report.

Incidentally, I asked M. Sztójay why the Hungarian representative in Belgrade did not get in touch directly with Herr Benzler, in order to spare the two Governments the conversations resulting from his reports. Perhaps it would also be expedient if Sztójay spoke with Herr Benzler while the latter was here, for after all he was well acquainted with him.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The file copy of this memorandum is not signed.

<sup>2</sup> Apparently this ought to read "Bačka." Cf. footnote 3.

<sup>3</sup> In a memorandum of July 3 (93/103767-70) Benzler recorded having had a detailed discussion with Sztójay regarding conditions in the Banat and Bačka in accordance with Weizsäcker's suggestions. The topics discussed were: (1) The deportation of Serbs from the Bačka; (2) Repeated Hungarian complaints about alleged unfavorable treatment of the Hungarian national group in the Banat; (3) Interference by Hungarian officials and military in the Banat contrary to existing agreements.

Weizsäcker's memorandum St.S. 462 of July 7 (93/103778) records a complaint by Sztójay regarding administrative measures in the Banat tending to consolidate Serbian administration. Weizsäcker asked if Sztójay doubted the German promise regarding the Banat; if not, he would have to admit that the psychological moment for a declaration regarding the transfer of the Banat to Hungary had not arrived.

In a memorandum of July 9, St.S. 446 (93/103795) Weizsäcker recorded another démarche by Sztójay in the matter of the Banat. On this occasion Sztójay emphasized, however, that his démarche did not imply "any doubts in the Führer's word regarding the Banat."

## No. 56

93/103764

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

St.S. No. 444

BERLIN, July 1, 1941.

The Hungarian Minister, as he informed me today, had instructions to hand to the Führer personally a letter from the Regent of Hungary. When I explained to the Minister that the Führer was at his headquarters and that it was not quite simple to reach him, Sztójay gave up the idea of an audience and left the letter with me. It will be forwarded to the Foreign Minister by the Foreign Minister's Secretariat as quickly as possible.

The letter is sealed. Sztójay was not informed with regard to its contents.<sup>1</sup>

The Minister had no instructions to make additional statements orally if the audience with the Führer should come about. Obviously, he merely wished, if he were received, to advocate German-Hungarian solidarity also with respect to the later development of the war.

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister (by telegraph).

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>1</sup>This letter has not been found in the German Foreign Ministry files. Likewise not found were Hitler's letter of July 3 to Horthy and Horthy's letter of reply which Sztójay handed to Weizsäcker on July 7 (Weizsäcker's memorandum St.S. 460 of July 7: 93/103777). For a summary based on Hungarian documents of what seem to be the same three letters, see C. A. Macartney, *A History of Hungary, 1929-1945*, vol. II, pp. 80-81.

## No. 57

F17/093-95

*General Antonescu to Adolf Hitler<sup>1</sup>*

JULY 1, 1941.

EXCELLENCY: Filled with admiration, I have followed the victorious operations of the German Wehrmacht along the entire front from the Baltic Sea to Lwów.

The splendid victories on land and in the air make it apparent that a decisive victory is very near at hand and that the Soviet armies can be regarded as having been annihilated.

In the course of these 7 days, the German and Rumanian Army Groups have succeeded in checking the Soviet armed forces on the Rumanian front and achieving air superiority, and at the same time have prepared the offensive which must lead to the final destruction of the Soviet military forces on the southern wing.

<sup>1</sup>The document printed is from a German text of the letter. The Rumanian original text is filmed on F17/090-92.

In order to assure unified command, the following Rumanian forces have been placed under the immediate command of the German Eleventh Army:

Six divisions, three mountain brigades, three cavalry brigades, the armored divisions; furthermore, additional units of heavy artillery, antitank artillery, engineers, etc.

In accordance with Your Excellency's directions<sup>2</sup> this army will carry out the main operations; it is to attack in the general direction of Vinnitsa, in order to strike the Soviet forces in southern Galicia from the rear.

The attack by the German Eleventh Army is to be secured on the right flank by the Fourth Rumanian Army with six divisions and one cavalry brigade, which is to attack in the general direction of Huși, Kishinev, and Dubossari, by shifting almost its entire strength to the left wing.

An army group, advancing from Dobrudja, will cross the Danube in the region of Tulcea and drive north with two divisions in the attack.

All measures have been taken for the protection of the oil fields. I may add that this area is no longer threatened, because the Soviet Air Force was vanquished at the very first moment on this front too.

I have taken all necessary steps to insure that the petroleum products are transported with the greatest possible speed. All the tank cars needed will be made available by me.

I should not omit to inform Your Excellency that General Ritter von Schobert and I are on the best of terms and that all the requirements of Army Group, Rundstedt in regard to the operations to be undertaken will be given full consideration.

With confidence in final victory and the unshakable friendship which forever links Rumania and the Greater German Reich, I beg Your Excellency to accept the assurance of my highest consideration.

GENERAL ANTONESCU

<sup>2</sup>This might refer to a letter of June 29 in which Hitler had set forth the task of the Rumanian forces in the operations of the Eleventh German Army and requested that the required Rumanian units be placed under the command of the Eleventh Army.

For a summary of this letter see Andreas Hillgruber, *Hitler, König Carol und Marschall Antonescu* (Wiesbaden, 1954), pp. 134-135. No record of Hitler's letter has been found in the archives of the Foreign Ministry.

## No. 58

222/149772

*The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BUCHAREST, July 2, 1941—1:10 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received July 2—1:38 p.m.<sup>1</sup>

No. 1953 of July 2

For the Foreign Minister.

The report of the advance of Hungarian troops in the direction south of Lwów impels General Antonescu to make the following request:

1. He again asks that a common frontier between Germany and Rumania be established.<sup>2</sup>
2. He asks that we avoid employing Rumanian and Hungarian troops side by side, in order to avoid incidents.

KILLINGER

<sup>1</sup> Marginal note: "Transmitted to the Special Train as No. 2114. July 2, 1:50 p. m."

<sup>2</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 416.

## No. 59

205/142791-92

*The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

STOCKHOLM, July 2, 1941—4:45 p.m.

No. 822 of July 2

Received July 2—6:30 p. m.

With reference to our telegram No. 769 of June 27, last paragraph.<sup>1</sup>

Today the Swedish Government gave me a list of its wishes in regard to deliveries of German war equipment, namely:

1. Licences for airplane engines (1600-1700 horsepower) and delivery of the machine tools necessary for starting production. Details are known to Ministerialrat Müller of the Reich Air Ministry.
2. Delivery of Me[sserschmitt] 110's.
3. Delivery of Twin Wasp engines from stocks in France.
4. The delivery to Sweden of tanks and the provision of German licences in return for which Sweden will provide spare parts for tanks—a transaction with which Daimler-Benz and the OKW are already familiar.
5. Armor for tanks, namely, 1,500 tons of 10-60 mm. armor for covering 20-ton tanks.
6. Magazine equipment for tanks [*Kampf-wagen-Kastengerät*].

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 28.

7. Ten cross-country motor vehicles with equipment, specifically, 1-ton half-tracks from Demag A.G. Also there is Swedish interest in a considerable number of 3-ton tractors.

8. 21-cm. cannon along with ammunition and equipment, regarding which there have been negotiations for some time with Skoda. The prerequisite for Swedish interest is a shorter delivery period.

9. A list of orders concluded but not yet carried out, especially for optical and radio equipment—familiar to Captain Flues at the OKW.

In consideration of the great cooperation shown by the Swedish side in connection with all German military wishes<sup>2</sup> and in order to support the German and Finnish wishes regarding supplies, I consider it necessary that I be provided at this time with considerable concessions in the areas of deliveries of war equipment important to Sweden. An accommodating attitude in this area will, moreover, considerably advance our political efforts here. Please check on the above-described Swedish wishes with these views in mind.<sup>3</sup> I should welcome it if Ministerialrat Müller of the Air Ministry and a representative of the Office of Economics and Armaments (Colonel Becker or representative) would then be sent to Stockholm with the necessary authority so that negotiations could be begun on this subject with Sweden at the beginning of the coming week. Please send telegraphic instructions at once.<sup>4</sup>

SCHNURRE  
WIED

<sup>2</sup> See documents Nos. 8, 16, 17, and 28.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 92.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 98 and footnote 4.

## No. 60

129/121106-07

*The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 1405 of July 1

LISBON, July 2, 1941—11:00 p. m.

Received July 3—8:25 a.m.

In the course of today's conversation with Salazar the talk turned to the establishment of a corps of Spanish volunteers to fight against Bolshevism<sup>1</sup> and to the question of carrying out a similar demonstration in Portugal. I informed Salazar that we received daily applications from Portuguese to be taken into the German Army, but that we always rejected these with our thanks for the friendship demonstrated, for the reason that foreigners were not accepted in the German Army. I also personally considered it to be the right thing for the Portuguese

<sup>1</sup> See documents Nos. 12 and 70.

to express their commitment to the new Europe by standing firm on the Continent, in the islands, and in the colonies. Salazar explained that this was his opinion, too. In Spain it was somewhat different. Aside from the fact that Spain had a debt of gratitude to pay for the help in the Civil War, the nature of the Spaniard was also more expansive and more demonstrative than that of the reserved Portuguese. Furthermore, the small contingent that Portugal could provide at best could not exercise any sort of influence on the success of the victoriously advancing tremendous German Army. On the other hand, however, he had already been considering for several days in what way he could give widely visible expression to Portugal's sympathy with Germany's fight against Bolshevism. He would perhaps organize a demonstration by the Portuguese Legion, which after all had been established at the time for the fight against Bolshevism and still today had to perform this in the interior of the country, and would use this occasion for a presentation of his political views. Portugal's deathly enmity toward Bolshevism was known to the world and particularly also to England, but he nevertheless considered it necessary during these days of the decisive struggle to commit himself also toward the outside. I replied to the Minister President that I was convinced that such a demonstration would find a strong response not only in Germany but all over the world.<sup>2</sup>

HUENE

<sup>2</sup> In telegram No. 1430 of July 6 (129/121109) Huene reported that while pro-German Portuguese officers were advocating a special Portuguese formation for the employment at the eastern front, the Portuguese Ministry of War favored a strengthening of the garrisons in Portugal and on the Atlantic islands. In telegram No. 1603 of July 27 (129/121120) Huene reported that the organization of a small Portuguese military unit for the eastern front was still being considered.

In telegram No. 2407 of Oct. 31 (129/121193) Huene reported that he had again brought up the matter with Salazar who listened to the arguments in favor of a unit of Portuguese volunteers for the fight against Russia but who asked that Huene not request an immediate reply.

## No. 61

F1/0579-81

*The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the Foreign Minister*

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, July 2, 1941.

The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht  
WFSt/Abt. L(IV/K) No. 1557/41g. Kdos.

DEAR REICH MINISTER: In reply to your letter of June 27<sup>1</sup> and with reference to the decisions of the Führer on the occasion of Ambassador Abetz' visit,<sup>2</sup> I confirm the agreement of the High Command of the

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 31.

<sup>2</sup> See document 24, footnote 4.

Wehrmacht with the conceptions you advanced on the application of the Paris Protocols.<sup>3</sup>

The concluding negotiations concerning the use of the port of Bizerte are now, in accordance with the French views, directed at having transport to Bizerte at first sail from ports in southern Italy only, and not from Toulon.<sup>4</sup> A convoy guard by the French Navy is thus eliminated. What matters now, however, is to charter as many fast French merchant vessels as possible. Traffic can be expected to start from about the middle of this month with the inclusion of Italian transports.

To my regret I have to reply in the negative to your question relating to Dakar and whether some Luftwaffe units could be transferred there by the middle of this month. Before the conclusion of the war in the East, German aerial forces will not be available for this purpose.

But I should also like to point out that in the Paris negotiations the French characterized the establishment of a German air base in French West Africa as a serious encumbrance for a sympathetic reception of German-French military collaboration in the colony. Besides, it was rightly pointed out by them that from this step, more than from the provisioning of German U-boats by a tender stationed in the port of Dakar, an immediate outbreak of open conflict with England or the United States would have to be expected. Hence it was laid down in the Paris Protocols that a German air base near Dakar was not to be established until a later date.

Furthermore, the measures of the French armed forces for reinforcing the defense potential in West Africa are, according to the Protocols, on a scale sufficient by themselves for prolonged defense, and even against considerable forces. The employment of the Luftwaffe in that area was not intended to add to the defense potential, but mainly for the offensive against enemy commerce.

For these reasons the prior or simultaneous movement of Luftwaffe units to Dakar is not necessary, even if in accordance with the Führer's decision the date for its utilization as a naval base must be postponed for political reasons.

I will make it my business, however, to urge the French that they carry out the military reinforcements of Dakar and the West African region which is provided in the Paris Protocols. In this fashion it will be possible to let the exploitation of Dakar as a base for the German Navy take effect immediately if the political conditions permit it, and the further political concessions which in this connection are expected by the French can then be made to them from our side.

Heil Hitler!

Yours, etc.

KEITEL

<sup>3</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 559.

<sup>4</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 559, footnote 5.

*Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler*<sup>1</sup>

ROME, July 2, 1941/XIX.

FÜHRER: To begin with, I should like to thank you heartily for the letter<sup>2</sup> you sent me informing me of the progress of the initial phase of the operations against Russia. The bulletins issued by your High Command on Sunday, June 29,<sup>3</sup> have strengthened my conviction, which I expressed in my last letter to you, that the campaign against Russia will culminate in a triumph of your arms. The space is no obstacle to maneuvering units such as yours, but rather an advantage.

I was aware that the military organization of the Soviet Union had made remarkable progress in these past years, but what you tell me is a surprise to me also. It appears clear that this mighty military organization, not being able to be with us, would have been against us when the time came. It is therefore necessary and foresighted to eliminate it, so as to deprive Great Britain of all hope of aid from the European Continent. The marshaling of the European nations against Russia with regular and volunteer troops is actually a marshaling against Great Britain, which has allied herself with the Kremlin. This is very important for the future development of the war and for American intervention, which in my opinion has been postponed. After Russia's liquidation, Great Britain's fate will soon be decided, particularly if we should succeed in drawing Turkey over to our side and attacking Egypt from two sides.

As regards the sending of the Italian Army Corps, the three divisions are ready and can depart as soon as the timetable has been established by the proper authorities.

I accept with pleasure your proposal for a meeting at your Headquarters and am of the opinion that, morally as well as politically, such a meeting will rouse a wide response in both our countries and in the rest of the world. The task of beating Russia in order to extirpate Bolshevism is truly epic, and to have dared to do this will be the imperishable glory of your armies and the Axis revolution.

I want you, Führer, in this great hour of your life and of the history of your people, to feel that I am with you in comradeship and faith.

MUSSOLINI

<sup>1</sup>The translation is from the original Italian. The first page of the German translation (F19/391-92) is only partially legible.

<sup>2</sup>Of June 30, document No. 50.

<sup>3</sup>This bulletin listed the capture of 40,000 prisoners of war and 600 guns, the destruction or capture of 2,233 armored vehicles and the destruction of 4,107 enemy planes.

*The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT  
No. 1101 of July 2

TOKYO, July 3, 1941—3:55 a. m.  
Received July 3—10:50 a. m.<sup>1</sup>

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to my telegram No. 1069 of June 28<sup>2</sup> and your telegrams Nos. 916<sup>3</sup> and 917<sup>4</sup> of June 28.

In accordance with instructions I tried in every way as soon as the above-mentioned telegrams arrived to bring influence to bear on the Japanese Government and other leading circles in favor of a rapid military action against Soviet Russia. For that purpose I have kept in touch with both the Foreign Minister and prominent leaders of the Nationalists; I have had the Wehrmacht Attachés and members of the Embassy working toward the same end and have also assured myself of the cooperation of the Italian Ambassador.<sup>5</sup> It became apparent that the Nationalist wing, which had previously been influenced in favor of action in the south, will not readily adopt the new line. This tendency intends to cling tenaciously to prosecution of the campaign in the south, which was almost to be expected in view of the slowness of the reaction but which at the moment has led to that paralysis of the opposing tendencies mentioned in telegram No. 1069 of June 28. According to reliable information Matsuoka personally has strongly advocated a clear-cut decision. He was unable, however, to prevail with all the leadership committees of the Cabinet, the full Cabinet, and with the Emperor in favor of an immediate decision for a Japanese entry into the war.

After this morning's Cabinet meeting, presided over by the Emperor,<sup>6</sup> Matsuoka asked me and also the Italian Ambassador to call on him at 2:00 p. m. He first made an oral statement to us, addressed to the Reich Foreign Minister, which was drawn up on the basis of a Cabinet decision, and then gave me an English translation of it. The text will follow by a separate telegram.<sup>7</sup> A statement addressed to the Italian Government was likewise presented. It is identical in content but differs in the wording of the introductory

<sup>1</sup>Marginal note: "Forwarded as No. 2130 to the Special Train, July 3."

<sup>2</sup>Document No. 33.

<sup>3</sup>Document No. 35.

<sup>4</sup>Document No. 36.

<sup>5</sup>Mario Indelli.

<sup>6</sup>The record of the decisions of this Imperial Conference of July 2 was submitted to the International Military Tribunal of the Far East as exhibit No. 588 (Doc. No. 1652).

<sup>7</sup>Document No. 64.

sentence. Text likewise follows by separate telegram.<sup>8</sup> The statement to the Italian Government, by the way, does not speak of the German-Soviet war but of the war of the Axis Powers against the Soviet Union. Matsuoka gave an oral explanation of the statement he had presented, saying that Japan was not at present in a position to enter the war against the Soviet Union without facing other complications. The meaning and purpose of the Japanese attitude would become clear to the German Government upon a careful and thorough study of the statement.<sup>9</sup>

I replied to Matsuoka that I would immediately forward his statement to the Reich Foreign Minister. I had to reserve comment on it, but asked for a technical explanation with respect to the extent of the East Siberian territory in which the Japanese Government, according to its statement, intended to achieve the destruction of communism. Matsuoka replied that this territory was not precisely delimited geographically, but in his opinion about Irkutsk.

Matsuoka stated further that he would ask the Russian Ambassador<sup>10</sup> to call on him after he had received the Ambassadors of the Axis Powers. He would hand him a statement, the text of which he gave me in an English translation. The text will follow by a separate telegram.<sup>11</sup> Matsuoka emphasized the closing sentence in particular.<sup>12</sup>

For the public only a communiqué would be issued on today's Cabinet session presided over by the Emperor.<sup>13</sup> This communiqué would also serve as a guide for conversations with the American<sup>14</sup> and English<sup>15</sup> Ambassadors. If they should insist on further information about the Cabinet decision, he would point out Japan's commitments under the Tripartite Pact.

Matsuoka then expressed his appreciation for the fact that because of the information received from the Reich Foreign Minister before

<sup>8</sup> In telegram No. 1108 of July 1, dispatched July 3 (82/60248) Ott forwarded the text of this introductory sentence of the statement handed to the Italian Ambassador.

<sup>9</sup> In a memorandum of July 3 (82/60238-39) Weizsäcker recorded having been informed by Oshima of the Japanese position following the recent Cabinet decision. In this connection Oshima said that he had told Tokyo that "he was not prepared to participate in representing a weak Japanese policy."

<sup>10</sup> Konstantin Smetanin.

<sup>11</sup> Telegram No. 1104 of July 1, dispatched July 3 (82/60246-47). The text of this statement handed to the Soviet Ambassador is printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941*, vol. II, p. 504.

<sup>12</sup> This sentence read as follows: "I need hardly add that their Excellencies, Messrs. Stalin and Molotov, may rest assured that I will do my best but that future developments will largely decide if the Japanese Government can consistently abide by this policy."

<sup>13</sup> For text of the Government communiqué and of a statement by Matsuoka regarding the Imperial Conference, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. IV, p. 287.

<sup>14</sup> Joseph C. Grew.

<sup>15</sup> Robert L. Craigie.

the outbreak of the German-Soviet conflict<sup>16</sup> he had not been caught unawares by events in this difficult period.

Ott

<sup>16</sup> Presumably a reference to Matsuoka's conversations with Ribbentrop in March and April 1941. See vol. XII of this series, documents Nos. 218, 230, 233, and 278.

## No. 64

82/60244-45

*The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 1102 of July 2

TOKYO, July 3, 1941—3:55 a. m.

Received July 3—8:25 a. m.<sup>1</sup>

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to my telegram No. 1101 of July 2.<sup>2</sup>

Text of declaration of Japanese Foreign Minister follows:<sup>3</sup> Oral statement. Strictly confidential. (Translation).

Please convey the following to His Excellency Herr von Ribbentrop:

I have duly noted your Excellency's request made through Ambassador General Ott in Tokyo and Ambassador General Oshima in Berlin. I have taken particular care in studying the views set forth by your Excellency in approaching the Japanese Government with the request.

In reply I take pleasure in stating that Japan is preparing for all possible eventualities as regards the U.S.S.R. in order to join forces with Germany in actively combating the communist menace. Japan is keenly watching developments of conditions in Eastern Siberia in particular, determined as she is to destroy the communist system established there. It is, I believe, hardly necessary to add that the augmentation of military preparations, among other things, with an eye to realizing this object, together with the aim of restraining Soviet Russia at the Far Eastern end in her struggle with Germany is steadfastly kept in the mind of the Japanese Government.

At the same time I beg to state that the Japanese Government have decided to secure points d'appui in French Indochina which will enable Japan further to strengthen her pressure upon Great Britain and the United States. In this connection I would like to draw your Excellency's attention to the fact that Japan has been keeping constant vigil in the Pacific, including the southwestern ocean with a view to restraining these two powers and will continue the efforts and even intensify them, if necessary. I trust that your Excellency is in full agreement with me that this really constitutes a vital contribution to our common cause, indeed no less vital than Japan's intervention at this junction in the German-Soviet War.

<sup>1</sup> Marginal note: "Forwarded to the Special Train as No. 2131, July 3."

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 63.

<sup>3</sup> The text of Matsuoka's statement is in English in the original.



Japan cannot and will not relax her efforts in the south which after all possess a very important bearing upon the whole course of the war out of which I am most confident that Germany and Italy will soon emerge victoriously. I assure your Excellency once again that the Japanese government will not fail to act in accordance with the aims and spirits of the Tripartite Pact.

OTT

No. 65

82/60249-50

*The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 1109 of July 2

Tokyo, July 3, 1941—3:55 a. m.

Received July 3—6:30 a. m.<sup>1</sup>

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to your telegram No. 942 of July 1.<sup>2</sup>

Immediately upon receipt of the above telegram I called on Matsuoka and transmitted to him personally the message of the Reich Foreign Minister. Matsuoka stated that he had already received from Ambassador Oshima the announcement of the message even before today's Cabinet session, presided over by the Emperor, had begun.<sup>3</sup> Even without knowing the exact text he had made use of the fact that a special message from the German Foreign Minister was imminent for backing up his point of view and for bringing about a clear-cut decision. He was grateful for the message with which he would tomorrow immediately acquaint the Army and Navy, as well as the Emperor. He was personally in full agreement with the ideas of the Reich Foreign Minister. He regretted that his opinions had not prevailed for the moment. During the Cabinet session he had warned Prime Minister Konoye and other Cabinet members and pointed out that the Japanese people would, after some time, demand government action against the Soviet Union. Opposing forces, who now dominate the scene, will in the long run be unable to carry their point. He requests that the Reich Foreign Minister be assured that he will adhere to the old policy.

I drew Matsuoka's attention to the fact that the Cabinet decision will certainly not be understood by the people who will in the future heavily blame the Government for the missed opportunity. Matsuoka explained the wording of the Japanese statement to the Soviet Ambassador<sup>4</sup> with the necessity of deceiving the Russians or at least of

<sup>1</sup> Marginal note: "Forwarded to the Special Train as No. 2129, July 3."

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 53.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 63 and footnote 6.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 63 and footnote 11.

keeping them in a state of uncertainty, owing to the fact that the armaments were still incomplete. At present Smetanin did not suspect that speedy preparations were being made against the Soviet Union as is hinted at in the Government decision transmitted to us.<sup>5</sup> He had furthermore informed Smetanin that, as far as was known to Japan, neither had the USA promised assistance with regard to arms nor had the Soviet Union asked for it. He wished to give the earnest advice not to attempt any cooperation of this kind as Japan, at the request of her allies, would not tolerate shipments. I told Matsuoka that Japan's attitude could not satisfy us. Matsuoka replied that he had expected this and personally regretted the Cabinet resolution; but he assured us again that deficiencies in preparedness would be eliminated as fast as possible, and that the Army was preparing for all eventualities.

OTT

<sup>5</sup> See document No. 64.

No. 66

65/45212X-13X

*The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry*<sup>1</sup>

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 565 of July 3

TEHRAN, July 3, 1941—10:15 p. m.

Received July 4—4:20 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 351 of June 30.<sup>2</sup>

Shortly before the arrival of the above-mentioned telegraphic instruction the Egyptian Ambassador<sup>3</sup> had requested a conference, which took place on July 2 after arrival of the telegraphic instruction.

The Ambassador told me about a telegram of June 29 from King Farouk to him, in which the King stated that he had information in his possession according to which the British General Staff had decided upon the occupation of the Iranian oil region. This occupation was necessary for protection against a possible German attack on Iraq and Iran from the territory of the Soviet Union. A period of two months was set for the necessary preparations. For carrying out the operation of occupation, for which only three weeks were allotted, the British General Staff had asked that up to 500,000 (five hundred thousand) men be provided. The occupation is to extend to the entire concession area of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in-

<sup>1</sup> Marginal note: "Shown to the Führer. Hew[el]."

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 49.

<sup>3</sup> Zoulikar Pasha.

cluding the ports on the Persian Gulf, and also Kermanshah. Furthermore the decision of the British General Staff provided for an advance from Ruwandiz via the Rayat Pass into the Iranian province of Azerbaijan for the protection of the Iraq oil areas near Kirkuk and Mosul. The main push is to take place in the west at Lake Urmia through Khoi to Dzhulfa. In the telegram the King had issued him the express instruction to inform His Majesty the Shah and the German Minister of these British intentions. The Shah had been informed on July 1. The Shah had been very much impressed by the news. He had expressly requested the Ambassador not to speak to anyone about it. The Shah is thinking over the situation at the present time in order to become clear about the precautionary defense measures to be taken.

The Ambassador stressed several times that it was not a matter of rumors but of a decision of the British General Staff that should be taken seriously. The Ambassador referred in particular to the fact that this decision was taken before the tremendous successes of the Wehrmacht over the Bolsheviks had become known. Under the pressure of the situation the preparations for the Iranian operation would probably be shortened so far as possible.

The Ambassador asked that the King's communication be passed on to the Reich Foreign Minister, and that the telegram be regarded as a proof of an attitude of candor and good faith toward Germany on the part of the King. The Ambassador then described the King's position, which had become still more difficult and dangerous since our last conversation; the latter had been characterized quite openly by the English as enemy No. 1.

The Führer's message<sup>4</sup> had made a deep impression upon the King; it had been received by him with great gratitude.

Upon inquiry the Ambassador stated that Azzam was at the present time detailed to the Egyptian Foreign Ministry with the rank of minister plenipotentiary, without however exercising any function. Any political activity was impossible for him as a result of the strictest possible British supervision. The Ambassador did not know the whereabouts of Ali Maher. The Ambassador could not give any information about the possibility of carrying on the aspirations represented by the two.<sup>5</sup>

ETTEL

<sup>4</sup> Vol. XII of this series, document No. 427.

<sup>5</sup> In telegram No. 574 of July 7 (266/173624) Ettl reported having been told by the Egyptian Ambassador that the preparations for the British operation referred to in the document printed were being carried on "most actively."

No. 67

4685/E225279

*The State Secretary to the Legation in Rumania*

Telegram

BERLIN, July 3, 1941—10:30 p. m.

SECRET

Multex 446 of July 2

Russian émigrés who volunteer for the fight against the Soviet Union should be treated in a friendly way, but not be registered, since it is not intended to employ them. The decisive thing among others is the consideration that in case of capture they will probably not be treated according to the laws of international warfare. There will be a reservation regarding the employment of individual persons because of special suitability for special tasks in accordance with the decision of the military authorities.

*For your confidential information:* We have no interest in the Russian émigrés being in evidence.

Confirm receipt.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 68

191/138817-18

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

St.S. No. 453

BERLIN, July 3, 1941.

As was to be expected, the Chinese Ambassador informed me this evening that Chiang Kai-shek is breaking off relations with the German Government.

Mr. Chen did not give me a note. Rather, he only informed me orally, for the use of the German Government, that after Wang Ching-wei had been recognized by Germany his Government had decided to break off diplomatic relations with Germany. The Ambassador assumed that a formal notification in writing was being given to our representative in Chungking.<sup>1</sup>

The Ambassador said that all the members of his Embassy and all the members of the Chinese Consulates in the Reich had been instructed to leave Germany. He asked that this departure need not take place before July 10, since there was a great deal of business to wind up. I told him that I agreed to having the departure take place some time after July 10 at a date still to be fixed. (I did not press for an earlier date, since our Mission in Chungking is estimated to need

<sup>1</sup> According to telegram No. 100 of July 2, dispatched from Chungking July 3 (191/138823), a note to this effect addressed to Altenburg was delivered by the Chinese Chief of Protocol on July 2 at 7:30 p. m.

at least 4 to 5 days by automobile to leave the country in the direction of Indochina.) The Ambassador put in a word for the approximately 150 Chinese students and 800 to 900 other Chinese citizens staying behind in Germany. He believed that he might express such a recommendation as the break-off of relations with Chiang Kai-shek was not the same as a state of war. Regarding this I replied that our conduct toward the Chinese citizens would be guided, among other things, by the treatment of the Germans in the area controlled by Chiang Kai-shek, as well as by the conduct of the Chinese concerned on the territory of the Reich.<sup>2</sup>

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>2</sup>In telegram No. 53 of July 4 (191/138826-28) Weizsäcker informed the Mission in Chungking of the Chinese step and asked that preparations be made for terminating the Mission.

No. 69

1584/382515

*Reichsleiter Bormann to Reich Minister Lammers*

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, July 3, 1941.

Bo/Fu.

RK 10036A.

Subject: Confiscation of the property of the Netherlands Royal House.

DEAR HERR LAMMERS: The former Queen Wilhelmina of Holland gave a radio speech on June 27, 1941, in which she stated that her House feels deep sympathy for the Russian people, which would soon be confronted with terrible trials. Today it was Russia's turn, but she knew that tomorrow and the day after the mighty bulwarks of our civilization—Great Britain and North America—would have to resist the main force of the German war machines; therefore they would fight on the side of the Russian people. In conclusion Wilhelmina then praised the resolute stand and the wise and courageous policy of the British Empire in the face of the new conflict.

The Führer has now given the permission requested earlier by the Reich Commissar to confiscate the property of the Netherlands Royal House.<sup>1</sup>

Heil Hitler!

Yours, etc.

M[ARTIN] BORMANN

<sup>1</sup>In telegram No. 224 of July 7 from the Hague (173/84441) Betz reported that Seyss-Inquart had received Hitler's approval for the confiscation of the property of the Netherlands Royal House. In a letter of July 18 (1584/382517-18) Lammers notified Seyss-Inquart of Hitler's approval of this step, informing Bormann at the same time (1584/382518) that Hitler's decision had been communicated to the Reich Commissar.

No. 70

502/234719-20

*The Chargé d'Affaires in Spain to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 2329 of July 4

MADRID, July 4, 1941.

With reference to your telegram No. 1516 of July 3.<sup>1</sup>

The call for volunteer enlistments for the "Blue Division" to be sent to Russia has produced 40 times the number of volunteers needed. Final selection will take place in all army corps districts today. The volunteers will then be staged in the vicinity of Irún, on the Spanish-French border, whence shipment to Germany by railroad will probably begin next week. An advance party of seven Spanish officers is leaving for Berlin by plane tomorrow to take up first contacts with German military command organizations. A billeting party will follow soon.

The strength of the Division including rear services and replacement units totals 641 officers, 2,272 noncommissioned officers and sergeants, and 15,780 men.

The Division is made up of the following units: three infantry regiments, four artillery battalions, one reconnaissance battalion, one combat engineer battalion, one antitank battalion, one signal battalion, one medical unit, and a complete division headquarters.<sup>2</sup>

The Military Attaché is reporting all details to the Attaché Group on a continuing basis.<sup>3</sup>

HEBERLEIN

<sup>1</sup>In this telegram (95/106947-48) Weizsäcker stated that the Reich Government would gladly welcome volunteers from the Spanish Army, Navy, and Air Force, as well as from the Falange, and hoped that they would constitute an integrated Spanish formation under Spanish command, but which could be incorporated as a unit into the Wehrmacht. He asked that Russian émigrés not be accepted.

<sup>2</sup>In addition there was a group of Spanish Air Force pilots who volunteered for service against Soviet Russia (see document No. 34, footnote 1).

In a confidential report of July 30 (138/77031) Likus recorded that when the first contingent of Spanish pilots arrived at the Tempelhof airfield they were greeted by a band of the Luftwaffe which rendered not the Spanish national anthem, but that of the former Spanish Republic.

<sup>3</sup>In telegram No. 1889 of Aug. 20 (502/234775) Sonnleithner explained that reports had been received that Communists were infiltrating into both the French and the Spanish volunteer formations in order to spy and then to defect to the Russians. Having noted that the Communist elements in the Spanish formation were reported to have come chiefly from Spanish Morocco, Sonnleithner directed that the report be investigated.

In telegram No. 2892 of Aug. 21 (95/107022) Stohrer reported that the predominant part of the Blue Division was made up of regular troops; that no Moors were included; and that 10 years of earlier service had been required for admission so that Communist infiltration seemed improbable. Stohrer advised against approaching the Spanish Government in regard to the rumors of communistic penetration. He recommended that inasmuch as the Division was now in Germany any further investigation be by German security agencies. Further reports on the Blue Division are filmed on serial 502.

## No. 71

2361/488576-79

*The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry*TOP SECRET  
No. A 2422

THERAPIA, July 4, 1941.

## POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Conversation with State Secretary Baron Benoist-Méchin.

For the Foreign Minister.

(1) As I have already reported by wire, the visit of State Secretary Baron Benoist-Méchin brought only slight satisfaction to the wishes of the French Government with regard to Syria.<sup>1</sup> During the many discussions which the State Secretary had with Turkish leaders their tendency was constantly noticeable to observe strict neutrality and to avoid any English demands aimed at direct or indirect support of Soviet Russia.

At first the State Secretary met with a cool reception, probably because of Darlan's speech about the events of 1919-1920, which was very widely misunderstood here. Later, however, the State Secretary was assured that Turkey considered the three power pact<sup>2</sup> to be in full force also with respect to France, and that she would in no case yield to an English request which might prejudice French interests.

In addition, M. Saracoglu very frankly discussed with me the question how it would be possible, without hurting French interests, to obtain satisfaction of the Turkish demands known to us (of making the Baghdad railway secure). He mentioned that the French, in case they could not hold their position in Syria, as is to be expected, perhaps might find it convenient to make the Turks trustees of Syria. In such an event Turkey would be prepared immediately to occupy Syria, to grant the French Army an honorable departure, and after conclusion of the war to return Syria to France, except for the northern part. I replied to the Minister that I could not express any opinion in this matter, but would convey the suggestion to the State Secretary.

M. Benoist-Méchin and I agreed that discussion of such an idea was unacceptable as long as the possibility to defend Syria existed and

<sup>1</sup> In telegram No. 1860 of June 21 (386/211108) Abetz had reported having been informed by the French Government that Benoist-Méchin would fly to Ankara "to take personal charge of negotiations with Turkey regarding the passage of French troops and arms to Syria and to see that the transports of gasoline were speeded up." In telegrams No. 2 (265/173047) and No. 3 (265/173045) of July 1 sent from Therapia, Papen reported about the results of Benoist-Méchin's negotiations.

<sup>2</sup> A reference to Turkey's mutual assistance pact with Great Britain and France, signed October 19, 1939. For text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cc, p. 167.

that furthermore a Syria under Turkish trusteeship would be far more inconvenient to Germany's conduct of the war later on than a Syria in British hands. Neither M. Saracoglu nor the President made any subsequent reference to this idea.

The clear and precise manner in which the State Secretary explained the basic concept of German-French collaboration to the Turkish statesmen has had an excellent effect. The decision of the French to participate with volunteer detachments in the European struggle against Bolshevism<sup>3</sup> has underscored the fact that the development of a new Europe was making rapid progress.

(2) In the exhaustive conversations which I was able to have with Baron Benoist-Méchin he discussed in detail the evolution of German-French relations and the impediments which the Laval crisis<sup>4</sup> has created. Obviously wishing that I should convey this to you (because he assumes that the reports of Ambassador Abetz' might, perhaps, not have fully elucidated this point) he emphasized that Pétain had separated from Laval solely after it had become evident that Laval had promised his parliamentary friends that he would later on, that is, after the present difficulties had been overcome, reinstate them into their posts and places. Abolition of the parliamentary system was not a matter of principle for him and was merely aimed at a temporary compromise. The Marshal, however, did not want to hear anything of the old methods, wishing to build up a new France. Germany ought therefore to have confidence in the persons on whom he was calling for this purpose.

I must confess that the frankness and the views of Baron Benoist-Méchin as supporter of a close German-French understanding had the effect of convincing me. He mentioned of course that in order to obtain a firm backing for the development in France, Germany ought to carry her promises and good intentions into effect. When he told me about the offer of the English Government with regard to Syria and I asked him what further French colonies England could attack, he mentioned Dakar and the concentration of British-French forces which pointed to an attack. Yet Germany had hitherto not fully complied with the French wishes for the strengthening of the means of defense.

The State Secretary further said that people in France were probably better informed than we were with regard to public opinion and developments in the United States. If the victorious conclusion of the German-Russian war were to bring on peace, it could be done only if Germany took into account the desires and hopes of the smaller countries, presently occupied, such as Holland, Belgium, and Norway, for administrative autonomy and independence. But above all, said

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 78 and footnote 2.

<sup>4</sup> See vol. xi of this series, document No. 510 and subsequent documents.

Baron Benoist-Méchin, it was necessary to find a political solution for Russia, which would leave the individual parts of that empire their territorial and administrative sovereignty and above all their religious freedom. It was known that with respect to the struggle of National Socialism against the churches a parallel was being drawn in the United States between the former system and Bolshevism. Yet the Russian people could not exist and even less be governed well unless they had a firm religious foundation. The solution of this very problem would indicate whether it was true that National Socialism was not an "export commodity."

Counselor of Embassy Kelley,<sup>5</sup> who recently returned from leave in the United States, has spoken in a similar sense about the possibility of ending the war and America's position regarding this. How much the problem to which I have referred already occupies our enemies is shown by the fact that the English propaganda is spreading the rumor that the conquered parts of Russia would be put under Herr Rosenberg and incorporated in the German administrative system.

The aim of such propaganda is all too plain:

The offensive against Bolshevism has become an European affair, a "crusade". It is therefore necessary to disturb this European unity and to tell the participants: "You do not fight to restore a 'Christian order' of the Occident but for the 'Anti-Christ', National Socialism." This shows the greatness of the danger which appears at the cradle of the new Europe.

Baron Benoist-Méchin spoke with great satisfaction of the cooperation with Ambassador Abetz, of his constant efforts to promote German-French collaboration, and asked me to convey his regards to the Foreign Minister.

PAPEN

<sup>5</sup> Robert Francis Kelley, First Secretary, later Counselor of Embassy of the United States Embassy in Turkey.

## No. 72

82/60265-67

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan*

Telegram

No. 598 SPECIAL TRAIN EUROPA, July 5, 1941—12:17 a. m.  
from the Special Train Received Berlin, July 5—1:10 a. m.  
No. 981 from the Foreign Ministry Sent July 5.

On the occasion of the discussion concerning Japan's attitude toward Soviet Russia, I wish to correct below for your own information what Matsuoka has told you at the time concerning my conference

with him about the conclusion of a Japanese-Russian pact of non-aggression or neutrality.

As you reported in your telegram No. 685 of May 6, 1941,<sup>1</sup> Matsuoka told you at that time that after his departure from Berlin, he did not at first consider the possibility of concluding a Japanese-Russian treaty of neutrality. [He said] he had even brought this up in his conversation with me stating his willingness to accept only in case Russia was willing to conclude such a pact. By telling you this, Matsuoka obviously wanted to say that I ought to have reckoned with the conclusion of the pact after the conversations at Berlin.

After agreement had already been reached on the conclusion of the pact and immediately before it was formally signed, Matsuoka also informed Count Schulenburg in Moscow in a similar vein.<sup>2</sup> At this occasion Mr. Matsuoka described his conversations with me at Berlin as follows: He had told me that while at Moscow he would probably not be able to avoid discussing the long pending question of a Japanese-Soviet Russian neutrality or nonaggression pact. He would, of course, show no eagerness in the matter but would be compelled to do something in case the Russians agreed with Japan's wishes. I had consented to this point of view.

Neither the presentation of the matter made to you nor that made to Count Schulenburg corresponds to the facts. The subject of a Japanese-Soviet pact of nonaggression or neutrality had been touched upon by Matsuoka and me in our conversation of March 28, 1941, in the following way, according to the memorandum drawn up immediately after the conversation by Minister Schmidt:<sup>3</sup>

Following a remark on the conclusion of a Japanese-Russian long-term trade agreement, Matsuoka asked me directly whether during his return trip he should remain in Moscow for a somewhat longer period, in order to negotiate with the Russians on a nonaggression or neutrality pact. He emphasized in this connection that the Japanese people would not countenance a direct acceptance of Russia into the Tripartite Pact, which would call forth a unanimous cry of indignation all over Japan. I replied to Matsuoka that the adherence of Russia to the Pact was out of the question and recommended that he should not bring up the previously mentioned question; i.e., the question of a nonaggression or neutrality pact in Moscow, since this would not fit into the framework of the present situation. On Matsuoka's further remark that the conclusion of a fishing and trade agreement would improve the atmosphere between Russia and Japan, I replied that there were no objections to the conclusions of such purely commercial agreements.

Thus, what I said to Matsuoka at the time unmistakably indicated that I did not consider the conclusion of a Japanese-Russian pact of nonaggression or neutrality to be appropriate. The news of the conclusion of the Pact therefore came as a surprise to me. However, I refrained at the time from making this known to Matsuoka.

<sup>1</sup> Vol. XII of this series, document No. 464.

<sup>2</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 332.

<sup>3</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 230.

Even now there would be no sense in pointing out to Matsuoka the incorrectness of the account which he gave you at the time, as well as pointing to the fact that by concluding the Pact he confronted the German Government with an astonishing *fait accompli*. I am nevertheless informing you of the actual course of events because during your future political conversations, there may arise an opportunity to rectify this point to Matsuoka in a suitable way, should it be deemed useful. In the same way, there may be an occasion in the further course of events to remind Matsuoka that during the same conversation in which he discussed the conclusion of the Japanese-Soviet Pact with you, he made the following noteworthy statement: "If war should break out between Germany and the Soviet Union, no Japanese Prime Minister or Foreign Minister would be able to keep Japan neutral. In such a case Japan would be impelled by natural consideration to join Germany in attacking Russia. No neutrality pact could change anything in this respect."<sup>4</sup>

Should you deem it advisable to draw attention to both of the points, when there is an occasion, please do it in a very gentle manner so that Matsuoka will not receive the impression that I wish to take him to task on these matters.

RIBBENTROP

<sup>4</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 464.

No. 73

233/156556-58

*The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BUENOS AIRES, July 5, 1951—4: 11 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received July 6—1: 40 a. m.

No. 1068 of July 5

In yesterday's lengthy conversation the new Argentine Foreign Minister<sup>1</sup> also spoke about the impressions he had gained during his stay in Rome during the war and his trip back here via Spain, Portugal, and North America, and he summarized his opinion on the present war situation as follows:

He was counting on the defeat of Russia in the immediate future, which would lend new emphasis to the already existent indisputable supremacy of the Wehrmacht. There could be no doubt that Germany, in possession of the Russian wheat areas (Ukraine), her minerals and other resources, especially petroleum, could continue the war for a long time, and was really unconquerable. Germany was therefore in a position, after the total defeat of European Russia to

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Enrique Ruiz-Guiñazú.

be expected in a few weeks, to end the war by a new offer of peace that would have a quite different basis from those of the former peace offers after the conquest of Poland<sup>2</sup> and France:<sup>3</sup> All of Europe was prepared for a new order under German leadership. The tremendous economic prospects which the prompt conclusion of peace would offer to Germany were unmistakable.

On the other hand it should not be forgotten that the course of the war for almost 2 years had shown that Germany, in spite of the greatest efforts, could not [force] England, supported by North America, to her knees. England's situation would rather improve owing to the constantly increasing assistance of North America, so that she, too, could continue the war indefinitely. Only a successful invasion, which, it was generally believed, would cost Germany a tremendous number of casualties and still not guarantee a thorough success, could bring about a fundamental change in the situation.

Inasmuch as the prospect of direct negotiations between the Germany of Adolf Hitler and England under Winston Churchill probably had to be termed hopeless for some time to come, the (group garbled) of a mediator appeared indispensable for bringing about peace. Only President Roosevelt could be considered for such; aside from the military power now being developed he could also throw the entire economic and financial influence of North America into the scales, whereas the position of the Pope, in spite of his high personal prestige, was not strong enough for such mediation. Roosevelt's entire past policy had been directed toward the strengthening of his domestic position and he had been largely successful in this. He certainly had sufficient authority to stop all the warlike noises in the United States and to apply his great influence to mediation. If such peace negotiations did not materialize the end of the war was entirely out of sight. The resultant disorganization of the entire economic life, under which South America also suffered severely, and particularly the threatening destruction of England and Germany and a large part of Europe was terrible, and the responsibility of the leading statesmen for the continuation of the war was extremely grave.

Without appropriate authorization from Berlin I did not consider myself empowered to further develop the conversation and therefore I did not ask whether the ideas that were expressed had anything to do with the conversations held with Roosevelt and the leading officials in the State Department during the Minister's recent visit in

<sup>2</sup> See vol. VIII of this series, Editors' Note, p. 227.

<sup>3</sup> In a major speech before the Reichstag on July 19, 1940, in which he reviewed the achievements of the German armed forces Hitler also said, "In this hour, I feel it to be my duty before my own conscience to appeal once more to reason and common sense in Great Britain as much as elsewhere. I consider myself in a position to make this appeal because I am not the vanquished, begging favors, but the victor speaking in the name of reason. I can see no reason why this war must go on . . ." The German text is printed in *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, August 1940, pp. 603-622. The official German translation is in German Library of Information, *Facts in Review* (New York, 1940), vol. II, No. 32, pp. 362-375.

Washington.<sup>4</sup> Rather, I limited myself to replying to the Minister that in the first place President Roosevelt with his odious statements about Germany lacked any sort of objectivity, which, after all, was the necessary basis for such mediation; therefore it was precisely he whom we consider responsible for lengthening the war because of the support of England. Finally the German people had not forgotten the fateful role played by another American President at the close of the World War and would therefore be extremely distrustful with regard to any proposal coming from North America. The Minister thereupon stated that the situation today was after all entirely different, because Germany was victorious on all fronts as the accepted ruler of Europe and therefore had opportunities to be "generous." I have the impression that the Foreign Minister expressed mainly his personal opinion, though he doubtless wanted to offer the good offices of the Argentine Government for personal mediation, without his being authorized or commissioned to do so by the English or North Americans. I request instructions.<sup>5</sup>

THERMANN

<sup>4</sup> Dr. Ruiz-Guiñazú was in Washington in May for discussions about a trade agreement between the United States and Argentina. For the record of a conversation with Sumner Welles, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. vi, pp. 399-401. No record of a conversation between Ruiz-Guiñazú and President Roosevelt has been found and it is doubtful whether a meeting between the two men took place.

<sup>5</sup> Document No. 112.

## No. 74

386/211175-76

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Paris*

Telegram

SPECIAL TRAIN WESTFALEN, July 5, 1941—7:25 p. m.

No. 605 of July 5

from Special Train

Received Berlin, July 5—8:30 p. m.

No. 3556 from the Foreign Ministry

Sent July 5.

RAM 291/RV

With reference to your telegram No. 1909 of June 26.<sup>1</sup>

Please tell M. Darlan orally that we are prepared to consider a pardon for the territorial guards in our custody as requested by Marshal Pétain in his letter to the Führer,<sup>2</sup> although from the legal point of view we would certainly be justified in treating them as snipers. We are also prepared to renounce the extradition, offered us by Darlan, of Reynaud and Mandel, who were the intellectual insti-

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 23.

<sup>2</sup> The text of the letter was transmitted in telegram No. 1909. See footnote 1.

gators of the activities of the territorial guards. We are, however, making the pardon dependent on the condition that the French Government on its part impose imprisonment for life on Reynaud and Mandel and that it assume the strict responsibility that the two former Ministers never escape from detention and flee abroad. We must further demand that the French Government place at our disposition all the documents in its hands that would furnish information about the political collaboration of Reynaud and Mandel with the American Government. We already have evidence that the two former Ministers together with Roosevelt and his followers, especially the former American Ambassador Bullitt, had worked toward war. We are moreover interested in strengthening our material by the exhibits in the French files, which are, no doubt, voluminous and convincing. France, just like Germany, has a great interest in shedding light upon these warmongering intrigues, because this would surely contribute to opposing the present warmongers in the United States effectively and thereby speed the conclusion of peace. In publishing the French material we would keep its delivery by the French Government secret and announce instead that we ourselves had found the material in France.

As soon as the French Government fulfills the two above-mentioned conditions, that is the imprisonment for life of Reynaud and Mandel, and the delivery of its documentation concerning the warmongering collaboration of the two Ministers with Roosevelt and his followers, we would declare a general pardon of the territorial guards. The pardon could not, of course, extend to offenses punishable also in the case of regular French soldiers. Those members of the territorial guards who might have committed such offenses would in their prosecution be treated like regular French soldiers.

Please report by wire.<sup>3</sup>

RIBBENTROP

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 211.

## No. 75

4803/E237277-80

*The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry*

THE HAGUE, July 5, 1941.

Subject: The political situation in the occupied Netherlands territories.

The war against Bolshevism naturally has also greatly excited the population in the Netherlands and is constantly in their minds. In this connection the most varied opinions and hopes are expressed with

feelings ranging from joy to depression. Joy because Germany will supposedly experience her defeat in the east, as did Napoleon, because this will give England time to repair the breaches, because a Germany weakened by Russia will no longer be able to fight England and the United States successfully and so on; depression because Germany may win in the east and then smash England. The majority of the Dutch are optimistic, however, regarding the fate of their country; they believe more than ever in the final victory of England and expect some sort of operation against the Germans in the west as long as the latter are occupied in the east. The attitude of the people has become noticeably more intransigent.

The attitude of the "Nederlandsche Unie"<sup>1</sup> probably reflects this hope most clearly in the editorial which appeared in its newspaper *Unie* on July 3. (A translation is attached.) This article is considered by the Reich Commissar to be an unequivocal rejection and a challenge to the speech given by the Reich Commissar in Amsterdam.<sup>2</sup> In any case this attitude of the Netherlands Unity party makes continued recognition of the N[ederlandsche] U[nie] impossible. The Office of the Reich Commissar is considering the dissolution of this party. In the meantime all German agencies have been ordered to limit contact with the Unie functionaries to only the most necessary official conversations.

Since the appearance of this article we can no longer reckon with the formation of a Netherlands legion for the fight against Bolshevism;<sup>3</sup> the suggestion to this effect made by the National Front has no possibility of realization owing to the slight importance of this party. The NSB takes a negative attitude toward a "Netherlands legion" because it fears that the value of the 4,000 men of the Waffen SS who are already participating in active fighting in the east with the Standarte Westland would thereby be lessened. Moreover, an appeal by the NSB or the NSNAP would only achieve the opposite among the people of the Netherlands. Therefore, as we can no longer count on a Netherlands legion originating spontaneously, so to speak, it is intended to designate the SS-Standarte Northwest stationed at Hamburg, in which 2,000 Netherlands are already serving, as a Netherlands legion under the name of the "Volunteer Standarte of the Netherlands," and to call for recruits to this regiment through the Office of the Reich Commissar. At the moment a few formal ques-

<sup>1</sup> For the development of the political parties in the Netherlands during the German occupation, see vol. XI of this series, document No. 667.

<sup>2</sup> The German translation of this article has been filmed on 4803/E237281-84. In his speech at a meeting of German and Dutch National Socialists on June 27, Seyss-Inquart reminded people of the Netherlands that their fate was decided in the east. Excerpts of this speech are printed in *Dokumente der Deutschen Politik* (Berlin, 1944), vol. IX, pt. 1, p. 257.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 45.

tions are still being clarified with the Reichsführer SS but it can be assumed that recruiting can be started in the next few days.<sup>4</sup> Propagandistically the 2,000 SS men in Hamburg can be utilized as a nucleus.

Besides the 4,000 Netherlands in the Waffen SS another 4,000 Dutch NSKK men are in action in the east. These 8,000 Dutchmen come almost exclusively from the ranks of the NSB and NSNAP. To what extent they should be counted as being in the "legion" for purposes of propaganda should be clarified with the Reichsführer SS. The Reich Commissar will give his opinion with regard to this.

The new situation makes it necessary and possible to proceed against the old political parties. The Reich Commissar has ordered the dissolution of all the old parliamentary parties and the confiscation of their property.<sup>5</sup> The main blow is directed against the anti-revolutionary party, which had been known for a long time as an organized resistance movement against National Socialism. The leader of this party, former Minister President Dr. Colijn, has been ordered not to leave the Limburg town of Valenberg. About 90 of his close co-workers have been interned in a camp. Dr. Colijn is under constant surveillance, but has a certain amount of personal freedom of movement. Nothing can be said as yet about the effect of the prohibition of the old parties.

Along with this, most of the clubs of all kinds are to be dissolved in order to eliminate the centers of resistance which they represent.

As a further measure of the Reich Commissar, the dissolution of the States-General and an extensive amendment of the Netherlands Constitution is planned, as a result of which the reassignment of important administrative posts will become necessary and possible. Thereafter the dissolution of the trade unions is to be ordered. These have been under the administration of a Dutch commissar for almost a year. Reports will be made on the course of these actions.<sup>6</sup>

The order for the collection of metal has met with a very negative reception. The general attitude of the population is best characterized by the current whisper propaganda: "Better to throw it into the canal than to give it to the Jerries."

After the Queen's speech<sup>7</sup> the Reich Commissar ordered that all pictures of the members of the Royal House now living be removed from all public buildings. Although the people expected and understand this measure they show their annoyance at it nevertheless.

<sup>4</sup> In telegram No. 218 of July 5 (173/84440) Bene reported that Himmler had approved the organization of the "Volunteer Standarte of the Netherlands."

<sup>5</sup> For text of this decree of July 4, see Raphaël Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., 1944), pp. 459-460.

<sup>6</sup> These reports have not been found.

<sup>7</sup> See document No. 69.



The English air raids, which have become more frequent in recent weeks, are taken without excitement.

Owing to the general tension described above, there is a possibility that there will be some attacks and raids, but no major revolts are expected.

BENE

## No. 76

105/113675-76

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Paris*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 607 of July 5                      SPECIAL TRAIN, July 5, 1941—8:00 p. m.  
     from the Special Train          Received Berlin, July 5—8:30 p. m.  
 No. 3554 from the Foreign Ministry                      Sent July 6.

For the Ambassador personally.

The Russian Grand Duke, Vladimir, has sent the Führer from St. Briac a proclamation drawn up by him, addressed to all Russians, along with a cover letter.<sup>1</sup> In the proclamation all Russians are called upon to cooperate in the liberation of their homeland from Bolshevism.

Please summon the Grand Duke at once and communicate the following to him:

1. The Reich Government had taken cognizance of his proclamation. This proclamation was of a nature to help the Soviet Government and make the fight of the Wehrmacht more difficult, because it gave the Bolshevik rulers the opportunity of claiming in their propaganda that Russia was now threatened by the return of the old Tsarist feudalism, which would strengthen the will of the Red Army to resist.

2. We wish to learn from the Grand Duke what he had so far done with his proclamation, in particular whether and to what offices he had sent it and whether he had had it published anywhere.

3. The Reich Government had to demand of him that he refrain from any dissemination of the proclamation, as well as from all similar steps and from any political activity whatsoever, and that he give you a strict assurance to that effect.

4. In case he should not comply with the foregoing demand, the Reich Government to its regret would be forced to intern him at once.

Please also see that from now on the Grand Duke is watched most carefully by German security organs with respect to his entire activity, particularly his personal connections and his correspondence, and that the information gained in this connection is reported to you at once. Any dissemination or discussion of the proclamation in the French press or in any other manner must absolutely be prevented.

<sup>1</sup> Neither found.

Please report at once by wire concerning the course of your conversation with the Grand Duke.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, please report regularly your future information and observations concerning the Grand Duke.<sup>3</sup>

RIBBENTROP

<sup>2</sup> Nothing found.<sup>3</sup> No further reports found.

## No. 77

205/142793-95

*The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 861 of July 5

STOCKHOLM, July 6, 1941—8:04 a. m.

Received July 6—10:35 a. m.

With reference to your telegram 1094 of July 4.<sup>1</sup>

1. The implementation of the German military wishes which involved not only the transit of the Oslo Division but also required important departures as regards the Navy and Air Force from the policy of neutrality of Sweden up to now was a severe test in domestic policy which the structure of the coalition Government could not cope with immediately. The pros and cons are still being heatedly discussed, and opinion in the country is divided. The Social Democratic party, which possesses the absolute majority in the Government and in both houses of the Riksdag, displays a split which casts doubt on the work of the Cabinet in future decisions. The Cabinet will hardly be capable of bearing still graver tests than those thus far.

2. The request to accede to the Tripartite Pact would represent such an encumbrance that it would mean the total abandonment of the present neutrality policy so far maintained with all means toward the outside and would bring about a political decision by Sweden in the sense of the Axis Powers against England and America. Such a result is difficult to attain with the present Cabinet. It is more than doubtful that the King would find an authoritarian minority government that would support such a decision, because strong personalities who could sweep the Swedish people along with them will be difficult to find. At any rate stable conditions that would be needed precisely for the case of a future accession by Sweden to the Tripartite Pact could hardly be created, since a minority government would find the Social Democratic party and thus the majority of the country in opposition.

3. Even Foreign Minister von Günther, who like the King would push the rapprochement with Germany to the limits of what could possibly be tolerated domestically, will not be able to justify Sweden's

<sup>1</sup> Not found.

accession to the Tripartite Pact to the political public opinion of the country. Günther probably desires Sweden's political decision for Germany, but not a commitment of Sweden to distant powers like Italy and Japan who are alien to Swedish interests.

4. What Foreign Minister von Günther personally considers to be necessary and worth striving for, as is evident from numerous conversations with him of recent date, is a treaty regulation of Sweden's relationship with the Reich expressing Sweden's cooperation in the consolidation of the new Europe, in particular in the great tasks arising in the east. Such a treaty would in practice mean the option for Germany and would fix Sweden's position at the side of Germany, but would still tend more toward the east than toward the west. Evidently Günther would accept an orientation against England inevitably resulting from this as a necessary consequence. Moreover such a treaty, in Günther's opinion, (clear text evidently missing) could be put through great domestic policy difficulties which in some circumstances could lead to a Cabinet change. Furthermore, at such negotiations we could count on the present Foreign Minister to support our wishes, and in this he would also be able to rely on the authority of the King. The problem would be simplified for Sweden, without a doubt, if Finland and Denmark would accede to such a treaty first or simultaneously. In all political conversations with Günther he expresses the great concern of standing isolated after a political accession of Finland to the Reich.

4. [sic] A treaty of the above-sketch type, which would fix Sweden's position at our side in the northern and eastern European area, could be of considerable importance and utility for us. Accession by Sweden to the Tripartite Pact could only rest upon an exceedingly unstable political situation.<sup>2</sup>

SCHNURRE  
WIED

<sup>2</sup> See, further, document No. 79.

No. 78

386/211182

*The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 2030 of July 6

For the Foreign Minister.

After arrival of the information of German agreement for the organization of French volunteer units for the struggle against Rus-

<sup>1</sup> Marginal note: "Forwarded as No. 2178 to the Special Train. July 6."

sia,<sup>2</sup> I assembled at the Embassy the leaders of the Rassemblement National Populaire,<sup>3</sup> of the Doriot party,<sup>4</sup> of the Francistes,<sup>5</sup> and of the Ligne Française.<sup>6</sup> These groups agreed on a common organization of volunteer units and on the text of a proclamation which will be published tomorrow in the press and on the radio.<sup>7</sup>

Marshal Pétain as Chief of State has given his approval to the organization by private initiative of volunteer units for the struggle against Russia, and for this case he has canceled the law which prevents military service by French subjects outside the French armed forces.<sup>8</sup>

ABETZ

<sup>2</sup> Paris telegram No. 1862 of June 23 (386/211115) reported that Russian émigrés had asked to enroll.

<sup>3</sup> Weizsäcker's draft telegram of July 1 (4641/E209269) forecast German approval of the enrollment of French volunteers in the Wehrmacht but indicated that Russian émigrés would not be enrolled.

<sup>4</sup> Ritter's telegram No. 3555 of July 5 (386/211177-78), No. 606 from the Special Train, confirmed the decision to accept French volunteers; indicated that support for such enrollment on the part of the French Government was not wanted; and suggested an upper limit of 10,000.

<sup>5</sup> Marcel Deat.

<sup>6</sup> Jacques Doriot, leader of the Parti Populaire Français.

<sup>7</sup> Marcel Bucard.

<sup>8</sup> Constantini.

<sup>1</sup> Abetz' telegram No. 2031 of July 6 (386/211183-84) indicates that publication of the proclamation was temporarily held up by an officer of General von Stülpnagel's staff.

<sup>2</sup> Abetz' telegram No. 2035 of July 7 (386/211186) indicated that there would be large participation; some 50 trained pilots had enrolled.

In telegram No. 3653 of July 14 (386/211208-209), No. 662 from the Special Train, Ritter instructed Abetz that so large a number of French volunteers as the 30,000 which had been reported, was politically undesirable; 10,000 to 15,000 was the upper limit.

No. 79

205/142796

*The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Sweden*

Telegram

SPECIAL TRAIN WESTPHALIA, July 6, 1941—8:40 p. m.

No. 614 of July 6

from the Special Train Received Berlin, July 6—9:20 p. m.

No. 1156 of July 7 from the Foreign Ministry Sent July 7.  
RAM 295/R.V.

For the Minister personally as well as for Minister Schnurre.

I have taken cognizance of the statements in your telegram No. 861 of July 5.<sup>1</sup> I reserve a final instruction concerning the further treatment of the question of Sweden's accession to the Tripartite Pact, but for your personal orientation at this time I wish to point out

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 77.

that the possibility of a bilateral pact of Sweden with Germany mentioned in your telegram is out of the question. If Sweden wishes to participate with Germany in the new European order, then only the form of the Tripartite Pact can be considered for this. Should Sweden in actuality finally decline accession, then we would bring about the accession of Denmark and Finland alone. I therefore request that, in case Swedish quarters should bring up for discussion in conversations there the idea of a bilateral pact with Germany, you, for your part, not treat this as any actual possibility. However, as already stated, please await my further instructions<sup>2</sup> before taking any steps in regard to Sweden's accession to the Tripartite Pact.

RIBBENTROP

<sup>2</sup> No record of further instructions on this point has been found.

No. 80

1527/873619-21

*The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

WASHINGTON, July 7, 1941—5: 65 a. m.

SECRET

Received July 7—5: 40 p. m.

No. 2098 of July 6

For Chief of OKW, Ausland; Chief of the Army General Staff; Chief of the Luftwaffe Operations Staff

Evaluation of the military situation July 6.

The wirepullers around Roosevelt had planned to carry on the war according to the plan that the English along with other deluded people should fight and bleed for America until the time had come for ending the war by means of an intervention by America that no longer entailed any danger. The plan has long been disrupted by the Führer's measures and the uncertainty because of Japan's attitude, and was upset in the last fortnight by Germany's initiative against Russia. It has been noted quite correctly on the part of best (clear text evidently missing) that a Germany which was victorious against Russia would have all the possibilities of victory in her hands. Soon, however, the primitive strategists at the helm of the English and American governments comforted themselves with the idea that Germany would be tied down with her main forces in Russia for at least three months and Japan would likewise hold back militarily for months until the decision had been reached in the Russian campaign. They pushed aside the American General Staff, which warned against such wishful thinking, [they said that] now was the time to strike Germany in the West by continuing and strengthening the air attacks in order thereby to shatter German morale; in the Middle East

to replace General Wavell, who does not believe in Roosevelt's message of salvation and his strategy, with a more suitable soldier;<sup>1</sup> and to propose to the American people through the Secretary of the Navy<sup>2</sup> that the bulk of the American fleet should "purge" the Atlantic Ocean of the German "threat".<sup>3</sup> The Russians were informed that the United States was not yet ready now, but from 1942 on the big blow would come from America. The Russians should keep to the tradition of the campaign of 1812 and like the United States try to draw out the war.

These ideas characterize the primitive strategical thinking and, as always in history, the lack of clarity in military matters, typical of opportunist politicians. They are doing the Japanese a favor in withdrawing naval forces from the Pacific; they live in a realm of fantasy, intoxicate themselves with slogans and do not have the slightest conception of how one is to purge the Atlantic of the German threat for the duration of the German-Russian war; they believe with boundless presumption that they can hold the Japanese exactly to the policy which is agreeable to the Americans, and they hardly take any account of German initiative. Of military importance at the moment is the fight now going on inside America as to whether the United States should enter the war in order to lengthen the war thereby and to keep England going.

The events of the first two weeks of the Russian campaign have not by any means increased the sentiment for war, but have increased the nervousness about Japan's attitude. Again American war policy regards as its most important task the elimination of the danger threatening from the Pacific and shrinks from decisions as long as clarity in the relations with Japan, and if possible, an understanding with Japan has not been achieved. For this reason threats are addressed to Japan which are backed only by an increasingly dispersed fleet which is incapable of attack. In the Sunday newspapers of July 6 there are also tendentious reports regarding the slowing down and halting of the German attacks, which are clearly meant for Japan.

The United States today has neither the fleet to carry on this struggle against Japan in the Pacific and at the same time support the English in the Atlantic with adequate forces, nor will it have in the course of this year an adequate army and a suitable air force. Finally, the utilization of even the few serviceable divisions is badly hampered by the scarcity of shipping space.

BÖTTICHER  
THOMSEN

<sup>1</sup> On July 5, General Sir Claude Auchinleck replaced Sir Archibald Wavell as British Commander in Chief, Middle East.

<sup>2</sup> Frank Knox.

<sup>3</sup> In address to the conference of State Governors on June 30 Secretary Knox, according to the *New York Times* of July 1, 1941 (p. 1, col. 4), stated that "the time to use our Navy to clear the Atlantic of the German menace is at hand."

## No. 81

765/270453-55

*The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 2110 of July 5

WASHINGTON, July 7, 1941—7:04 p. m.

Received July 8—2:30 p. m.

Pol IM 2131 g Rs.

With reference to telegram No. 2082 of July 5.<sup>1</sup>

[1.] Following announcement of the espionage case arrests in New York, the Consulate General reported as follows: Max Albrecht Blank, who was taken on by the Library of Information some 3 weeks ago, is personally known from the time when he was employed by the Westermann & Company concern. He came to the Consulate General on several occasions and dropped hints that he had various secret contacts.

2. The Consulate General knew that Axel Wheeler-Hill operated a transmitter. It immediately reported this to the Foreign Ministry and asked that this contact be immediately broken off in view of Wheeler's personality. At the same time, attention was called with renewed emphasis to the damage which such an operation was bound to cause. Wheeler had received training in radio communications and intelligence work in Hamburg.

3. Karl Reuper returned from Germany after the outbreak of the war and immediately started telling that he had undergone training and would send intelligence reports to Germany by means of Wheeler's transmitter.

4. The transmitter was procured by Schröder of the D.A.B.

5. The wife of the arrested Georg Schuh, who is a German national herself and left for Germany a few weeks ago, is personally known; she regularly sent information to an agency in Hamburg through ship stewards, etc. Her maiden name was von der Osten. Her nephew, one von der Osten, was sentenced to a long prison term as a German spy in Turkey some time ago.

Most, and probably all, of the persons involved in this affair were totally unqualified for operations of this kind, according to everything the Consulate General had heard about them. To give themselves importance, these people kept hinting all the time among their acquaintances that they had been given such missions and were carrying them out. It can be assumed that the American authorities had long

<sup>1</sup>This telegram (765/270450) reported the arrests of a number of persons in New York, seven of whom admitted having been engaged in espionage activities on behalf of Germany; among those arrested was the operator of a secret radio transmitter whose activity had been known to the FBI from the very beginning.

known all about the network, which certainly would not have been any great feat, considering the naive and sometimes downright stupid behavior of these people. The Consulate General repeatedly called the Foreign Minister's attention to this mischief.<sup>2</sup> The various counter-intelligence agencies in Germany have indiscriminately trained totally unqualified persons, and then sent them over here on missions, supplied with sympathetic ink and the like. Even immature, young fellows of twenty-one years were expected to set up transmitters here.

The operations of the German agencies concerned in this field were marked by naiveté and irresponsible carelessness, and on top of that lacked any kind of coordination. One almost had the impression that the various "counterintelligence" agencies were competing against one another.

I am completely in agreement with the Military Attaché with regard to this evaluation. I should add that such poorly organized operations by irresponsible and incompetent agents, which most likely have not benefited our conduct of the war, may cost us the last remnants of sympathy which we can still muster here in circles, whose political opposition is of interest to us.<sup>3</sup>

THOMSEN

<sup>2</sup> See vol. ix of this series, documents Nos. 289, 299, and 505; and vol. xi of this series, document No. 255.

<sup>3</sup> Referring to the telegram which is printed here, Sonnleithner informed Counselor Kramarz of Political Division IM in telegram No. 637 of July 11 from the Special Train (765/270457) that the Foreign Minister requested a report as to "who of those arrested in New York on suspicion of espionage worked with the Abwehr and who with the SD". In telegram No. 2349 of July 15 (765/270458) Counselor Grote told the Foreign Minister's Secretariat that inquiries were being made with the Abwehr and that a report could not be submitted before 8 days. See, further, document No. 286.

## No. 82

366/211187-89

*Ambassador Abetz to the Foreign Minister*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 204 of July 8

WIESBADEN, July 8, 1941—8:20 p. m.

Received July 8—10:20 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

I introduced the conversation with the French Government which, jointly with General Vogl, was started yesterday and resumed this morning, with the remark that:

1. For the *Iraq/Syrian sector*,<sup>1</sup> the French services agreed upon and the German services in return in the political, military, and economic field have been carried out.

<sup>1</sup> See vol. xii of this series, documents Nos. 546 and 559.

2. For the *North Africa Sector*, French services agreed upon, namely, deliveries of trucks for the German Africa Corps, have been fulfilled; transfer of guns and ammunition in progress, but transport, escort, and transshipment of supplies via Bizerte has *not yet started*, whereas German services promised in return in this sector in the political, military, and economic field have been carried out or are in progress.

3. For the *West Africa Sector* the agreement on French services planned was not expected by Germany by the date contemplated and therefore the discussions of German services in return have been postponed. Darlan replied that since the signing of the protocol on North Africa a number of events had occurred which had greatly increased the dangers incident to transportation via Bizerte. England had succeeded in bringing very considerable aerial reinforcements to Egypt through the Strait of Gibraltar and via the Gold Coast. By using an aircraft carrier near the Balearics 50 planes a day have been brought to the Eastern Mediterranean during the past month and by way of Central Africa a total of 200 machines. The Luftwaffe, on the other hand, had had to withdraw forces for the Russian campaign. French North Africa's own defenses had been greatly weakened because a major portion of the Air Force and six battalions had to be removed to Syria.<sup>2</sup> It seemed doubtful to him that England would wish to venture attacks on French North Africa; on the other hand, it had to be expected that England would make the most remote French position of Dakar the target of attacks as soon as the support of the German military operations via Bizerte furnished her a pretext for this. The French Government was still determined to take this risk and made no change at all in its basic attitude. It could, however, defend a second Syria before public opinion only if moral weapons, in addition to military ones, were placed at its disposal. General Vogl refuted Darlan's opinion concerning the unfavorable development of the military strength in the Mediterranean. The German air forces there had suffered no reduction and could, moreover, soon be reenforced by wings from Russia, since the operations in the east were taking such a surprisingly swift and favorable turn. He believed that England, who had met in Syria with so fanatical an opposition on the part of the French troops, would not risk a thrust against French possessions a second time. Until now all English landing maneuvers had failed, and if France feared English attacks on Dakar, it should be recalled that in the past year such an attempt had been prevented with far smaller forces than were available today. The reasons of the French for

<sup>2</sup> In telegram No. 191 of June 28 (378/209754-62) Welck reported that the French had received permission to transfer six infantry battalions and other troops and equipment to Syria.

the delay in the implementation of the movements of supplies via Bizerte could, therefore, not be recognized, and he had been commissioned by the OKW to press for a speedy performance of the services agreed upon. Darlan replied that the loss of Syria had shown that the most valiant resistance was doomed to failure if technical preparations were not made in time. From the moment the transports started to move through Bizerte, he counted on a large-scale attack of the English on Dakar, by sea, air, and land; so that the problem of Dakar arose indirectly already in the North Africa sector of negotiations. Since the events in Syria, he also had to be in a position, more than previously, to expound the policy adopted toward England before his people through [suitable] propaganda. In this morning's conversation, Darlan asked for an early opportunity for a talk with the Foreign Minister in which he took it for granted that the peace treaty would not be prejudged. He would, however, like to submit the proposal for a political protocol which regulates relations between Germany and France for those questions that have arisen outside of the Armistice and those which may still arise.<sup>3</sup> In conclusion Darlan then stated that at the end of the week he would call a Cabinet meeting in Vichy, which Weygand was also being asked to attend, in order to obtain a decision as to whether supplies could start to move through Bizerte at once, in compliance with the German request.<sup>4</sup>

ABETZ

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 110.

<sup>4</sup> In a note to Abetz of July 8 (3485/E019480) and referring to this conversation, Darlan wrote ". . . in order to clear up any misunderstanding, I wish to make it plain that the political position of the French Government has not changed at all. If I insist on the necessity for a broad political conversation, it is because I consider this to be indispensable for the French Government so that it can proceed along the path it has traced for itself . . ." For the outcome of the Cabinet meeting see document No. 100.

## No. 83

1527/373635-36

*The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

No. 2138 of July 8

WASHINGTON, July 9, 1941—1:44 a. m.

Received July 9—5:00 p. m.

For the State Secretary.

With reference to my telegram No. 2126 of July 8.<sup>1</sup>

The reaction to the landing of the American naval forces on Ice-

<sup>1</sup> Not found.

land<sup>2</sup> shows how skillfully Roosevelt exploits the power which he has gradually usurped. To this extent the occupation of Iceland is to be regarded as a touchstone of what public opinion and a generally quite amenable Congress will accept. As I have reported, Roosevelt's tactics consist in suggesting gradually to the public by word and deed the mood which he needs for consistently pursuing his policy. Today the American people are not yet ready to make blood sacrifices far away from America in addition to paying high taxes within the country.

They are nevertheless already following Roosevelt more or less fatalistically along a path that does not seem to involve any dangers for the time being, but whose general direction can be clearly recognized. Through an appeal to the ideals of conditional "defense" the American public is to be pushed into a course which will make it psychologically ripe for asking the President for war. Roosevelt himself is much too skillful a politician to ask the people for war. Even though most of the material prerequisites are lacking for America's entry into the war, one must reckon nevertheless with Roosevelt's unpredictableness as well as with factors that cannot be entirely judged from here, particularly Japan's attitude, which determines the freedom of action in the Atlantic. If there should be an incident because of Iceland, then Roosevelt will operate with the argument of defense against an unprovoked attack.

Public opinion here is at heart prepared to recognize that the President's policy makes such incidents almost unavoidable; and as soon as the American honor is engaged and the first American blood has been shed under the American flag, the propaganda will have a relatively easy game. But it should not be simply assumed that the President would regard such an incident as an adequate reason for

<sup>2</sup> United States Forces arrived in Iceland on July 7, 1941. For the United States-British-Icelandic negotiations preceding this move, cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. II, pp. 776-792.

Counselor Eitzdorf, the Foreign Ministry's representative with the High Command of the Army recorded the following in his notes of July 16 (1247/337687): "OKM has requested a political decision on whether with regard to naval warfare the occupation of Iceland is to be considered as the entry into the war by the U.S.A., or whether it is to be regarded as a provocation which should be ignored.

"The Führer stated in this connection that he is most anxious to delay the entry into the war by the U.S.A. for another month or two, because on the one hand, the entire Luftwaffe is needed for the campaign in the East, and on the other hand, a victorious campaign will have a tremendous effect on the situation as a whole—presumably also on the U.S.A. Therefore, the existing instructions issued to the Navy are not to be changed for the time being; rather, one should continue to avoid all incidents."

Eitzdorf's notes apparently refer to a conference at Hitler's field headquarters on July 9 at which the High Command of the Navy submitted a paper on the effects of the entry of American troops into Iceland with proposals for possible countermeasures. Cf. U.S. Navy Department, Office of Naval Intelligence, "Führer Conferences on Matters Dealing With the German Navy, 1941" (Washington, D.C., 1947), vol. II, pp. 3-7.

asking Congress for a declaration of war. For until the rearmament of the United States is completed on land, sea, and in the air, his policy is not interested in carrying on a full war with all of its consequences, particularly in view of the undefined situation in the Pacific. The immediate aim of Roosevelt's policy is exclusively to strengthen England and her allies materially and morally and to prolong the war until America either can intervene decisively on the side of England or is so well armed that she can take over the English inheritance and settle accounts once and for all with her opponents, in particular Japan. This policy is served by the authorization law,<sup>3</sup> which is misused by Roosevelt propagandistically as an expression of the will of the people, by the closing of the German consulates,<sup>4</sup> by the promise of aid to Russia<sup>5</sup> and by the occupation of Iceland. Further similar bombastic actions can be expected, which basically obligate America to very little and do not involve any immediate dangers.

THOMSEN

<sup>3</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 146, footnote 1.

<sup>4</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 634.

<sup>5</sup> Presumably a reference to the statements made by Acting Secretary of State Sumner Welles on June 23 concerning the German attack on Russia, the last two paragraphs of which read as follows:

"In the opinion of this Government, consequently, any defense against Hitlerism, any rallying of the forces opposing Hitlerism, from whatever source these forces may spring, will hasten the eventual downfall of the present German leaders, and will therefore redound to the benefit of our own defense and security.

"Hitler's armies are today the chief dangers of the Americas."

For text, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. I, pp. 767-768.

## No. 84

65/45749-50

### *The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

SECRET

TEHRAN, July 9, 1941—8:40 p. m.

No. 590 of July 9

Received July 11—4:35 a. m.

Owing to the increasing flow of reports about English intentions to attack which have reached the Shah,<sup>1</sup> especially from the source named in telegram No. 565 of July 3,<sup>2</sup> he has ordered extensive military defense measures. Troops in the provinces of Azerbaijan and Kermanshah have consequently again been reinforced. The Shah has also given orders that Khuzistan Province, where the concessions of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company are located, including Abadan, is to be

<sup>1</sup> Riza Shah Pahlevi.

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 66.

defended with all possible means. Further troop reinforcements were therefore dispatched to that province, too.

Hand in hand with the military preparations went the diplomatic steps the Shah ordered to be taken with the British Government, which through the Iranian Ambassador in London<sup>3</sup> and simultaneously through its Minister here<sup>4</sup> was informed, that consistent with her policy of neutrality, Iran would turn against "the aggressor." In the event of any British attack, the Iranian Government would appeal to Germany for aid and enter the war on Germany's side. The same applied in the event of a Russian attack; just as in the opposite case of a German attack, the Iranian Government would request aid from Britain. The British Government, which was visibly impressed by this plain language, hastened, as the Minister President told me, to declare that it had no intention whatever of attacking Iran.

The Minister President<sup>5</sup> is of the opinion that the English, who did not remain unaware of the serious military defense preparations of Iran, would not risk an attack on Iran in view of the clear position of the Iranian Government, of which they had been notified. If the attack should be made, nevertheless, the Iranian armed forces, despite their weakness in some modern weapons, would fight for every square meter of Iranian soil. Then the Iranian Government would approach the German Government with a request for help.

I made it plain to the Minister President that any feeble, tacit consent to a British attack would make the worst possible impression in Berlin. I disposed of the question of a German attack on Iran, which he discussed only theoretically, to be sure, by pointing to Germany's sufficiently proved determination to avoid as far as possible an extension of the war. I am convinced that Iran will counter a British attack with resolute military resistance and that the appeal to Germany for help announced by the Minister President in that contingency will be issued. Because of the military and diplomatic steps taken by the Iranian Government, I believe that the danger of a British attack on Iran has become less acute.

ETTEL

<sup>3</sup> Mohammad Ali Moghaddam.

<sup>4</sup> Sir Reader William Bullard.

<sup>5</sup> Ali Mansur.

No. 85

260/170076-77

*The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Finland*

Telegram

SPECIAL TRAIN, WESTFALEN, July 9, 1941—10:10 p. m.

No. 630 at the Code Room

of the Foreign Ministry Received Berlin, July 9—10:30 p. m.  
No. 849 of July 9 from the Foreign Ministry Sent July 9.

For the Minister personally.

Recently I telegraphed you, in reply to your inquiry, that you may mention to the Finnish Government that it should break off diplomatic relations with England.<sup>1</sup> Since then I have heard nothing definitive from you in this matter. I just read that Eden has stated in the House of Commons that England intended to maintain diplomatic relations with Finland and to keep her Minister there.<sup>2</sup> I ask that you now take up this matter with the Finnish Government and say more or less the following:

England, both through Mr. Churchill's utterances and through the exchange of military missions and, according to our information, through the agreements made by these missions for cooperation in all military fields, had openly made herself an ally of the Soviet Union in its war against the German Reich.<sup>3</sup> Inasmuch as Finland is Germany's ally in this fight against the Soviet Union, it appeared to us, both out of fundamental considerations and in view of the possibilities for espionage and the reporting of intelligence, detrimental to the interests of the allied Finnish-German armies, if Finland continued to maintain contact with England and keep the Finnish Minister in England. We should thus like to assume that Finland now on her part, is drawing the consequences from this situation and breaking diplomatic relations with England and recalling her Minister as soon as possible.

I also refer to the telegram recently transmitted to you,<sup>4</sup> according to which the English themselves had apparently, as a matter of course, counted on the break of diplomatic relations with Finland and had already sent instructions to the English Minister that the intelligence organization was to be turned over to his American colleague. I assume that the Finnish Government is not closing its eyes to these

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 29 and footnote 2.

<sup>2</sup> On July 2, Mr. Eden, replying to a question in the House of Commons, stated, "His Majesty's Government are at present maintaining diplomatic relations with Finland." (*Parliamentary Debates*, fifth series, H of C, vol. 372, col. 1325.)

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Winston S. Churchill, *The Grand Alliance* (Boston, 1950), pp. 377-395.

<sup>4</sup> Not found.

facts and request a telegraphic report from you in the near future on the settlement of the matter.<sup>5</sup>

RIBBENTROP

<sup>5</sup> In telegram No. 632 of July 16 (260/170079-80) Zechlin reported further discussions with Witting regarding a Finnish break of diplomatic relations with Great Britain. It appeared that Witting advocated this course; recognized that the Anglo-Russian treaty of July 13 had completely changed the situation; but had been unable to make his views prevail.

In telegram No. 645 of July 19 (260/170083-84) Blücher reported an hour-long discussion with Witting in which he again urged that Finland break off relations with Britain. It appeared that President Ryti opposed such a move because of the reaction which it would have on the United States.

See, further, Editors' Note, p. 185.

### No. 86

265/173076

#### *The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 24 of July 9

ANKARA, July 9, 1941.

Received July 9—10:52 p. m.

For the Reich Foreign Minister.

The Foreign Minister has advised that General Dentz is suing for an armistice.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, a French minelayer and a tanker have come into the port of Alexandretta, probably to seek safety. Saracoglu recalled his statement that Turkey has the greatest possible interest in northern Syria but has made no agreements with England in this matter. He requested consideration whether Germany might not give consent to Turkish occupation of northern Syria (approximately up to the pipeline Abu Kemal-Tripoli), of course just as a temporary solution until conclusion of a peace. The French Army in Syria could be returned to that section and repatriated to France. Please state your view.<sup>2</sup> Sharp reaction against England in Antalya affair<sup>3</sup> not yet exploited by our propaganda. Fifty-two dead.

PAPEN

<sup>1</sup> Cf. document No. 101.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 97.

<sup>3</sup> The French auxiliary vessel *St. Didier* was sunk by British aircraft in the Gulf of Antalya off the southern coast of Turkey on July 4.

### No. 87

278/178844-46

#### *Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, July 9, 1941.

U. St.S. Pol. 631

The Bulgarian Minister called on me today and for his part, too, brought up—in a somewhat different form from the past reports—the Italian wishes for a change of the frontier with Bulgaria, regarding which we already have a memorandum from Minister Beckerle of July 8<sup>1</sup> and the telegram No. 703 of July 8 from the German Chargé d'Affaires in Sofia.<sup>2</sup>

The description of the frontier which the Italian Minister in Sofia<sup>3</sup> gave the Bulgarian Government is appended as an enclosure<sup>4</sup> and drawn on the accompanying photostat of a map.<sup>5</sup>

Minister Draganov, as instructed, expressed doubts as to whether the line proposed by the Italians was in accordance with the agreement made between Germany and Italy,<sup>6</sup> and asked, as instructed, that information regarding this line be communicated to the Bulgarian Government. His presentation, however, differed in one point from the telegram from our Chargé d'Affaires in Sofia. Whereas according to this telegram the Italian Minister in Sofia in transmitting the draft treaty stated that this frontier was in accordance with the one agreed upon in Vienna between Germany and Italy, according to Draganov's statement the Italians had admitted that this was not the case in several points, particularly at Mount Ljuboten, northwest of Skoplje.

M. Draganov asked in addition that because we had made Italy accept the Vienna line of the frontier with Bulgaria we now support Bulgaria in holding this line. Finally the Minister also mentioned that the Italians had offered the Bulgarians compensation

<sup>1</sup> This memorandum (278/178841-42) dealt with a forthcoming visit to Rome by the Bulgarian Minister President and the Foreign Minister for the purpose of negotiations on the final determination of the Albanian-Bulgarian frontier, and in this connection recorded an Italian suggestion made in Sofia that Bulgaria give up a large territory to the west and northwest of Skoplje. The memorandum stressed that this involved an area where there were mines which were of importance to Germany.

<sup>2</sup> This telegram (278/178843) reported that, according to the Bulgarian Foreign Minister, the Italian Minister in Sofia had handed in a draft treaty providing for a frontier which greatly differed from the present line of demarcation. The Bulgarian Foreign Minister requested German corroboration of the Italian assertion that this line of the frontier was in accordance with the line which Germany and Italy had agreed upon at Vienna.

<sup>3</sup> Count Massimo Magistrati.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed (278/178847).

<sup>5</sup> Not found.

<sup>6</sup> See vol. XI of this series, document No. 398.



at Vranje for the cession at Mount Ljuboten, not at the expense of Albania but of Serbia.

As is known, this line of the frontier was carried through in Vienna with respect to Italy because there are chrome deposits in the area northwest of Skoplje which according to the present Italian wishes, as shown in the appended map, would partly fall into Italian hands. Furthermore, as is known a special agreement has already been made between Germany and Bulgaria regarding these chrome deposits,<sup>7</sup> so that we are also directly interested in the question.

A memorandum by Senior Counselor von Schmieden, who was present at the negotiations in Vienna, is appended.<sup>8</sup>

Since according to present plans the Bulgarian Ministers are to be in Rome on July 14, a quick decision is necessary as to whether and in what form we should help the Bulgarians in this matter.

I therefore propose that we give the Bulgarian Government confidentially a map with the line agreed upon in Vienna, and tell the Bulgarians that they should not give in to the Italians in this matter. We might also consider speaking openly with the Italians about the matter; we could probably first wait and see, however, what the Bulgarians themselves accomplish in Rome.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary.<sup>9</sup>

WOERMANN

<sup>7</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 393 and footnote 3.

<sup>8</sup> Not found.

<sup>9</sup> See, further, document No. 94.

## No. 88

82/60296-98

### *The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Minister*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOKYO, July 10, 1941—11:50 a. m.

No. 1184 of July 10

Received July 12—3:10 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to your telegram No. 1112 of July 9.<sup>1</sup>

Following the Japanese Foreign Minister's communication on the status of the Japanese-American talks, reported in telegram No. 865 of June 3,<sup>2</sup> I have regularly called the Foreign Minister's attention

<sup>1</sup> A marginal note identifies this telegram as Special Train telegram No. 6277. Neither telegram No. 1112 nor No. 6277 has been found but it is probable that an error is involved and that the reference is to telegram No. 627 from the Special Train forwarded to Tokyo as No. 771 of July 9. See document No. 89, footnote 1.

<sup>2</sup> In this telegram (177/85139) Ott reported having been informed by Matsuoka that the American reply to the Japanese position with regard to a previous American statement was being expected.

to the necessity of promptly informing the German Government about the awaited American reply. The Foreign Minister assured me repeatedly, most recently at the end of June, that Japan's statement of her position, on which I reported by telegram No. 731 of May 13,<sup>3</sup> had not yet been answered. Information received by me from other sources confirmed the fact that the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, Admiral Nomura, as was to be expected, was trying to keep the Japanese-American negotiations going but had not yet received any statement of the American Government's position. In my last conversations with Foreign Minister Matsuoka after the beginning of the German-Russian conflict, he told me in reply to my question about the status of Japanese-American relations that he was fully occupied with internal political conflicts and by deliberations regarding Japan's attitude toward the German-Russian conflict and that he consequently was unable at present to devote any attention to the American problem. I thereupon tried to keep informed about the status of Japanese-American relations through other channels as well. In so doing I learned from an informed person in the Japanese Foreign Ministry, who, however, was not authorized to make any statement, that at the insistence of Admiral Nomura an American reply to<sup>4</sup> the Japanese statement had actually been received. My informant told me that the American reply is an attempt to reinstate the original American plan of April 18.<sup>5</sup> In particular, the American Government demanded a statement from Japan ruling out application of the Tripartite Pact in the Pacific. With regard to China, the American Government did not want to agree to a commitment to break with Chiang Kai-shek in the event that he should refuse to accept the American advice that he arrive at an agreement with Japan. Finally, Secretary of State Hull had pointed out in an oral statement made to Nomura that a successful continuation of the discussions was possible only if that were desired uniformly by the entire Japanese Cabinet. However, certain statements by individual members of the Government cast serious doubt regarding the existence of such a desire.<sup>6</sup>

I have also learned from my informant that Matsuoka felt personally offended by Hull's approved (group missing) and will try to take the wind out of the sails of the pro-American clique by calling attention to this improper interference in Japanese internal affairs.

<sup>3</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 512, footnote 2.

<sup>4</sup> The following portion of this telegram was sent separately by radio via Osaka, received in Berlin on July 12, 6:45 p. m., and forwarded to the Special Train at 9:35 p. m.

<sup>5</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 454 and footnote 1.

<sup>6</sup> The foregoing presumably refers to the statement given to Ambassador Nomura by Secretary of State Hull on June 21 and to the draft proposal which Secretary Hull handed to Nomura on that occasion. Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941*, vol. II, pp. 485-492.

My informant categorically denies that these negotiations might lead to an agreement with the United States. He doubts, however, whether a majority of the Japanese would decide on a clear break. It is much more probable that the Japanese Government in its reply to the American statement will revert to its own proposal of May, which would then result in a "deadlock."<sup>7</sup>

I learned confidentially that this morning there was a meeting of the leadership committee of the Cabinet in which Matsuoka told for the first time of the existence of the American reply. According to my information the leadership committee has adjourned till Saturday,<sup>8</sup> when it will continue the discussions.

In accordance with instructions I shall in the course of our next conversation ask Matsuoka, without indicating that I have been told to do so, about the state of the negotiations and remind him again of our request for detailed information.

Since, as experience shows, Matsuoka feels, in American affairs, which are always treated here with special secrecy, greatly dependent on the group of Cabinet leaders, I should, for the sake of counteracting the pro-American clique, appreciate it if you would inform me of all details which have come to light at your end with regard to the new American move.

OTT

<sup>7</sup> In English in the original.

<sup>8</sup> July 12.

## No. 89

82/60285-89

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan*

Telegram

SPECIAL TRAIN WESTFALEN, July 10, 1941—2: 51 p. m.

No. 707 from the Special Train

Received Berlin, July 10—4: 00 p. m.

No. 1018 from the Foreign Ministry

Sent July 10.

For the Ambassador personally.

Please wire immediately detailed analysis of conditions there. The following items are of particular interest:

1. What are the present relations between Japan and the United States? I had already asked you to inquire of the Japanese Foreign Minister of your own accord and without instructions,<sup>1</sup> at the next occasion, whether the recent Japanese-American conversations on

<sup>1</sup> Ribbentrop's telegram No. 627 from the Special Train forwarded to Tokyo as No. 771 of July 9 (82/60284) to which this passage refers directed Ott to make his inquiries "without indicating that he had instructions from us."

rapprochement<sup>2</sup> have come to naught, and above all, in which way they were terminated. Do you think it possible that the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, Nomura, has given any oral assurances—without any written agreement having been made—to the American Government, which could have induced Roosevelt to occupy Iceland,<sup>3</sup> knowing that in the rear he has nothing to fear from Japan? Please wire at once all available information on the subject of Japan—America. Of course I request you not to show the slightest suspicion with respect to the Japanese Government in official conversations.

2. How was America's occupation of Iceland received by Japanese public opinion in the press, and above all, in important government and army circles? How is this action evaluated? Have you the impression that there could be a tendency in Japan to pursue perhaps a very shortsighted policy, which by coming to terms with America, would result in involving the latter in a European war for a long time in order to have a free hand in East Asia without openly clashing with America, to settle the Chinese business and to expand further in the South? I need not emphasize that this would be, as I said, an extremely shortsighted policy which would mean that Japan could miss the great historical opportunity that will never come again.

With England and America, Japan will never be able to establish a Greater East Asia; this is only possible against those two countries. The Japanese Government would be under a terrible delusion if it should believe itself to be able to obtain by diplomatic barter a gigantic, historical decision such as the establishment of its position of power in East Asia from the clever English and Americans.

Out of opportunism the latter would perhaps make certain temporary compromises but would never yield on principles, in order to attack Japan at a favorable opportunity, seizing from her everything she has won during the last years with the blood of her army.

3. I request a detailed report regarding the reaction of the Japanese Government to my message to Foreign Minister Matsuoka.<sup>4</sup> I do not quite understand why you have not yet reported on this in detail. As Mr. Matsuoka told you, he intended to lay the message before the Japanese Cabinet and the Emperor. What was their reaction? Did not Mr. Matsuoka inform you about this during your conversation? If necessary please take up this question anew with the Japanese Foreign Minister, whereby an answer to this message must, of course, be expected by us.

<sup>2</sup> See vol. XII of this series, documents Nos. 454, 455, and 456.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 83.

<sup>4</sup> Document No. 53.

4. Please thank the Japanese Foreign Minister on this occasion for having transmitted the telegram from the Japanese Ambassador at Moscow.<sup>5</sup> It would be good if we could receive further news from Russia in this way at regular intervals.

Summarizing, I would like to say this: I still have full confidence in Japan's policy and in the Japanese Foreign Minister, above all, because the present Japanese Government would actually act irresponsibly toward the future of the nation if it did not seize this unique opportunity to solve the Russian problem as well as to secure once and for all Japan's expansion to the south and the settlement of the Chinese problem. Since, as the Japanese Ambassador reports from Moscow, Russia actually is faced with impending collapse, which tallies, incidentally, with our observations in so far as we are able to appraise the situation during the present phase of the war, it is practically impossible for Japan not to solve the question of Vladivostok and of the Siberian area.

It is, of course, also in our interest that Japan intends to secure for herself further positions in Indochina,<sup>6</sup> etc., just as any expansionist measure on the part of Japan is welcomed by us on principle. Regarding the consequences which may and probably will result from the occupation of Iceland by American armed forces, and the attitude to be taken by us toward Japan in this connection, I will send you detailed instructions within the next few days. I wish to say today for guidance in your conversations that the fact that American armed forces were being sent for the military support of England into the area of operations officially declared by us not only clearly proves the aggressive intentions of Roosevelt but that the penetration of American armed forces into this combat zone to support England amounts, as such, to an aggression against Germany and Europe. For it is impossible to join one of the armies in a theater of war where two armies are locked in combat without wishing to join in the shooting and without actually doing so. I do not doubt for one moment that, in the case of an outbreak of hostilities between America and Germany, Japan will stand by her obligations resulting from the Tripartite Pact. In this connection it can be regarded as absolutely certain even today that America is the sole aggressor.

For the rest, I request that you go on with your efforts to bring about the earliest possible participation of Japan in the war against

<sup>5</sup> In telegram No. 1171 of July 8 (82/60274-75) Ott had forwarded excerpts from a telegram from the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union, Yoshitsugu Tatekawa, which Matsuoka had given him that day.

<sup>6</sup> In telegram No. 670 from the Special Train, forwarded to Tokyo as No. 1068 of July 16 (216/147719) Ribbentrop informed Ott that this remark regarding Indochina was for his personal information, adding the following instruction: "Please be noncommittal in conversations about Indochina with the Japanese and otherwise so that the impression may not arise that we urged this occupation on the Japanese, so to speak, at the expense of the French."

Russia, in accordance with my message to Matsuoka, using all the means at your disposal, for the earlier this participation in the war materializes, the better it is. The natural goal must be, as before, to bring about the meeting of Germany and Japan on the Trans-Siberian railroad before winter sets in. With the collapse of Russia the position of the Tripartite Pact Powers in the world will be so gigantic that the question of the collapse of England, that is, the absolute annihilation of the British Isles, will be only a question of time. An America completely isolated from all the rest of the world would then be faced with the seizure of those of the remaining positions of the British Empire important to the Tripartite Powers.

I have the rock-like conviction that the new order which we desire will be achieved as a matter of course and will present no more insurmountable difficulties if the Tripartite Powers will firmly stand together, countering at once every action on the part of the Americans by employing the same weapons. For the rest, please report in future as often and as detailed as possible about all developments of the political situation at your post.

RIBBENTROP

## No. 90

245/162034-35

*The Chargé d'Affaires in Croatia to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 708 of July 10

ZAGREB, July 10, 1941—8:40 p. m.

Received July 10—10:10 p. m.

Subject: Persecution and resettlement of Serbs.<sup>1</sup>

The Serbian question has become considerably more acute in the last few days. The ruthless carrying out of the resettlement with many unfortunate by-products, and numerous other acts of terror in the provinces in spite of the strict decree of June 27, 1941,<sup>2</sup> by the Poglavnik are giving even the sober-minded Croatian circles reason for serious concern. The various previous acts of terror and excesses

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was sent in reply to Foreign Ministry instruction Pol IV 2141 of June 25 (4832/E243223-39), which forwarded a report from the Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry with the Military Commander in Serbia with a number of enclosures dealing with the persecution and forceful expulsion of Serbs in Croatia.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram No. 608 of June 27 (4827/E241186) Kasche reported that on June 26 Pavellić had issued an "Extraordinary Decree and Order" for the prevention of arbitrary excesses. It provided for trials by courts martial with the death penalty against perpetrators of arbitrary acts. This decree was published in the Croatian press on June 27. A summary of the first four paragraphs of that decree is contained in a document from the files of the Legation in Zagreb, initialed by Kasche on June 27 (4827/E241187-88).

by the Ustaše committed against the Serbian population in many regions of the country, which had come to the knowledge of the Legation through communications from the Military Commander in Serbia,<sup>3</sup> through reports by individual Wehrmacht command posts, through the Sarajevo Consulate and a number of other sources, had already induced the Minister to point out orally and in writing as well both to the Marshal<sup>4</sup> and to the Foreign Minister<sup>5</sup> the dangerous character of these occurrences.<sup>6</sup> The more so, as it was necessary for the understanding between the Wehrmacht and the Croatian people to limit these occurrences.

Taking into consideration this last point General Glaise von Horstenau yesterday evening, after talking with me, felt impelled to bring up this matter of the Serbs first with the Marshal and then, at the latter's express wish, also with the Poglavnik. General Glaise von Horstenau expressed to the Poglavnik in the presence of the Marshal his grave concern over the excesses of the Ustaše, supporting his statements with numerous specific examples from the most recent period. The Poglavnik had to agree with him in general, spoke of the phenomena common to all revolutions and referred to the decree of June 27 mentioned above. The Poglavnik and the General agreed that in the future particularly striking cases reported by Wehrmacht authorities would be subjected to a close investigation.

The German General stated in his report to the OKW, which he submitted at the same time, that he could not make any proposal that could induce the German occupation forces to interfere directly with the misdeeds of the Ustaše, because Croatia was an independent state belonging to Italy's sphere of influence. Furthermore, the occupation forces were much too weak to take over police surveillance to the extent necessary. Moreover, intervention in individual cases would involve the Wehrmacht much more than heretofore in a share of the responsibility in the tremendous majority of cases where it could not intervene.

The General states in his report that the whole country has been seized with a feeling of the gravest legal insecurity. Unfortunately,

<sup>3</sup> A letter of June 25 from the Chief of the Administrative Staff of the Military Commander in Serbia to the Legation in Zagreb (4827/E241181-84) listed a number of terroristic acts committed against Serbs on the territory of the Independent State of Croatia and requested the Legation to make serious representations with the Croatian Government. A copy of this letter was sent to the Foreign Ministry by the OKW on July 15 (4827/E241159). The cover note stated that the OKW "considered it intolerable that incidents of that kind should be permitted in the Army's zone of operations."

<sup>4</sup> Slavko Kvaternik.

<sup>5</sup> Mladen Lorković.

<sup>6</sup> A note verbale of the German Legation in Zagreb sent to Foreign Minister Lorković on July 7 (4827/E241180) enclosed the report from the Military Commander in Serbia referred to in footnote 3. Additional data on terrorist acts against Serbs were sent to the Croatian Foreign Minister with notes verbales of July 10 and 15 (4827/E241162-79).

as one who has been acquainted with the entire former Yugoslav area for many years, I must concur in this opinion, because the Serbian question has become very much more acute as a result of the resettlement of the Serbs now under way. This resettlement which is being carried out harshly and the many atrocities preceding it will heap up tremendous amounts of incendiary material everywhere where Serbs live, and will create centers of unrest in the near future which will be difficult to control.

TROLL

## No. 91

319/192473-77

*The Head of Division W VI of the Economic Policy Department to the High Command of the Wehrmacht and Other Offices and Ministries*<sup>1</sup>

BERLIN, July 10, 1941.

Ha. Pol. IIb 2367<sup>2</sup> I.

Subject: New German-Swedish Agreement regarding Overseas Maritime Traffic to and from Göteborg.

With reference to my letter of February 10, Ha. Pol. IIb 374/I,<sup>3</sup> and of March 8, Ha. Pol. IIb 750.<sup>4</sup>

The Swedish ship traffic to and from the overseas areas by way of the harbor of Göteborg which was established by the German-Swedish exchange of notes of February 7<sup>5</sup> and of March 5<sup>4</sup> of this year was brought to a standstill by the inclusion of the sea area around Iceland in the German zone of operations at the end of March of this year.<sup>6</sup> The difficulties arose from the establishing of the course to be followed through the zone of operations by the incoming and outgoing Swedish ships. On the German side a course was prescribed for the ships along a loxodrome halfway between Iceland and the Faroes. The Swedish Government meanwhile had informed us that it had not succeeded in getting the consent of the British Government to this course: that rather the British side for control purposes had

<sup>1</sup> This letter was addressed also to the High Command of the Navy, to the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe, to the Reich Ministry of Economics, to the Reich Ministry for Food and Agriculture, and to the Reich Ministry of Communications.

<sup>2</sup> Ha. Pol. IIb 2367: Not found.

<sup>3</sup> This letter (319/192537-38) addressed by Leitner to the same group of recipients as are indicated by the heading and footnote 1, announced the initial establishment of the Göteborg traffic by means of the exchange of notes of Swedish Minister Arvid Richert and Rudolf Leitner.

<sup>4</sup> Not found.

<sup>5</sup> This exchange of notes, filmed on 319/192539-43, served as an enclosure to Leitner's letter of Feb. 10 identified in footnote 3.

<sup>6</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 210.

demanding that ships sailing from east to west or from west to east take a course leading through the Faroes and touching at Skopen Sund.

At the wish of the Swedes, negotiations have taken place in the Foreign Ministry, July 4-8, with a Swedish delegation headed by Rear Admiral Lindström with the aim of getting the Göteborg traffic again under way. The results of the negotiations are set down in the official minute, a copy of which is enclosed.

By order:  
RÜTER

[Enclosure]

BERLIN, July 9, 1941.

OFFICIAL MINUTE ON THE RESULTS OF THE DISCUSSIONS CONDUCTED IN  
BERLIN FROM JULY 4 TO JULY 8, 1941, REGARDING THE CONTINUATION  
OF THE GÖTEBORG TRAFFIC

Copy zu Ha. Pol. IIb 2367.

I. On the German part it is agreed that the wish of the Swedish Government be granted that the five Swedish ships now lying in America, namely the *Saturnus*, *Sveadrott*, *Brasil*, *Stegeholm*, and *Peru*, may make the trip to Göteborg by the course over the Faroes whereby the Swedish Government assumes every risk of loss in the zone which is prescribed in paragraph 1 of II below, under the stipulation that the five ships observe the conditions of notification, identification, etc.

II. After the Swedish delegation had proposed that Sweden herself bear the risk for the ship traffic near the Faroes and further that she give guarantees that no exchange of goods take place at the Faroes, the German delegation agreed with the continuation of the Göteborg traffic itself along a course for the ships by way of the Faroes under the following conditions:

1) Within the area that is comprised within a circle with a radius of 60 nautical miles with its center at Skopen the traffic goes exclusively at Swedish risk. At this occasion it is emphasized on the German part, as it has been repeatedly before, that a guarantee for a safe trip by the ships through the German zone of operations cannot be undertaken on the German part.

2) The Swedish Government guarantees that neither on the outward nor on the return trips of the ships will there be any goods discharged or taken aboard at or near the Faroes; and the stipulation applies for the crew, for passengers, and to mail, newspapers, and films.

3) The Swedish Government pledges that for the whole voyage of each ship it will have aboard a Swedish officer as supercargo who will be responsible that the regulations which are to be issued by the Swedish Government are not violated, particularly by the captain or by the crew.

4) The German consent to this reactivation of the Göteborg traffic represents only an experiment until further notice which can be given up again in accordance with the war situation and with the experiences gained.

5) Under the condition that the stipulations which are enumerated as 1 to 4 under II are fulfilled on the Swedish part, it is declared on the part of the Germans that they will be ready to be considerate of the Swedish ships sailing on the Faroe course according to the possibilities. The voyage of the ships in the zone which is described in paragraph 1 of II goes, however, essentially at Swedish risk.

III. The assurance is given on the part of the Swedes that they will strive so to regulate the Göteborg traffic that the trips of ships through the German zone of operations do not take place more than twice a month in each direction and that the traffic will be simplified and lightened as much as possible (grouping the ships together, agreement as to times, etc.). The prescribed regulations which are to be observed (notifications, identifications of the ships, prescriptions for the voyage) will be made known to the Swedish Legation in Berlin (Naval Attaché) once more by the High Command of the Navy.<sup>7</sup>

IV. The German delegation declares its agreement that the goods, bought on Swedish account and which in total weight of approximately 8000 tons are still lying in England, be brought to Sweden. It is agreed that this can be carried out: a) either by means of a Swedish ship which goes in ballast from overseas to England and brings the goods from there to Göteborg and then will be left free on the German part for outward voyage with goods; b) or in such fashion that the goods will first be shipped from England to a harbor in some neutral country (e.g., Portugal or South America) and then reach Sweden in the Göteborg traffic.

V. The Swedish wish for an extension of the list of goods which according to the exchange of notes of March 5, 1941, are valid for the Göteborg traffic<sup>8</sup> will be examined benevolently and will be considered generously.

<sup>7</sup> The exchange of notes of Feb. 7 (see footnote 5) had provided for a German Control Office (Geleitstelle) which was to operate at Göteborg. For each entering or departing ship the Swedish maritime authorities were to submit complete data to the Control Office: name of the ship, list of passengers and crew in all cases. For outgoing ships they were to provide the destination and full details regarding the cargo: kind, amount, name of the exporter, name of the ultimate receiver. For incoming ships the Swedish authorities were to provide the port of departure and date, the probable date of entry, and full description of the cargo. Such data were to be presented at least 8 days prior to the arrival or departure by the ship. Each outgoing ship on reaching its port of destination was to report its arrival to the nearest German Consulate and was also to report the discharge of its cargo.

<sup>8</sup> Ritter's letter of July 14 addressed to OKM, to OKW, OKL, and to various ministries (319/192452-64) forwarded a memorandum with the revised list of items for the trade with South America, Central America, and Mexico, and for Japan and China.

VI. In view of the present stoppage of freight traffic over Petsamo it is agreed that closer agreements over the exportation and importation of Swedish goods by way of Petsamo are not in order but that in principle the list of goods valid for the Göteborg traffic can be applied in approving Swedish wishes for exports as soon as the Petsamo traffic is resumed.<sup>9</sup>

Initials of Minister Leitner  
Initials of Office Chief Stähle

<sup>9</sup> In telegram No. 1129 of Aug. 5 (319/192430-31) Wied reported that Hägglöf had told him that Sweden's trade in Europe was practically confined to Germany and Finland, and her overseas trade was confined to the Göteborg traffic which was controlled by Germany.

### No. 92

319/192471

*Memorandum by the Head of Division W V of the Economic Policy Department*

BERLIN, July 10, 1941.  
e.o. Ha. Pol. 454 g. Rs.

Major Radtke,<sup>1</sup> by order of Colonel Becker,<sup>2</sup> telephoned that he would go to Stockholm on Friday.<sup>3</sup> Colonel Becker himself cannot go, unfortunately.

I. As to the individual Swedish wishes<sup>4</sup> he will bring the following answers.

- 1) License for motors: positive, within the framework of the communications already made to us by Ministerialrat Müller.
- 2) Airplanes: negative.
- 3) Motors from captured material: positive.
- 4) Delivery of tanks to Sweden in exchange for the delivery from Sweden to Germany of spare parts for tanks: essentially negative.
- 5) Armor for tanks: negative.
- 6) Magazine equipment for tanks. Inasmuch as the Swedish wish is not clear, no position with regard to it can be taken now.
- 7) Cross-country motor vehicles and tractors: a partial compliance is possible.
- 8) 21-cm. cannon from Skoda. A good substitute offer can be made to the Swedes.
- 9) Lists of the still open orders for optical and radio equipment: positive.

<sup>1</sup> Major Radtke, of the OKW, W1 RÜ.

<sup>2</sup> Colonel Becker, of the OKW, W1 RÜ.

<sup>3</sup> i.e., July 11.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 59.

II. A general directive whether the basic tendency in the actual discussions of the Swedish wishes is in large measure to be benevolent or scarcely so is expected from Headquarters today.<sup>5</sup>

Herewith respectively submitted through the Dirigent of Ha. Pol. to Ministerialdirektor Wiehl.<sup>6</sup>

VAN SCHERPENBERG

<sup>5</sup> A minute by Scherpenberg, e.o. Ha. Pol. 459 g. Rs. (319/192468), of July 12 records: "According to a communication from Colonel Becker, General Thomas brought the directive from the Führerheadquarters for Major Radtke that in the negotiations with the Swedes regarding war material he was to show a reserved attitude rather than a benevolent attitude."

<sup>6</sup> Wiehl's memorandum of July 12, zu Ha. Pol. 459 g. Rs. (319/192469-70), records the point by point discussion of Schnurre's telegram of July 2 (document No. 59) with the War Economy and Armaments Office of OKW and with the Reich Air Ministry.

### No. 93

326/195002

*The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in Brazil*

Telegram

No. 967

BERLIN, July 10, 1941.  
Sent July 11, 5:40 a. m.  
zu Ha. Pol. 4187 g.<sup>1</sup> II.

With reference to your Nos. 630<sup>2</sup> and 1108.<sup>1</sup>

Please inform the Brazilian authorities that we shall continue to hold to the execution of the contract as in the past and that the Wehrmacht together with Krupp is investigating a new plan of production regarding which a further communication will be made as soon as possible.<sup>3</sup> Please inform Schluchtmann<sup>4</sup> of your step as soon as possible so that he will proceed *pari passu*.

For your information and to guide your conversation:

Krupp submitted to the Wehrmacht a proposal for the resumption of the manufacture interrupted by the exigencies of war;<sup>5</sup> to be sure, it also necessarily represents a postponement of the original delivery plan, but signifies a considerable extension and improvement of the proposal in the letter of March 11, 1941.<sup>6</sup> Meanwhile a decision on

<sup>1</sup> Ha. Pol. 4187: This was telegram No. 1108 of June 19 (326/194994) in which Prüfer reported that the Brazilian Ministry of War could no longer be put off regarding the delivery of the promised war materials.

For previous developments, see vol. XII of this series, document No. 612.

<sup>2</sup> See vol. XII, document No. 612, footnote 1.

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

<sup>4</sup> The representative of Krupp in Rio de Janeiro.

<sup>5</sup> See vol. XII, document No. 612, footnote 3.

<sup>6</sup> See vol. XII, document No. 612, footnote 2.

Krupp's proposal is possible ~~only after conclusion of the decisive operations in the east.~~<sup>7</sup>

WIEHL<sup>8</sup>

<sup>7</sup> The words scored through were crossed out on the original and new words added in longhand to read: "only after further progress has been made with current operations in the east."

<sup>8</sup> Typed marginal note:

"Note: The original version of the statement to be transmitted to the Brazilians, agreed upon in yesterday's conference, seems to me to be too laconic; the Ambassador will have to say a little more to the Brazilians, after all. I have arranged the present version by telephone with Major Radtke, who was entirely of my opinion.

The phrase 'in agreement with Schluchtman' intended by H. Pamperrien seemed ambiguous to me; of course the Ambassador must proceed alone, and merely a *pari passu* procedure by Schluchtman is to be assured. Here, too, Major Radtke and I are of one opinion. M[oraht]."

"2. A[fter] dis[patch] re[submit]. H. Pamperrien.

(Let Krupp know by telephone for the purpose of informing Schluchtman in Rio. Information to OKW and RWM on 4559)."

## No. 94

278/178852

### *Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

U. St.S. Pol. 643

BERLIN, July 11, 1941.

In connection with the conversation of this morning (U. St. Pol. 641)<sup>1</sup> I gave the Bulgarian Minister, in accordance with instructions, a map showing the Vienna boundary line between Albania and Bulgaria. And I added, in accordance with instructions, that the Bulgarian Government could use the argument with the Italians that it had already concluded an agreement with us regarding the exploitation of chrome and that it could not agree to a unilateral modification of the frontier without Germany's consent.

The Minister expressed his thanks for this communication the importance of which he correctly understood.

I furthermore told the Minister that on the basis of his statements I could not see on which side of the Vienna line the chrome mines were which Italy demanded to have handed over to her last night. Finally, anticipating every possibility, I also pointed out to him that there were minor differences between the German and the Italian map.

WOERMANN

<sup>1</sup> In this memorandum of July 11 (278/178850) Woermann recorded having been informed by Minister Draganov that an Italian colonel had confronted the Bulgarian Military Commander in Skoplje with the demand "in form of an ultimatum" for the evacuation of the chrome mines north of Mount Ljuboten held by Bulgaria. On this occasion the Bulgarian Minister again requested information regarding the line of the frontier agreed upon by Italy and Germany in Vienna.

According to this memorandum Woermann was subsequently authorized by Ribbentrop to give Minister Draganov a map of the Vienna line.

## No. 95

82/60301-02

### *The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Tokyo, July 12, 1941—10: a. m.

No. 1208 of July 12

Received July 13—12:20 a.m.<sup>1</sup>

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to your telegram No. 771 of July 9<sup>2</sup> and my telegram No. 686<sup>3</sup> of July 10.

In the absence of the Foreign Minister who was indisposed I saw Deputy Foreign Minister Ohashi today about current matters and in that connection turned the conversation to American-Japanese relations. Ohashi confirmed to me that an American reply had been received. His statements about its contents agree in general with the reports I had already received confidentially from within the Foreign Ministry. He also confirmed to me the oral statement by Secretary of State Hull, which has already been reported. He added, more specifically, that the American Government had refused to be bound by any agreements in the matter of an entry into the war "for self-defense." Furthermore, the American Government had stated with regard to a settlement of the Japanese-Chinese conflict that it could not agree to the continued presence of Japanese troops in North China and Inner Mongolia. With regard to China the American Government intended to adhere to the principle of the Open Door. Finally, the American reply contained the offer to settle all questions of trade and of procurement of raw materials in the Pacific with Japan in a fair manner on the basis of reciprocity.

Ohashi told me that the proposal was of course unacceptable. He himself believed, however, that the Japanese Government would for the present avoid breaking off the negotiations abruptly so as not to aggravate the present difficult situation. I asked Ohashi to let me have all the details of the American reply and keep me currently and promptly informed about further developments. Ohashi promised me that he would inform the Foreign Minister immediately.

OTT

<sup>1</sup> Marginal note: "Forwarded to the Special Train as No. 2315, July 13."

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 89, footnote 1.

<sup>3</sup> Marginal note: "Presumably 1184".

Telegram No. 1184 is printed as document No. 88.

## No. 96

106/113710-12

*Circular by Ambassador Ritter*<sup>1</sup>Multex No. [479]<sup>2</sup>JULY 10, 1941.<sup>2</sup>

Pol. I M 5166 g.

With reference to my instruction Pol. I M 4796 g. of July 4.<sup>3</sup>

In consultation with the authorities concerned, particularly the OKW and the Waffen SS, guidelines have been set up for the employment of foreign volunteers in the struggle against the Soviet Union and for their technical implementation. The essential points are:

1. In principle only compact units under their own leadership will be used, which in general will be formed in the homelands of the volunteers. Formations in a state of readiness will be reported to the OKW by the German Diplomatic Mission, if there is one, through the Foreign Ministry. Transportation will be arranged by the branches of the Wehrmacht or, in the case of untrained units, by the commander of the Replacement Army in conjunction with the Chief of Wehrmacht Transportation. Immediate employment is intended in the case of volunteer formations which are trained and equipped by the homelands. Formations that have to be first inspected, equipped, and trained in Germany will be assigned to the Replacement Army for the time being. Danish, Norwegian, Swedish, Dutch, and Flemish volunteers will in principle be taken by the Reichsführer SS and placed in the Waffen SS. In general Reich citizenship will not be acquired through enlistment. In the case of countries with legislation according to which entry into the Wehrmacht results in loss of citizenship, negotiations, if necessary, will be considered in order to make it possible that citizenship is retained. Please send a written report on this question if it should arise.

2. Volunteer units ready for action will not as a rule receive new uniforms, but will receive the important characteristics of the German uniform (steel helmet, rank and national insignia). Formations that are trained in Germany will receive German uniforms with the badges of their nationality. Arms will be provided by Germany. Arms brought along will be utilized in so far as the supply of ammunition permits. The oath will be rendered to the Führer as Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht for the fight against Bolshevism.

<sup>1</sup> Sent to the Embassies in Italy and Spain, the Embassy in Paris, the Legations in Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, Croatia, Portugal, Bulgaria, to the Reich Plenipotentiary in Denmark, the Representative of the Foreign Ministry with the Military Commander in Belgium and northern France, and to the Representative of the Foreign Ministry with the Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands.

<sup>2</sup> The number is supplied from the copy sent to Rome (2281/482322-24) which had the date of July 11 and was actually dispatched on July 12, 12:40 a. m.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed (34/24740-47). This instruction forwarded to a number of Missions copies of the minutes of an interdepartmental conference held in the Foreign Ministry on June 30 which dealt with foreign volunteers for the struggle against the Soviet Union.

3. Assumption of all costs by the Reich is planned. This is confidential for the time being, since negotiations regarding this are still in progress with the responsible Reich authorities. In any case foreign volunteers will receive soldier's pay, front allowances, reimbursement of travel and expenses for detached service as well as cash allowances for feeding themselves. Further details are still being settled.

4. Compact volunteer formations will in principle be subject to the military disciplinary regulations of their country. German disciplinary regulations will apply to formations lacking their own disciplinary regulations or with German superiors. Large formations with their own military courts will retain them. Smaller units will be subject to German military jurisdiction.

5. The Waffen SS has already issued or intends to issue similar regulations.

6. In countries where there are German Missions I request the Mission chiefs to take care that all political negotiations in the question of volunteers, i.e., negotiations with the government, political organizations, and similar groups, are carried on by the Mission chief, whereas the handling of the technical military questions, falls to the Wehrmacht Attaché. In France the volunteers will be handled by the Military Commander in accord with the Paris Embassy.

RITTER

## No. 97

265/173081

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey*

Telegram

RAM 308/R

SPECIAL TRAIN, July 12, 1941—2:00 p. m.

Received Berlin, July 12—2:20 p. m.

No. 902 from the Foreign Ministry

Sent July 12.

With reference to your telegram No. 24 of July 9.<sup>1</sup>

With regard to the wish of the Turkish Government expressed to you through the Turkish Foreign Minister that we give our consent to the occupation of northern Syria by the Turks, you are requested to convey the following:

The English justified their attack on Syria on the ground that the French had permitted German aircraft to be there. While we believe that the English used this merely as a pretext and would have taken action against Syria in any event, France nevertheless has acted very loyally toward us in this matter. Consequently, we also feel an obligation of loyalty on our part not to range ourselves against French interests in the Syrian question, and it is therefore not possible for us to take a favorable stand regarding the Turkish request for occupation of northern Syria.

RIBBENTROP

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 86.



## No. 98

319/192467

*The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 926 of July 12

STOCKHOLM, July 12, 1941—5:30 p. m.

Received July 12—8:05 p. m.

Also for Ambassador Ritter.

In my telegram No. 822 of July 2<sup>1</sup> I asked that after examination of the Swedish wishes for arms a negotiator with adequate full powers be sent here. Today Major Radtke arrived, bringing a fully negative answer that was not cleared with the Foreign Ministry. According to the statements of Radtke there are a few minor items in the Swedish list of wishes which were cleared in a positive sense in Berlin,<sup>2</sup> but Radtke cannot make even these few concessions to the Swedes because the OKW, for certain basic considerations, does not wish to make any concessions at all without new massive Swedish counterservices.<sup>3</sup>

On the basis of this instruction of Radtke's I was obliged to call off the negotiations set for today with the Swedish officials. In addition to this the instructions of Radtke are in contradiction to the directives for the Air Attaché here which on individual points were positive and which have just been confirmed by telephone by the Reich Ministry of Air.<sup>4</sup> I shall therefore take up the aerial questions separately on the basis of the directives which the Air Attaché has received.<sup>5</sup> In this situation the question of the delivery of German war material to Sweden requires basic clarification, hereafter as hitherto, particularly because we will have to present further German and Finnish wishes<sup>6</sup> of the most varied kind to the Swedish Government.<sup>7</sup>

SCHNURRE

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 59.<sup>2</sup> See document No. 92.<sup>3</sup> See document No. 92 and footnote 5.<sup>4</sup> A draft telegram of July 5, Ha. Pol. 440 g. Rs. Ang. 3 (319/192480-81), outlined the provisional views of the Reich Ministry of Air (pending final decision by the Reichsmarschall), and indicated that Colonel Becker would be on hand in Stockholm to be of assistance in the negotiations on aerial matters.<sup>5</sup> Not found.<sup>6</sup> In telegram No. 1196 of July 8 (319/192478-79) Schnurre was informed that because of the general difficulties in transportation the situation with respect to rubber had become critical, and was directed to ask for the delivery to Germany of some 3,000 tons of raw rubber from Swedish stocks against payment.<sup>7</sup> Schnurre replied in telegram No. 942 of July 13 (319/192466) that he had carefully checked the matter with Friedrich, the expert of the Reich Office for Rubber. On the basis of the niggardliness of the German response to Sweden's wishes, Schnurre did not consider it appropriate to ask the Swedes for rubber. Friedrich agreed with this view and planned to return to Berlin to see if it might not be possible to offer the Swedes buna in return for rubber and to offer also the process of manufacturing buna.<sup>8</sup> In telegram No. 1301 of July 14 (319/192465) Wiehl informed Schnurre that Ambassador Ritter would bring up the matter of Sweden's wishes again with the OKW.

See, further, document No. 254.

## No. 99

1527/373656-58

*The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

No. 2194 of July 11

WASHINGTON, July 12, 1941—8:33 p.m.

Received July 13—10:00 a.m.

For OKW, Ausland; OKH, Attaché Department; RLM, Attaché Group.

The development of American rearmament up to the middle of this year has in general proceeded in such fashion as we have continuously reported since the spring of 1939. In the middle of this year the American Army reached the planned strength and organization and now requires a few more months in order to receive as a whole the latest training and equipment. Parts of the Army are ready today.

As a result of large deliveries to England, the equipping of the Army Air Force with material has also not yet been completed.

The previous evaluations of the rearmament and of the American armament industry have proved to be accurate in all essential points, even where they differed from the opinions of American experts. I refer to my individual reports. The fact remains, which is also important for the political measures of the American Government, that the second half of 1941 will bring a sharp rise in the development of the Army, Air Force and armament industry.

On July 1 the American Army, including its air force, had a strength of about 1,400,000 men, consisting of 4 armies, 9 army corps, 27 infantry divisions, one of them motorized, 2 cavalry divisions and 4 armored divisions, which will be increased to 6 in the near future, under one commander of armored troops. 120,000 men are employed in the overseas possessions including Newfoundland and Alaska.

The Air Force is supposed to consist of 54 combat groups and 6 transport groups, the organization of which was reported in the dispatch of January 23.<sup>1</sup> It is 167,000 men strong.

The equipment of the Army and the Air Force will improve considerably by autumn; by spring of 1942 it will be complete. At the moment the equipment is still inadequate. Only 2 divisions can be considered as fully equipped, and a total of 5 as being ready for immediate use.

The demand of the War Department that the service period of the men called up under the military law,<sup>2</sup> of the reserve offi-

<sup>1</sup> Not found.<sup>2</sup> Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, approved Sept. 16, 1940; U.S. Statutes at Large, 1939-1941, vol. 54, p. 885.

cers, and of the National Guard units be extended beyond the one year so far stipulated, is being justified on these grounds: Between 75 and 90 percent of the officers are reserve officers, and the new units cannot be set up with their modern training or kept in the high state of readiness which is desirable if there is an annual turnover of officers and men.

At the same time the Army demands abolition of the provision according to which men called up under the military service law and the National Guard must not be used outside the Western Hemisphere. In order, nevertheless, to have always some forces available for overseas employment, two divisions were formed solely of volunteers serving 3 years, with regard to whose employment there are no restrictions.

Whereas the entire Army in its present organization will be provided with modern equipment by spring of 1943, certain formations in the meantime are being prepared for special tasks according to completion of their training and equipment. They are called "task forces",<sup>3</sup> formations of all service arms, usually reinforced divisions that are equipped for immediate independent use for special tasks. Thus there are two divisions for landing operations. Two armies with 4 army corps including army and corps troops are supposed to be constantly in the highest state of readiness after completion of their armament.

In my reports I have regularly noted the development of American armament and the armament industry, also their weaknesses. I urgently warn against overestimating the weakness and underestimating American efficiency and the American determination to perform.

It is easy to draw incorrect conclusions from statements and criticism in the American press. In cases of doubt I recommend that my evaluation be used as a basis.

As I have done for years I repeat in particular my report that the American officers' corps of the Army and the Air Force in general meets high requirements and that the influence of the tradition going back to Washington and Steuben, and thereby to Frederick the Great, supports the structure of the American armed forces. They are working intensively and are giving greatest attention to the problem of modern warfare. Unsuitable individuals are now being eliminated, good officers are being advanced with priority; the officers of the reserves and the National Guard are being trained intensively.

BÖTTICHER  
THOMSEN

<sup>3</sup> In English in the original.

## No. 100

386/211199

*The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 2091 of July 12

PARIS, July 12, 1941—9:50 p. m.

Received July 12—10:50 p. m.

For Herr Schwarzmann.

For immediate presentation to the Foreign Minister and Ambassador Abetz.

This evening Fatou<sup>1</sup> and Guérard handed me the instruction they received after today's Cabinet meeting<sup>2</sup> for transmission to the Embassy. The text of this instruction, translated into German, reads as follows:<sup>3</sup>

I have the honor to inform you that after hearing the presentation of Admiral Darlan, under the chairmanship of Marshal Pétain, the Cabinet decided that:

1. It did not seem possible to proceed to carry out part II of the Military Protocol of May 28,<sup>4</sup> as long as the political negotiations, within the framework of which this protocol is placed, have not been concluded.

2. The French Government will remain loyal to the policy established on May 11 in Berchtesgaden,<sup>5</sup> but it believes that at this moment any decision other than the one it has made would be contrary to the interests of France as well as of Germany.

3. A note verbale<sup>6</sup> will be addressed to you at once that will exactly define the attitude of the French Government.

SCHLEIER

<sup>1</sup> Louis Marie Pierre Fatou, Commander (promoted to Captain in November 1941), Naval Representative of the French Delegation in the Occupied Zone.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 82.

<sup>3</sup> The French text is printed in *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. IV, pp. 589-590.

<sup>4</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 559.

<sup>5</sup> See vol. XII of this series, documents Nos. 490 and 491.

<sup>6</sup> See document No. 113.

## No. 101

386/211198

*The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Italy  
and to the Embassy in Paris*

Telegram

SECRET

To Rome No. 1735

BERLIN, July 12, 1941.

To Paris No. 3649

zu Pol. VII 3832 g.<sup>1</sup>

For Chief of Mission! For your information:

By direction of the Foreign Minister, I have informed Minister Cosmelli of the Italian Embassy as follows:<sup>2</sup>

"The French Government has recently informed us that, through the American Consul General in Beirut,<sup>3</sup> the English had sent to General Dentz proposals for the suspension of hostilities.<sup>4</sup> The French Government at the time secretly inquired as to our view. We had thereupon replied to the French Government that we were convinced of the insincerity of the English intentions and could therefore only warn the French against making agreements with the English.<sup>5</sup> We had at the same time added, however, that if the French considered themselves incapable of offering further resistance, we naturally would have to leave to them the final decision as to how they should proceed. Since that time the French had not approached us in the matter any more. In the last few days a number of conflicting reports concerning the Anglo-French armistice negotiations had come to our attention."<sup>6</sup>

End of the communication.

<sup>1</sup> Pol. VII 3832 g.: Not found.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram No. 643 of July 11 from the Special Train (70/50567) Ribbentrop's instructions were conveyed to Woermann.

<sup>3</sup> Cornelius Van H. Engert.

<sup>4</sup> In Paris telegram No. 1946 of June 29 (70/50529-30) Schleier reported the fact of the British proposal and the text of a French reply. Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. III, pp. 755-756.

<sup>5</sup> No record of such a German reply has been found.

<sup>6</sup> In telegram No. 221 of July 9, dispatched July 10 (70/50558-59) Rahn reported having been informed by the French High Commissioner of Syria that he was forced to approach the British with a request for negotiations regarding cessation of hostilities. Cf. document No. 165.

By a message of July 11 (70/50570) Weizsäcker sent to the Special Train the text of an instruction which he proposed be sent to Rahn. A minute of July 12 by Weber (70/50569) records Ribbentrop's approval of the instruction which requested Rahn to limit himself to giving the following general advice:

"(a) If honorable terms, compatible with the dignity of France, could not be obtained in the armistice negotiations an unconditional surrender without assumption of political commitments of any kind would be preferable.

"(b) Any concession favoring the de Gaullists, above all any recognition of the de Gaullists as a political or military factor ought to be avoided in the negotiations."

According to a teletype message sent by Woermann to Gaus on the Special Train on July 14 (70/50576) the instruction which was dispatched on July 12, 10:45 p. m. failed to reach Rahn because of conclusion of the armistice.

I then referred to the Anglo-French exchange of notes of which we had meanwhile been informed from Vichy.<sup>7</sup>

WOERMANN

<sup>7</sup> Following a proposal by General Dentz of July 8 addressed to the British authorities for cessation of hostilities an Anglo-French exchange of communications took place through the good offices of the United States which resulted in the signing of an armistice agreement on July 14. See *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. III, pp. 762-774.

[EDITORS' NOTE. On July 12 the German Foreign Minister had a conversation with Minister M. C. Açikalin of the Turkish Foreign Ministry who on instruction from Saracoglu conveyed thanks for Ribbentrop's part in the achievement of the German-Turkish Treaty of June 18 (Volume XII of this series, document No. 648). The record of this conversation which was drawn up by Loesch on July 13 (F20/320-32) is in large part illegible on the copy from the film of files of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat.

From those parts of the document which can be read it appears that most of the conversation was taken up by Ribbentrop's explanations of past German policy toward Britain, Turkey, and the USSR.]

## No. 102

62/42334

*The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Denmark*

Telegram

SPECIAL TRAIN WESTFALEN, July 13, 1941—1:00 a. m.

No. 651 of July 13

from the Special Train Received Berlin, July 13—2:10 a. m.

No. 772 of July 13 from the Foreign Ministry

Sent July 13.

With reference to your telegram No. 882.<sup>1</sup>

It is entirely in our interest that the Danish Government or the King of Denmark<sup>2</sup> should protest to the American Government against the occupation of Iceland by American troops.<sup>3</sup> Please make strong representations to this effect with the Government at your post.<sup>4</sup>

RIBBENTROP

<sup>1</sup> In this telegram of July 8 (62/42328-29) Kotze reported that he had talked with Foreign Minister Scavenius "about the occupation of Iceland by American troops" and asked for instructions regarding the Foreign Ministry's attitude to a possible Danish protest to Washington.

<sup>2</sup> Christian X.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 83, footnote 2.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 118.

## No. 103

1527/373669

*The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Portugal*

Telegram

SPECIAL TRAIN WESTFALEN, July 13, 1941—1:00 a. m.

No. 652 of July 13

from the Special Train Received BERLIN, July 13—2:10 a. m.

No. 1062 of July 13

from the Foreign Ministry

Sent July 13.

In connection with the occupation of Iceland by American troops,<sup>1</sup> American politicians are speaking openly for America also occupying the Azores.<sup>2</sup> Please call the attention of the Government there to this news and ask them how they evaluate the matter and what position they will take toward an American occupation of the Azores.<sup>3</sup>

RIBBENTROP

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 83, footnote 2.

<sup>2</sup> On May 6 Senator Claude Pepper proposed in a speech in the United States Senate that the United States seize various bases in the Atlantic, among them the Azores and the Cape Verde islands (for text of his speech, see *U.S. Congressional Record*, vol. 87, pt. 4, p. 3617). In telegram No. 982 of May 9 (129/121081-82) Huene gave the text of an official declaration of the Portuguese Government repudiating these proposals. For the attitude of the United States Government concerning the Azores and the other Atlantic Islands, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. II, p. 839-859.

<sup>3</sup> No reply to this directive has been found. For Portugal's attitude see document No. 141.

## No. 104

1527/373670-71

*The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

WASHINGTON, July 13, 1941—5:44 p. m.

URGENT

No. 2210 of July 13.

Received July 14—2:45 a. m.

For the State Secretary.

From the reports by agents regarding statements by Early and Willkie (cf. telegram No. 2146 of July 9<sup>1</sup> and No. 2165 of July 10<sup>2</sup>)

<sup>1</sup> This telegram (1527/373638-40) relayed reports from a "reliable source" regarding statements made by Early, President Roosevelt's Press Secretary, that "Roosevelt intended to occupy suddenly the Cape Verde Islands and Dakar within the next two weeks." Cf. document No. 133.

<sup>2</sup> This telegram (1527/373642-43) reported that Wendell Willkie, the Republican candidate for the Presidency in the 1940 election, told his friends about a recent conversation with President Roosevelt in the course of which the latter allegedly expressed his "firm resolution to bring about a state of war with Germany, and as early as possible at that."

as well as from other data, the following appraisal of American foreign policy after the occupation of Iceland may be made:

1. The President does not want a formal declaration of war on Germany because it would commit him irrevocably to a total effort. He still believes that he will be able to attain his goals, namely, the protection of the Western Hemisphere and the destruction of National Socialism without a full war effort of his own. He has intimated to the English that they will have to wage total war at the front alone.

2. This does not exclude Roosevelt's being determined to wage undeclared war. The frequent use of the expression "pirates" with respect to German air and naval forces indicates a tendency toward "shooting without declaration of war."

3. For this the President reserves for himself freedom of action even without asking Congress. The President on the basis of his powers is at any time in a position to take steps which place America de facto in a state of war, and with respect to which Congress has no other choice than to give its subsequent approval if he demands it. American history offers many such examples.

4. One must reckon with further operations after the fashion of the occupation of Iceland, possibly also in the Pacific. With respect to Portugal, too, the principle propounded by Hull applies that the inalienable right of self-defense has precedence over the respect for foreign territorial sovereignty.

THOMSEN

## No. 105

82/60316-19

*The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

Tokyo, July 14, 1941—2:30 a. m.

MOST URGENT

No. 1217 of July 13

Received July 14—11:20 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to your telegram No. 1018 of July 10,<sup>1</sup> received in Tokyo on July 12, 1941.

(1) With regard to Japan's present relations with the United States I wish to refer to my telegrams of July 10<sup>2</sup> and 12,<sup>3</sup> which crossed with your telegrams referred to above. Japanese-American relations are marked by increasing tension. Measures of economic strangulation by the United States against Japan, most recently in evidence in the breaking off of the Japanese-Netherlands Indies economic nego-

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 89.<sup>2</sup> Document No. 88.<sup>3</sup> Document No. 95.

tiations<sup>4</sup> at the instance of the Anglo-Saxons, have greatly aggravated the situation. Attempts of Anglophile Japanese circles still to try for a compromise are doomed to fail in view of the American attitude and the Japanese activists' growing determination to resist. In the circumstances I consider it improbable that there has been any secret oral assurance from the Japanese Government giving Roosevelt reinsurance and a free hand to occupy Iceland. However, the majority of the Japanese Cabinet and also the Japanese Foreign Minister view the possibility of America's entry into the war with marked concern, which is also expressed in point 5 of a "personal message" of July 11, from Matsuoka, which has presumably in the meantime been handed to the Foreign Minister by Ambassador Oshima.<sup>5</sup> As Matsuoka already stated in Berlin, the Japanese Government believes that the military conflict will be extremely long-drawn-out after an American entry into the war. Matsuoka is therefore most anxious to keep America from intervening actively, because he realizes that American offensive actions in the Atlantic will of necessity, as he fears, lead to the extension of the war to the Pacific. Japan, incidentally, is taking precautionary measures in the increasingly probable event of war with America. The Deputy Chief of Staff, Admiral Kondo, stated that Japan is discontinuing shipping to the East Coast of the United States and is also avoiding the Panama Canal as much as possible, so as to prevent seizure in case America enters the war. Shipping to the West Coast of the United States is being directed in such a way that an immediate withdrawal will be possible there too.

<sup>4</sup>Announcement of the breaking off of these negotiations which had begun in September 1940 in Batavia was made in Tokyo on June 18, following the "unsatisfactory reply" to the Japanese proposals in a memorandum of June 6 by the Netherlands delegation. Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. v, pp. 179-180.

<sup>5</sup>The message was conveyed to Ribbentrop in a telegram of July 12 (1007/307790-92) in which Matsuoka explained that he had originally assumed that his statements made to Ott on July 2 (see documents Nos. 63 and 64) constituted an adequate reply to Ribbentrop's message (document No. 53). He had now decided, however, to express his views to Ribbentrop directly.

He reiterated his conviction that Japan's policy had been clearly set forth in his statements of July 2 to Ott and proceeded to explain to Ribbentrop the difficulties arising from the absence of a strong central direction in Japanese policy. Assuring the German Foreign Minister that "my opinion regarding the future treatment of the Soviet Union remains the same as I stated it to Your Excellency in Berlin" Matsuoka then made the following statements in point 5 of his message, to which a reference is made in the document printed:

"In our conversations in Berlin Your Excellency as well as I clearly realized that our views regarding a possible participation in the war by the United States of America differ somewhat. Every day I pray to Heaven that the matter may turn out as your Excellency believes that it will; in my opinion, however, every conceivable step must now be taken to prevent America's entry into the war until the conclusion of the Russian campaign. Regarding later developments I am of the same opinion as your Excellency. The Japanese Government is making incessant efforts to attain this goal. But as the Foreign Minister of an allied state and as Your Excellency's good friend I would like to repeat that I am unable to suppress concern on this point because I believe that I know America to some extent. I would ask your Excellency to be so good as to convey this view of mine to the German Reich Chancellor. May we be sufficiently well armed, morally and materially, even in the most unfavorable case!"

(2) Regarding press reaction to the occupation of Iceland I refer to telegraphic report No. 1175 of July 9 and No. 1177 of July 10.<sup>6</sup> The occupation of Iceland is interpreted as an unequivocal step by the United States of America in the direction of entry into the war. In view of the statements made in point (1) above, I do not believe that the Japanese Government is striving to reach a compromise with America and tie the latter down in a long European war in order to have a free hand in East Asia. To be sure, Anglophiles and also Nationalists view the transfer of strong American naval units from the Pacific with relief, since they expect that the Indochina operation will as a result be carried out without hindrance. This operation, which Japan decided upon only after long consideration, demands at present the full attention of the Japanese leadership. I have learned confidentially that the instruction mentioned in my telegram No. 1181 of July 10<sup>7</sup> was sent on Saturday<sup>8</sup> to the Japanese Ambassador in Vichy, who will carry it out next week with the French Government. In the Army and Navy as well as in other activist circles it is firmly believed that Japan's position of power in East Asia can be made a reality only in opposition to the Anglo-Saxon powers. True, in these circles, too, one encounters the view that the further course of the war and the German successes will mean a weakening not only of the Soviet Union but also of the Anglo-Saxons in the Pacific to an ever-increasing degree. The main difficulty is to convince these circles again and again that further waiting will not be profitable for Japan.

(3) When the personal message of the Foreign Minister<sup>9</sup> was handed to Matsuoka on the evening of July 2, the conversation had assumed a serious character in view of the unsatisfactory content of the message addressed to Germany.<sup>10</sup> I considered it self-evident that Matsuoka, in keeping with the importance attributable to the Foreign Minister's personal message, would carefully discuss it with the Emperor and the Government and reply in detail. I therefore do not understand how Matsuoka, as stated in the introduction to his "personal message" to the Foreign Minister, could be of the opinion that no personal reply was expected. In my next conversation with Matsuoka, which took place on July 8,<sup>11</sup> I deliberately refrained from insisting on a reply, however, in order not to give the Japanese Government the mistaken impression that its participation in the German-Russian war, and even less so its aid, were indispensable. In view of

<sup>6</sup>Neither found.

<sup>7</sup>This telegram (83/60293-94) announced the impending presentation of the Japanese proposals in Vichy which are referred to in document No. 126.

<sup>8</sup>I.e. July 12.

<sup>9</sup>Document No. 53.

<sup>10</sup>See document No. 64.

<sup>11</sup>The only record of a Matsuoka-Ott conversation on July 8 is telegram No. 1171 of July 8 referred to in document No. 89, footnote 5.

the Japanese mentality this seemed to me tactically inadvisable. In the conversation on July 8, moreover, Matsuoka gave the distinct impression of being unsure of himself and nervous—which, I am told, was due to worries about his personal position. In accordance with instructions I will ask the Japanese Foreign Minister in our next conversation to tell me about the reaction of the Japanese Cabinet and the formation of the Cabinet to the personal message of the Foreign Minister [*um Mitteilung der Reaktion japanischen Kabinetts und Kabinettsbildung . . . ansprechen*]. I was able to ascertain today at the War Minister's,<sup>13</sup> where I had been invited, that the Foreign Minister's message has found wide support among army leaders, although it was emphasized that a certain period of preparation is necessary for intervention against the Soviet Union.

(4) With regard to the reports of the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow<sup>14</sup> I refer to my telegram No. 1207 of July 12.<sup>15</sup> In the meantime (group garbled) there are noticeable indications here that Japan is proceeding seriously with military mobilization measures. The Military Attaché<sup>16</sup> has reported on this in telegram No. 1200 of July 12.<sup>17</sup> Regarding Japan's attitude in the event of American aggressive action against one of the Axis Powers, I wish to refer to point 2 of my telegram No. 893 of June 6.<sup>18</sup>

I am trying to exert all the influence I can with Matsuoka personally, with the Foreign Ministry, the branches of the Armed Forces, the Nationalists, and friendly business circles, to bring about Japan's entry into the war against Russia as soon as possible, making use especially of the arguments in the personal message of the Foreign Minister and your above-mentioned telegram, and I believe, as indicated by the military preparations, that Japan's participation will come about in the foreseeable future.<sup>19</sup> The greatest obstacles which will have to be overcome in this connection are presented by the disunity among the activist group which, without unified leadership, pursues different goals and adjusts only slowly to the changed situation.

OTT

<sup>13</sup> Lt. Gen. Hideki Tojo.

<sup>14</sup> Yoshitsugu Tatekawa.

<sup>15</sup> In this telegram (105/113721) Ott reported that the Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister promised to instruct the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow to report currently on the questions taken up in Foreign Ministry telegram No. 1029 of July 11—Pol. 3512. The latter telegram has not been found.

<sup>16</sup> Colonel Kretschmer.

<sup>17</sup> Not printed (82/60300).

<sup>18</sup> Vol. XII of this series, document No. 596.

<sup>19</sup> In telegram No. 1248 of July 15 (82/60335) Ott reported that the Soviet Ambassador had called on Matsuoka on July 12 to inquire officially whether Japan's pact of neutrality with the Soviet Union would apply to the present war between Germany and the Soviet Union. Matsuoka had replied that it could not apply having been concluded at a time "when German-Russian relations had been substantially different."

## No. 106

278/178854-55

*The Legation in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 806 of July 14

Del. No. 15

BUDAPEST, July 14, 1941—10:15 a. m.

Received July 14—11:00 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to your No. 1203.<sup>1</sup>

According to the determination of the frontier which was agreed upon in Vienna and regarding which I informed King Boris on April 27 in accordance with the instruction of the Foreign Minister,<sup>2</sup> the chromium mine Jessorina falls within the Bulgarian territory. In order to make absolutely sure that the Jessorina mine belongs incontestably to Bulgaria and to avoid later frontier disputes, we have, precisely on account of this mine, made the line of the frontier deviate from the ridge of the Šar Planina north of Tetovo and to the west of Mount Ljuboten in a northwestern direction and drawn the line across the low ridge situated approximately 15 to 20 kilometers north of Mount Ljuboten toward the east to the railroad line and then further into the valley of the Black Morava.

A subsequent change in the line of the frontier would not only be in contradiction to the communication made to King Boris but would also represent a considerable economic disadvantage to Germany. The Jessorina mine is one of those mining enterprises, the exploitation of which has been left to us on the basis of the Protocol signed with the Bulgarian Foreign Minister on April 24.<sup>3</sup> Even prior to April 24 the Foreign Minister hinted to Count Ciano that we had special economic interests in the territory northwest of Skoplje. In the latest Berlin agreements with Italy of June 19<sup>4</sup> we conceded to the Italians the delivery of 7,000 tons of chromium from the area of Skoplje. In the negotiations regarding this matter it was quite clear that the Italians knew and expected that the chromium mines situated around Skoplje had become Bulgarian territory and would

<sup>1</sup> There is in the files only what appears to be an unnumbered draft copy of this telegram which was sent to Clodius in Budapest by the Foreign Minister's Secretariat on July 13 (93/103811). It informed Clodius of the dispute between Italy and Bulgaria regarding the Jessorina mine and requested his view as to whether it was to go to Italy or Bulgaria in accordance with the Vienna decisions of April 1941.

<sup>2</sup> See vol. XII of this series, documents Nos. 405 and 450.

<sup>3</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 393, footnote 3.

<sup>4</sup> This refers to the Eighth Secret Protocol of June 19 which with its annexes is filmed on 2033/445489-525. Cf. vol. XII of this series, document No. 652.

be administered by Germany, or that at least their production would be managed by Germany.<sup>5</sup>

CLODIUS  
ERDMANNSDORFF

<sup>5</sup> In a memorandum of July 14 (278/178856) Woermann recorded having been told by the Bulgarian Minister that the incident involving the Jesserina mine had been settled.

### No. 107

617/249975-76

*The Legation in Afghanistan to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

TOP SECRET  
No. 224 of July 12

KABUL, July 14, 1941—6:40 p. m.  
Received July 14—8:20 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 192 of June 21.<sup>1</sup>

Italian Counselor of Legation Anzilotti, who has returned from his trip to the Fakir,<sup>2</sup> reports basic willingness to intensify border fighting. This is dependent upon financial assistance in gold pounds, afghanis or rupees. Gold bars are less desirable.

After the first assistance to the Fakir in February 1941, whereby we and the Italians each paid 80,000 afghanis, the Fakir was promised 25,000 English pounds every 2 months; of this A[nzilotti] has already delivered 12,000 English pounds, of which we contributed 7,000; our assets today are 25,000 dollars, 11,445 gold pounds, and about 190,000 afghanis. The Italians possess no funds here at the moment, since the promised equivalent of 6,000,000 lire has not yet arrived.

A greater effort by the Fakir would have to be ordered at your end within the framework of other operations according to the time and extent desired. An auxiliary action, the effect of which requires time, was discussed by the Fakir with A. as follows:

For maintaining and intensifying the present petty hostilities, instead of 25,000 English pounds every 2 months, 300,000 rupees every month; for extension to further areas, double the amount of this; for a general border uprising, triple the amount. Providing arms and ammunition would release free money for winning over additional followers, who are now in the pay of the English and would fight for the Fakir under the same conditions. It is important in this connection that financial assistance begin at the earliest possi-

<sup>1</sup> Not found.

<sup>2</sup> The reference is to the Fakir of Ipi, religious leader of the Waziri tribe in the "independent zone" between India and Afghanistan. Cf. vol. XII of this series, documents Nos. 300 and 511.

ble moment, because recruiting and intensifying [hostilities] will require several months; therefore transfer to the Fakir now the remainder of the promised sum of 25,000 English pounds, equal to 13,000 in gold pounds and afghanis.

Please send as soon as possible the additional sums needed; paper pounds are also usable.

A suitable dropping point which was inspected by A. is being re-examined for air drop: English rifles and ammunition, tank guns, IMG [infantry machine guns] with antiaircraft equipment, hand grenades.

According to A., the Fakir welcomes temporary detailing of a radio operator for instruction, also two additional Europeans. The Fakir allegedly has no connection with the Russians; nor, supposedly, are there any Europeans with him. A German agent in Baluchistan reported that the local police are alerted; it is questionable whether they are strong.

The Kabul area is under the strictest surveillance at the moment, presumably as a result of A.'s trip having become known. Since July 9 gasoline consumption has been limited to 3 gallons per car per day.

RASMUSS  
PILGER

### No. 108

6115/E295536-37

*Memorandum by Dr. Karl Megerle*

BERLIN, July 14, 1941.

BRIEF FOR THE FOREIGN MINISTER

The occupation of Iceland by the USA, the further designs on Ireland, the Spanish and Portuguese islands in the Atlantic and also on Dakar permit us now to make the struggle against England and American aggression a European issue and to develop the concept of a European Monroe Doctrine. In this way the connection between the anti-Bolshevist and the anti-English aspects of the present struggle can be established. In making use of this in propaganda it will be advisable to proceed only gradually in order to get the European states which are outside the sphere of the Tripartite Pact slowly used to this line. With respect to the Nordic sector (Scandinavia) the emphasis will have to be more on the attack against Iceland, with respect to the Latin [*Lateinischen*] states (Spain, Portugal, and France) on the danger for their outlying possessions. The necessary slogans and data must be furnished first of all and

primarily by the press and public opinion of the regions directly concerned and then be taken up by Germany and her friends.<sup>1</sup> A further important bridge between the anti-Bolshevist and the anti-Anglo-Saxon sector of the struggle for the defense of Europe is formed by the Anglo-Soviet alliance which is now complete and with regard to which it is to be insinuated that Europe has already been promised by England to Bolshevism as its spoils of victory.

Submitted to Minister Dr. Schmidt for his information and with the request that this be forwarded to the Foreign Minister.<sup>2</sup>

MEGERLE

<sup>1</sup> Marginal note in Ribbentrop's handwriting: "Yes".

<sup>2</sup> Marginal note "Submitted to the Foreign Minister. I have issued to the German press this line as its guide line as early as the end of last week. Dr. Schmidt, July 14."

The text of a directive along similar lines for the guidance of the German press in dealing with the United States was sent by Schmidt to the Embassy in Italy in telegram Multex 484 of July 12 (4865/E248873-74).

## No. 109

205/142807

*The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Sweden*

Telegram

RAM 315/R SPECIAL TRAIN, July 14, 1941.  
Foreign Ministry Code Received Berlin, July 15—3:00 a. m.  
Room No. 664  
No. 1303 from the Foreign Ministry Sent July 15.

With reference to your telegram No. 869.<sup>1</sup> For the Minister personally as well as for Minister Schnurre.

Please decline in a friendly way the offer of the Government there to detail a group of Swedish officers to the German Wehrmacht:

The Reich Government expressed sincere thanks for this offer, of which it has taken cognizance with pleasure. It is of the opinion, however, that since the Swedish officers, unlike the officers coming from other countries, would not command any volunteer cadres of their

<sup>1</sup> This telegram of July 7 (205/142799-800) reported that the question of volunteers had been discussed by Major General von Uthmann with the Swedish military and by Wied and Schnurre with the Foreign Minister. The plan was produced that Sweden send a group of selected officers, possibly one general, one colonel, and several ranging from lieutenant colonel to lieutenant, and including some General Staff officers and some from the Air Force. At such time as Germany would suggest, they would be released from the Swedish armed forces and allowed actively to participate in German units in the war against Russia. On the part of the Swedish military it was suggested that they be committed on the sector of the front south of the Gulf of Finland which would insure their employment over a considerable time. The Swedish Government, on the other hand, had determined to restrict the participation of Swedish volunteers to the Finnish armed forces.

own, they would not have any real sphere of activity and therefore would come into a somewhat difficult situation.

We believed that the Swedish officers would feel this themselves and therefore would request that they not be sent, much as we would have appreciated Swedish participation per se.<sup>2</sup>

RIBBENTROP

<sup>2</sup> See, further, document No. 270.

## No. 110

386/211230-31

*The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat*

Telegram

No. 669 of July 15 SPECIAL TRAIN, July 15, 1941—7:30 p. m.  
Received Berlin, July 15—8:45 p. m.

For Ambassador Abetz personally.

For the immediate future, please fashion your policy in France as follows:

1. The question of the shipments, etc., via Bizerte is important to us. Please see to it, therefore, that the agreements reached with the French on this question<sup>1</sup> are kept and that the shipments can start as soon as possible. Please check the attempts of M. Darlan to delay on this question in view of the case of Syria. We are not in a position to make any more concessions than we have already made.

2. Furthermore I ask that, until further notice, you treat all other pending questions in a dilatory manner and confine yourself to constant observation of further developments both in internal French matters as well as of the relations of France to England and America, and to reporting on them.

3. A meeting between Darlan and me is inopportune at the present time. It is possible that this might be advantageous in the foreseeable future, but as yet it is impossible to tell. I cannot at this time accede to Darlan's suggestion for the conclusion of a political protocol,<sup>2</sup> regarding whose contents you have reported nothing, but I should like first to await the conclusion of the Russian campaign before making further decisions with regard to France.

RIBBENTROP

<sup>1</sup> In telegram No. 2057 of July 9 (386/211194) Schleier reported the conclusion of a protocol for implementation of the agreement regarding supplies via Tunisia.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 113.



## No. 111

1200/331628-30

*State Secretary Weizsäcker to Reichsleiter Rosenberg*

JULY 15, 1941.

Pers. 2658 g.

DEAR REICHSLEITER: With reference to the conversation which we had on July 8<sup>1</sup> concerning the future treatment of the questions of the new eastern European areas of occupation, I should like once more to clarify below the standpoint of the Foreign Ministry in summary, on the basis of the instruction issued me by the Foreign Minister.<sup>2</sup> In so doing I should like to state at the outset as a principle that the authority given to you applies to the internal administration of the occupied eastern European areas, and that in case questions should arise regarding these areas, which are to be taken with the governments of third countries, the Foreign Ministry has exclusive responsibility for them.

For the rest I should like to make the following comment on the questions which we discussed:

1. The question of how the eastern European areas of occupation are to be politically constituted in the further course of events affects the entire foreign policy of the Reich to such a degree that the Foreign Minister can never disinterest himself from it. He must therefore reserve the right at any time to intervene in the questions connected with this in order to report on them directly to the Führer. The Foreign Minister therefore expects that you will keep him regularly informed concerning the developments in these areas on account of their connection with the over-all formation of our foreign policy.

2. The function of the representatives of the Foreign Ministry with the Reich Commissars, in addition to their activity in local questions involving foreign policy and the propaganda work directed to third countries regarding the future political shape of the individual eastern European areas, consists in reporting to the Foreign Ministry on the internal developments in these areas, to the extent that they are important for the future foreign relations of the Reich with the new political structures. Thus, their activity in this respect is purely as observers. The representatives do not have the task of themselves exerting active influence on the internal developments.

3. As regards the question of who is to appoint the representatives of the Foreign Ministry, it is quite self-evident that as representatives of the Foreign Ministry they cannot be appointed by another authority, but only by the Foreign Minister himself. It is just as self-evident that as representatives of the Foreign Ministry they can receive

instructions only from the Foreign Minister, and that they have to address their reports to him. As a special concession the Foreign Minister has agreed that the representatives of the Foreign Ministry with the Reich Commissars in the eastern European areas of occupation shall give the Reich Commissars carbon copies of each of their reports, which is not done by the Foreign Ministry representatives in the other areas of occupation.

Finally, the Foreign Minister has instructed me to tell you the following: He has reported to the Führer on the matter in the last few days. The Führer has stated that the Foreign Minister, of course, could send a Foreign Ministry representative to each Reich Commissar, as it had done in The Hague, in Belgrade, etc. The representatives of the Foreign Ministry at these last-named places, who are naturally appointed by the Foreign Minister, receive their instructions exclusively from him and report to the Foreign Ministry without submitting copies of their reports to the authorities to which they are attached. I may therefore assume that these questions can now be regarded as having been definitively settled, also as regards the representatives of the Foreign Ministry with the Reich Commissars in the eastern European areas of occupation, with the provision that the Foreign Minister will keep the promise he made as a concession that copies will be given to the Reich Commissars.<sup>3</sup>

Heil Hitler!

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>1</sup> According to a memorandum by Weizsäcker of Aug. 28 (34/24839-41) the Foreign Ministry did not receive a reply from Rosenberg; Weizsäcker then discussed the matter with Rosenberg's permanent deputy, Gauleiter Meyer, on Aug. 15 and 28. In these discussions certain principles were formulated regarding the position of the Foreign Ministry and its representatives with the Ministry of Occupied Eastern Territories, which were to be submitted to Ribbentrop and Rosenberg for their approval. See, further, document No. 277.

[EDITORS' NOTE. On July 15 Hitler received Ambassador Oshima at his field headquarters in the east. Hewel's memorandum of this conversation of July 15 on the film of files of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat (F7/0137-20) is only partly legible. From the legible portions of this document it appears that Hitler spoke at length about the German campaign against the Soviet Union and then urged Japan to participate in the annihilation of Russia.]

<sup>2</sup> Weizsäcker's memorandum of July 8 (1200/331623-25) records this conversation which dealt primarily with the position of the representatives of the Foreign Ministry with respect to the administrative authorities in the occupied eastern areas.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram No. 665 of July 14, sent from the Special Train on July 15 (1200/331626-27). The document printed follows verbatim the text of this instruction.

## No. 112

233/156560

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Argentina*

Telegram

No. 847

BERLIN, July 16, 1941—5:20 p. m.  
zu Pol. II 489 g. Rs.<sup>1</sup> Ang. II.

For the Ambassador.

With reference to your telegram No. 1068 of July 5.<sup>2</sup>

I agree with your attitude toward the opinion of the Argentine Foreign Minister regarding the war situation. You can point out to the Minister the new manifestation of Roosevelt's aggressive and provocative policy demonstrated in the meantime in the case of Iceland.<sup>3</sup> With this the President admits quite openly that he wants war and not peace. I suggest a friendly word for the Argentine Foreign Minister, whose understanding attitude is known also in Berlin. Please, however, do not touch on the idea of the possible good offices of the Argentine Government.

RIBBENTROP

<sup>1</sup> Pol. II 489 g. Rs. : Not found.<sup>2</sup> Document No. 73.<sup>3</sup> Document No. 102.

## No. 113

F10/460-478

*Memorandum for the Führer*

WESTFALEN, July 16, 1941.

The enclosed communication of the French Government was delivered to the Embassy in Paris and forwarded to Ambassador Abetz,<sup>1</sup> who is now in Berlin. He transmitted it to me yesterday by teletype.

I have instructed the Ambassador, subject to the Führer's approval, to go back to Paris immediately and return the communication to the French Government with the oral comment that the communication indicated a complete misconception of France's position as a nation defeated by Germany, and that he, Ambassador Abetz, was therefore unable to transmit the communication to his Government.

<sup>1</sup> Paris telegram No. 2101 of July 14 (386/211214-224) transmitted the text of the French note as printed below except for the last section, beginning with "The Government of the Reich and the Italian Government make the following declaration to the French Government . . ."

The telegram also contains a version of the German draft armistice agreement (less article 22) in Syria of July 12 (386/211224-228), the French text of which is printed in *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. iv, pp. 627-30.

I believe it is necessary to put an end once and for all to these naïve French attempts at blackmail.

R[IBBENTROP]

[Enclosure]

NOTE VERBALE<sup>2</sup>

VICHY, July 14, 1941.

In pursuance of the conversation of May 11, 1941, at Berchtesgaden,<sup>3</sup> three protocols concerning the Levant, Tunisia, and French Africa, respectively, were signed by Ambassador Abetz and by General Warlimont as the representative of the High Command of the Armed Forces on the one hand, and Admiral Darlan, Vice President of the Council of Ministers on the other.<sup>4</sup>

These protocols, which referred to the military assistance which France, should the occasion arise, could give to Germany in her war against England, were drawn up in the course of a series of political conversations, and their practical implementation was explicitly made contingent on, first: "the prior reinforcement of our military defenses in Africa"; and, second: the granting of a certain number of political and economic concessions capable of justifying, in the eyes of French public opinion, the possibility of an armed conflict with England and the United States, which might result from the said protocols.

Trusting in the prompt conclusion of the political negotiations promised by Ambassador Abetz, and satisfied with the military reinforcement of our defense resources in Tunisia granted by the OKW the French Government felt on May 28 that it was in a position to assume immediately the risk that might result from the concessions it had made regarding Bizerte.

Since the signing of the protocols, however, new circumstances outside French control have unfortunately changed the existing situation, giving rise to an exchange of letters of June 17 and 19, 1941,<sup>5</sup> between General Vogl, President of the German Armistice Commission and Delegate of the OKW, and Baron Benoist-Méchin, State Secretary with the Vice-President of the Council of Ministers and delegate of Admiral Darlan.

According to the text of this exchange of letters, General Vogl stated explicitly "that the military conversations had the character of

<sup>2</sup> Marginal note by Ribbentrop: "[For] F[ührer]."

The French text of this note verbale, except for the draft declaration (see p. 149), has been found among the personal papers of Abetz as part of his memorandum of July 1, 1943 (P3/P150-165). See *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. iv, p. 564, footnote 3.

<sup>3</sup> See vol. xii of this series, documents Nos. 490 and 491.<sup>4</sup> See vol. xii of this series, document No. 559.<sup>5</sup> Not found; see, however, Jean-Louis Aujol, *Le Procès Benoist-Méchin* (Paris, 1948), p. 238.

preliminary explorations and that the entry into force of the two agreements was reserved for a later date."

Acknowledging General Vogl's declaration, Baron Benoist-Méchin replied:

"I thank you very much for confirming to me that these provisional conversations had an exploratory character and that the date for the entry into force of these two agreements will be determined later in consultation with the French Government."

What are the new factors which have entered the picture since May 28 to change the general situation?

- (1) The English attack on Syria.
- (2) The attitude of increased hostility toward France demonstrated by England.
- (3) The deadlock in the political conversations which formed the framework for the military protocols.

In order to give a clear and absolutely unequivocal picture of the situation in which the French Government finds itself at the present moment, it appears appropriate to examine each of these three factors individually:

1. The English attack on Syria.

The English attack on Syria, which was launched on the pretense that the French Government had extended assistance to the German Air Force operating in Iraq, has had the following consequences:

*a.* The French Government was compelled to transfer from Algeria and Tunisia certain defense forces and equipment needed for Syria, and thus correspondingly to weaken its military potential in North Africa.

*b.* France has lost one of the most valuable territories of her empire, without having been compensated for this loss by any tangible advantage.

*c.* French public opinion has become aware of the disastrous consequences which the French Government's policy of aid to Germany could have for the empire if the resulting operations lack sufficient military and psychological preparation.

*d.* The contradiction which exists between a policy which must lead France to fight in widely separated parts of her empire, and the fact that France is at the present moment subject to an armistice regime designed to put her out of action, has been brought home to the French Government with great clarity.

*e.* An armed conflict between England and France is being provoked without France having received an explicit declaration from the Reich Government that the fact of France's fighting with Germany's principal enemy has brought about a fundamental change in the German-French statute [*Statut*].

2. The attitude of increased hostility of England and the United States toward France.

This hostility, brought on by the heroic opposition of our troops in Syria, the failure of the English de Gaullist propaganda, and the French Government's perseverance in the policy it had determined upon, has manifested itself in a series of actions and statements by the leading Anglo-American statesmen, namely:

*a.* Mr. Winston Churchill's address before the House of Commons, in which he stated that England, "in the desire to conquer the enemy wherever he is to be found, would not limit herself to attacking only areas actually occupied by German forces, but would also attack all areas which the British Government assumed might be taken over by German forces."<sup>6</sup> The declaration seems to forecast a series of preventive attacks which would have the purpose of counteracting actual or presumed German military plans.

*b.* Various speeches by President Roosevelt (May 28, July 10, 1941,<sup>7</sup> etc.), which defined the American designs on Dakar and the Atlantic coast of the African continent.

*c.* The increased military preparations of the English in their various possessions on the west coast of Africa.

It is evident from the foregoing that the execution of the military operations envisaged in Protocols No. 2 and 3 of May 28 would involve infinitely greater hazards today than at the time of the signing of the protocols in question and for the following reasons:

(1) The withdrawals, especially in the field of aviation, effected to strengthen the defense of Syria have weakened our defense resources in North Africa.

(2) The operations in the east now begun by the bulk of the Wehrmacht—though there can be no doubt as to the outcome—have nevertheless compelled the German General Staff for the moment to strip the occupied French territories of aircraft and antiaircraft weapons, rendering these areas, the French cities and factories, infinitely more vulnerable to the incursions of the Royal Air Force; what is more, this at the very moment when these factories were starting to manufacture war material for the account of the Reich.<sup>8</sup>

(3) The several declarations by Messrs. Churchill and Roosevelt make it impossible any longer to view the operations in Tunisia, French West Africa, and French Equatorial Africa as isolated actions. Rather, they must be looked upon as one operation, because the execution of only a part of the protocols in question must, with virtual certainty, provoke a reaction by the Anglo-Americans in other, sometimes very distant parts of the French Empire.

In fact, it may be expected that the counterblow to Bizerte will be struck, not against this port, but against Dakar and French Equatorial

<sup>6</sup> The date and place of this speech have not been found. A similar statement was made by Eden on May 22, 1941. For text, see the *New York Times*, May 23, 1941, p. 4, col. 3.

<sup>7</sup> The dates of the President's radio address and his message to Congress were May 27 and July 7, respectively. For the texts, see Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1941, vol. iv, p. 647 and vol. v, p. 15.

<sup>8</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 559, footnote 9.

Africa. There are not two problems: Bizerte and Dakar; there is only one single problem: Africa. The whole of French Africa, i.e., the most important part of our empire by far, is thus threatened with becoming involved in an armed conflict with the English land, air, and naval forces.

3. The deadlock in the political conversations which form the framework for the military protocols.

The German-French negotiations have since May 28 not kept pace with the military events, despite certain minor concessions, the value of which the French Government certainly does not fail to recognize, and have to this date produced no results capable "of justifying in the eyes of French public opinion the possibility of an armed conflict with England and the United States." This conflict today, however, is no longer a mere potentiality; it has actually broken out in Syria.

For all of these reasons, the French Government, on July 8, 1941, addressed itself to the Reich Government to request a new meeting between Admiral Darlan and the Reich Foreign Minister.<sup>9</sup>

Admiral Darlan intended in the course of this conversation to discuss with Herr von Ribbentrop the new problems that had arisen since the conference of May 11, 1941, in order to adapt the common course of action of the two Governments accordingly and enable France to take another step forward on the path of German-French collaboration.

It has been impossible to date to hold this meeting, and the French Government submits to the compelling reasons which have prompted the German Government to postpone it.<sup>10</sup> The French Government believes, however, that it is not in the interest of either the Reich or France to precipitate an operation in Africa with all the hazards it involves without careful military preparation and a drastic change in the political climate; for these two conditions are essential for carrying such an operation to its conclusion with every chance of success.

The views of the French Government on the nature and the purpose of this change of climate are presented in an appended note,<sup>11</sup> which will be delivered to Ambassador Abetz simultaneously with the present documents.

Conscious of the obligations imposed by the policy which it has traced for itself, and by which it intends to abide without reservation and equivocation, but conscious also of the responsibilities it assumes with this policy toward both the French nation and the Reich, the French Government therefore has the honor to repeat its request in the hope that a conference of this nature, from which it anticipates the best results, may take place in the very near future and enable it to proceed immediately to the implementation of the military protocols,

the preliminary study of which has already been completed and with regard to the modalities of which the French and German military experts have already reached agreement.

#### APPENDIX

France has made it a point of honor to carry out in an irreproachable manner all of the clauses of the Armistice, with which the names of Mers-el-Kebir<sup>12</sup> and Dakar<sup>13</sup> will forever be associated.

On October 24, 1940, at Montoire Marshal Pétain adopted the policy of collaboration which Reich Chancellor Hitler had proposed to him.<sup>14</sup>

This collaboration has been strengthened progressively until it has brought France into conflict with her former ally. The continued development of this policy carries with it the risk that the hitherto localized and intermittent attacks by Great Britain will develop into a general war with the attendant destruction and suffering.

The prospect of these new ordeals, in which the French Army, the French Air Force, and the French Navy will find opportunities, as in Syria, to demonstrate their traditional valor, will not deflect the French Government from the path which it has taken consciously and of its free will.

This prospect, however, imposes on it new obligations and new responsibilities toward the French nation as well as toward Germany.

If the French Government addresses itself today to the German Government, it does so in order to be in a position to assume these obligations and these responsibilities.

The French Government would incur a grave responsibility with respect to the French nation if it were to involve its people in a new war without having the assurance that such a policy, inspired by the great French traditions, which are both European and hostile to British imperialism, provides the only means to restore France to her place in the community of the great nations. The French Government would incur no less a responsibility toward Germany if it did not in all candor indicate the moral and material conditions on which, in its view, depend the efficacy of its political and military actions.

So that France may in honor fulfill the mission to which she has been called, it is first of all necessary that all the moral forces of the country be united. This unification can be achieved only if all citizens are unanimous in their faith that the destinies of France and Europe are henceforward united. The Government has the will and

<sup>9</sup> Document No. 82 and footnote 4.

<sup>10</sup> See document No. 110.

<sup>11</sup> See the Appendix printed on p. 147.

<sup>12</sup> See vol. x of this series, document No. 93.

<sup>13</sup> See vol. xi of this series, document No. 92.

<sup>14</sup> See vol. xi of this series, document No. 227.

the certainty of achieving this accord if it is given the possibility of acting without hindrance, and if Germany and Italy will give precise promises and hopes that will reassure French patriotism. In the military sphere, the reconstructed French Army, Air Force, and Navy must be enabled in the common interest of Europe and France not only to fight heroically against the British forces, as they did at Mers-el-Kebir and in Syria, but also as at Dakar, to triumph over them.

Finally, French policy must have the value of an example on the international plane and so convert the still undecided countries to the European order, thereby depriving of their foundation any potential coalitions likely to form about Great Britain.

None of these results can be achieved at the present stage of the Franco-German relations prescribed by the Armistice of June 22, 1940.<sup>15</sup> The policy of collaboration may lead France to a point where she would have to wage war everywhere. But she cannot do this under an armistice regime, the very object of which is to render her impotent.

The armistice treaties currently in force actually block the exercise of French sovereignty and in an even greater measure the use of French military strength.

For all these reasons they appear no longer compatible, in either letter or spirit, with the new tasks of which France believes she has proved herself worthy, through the loyalty of her leaders and the bravery of her soldiers. While the present situation does not imperil the spiritual unity of the state, and while, in particular, the Government, as it has shown, has remained the master of its political decisions, nevertheless, apart from this, the situation created by the Armistice prevents it from affirming this freedom with sufficient force and detracts from the moral and material value of its actions both at home and in the international field.

In consideration of these statements, the French Government which, in view of the marked hostility on the part of Great Britain, deems itself henceforth freed from any obligation toward that country, and fully conscious of France's own mission in Europe and the world, requests the opening of negotiations with the German and Italian Governments.

In the opinion of the French Government, these negotiations should aim at an immediate and definitive settlement of certain vital questions, and at replacing the armistice regime by a regime founded on the sovereignty of the French State and a loyal collaboration by France with Germany and Italy.

<sup>15</sup> Vol. IX of this series, document No. 523.

The Government of the Reich and the Italian Government make the following declaration to the French Government:<sup>16</sup>

If France, as a result of the Anglo-American attack on French North Africa, will participate with all the resources at her command in the war against England and the United States and in the European war of liberation against Bolshevism on the side of the Axis Powers, they will give France the following assurance:

1. France shall retain her territorial possessions in Europe in accordance with the status of 1914.

2. France shall retain her colonial possessions in Africa. Certain changes which within the framework of the final settlement of the entire African colonial situation should also be necessary in the French colonial possessions, among others, shall be equalized by the Axis Powers by compensations of at least equal value.

<sup>16</sup> This draft declaration follows the Appendix to the French note without any further comments or notations. The French text is filmed on F10/480. In the Abetz Memorandum of July 1, (see footnote 2) the Appendix to the French note closes with this sentence: "In the opinion of the French Government this new regime could be established on the following principles:" This is followed by: a draft of a provisional treaty between Germany, Italy, and France; a secret draft protocol; a French declaration joining the Tripartite Pact; a joint declaration by the German and Italian Governments, and by a draft of a revision of the Armistice conditions (P3/P160-165).

## No. 114

Nuremberg Document 221-L

### *Unsigned Memorandum*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, July 16, 1941.

Bo/Fu.

A conference attended by Reichsleiter Rosenberg, Reich Minister Lammers, Field Marshal Keitel, the Reichsmarschall, and me was held today by order of the Führer at 3:00 p. m. in his quarters. The conference began at 3:00 p. m. and, including a break for coffee, lasted until about 8:00 p. m.

By way of introduction the Führer emphasized that he wished first of all to make some basic statements. Various measures were now necessary; this was confirmed, among other events, by an assertion made in an impudent Vichy newspaper that the war against the Soviet Union was Europe's war and that therefore, it had to be conducted for Europe as a whole. Apparently the Vichy paper meant to say by these hints that it ought not to be the Germans alone who benefited from this war, but that all European states ought to benefit from it.

<sup>1</sup> The document is from the files of Martin Bormann. The text is printed in *Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal*, vol. xxxviii, U.S. Exhibit 317, pp. 86-94, and in English translation in *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, vol. vii, pp. 1086-1093.

It was essential that we not proclaim our aims before the whole world; also this was not necessary, but the chief thing was that we ourselves know what we wanted. In no case should our own way be made more difficult by superfluous declarations. Such declarations were superfluous because we could do everything wherever we had the power, and what was beyond our power we would not be able to do anyway.

What we told the world about the motives for our measures ought to be conditioned, therefore, by tactical reasons. We ought to proceed here in exactly the same way as we did in the cases of Norway, Denmark, Holland, and Belgium. In these cases too we said nothing about our aims, and if we were clever we would continue in the same way.

We shall then emphasize again that we were forced to occupy, administer, and secure a certain area; it was in the interest of the inhabitants that we provide order, food, traffic, etc., hence our measures. It should not be recognizable that thereby a final settlement is being initiated! We can nevertheless take all necessary measures—shooting, resettling, etc.—and we shall take them.

But we do not want to make any people into enemies prematurely and unnecessarily. Therefore we shall act as though we wanted to exercise a mandate only. It must be clear to us, however, that we shall never withdraw from these areas.

Accordingly we should act:

1. To do nothing which might obstruct the final settlement, but to prepare for it only in secret;
2. To emphasize that we are liberators.

In particular:

The Crimea has to be evacuated by all foreigners and to be settled by Germans only.

In the same way the former Austrian part of Galicia will become Reich territory.

Our relations with Rumania are presently good, but one does not know what our relations will be at any future time. This we have to consider and we have to draw our frontiers accordingly. One ought not to be dependent on the good will of other people; we have to arrange our relations with Rumania in accordance with this principle.

In principle we have now to face the task of cutting up the giant cake according to our needs, in order to be able: first, to dominate it; second, to administer it; and third, to exploit it.

The Russians have now given an order for partisan warfare behind our front. This partisan war again has some advantage for us; it enables us to exterminate everyone who opposes us.

Principles:

Never again must it be possible to create a military power west of the Urals, even if we have to wage war for a hundred years in order to attain this goal. All successors of the Führer must know: Security for the Reich exists only if there are no foreign military forces west of the Urals; it is Germany who undertakes the protection of this area against all possible dangers. Our iron principle must be and must remain:

*We must never permit anybody but the Germans to carry arms!*

This is especially important; even when it seems easier at first to enlist the armed support of foreign, subjugated nations, it is wrong to do so. This will prove some day to be to our disadvantage absolutely and unavoidably. Only the German may carry arms, not the Slav, not the Czech, not the Cossack, nor the Ukrainian!

On no account should we apply a wavering policy such as was done in Alsace before 1918. What distinguishes the Englishman is his constant and consistent following of *one* line and *one* aim. In this respect we must absolutely learn from the Englishman. Therefore we ought never to base our actions on individual contemporary personalities; here again the conduct of the British in India towards the Indian princes, etc., ought to be an example: It is always the soldier who has to consolidate the regime!

We have to create a Garden of Eden in the newly won eastern territories; they are vitally important to us; as compared with them colonies play only an entirely subordinate part.

Even if we divide up certain areas at once, we shall always proceed in the role of protectors of the Right and of the population. The terms which are necessary at this time should be selected in accordance with this principle: We shall not speak of new Reich territory, but of the task which became necessary because of the war.

In particular:

In the Baltic territory the country up to the Düna will now have to be administered in agreement with Field Marshal Keitel.

Reichsleiter Rosenberg emphasizes that in his opinion a different treatment of the population is desirable in every Commissariat. In the Ukraine we should start with attention to cultural matters; there we ought to awaken the historical consciousness of the Ukrainians, establish a university at Kiev, and the like.

The Reichsmarschall on the other hand states that we have to think first of securing our food supply; everything else can come later.

(Incidental question: Is there still anything like an educated stratum in the Ukraine, or do upper class Ukrainians exist only as emigrants outside present day Russia?)

Rosenberg continues, also in the Ukraine certain efforts toward independence should be encouraged.

The Reichsmarschall asks the Führer to indicate what areas had been promised to other states.

The Führer replies, Antonescu desired Bessarabia and Odessa with a strip (of land) leading west-northwest from Odessa.<sup>2</sup>

Upon objections made by the Reichsmarschall and Rosenberg, the Führer replies that the new frontiers desired by Antonescu contained little outside the old Rumanian frontiers.

The Führer stresses furthermore that nothing definite had been promised to the Hungarians, Turks, and Slovaks.

The Führer then submits for consideration whether the former Austrian part of Galicia ought to be added immediately to the General Government; upon objections being voiced the Führer decides that this part shall not be added to the General Government but shall only be placed at the same time under Reich Minister Frank (Lwów).

The Reichsmarschall considers it right to assign East Prussia several parts of the Baltic region, e.g., the Forest of Bialystok.

The Führer emphasizes that the entire Baltic area must become Reich territory.

Likewise the Crimea, including a considerable hinterland (the area north of the Crimea) must become Reich territory; the hinterland must be as large as possible.

Rosenberg had misgivings about this because of the Ukrainians living there.

(Incidentally: It appeared several times that Rosenberg has a soft spot for the Ukrainians; thus he wishes to enlarge the former Ukraine to a considerable extent.)

The Führer emphasizes further that the Volga colony too will have to become Reich territory, also the district around Baku; the latter will have to become a German concession (military colony).

The Finns wanted East Carelia,<sup>3</sup> but the Kola Peninsula should come to Germany because of the large nickel mines there.

The annexation of Finland as a federated state should be prepared with great caution. The area around Leningrad is wanted by the Finns; the Führer will raze Leningrad to the ground and then hand it over to the Finns.<sup>4</sup>

There ensues a rather long discussion as to the qualifications of Gauleiter Lohse,<sup>5</sup> who has been considered by Rosenberg as Governor of the Baltic area. Rosenberg emphasizes again and again that he had approached Lohse already and it would be very embarrassing if

<sup>2</sup> For Hitler's discussions with Antonescu regarding Rumania's territorial aspirations to Soviet Russian territory, see vol. XII of this series, document No. 614. Cf. document No. 159.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. vol. XII of this series, document No. 592 and footnote 3.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 388 and footnote 1.

<sup>5</sup> Hinrich Lohse, Gauleiter of Schleswig-Holstein.

Lohse were not appointed; for the western part of the Baltic country Kube<sup>6</sup> was to be appointed, but subordinated to Lohse; for the Ukraine Rosenberg proposes Sauckel.<sup>7</sup>

The Reichsmarschall, however, emphasized the most important criteria which for the time being must be exclusively decisive for us: securing of food supplies, and as far as necessary, of the economy; securing of the roads, etc.

The Reichsmarschall emphasizes that Koch<sup>8</sup> should either be considered for the Baltic area because he knew it very well, or that Koch should receive the Ukraine because Koch was the person with the greatest initiative and with the best training.

The Führer asked whether Kube could not be appointed as Reich Commissar for the Moscow area; Rosenberg and the Reichsmarschall both thought that Kube was too old for this position.

Upon further representations Rosenberg replied he was afraid that Koch might soon refuse to obey his (Rosenberg's) instructions; Koch had, by the way, said this himself.

As against that the Reichsmarschall pointed out that it was after all not possible for Rosenberg to guide every step of the appointees; rather these people had to work quite independently.

For the Caucasus area Rosenberg proposed his Stabsleiter, Schickedanz. He emphasized time and again that Schickedanz certainly would fulfill his task very well, a statement which is doubted by the Reichsmarschall.

Rosenberg then stated Lutze<sup>9</sup> had proposed to him to appoint several SA leaders, namely Scheppmann for Kiev; Manthey, Dr. Bennecke, and Litzmann for Estonia; and Burgomaster Dr. Drexler for Latvia.

The Führer has no objections to the employment of the SA leaders.

Rosenberg then states he had received a letter from Ribbentrop who desired the participation of the Foreign Ministry;<sup>10</sup> but he asked the Führer to state that the internal organization of the newly acquired areas was no concern of the Foreign Ministry. The Führer absolutely shares this view. For the time being it will suffice for the Foreign Ministry to appoint a liaison officer to Reichsleiter Rosenberg.

The Führer emphasizes that the Ukraine will undoubtedly be the most important district for the next 3 years. Therefore it would be best to appoint Koch there; if Sauckel were to be employed it would be better to use him in the Baltic area.

<sup>6</sup> Wilhelm Kube, former Oberpräsident and Gauleiter of Brandenburg.

<sup>7</sup> Fritz Sauckel, Gauleiter of Thuringia.

<sup>8</sup> Erich Koch, Gauleiter of East Prussia.

<sup>9</sup> Viktor Lutze, Chief of Staff of the SA.

<sup>10</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 649, footnote 6.

Rosenberg further states that he intends to appoint Schmeer, Selzner, and Manderbach as Commissars in the Moscow area. The Führer desires that Holz be employed too, and that the former Gauleiter Frauenfeld should be placed in charge of administration of the Crimea.

Rosenberg states he intends also to employ Captain von Petersdorff because of his special merits; general consternation, general rejection. The Führer and the Reichsmarschall both insist that without doubt von Petersdorff is insane.

Rosenberg states furthermore that the employment of the Burgomaster of Stuttgart, Strölin, has been proposed to him. There were no objections.

Since Kube is considered too old for the Moscow district by both the Reichsmarschall and Rosenberg, Kasche is to take over this district.

(Memorandum for Party Comrade Klopfer:

Please ask Dr. Meyer<sup>11</sup> *at once* for the files concerning the plans for the future organization and the intended appointments.)

The Reichsmarschall emphasizes he intended to assign to Gauleiter Terboven<sup>12</sup> the exploitation of the Kola Peninsula; the Führer agrees.

The Führer emphasizes that Lohse, provided he feels equal to this task, should take over the Baltic area; Kasche Moscow; Koch the Ukraine; Frauenfeld the Crimea; Terboven Kola; and Schickedanz the Caucasus.

Reichsleiter Rosenberg then broached the question of providing for the security of the administration.

The Führer tells the Reichsmarschall and the Field Marshal that he had always urged that the police regiments be provided with armored cars; this has proved to be most necessary for police operations within the newly-occupied eastern territories, because a police regiment equipped with the appropriate number of armored cars of course could perform much service. Otherwise though, the Führer pointed out the security protection was very thin. However, the Reichsmarschall was going to transfer all his training fields to the new territories, and if necessary even Junker 52's could drop bombs in case of riots. Naturally this giant area would have to be pacified as quickly as possible; the best solution was to shoot anybody who looked askance.

Field Marshal Keitel emphasizes that the inhabitants themselves ought to be made responsible for their affairs because it was of course impossible to put a sentry in front of every shed or railway station.

<sup>11</sup> Alfred Meyer, Gauleiter of Westphalia, North.

<sup>12</sup> Josef Terboven, Reich Commissar for occupied Norway.

The inhabitants had to understand that anybody who did not perform his duties properly would be shot, and that they would be held responsible for every offense.

Upon a question of Reichsleiter Rosenberg the Führer replied that newspapers, e.g., for the Ukraine too, would have to be reestablished, in order to obtain means of influencing the inhabitants.

*After the interval* the Führer emphasized that we had to understand that the Europe of today was nothing but a geographical term; in reality Asia extended up to our previous frontiers.

Reichsleiter Rosenberg then described the organizational arrangement he intended to establish; he did not intend to appoint a permanent deputy of the Reich Commissar from the outset, but always the most efficient of the General Commissars would be called upon to deputize for the Reich Commissar.

Rosenberg will set up four departments in the office of the Reich Commissar: first for the general administration; second for politics; third for economics; fourth for engineering and architecture.

(Incidentally: The Führer emphasizes that activities on the part of the churches are out of the question. Papen had sent him through the Foreign Ministry a long memorandum<sup>13</sup> in which it was asserted now was the right moment to reestablish the churches; but this was *completely* out of the question.)

The Reichsmarschall will detail to Rosenberg's organization Ministerialdirektoren Schlotterer and Riecke.

Reichsleiter Rosenberg requests appropriate premises to house his administration; he requests the premises of the Trade Mission of the Soviet Union in Lietzenberger Street; the Foreign Ministry, however, was of the opinion that these premises were extraterritorial. The Führer replies that this was nonsense; Reich Minister Lammers was charged to inform the Foreign Ministry they were to hand over these premises to Rosenberg at once and without any negotiations.

Rosenberg then proposes to detail a liaison officer to the Führer; his aide, Koeppen, was to be appointed; the Führer agrees and adds that Koeppen should take over a role parallel to that of Hewel.

Reich Minister Dr. Lammers then read the rough drafts which he had made. (See the annex!<sup>14</sup>)

<sup>13</sup> Not found. In a note of July 17 (1247/337693) Counselor Etzdorf, the Foreign Ministry's representative with the High Command of the Army, recorded the following:

"Papen has proposed to the Führer that Russia be led back to Christianity in order to strengthen morale. Führer: Idea of the 'old jockey' missionary activity was entirely out of the question. If one did it at all, one should permit all the Christian denominations to enter Russia 'in order that they club each other to death with their crucifixes'."

<sup>14</sup> Not found.



A longer discussion takes place concerning the authority of the Reichsführer SS; obviously at the same time all the participants have in mind the authority of the Reichsmarschall.

The Führer, the Reichsmarschall, and others reiterate that Himmler was to receive no other authority than he had in Germany proper; but this much was absolutely necessary.

The Führer emphasizes repeatedly that this quarrel would soon subside in practice; he recalls the excellent cooperation between the Army and the Luftwaffe at the front.

In conclusion it is decided to call the Baltic country "Ostland."

Annexes.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>15</sup> Not found.

### No. 115

5077/E292425-427

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat*

BERLIN, July 16, 1941.

D IX 44.

Subject: Letter of M. Wolodymyr Stachiw of July 2, 1941.

Respectfully submitted to Consul General Grosskopf with the request that further action be taken.

If it should be considered necessary that the matter be submitted to the Foreign Minister, the Foreign Minister's Secretariat would be grateful if a position were taken.<sup>1</sup>

BRUNS

[Enclosure]

BERLIN-WILMERSDORF, July 2, 1941.

YOUR EXCELLENCY, HIGHLY HONORED REICH FOREIGN MINISTER: On behalf of the Ukrainian Government for the Western Ukraine in Lwów I take the liberty of communicating the following:

On June 30, 1941, there met in Lwów, the capital of Western Ukraine, a Ukrainian national assembly where Jaroslav Stecjko, the deputy of the leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, OUN., proclaimed the establishment of authority of the Ukrainian State in the Western Ukraine and read aloud the proclamation of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists.

At the same time the proclamation of the leader of the OUN., Stepan Bandera, was read, according to which Jaroslav Stecjko was appointed chief of the Government of Western Ukraine.

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 138.

Speeches of welcome were held by Bishop Dr. Joseph Slipyj in the name of the Metropolitan of the Uniate Greek Church, Andreas Count Scheptyckyj, and by Dr. Hrynioch in the name of the Ukrainian Legion and its commander Captain Roman Schuchewytsch.

High officers of the victorious Wehrmacht were present at this Ukrainian assembly. Captain Professor Dr. H. Koch<sup>2</sup> made the welcoming speech on behalf of the Wehrmacht.

By radio the Ukrainian Government in Lwów appointed the undersigned as its Plenipotentiary Extraordinary with the Government of the German Reich and with the governments of the countries allied with and friendly to the German Reich.

This communication is being sent to the Imperial Japanese Government, the Royal Italian Government, and the Governments of the countries which have acceded to the Tripartite Pact.<sup>3</sup>

Yours, etc.

WOŁODYMYR STACHIW

<sup>2</sup> Representative of the Abwehr.

<sup>3</sup> An almost identical communication dated July 3 (105/113736-37) was addressed to the Rumanian Minister in Berlin. Woermann's memorandum U.St.S.Pol. 652 of July 16 (105/113735) records that Bossy showed him the communication that day and in that connection asked about the future shape of the Soviet Union. Woermann replied that nothing could be said at the time on this matter and emphasized that Germany did not recognize any Ukrainian government in Lwów or its representative in Berlin.

### No. 116

4828/E241815-16

*The Director of the Department for German Internal Affairs to the Legation in Croatia*

Telegram

No. 650

BERLIN, July 17, 1941—2:10 a. m.

Received July 17—2:15 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 577 of June 25.<sup>1</sup>

The draft of a treaty between the German and Croatian Governments concerning the resettlement of Slovenes and Serbs in the area of the former Yugoslav state, which Minister Kasche submitted,<sup>2</sup> has been thoroughly reviewed. The review has shown that it is expedient not to conclude a formal agreement in consideration of the fact that no provisions are intended regarding the treatment of the property of the persons involved in the resettlement which is being carried out as a war measure, and also in view of the fact

<sup>1</sup> In this telegram (4828/E241817) Kasche had reported that the Military Commander in Serbia had agreed to the Croatian request that 30,000 Serbs be resettled in Serbia in addition to those who were to be resettled in accordance with the decisions taken in the conference of June 4 (see vol. XII of this series, document No. 589).

<sup>2</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 589, footnote 3.

that the necessary speed in settling the matter cannot be achieved with this procedure. It is considered to be sufficient if an exchange of notes between the Legation and the Croatian Government in the near future expresses the approval of the German and Croatian Governments concerning the implementation of the principles of the resettlement agreed upon by all concerned in accordance with the minutes of the conference in Zagreb on June 4, 1941. Other questions arising which go beyond the content of the memorandum would have to be settled in the same manner, in case the need should arise. The agreements are not to be published. The Foreign Minister has given his consent to this treatment of the matter on condition that the same is done on the Croatian side. Please take the necessary steps and report regarding them.<sup>3</sup>

LUTHER

<sup>3</sup> In a dispatch of Aug. 9, the Chargé d'Affaires in Zagreb, Counselor Troll, reported that an exchange of notes between the Governments of Germany and Croatia had taken place in accordance with this instruction. The German note verbale of July 31 and the Croatian note verbale of Aug. 5 are filmed on 4828/E241309-14.

No. 117

82/60338-41

*The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 1250 of July 16

TOKYO, July 17, 1941—12:30 p. m.

Received July 17—3:55 a. m.

I have taken the opportunity, together with the Attachés of the armed forces, to discuss the present political situation with influential leaders of the Army and Navy. The Chief of Staff, Sugiyama, who is directly subordinate to the Emperor, stated that Japan was vigorously pushing her military preparations. The Kwantung Army had thus far been organized only for defense. The shift to the offensive required time. The Russian armed forces in the Maritime Territory were massed just as they had been on the German-Russian border. Withdrawal of the Russian Army, which was held close to the border by the Amur railway, was difficult. One would therefore have to reckon from the very outset with severe fighting which would have to bring about the annihilation of the enemy. Japan's Army did not have at its disposal large mechanized forces like the German Army, and therefore no rapid conquest of territory could be expected. The primary objective was therefore the destruction of the fighting power of the enemy which might form the support for a Siberian-Bolshevik government. Other generals said the same thing. They emphasized that

effective preparations to strengthen the Army had not begun till after June 22. Prior to that date Germany had not expressed any wish for Japan's participation in a possible conflict with Russia. Consequently, the Japanese Army had made no preparations against the Soviet Union in order not to alert it prematurely and act contrary to any plans that the Germans might have.

Vice Admiral Kondo, Chief of Staff, who has headed the naval staff for 2 years, spoke enthusiastically about the success of German arms. Unfortunately, it was impossible for Japan to go into action immediately, in view of the lack of preparations and the strength of the Russian adversary. It was hardly practicable to withdraw large forces from China. For the Navy it was primarily a question of committing sufficient naval air forces against about 2,000 remaining combat and pursuit planes of the Russian Far East Army. The naval air force, which is the backbone of the Japanese Air Force and also takes a decisive part in land operations, was partly tied down in China. Other units had to stand by for defense against possible action by the Americans in East Asia. To be sure, it was not expected that there would be any serious American-English interference with the Indochina operation.<sup>1</sup> However, the Navy, including the air force, had to be ready for action. In reply to my remark that America was not in a position to take action and that the American Navy, moreover, was not rated very highly, he said that in the last 2 years the American Navy had made great progress in training and that the younger officer corps in particular was good. It would be a mistake to underestimate the American Navy. Units of it would probably operate over the South Pacific and attack forward Japanese positions from the South Sea base (Port Darwin). The Japanese Navy would immediately have supply difficulties. However, he had to concede that the danger would not become acute for about 6 months. I pointed out to the Vice Admiral Chief of Staff that if the Russian enemy were first disposed of, that very fact would then free the Japanese Navy in the rear; in the contrary case, it was to be feared that the Americans would obtain a foothold in Kamchatka. Admiral Kondo replied that the Japanese Navy was on its guard and would immediately take action to prevent that. Japan would not permit military support of Russia, and the Russian Government had indicated to Ambassador Tatekawa that it expected American war material only through Iran. Russia had only an insignificant amount of merchant tonnage in the Pacific and the English and Americans would hardly make any tonnage available. Reminded of the possibility of procuring raw materials, Kondo admitted that recently three Russian tankers had been sighted at the latitude of Sakhalin and a few Russian ships were now

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 126.

lying in Manila, probably in order to take on copra and other goods there. Admiral Kondo pointed out in conclusion that the question of the timing of Japanese intervention was largely a matter to be decided by the Army, which would undoubtedly have to wait for the end of the rainy season, that is, till the middle or the end of August. He asked that it be borne in mind that Japan was now in the fifth year of a hard war. It was important that Japan not suffer any reverse but remain a strong factor in the event of a conflict with the United States of America which may become necessary.

From circles close to the Prime Minister and the War Minister I hear that they are absolutely determined to persist with the China campaign as the center of Japanese interest. They have not yet come round to the conviction that a determined attack first on the Russian and then on the Anglo-Saxon position will also force Chiang Kai-shek to give in. The Army leaders want to make adequate preparations in any case before beginning a new military operation, especially since the position of the Army, after years of war, is no longer the same as it was 5 years ago. The Army leadership also intends for the time being to await the result of the Saigon operation and at the same time to proceed consistently with further mobilization. The political leadership is toying with the idea of convoking the Diet at the end of August in order, if necessary, to put through an enabling act. The internal political situation in Russia is being closely watched, with occasional expressions of hope that independence movements will arise in parts of Siberia. This idea, it seems to me, is also suggested in Matsuoka's oral statement of July 2 to the Foreign Minister.<sup>2</sup> It is further indicated by Matsuoka's repeated questions about when the Stalin regime will collapse and the question about German ideas on the future internal organization of Russia.

Under the impact of the great German victories overcautious considerations will in my opinion finally be pushed aside by public opinion and by the war sentiment of the officers' corps, which is growing as mobilization progresses. To be sure, there is still great anxiety about a long war with the United States. On being reminded of the aggressive attitude of the United States and asked what Japan's reaction might be, leading figures in the Armed Forces and the Foreign Ministry repeatedly replied to me that this matter should be handled by the three-member Commission of the Tripartite Pact.<sup>3</sup>

OTT

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 64.

<sup>3</sup> See vol. XI of this series, documents Nos. 153 and 270, and vol. XII, document No. 304.

## No. 118

62/42396-38

*The Chargé d'Affaires in Denmark to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

SECRET

No. 915 of July 17

COPENHAGEN, July 17, 1941.

Received July 17—7:10 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 772 of July 13,<sup>1</sup> and with reference to my telegrams Nos. 882 of July 8<sup>2</sup> and 889 of July 9.<sup>3</sup>

The request of the Foreign Ministry for official information has so far had the result that the American Chargé d'Affaires<sup>4</sup> has sent over Roosevelt's statement to Congress, which is known to you, together with the letter of the Icelandic Prime Minister to Roosevelt, and the reply to it.<sup>5</sup> The Icelandic Chargé d'Affaires<sup>6</sup> transmitted a copy of a telegram from the Prime Minister from Reykjavik, in which it is confirmed that all parties of the Althing, with the exception of the Communists, have approved the Jonasson-Roosevelt agreement. This circumstance, it is thought in authoritative circles in the Foreign Ministry, precludes a protest by the King because he, too, would violate the Icelandic Constitution, upon which he took an oath, and, apart from the practical futility of the entire step, this would bring him into opposition to the people and Parliament in Iceland, in which he would be in the wrong.

I, on the other hand, took the very emphatic stand that in connection with the most recent events, one came up against the amazing and inexplicable fact that the same Icelanders who, less than a year ago, had protested most vehemently against the English occupation,<sup>7</sup> and in January 1941, used an obscure American press notice to proclaim to the world emphatically that they would prevent any form of Anglo-American traffic in arms through Iceland's harbors and intended to remain very strictly neutral,<sup>8</sup> were now, without discernible opposi-

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 102.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 102, footnote 1.

<sup>3</sup> In this telegram (130/70788) Kotze reported that according to the Danish Foreign Minister, the American Chargé d'Affaires had received no instructions regarding the landing of American forces in Iceland.

<sup>4</sup> Mahlon F. Perkins.

<sup>5</sup> For the text of President Roosevelt's message of July 7 to Congress transmitting a message received from the Prime Minister of Iceland, Hermann Jonasson, and the President's reply, see Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1941, vol. v, p. 15.

<sup>6</sup> Jon Krabbe.

<sup>7</sup> British troops landed in Iceland on May 10, 1940. Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1940*, vol. II, pp. 679-684.

<sup>8</sup> Details concerning the Icelandic protest are found in a memorandum by Grundherr of May 19, 1941 (130/70742-52) which discusses developments in Iceland.

tion, voluntarily summoning into the country tens of thousands of American soldiers. We had thought of a statement to be issued by the King, because despite a voluntary aloofness since April 1940, he must still be regarded as the de facto head of the state. Even now we believed that such a statement, particularly in view of the future of Denmark and Iceland, could be of great importance. But what mattered, above all, was that this act of a new, forcible occupation of Iceland by foreign troops should not be accepted without any expression of opposition from the Danes. One should not be deterred by formalistic objections from speaking plainly in a matter so decisive for Iceland's future position in the European world.

After this discussion, M. von Scavenius called in his aides and in my presence instructed them first of all to assemble material and prepare texts for an official statement which would take into account the constitutional objections, and which could ultimately be issued by the Minister President<sup>9</sup> or the King. He said he would inform me as soon as possible of his proposals on this matter.<sup>10</sup> In addition, material was to be prepared in order that through the pens of well-known journalists, like Professor Gudmund Hatt, attention might be called publicly in more comprehensive form, less bound by formal objections, to the sudden change in position of the Icelanders, its internal implications and the importance of the entire question for the future.

In view of the age and the well-known general attitude of the King, it is improbable that after the vote of the Icelandic Parliament, he can be induced to take some sort of public stand, particularly since he has refrained from any such interference since April 1940. As far as the contemplated statement by the Government and the public discussion in the press are concerned, it will take constant pressure by us to induce the Danes to take more effective action.

The Danish Minister in Reykjavik,<sup>11</sup> who has likewise been asked for his reaction, but who is probably hampered the most by Anglo-American censorship, has not yet replied.<sup>12</sup> In the Foreign Ministry they still hope to get from him information through special channels concerning actual sentiment in Iceland.

KOTZE

<sup>9</sup> Thorvald Stauning.

<sup>10</sup> In telegram No. 989 of Aug. 4 (62/42345-49) Renthe-Fink transmitted the confidential draft of the statement which the Minister President was going to read in Parliament regarding the landing of American troops in Iceland. German proposals for changes in the text of the draft and Renthe-Fink's reports about these changes are contained in Weizsäcker's instruction of Aug. 6 (130/70814-18) and in Copenhagen telegrams of Aug. 12 (unnumbered: 62/42359-60), Nos. 1031 of Aug. 14 (62/42361-66), and 1038 of Aug. 16 (62/42367).

<sup>11</sup> F. le Sage de Fontenay.

<sup>12</sup> Renthe-Fink transmitted the report of the Danish legation at Reykjavik in telegram No. 968 of July 30 (62/42340-41).

## No. 119

34/24761-63

### *Führer's Decree of July 17*

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, July 17, 1941.

Enclosure 1 zu WFSt/Abt. L (IV/Qu) No. 334/41 of July 18, 1941.

Concerning the administration of the newly-occupied eastern territories.

In order to restore and maintain public order and public life in the newly-occupied eastern territories I order as follows:

#### Paragraph 1

As soon and in so far as the military operations in the newly-occupied eastern territories are terminated, the administration of these territories will be transferred from the military authorities to the authorities of civil administration. I shall in each case designate by special decree the territories which are accordingly to be transferred to the civil administration, and the date at which this is to be done.<sup>1</sup>

#### Paragraph 2

The civil administration in the newly occupied eastern territories, in so far as these territories are not incorporated in the administration of the adjoining areas of the Reich or of the General Government, shall be placed under the "Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories."

#### Paragraph 3

The military sovereign rights and powers shall be exercised in the newly-occupied eastern territories by the Wehrmacht commanders in accordance with my decree of June 25, 1941.<sup>2</sup>

The powers of the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan in the newly-occupied eastern territories are separately defined by my decree of June 29, 1941,<sup>3</sup> and those of the Reichsführer SS and Chief of

<sup>1</sup> A Führer decree of July 17 (34/24765) assigned the civil administration of the region of Bialystok to the Oberpräsident of the province of East Prussia and that of former Polish Galicia to the Governor General. The territories of the former states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia together with the area inhabited by the White Ruthenians was designated the Reich Commissariat, "Ostland," whose precise boundaries were to be stated later.

A decree of July 18 (34/24764) separated the western part of this area from the zone of operations and ordered the civil administration to take over effective July 25.

A directive of July 22 (5083/E292814-14/3) placed the regions of Vilna, Bialystok, and Lwów under civil administration effective Aug. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (5078/E292510-11).

<sup>3</sup> Not printed (5078/E292512).

the German Police by my decree of July 17, 1941,<sup>4</sup> and are not affected by the following provisions.

Paragraph 4

I appoint Reichsleiter Alfred *Rosenberg* Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. He shall have his headquarters in Berlin.

Paragraph 5

The parts of the newly occupied eastern areas placed under the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern territories shall be divided into Reich Commissariats, these into General Regions [*Generalbezirke*] and these again into Districts [*Kreisgebiete*]. Several districts can be combined into a Main Region. The Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories shall issue the more specific regulations concerning this.

Paragraph 6

At the head of each Reich Commissariat there shall be a Reich Commissar; at the head of each General Region a General Commissar; and at the head of every district a District Commissar. In case of the formation of a Main Region a Main Commissar shall head it.

The Reich Commissars and the General Commissars shall be appointed by me, the heads of the main departments in the offices of the Reich Commissars as well as the Main Commissars and District Commissars shall be appointed by the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories.

Paragraph 7

The Reich Commissars shall be subordinate to the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories and shall receive their instructions from him exclusively, in so far as paragraph 3 does not apply.

Paragraph 8

It shall be the responsibility of the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories to legislate for the newly-occupied eastern territories placed under him. He may delegate to the Reich Commissars the power to legislate.

Paragraph 9

The Reich Commissars shall be responsible for the entire administration of their areas with respect to civil affairs.

As long as military operations are in progress the security of the

<sup>4</sup>Not printed (34/24766). This decree gave Himmler responsibility for the policing of the occupied eastern areas and also authorized him to issue directives in this field to the Reich Commissars.

operation of the railroads and the mails is the responsibility of the competent supreme authorities of the Reich in accordance with the instructions of the Chief of the OKW. A different arrangement may be considered for the time after the conclusion of the military operations.

Paragraph 10

In order that the measures taken by the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories or the Reich Commissars in their areas may be harmonized with the larger viewpoints of the interests of the Reich, the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories shall keep close contact with the supreme Reich authorities. In case of differences of opinion which cannot be resolved by direct negotiations, my decision shall be obtained through the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery.

Paragraph 11

The regulations necessary for carrying out and supplementing this decree shall be issued by the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories in agreement with the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery and the Chief of the OKW.

*The Führer*  
ADOLF HITLER  
*The Chief of the OKW*  
KEITEL  
*The Reich Minister and*  
*Chief of the Reich Chancellery*  
DR. LAMMERS

No. 120

195/139184-87

*Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

U. St.S. Pol. 661

BERLIN, July 17, 1941.

M. Bose called on me today after his return.<sup>1</sup>

I first informed him regarding the tasks assigned to State Secretary Keppler. After his visit with me M. Bose called on Herr Keppler.

Bose first spoke in detail concerning the repercussions of the German-Russian war on public opinion in India. The Soviet Union had been popular in India, especially among the intelligentsia, from which

<sup>1</sup> Following his visit to Germany the Indian nationalist leader, Subhas Chandra Bose, had gone to Rome on May 29 (see vol. xii of this series, document No. 561 and footnotes 3 and 4). In a memorandum of July 10 (195/139182-83) Woermann recorded having received a letter from Bose who announced that he was coming to Germany and would arrive in Berlin by July 14 at the latest. In this letter of July 5, which is attached to Woermann's memorandum, Bose remarked that his talk with Ciano was not encouraging and that prospects for the realization of his plans looked gloomy as a result of the outbreak of the war in the east.

the leader group came, because in India they believed that the Soviet Union was an anti-imperialist power and thus the natural ally of India against England. The German-Russian pact of 1939 had been a climax for India. It had made it possible for the basically anti-National Socialist intelligentsia now to regard Germany and Italy as those powers which, in friendship with the Soviet Union, would put an end to the British rule in India, although the British propaganda had succeeded in preserving hostile feelings against the Axis Powers in large parts of India. In the German-Russian war the feelings of the Indian people were very decidedly on the Russian side, because the Indian people were sure that Germany was the aggressor and thus also an imperialist power dangerous to India. Even after a complete German victory over Russia it would be difficult to change public opinion in India in this regard.

At the same time Bose expects—and there are already reports from London confirming this—that England will now carry out reforms in India that will make it appear inviting to that portion of public opinion which is always inclined to compromises to continue to bet on the English, while at the same time the danger of a German attack on India is pictured; not in the sense of a liberation of the Indian people but of a replacement of British rule by German rule.

Bose expects that India will become even more than before a center for the development of British military power and considers it very probable that England will advance not through Afghanistan but through Iran in order to seize first the oil fields and then to join hands with the Soviet Union in the Caucasus region.

Bose's statements indicated that, away from Berlin, he is strongly influenced by the Soviet thesis even in the question of the origin of the German-Russian conflict, so that it will be one of the first tasks to set him right on this point.

I told Bose that we adhered unchanged to the intention of a proclamation in favor of a free India; <sup>2</sup> naturally a favorable moment had to be chosen for this.

At this point M. Bose became very excited and asked that the Foreign Minister be told that this proclamation should be issued as quickly as possible. Every day that passed gave England the lead with the projected measures of reform in India, whereas on the other hand he did not see any reason for holding back the proclamation. However, he could understand that the moment had to be chosen by judging the situation as a whole.

I did not deal in detail in our short conversation with the other current questions, in particular with that of preparations here for the establishment of a free India <sup>3</sup> center. It was obvious, however, that

<sup>2</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 553.

<sup>3</sup> In English in the original.

for Bose these questions are of lesser interest as long as he does not have the certainty that the declaration regarding a free India will be issued.

I refer also to the report of July 13 <sup>4</sup> from the German Embassy in Rome and the memorandum of the Italian Foreign Minister contained therein regarding Bose's conversations in Rome. The idea discussed there in point 4, of keeping Bose in reserve in a neutral country for a later suitable moment, appears to me to be inapt.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister. Proposals for the further treatment of the questions concerned are being prepared by State Secretary Keppler and me.

WOERMANN

<sup>4</sup> Report No. 61 g. (41/28496; 28498-501).

## No. 121

1527/373694-95

*The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

WASHINGTON, July 18, 1941—9:03 p. m.

SECRET

Received July 19—8:20 a. m.

No. 2301 of July 18

1. The opposition is incessantly demanding of Roosevelt and Knox an authentic interpretation of their orders to the American fleets which was announced in Roosevelt's message to Congress <sup>1</sup> on the occasion of Iceland. Assertions by the opposition that the American fleets had received orders from Roosevelt to shoot at German war vessels have become so annoying to the President that he felt compelled in his press conference today again to deal with this matter in a detailed fashion. The English text of his statement to the press conference in the United Press version follows en clair as No. 2302. <sup>2</sup> According to this Roosevelt said the following: The occupation of Iceland was simply necessary for the defense of both the United States and the Western Hemisphere as a whole in order to forestall seizure by an unfriendly power. For the protection and maintenance of the American garrisons employed for this it is imperative that the lines of communication with Iceland be kept open.

The President interpreted this statement in the sense that because of basic military considerations he had to refuse to state what means the fleets would use in order to keep the lines of communication with Iceland open.

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 118, footnote 5.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

These evasive tactics of parliamentary maneuvers [*Parlamentsverhandlung*] indicate that on the one hand he is trying to calm the opposition which is troublesome for him, but that on the other hand he does not want to disappoint the English but rather to encourage them, as they might fear that the opposition had forced him to withdraw a possible order to shoot.

2. In this connection the leading Senator of the noninterventionist opposition informed me that Roosevelt always expresses himself unclearly also for the purpose of being able to exploit to his best advantage any possible incident with the German naval forces. The leader of the opposition was deeply concerned about the gravity of the situation developing from these dishonest statements by the President. He urgently let it be suggested to me that everything be done to ensure that the German Government saw through these intrigues by Roosevelt aimed at provoking an incident with every possible means. Time and again he stressed that the calm dignity of the Reich Government, which did not allow itself to be provoked by any American impudence, had so far been successful in that the opposition had had the time to rally and to organize. The Führer's restraint, as he well knew, put Roosevelt in a white heat. If an incident could be avoided until the end of this year the opposition, in the opinion of its leaders, would be so strong that no one would be able to induce this country any longer to take an active part in the war; by that time, namely, the majority of the American people would be sufficiently convinced of the selfishness of Britain's policy and conduct of the war as well as of the lack of scruples of the American interventionists and would likewise have gained clarity regarding the steps toward American military intervention.

THOMSEN

## No. 122

496/233480

*Memorandum by an Official of Political Division IM*

BERLIN, July 18, 1941.  
zu Pol. I M 2247 g. Rs.<sup>1</sup>

With reference to telegram No. 2443 of July 17 from Madrid.<sup>2</sup>

On the basis of strictly confidential arrangements between the German Navy and the Spanish Naval Command, German submarines

<sup>1</sup> Pol. I M 2247 not identified. It may be Madrid telegram No. 2443 of July 17. See footnote 2.

<sup>2</sup> In this telegram (95/106953) an official of the German Embassy reported that it was clear from the British note of protest to the Spanish Government that the British were aware of the submarine supply action by the German Naval Attaché in the Canary Islands.

have for some time been supplied by German tenders based on Canary Islands ports.<sup>3</sup>

According to a communication received from the Naval Operations Staff in reference to the above telegram from Madrid, it appears that the English have closely observed such a supply operation of a German submarine. The detailed and correct information relating thereto in the British note of protest leaves no doubt in that respect.

The Naval Operations Staff has the impression that the Spaniards will not let themselves be affected by the English protest and are prepared to continue their collaboration. The German Naval Attaché in Madrid,<sup>4</sup> however, has on his own taken care to have these supply operations discontinued for the next months.<sup>5</sup>

Herewith submitted to Ambassador Ritter.

VON GROTE

<sup>3</sup> See vol. XI of this series, documents Nos. 268 and 450.

<sup>4</sup> Cmdr. C. Meyer-Döhner.

<sup>5</sup> For further developments see documents Nos. 391 and 403.

## No. 123

1007/307749-57

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat*

KÖNIGSBERG, July 18, 1941.

### BRIEF FOR THE FOREIGN MINISTER

By telegram No. 1247 of July 15,<sup>1</sup> the German Embassy in Tokyo reported the counterproposals which the Japanese Government made regarding the text of the proposed Japanese-American agreement.<sup>2</sup> Using the text communicated by telegram No. 731 of May 13 from Tokyo<sup>3</sup> as a basis, the wording as amended by the changes now proposed is as follows:<sup>4</sup>

"Actuated by a desire to restore their traditional friendship, the Governments of Japan and the United States will embark upon the negotiation of a general agreement with a view to establishing, by a joint effort, a just peace in the Pacific and thus arresting the tragic confusion that now threatens civilization.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (82/60328-32).

<sup>2</sup> What is involved here are Japanese counterproposals to the American draft proposal of June 21. See document No. 88 and footnote 6, which in turn was a reply to the Japanese proposal of May 12 (see vol. XII of this series, document No. 512, footnote 2).

<sup>3</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 512, footnote 2.

<sup>4</sup> The texts of the American and Japanese drafts cited in the original of the document printed are actually translations into German of English texts cited in telegrams Nos. 1247 and 731 (see footnotes 1 and 3). This has been taken into account in producing the translation printed here. These English texts transmitted in the telegrams referred to above are likewise cited in an unsigned memorandum of July 17 from the Foreign Minister's Secretariat (82/60354-60) comparing the pertinent American and Japanese drafts.

"I. *The concepts of Japan and the United States respecting international relations and character of nations.*

"The Governments of Japan and the United States jointly acknowledge each other as equally sovereign States and contiguous Pacific powers.

"Both Governments assert the unanimity of their national policies as directed towards the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of respectful confidence and cooperation between their peoples.

"Both Governments declare that it is their traditional and present concept and conviction that nations and races compose as members of a family one household; each equally enjoying rights and admitting responsibilities with a mutuality of interests regulated by peaceful processes and directed to the pursuit of their moral and physical welfare which they are bound to defend for themselves as they are bound not to destroy for others. There should, of course, be neither oppression nor exploitation of the backward peoples.

"Both Governments are firmly determined that their respective traditional concepts on the character of nations and underlying moral principles of social order and national life will continue to be preserved and that they will not be deformed by foreign ideas or ideologies contrary to those moral principles and concepts.

"II. *The attitudes of both Governments towards the European war.*

"It being the common aim of both Governments to establish world peace, they will join forces with a view to preventing the extension of the European war and restoring peace speedily *when the proper time arrives.*"

(Note: The American reply had proposed leaving out the words "and restoring peace speedily," since there is not at present any prospect of peace. Japan, on the other hand, proposed substituting for those words "and restoring peace speedily when the proper time arrives.")

*"The Japanese Government maintains that the purpose of the Tripartite Pact was and is defensive and that this purpose indubitably is thus to contribute to the non-extension of the present war. If, however, the European war should experience an extension, the Japanese Government will fulfill the obligations of that Treaty and they will decide their attitude solely by considerations of the defense of their welfare and security."*

(Note: The original text read:

"The Government of Japan believes that the purpose of the Tripartite Pact was and is defensive and designed to prevent the participation of nations in the European war [not] present[ly] involved in it.

"The Government of Japan declares that there is no question that the obligation of military assistance under the Tripartite Pact comes into force in the case stipulated in article 3 of the said Pact."

The American reply had proposed that the two foregoing paragraphs be omitted entirely. The Japanese Government

thereupon made the above counterproposal which is underscored with dots.)<sup>5</sup>

"Being pledged to the hate of war the attitude of the United States towards the *European* war is and will continue to be determined solely and exclusively by considerations of the protective defence of its own national welfare and security. The Government of the United States declares that it does not and will not resort to any aggressive measure aimed to assist any one nation against another."

(Note: The American Government proposed as paragraph 4 the following text:

"The Government of the United States maintains that its attitude toward the European hostilities will be determined solely by considerations of its national security and defense."

The Japanese Government, however, demands in its counterproposal that the old text of the former paragraph 4 be restored as given above.)

"III. *China.*

*"The Japanese Government declares to the Government of the United States that the fundamental condition for the solution of the China affair is not contrary to the principles mentioned in the Konoye declaration and the arrangements already put into effect in pursuance of that declaration. The Government of the United States will recommend to the Chiang Kai-shek regime to enter into negotiations with the Japanese Government for the purpose of cessation of hostilities and restoration of peaceful relations."*

(Note: The American Government had proposed a longer text for paragraph III, according to which Japan would from the outset tie her hands with respect to any negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek. Orally the American Government declared with regard to this that it was against the stationing of Japanese troops in China, and it demanded finally that the Japanese peace terms had to be acceptable to Chiang Kai-shek. Instead of that, the Japanese Government proposed the above text which is underscored.)

"IV. *Commerce between both nations.*

"When an understanding is reached between the two Governments, Japan and the United States shall assure each other to supply mutually such commodities as are respectively available or required by them. Both Governments will take steps necessary for the resumption of normal trade relations as once existed under the treaty of navigation and commerce between the two countries.

"V. *The Economic Activity of both nations in the Southwestern Pacific Area.*

*"On the basis of the pledges hereby given the activity of Japan and of the United States in the Southwestern Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations, the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States agree*

<sup>5</sup> The passages which in this English translation are italicized are underscored with dots in the German original of the document.



*to cooperate independently each without the other in the production and procurement of the natural resources in these areas (such as, for example, mineral oil, rubber, tin and nickel) which each of the two countries needs."*

(Note: Instead of paragraph V the American reply proposes a text by which Japan and the United States undertake to cooperate in the entire Pacific area in questions of trade and raw materials and not to practice any discrimination. Thereby America seeks to restore the Open Door in China. The Japanese counterproposal would adopt the above-quoted text which is underscored for paragraph V.)

*"VI. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific.*

*"A. Both Governments declare that the policy underlying this understanding is peace in the Pacific area, and further that it is their fundamental purpose through cooperative efforts to contribute to the maintenance and preservation of peace in the Pacific area, and that neither of them has territorial designs in the area mentioned.*

*"B. The Governments of Japan and the United States jointly guarantee the independence of the Philippine Islands on the condition that the latter observes permanent neutrality and accords to the Japanese subjects a treatment equal to the Commonwealth citizens.*

*"C. The Government of the United States will make endeavors that amicable consideration shall be accorded to Japanese emigration to the United States. Japanese immigrants shall be placed on a basis of equality with other nations, free from discrimination."*

(Note: With reference to paragraph VI the American reply stipulates that a guarantee of the independence and neutralization of the Philippines is not to be given immediately but only when it is desired by the United States. The Japanese counterproposal has the present text under paragraph VI, the passages underscored being new. The American reply would delete clause C completely.)

Telegram No. 1247 of July 15 from Tokyo, on the basis of which the above text is composed as it now appears in accordance with the Japanese proposals, also states the following:

"Foreign Minister Matsuoka, whom I have been trying to see since the end of last week, is indisposed for the time being and informed me through his office that his doctor had ordered for him complete rest. In response to an extremely urgent request from the Russian Ambassador, however, he had gotten up on Saturday<sup>6</sup> to receive him briefly. The doctor had thereupon strictly forbidden him to engage in any activity if he wished to be able to work again in the next few weeks. In his absence the head of the European Department<sup>7</sup> informed me of the contents of the American reply to the Japanese communication of last May. At the same time he said that the Japanese Government had drawn up a counterproposal, which would be

<sup>6</sup> i.e., July 12.

<sup>7</sup> Ryuki Sakamoto.

transmitted to the American Government in the next few days by Ambassador Nomura.<sup>8</sup> Unfortunately, he was not in a position to furnish the exact text of the American proposal, but he would reveal the substance of it. A few unmentioned details concerned only the Chinese question. The American reply and the Japanese counterproposal are both largely based on the text transmitted by telegram No. 731 of May 13, 1941. The head of the European Department also informed me that Ambassador Nomura had received instructions to tell the American Government that the oral statements by Secretary of State Hull about certain members of the Japanese Government were considered inappropriate.<sup>9</sup> One did not wish to assume that the American Government intended thereby to intervene in internal Japanese affairs. The Head of the European Department emphasizes as his personal opinion that the Japanese counterproposal merely tossed the ball back; on account of the great divergence of views an agreement was out of the question. On the China question the positions of the two Governments were diametrically opposed to each other."

(WEBER)

<sup>8</sup> Cf. the Konoye memoirs, printed in *Pearl Harbor Attack: Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*, 79th Cong., 2nd sess., pt. 20, Joint Committee Exhibit No. 173, pp. 3994-4003.

<sup>9</sup> This presumably refers to a portion of the oral statement handed to Ambassador Nomura by Secretary of State Hull on June 21 (see document No. 88 and footnote 6) where Hull spoke of some influential Japanese leaders who were committed to the support of Germany and who made public statements emphasizing Japan's commitments under the Tripartite Pact. "So long as such leaders maintain this attitude in their official positions and apparently seek to influence public opinion in Japan in the direction indicated, is it not illusory to expect that adoption of a proposal such as the one under consideration offers a basis for achieving substantial results along the desired lines?" See *Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941*, vol. II, p. 485.

## No. 124

82/60364

*Memorandum by Ambassador Stahmer*

By Teletype  
to Special Train Westfalen

BERLIN, July 18, 1941.

BRIEF FOR THE FOREIGN MINISTER FOR PRESENTATION TO THE FÜHRER

Subject: Situation in Japan after the resignation of the Cabinet.

For Weber.

The resignation of the Cabinet<sup>1</sup> is attributable to inner conflicts over the attitude of the Japanese Government with respect to foreign

<sup>1</sup> The resignation of the Konoye Cabinet had been first reported by Ott in telegram No. 1258 of July 16 (82/60345). In telegram No. 1271 of July (82/60348-49) Ott stated that the "Cabinet crisis had come as a surprise even for those who were initiated" and then gave a detailed discussion of the background of the crisis based on information "from generally well informed sources." The resignation of the Konoye Cabinet was also the subject of a brief memorandum for the Foreign Minister drawn up by Woermann on July 17 (82/60352-53).

policy. The Minister of War<sup>2</sup> and the Minister of the Navy<sup>3</sup> pressed for an energetic implementation of foreign policy and acceleration of the military preparations against Russia and in Indochina, which were opposed by the Foreign Minister, who apparently still wanted to adhere to his policy of delay. There are now two possibilities: (1) A new cabinet will be formed with a Foreign Minister who will vigorously push developments in Japan in accordance with the Tripartite Pact. (2) A cabinet will be formed which will continue trying to steer a middle course. I consider the first possibility very likely, because according to reports just received Prince Konoye has been asked to form the new government and the former Minister of War and the Minister of the Navy will remain in office. At the time of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact these two Ministers worked very vigorously to help bring the Pact into being, and it may definitely be assumed that they will press for a speeding up of military preparations and a clear and unequivocal stand by the Japanese Government. The Minister of the Navy in particular is reputed to be a strong personality.

General Araki, likewise a very dynamic officer, who has already in the past taken an unequivocal stand in favor of the Tripartite Pact, seems to have the best prospects of becoming the future Foreign Minister. The candidacy of Toyoda, the former Minister of Commerce, which has been mentioned in the American press, is considered extremely unlikely in the Japanese Embassy here.

STAHRMER

<sup>2</sup> Gen. Hideki Tojo.  
<sup>3</sup> Adm. Koshiro Oikawa.

## No. 125

F11/0362;  
F2/0380-77

### *The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry*

No. A2335

ANKARA, July 14, 1941.

[Sent July 18.]<sup>1</sup>

Received July 20.<sup>2</sup>

### POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: The development of Turkish foreign policy.

For the Foreign Minister.

My many reports will have shown with what unqualified satisfaction Turkey has welcomed the outbreak of the German-Soviet War.

<sup>1</sup> The dispatch date is supplied from another copy (2361/488584-88).

<sup>2</sup> Marginal notes:

"To Special Train Westfalen by closed circuit secret teletype."

"[For] F[ührer]."

"Shown to the Führer. Hew[el], July 21."

The Turkish press, in conformity with the Government's neutrality declaration,<sup>3</sup> to be sure, has been instructed to restrain its enthusiasm. Its reports are therefore strictly factual. The country, however, is following the decisive developments with tremendous attention. While the restrained reporting of the German Supreme Army Command has not had the effect of shaking the firm confidence in a German victory, it has nevertheless brought certain anxieties to the surface, which clearly reflect Turkey's attitude. Secretary General Numan Menemencioglu mentioned that although, according to the reports of his Ambassador in Moscow,<sup>4</sup> the Russians were beaten on the Stalin Line, they would upon the advice of their English friends attempt to build up a new solid front east of Moscow. There is talk of 120 divisions which the Russians could activate and arm.

This very idea is a nightmare for the Turks. If carried into reality it would mean that the Russian campaign which, as was hoped here, would bring an end to the war could not be terminated. On the contrary parts of the German Army would in that case remain tied down in Russia and the Reich would be exposed to the grinding effect of a war on two fronts of long duration.

In my conversations with M. Saracoglu and M. Numan I have repeatedly pointed out that Turkey's self-evident interest in the elimination of the Bolshevik system was naturally bound to bring the country over to the side of the German Reich. As soon as the campaign against the Soviets was victoriously concluded, the Reich would be in a position to get down to the reorganization of Europe which had been discussed for such a long time. Then the moment would have arrived when Turkey would have to make the decision whether she belonged to Europe or whether she wanted to remain an appendix to the British-American-Russian front. I further pointed out that Churchill's and Roosevelt's decision to fight side by side with Bolshevism until Germany was destroyed had made it plain to anyone who had not yet grasped this fact that England, who never throughout her history had shown the slightest interest in European solidarity, must henceforth be reckoned among the foremost of Europe's declared enemies.

I have reason to assume that this train of thought meets with full approval here, for the official *Ulus* writes in its editorial of July 11: "If Germany should lose this war, all mankind from the Pacific to the Atlantic would be shaken to its roots. If Germany wins, the Russian world would be divided up and scattered, and the edifice of the Communist International would be forever overthrown. Those on the European Continent who but recently were at each others' throats

<sup>3</sup> According to Papen's telegram No. 788 of June 23 (105/113586) this declaration was made in an Anatolian News Agency report of June 23.

<sup>4</sup> Ali Haydar Aktay.

have united to ward off domination by the Kremlin. Europe has been unified in the *mystique* of a crusade." Also, the clumsy attack of Litvinov's in his radio address<sup>5</sup> has been rejected by the entire press in the manner it deserved.

There is no mistaking the wish of the Turkish Government that the Reich, after defeating Bolshevism, will succeed in ending the war on the basis of a compromise that would afford Germany the possibility of satisfying her needs for Lebensraum and raw materials in the east and would put her in a position to offer France, Holland, Belgium, and Norway a peace that would be acceptable to all of these countries.

It is the unspoken wish of the Turkish Government to offer its good offices in such a situation. The further the war progresses and the closer it comes to the areas of Turkish interest in the Caucasus, the greater will be the inducement for the Turks to talk with us about the future situation in that region. As Ali Fuad<sup>6</sup> intimated to me today, Turkey would be pleased if in the Caucasus a federation of the local tribes, which are in greater or less degree related to the Turks, could be established while east of the Caspian Sea formation of an independent Turanian state would be regarded as the best solution. These buffer states would relieve Turkey for a long time of the Russian pressure and at the same time greatly strengthen her economic situation.

The English are of course not unaware of these ideas. For that reason it is not likely, as is feared in military quarters, that the English might try to move major forces from the Mosul area through Iran so as to make common cause with the Russians in the Caucasus. It goes without saying that the English are busying themselves with organizing a strong defensive front in northern Iraq, in order to be able to exert political and military pressure on Turkey from there and from Syria.

The close interconnection of English interests with Bolshevism is most severely condemned here although the greatest reserve is observed publicly. As I have previously reported,<sup>7</sup> it has been learned from Moscow that at the beginning of the campaign Stalin was still hopeful that he might reach an understanding with the Führer on the basis that if the Russian Army were beaten in the west, he would be granted continued existence in the eastern part of Russia. It has become known that he refused to receive the English delegation<sup>8</sup> and that he harbors as much as ever the strongest distrust

<sup>5</sup> Presumably a reference to an English language broadcast by Litvinov of July 8 in which he called on Britain and the USSR to strike at Hitler "untiringly."

<sup>6</sup> Gen. Ali Fuad Erden, head of the Turkish Military Academy.

<sup>7</sup> Not found.

<sup>8</sup> Probably a reference to the British Military Mission in Moscow which arrived in Moscow on June 27 following arrangements made regarding the exchange of British and Soviet military missions. Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. I, pp. 175-177.

of England's war aims. It is said that he agreed to sign the agreement<sup>9</sup> that he would conclude no separate peace, only after the English, with American help, had given him a guarantee of continued existence in all circumstances. Incidentally it is generally believed here that Churchill's fall in the foreseeable future is more probable than the fall of Stalin. It is reported that the English opposition is getting nervous because of America's constant approach toward the British Empire's sphere of influence. It is this distrust of American intentions which prompted Churchill not to withdraw the British troops from Iceland although the Americans advised him to do that and to throw the surplus of his numerous divisions, unemployed in England, into the struggle against Germany. Another peril for Churchill is said to be the charge of fraternization with Bolshevism. It is predicted that he will some day be overthrown for these reasons.

As regards the position of Turkey toward the problems on her southern front, the desire is to continue to maintain a correct attitude toward England, as in the past. Because of the unfortunate outcome of the Syrian campaign, England will now be in a position to exert even greater influence in economic and transit matters than ever before. Added to this is Turkey's fundamental antipathy toward all so-called Arab liberation movements. Although recognition is given to the principle of independence of the near eastern Arab states, it has not been forgotten that the Arabs, who yesterday went with the British and today are going with us, would tomorrow ally themselves with the devil himself in order to march against Turkey.

The current complicated position of Turkey with respect to the problems on her southern border can be resolved only through a policy in accord with us.

In view of this situation it might not be uninteresting, once matters in Russia have developed to a certain point and agreement is reached on the future organization of Europe, to let Turkey take the initiative. Because after the English ally has brusquely rejected every possibility for peace, she would be fully justified in burying the alliance for good and making an unequivocal decision in favor of Europe.

I believe that skillful exploitation of the situation by us could accomplish a great deal toward extricating Turkey from the present dilemma of alliance versus friendship. This should not be by political, let alone military, pressure upon her, but on the contrary by slowly bringing psychological influence to bear and by emphasizing the "European" mission which is devolving upon that country

<sup>9</sup> A reference to the British-Soviet Agreement for Joint Action and Mutual Assistance signed in Moscow on July 12. For text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CXXV, p. 277.

and its peace-minded leader out of the course of historical events. Carrying out this mission affords Turkey a unique opportunity for occupying once more a top-rank position in world politics.

PAPEN

No. 126

216/147722-23

*The Dirigent in the Political Department to the Embassy in Japan and to the Embassy in Paris*

Telegram

No. 678 of July 19 from Königsberg  
 No. 1094 to Tokyo from the Foreign Ministry  
 No. 3712 to Paris from the Foreign Ministry

RAM (KÖNIGSBERG), July 19, 1941.  
 Received Berlin, July 19—1:05 a. m.

Sent July 19.

On July 17 Ambassador Oshima handed to the Foreign Minister the following memorandum with an appendix concerning the Japanese demands on France regarding Indochina:<sup>1</sup>

"The Japanese Government has started negotiations with the French Government with a firm resolve to secure, among other things, naval and air bases in Indochina. A Japanese proposal made in this connection is attached. The realization of this plan is the first step for our advance to the South. It will undoubtedly play an important part as a diversion of the English-American forces. In this sense the Japanese Government believes that in pursuing this aim it is giving valuable assistance to Germany and Italy, loyal to the spirit of the Tripartite Pact. It therefore believes that it may assume that the German Government will not only refuse any entreaty of the French Government to arrange for a refusal or mitigation of the Japanese proposal but that it will also assist the Japanese Government by endeavoring to convince the French Government of the advisability of compliance."

End of the memorandum.

Appendix follows:

"CONFIDENTIAL

1. France and Japan undertake to cooperate militarily for the common defense of French Indochina.
2. For this purpose the French Government will authorize Japan to adopt the following measures:

<sup>1</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 611. Ambassador Ott had reported in telegram No. 1246 of July 15 (216/147716-17) that the Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister had told him "strictly confidentially" that the Japanese Ambassador in Vichy had received instructions to seek French agreement to the stationing of Japanese troops and the establishment of a few Japanese naval and air bases in Indochina.

(a) Dispatch of the necessary number of Japanese troops, naval units, and air forces to South Indochina;

(b) Use of the following eight localities as air bases: Siemreap, Pnompenh, Tourane, Nhatrang, Bienhoa, Saigon, Scotrang and Kompongtrach.

Use of Saigon and the Bay of Camranh as naval bases; the Japanese forces will bring the necessary installations.

(c) These forces will have all freedom regarding billeting, maneuvers and movements. They will be granted special facilities for the fulfillment of their task. This also includes the abolition of the restrictions provided in the Nishihara-Martin agreement.<sup>2</sup>

(d) The French Government will supply the Japanese forces with the necessary amount of foreign exchange; the Japanese Government is willing to pay for these in accordance with methods which are to be determined jointly.

3. The French Government will agree to a general plan of entry of these forces. The manner of such entry will be the topic of consultation between the local Japanese and Indochinese authorities. In order to eliminate the possibility of a conflict the French authorities will adopt appropriate measures such as the removal of Indochinese forces from the vicinity of points of debarkation of the Japanese forces."

End of Appendix.

The Foreign Minister requests that you observe restraint in the matter.

RINTELEN

<sup>2</sup> A military accord signed by the Japanese and French local commanders in Indochina on Sept. 22, 1940. Under its terms the French granted Japan the use of three airfields in Tonkin, the right to station 6000 Japanese troops there, the passage of up to 25,000 Japanese troops through Tonkin to Yunnan, and permission to evacuate a division of the Canton army through Tonkin. Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1940*, vol. IV, p. 142 and footnote 92.

No. 127

82/60374-75

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 680 of July 19 from  
 the Special Train

KÖNIGSBERG, July 19, 1941—10:45 a. m.

No. 1098 of July 19 from  
 the Foreign Ministry

Received Berlin, July 19—12:00 noon.

RAM 318

Sent July 19 [1:20 p. m.]<sup>1</sup>

[Pol. VIII 4117 g.]

For the Ambassador personally.

An examination of the text of the Japanese counterproposals to the American Government, transmitted in your telegram No. 1247 of July

<sup>1</sup> The information in brackets is supplied from another copy (1680/395735-36).

15,<sup>2</sup> shows that these counterproposals have been noticeably toned down, particularly in those passages which refer to the Tripartite Pact, and that this toning down is attributable to the American Government's wish that these passages be omitted entirely. In view of this, to us undesirable, development in this matter I request that you call on the Deputy Foreign Minister<sup>3</sup> or the Head of the European Department<sup>4</sup> and, without indicating that you have received any instructions from here, state approximately the following as your personal view.

You had carefully examined the text furnished to you by the Head of the European Department and, of course, had forwarded it to Berlin. As yet you had no instructions from Berlin but believed that on your own initiative you ought to bring up one point immediately. For it appears that the passages of special importance to the other powers of the Tripartite Pact which were contained in the first Japanese counterproposal obviously met with the disapproval of the Washington Government and led to the demand of the Americans that these passages be deleted.

To be sure, the second Japanese counterproposal retained the sense of these passages but in such a substantially weakened form that you could not but express the fear that this method of partial compliance with American wishes would only strengthen the Washington Government's hope that it would be able in the end to put through formulations which would make the Tripartite Pact more or less ineffectual. It was therefore your opinion that yielding with regard to those very passages relating to the Tripartite Pact was extremely risky and inconsistent with the sense and spirit of that Pact.

Actually, the situation was rather this: that the Americans would be more careful the more categorically Japan's determination to stand by the Tripartite Pact were stated, whereas every concession in this regard would encourage Washington to take further steps toward America's entry into the European war and thus by its aggressive action bring about the very situation that the Japanese Government wished to avoid.

In view of this situation you urgently requested that the presentation of the new Japanese counterproposals through Ambassador Nomura be postponed for the time being, so that the above-mentioned point might be re-examined and you yourself be provided with an opportunity, if need be, to inform the Japanese Government of the views of the Reich Government regarding the present state of the Japanese-American negotiations, which you expected to receive.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 123 and footnote 1.

<sup>3</sup> Chuichi Ohashi.

<sup>4</sup> Ryuki Sakamoto.

If it should become apparent from your conversation that Nomura has already submitted the counterproposals, there is nothing that can be done about it; in the contrary case, please use your influence to have the presentation of these proposals postponed. Please report by wire.<sup>5</sup>

RIBBENTROP

<sup>5</sup> Document No. 137.

## No. 123

8589/E602970-73

### *Führer's Directive*

CHEFSACHE

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, July 19, 1941.

TOP SECRET MILITARY

The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht  
OKW/WFSt/Abt. L (I Op. No. 441230/41 g.K. Chefs.

By officer only

#### DIRECTIVE NO. 33: CONTINUATION OF THE WAR IN THE EAST

(1) The second round of battles in the east has ended on the whole front with the breakthrough of the Stalin Line and sweeping advances of the armored units. With Army Group Center the elimination of the strong enemy combat forces remaining between the motorized units will still require considerable time.

The northern wing of Army Group South is hampered in its action and freedom of movement by the Fortress of Kiev and the Fifth Soviet Army in its rear.

(2) The aim of the next operations must be to prevent further strong parts of the enemy from withdrawing into the vast Russian expanse, and to destroy them.

Preparations to that effect are to be set afoot along the following lines:

##### (a) *Southeastern Front:*

The principal objective is the destruction of the enemy's Sixth and Twelfth Armies, while still west of the Dnieper, by a concentric attack. The Rumanian main forces will have to cover this operation in the south.

The enemy's Fifth Army can also most quickly be destroyed by joint action between forces of the Army Group Center's southern wing and Army Group South's northern wing.

Some infantry divisions of Army Group Center will have to be turned toward the south. Additional forces, motorized units particularly, will have to be committed in a southeasterly direction after fulfilling their present missions, securing their supplies, and screening in the direction of Moscow. This will be in order to cut off those enemy forces which transfer to the far side of the Dnieper from escape into the depths of the Russian space, and to destroy them.

*(b) Center of the Eastern Front:*

Army Group Center, after eliminating the numerous encircled enemy pockets and after making its supplies secure, will continue its advance upon Moscow with infantry units, with the mission of cutting the Moscow-Leningrad communications with the motorized units that are not being employed southeastward in the rear of the Dnieper Line, and thereby covering the right flank of the thrust of the Army Group North toward Leningrad.

*(c) Northeastern Front:*

The advance in the direction of Leningrad must not be resumed until the Eighteenth Army has closed up with the 4th Armored Group and the deep flank is dependably shielded toward the east by the Sixteenth Army. Army Group North must also endeavor to block the withdrawal to Leningrad of the Soviet forces still fighting in Estonia.

The early seizure of the Baltic islands, as possible bases of the Soviet fleet, is desired.

*(d) Finnish Front:*

It remains the mission of the Finnish main forces, reinforced by the bulk of the 163rd Division, to attack the enemy confronting them with the main effort east of Lake Ladoga and later, by concerted effort with the Army Group North, to destroy them.

The targets of the attack under command of XXXVI Corps and the Mountain Corps remain unchanged with the understanding, that for the time being stronger support cannot be expected from air units and therefore, if necessary, one will have to put up with a temporary postponement of the operations.

(3) For the *Luftwaffe*, upon the release of any units from the center of the front, it is especially important to support the attack along the southeastern front as the main effort [*schwerpunktmässig*] by the commitment of air and antiaircraft forces, and if necessary, by the prompt bringing up of reinforcements or by a suitable regrouping.

The attack on Moscow with forces of the Second Air Force, reinforced by fighter formations from the west, is to be carried out as soon as possible as "retaliation for the Soviet attacks on Bucharest and Helsinki."

(4) The mission of the *Navy* remains to maintain the maritime traffic, especially for the sending of supplies for the land operations, as far as enemy situation in the sea and in the air permits. Furthermore, while we progressively threaten the enemy bases, our actions must as much as possible be directed at preventing enemy forces from escaping to Swedish ports of internment.

After the fleet units in the Baltic are set free once more, the motor torpedo boats and minesweepers—at first in the strength of one flotilla of each—are to be transferred to the Mediterranean.

Several submarines are to be dispatched to the Arctic Ocean for the support of the German operations in Finland, which are hampered by the bringing up by sea of enemy reinforcements.

(5) In the west and north all three Wehrmacht branches must be on the alert to repel possible British attacks on the Channel Islands and the Norwegian coast. The rapid transfer of combat aircraft from the western theater into all parts of Norway must be ready and prepared.

ADOLF HITLER

No. 129

512/235521-23

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

St.S. No. 493

BERLIN, July 19, 1941.  
zu D VIII 837 I.<sup>1</sup>

For the Foreign Minister.

I should like to make the following comments in regard to the enclosure:

Concerning the treatment of German church matters in so far as they take place abroad or have an effect abroad, general guidelines should, in my opinion, be set up according to which one can proceed without having to obtain the decision of the Foreign Minister or the State Secretary in each separate case.

Foreign policy interests must be observed in two respects:

a. cultural ethnic German interests, which are connected with church-type institutions more often abroad than at home, and in different ways.

b. general foreign policy interests which require a careful treatment of church questions (e.g., the European mobilization against Bolshevism under German leadership).

I therefore recommend that the Foreign Ministry be guided by the following considerations for the issuance of exit and entry permits, foreign exchange permits, and funds for church-cultural items:

1. The exit and entry of church personages who are as such above reproach shall be permitted if, in the opinion of the competent agency abroad, a refusal of the permit would provide an occasion for propagandistic exploitation.

2. German cultural institutions on a denominational basis abroad, such as hospitals, schools, universities, etc., shall be kept viable and capable of functioning both as regards *personnel* (through approval of the departure of the absolutely necessary replacements) and *financially* (through donations or approval of the issuance of foreign

<sup>1</sup> See enclosure.

exchange permits), if in the opinion of the competent agency abroad:

they are directed in a manner above reproach,  
 their disappearance would arouse considerable attention that could  
 be utilized against us propagandistically,  
 there are no other equivalent German cultural positions in existence,  
 or

there is a danger that if they are given up cultural positions of our  
 enemies will gain a foothold (e.g., the Catholic University at Peking).

3. In countries with a marked ecclesiastical life, such as Spain,  
 Sweden, Italy, Denmark, there should be the possibility of religious  
 instruction in our propaganda schools, i.e., in the German schools in  
 which foreign children are educated together with German children.

WEIZSÄCKER

[Enclosure]

Department Germany <sup>2</sup>

BERLIN, June 28, 1941.

e.o. D VIII 837 I.

The dispatch of Reich German clergymen involves churchmen who  
 care spiritually for the Germans abroad who are organized in their  
 own German congregations. In processing the applications for exit  
 permits Department Germany also asks the participation of the Chief  
 of the Auslandsorganisation and the Chief of the Security Police  
 and of the Security Service. Through this participation a position  
 is taken both as regards the person of the proposed clergyman and  
 also objectively as regards the pastoral post involved. In its efforts  
 at consolidating the Germans abroad the Auslandsorganisation con-  
 siders itself to be hampered through their ecclesiastical organization.  
 The Party Chancellery shares the view of the Auslandsorganisation.

On the occasion of a report which I gave the Foreign Minister on the  
 subject of the participation of the Foreign Ministry in church matters,  
 the Foreign Minister expressed himself as opposed in principle to  
 special consideration by the Foreign Ministry of German church work  
 abroad.

The Foreign Ministry therefore will support church matters only in  
 exceptional cases if there are considerable ethnic German interests  
 involved, and will therefore also facilitate the dispatch of Reich Ger-  
 man clergymen to foreign German congregations only in isolated  
 cases.<sup>3</sup>

Herewith again submitted to the State Secretary.

LUTHER

<sup>2</sup> Department Germany (Abteilung Deutschland), a shortened form for Department for German Internal Affairs.

<sup>3</sup> Marginal note: "In my opinion the closing paragraph is too narrowly formulated. Besides the ethnic German interests purely foreign policy interests also come into question. See separate memorandum (St.S. No. 493), July 19. Weizsäcker."

[EDITORS' NOTE. *The Memoirs of Marshal Mannerheim* translated by Eric Lewenhaupt (London, 1953), page 423, mention a letter which Hitler wrote to President Ryti regarding the intelligence service maintained by the British Legation in Helsinki. The letter is also mentioned in the book edited by John H. Wuorinen, *Finland and World War II, 1939-1944* (New York, 1948), page 116, which states that Hitler demanded that Finland break off diplomatic relations with Great Britain because the British Legation served as a center for espionage for Soviet Russia. It is stated that the letter was received on July 19 and it is further stated that the Finnish Government took up the problem on July 22. No trace of such a letter by Hitler to Ryti has been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry.]

No. 130

82/60382-83

*The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 1297 of July 19

TOKYO, July 20, 1941—1:50 a. m.

Received July 20—4:20 a. m.

[Pol. VIII 3982 g.]<sup>1</sup>

With reference to my telegram No. 1295 of July 19.<sup>2</sup>

The translation of the Foreign Minister's declaration follows:

"Entrusted with the post of Foreign Minister, I have the honor of hereby introducing myself to the German (the Italian) Ambassador in Tokyo.

I respectfully request that you transmit my regards to your Foreign Minister and inform him that I was unexpectedly entrusted with the post of Foreign Minister in the formation of the new Cabinet.

At the same time I would like to inform you and your Government officially of the change of the Imperial Japanese Government. As you have perceived from the announcement by the Imperial Government, this governmental change was effected in order first to carry out political measures in accordance with the international situation, and further to be able to take, as soon as possible, the necessary steps to strengthen the inner political situation of the country. Apart from these points there were no reasons for the governmental change, and the present policy of the Japanese Empire will in no case undergo any change.

I request that you take particular cognizance of the fact [that] Japan's policy will rest on the basis of the spirit and aims of the Tri-

<sup>1</sup> The file number is supplied from another copy (1680/395710-11).

<sup>2</sup> In this telegram (82/60379) Ott reported that the new Japanese Foreign Minister, Admiral Toyoda, had summoned him and the Italian Ambassador to give them the statement which is printed here.

partite Pact, concluded between Japan, Germany, and Italy. No change whatever will take place in Japan's attitude toward Germany and Italy, as former Foreign Minister Matsuoka clearly expressed it to you, on the basis of cabinet decision of 2 July.<sup>3</sup> I respectfully request that you also notify your Government of the above. I personally was active in the Navy at the time of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, and had a share in bringing it about. As successor of former Foreign Minister Matsuoka, I intend to continue his foreign policy and to strengthen even more the close unity of Japan, Germany, and Italy, and to march forward in the common spirit. I express the hope that you, Herr (Signor) Ambassador, will bestow upon me, just as upon the former Foreign Minister, your valued friendship and cooperation."

OTT

<sup>3</sup> See documents Nos. 63 and 64.

## No. 131

82/60376-78

*The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOKYO, July 20, 1941—1: 55 a. m.

No. 1293 of July 19

Received July 20—7: 50 a. m.

Prince Konoye's third Cabinet<sup>1</sup> has not brought about any stronger concentration of national forces, the urgent necessity of which had been given as the reason for the reshuffling of the Cabinet. Not represented in it, to be sure, are those ministers that belonged to the former political parties. Furthermore, the Navy is more strongly represented through the appointment of Admiral Toyoda as Foreign Minister and Minister of Colonies, and of Vice Admiral Sakonji as Minister of Commerce and Industry. The new Cabinet, however, is also largely under the influence of big business, which is shown in the first place by the fact that the former Director General of the Sumitomo combine, Ogura, has received the important post of Finance Minister. Ogura, who wielded a strong influence in the former Cabinet even as Minister without Portfolio, will undoubtedly try to carry out one of his conservative financial policies and therefore, if anything, obstruct the heavy demands of the armed forces. Furthermore, Vice Admiral Sakonji, as Director of the North Sakhalin Petroleum Company, and Admiral Toyoda, as a result of his family connection with

<sup>1</sup> Ott had reported the formation and composition of the new Konoye Cabinet in telegram No. 1284 of July 18 (82/60368).

the Mitsubishi combine, have close ties with industry. Business circles accordingly show satisfaction with the new government.

The former Minister of the Interior, Baron Hiranuma, who, as I reported, has repeatedly created personal and substantive difficulties for Matsuoka, has remained as a very influential person in the Cabinet. In spite of strong pressure Konoye could not bring himself to eliminate this powerful man. He did, to be sure, make him relinquish the post of Minister of the Interior, under whom the police prefects are placed, and remain in the Cabinet as Minister without Portfolio, but behind the scenes his influence is still strong, especially since his friend and long-time collaborator, Tanabe, has received the post of Minister of the Interior. Furthermore, Hiranuma is close to Lieutenant General Yanagawa, president of the "Society for the Support of the Imperial Government," who belongs to the Cabinet as Minister without Portfolio. Everything indicates that the aim of the Cabinet's resignation was to get rid of Matsuoka. This man of fertile mind and animated manner had already been long disliked by the conservative elements. His oratorical talent and his ability to gain popularity among the masses made him appear to these circles as downright dangerous. For this reason the press has received strict instructions to ignore him as far as possible—which on the whole has indeed been successful.

Though his resignation is consequently to be attributed mainly to domestic Japanese causes, reasons of foreign policy were also involved. In spite of his well-known weakness Matsuoka did during his term of office show himself to be an advocate of a broad interpretation and application of the policy of the Tripartite Pact. He was confirmed therein particularly by the personal impressions he received on his trip to Germany and Italy.

As I have reported, he had to fight on that account against strong opposition in the Cabinet, in the business circles and among the Anglophiles. On various points, as for example in dealing with the American proposal, he did not prevail with the policy that we desired and for that reason made himself the target of vehement criticisms from the nationalist camp. The conclusion of the Neutrality Pact with the Soviet Union,<sup>2</sup> which he himself probably regarded as a mistake, was strongly held against him after the beginning of the Russian-German war, and the resulting reproach that he had put Japan into a difficult moral position was cleverly exploited by his opponents. Furthermore, his opponents declared that at the last Cabinet session he had, as confirmed by Furuuchi, [?] championed the view of Ambassador Oshima and of the German Government and was kept in leading strings by them.

<sup>2</sup> See vol. xii of this series, document No. 332, footnote 2.



Konoye's colorless statement after the formation of the Government,<sup>3</sup> which was transmitted by D.N.B., and the vague press comments on the situation do not hold out any prospect that the new government aims to pursue a vigorous policy. Rather, it is to be assumed that after Matsuoka's ouster a continued policy of wait-and-see will be adopted toward the United States and that still greater safeguards in the matter of preparation will be demanded with regard to taking action against the Soviet Union. Finally, the circles around Konoye and Hiranuma are primarily concerned about China, without developing constructive plans for the solution of this problem.

I am convinced that after a while these obstacles will be overcome. In this connection there are the Indochinese operation,<sup>4</sup> the preparations for which are already too far advanced to be called off, the impossibility of reaching an agreement with the United States on China, and the weight of the current mobilization preparations which commit Japanese policy to that of the Tripartite Pact. I should therefore like to suggest that no doubts about Japan's attitude be evinced by Germany, although for the time being a certain reserve toward the [Japanese] Government might be advisable.

OTT

<sup>3</sup>This statement reads as follows: "The policy of this country to cope with the international situation is already fixed; it now remains for us to put it into practice with speed and decision. It is my firm belief that the only way to realize this is to put our internal affairs in order on the basis of national policy. With the earnest support of a population of 100,000,000 I intend to do everything in my power to accomplish the great ideal of founding an empire by overcoming all difficulties that may lie in our country's path." See *Keessing's Contemporary Archives, 1940-1943*, p. 4703.

<sup>4</sup>See document No. 126.

## No. 132

71/50882

*The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat*

Telegram

No. 684 SPECIAL TRAIN WESTFALEN, July 20, 1941—3:10 a. m.  
Received Berlin, July 20—3:20 a. m.

For the Acting State Secretary.

Please notify all Foreign Ministry personnel concerned with propaganda in the Arab question of the following directive:

Regard for the French rule in Syria has so far imposed on us a certain reserve in supporting the demands of the Arabs for political freedom and independence. With the collapse of French resistance against England in Syria, the reason for this reserve has been eliminated. I ask you therefore to support vigorously henceforth the wishes of the Arabs for the achievement of unlimited freedom in

the propaganda treatment of the Arab question. This propaganda must be carried on under the slogan of "The Axis fights for the freedom of the Arabs"; appropriate Italian cooperation is to be arranged.

RIBBENTROP

## No. 133

1527/373706-08

*The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 2324 of July 19 WASHINGTON, July 20, 1941—8:59 a. m.  
Received July 20—8:20 p. m.

With reference to my telegrams No. 2146 of July 9<sup>1</sup> and No. 2301 of July 18.<sup>2</sup>

According to all indications President Roosevelt had postponed for the moment his intention to occupy the Cape Verde Islands, the Azores, and Dakar.

Thus the chairman of the "America First Committee", General Wood, announced in a press statement on July 18<sup>3</sup> that he had just been informed that the military advisers had prevented the implementation of Roosevelt's plan. General Wood was doubtless given this information by Army circles.

The fact that the President has actually changed his original intention is also evident from the following announcements of two well-informed periodicals: The *United States News* predicts in the issue published on July 15 the dispatch of American troops to Atlantic bases on foreign territory; 3 days later Lindley writes in *Newsweek* that the occupation of the Portuguese and French bases had now become improbable unless Germany should make motions to occupy England or Portugal. Pearson and Allen on July 17 also pointed to a repeated change in military orders according to which the orders were given to the American Marine landing troops four times and withdrawn three times previous to the occupation of Iceland.

This change in the President's opinion certainly was decisively influenced not only by the grave misgivings of the Army and the Navy but also by the reports which were heeded here regarding a strengthening of the Portuguese garrisons on the Azores and the Cape Verde Islands,<sup>4</sup> as well as regarding preparations of the French to defend Dakar. A further reason for Roosevelt's hesitation to push further

<sup>1</sup>See document No. 104, footnote 1.

<sup>2</sup>Document No. 121.

<sup>3</sup>No report of such a press statement has been found.

<sup>4</sup>Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. II, pp. 841-842.

into the Atlantic lies in the momentary lack of clarity about Japan's next steps.

A definite prediction about the President's intentions is hardly possible at the present time. It is at any rate a fact that at the present time—mainly because of American productive capacity—he is providing restricted war aid to England; however he has thus far resisted the full and open employment of the Atlantic fleet and he has also resisted giving in to the English wish that he personally support the propaganda for the entry of the United States into the war. The President adjusts his measures to the daily developments at any given time, whereby his decisions often represent the character of an emotional reaction—be it to the actions of Germany or to the pleading of England. His position thus far, would, as reported,<sup>5</sup> indicate a continuation of the policy of aid to England while avoiding a binding declaration of war, whereby it is being taken into account here that after the conclusion of the German campaign against Russia, England will demand a clear decision. At the same time he is utilizing what is probably his own existing indecision as a tactical expedient by means of changes, secrecy, and in part misrepresentation of his actual intentions. He thereby calls the attention of the whole country to his person, does not commit himself to any decisions and tries, through intentional lack of clarity about his measures (orders to shoot), to bring the opponent to undertake actions which he can utilize as justification of his own measures. It is at any rate certain that nothing would be more welcome to the President than an incident for which he can make Germany responsible.

THOMSEN

<sup>5</sup> Document No. 104.

### No. 134

F19/373-81

#### *Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini*<sup>1</sup>

At present FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, July 20, 1941.

DUCE: Now that the fourth week since the beginning of the war in the east has come to an end, I should like, Duce, to give you a brief summary of the situation as it appears to me.

I read your last letter<sup>2</sup> with hearty pleasure. I share your political views entirely, Duce. Some important new problems have now arisen that I should like to refer to briefly:

<sup>1</sup> In telegram No. 1630 of July 21 (B12/B001091) Mackensen reported that at 8:00 p. m. he handed the letter to Mussolini who read it aloud, translating it into Italian for Ciano. Mussolini suggested that the meeting with Hitler take place after the Italian formations took over their sector on the eastern front which would be in the second half of August.

<sup>2</sup> Of July 2, document No. 62.

1. *France* has again started playing her double game; either as an aftereffect of the loss of Syria or, as I believe, as a result of the budding of new hopes in view of the tying down of substantial German forces in the east. Although we had recently, among other things, reached an agreement on the landing of miscellaneous war material in Bizerte, the French Government now states again that it could permit this only after new concessions of a psychological and military kind.<sup>3</sup> In other words: the present French Government sees itself in the role of Talleyrand at the Congress of Vienna, and at the same time forgets that I am neither Metternich nor Hardenberg.<sup>4</sup> I do not have to become mistrustful about it now, because, as a matter of fact, I have never lost my mistrust. At any rate, more than ever, I consider it necessary to be constantly on my guard. Moreover, I am not at all thinking of making still more concessions, because every concession always means the ultimate loss of a position without the French Government's seriously committing itself to counterservices. To put it differently our concessions, Duce, cannot be revoked, while the French Government, on the other hand, is always in a position to retract its commitments.

Nevertheless, this situation gives rise to problems for the solution of which we must be particularly concerned, Duce. Because the additional safeguarding and development of the sea routes to Tripoli and Bengazi gain thereby added significance.

I consider it the primary goal of our common effort to exclude any possibility of a new critical development in the supply situation in Libya. Beyond that, traffic facilities must further be expanded in such a way that the requirements resulting from future intentions for this theater of war may be met to the full extent and with as little interference from the enemy as possible.

Perhaps it is conceivable, Duce, that a means for the improvement of the present situation could be found similar to the splendid companionship in arms of the Italian and German army units in Libya, and a much closer collaboration could be achieved between the Italian and German naval and air staffs which are concerned with the maintenance and protection of communications to Libya.

I would place at your complete disposal for this purpose the liaison staffs of the German Navy and Luftwaffe which have been stationed in Rome for some time, and would ask that you call on them for assistance within the framework of the Italian High Command.

I would cite as important tasks in which German military experience could prove useful:

1. Activation of the fighter and anti-aircraft defense at sea and as protection for the loading and unloading ports against attacks by sea from surface and submarine forces.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 113.

<sup>4</sup> Karl August von Hardenberg, Prussian delegate at the Congress of Vienna.

2. Antisubmarine defense in which, particularly in our transportation to Norway, we acquired very valuable experience. We succeeded there in only a few weeks in eliminating the British submarines completely.

3. Distribution and use of naval and air forces, particularly in the convoy service.

4. Effective immobilization of the Island of Malta as a base for the enemy air force committed against our transports.

5. Management of merchant ship tonnage.

I am mentioning these points only so as to leave it to you to give an appropriate order in which such a collaboration could take place. I ask only that you make such effective use of the German liaison staffs that you, too, Duce, in your fight will profit from the results of our experience. For it is my ardent desire, Duce, to help with our means which are naturally limited to the best of our ability in this distant theater of war; not only that Italy may retain her North African colonies, but that she may, in addition, satisfy those demands which, to my mind, are so well justified that, unless they are granted, there will be no peace for Germany either.

2. *Spain.* The present attitude of Spain, and particularly Franco's latest speech,<sup>5</sup> at last seem to me permeated with the realization that not only the freedom of Germany and Italy, but actually the future of Europe is at stake in our battle. If, in the end, active collaboration could still result, I would be sincerely glad of it. I hope that as far as Germany is concerned, our armed forces will regain complete freedom of action by autumn at the latest. Collaboration with Spain then could, in certain circumstances, still be very advantageous generally.

3. *Turkey.* I hope here that with continued success on the eastern front, we may perhaps succeed in drawing Turkey more into our sphere of interest in order at least to be able to consider those ideas that you, Duce, touched upon in your last letter. Yes, it will perhaps be possible, as operations progress in the east, to confront the English military leaders with new problems altogether. I wanted to talk with you about it, Duce, the next time we see each other. Even the attack upon Egypt from the side of Asia Minor would make our military situation much easier.

4. *Japan.* I still don't quite understand the reason for the Cabinet crisis in Japan.<sup>6</sup> I consider it impossible that the Japanese Government should overlook or fail to grasp the unique opportunity that the present situation offers it. To be sure, whatever step it decides to take, it naturally requires a certain period of preparation. I do not believe that Japan will be in a position to proceed against Soviet Russia before the middle of August. The measures toward the south too can-

<sup>5</sup> Of July 17, 1941. The contents of the speech were reported by Heberlein in Madrid telegram No. 2460 of July 18 (95/106955-56). See also document No. 157.

<sup>6</sup> See document No. 124.

not be taken without further ado. I consider it possible that before a step, particularly against Russia, is undertaken an improvement in Japan's strategic position to the south will have to be assured. On one point, I believe, there is no longer any doubt in Japan: Through no fault of our own, America, thanks to her Jewish leadership, is not only the enemy of Europe but also the enemy of East Asia. Day after tomorrow it will, in exactly the same way, be the enemy of the British World Empire, and, moreover, its most dangerous enemy. Only the narrow-minded stupidity of the present English administration fails to foresee this future development, or else, they force themselves to shut their eyes to this development.

The occupation of Iceland,<sup>7</sup> Duce, has, in these circumstances, only strengthened me in my determination to end the war in the east with all available means as rapidly as possible. The prospects are favorable for it!

After the first breakthrough had been initiated for the destruction of a number of Russian armies, as well as the smashing of or attack on numerous Russian divisions, some time passed, in order

1. that these encircled Russian armies, which after all consisted of more than a million men, might be destroyed or forced to capitulate;

2. that the infantry divisions might be allowed, after conclusion of these battles, to catch up with the armored divisions which had advanced far ahead; and

3. that the general supply base, that is, particularly the railroad and the communications network, might be put in order and connected with the advancing armies.

In the latter field particularly a tremendous amount has been achieved. Numerous Russian railroads are again operating, other lines are in process of having the gauge changed, that is, our supply trains are already advancing on the German gauge to far east of Minsk. These lines will in a few days, despite all the destruction, already have reached or crossed the so-called Stalin Line. After these preparations were made, and the infantry divisions had caught up with the motorized units ahead of them, I gave the order to attack the Stalin Line and to break through at the places foreseen. This operation succeeded along the entire front. At the moment there are trapped Russian units or armies at eight places along our front. The noose is being drawn tighter almost hourly, and I do not believe that any considerable portions can succeed in breaking through. It will then probably take 8 days again before the mass of our infantry will have followed the armored units which will have pushed far to the east. But I estimate that by the end of next week large portions of the Russian armies that were previously stationed at the Stalin Line will

<sup>7</sup> See document No. 83.

be destroyed. Further actions of annihilation are now being started. They will follow very shortly. I already consider it entirely out of the question that the Russian Command will succeed in bringing any considerable force back across the Volga or even behind the Urals. At any rate I am determined to pursue the Russian Army until it is entirely destroyed and annihilated. This resolve is also shared by the troops. This hard resolve was born under the influence of the horror that Bolshevism has only now revealed to us; for the power against which we are fighting here, consists not of people, but of devils. Every day the conviction grows, both among officers and men, that we stepped in at the last possible moment to combat a danger that threatened Europe to a degree unsurpassed since the Hun or Mongol invasions. The atrocities that are perpetrated by these beasts defy the imagination. My Leibstandarte, for example, came upon an advance detachment of the armored group Kleist, which had hurried far ahead, been cut off, and finally, after all its ammunition gave out, had been overpowered. They were found, all tied up, in a condition so horrible that the photographs cannot be circulated even in Germany. The consequence of these impressions is a growing fanaticism, even among our own soldiers, who prefer not to take prisoners at all any more. What we do find here in the way of prisoners is—whether enlisted man or officer—so brutalized and unspeakably debased that again there emerges the sharp boundary line between Europe and Central Asia, as distinguished from the Far East, from those old highly cultivated races, that is, who for thousands of years had to defend themselves laboriously in bloody battles against Mongol Asia.

The German and Rumanian formations attacking from Rumania under the command of Antonescu have now liberated large parts of Bessarabia and have for 3 days been engaged in crossing the Dniester. It is precisely the Rumanian units of this Army group that have fought splendidly. Their Chief, General Antonescu, himself is certainly a very rare person, not only thoroughly energetic, but also particularly competent. Just as gallantly, however, did the 2½ divisions of the Slovak Army and particularly also the Hungarian units fight. Unfortunately the press cannot refrain from continually re-opening the barely healed wounds between Hungary and Rumania. At the moment, therefore, in addition to other troubles, I also have the worry of preventing the troops of these countries from coming in direct contact with each other in order, if possible, to avoid incidents; I believe, however, that the soldiers are much more averse to them—if only because of the bloody mission they have in common—than the journalists in the various capitals.

The battle in the extreme north is primarily a battle against nature. General Dietl<sup>8</sup> in particular first has to cut at least a small path through every kilometer covered in order to be able to bring up ammunition and food. There is, moreover, I hear, in the tundra amidst the snow and ice, a veritably inconceivable plague of gnats. This is, therefore, a war like that in Narvik, in which patience and endurance are just as decisive as bravery—three virtues which the Finns especially have to an extraordinary degree. They are just as splendidly led as they are unprecedentedly reliable and at the same time extremely unassuming. A small but brave race of heroes!

Your formations, Duce, are now being brought up as rapidly as possible in the circumstances and I am convinced that they will participate successfully and advantageously in the second phase of the battles in the south. I am particularly glad that this corps of yours is a complete and numerically adequate one because this also poses simpler problems in the matter of supplies later on. It will be especially a joy to me, Duce, to be able to greet you yourself again. This time, even more than before, I am convinced that the war is won; for after the annihilation of Russia, there will be no power in the world, Duce, that can shake our European or your North African position. Aside from this, however, we shall succeed in guaranteeing out of the immeasurable expanse of the eastern area, those basic economic conditions that would be calculated, even if the war lasts very long, to free the rest of Europe from its ever-present want and its attendant anxiety.

Please accept, Duce, my heartiest and comradely greetings,

Your<sup>9</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Eduard Dietl, General of Mountain Troops; Commanding General, Mountain Corps Norway in Finland.

<sup>9</sup> No typed signature appears on this version of the document which is the film of a copy made from the carbon of the original.

No. 135

199/140898-99

*The Minister in Bolivia to the Foreign Ministry*<sup>1</sup>

Telegram

No. 211 of July 20

LA PAZ, July 20, 1941.

With reference to my telegram No. 210 of July 19.<sup>2</sup>

Today's press announces in big headlines that a state of siege has been proclaimed and that I have been declared persona non grata.

<sup>1</sup> Marginal note: "Shown to the Foreign Minister. R[intelen], July 21."

<sup>2</sup> In this telegram (203/141631) Wendler first reported that the Under State Secretary had informed him that he was no longer persona grata and that his departure was desired by next Tuesday, July 22.



No. 137

82/60895

*The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT TOKYO, July 21, 1941—10:40 a. m., summer time.  
No. 1308 of July 21 Received July 21—10:20 p. m.<sup>1</sup>

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to your telegram No. 1098 of July 19.<sup>2</sup>

With regard to the Japanese counterproposals addressed to the American Government I have told the Deputy Foreign Minister<sup>3</sup> about my personal objections to the toning down of the passages relating to the Tripartite Pact and urgently requested that Ambassador Nomura postpone their presentation so that they can be re-examined.

The Deputy Foreign Minister replied that the instructions had in the meantime been sent, as Foreign Minister Matsuoka had specially expedited the transmittal before he resigned in order to commit Japanese policy to the unbridgeable antagonism toward the United States of America. Like Matsuoka, the Deputy Foreign Minister was convinced that in view of these antagonisms, which have arisen particularly on the China question, a practical agreement was impossible. Moreover, further tension in relations with the United States of America was to be expected in the next few days as a result of the Japanese action against Indochina. In these circumstances the Japanese counterproposals were (group missing), as I had repeatedly been told, only a tactical maneuver to clear Japan of the blame for the failure of the negotiations.

OTT

<sup>1</sup> Marginal note: "Forwarded to the Special Train as No. 2442, July 21."

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 127.

<sup>3</sup> Chuichi Ohashi.

No. 138

5077/E292421-24

*Memorandum by an Official of the Department for German Internal Affairs*

BERLIN, July 21, 1941.  
zu D IX 44.<sup>1</sup>

Subject: Letter of M. Wolodymyr Stachiw of July 2, 1941,<sup>2</sup> addressed to the Reich Foreign Minister recording his appointment as Plenipotentiary of the Ukrainian Government.

<sup>1</sup> D IX 44: Document No. 115.

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 115, enclosure.

The events from which M. Wolodymyr Stachiw, in his opinion, can derive his mandate for announcing to the Reich Foreign Minister his appointment as Plenipotentiary of an alleged Ukrainian Government, in Lwów are briefly described in the enclosed memorandum. What is involved is an arbitrary action of the ambitious and active Bandera group. The action which it staged in Lwów has no constitutional significance whatsoever from our viewpoint. This view has been expressed unequivocally to the leading people of the Bandera group by the German military and domestic authorities, which, however, presumably does not exclude that the dispute described will not be the last one. If nevertheless Bandera and his staff have so far been treated leniently this is explained by the fact that the activities of this section of the OUN have often turned out to be quite useful, and by the wish that the groups of the Ukrainian youth which are particularly attached to it should not lose their enthusiasm for their cause.

A reply to the letter of M. Wolodymyr Stachiw in my opinion is out of the question. Likewise the matter should not be submitted to the Reich Foreign Minister at the present stage.

Herewith to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat through Under State Secretary Woermann.

GROSSKOPF

[Enclosure]

BERLIN, July 21, 1941.  
zu D IX 44.<sup>3</sup>

## MEMORANDUM

Subject: Proclamation of the "Ukrainian Government" by Bandera followers in Lwów on June 30, 1941.

Reference: Letter of July 16, 1941, from the Foreign Minister's Secretariat and letter of July 2, 1941, from Wolodymyr Stachiw to the Foreign Minister.

The occurrences of June 30 in Lwów represented a surprise coup of the Bandera people, i.e., the group of the OUN, the "Ukrainian nationalists," led by Stepan Bandera; this group doubtless wanted thereby to assure themselves of priority over the other Ukrainian groups. For this purpose they utilized what was first announced simply as a liberation celebration of the Ukrainian nationalists in Lwów which the Wehrmacht representatives mentioned in M. Stachiw's letter had had no hesitation in attending. Without having notified any German authorities at all in advance, Bandera's deputy,

<sup>3</sup> D IX 44: Document No. 115.

Jaroslav Stecjkó—after the general welcoming addresses mentioned by Stachiw had first been given—suddenly read a proclamation by Bandera concerning the establishment of a Ukrainian Government in western Ukraine, regarding the prosecution of the war by this new state “shoulder to shoulder” with the Reich against the Soviet Union, and the appointment of Stecjkó as chief of the Government of Western Ukraine.

The fact that the Bandera people could steal a march upon the other Ukrainian groups can be attributed not only to their greater lack of scruples but also to the fact that they had shown themselves to be particularly active. A considerable number of their followers belonged to the Ukrainian battalion fighting in German uniforms which occupied the Lwów radio station and the town hall; they were active in the radio propaganda, etc.

As for the German military authorities they were interested in establishing contact with any kind of organized Ukrainian groups which for their part supported the measures that were taken with respect to tranquillity, order, and welfare in the occupied territory. As the Bandera people along with their cells which operated within the country seem to have been on the spot earliest, they evidently had priority in this cooperation, too. On the German side, naturally, only aims of maintaining order locally had been envisaged; the Lwów meeting tried to give the situation a political turn.

Professor *Koch*, who attended the Lwów meeting as a representative of the Abwehr and who had welcomed it merely as a liberation celebration before the proclamation was read reproached M. Stecjkó sharply for the disloyalty of his conduct and left the hall together with the other representatives of the Wehrmacht. In the meantime, however, the Bandera people had taken another high-handed step by disseminating Bandera's proclamation over the Lwów radio.

As a reaction on the part of Germany, security measures were ordered against Bandera and some of his closest coworkers; they were relatively mild, to be sure, but were meant to remind the people concerned of the realities of the situation. Bandera was told to move from the General Government where he had been staying to Berlin. There he was placed under house arrest for a while; even now he is still on parole, but with freedom of movement within Greater Berlin. The same procedure was followed in the case of Stecjkó.

Regarding the situation in Lwów I have heard in connection with the matters described that with the controlling participation of Professor Koch a “Ukrainian Territorial Council”—according to another version, incidentally, called only a “Ukrainian Council of Trusted Representatives” [*Vertrauensrat*]<sup>1</sup>—is in the process of formation; this body is supposed merely to be available to the German administration

as an advisory organ. It is intended to include the Bandera people, too; evidently, however, all differences of opinion have not been eliminated as yet.

Submitted herewith to Senior Counselor Grosskopf.

BAUM

No. 139

1527/378705

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the United States*

Telegram

No. 696 of July 19                      SPECIAL TRAIN, July 19, 1941—1:15 p. m.  
from the Special Train              Received Berlin, July 22—1:40 p. m.  
No. 1395 of July 22 from the Foreign Ministry              Sent July 22.

For the Chargé d'Affaires.

Please see that the following ideas are circulated in the United States, using the channels at your disposal.

Of all parts of the population in the United States, the Jews, surely, have the greatest interest in America's not entering the war, because the effects of America's entry into the war will sooner or later be for no one so disadvantageous as for the American Jews. In the first place one can expect as a certainty that the war will bring to America exactly what the Jews feel to be a particular nightmare, namely a strictly authoritarian regime that will reduce the possibilities of influence for the Jews to a minimum. The tremendous losses certainly to be expected in a war of America against Europe will bring out strikingly clear the hatred of the Jews which is latent in the United States anyhow. People will soon recall that the Jews were the principal warmongers and they will be made responsible for the losses that occur. The end of the story will be that one day all the Jews in America will be beaten to death.

I should think that a dissemination of these ideas among American Jewry could produce an effect desired by us, and I ask you to report by wire to what extent indications of such ideas, which doubtless predict the future development correctly, can be observed there even at this time.<sup>1</sup>

RIBBENTROP

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 150.

## No. 140

260/170091

*The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

HELSINKI, July 22, 1941—5:04 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received July 22—5:40 p. m.

No. 659 of July 22

With reference to my telegram No. 652.<sup>1</sup>

1) The meeting of the Cabinet has just taken place.<sup>2</sup> All of the members with the exception of two supported the proposal that the President authorize the Foreign Minister in his relations with England "to go as far as breaking off diplomatic relations." Thereupon the President extended this authorization to the Foreign Minister.

2) The Foreign Minister would be very pleased if the English Government would take the most recent Finnish answer as the occasion for breaking off relations.<sup>3</sup> If this does not take place within the next few days, however, the Foreign Minister is resolved to act on the basis of the authorization.<sup>4</sup>

3) The Foreign Minister in this connection pointed out to me that the doctrine was widespread among the Finnish people that Finland should not enter the war in the West. The Foreign Minister would therefore welcome it if, in case of a breach of relations with England, the German press would *not* represent this as entrance of Finland on the side of Germany in the war against England, but simply as the cessation of diplomatic relations between Finland and England.

BLÜCHER

<sup>1</sup> In this telegram (260/170088) Blücher reported that Ryti and Witting were suggesting to members of the Foreign Affairs Committee the breaking off of relations with England; that the Cabinet would meet the next day; and that a sharp telegram was being sent to London refusing further British demands and demanding the return of confiscated cargoes.

<sup>2</sup> See Editors' Note, p. 185.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 1.

<sup>4</sup> See, further, document No. 160.

## No. 141

129/121118-19

*Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

U. St.S. Pol. 698

BERLIN, July 22, 1941.

The newly appointed Portuguese Minister, Count Tovar, visited me today for the first time. We agreed that his communication with the Foreign Ministry could take place in the usual manner even before the presentation of his credentials.

The Minister was very open in the conversation. I note the following points:

1. Count Tovar expressed unequivocally his fears concerning the policy of the United States, especially with regard to the Azores, and confirmed that Portugal was not tranquilized by the statements of Sumner Welles.<sup>1</sup> In no case was Portugal willing to enter any sort of compromises whether open or covert with respect to the Azores but would rather fight if the occasion arose. With regard to the possibilities of defending the Azores, the Minister said that the defensive strength had been greatly increased through the arrival of new batteries and troops, so that an operation with a few destroyers, for example, could not be successful. Large ships would have to be used, and it was doubtful whether the Americans would run this risk.

2. Regarding Spanish-Portuguese relations, the Minister said that they were more cordial than ever before. In all of Spain there was only one man who stood outside the ranks; this was unfortunately Foreign Minister Serrano Suñer. The printing of the abdication statement of King Alfonso in the Portuguese press had occasioned in him an entirely unjustified and incomprehensible irritation with Portugal.

Count Tovar evaluated the internal situation of Spain very skeptically, particularly her situation with regard to supplies of food and gasoline. Portugal was willing to help with provision of food and had just now given Spain an unsecured credit for overseas foods, especially for the delivery of vegetable oils.<sup>2</sup> Spain's lack of oil was to be explained by the fact that in order to obtain foreign exchange she sold her oil abroad, especially to the United States, for a much higher price than the price she now had to pay for imports.

3. The Minister said with regard to German-Portuguese relations that actually there had never been any political talks between Germany and Portugal in recent years. If we wished to begin such talks, Portugal would certainly always be ready for them.

WOERMANN

<sup>1</sup> In a press conference on July 14, Sumner Welles said "that the United States hoped that Portugal would remain in control of the Azores and Cape Verde Islands and that this country [the U.S.A.] had no intention of acting against them." (*The New York Times*, July 15, 1941, p. 9, col. 1)

<sup>2</sup> Portugal and Spain had signed a trade agreement in Lisbon on July 2, providing for the supply to Spain of colonial produce, and for the financing of the shipments by Portugal. Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Bulletin of International News*, vol. xviii (1941), pp. 930-931.

[EDITORS' NOTE. On July 22 Marshal Kvaternik, the head of the Croatian armed forces, visited Hitler at his field headquarters. Hewel's record of this conversation on the German film of files of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat (F7/0119-108) is badly damaged



and for the most part illegible. The invitation to this visit which was to be followed by a trip to the front was transmitted in Ribbentrop's telegram No. 631 sent to the Legation in Zagreb on July 14 (116/66943). The text of an exchange of letters, between Ribbentrop and Kvaternik at the end of this visit was transmitted to the Legation in Zagreb in telegram No. 724 of July 29 (116/66962-63).]

## No. 142

851/284432

*Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter*

SPECIAL TRAIN, July 23, 1941.

The OKW informs us of the following:

"A Danish request for reinforcement of the Danish Army by about 2,000 men has been addressed to OKW through the Military Attaché in Copenhagen.<sup>1</sup>

The Commander in Chief of the Replacement Army<sup>2</sup> is of the opinion that this request could be complied with, but that it should be made conditional on the demand that a contingent of the Danish Army, of about regiment strength, should, as in the case of Croatia<sup>3</sup> be made available within the framework of the German Army for the fight against Bolshevism."<sup>4</sup>

OKW asks for our comment.

I propose that we should agree to Denmark's wish of reinforcing her Army by about 2,000 men on condition that a contingent of the Danish Army, of approximately regiment strength, in addition to the Danish corps of volunteers, will, as a unit, join in the war against Russia.<sup>5</sup>

RITTER

<sup>1</sup>This is probably an error and should read, "the Commander of German Troops in Denmark" (see document No. 198). The German Military Attaché for Denmark before the German occupation was Lt. Gen. v. Uthmann with offices in Stockholm.

<sup>2</sup>Col. Gen. Fritz Fromm.

<sup>3</sup>See document No. 46 and footnote 2.

<sup>4</sup>Marginal notes: "Together with General Jodl, I submitted this memorandum to the Führer. The Führer agrees with the proposal as set forth above. He also thinks that the inclusion of foreign contingents would ease the task of our Army later on in the occupation. Hewel, July 30."

"Ambassador Ritter: The Foreign Minister has been informed. R[intel], July 31."

"Yes. R[ibbentrop]."

<sup>5</sup>In telegram No. 990 of Aug. 5 (851/284425) Renthe-Fink reported that the German decision in this matter had been transmitted to the Danish General Staff by the German Military Commander. For the Danish reply and German reaction, see document No. 198.

## No. 143

535/239971

*An Official of the Department for German Internal Affairs to the Foreign Minister*

Teletype

BERLIN, July 23, 1941.

e.o. D IX 49.

I request the Office of the Foreign Minister to have the following telegram sent to the Foreign Minister:

Teletype, Special Train.

For Counselor of Legation Weber.

At the conference at Leibbrandt's<sup>1</sup> on July 23 the following matter was discussed:

I. The appointment of Reichsleiter Rosenberg as Reich Minister<sup>2</sup> and the decrees in connection therewith will probably be announced in the press together with a large military victory.

II. The Dienststelle Rosenberg claims the right to regulate church questions.<sup>3</sup>

In principle it was intended to mark time and, in general, without prompting religion, to leave it to the individual in keeping with the free exercise of religion. Efforts of foreign countries to contact church organizations in the occupied area in order to gain influence are not to be allowed. A more sympathetic attitude toward the Ukrainian (autocephalic) Church owing to its national ties.

I should like to remark on this that we must expect efforts by the Papal See to make contact with the Greek Orthodox *Uniate* Church in the Western Ukraine (Lwów, Bishop Sheptyzkyj) and also to approach the Catholic (Polish) population in Western Russia and Lettgallia (in eastern Latvia) as well as the Lithuanian population.

Moreover, the Greek Orthodox churches in the Balkans and in other foreign countries will probably try to take up contact with the remnants of the Greek Orthodox Church in the U.S.S.R.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.

GROSSKOPF

<sup>1</sup>Georg Leibbrandt, Ministerialdirektor; Chief, Political Division, in Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, 1941-1943.

<sup>2</sup>See document No. 119.

<sup>3</sup>See document No. 114.

No. 144

1527/373729-30

*The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat*

Telegram

No. 703 of July 24      SPECIAL TRAIN, July 24, 1941—3:00 a. m.  
 Received July 24—4:00 a. m.

Subject: Proposals for mendacious reports.

For the acting State Secretary.

It has been shown that England and America are daily flooding the world with mendacious reports which in some instances are quite clever. Following the motto that offense is the best defense, I therefore wish that every day one or two very clever mendacious reports be launched in the world concerning the intentions of Roosevelt or of Churchill. According to the type of report the question will be whether to plant the reports in the foreign press, to have them published in the German and foreign press, to disseminate them by radio or to circulate them through occasional remarks and information issued in the course of press conferences.

The formulation of these reports must be based upon close study of the weak points in American or English policy, which is to be undertaken in close cooperation with the Political Department. For example, the London radio report that U.S. troops had arrived in British Guiana<sup>1</sup> can be used to represent this report as the signal for further American troop landings, say, in neighboring Venezuela, and to this could be added a large number of further reports in order to denounce North American annexationist attempts in South America. Other reports should be aimed at exposing in our propaganda directed at England the American design to inherit the British Empire. Furthermore, Boston reports could be disseminated in England concerning the difficulties that had arisen between Churchill and Roosevelt on account of Iceland because the folly of leaving this island to America was being realized in England. These examples are meant to serve only as an indication of how I visualize our counteraction against the Anglo-American fabrications.

I am assigning to Dr. Megerle the task of carrying out this counteraction in close cooperation with the Political Department and the Press Department. Moreover this counteraction is to be included among the matters discussed in the daily conference on propaganda questions in

<sup>1</sup> Under the agreement of Sept. 3, 1940 (see vol. XI of this series, document No. 10 and footnote 4), the United States acquired the right to lease naval and air bases in British Guiana and other British possessions in the Western Hemisphere. The text of the agreement for the use and operation of these bases was transmitted in a letter of March 27, 1941, from the President to the Congress. For text, see Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1941, vol. IV, p. 387.

which Dr. Megerle participates. Dr. Megerle will submit to me weekly a short compilation of the false reports planted in accordance with the foregoing.

RIBBENTROP

No. 145

F11/0347-51

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey*<sup>1</sup>

Telegram

No. 787 of July 23      WESTFALEN, July 24, 1941—3:15 a. m.  
 from the Special Train      Received BERLIN, July 24—3:45 a. m.  
 No. 997 of July 24 from the Foreign Ministry      Sent July 24.

For the Ambassador personally.

American and English radio and press reports since yesterday have been asserting that the German Ambassador in Ankara has started a vigorous peace offensive.<sup>2</sup> It is said that he has already made inquiries of the diplomatic representatives of the various countries. In a lengthy report of the Associated Press from Ankara it is stated that there is hardly an Ambassador or Minister of a neutral country in Ankara whom the German Ambassador has not yet told that it is his country's mission to mediate peace between Germany and England.<sup>3</sup>

These reports are partly on the same lines as the statements in your last dispatch on Turkish foreign policy,<sup>4</sup> in which you suggest that the idea be considered whether it would not be expedient to let the Turks take the initiative in order to clarify the question of England's readiness for peace after the conclusion of the Russian campaign. This might also be advantageous inasmuch as in the event of a negative outcome of such an attempt, Turkey would decide more easily to give up her alliance with England and to develop further her friendship with Germany.

As to the substantive aspect of these statements, I want to say first of all that I consider such a course entirely erroneous because:

1. We will not make a peace offer either through the Turks or otherwise, for our experience with previous offers of this kind has, as you know, been completely negative;

<sup>1</sup> Marginal notes:

"[For] F[ührer]."

"Shown to the F[ührer]. Hew[el], July . . ."

<sup>2</sup> The texts of DNB summaries of such reports dated July 22 and 23 are on the film of files of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat (F11/0353-54). One of them has a marginal note in Ribbentrop's handwriting which reads: "Papen."

<sup>3</sup> A German text of this Associated Press report of July 23 is filmed on F11/0352.

<sup>4</sup> Document No. 125.

2. I consider the idea an illusion that instead of using power politics we can bring Turkey into our camp by assigning to her the friendly role of a mediator with respect to England.

I therefore ask you in any case not to pursue this idea any further nor to discuss it in conversations with diplomats at your post. The above-mentioned English and American reports are obviously based on indiscreet talk in the diplomatic corps at your post, in which the ideas which you suggested for consideration were rendered in distorted form. Such reports are, however, extremely prejudicial to the interests of the Reich. Every kind of conversation on questions of this nature in diplomatic circles is immediately regarded by our enemies as an indication of weakness on the part of Germany and is exploited accordingly by the press. I wonder how it is that foreign journalists time and again place the German Embassy there in the center of such conjectures, which interfere with German foreign policy.<sup>5</sup>

I therefore find it necessary to request that in your conversations at your post you refrain in all circumstances from saying anything about a peace offer from Germany or about a possible activity with respect to mediation on the part of Turkey or about any German plans at all unless you have received appropriate authorization from here to do so.

RIBBENTROP

<sup>5</sup>This passage is partly illegible on the document printed and was supplied from another copy (F2/0372-68).

## No. 146

216/147730-81

### *The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 1353 of July 24

TOKYO, July 24, 1941—11:50 a. m.

Received July 25—1:30 a. m.

The Japanese Foreign Minister, who had asked me to see him this afternoon, received me in the presence of an interpreter in order to inform me that the Japanese-French negotiations on the occupation of bases in Indochina,<sup>1</sup> as he stated, had resulted in an agreement concluded in Vichy on July 20. At present the two Governments were arranging for a protocol and a communiqué which will state, among other things, that the integrity of Indochina and French

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 126.

sovereignty over the territory would not be affected. The communiqué would be published probably on July 26.<sup>2</sup>

The Foreign Minister then expressed his thanks for the cooperation afforded to Japan by Germany.

In reply to my question as to whether the preparations and agreements were of such nature as to preclude any local difficulties, Admiral Toyoda stated that the agreements would assure a smooth course, particularly because the chief of the Japanese military mission in Indochina, General Sumita, had discussed all details with Governor-General Decoux. I then conveyed to the Japanese Foreign Minister, as instructed, the thanks of the Minister for the statement delivered to me at my last call.<sup>3</sup>

In response to his request I then outlined for the Foreign Minister the progress of our military operations in the Soviet Union on the basis of the available information. The Foreign Minister acknowledged my report with visible satisfaction. I then asked him to keep us informed also in the future of the reports of the Japanese missions in the Soviet Union and England, which he promised to do, and following this asked him whether the report on the reception of the Japanese reply by the American Government had already been received from the Japanese Ambassador in Washington.<sup>4</sup> The Foreign Minister replied that owing to the Japanese-French negotiations he had not yet been able to occupy himself with questions concerning America. I reminded the Japanese Foreign Minister of our urgent interest to have prompt and complete information on the progress of the talks.

OTT

<sup>2</sup>The protocol was actually signed on July 29 and made public that day. For text see Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1941, vol. v, p. 286. Signed simultaneously was a secret agreement which followed closely the text of the appendix printed in document No. 126 and which was subsequently presented to the International Military Tribunal for the Far East as Exhibit No. 651.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 130.

<sup>4</sup> See documents Nos. 88, 95, and 127.

## No. 147

105/113781

### *Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

U. St.S. Pol. 707

BERLIN, July 24, 1941.

The Rumanian Minister<sup>1</sup> inquired today about the future fate of the Ukraine and advanced the special wish of the Rumanian Government that the future Ukrainian state should not be too large. The 40 mil-

<sup>1</sup> Raoul Bossy.

lion Ukrainians would otherwise again exert pressure upon Rumania and on other European countries. In particular the Minister advocated that former Greater Galicia not become part of the Ukraine, so that in this manner a direct connection between Germany and Rumania would remain assured. The Minister then also asked whether we were cooperating with particular groups of the Ukrainian nationalists, and if so with which ones.

I told the Minister that it was still too early to make any sort of statements regarding the future organization of the territory of the former Soviet Union. At the moment the Soviet Union was still an area of operations. Gradually portions would be taken out of the area of operations and transferred to civil administration. I could not give him further details. As far as the Ukrainian groups were concerned, we had a clear policy of not making any one of the feuding nationalist groups the matrix of a future government. The Ukraine would certainly remain first under military and then under civil administration for a rather long time to come.<sup>2</sup>

WOERMANN

<sup>2</sup>In telegram No. 2303 of July 25 (105/113793-94) Killinger reported that Mihai Antonescu had indicated interest in the future of the Ukraine and expressed the wish "that no great Slav territory be established on Rumania's border."

No. 148

535/239972-74

*Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

BERLIN, July 24, 1941.

### I

The Party in the appended letter,<sup>1</sup> the Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs and the Governor General<sup>2</sup> have recommended that in the appointment to high offices in the Catholic Church the right of control of the State, which is recognized in the Reich Concordat<sup>3</sup> only to a limited degree (see annex 1),<sup>4</sup> be extended to the filling of all church offices with episcopal powers and expanded beyond the area of validity of the Reich Concordat to include the entire area under German sovereignty.

The demand for participation by the State in filling the high offices of the Catholic Church has been the subject of dispute between the temporal and spiritual powers in Catholic countries for a thousand

<sup>1</sup> Not found.

<sup>2</sup> Hans Frank.

<sup>3</sup> See Series C, vol. I, document No. 371.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed (535/239975).

years. From the standpoint of National Socialist Germany it is a matter of course. What church offices this demand is to apply to and the form and the time of application are, on the other hand, questions of political expediency.

### II

On occasions of individual cases the question has already been discussed repeatedly in a loose form with the Nuncio. Thus just recently when bishoprics became vacant outside the area of the Concordat (Prague, Budweis, among others) he was warned that the Curia was creating accomplished facts.<sup>5</sup>

As against an official assertion of our claims there are a number of very serious objections which would argue in favor of postponing this problem to the time of a basic new regulation of questions of church and state. These objections, however, can be overcome. They are:

a) The right of control, whose extension within the Old Reich and whose expansion to the entire area of German sovereignty is being demanded, is based on the Reich Concordat which has not as yet been denounced, but which we in practice considered no longer capable of application in the majority of its stipulations since it is intrinsically outdated. In the case of negotiations or even communications on the subject of this right of control, the obstacle of the express or silent recognition of stipulations of the Reich Concordat is difficult to avoid.

b) Negotiations on services of the Curia which, like our present wishes, go beyond the Concordat, lead to new concordat-like agreements which we do not want and to wishes of the Holy See for counterservices.

### III

Nevertheless the Political Department considers it likewise necessary that those cases of uncontrolled filling of the higher offices in the Catholic Church, utilizing the deficiencies of the Concordat, be halted and that the Vatican be warned in an appropriate communication against continuing the procedure so far practiced. It is a matter of finding a form for reducing the objections expressed under II a) and b). This form has been found in that no *proposals* for a new settlement will be made to the Curia but it will be notified of a *claim* by the State.

It is therefore proposed that the Embassy at the Vatican be directed to present a note verbale, a draft of which is appended as annex 2.<sup>6</sup>

We can comply with the wish of the Party Chancellery to treat the matter in a somewhat still, exclusively written way for the present.

<sup>5</sup> Weizsäcker recorded conversations with the Nuncio about this problem in memoranda of May 8 (534/239948) and June 26 (534/239926). A memorandum of June 19 (534/239896) shows that Weizsäcker also discussed the question of the bishopric of Prague with Neurath.

<sup>6</sup> Not printed (535/239976-77). See document No. 241.

The probably *sole* concession which could be made to the Vatican in the future would be the summary communication of the reasons in case of rejection of the proposed candidates. The Party Chancellery, too, according to its letter would now go along with this concession. There is however no reason to come out with this concession at this time.

A memorandum with an explanation of ecclesiastical terms used is appended as annex 3.<sup>7</sup>

The Party Chancellery has requested that it be given the draft of the communication to be directed to the Vatican for comment before it is sent out. This would be done through the Department for German Internal Affairs.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister with the request for his decision.<sup>8</sup>

WOERMANN

<sup>7</sup> Not printed (535/239978-79).

<sup>8</sup> Marginal notes:

"To me after return from vacation. W."

"H. Stegfr[ied]: Please determine as to what had happened with the original. W[eizsäcker], Aug. 1."

"It has been approved by RAM; draft is being prepared. Si[egfried], Aug. 8."  
See document No. 241.

### No. 149

4699/E226945

*Memorandum by the Director of the Department for German Internal Affairs*

BERLIN, July 24, 1941.

e.o. D VIII 52 g.

Subject: Removal [*Aussiedelung*] of the Volksdeutsche from South-eastern Europe.

In the Department for German Internal Affairs it became known confidentially that the Führer is supposed to have made a decision about the future fate of the German national groups in South-eastern Europe and overseas. They are to be resettled in the Reich. It is said that Reichsleiter Bormann and the Reichsführer SS are informed of this decision.

In many questions regarding ethnic policy in Southeastern Europe it is of decisive importance to know the future of the national groups. Thus, for example, the decision which the Foreign Ministry has to make as to whether a separate volksdeutsch labor service should be established in Croatia or whether the Volksdeutsche should serve in the Croatian labor service will depend essentially on whether the German national Group there is to be removed within the foreseeable future or whether it will be a lasting political factor.

The Foreign Ministry constantly has to make similar decisions. The Department for German Internal Affairs therefore requests the Foreign Minister to ask the Führer himself about this matter.<sup>1</sup>

LUTHER

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 187.

### No. 150

1527/373745-46

*The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry*

8

Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 2424 of July 24.

WASHINGTON, July 25, 1941—6:06 p. m.

Received July 26—6:30 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 1395 of July 22.<sup>1</sup>

I had the opportunity to discuss the ideas set forth in the telegraphic instruction with influential leaders of the opposition. They showed great interest and indicated time and again how very much they agree with these psychological observations and the evaluation of the domestic political situation in America; for example, one of the Senators, who has just travelled through a large part of America on a speaking campaign lasting several weeks and by so doing was able to gather excellent information regarding the present mood in the country, mentioned that the ideas under discussion had lately become subjects for conversation among American Jews themselves. The respected, intelligent and far-sighted Jews shared the same fears that in case a scapegoat later had to be found for America's entry into the war this would be the American Jews. In 1918 it was the big industrialists and Wall Street high finance; this time it would be the Jews. The emotionally exceedingly excitable American people would then not display the moderation and discipline of the German people, but would proceed against the Jewish warmongers with ruthless severity. Out of these considerations far-sighted Jewish circles are avoiding taking an active part in the warmongering and leave this to radical warmongers in the Roosevelt cabinet and to English propaganda. Indicative of this is that some of these Jews are trying to enter the America First Committee which is the leading militant instrument of the isolationists. In this connection the interview with the leading American Jew, B. Baruch<sup>2</sup> several weeks ago is noteworthy, [in which he said] that a victory by Germany would not represent any kind of economic threat to America. The wealthy Jews are alarmed by the warmongering and the anti-business tendency

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 139.

<sup>2</sup> Bernard M. Baruch, American financier, Chairman, War Industries Board, 1918-19.

of the "New Deal", which is dominated by numerous, often penniless but all the more ambitious Jews. Also the opinions of Americans who have been here for many generations are increasing, to the effect that they no longer intend to allow themselves to be kept on political leading strings and be criticized by Jews who have newly immigrated such as Felix Frankfurter,<sup>3</sup> etc.

The beginnings of such ideas are to be observed all over the country. So far, however, there has been no leadership and organization for a possible anti-Semitic movement, particularly for the reason that the most important media of information such as press, radio and film are ruthlessly controlled by the Jews. This control is made easier for them by the pro-Jewish policy of Roosevelt. A further report may be sent.

THOMSEN

<sup>3</sup> Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court.

## No. 151

205/142843

*The Chargé d'Affaires in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 1048 of July 24

STOCKHOLM, July 25, 1941—6:30 p. m.

Received July 25—9:15 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 1452 of July 24.<sup>1</sup>

Your instruction has been carried out. The State Secretary of the Foreign Ministry stated that the Norwegian ships in Göteborg<sup>2</sup> were being most sharply watched. In order to be able to put to sea the laid-up ships, which at present had only skeleton crews on board, would need at least 2 weeks of preparations. So far as he knew no such preparations had as yet taken place. The law regarding the supervision of foreign merchant ships provides for definite berths for ships which are withdrawn from traffic, but it does not prevent them from departing after clearing in accordance with the regulations. Boheman took note of my allusion to the fact that the agreement regarding the Göteborg overseas traffic<sup>3</sup> was closely connected with the question of the Norwegian ships in Sweden, and of my wish that in any case attempts by the Norwegian ships to break out should be prevented. He asked that further discussions on these matters be postponed until the return of Ministerial Director Häggglöf which would

<sup>1</sup> Not found.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 28 and footnote 4.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 91.

be at the beginning of August. In any case according to his view there was no threat that an attempt to break out would take place.<sup>4</sup>

BELOW

<sup>4</sup> In telegram No. 1047 of July 25 (205/142841-42) the Legation reported such a thickening of reports as to leave no doubt that there was the intention on the part of the ships soon to attempt a breakout.

The next day, however, in telegram No. 1056 (205/142844) Below reported having been assured by Boheman that the Swedish officials were unable to verify any preparations aboard the Norwegian ships for a breakout.

By telegram No. 1509 of July 28 (205/142845) Eisenlohr directed that Wied himself go to the Swedish Foreign Minister and state that the explanations made by Boheman were completely unsatisfactory; that the German Government knew for certain that the first breakout by Norwegian vessels a few months before had come about as a result of the cooperation of English warships, Norwegian crews, and English spies in Sweden; and with the toleration if not the actual help of subordinate Swedish officials. Germany could not accept legal explanations and excuses. Sweden was to be warned emphatically that a new breakout would have most serious consequences: Germany would cancel the Göteborg traffic agreement.

Below replied in telegram No. 1070 of July 29 (205/142851) that both Wied and Günther were on leave and he had therefore presented the matter again to Boheman. The State Secretary promised an answer after some days but indicated that he feared English retaliation if Sweden went beyond the law. See, further, document No. 174.

## No. 152

230/153286

*An Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 713

SPECIAL TRAIN, July 25, 1941—10:10 p. m.

Received Berlin, July 25—10:45 p. m.

Submitted to Ministerialdirektor Schroeder through Under State Secretary Woermann.

Telegram No. 404 of July 22 from Belgrade<sup>1</sup> regarding increased communist activity in Serbia has been submitted to the Foreign Minister and on his instruction was passed on to the Führer. Regarding the last paragraph<sup>2</sup> of this telegram the Foreign Minister ordered that Standartenführer Veessenmayer go to Belgrade at once. The Foreign Minister requests that the matter be taken up further from there.

WEBER

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (230/153287-89).

<sup>2</sup> This paragraph read as follows: "In these circumstances I would appreciate it if Veessenmayer came to Belgrade at the earliest opportunity and I request that a telegram be sent regarding the time of his arrival."

## No. 153

1527/373749-50

*The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

WASHINGTON, July 25, 1941—10:23 p. m.

No. 2435 of July 25

Received July 26—3:00 p. m.

For Chief of OKW Ausland; Chief of the General Staff; Chief of the Luftwaffe Operations Staff.

Evaluation of the situation on the evening of July 25.

1. The American fleet is dispersed. Even if it were brought together in the Pacific the Americans would not dare to attack Japan, because, being otherwise inadequately armed, they would in this way stake their future on one card with highly uncertain chances of success and would commit themselves to a Pacific front.

2. Consequently America must content herself with empty threats and possibly economic measures to counter a Japanese initiative. She will not go so far, however, as to provoke a war by doing this.

3. Thus Japan can do whatever she likes in the Far East and in the western part of the Pacific. Consequently America must keep the bulk of her naval forces assembled in the Pacific; to disperse them increases the existing weakness.

4. As long as this situation lasts American freedom of action is paralyzed. Accordingly nothing remains for America but to seek in every way an understanding and accommodation with Japan.

5. As long as this objective has not been attained, the U.S.A. must avoid a war with Germany, because the whole Atlantic would, as a result of this, immediately become a zone of war. The Americans would then have to use convoys to secure their indispensable imports of raw materials from South Africa and South America, as well as transports to the Middle East and England, and would in this way disperse their fleet more and more. Conducting the war would put an even greater strain on the already limited merchant shipping for purposes of the fleet, etc. America would have to reckon with a war on two fronts with dispersed naval forces and insufficient merchant shipping. In this case she would lose her imports from the Netherlands Indies that are essential to the war effort and at the same time would possess neither a complete army for reinforcing and occupying outlying positions nor even an approximately adequate air force.

6. The result is that the continued serious Japanese threat and the incomplete state of American armament paralyze the American freedom of (group garbled) and make an entry into the war against Germany extremely unlikely.

7. If the Japanese threat continues after the victorious conclusion of the Russian war the United States of America will not be capable of seriously interfering with further German measures. It will continue to scatter its increasing production of war material between deliveries to England, China, etc., and equipping its armed forces, but will not be able to exercise decisive influence in any direction. The hope is for a change in case it is possible to drag out the war until far into the year 1942.<sup>1</sup>

BÖTTICHER  
THOMSEN

<sup>1</sup> Telegram No. 2488 of July 29 (1527/373775-77) reiterated the appraisal of the situation as laid down in the document printed, emphasizing that a moment had arrived "when America not only wants to but has to seek an understanding and accommodation with Japan." It stated that the United States needed above all time and therefore aimed at avoiding any major decisions in the course of 1941, both with respect to Germany and Japan. Depending on the needs of the situation, Japan was being either "intimidated with empty threats and economic measures or wooed with kindness for the sole purpose of avoiding in 1941 an occupation of the Netherlands Indies, not to speak of a struggle for Singapore."

## No. 154

341/199326-27

*The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in Argentina*

JULY 25, 1941.

With reference to my telegram No. 686.<sup>1</sup>

For your information.

An affirmative reply memorandum was given the Argentine Ambassador here on July 22,<sup>2</sup> in which the following is stated:

The question whether the most-favored-nation clause would stand in the way of the conclusion of a complete customs union can be left open, because only the granting of limited preferences is envisaged for the time being. Limited preferences, however, according to generally recognized international concepts, are not excepted from the most-favored-nation treatment even if they should prepare the way for a customs union. The German Government for its part, however, is willing to contribute to the favorable development of economic relations between Argentina and her neighboring countries, and is

<sup>1</sup> This telegram has not been found. For previous developments see vol. XI of this series, documents Nos. 555 and 698 and vol. XII, documents Nos. 166 and 597.

<sup>2</sup> The reply memorandum has not been found. There is another memorandum of July 22 by Wtehl (341/199329-30) in which he records giving the reply memorandum to the Argentine Ambassador who mentioned that it would make a good impression in Brazil, but that the plan for a customs union was no longer actual. It had been promoted by the former Argentine Foreign Minister, he said, but his successor had not yet taken it up.

therefore ready to waive its right to take advantage of preferential tariffs on the basis of the most-favored-nation clause, in so far as it is a question of preferential tariffs that Argentina may arrange with Brazil and other South American countries bordering on Argentina. In this the German Government proceeds on the assumption that all the other countries entitled to most-favored-nation treatment also agree. Furthermore it requests confirmation that Argentina, too, will not claim such preferential tariffs as may be agreed upon in the future between Germany and other European countries. Finally, the German Government assumes that the Argentine Government will notify it in due time concerning the extent and type of the preferential tariffs to be arranged. End of the memorandum.

In our reply we started from the assumption that the realization of a customs union between Argentina and Brazil, and possibly other neighboring countries as well, lies in our interest. An economic alliance of the South American countries among themselves will, as long as it is limited to them, make them more resistant to the plans for economic and political supremacy of the United States; a larger South American economic area will probably provide a more efficient and receptive partner for the Greater German economic area of the future.<sup>3</sup>

WIEHL

<sup>3</sup> In a memorandum of Aug. 18, St.S. No. 527 (1053/312078-79) Weizsäcker recorded that he had informed the Brazilian Ambassador of the view of the German Government on the projected customs union.

## No. 155

2236/476117-18

*Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department*

Dir. Ha Pol No. 175

BERLIN, July 25, 1941.

*The Food Situation in Greece.*

Minister Altenburg, the Plenipotentiary of the Reich in Athens, has been pointing for weeks to the fact that the food difficulties of Greece are reaching a critical point, and has advocated German assistance, especially for the cities of Athens and Salonika. Up to now his suggestions have not been complied with, first because Greek matters are primarily Italy's business and also because the Reich Ministry of Food, in consideration of our own food situation, categorically refuses such help.

According to the last telegram from Athens from the Reich Plenipotentiary, No. 824 of July 19,<sup>1</sup> the Greek Government has again approached him and the Italian Plenipotentiary with an appeal for help because of the desperate food situation. The Reich Plenipo-

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (4697/E226766).

tentiary reports that in large areas of Greece there has been no bread for weeks, the population is gradually dying off, and in the last few days there were hunger revolts in Argos.

The main difficulty is with bread grain. Meat requirements can be met in a pinch, and there is plenty of olive oil, even for export. The annual Greek requirement of bread grain is 400,000 tons, their approaching harvest is 240,000 tons; accordingly they lack 160,000 tons. Their own harvest would last to about the end of February. Starting in March, 140,000 tons are supposed to be delivered from Bulgaria, as the grain surplus from the former Greek and presently Bulgarian area amounted to about 120,000 tons. Until now it was assumed that the difficulties would be eliminated during these days through the new harvest which is already under way. The Reich Plenipotentiary reports, however, that, because of disruptions in organization and transportation, this is evidently not coming about.

Italy's Plenipotentiary<sup>2</sup> informed our Plenipotentiary that grain was available in Italy, but that payment presented difficulties. Italy therefore intended for the time being to supply only 8,000 tons at the end of July. Our Plenipotentiary considers it necessary to increase this amount to at least 15,000 tons. On Tuesday, July 29, negotiations conducted by Minister Clodius will take place in Rome,<sup>3</sup> in which Greek food supplies are also to be discussed with the Italians. It is intended to aim in these negotiations primarily at adequate grain deliveries to Greece by Italy, if necessary with German support in regard to payment through a triangular clearing arrangement; since because of our extensive purchases of tobacco, we already have a considerable and growing clearing debt with respect to Greece. Should this not be successful, perhaps one could consider making from 10,000 to 15,000 tons of grain from Germany available on a loan basis, but only as a loan absolutely to be returned out of the new Greek harvest by September at the latest. However, the Reich Ministry of Food would agree to this only if such an action were designated as necessary by higher authority.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister through the Deputy State Secretary in accordance with instructions.<sup>4</sup>

WIEHL

<sup>2</sup> Pellegrino Ghigi.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 245, footnote 3.

<sup>4</sup> See, further, document No. 323.



## No. 156

B12/B001100-103

*The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, July 26, 1941—1:50 a. m.

TOP SECRET

Received July 26—4:15 a. m.<sup>1</sup>

No. 1668 of July 25

For the Reich Foreign Minister personally.

Translation of the letter of July 24 of the Duce<sup>2</sup> to the Führer.

"FÜHRER: I lose no time in replying to your last letter<sup>3</sup> and, following your example, I make a survey of the situation.

*France.* You are familiar with my ideas, Führer. It was Niccolò Machiavelli who first characterized the French in the words: The more they promise, the less they give you. There is nothing substantial to be expected of them. Weeks and months have gone by, and the conversations on the ports in Tunis have not progressed one step.<sup>4</sup> Meanwhile you have liberated more prisoners and Italy has made available to France her air and sea bases at home and in the Greek (text missing) for the Syrian campaign, which in the last few hours has become a Franco-English comedy with an American director, the United States Consul at Beirut.<sup>5</sup> In the interior of France a very strong revival of Communists and pro-English elements is to be noted. De Gaulle reflects the thinking of 90 percent of the French, including perhaps the Marshal himself.

In these circumstances, it is necessary, so far as the Mediterranean sector is concerned, to rely entirely on our forces and, above all, to effect their constant coordination. Because of this incomplete coordination painful losses have occurred. The *von Tirpitz*, for example, was shipwrecked (the whole crew was saved!) 2 miles off the coast of San Remo, because it had left Marseilles 2 days too soon and without having inquired as to the position of our mine fields along the Ligurian coast.

It is also important to perfect this collaboration, which is already in progress, and I am happy to give this collaboration the form that you, Führer, desire.

I intend to issue instructions to the effect that the present German liaison organs now assigned to us be transformed into agencies of the Admiral attached to the Admiral's Staff of the Royal Navy or of the General attached to the Royal Air Force. These agencies would be established as special services with the respective general staffs to which they are attached and would be intended, each in the person of its chief, to participate in the various studies that will be undertaken, as well as in decisions that are reached in regard to the questions

<sup>1</sup> Marginal note: "Forwarded as No. 2511 to the Special Train Westfalen, July 26."

<sup>2</sup> Another copy of the telegram is filmed on F19/369-72. The Italian text is found among the Lisbon papers of the Italian Foreign Ministry.

<sup>3</sup> Of July 20, document No. 134.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 113.

<sup>5</sup> Consul General Cornelius Van H. Engert.

that you have so clearly defined in your letter. Thus, in addition to General von Rintelen at Headquarters of the Italian Armed Forces, Admiral Weichold would take over the post with the General Staff of the Italian Navy, and General von Pohl with the General Staff of the Italian Air Force.

*It is important to work together to solve in the best possible way the most important problem that faces us in the Mediterranean; that of the transportation of men and materials.* I believe that there will then happen in Rome what is happening in Libya, where Italian-German comradeship is fully realized. In order to be prepared to cope with possible special situations on the western front, I have again brought the 10 divisions of the Fourth Army up to strength, and I intend to set up 4 divisions to guard the Tunisian front.

*Spain.* I do not believe that Spain wants to or can do more than the dispatching of the volunteer division.<sup>6</sup> In his speech the Generalissimo burned his bridges behind him but he has not moved from the sphere of words into action.<sup>7</sup> I shall continue my efforts to bring our plans to fruition, but all this must be done with great restraint in view of the oversensitiveness of the Spaniards, which is a peculiarity of their race. The attitude of Spain is useful for curbing possible indiscretions on the part of France.

*Turkey.* In this sector, too, it is necessary to proceed with much moderation. A month ago I was more optimistic. According to the last reports that I have received from Ankara, Great Britain's stock is rising and this is to be explained as a consequence of the failure of the Iraq venture and the Syrian campaign. The Turks will go along with us only if they have the mathematical certainty that Great Britain has lost the war. Nevertheless we must not give up our work and efforts. If Turkey should one day do what Sweden has done—that is, let the troops march through<sup>8</sup>—the fate of Egypt would be sealed; and I am more than ever deeply convinced that if England is liquidated in Egypt the British Empire will be liquidated. Great Britain is aware of this and is constantly fortifying her positions and allowing a large portion of American aid to be concentrated in Egypt.<sup>9</sup>

*Japan.* The recent governmental crisis in Tokyo has causes, aside from the official ones, with which we are not familiar.<sup>10</sup> It is my conviction that Japan will remain in our camp, partly because she will be forced to by reason of the fact that the help that the United States is giving Chiang Kai-shek is constantly increasing.<sup>11</sup> She will not begin with the march on Russia; she will occupy Indochina and that will lead to the break with Washington.

*Russia.* I have read with the keenest interest what you, Führer, have written me about the campaign in Russia, and about the races of which the Bolshevik Army is composed. Precisely because of its heterogeneous composition, because of the disorganization in its command and because of the bestial stupidity of the people, I have the

<sup>6</sup> See documents Nos. 12 and 70.

<sup>7</sup> In this speech of July 17 on the fifth anniversary of the revolution, Franco talked about Spain's policy toward the United States and the Soviet Union. For text see, *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, September 1941, pp. 764-769.

<sup>8</sup> See documents Nos. 16 and 17.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. III, pp. 275-298.

<sup>10</sup> See document No. 124.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. V, pp. 598-773.

mathematical conviction that your armies will rapidly destroy the Russian armies, which have already been severely weakened. As my generals tell me, the Italian Army Corps will be able to go into action between the 10th and 15th of August. Meanwhile, however, I am preparing a second Army Corps, and I could, if necessary, prepare also a third. There are men enough. As far as their "morale"<sup>12</sup> is concerned, it is very good, and their bravery is indisputable, provided they are well armed and well led. General Rommel will, I believe, have informed you what our divisions are doing around Tobruk and in this connection it should be noted that many of these men have been living in the desert uninterruptedly for 15 to 20 months.

I, too, Führer, earnestly desire to see you again. That I will be able to do after the 10th of August, and I am prepared to come to your headquarters in former Russian territory. I need have no scruples about leaving Italy for the Italian people are quietly at work and believe more than ever in victory.

Please accept, Führer, my cordial and comradely greetings and the expression of my undying friendship. Mussolini."

The original of the Duce's letter will follow in a sealed envelope by regular messenger leaving tomorrow morning, the 26th, addressed to the Foreign Minister personally.

MACKENSEN

<sup>12</sup> "Stimmung" used in the Italian original.

No. 157

95/106966-68

*The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

SECRET

MADRID, July 27, 1941—12:10 a. m.

No. 2542 of July 27

Received July 27—2:45 a. m.

As I was invited yesterday by the Foreign Minister to his country estate near La Granja, where he has been staying since my return from Germany, I had an opportunity for a lengthy talk with him.

After I told the Minister the excellent impression about the political and military developments with which I had returned from Germany, and discussed with him some urgent current matters, on which I am reporting separately,<sup>1</sup> the Foreign Minister sketched out for me a detailed picture of the international situation as it affects Spain. Answering and treating in detail my various questions and comments, the Minister told me substantially the following:

After the threat of a premature involvement in the war had diminished for Spain during the past weeks, the situation had changed significantly since the well-known aggressive speech of the General-

<sup>1</sup> In telegram No. 2541 of July 26 (95/106964) Stohrer reported that he had discussed with Suñer the closing of the Polish Legation.

issimo on the anniversary of the national liberation.<sup>2</sup> The speech had been premature. It suddenly opened the eyes of the English and the Americans about the true position of Spain. Previously, the English Government especially kept on believing that only he, the Foreign Minister, was pushing for war, while the "wise and thoughtful" Caudillo would preserve neutrality unconditionally. That illusion has now been taken from them. They had come to realize that Spain, in understanding with the German Government, would enter the war at a suitable moment. This is apparent from consistent reports of the Spanish Ambassadors in London<sup>3</sup> and Washington.<sup>4</sup> He had no doubt that the English and Americans were in consultation with each other on how to meet this new situation; it was evident that our enemies were trying, somewhere at long last, to forestall Germany. American propaganda for the occupation of the Azores and certain parts of West Africa, together with the steadily increasing activity of English and especially American agents in North and West Africa, were plain indications of this. More recently, the Spanish Government has been receiving information indicating that plans were being studied for a landing operation in the Spanish zone of Morocco. Neither would he exclude the possibility of a landing attempt in Portugal to establish a new European front. Tangier, too, was threatened, to say nothing of the Canary Islands, which would surely be attacked as soon as the Azores were occupied.<sup>5</sup>

The Spanish High Commissioner in Morocco, General Orgaz, who was currently in Spain for reporting and who was present during part of my talk with Serrano Suñer, confirmed the Minister's anxieties on the strength of his experiences on a recent visit to French Morocco. He explained that it was a matter of common knowledge that everywhere in West Africa English and American agents were studying intensely all questions relating to a landing operation. The attitude of General Noguès<sup>6</sup> was more than doubtful. Almost all the French in Morocco were basically followers of de Gaulle. Anti-Spanish sentiment was clearly visible. A striking illustration of this was the

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 156, footnote 7. In telegram No. 2460 of July 18 (95/106955-56) Heberlein summarized Franco's speech of the day before and concluded: "Franco's speech is the most open declaration up to now of his position on the side of the Axis Powers against communism and democracy and of his trust in the final victory of the Axis Powers."

<sup>3</sup> Jacobo, Duke of Alba and Berwick.

<sup>4</sup> Juan Francisco de Cárdenas y Rodriguez.

<sup>5</sup> A report dated Aug. 10 from the German Information Office III in Madrid (95/107006-07) records that the conviction was growing that Spain would become involved in the war by some act of desperation by the British: an attack by way of Portugal; or even more likely from the northwest African coast.

In telegram No. 2890 of Aug. 21 (95/107026-27) Stohrer reported that the Spanish Foreign Ministry had learned that Britain and America were considering the project of demanding bases from Portugal both on her islands and on her mainland territory.

<sup>6</sup> Gen. Auguste Paul Noguès, French Resident General and Commander in Chief in Morocco.

theft of the code from the Spanish Consulate in Casablanca by the French secret police.

When I interjected that it seemed most unlikely to me that the English or American would attempt a landing in Portugal because in such an event Spain and we too would be immediately on the scene, etc., the Minister replied that Spain naturally would take immediate action, but although a deployment plan was in existence, few practical preparations had been undertaken for it. The Minister inquired about the strength of our troops, and especially the strength of the air arm, held in readiness in southern France against all contingencies. I answered evasively, the more so because I had no exact information on the matter.

To impress upon me how seriously he viewed the situation, Serrano Suñer finally explained that only a few days ago he declined the Generalissimo's invitation to the mountains to hunt ibex, because he could not take the responsibility at this time for being away from Madrid and out of reach for several days.

STOHRER

No. 158

203/141869

*The Director of the News Service and Press  
Department to Various Missions<sup>1</sup>*

Telegram

**MOST URGENT**  
**Multex 552**

BERLIN, July 27, 1941.

Major Belmonte, the Bolivian Military Attaché here, will make a statement to the domestic and foreign press on Monday in which he will brand a letter allegedly written by him to Minister Wendler as a tendentious falsification.<sup>2</sup> The Reich Government will send a note to the Bolivian Government. DNB will publish a detailed report.

The text of Belmonte's statement, the note of the Reich Government, and the DNB report<sup>3</sup> will be given by NPD.<sup>4</sup>

Every means should be employed to ensure that the matter is prominently publicized in the press at your post and among the people

<sup>1</sup> The designated Missions were listed on the annex which has not been found.

<sup>2</sup> A memorandum by Woermann dated July 26 (199/140876-80) records a discussion of that date with Major Belmonte. "After Belmonte had read the text of the alleged letter to Wendler he declared most decidedly that he never had any relationship with Wendler and that he had never received a letter from him or sent one to him."

<sup>3</sup> To a memorandum of July 27 to Hitler (199/140859-72) Ribbentrop appended the text of Belmonte's statement, of the note of the Reich Government, and of the DNB report. On this memorandum there also appeared this marginal note: "The F[ührer] agreed to everything. H[ewel], July 27."

<sup>4</sup> NPD (Nachrichten-und Pressedienst), News and Press Service.

under the catchword, "Belmonte Case," and that the catchword gains acceptance. See that comments are made in which the Belmonte Case is held up as an action by the President of the United States infringing the sovereignty of South American countries. In the campaign of inflammatory agitation against Germany the U.S.A. President has pressured the Bolivian Government into an unheard-of action against a representative of the Greater German Reich. "The Belmonte Case" must be made into a slogan characterizing the criminal Jewish gangster methods used by the U.S.A. President to poison relations between nations. Every means should be used to propagate and popularize the slogan.

Report by wire on the reaction and the reproduction in the press there and among the people.<sup>5</sup>

Acknowledge receipt.

SCHMIDT

<sup>5</sup> No replies have been found. A confidential report of July 29 by Likus (138/77038-40) stated that the declaration made by Major Belmonte to the foreign diplomats and journalists in Berlin created a sensation.

No. 159

Nuremberg Document USSR-237

*Adolf Hitler to General Antonescu<sup>1</sup>*

At present FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, July 27, 1941.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: Permit me to begin this letter with my thanks for your letter which indicated to me not only the accord of our views held in common but above all your determination to fight this struggle—which in my opinion will decide the fate of Europe for centuries to come—at the side of the German Reich to the bitter end. I know, General Antonescu, that this is primarily your decision. It is your determination, your energy, and your manly bravery which made your people embark upon this course; a course, which, I am convinced will result not only in new successes but also in a new flowering of Rumania.

For me personally it is a great joy as well as a satisfaction, which is easy to understand, to congratulate you today from the bottom of my heart on these great successes. The recovery of Bessarabia is the most natural reward for your efforts and those of your brave troops.

As for myself, I can but thank you for your vigorous leadership as well as for the splendid achievements of your troops. These achievements and the universal will to arrive at an unselfish cooperation between German and Rumanian units have been described and

<sup>1</sup> This document was introduced at Nuremberg but is not in the published collection. No copy has been found in Foreign Ministry files.

confirmed to me by the commanders with expressions of the highest esteem.

*Just as soon as the pressure exerted from the northwest by Army Group South unhinges the defense along the Dniester and the pivotal points southward, I would greatly appreciate it if you would advance with your troops into the area southwest of the Bug and thereby take over the protection of this area also. At the same time the Eleventh Army, with the Rumanian IV Army Corps under command and forming the right wing, will, under command of Army Group South, drive eastward of the Bug toward the lower Dnieper.*

Permit me, General Antonescu, to add a few more words about the course of the entire operations. I am thoroughly satisfied with the results attained so far. In general, they are as good as the marching capacity of the infantry allowed them to be, considering the truly horrible roads. We have many units which in 5 weeks have now covered a distance of approximately 700 kilometers beeline, i.e., more than 1,000 kilometers in marching. I had hoped that the Russians would accept battle near the frontier. From the outset I was of the opinion that the claims regarding an early retreat, for instance, beyond their great rivers or even beyond the Urals were merely utopian wishes of the English. Either they will defend their territory in front of their industrial centers or they will have lost it, one way or the other, behind their industrial centers. To be sure, the fact that on the basis of this necessity which was soberly realized they chose to give battle at the very beginning resulted immediately in a number of bloody battles; these, however, without exception, ended either with the destruction of the enemy formations or at least with their being smashed and beaten. Our breakthrough across the Dnieper in the direction of Smolensk alone has again cost the enemy 200,000 prisoners, innumerable dead, and the loss of war material, the amount of which cannot be estimated at this time. The number of Russian tanks which we either shot to pieces or captured is today already close to 10,000. Enemy losses of guns and other material are incalculable. Replacement of these arms which are now lost is impossible. I do not have to assure you, General Antonescu, that what I am primarily interested in is not at all the winning of space but the annihilation of the enemy not only with regard to men but above all to materials. To replace man power may be easy for the Russians, to replace good, trained fighters is again much more difficult for them; but replacing arms and material on this scale is impossible for them.

This will be particularly hopeless the moment we will have taken possession of the most essential Russian centers of production. After 5 weeks of the campaign I realize that we will attain this goal probably at an earlier date than we had assumed.

Permit me, General Antonescu, to thank you once more for the help which you personally and your brave soldiers are rendering us in this struggle and to congratulate you and your people today very specially from the bottom of my heart on the recovery of a province, the loss of which was unavoidable in the circumstances of the year 1940 and which at that time particularly could not have been prevented by military measures.

Please convey these sincere congratulations of mine also to His Majesty, the young King.<sup>2</sup>

In loyal comradeship,

Yours, etc.

A[DOLF] HITLER

<sup>1</sup> In telegram No. 2337 of July 28 which was forwarded to the Special Train as No. 2549 (222/149845) Killinger reported having handed Hitler's letter to Antonescu in Ploesti at 10:30 a. m. that day. Antonescu asked that the following provisional oral reply be transmitted to Hitler:

"As I have emphasized from the beginning, I, the General, shall march on to the end without asking for anything and without putting forth any conditions. I have all confidence in the Führer's [sense of] justice. Apart from the forces which Rumania has already at her disposal at the front, I shall mobilize all the forces that will be needed."

See, further, document No. 167.

## No. 160

260/170095-96

*The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

HELSINKI, July 28, 1941—7:10 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received July 28—8:25 p. m.

No. 689 of July 28

1) Today the Foreign Minister told the English Minister the following: Finnish foreign trade, which had been reduced since 1940 by England's actions, had been completely blockaded since June 14, of this year.<sup>1</sup> Since Finland was waging a common war with Germany against the Soviets, England had concluded a military alliance with the Soviets and declared her will to help the Soviets with all means possible. Because complications were to be predicted from this, the Finnish Government has decided to close its Legation in London until further notice. The Finnish Government would be grateful to learn what the English Government intended to do with its Legation in Helsinki.

The English Minister asked what that meant and whether he should leave.<sup>2</sup> The Foreign Minister replied that he saw no other possibility.

<sup>1</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 643, footnote 1.

<sup>2</sup> In the text there is "withdraw" in parentheses.

2) The Minister asked whether it was a case of German pressure. The Foreign Minister answered that Finnish military and civil authorities had found the situation neither normal nor logical.

3) The Minister asked whether he should leave immediately. The Foreign Minister replied that his departure would be arranged as well as possible.

4) The Minister said that the Foreign Minister would probably understand that his action would have a great effect in the United States.

5) The Finnish Government will not inform the press before Thursday.<sup>3</sup> In agreement with the Foreign Minister I request that the German press: *a*) not present the matter before the Finnish press does, *b*) minimize the matter, *c*) not present it as Finland's entry into the war against England but only as a break in diplomatic relations.

6) The Finnish Minister in London has so far not been able to meet the Irish High Commissioner<sup>4</sup> who is allegedly abroad. The Foreign Minister hopes that Gripenberg can apply for *agrément* today with the High Commissioner.

7) The Foreign Minister asked me to which Power Finland should entrust the protection of her interests in England. I recommended Spain.

BLÜCHER

<sup>3</sup> July 31.

<sup>4</sup> J. W. Dulanty.

No. 161

F2/0376-73

*The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

THERAPIA, July 28, 1941.

TOP SECRET  
A 2854

For the Foreign Minister personally!

I should like to reply as follows to telegram No. 997 of July 24,<sup>1</sup> addressed to me:

1. Regarding the formal aspect:

The assumption made by the Foreign Minister that the American or British agencies' "reports especially prejudicial to the interests of the Reich" had their origin and explanation in conversations which I am supposed to have conducted with diplomats here—particularly as these reports were "partly on the same lines" as the statements in

my written report No. A 2335/41 of July 14<sup>2</sup> is an imputation which is very astonishing to me and which I must reject emphatically.

The relationship of mutual confidence that must exist between an Ambassador and his Foreign Minister if the Foreign Service is to function, should preclude the Foreign Minister's making such a grave charge before he had asked the Ambassador for a report and had studied the facts in the case.

I declare that I have at no time and with no diplomat discussed a "peace offer on the part of Germany after conclusion of the Russian campaign." If the Associated Press says that there is no Ambassador or Minister of a neutral country whom the German Ambassador has not yet told that it is the mission of his country to mediate peace between Germany and England, let it be stated, in reply to this ridiculous report of the Jewish representative of the Associated Press, that there is no longer any Ambassador of a neutral power at Ankara (with the American Ambassador there is no social intercourse, the Afghan Ambassador is traveling, the Iranian Ambassador has been ill for some time), and that of the three to four Ministers of neutral countries only the Swiss representative can be considered at all so far as political conversations are concerned.

If the Foreign Minister raises the question why foreign journalists time and again place the German Embassy there in the center of such conjectures which interfere with German foreign policy, I would repeat the truism that Ankara has been one of the centers of diplomatic activity of both friend and foe since Turkey acceded to the three power treaty.<sup>3</sup> It necessarily follows therefore that the foreign journalists, particularly the Jewish ones, are making every effort to discredit the representative of the Reich and to frustrate his work, after the [British] Intelligence Service has failed to eliminate him through an attempt at assassination.

2. Regarding the factual aspects:

Reporting as fully as possible from sources in the diplomatic corps regarding the opinions and positions of the enemy powers with respect to the momentary situation is in accordance with the repeated instructions of the Foreign Minister. In the political talks held for this purpose I have constantly pointed out since the beginning of the war against the Soviet Union that this war had created an entirely new situation in Europe; that the problem of the destruction of Bolshevism had created for the first time a united European front, from which no country within the frontiers of the Occident could withdraw. Therefore Turkey, also, would not be spared an early and clear decision as to whether, on the basis of her interests, she ought to be

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 125.

<sup>3</sup> Apparently a reference to Turkey's mutual assistance pact with Great Britain and France, signed Oct. 19, 1939. For text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cc, p. 167.

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 145.

considered as belonging to Europe and whether she could continue to remain an ally of the enemy camp in view of the war which we were waging for her interests as well.

I have in this connection stressed the fact that such a solidly united front would mean the end of the war, because it must seem folly to every American to support and continue to wage England's war against a united Europe and for Bolshevism.

That is something entirely different from a "peace offer on the part of Germany."

Naturally it is clear that nothing could be more unpleasant for our enemies, particularly the war-mongering Americans, than such a development, and that they are therefore even now trying to discredit it with all the means at their command.

In my dispatch of July 14, I dutifully reported the present views of the Turkish statesmen on the situation. The Foreign Minister has characterized the ideas continued therein as "entirely erroneous" and as "illusions." This does not alter the fact that Messieurs Saracoglu and Numan and other members of the Cabinet have repeatedly expressed themselves to me in this sense. With what skepticism, on the other hand, the political alliance with Turkey is regarded in England is clearly revealed by the authentic questionnaire of the Int[elligence] service forwarded to us by the Turkish Police. I have considered it my duty to suggest that we take advantage of such a situation.

If the Foreign Minister in his telegram No. 997 expresses the opinion that Turkey can be drawn into our camp *only* "by way of power politics," I should like to state in reply that the policy heretofore laid down by him and expressed by the Führer in his letters to the State President<sup>4</sup> consisted in a wise exploitation of our position of power combined with diplomatic accommodation.

I did not want to propose anything else for the future either in order to secure for us this most important position in the Near East without striking a blow. I have therefore kept entirely within the bounds of the policy heretofore pursued—a policy which was not without success.

The diplomatic aspect is dominated by military exigencies: If, after conclusion of the Russian campaign, the final attack on Egypt is to be launched from two directions, then, in the opinion of the military, the route from the Caucasus through Iran and Iraq is the logical one. But in northern Iraq a strong defensive front is being built up with American assistance and considerable manpower. Given the long supply line for the German troops, an attack against this front could probably not be launched without difficulty. The neutralization of the 50 Turkish divisions in this connection is a military

<sup>4</sup> See vol. XII of this series, documents Nos. 113 and 514, footnote 7.

requirement, which can for the present be achieved only in the diplomatic field.

The Foreign Minister finds that the influences disturbing to Reich policy always emanate from Ankara. However, in a period when documents allegedly found or secret orientation manuals regarding Turkey are exploited as proofs of aggressive intent on the part of the Reich toward the partner with which it had just concluded a friendship pact, and when Mr. Sumner Welles announces that he is in possession of sure proof of the aggressive intent of the "Nazi system" toward other neutral states,<sup>5</sup> it could not be so prejudicial to the interests of the Reich that the German Ambassador at Ankara has the reputation of working sincerely for a European understanding which would crown the victory of the Reich.

Let me repeat in conclusion:

Only a relationship based entirely on mutual loyalty and trust between the Ambassador and his Foreign Minister can be the condition for any profitable work in the field of foreign policy. I have fully and completely kept my promise of March 1939<sup>6</sup> in this respect. Should the Foreign Minister be of another opinion, it would be in the interest of the Reich and in my interest personally that the collaboration be terminated at once.

PAPEN

<sup>5</sup> According to the report in the *New York Times* of July 22, 1941 (p. 1, col. 7), Welles stated: "This Government has information that leads it to believe other steps of the character taken against Russia are under contemplation."

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Franz von Papen, *Memoirs* (New York, 1953), pp. 443-446.

## No. 162

386/211278-80

### *The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 2274 of July 30

PARIS, July 30, 1941—1:15 a. m.

Received July 30—2:00 a. m.<sup>1</sup>

1. Dr. Schwarzmann, for the Foreign Minister.
2. Armistice Commission, attention Minister Welck, Wiesbaden.

In today's conversation with State Secretary Benoist-Méchin I informed the French Government, in accordance with my instructions,<sup>2</sup> that the Foreign Minister had expressed surprise at the French note verbale of July 14<sup>3</sup> and was unable to take any official cognizance of it.

<sup>1</sup> Marginal note: "Forwarded as No. 2578 to the Special Train. July 30."

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 110.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 113, enclosure.

Inasmuch as this note had announced a delay over [the execution of] French obligations in Bizerte, the German return services regarding Bizerte have also been suspended.<sup>4</sup>

I reminded Benoist-Méchin that I had urgently warned the French Government in the conference of July 7<sup>5</sup> not to delay the carrying out of the supply movements through Tunis. Apart from the fact that the transmission of the note displays a total misconception about the situation as between Germany and France, it was also conceived in a petty spirit. A farsighted French policy would have utilized the German campaign against Russia as an occasion to effect immediately [Germany's requests regarding] Bizerte and Dakar without asking for anything in return, in order to make a French contribution toward weakening Europe's western enemy, England, at the very moment when the Reich was liberating all of Europe forever from Bolshevism.

Benoist-Méchin at first answered with the familiar arguments which had already been presented by the French Government in the note verbale and the preceding talks. France wanted to fulfill the obligations undertaken with respect to Bizerte as well as Dakar. The state of open war with England which could then be expected with certainty and from which the French Government did not shrink would nevertheless be difficult to justify before the French public if it yielded no hope for improved relations with Germany. There was no connection between the French note and the campaign against Russia. The ideas expressed in the French note had been drafted prior to the beginning of the war against Russia. The commitment to the position on the question of Bizerte had been formulated by the French Cabinet while he had been away in Syria and in Turkey. He very much regretted not having been able to make any changes after his return to Vichy. The Reich Government should not overlook the fact, however, that France, by this note, did not withdraw from her commitments for military collaboration with Germany against England, but merely wanted to assure for herself popular support for carrying this out in a most comprehensive and resolute manner.

I objected to Benoist-Méchin that if France were given an opportunity to collaborate with a victorious Germany it was not our task to impress the value of this policy on the French people by constantly

<sup>4</sup> In telegram No. 227 of July 26 (694/260247-49) Welck reported a conversation of General Vogl with Admiral Michellier in which the Chairman of the German Armistice Commission had informed his French counterpart that French attempts to link the agreements of the Paris Protocols with political negotiations could not be recognized and that the fulfillment of further concessions on the part of Germany would have to depend on a change of the French attitude regarding the Tunisian question. For further details on the Vogl-Michellier conversation see *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. v, pp. 5-12.

<sup>5</sup> The record of this conference, printed as document No. 82, does not contain any warning to the French Government on the part of Abetz. No other record of this conference has been found.

making concessions; instead, the French Government itself should find ways and means to gain popular support for such a policy. For this decision, however, the French Government lacked, by and large, the necessary enthusiasm, despite the admittedly good will of some members of the French Cabinet. Even if a sharper tone had recently been struck against England in official speeches both in the press and on the radio in the unoccupied territory, the forbearance toward warmongering circles in the United States impressed us unpleasantly as did also the fact that little or nothing ensued in presenting the prodigious European accomplishments of the Führer and the justification of the German claim to leadership in Europe. Too many French Government departments and agencies were still today nests of de Gaullist intrigue, and the Government was devoting a great deal less energy to combating these than to the attempt to keep from power protagonists of Franco-German collaboration, who disagreed with Vichy's reactionary course.

Benoist-Méchin side-stepped this question of domestic policy with the remark that this was outside his responsibility. To refute the charge of double-dealing with respect to the United States he cited the accord with Japan over Indochina,<sup>6</sup> which he had managed to have the Cabinet accept forthwith despite the strongest opposition pressure from Washington.<sup>7</sup>

He himself was well aware that the French Government and public opinion in France still left much to be desired. He pleaded however to place the necessary confidence in Darlan and the ministers appointed by him to the Cabinet that they would accomplish the re-orientation of French policies and of the French public in favor of integrating France into a Europe led by Germany.

At the end of the week in a Cabinet meeting at Vichy he wished again to press for immediate execution of German supply movements through Bizerte and, following that, he would ask Darlan to bring to Paris any resolution of the French Government to this effect.<sup>8</sup> His intervention at Vichy would be made much easier if Darlan were given the hope that he would be able to raise political questions, once the military measures had been undertaken.

I told Benoist-Méchin that I lacked instructions on this subject and was therefore not in position to make any statement thereon.

ABETZ

<sup>6</sup> See document No. 146.

<sup>7</sup> On United States pressure on France, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. v, pp. 212, 218, 243-244, 246-247.

<sup>8</sup> In telegram No. 2335 of Aug. 6 (386/211300-04) Schleier transmitted the text of a French note of Aug. 4 which was handed to him by Benoist-Méchin. Among other matters it listed three conditions which would have to be fulfilled before Bizerte could be utilized for supply shipments. The text of the French note has been printed in *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. v, pp. 53-56.

## No. 163

927/297338-39

*The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 2475 of July 29

WASHINGTON, July 30, 1941—5:28 p. m.

Received July 31—5:10 a. m.

Inf. 648 g.

With reference to my telegram No. 1686 of June 6.<sup>1</sup>

In recent months the mass dispatch of postcards has proved to be particularly effective as a propaganda action which can be carried out very quickly and suddenly and which is to be directed at as large a group of persons as possible who do not have much intellectual training. Therefore through the agency of the [Embassy] press officer the mailing of about a dozen cards, each in 100,000—in words a hundred thousand—to a million copies has been organized and financed. They contained sarcastic attacks on Roosevelt and the war-mongering members of his Cabinet, reminders of his campaign promise to keep America out of war, a reference to the American blood sacrifices in the World War, an appeal to American mothers, and they asked recipients to write or telegraph in this sense to their representatives in Congress and the White House. As all of the postcards had the letterhead of the American Congress or of the members of Congress concerned and contained mainly material which was taken from purely American sources and also appeared in one form or other in the official "*Congressional Record*", our hand was not in any way recognizable. Alarmed by the success of this campaign of postcards, the interventionist press is already starting to attack their being sent through Congress, but so far without success.

There follows a detailed telegram No. 24 (group garbled) of July 29 regarding the preparation and effectiveness of these postcards.<sup>2</sup> This telegram and the pertinent papers have been destroyed.

THOMSEN

<sup>1</sup>This telegram (598/245372-74) was a report on the propaganda activities carried on by the Embassy.

<sup>2</sup>This presumably refers to telegram No. 2476 of July 29, sent July 31 (1527/373773-74) which lists seven members of the House of Representatives and one Senator under whose names such cards were sent. Thomsen particularly emphasized the "telling effect" of the card sent out in a million copies by Senator Burton K. Wheeler and the great controversy between Wheeler and Secretary of War Stimson which had resulted from it.

## No. 164

8589/E602987-91

*Führer's Directive*

CHEFSACHE

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, July 30, 1941.

TOP SECRET MILITARY

The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht  
OKW/WFSt/Abt. L (I Op.) No. 441298/41 g.K. Chefs.  
By officer only

## DIRECTIVE No. 34

The development of the situation in the last few days, the appearance of strong enemy forces before the front and in the flanks of Army Group Center, the supply situation, and the necessity to give the 2nd and 3rd Armored Groups about 10 days of time to rehabilitate their formations, compel for the moment the postponement of the more distant missions and targets assigned in Directive 33 of July 19<sup>1</sup> and its supplement of July 23.<sup>2</sup>

I order therefore:

I. (1) In the northern sector of the eastern front the attack with the main effort between Lake Ilmen and Narva is to be continued in the direction of Leningrad with the objective of encircling Leningrad and establishing contact with the Finnish Army.

This offensive is to be screened off north of Lake Ilmen in the Volkhov sector, and south of Lake Ilmen to be pressed to the northeast only as far as securing the right flank of the advance north of Lake Ilmen demands. Previously the situation around Velikie Luki is to be cleaned up. All forces not required for this mission are to be added to the assault wing to the north of Lake Ilmen. The contemplated thrust of the 3rd Armored Group upon the Valdai Hills will not take place until the armored formations are again fully ready for action. Instead, however, the left wing of Army Group Center must be pushed ahead to the northeast as far as the flank protection of the right wing of Army Group North demands it.

Estonia is first to be cleared with all the forces of the Eighteenth Army; only then can divisions be brought through in the direction of Leningrad.

(2) Army Group *Center*, with the utilization of favorable terrain sectors, will shift over to the defensive.

In so far as it is necessary to gain favorable jump-off positions for the later assault operations against the Twenty-first Soviet Army, some attacks with limited objectives may still be carried out.

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 128.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (8589/E602975-77).



For the rest, the 2nd and 3rd Armored Groups are to be withdrawn from the front as soon as the situation permits, and be speedily rehabilitated.

(3) On the *southeastern front* the operations, for the time being, will be continued with forces of Army Group South alone.

Their objective must be the destruction of the strong enemy forces west of the Dnieper and for the rest, by gaining bridgeheads near Kiev and to the south, the creation of suitable conditions for later pulling the 1st *Panzer Grenadier Division* across to the eastern bank of the Dnieper.

The Fifth Red Army, fighting in the swamp area northwest of Kiev, must be forced to give battle west of the Dnieper and be destroyed. The danger that it might break through to the north across the Pripet must be forestalled in good time.

(4) *Finnish Front:*

The attack in the direction of Kandalaksha is to be called off. With the Mountain Corps the threats to the flank from Motovskiy Bay are to be eliminated and only those forces left to XXXVI Corps Headquarters that are necessary for defense and for the feigning of further assault preparations.

The cutting of the Murmansk railway is now to be attempted in the sector of the III (Finnish) Corps, especially in direction Loukhi; all the forces suitable for this attack are to be transferred there, with any surplus units to be turned over to the Karelian Army. If, because of the terrain difficulties, the attack should come to a halt with the III (Finnish) Corps, too, the German forces are to be withdrawn and added to the Karelian Army. This applies particularly to mobile units, tanks, and heavy artillery.

The 6th Mountain Division is to be moved to the Mountain Corps, with the utilization of all available transport routes. Whether the rail route through Sweden to Narvik can also be used will be clarified by the Foreign Ministry.<sup>8</sup>

II. *Luftwaffe*

(1) *Northeastern Front:*

The Luftwaffe will shift the main effort of the conduct of the air combat to the northeastern front, by bringing the bulk of the VIII Air Corps into the First Air Force. The reinforcements are to be brought in early enough for their utilization at the beginning of the main point of the attack by Army Group North (early on August 6).

(2) *Center:*

It will be the mission of the Luftwaffe units remaining with Army Group Center to provide the absolutely necessary fighter protection

<sup>8</sup> See documents Nos. 172 and 176.

before the front of the Second and Ninth Armies and possibly to support local attacks. The attacks on Moscow are to be continued.

(3) *Southeastern Front:*

Missions as before. No reduction of the Luftwaffe units employed with Army Group South is contemplated.

(4) *Finland:*

The principal mission of the Fifth Air Force is the support of the Mountain Corps. In addition, the attack of the III Finnish Army Corps is to be supported at some promising sector.

The requisite preparations are to be made for the possibly necessary dispatch of forces in support of the Karelian Army.<sup>4</sup>

ADOLF HITLER

<sup>4</sup> The supplement of Aug. 12 (8589/E603003-006).

No. 165

70/50628-81

*Memorandum by Minister Rahn*

WESTFALEN, July 30, 1941.

REPORT ON THE GERMAN MISSION IN SYRIA FROM MAY 9 TO  
JULY 11, 1941

I. *Mission.*

On May 6, 1941, at 10 p. m., Ambassador Abetz in Paris transmitted to me the order of the Foreign Minister, in line with the general agreement reached with the French Government, to fly to Syria and there to prepare for the purchase of French arms for the equipment of the Iraq Army.<sup>1</sup> Ambassador Abetz informed me that, in the opinion of the French, the Levant, of all of France's overseas possessions, was most strongly infected by de Gaullism and that High Commissioner General Dentz himself was known as an Anglophile. It was, therefore, necessary above all, to overcome the psychological resistance on the spot, to get the consent of the Italian Control Commission in Syria to the release of the stores of arms, to ascertain the most suitable transportation route to Iraq, and to prevent a sabotaging of the shipments by de Gaullist elements. I received written authorization from Ambassador Abetz in the name of the Foreign Minister, and from General Vogl in the name of the Armistice Commission. Admiral Darlan sent along a representative, M. Guérard, provided with appropriate powers, to accompany me and to establish the contact with General Dentz and the French General Staff in Syria. He indeed gave me untiring and very skilful assistance in all conversations. Herr Eitel Friedrich Möllhausen, of the Paris Embassy, accompanied

<sup>1</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 476 and footnote 3.

me as secretary; the Foreign Ministry placed at my disposal the radio operator, Weller. Both gave an excellent account of themselves, as did Consular Secretary Hornberger and radio operator Höntschi, who were later assigned to me.

## II. *Journey.*

On May 7 we flew to Berlin in order to pick up the radio operator and some spare parts. On May 8, in the morning, we flew to Athens. There I learned late in the evening that Minister Grobba was on the way to Iraq<sup>2</sup> with two bombers and had already landed in Rhodes. Through the wireless connection of Field Marshal von Reichenau,<sup>3</sup> it was possible to reach Minister Grobba around 4:00 o'clock in the morning, and to get him to await my arrival in Rhodes. On the morning of May 9, I met Grobba and invited him to fly with me in my plane to Aleppo and also to have his two bombers land there. I assumed—and this was confirmed in the further course of events—that the arrival of two representatives of the Reich and a special courier of Marshal Pétain's at a Syrian airport would deter the somewhat de Gaullist-minded French officers from making difficulties for the German officers and their planes in continuing their flight. But this also established a precedent for the arrival of additional German bombers. When the three planes made a surprise landing in Aleppo late in the afternoon of May 9, the French officers after a short discussion, took in fact an entirely correct attitude; they made ground organization and a guard detail available and invited the German officers to dinner in the officers' mess. There over the door hung a sign bearing the ambiguous text: "Vivent les Gaulles nos ancêtres" [Long live the Gauls, our ancestors].

A threatening little incident, which was fortunately, however, hardly noticed by the French, was averted through the intervention of Grobba and me. The French had assigned a lieutenant to the German officers as a liaison officer. The French designation "*sous-lieutenant*" was translated by the German officers as "Sergeant" [*Unteroffizier*] and this apparent faux pas was commented upon with loud and vehement protests. The German officers, moreover, wanted to inspect the city and the citadel of Aleppo, with its French military garrison, in full uniform. This, in view of the sensationalism characteristic of Arab countries, would at once have become known throughout Syria and prematurely drawn the attention of the French, Syrians, and English to our further plans. The rather sharp discussion which arose in this connection may have been the first cause of certain misunderstandings with which Minister Grobba later on had to contend in his cooperation with the German military authorities in Iraq.

<sup>2</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 435.

<sup>3</sup> Commanding General of the Sixth Army.

Through orientation on the spot and after talks with Lieutenant Commander Voissard, a confidential agent of Darlan's who had meanwhile arrived in Aleppo, and with the Iraq Consul in Aleppo, I realized that the only reliable and quick route to be considered for the transportation of arms to Iraq was the Baghdad Railway, but that it could only be used if the arms were expedited so quickly and unobtrusively that neither the Turks nor the English would have time to prepare a sabotage operation.

## III. *First Meeting with High Commissioner General Dentz.*

Since our He. 111 was unable to land at the small airport near Beirut, I flew with Guérard on May 10 in a special French plane to Beirut, where General Dentz had come to meet us from his summer seat in Damascus. The High Commissioner received me courteously but with extreme coolness. Right after the first sentences he stated that the mission of Minister von Hentig<sup>4</sup> had at the time touched off a series of disorders, demonstrations, strikes and small revolts, which up to now he had not been able to put down completely, and which had taken a toll of over 100 lives. I replied that I had not been sent to pursue an Arab policy and that I would concern myself with Arab questions only in closest agreement with him. It was my task to prove that German-French collaboration, for which the Führer had established the principle of "do ut des", was no ideological game, but led to tangible results. From this point of view we regarded the Iraq question as the touchstone of French good will, and here he [Dentz] could win a battle for France. Since I had to conclude from his replies that he was by no means informed about the new status of German-French relations, I spent about 1 hour in telling him about the policy which had led to the meeting of the Führer with Marshal Pétain at Montoire,<sup>5</sup> and after various reverses, to the new rapprochement between the Reich Government and Darlan's Cabinet. In the end Dentz stated that he was prepared to give loyal support to the policy of Darlan and, together with his General Staff, to consider at once what quantities of arms could, without jeopardizing their own fighting strength, be released for deliveries to Iraq. He had to point out, however, that the Army of the Levant was exposed to strong Anglo-de Gaullist propaganda, and that, in the event of a British attack on Syria, he could not vouch for its reliability. He therefore asked me for the time being to see to it that no German officers came to Beirut, and that I myself appear camouflaged under a French name. He misunderstood my suggestion that I would choose for this purpose the name "Robert Renoir," and wrote on the identification card intended for me: "Robert Renouard". In reply to his question whether this

<sup>4</sup> For the background of Hentig's trip to Syria in January 1941, see vol. XI of this series, document No. 626.

<sup>5</sup> See vol. XI of this series, document No. 227.

was written correctly, I replied that I was glad to get this name from him, "because there were so many things to put together again (renouer) between our two peoples."<sup>6</sup> This spontaneous reply seemed to please him. From that moment on until the day of the Armistice he met me with decided personal cordiality.

We arranged a second meeting for the afternoon, and I took it upon myself to get the head of the Italian Control Commission, General de Giorgis, to release the arms that were impounded and—as a precaution—to deploy and disperse the planes that were tightly packed in the sheds among the various airports. General de Giorgis seemed at first not to be greatly edified by the appearance of a German delegation. It was possible, however, after a short time to create a close, even cordial and comradely relationship with de Giorgis and the gentlemen of the Italian Control Commission, due primarily to Möllhausen's social grace and his excellent command of Italian. During the entire time there was not a single difference of opinion between us and the Italians. General de Giorgis and his chief aide, Lieutenant Colonel Invrea, performed their duty objectively and dauntlessly. Most of the other men, above all, the great throng of civilian officials, including primarily Consul General Sbrana, who is equally unpopular with the French and Arabs, showed a striking lack of courage and were greatly shaken at every atrocity report.

On the afternoon of May 10, General Dentz submitted to me a list of arms for Iraq, drafted by his General Staff, which, however, was at first entirely inadequate. When I pointed out that half measures were more harmful than helpful, he approved a substantial extension of the list, so that the following items were finally scheduled for the first shipment: 15,500 guns and 200 machine guns with 900 belts of ammunition and 5 million rounds and four 7.5 field guns with 10,000 rounds. Everything with the proper equipment, accessories, spare parts, etc. This transport, like the ones that followed, was so assembled that each individual shipment was a unit in itself and was entirely usable in the event of the loss of another shipment.

When General Dentz stated that, according to the information of his General Staff, a period of 11 days was needed for the assembling and shipment of the arms, I replied to him: "General, permit me to make a remark: our armies won their battles through their speed. I intend to do the same. You will not let yourself be put to shame by a civilian. Eleven days—that is impossible; the English will know about it long before the time expires, they will accuse you of complicity, bomb the transports, or prepare acts of sabotage. I can give your General Staff not 11 days, but 10 hours." Whereupon Dentz said: "Would you like to tell an old General Staff officer how this is

<sup>6</sup> In the original, the passage within quotation marks is given in French as well as in German.

to be done technically?" And, in response to my question, "may I?" he said "Please dictate." He then wrote down my suggestions: personal commitment of a reliable General Staff officer, the placing in readiness of all available trucks of the Army, the commandeering of the troops closest to the depots for round-the-clock loading, truck movements radiating to the nearest railroad station; there, preparation of cars and locomotives, collection of the individual transports and assembling of the final transport train in Aleppo. After a brief scrutiny of the proposals, General Dentz picked up the telephone, saying, "in order to give you pleasure," and transmitted the orders literally to the General Staff. Ten minutes later the General Staff officer in charge of the organization was, in my presence, put on his honor as an officer. Seventeen hours later two transport trains with a total of 27 fully-loaded cars were assembled in Aleppo.

When I was informed that the Turkish Government requested advance notice of 5 days for each transport through Turkish territory, I suggested to the High Commissioner that the Turks be informed through his railroad commissioner that he feared the thinly garrisoned Syrian-Iraq frontier would be imperiled by Iraq troops who might stream back and he therefore requested immediate permission for the transit of 200 men, together with material, for the purpose of strengthening the protection of the border. General Dentz agreed to this also. Permission was received from the Turks a few hours later. The Turks, to be sure, later protested against this deception, but did not interfere with the transports that followed.

In discussing the possible consequences of our transports and a possible English attack on Syria, I asked General Dentz about the supply situation of the Army and the civilian population. The General replied that there were, to be sure, abundant supplies in the country. But, as a result of famine propaganda which had noticeably increased recently the supplies had disappeared from the market and obviously had been bought up and concealed by speculators. Official food supplies were practically not available. Depending on the kind of commodity, there was enough for two to eight days. I suggested that, under the name of Renouard, I be given unrestricted permission for the importation of food from Iraq. We would then on a certain key date, throw the goods on the central markets of Beirut, Damascus and Aleppo at low prices and through clever allusions in the press to additional shipments from Iraq, intimidate the speculators and get them to unload their stocks. As soon as the downward movement got under way, I suggested that he buy up as large supplies as possible in order to assure supplies for the Army and to be able to step in and regulate prices on the free market. The High Commissioner was glad to accept the offer. (After the imports came through successfully,

the prices of the most important commodities fell: grain, sugar, rice, and edible fat prices 30 to 50% in a few days. When the armistice was signed, the Mandate Government still had supplies sufficient for 15 to 20 days.)

On the evening of May 10, I followed General Dentz to Damascus and also had my staff follow me from Aleppo.

#### IV. *Damascus.*

Shortly after my arrival in Damascus, the first German bombers arrived there under the command of Major von Blomberg. I asked him if possible not to route further planes via Damascus, which was too near to the British air bases and also offered the British espionage service a convenient field for activity, but via Palmyra, whose large airport lay at some distance from the city, completely isolated in the desert. There, too, there was less danger of incidents. Furthermore, he should also give orders that the German planes stop for only a very short time at Syrian airports and do as little refueling as possible in order to share the scanty and irreplaceable French supply (totaling about 4500 tons). I wired several times to this effect to Berlin.<sup>7</sup> The death of Major von Blomberg<sup>8</sup> and the obvious difficulties in the transmission of orders to, and communications with the planes intended for the operation in Iraq prevented the execution of these suggestions. The loss of a number of German bombers would otherwise have been avoided and I would have been spared numerous vexatious arguments with the French General Staff and the Commandant of the airfield. Again and again German planes came to Damascus; again and again the pilots made excessive demands for gasoline; again and again they asked for permission for an extended stay in order to await further flying orders. The conduct of the German soldiers was, in general, excellent. Only the pilots of some transport planes were an exception to this and compelled me to intervene and occasionally to act as a mediator with the French Commandant. I then arranged in great haste for gasoline to be supplied from Damascus and Palmyra; obtained food supplies, beverages, also articles of equipment that were needed for the German fliers, and had quarters and beds prepared for them. This took, all told, May 11 and the morning of May 12. On the morning of May 11, after another conversation with High Commissioner Dentz. I reported to Berlin that the latter was skeptical about the prospects for Iraq. If Germany wanted to make more than a heroic gesture, supplies had to be assured through Turkey or through the occupation of Cyprus. At the same time I asked that Turkey's consent be obtained for one through train per week, in order to assure supplies in the event of danger of an English attack.

<sup>7</sup> An unnumbered telegram by Rahn of May 12 (70/50276) deals with this matter.

<sup>8</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 528.

On May 12, after the appearance of a British reconnaissance plane over the airfield of Damascus the High Commissioner placed the entire country in a state of defense and concentrated troops on the Palestinian border.

#### V. *First Arms Transports.*

The arms trains meanwhile rolled through Turkish territory. On the afternoon of May 12, I flew with a small French special plane to Kamichlié on the northeastern border of Syria, in order to arrive simultaneously with the transports at the frontier station of Tel Kotchek, to take over the trains and take them to Mosul. Captain Cornet, the aide to the High Commissioner, escorted me. Since the plane had heavy sandstorms to contend with on the way, we ran out of gasoline, and were forced to land near Hassetche with our last drop of fuel.

The five officers of this little desert garrison received us hospitably and promised to place a car at our disposal for the trip to Tel Kotchek. Since I was appearing in the guise of a French merchant from Paris, I had to endure 2 distressing hours of a lively question-and-answer game at dinner. I used the 5-hour trip through the desert at night, disturbed only once by the stone-throwing of anti-French Bedouins, to rouse Captain Cornet from his decidedly cool reserve and win him over to the common game. Subsequently, he rendered us valuable services. At 2:00 o'clock in the morning of May 13, we arrived in Tel Kotchek only to find that, despite my telegraphic requests, nothing was prepared. Obviously the telegrams had not arrived. The Iraq station master, whom I had aroused from his bed, had received no instructions. The Iraq locomotive requested was not on hand, nor was the Iraq guard, and there was not a trace of Grobba himself, whom I had asked to meet us at Tel Kotchek. After much talking I finally learned that a few hundred meters beyond the border there was an Iraq police station, from which, if necessary, Mosul could be reached by telephone. The Iraq station master, who claimed that the border police fired at nocturnal visitors, and who called upon the French officer to corroborate this, had to accompany me there despite his great reluctance. We drove up to the station with flash signals and violent honking and by means of promises and threats, got the police sergeant on duty to connect us by telephone with the Iraq general in Mosul. A quarter of an hour later Minister Grobba was on the phone; he promised to send at once a locomotive and some guards as far as the second station on the Iraq side and to come by automobile himself to meet me. He was also going to see to it that counterdeliveries of the provisions that were most important for Syria were made ready at once. The first trainload of arms arrived in Tel Kotchek around 6:00 o'clock in the morning, the second toward 8:00. With the help of the Iraq station master, we were able for a small fee to get a Turkish locomotive engineer to attach his locomotive to the cars which had

meanwhile been coupled together to make a long train. I got into the locomotive and around 10:00 a. m. rode across the Iraq frontier. In Tel Kotchek I heard rumors to the effect that the English already knew about the arms transport and had gotten a friendly Bedouin tribe to attack the train at a distance of about an hour and a half from Tel Kotchek on the other side, when it was on a curve of almost 90 degrees, and therefore going very slowly. At the spot indicated a troop of Bedouins actually did rush toward the train with rifles swinging, garments a-flutter, and with loud cries. It was entirely superfluous, for me, however, to unlock my powerful 6.3-mm. pistol and thus get the poor engineer to drive faster. They meant no harm, they were simply giving us a little ovation with greetings and handclapping and, with beaming faces, pointed to the guns that were loaded in open cars.

Shortly afterward the meeting point agreed upon came into view. The Iraq escort personnel were already waiting with a locomotive, and a cloud of dust on the highway of the steppes announced the arrival of Grobba. When the train left the station again, an English plane dropped a bomb, which, however, landed in the sand, about 500 meters from the tracks. On May 13, at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon the transport arrived unmolested in Mosul—about 75 hours after my first talk with General Dentz.

#### VI. *Additional Arms Transports.*

After the food deliveries had been assured and had begun with the energetic assistance of Minister Grobba, I flew on May 14 via Palmyra back to Damascus. My observations in Mosul had given me the somewhat depressing impression of doubt in the efficacy of German aid. All sorts of things were lacking: there were no bombs, no spare parts, no gasoline—above all, however, so it seemed to me, no firm and purposeful leadership. At the same time, the young fliers themselves made the best possible impression. I thought, therefore, that through increased arms deliveries, I should so strengthen the striking power of the Iraq Army that sufficient time would be won for the organization of German supplies. Since it was to be expected, moreover, that by that time the Turkish Government, despite its commitments to England, would have to approve the transit of German and French supplies, I tried to make all necessary preparations for the provisioning of any German motorized units that might arrive. For this reason I had urgently requested in Mosul the reopening of the pipeline to Tripoli.

In Damascus I found a mood of great nervousness. At almost the same time as we flew over Palmyra, two English Blenheims had attacked the airport. The Gaullist General Catroux had had leaflets dropped on Damascus calling upon the French to rise in revolt. On May 15 the airports of Rayak and Palmyra were attacked, and two German planes and one French plane were hit in Palmyra. Among

the French, only General Dentz himself was entirely calm and almost serene in his composure. He congratulated me on the "sportsmanlike achievement" of the first arms transport and discussed further deliveries. We agreed to stagger the trains so that the third should arrive in Mosul on May 26, the fourth on May 28, the fifth on June 3, the sixth on June 10. There were still available three 15.5 batteries, 354 machine guns, each with adequate ammunition and all spare parts, 100,100 hand grenades, 60 heavy trucks, 20 command cars, 400 binoculars, 30 km. of cable; also optical instruments, telephone apparatus, etc.

The third and fourth trains, in charge of Möllhausen, crossed the Iraq border shortly before the English succeeded in blowing up a bridge in the northeast corner of Syria, near Kubur el Bid not far from Kamichlié. Dispatching of the two last trains was delayed on account of repair work which required 5 days—fortunately, because in the meantime the collapse of Iraq's resistance had become evident.

My desperate efforts to bring back to Syria the war material that was still stored in Mosul failed. Möllhausen deserves credit for getting two trainloads of grain off to Syria through forceful action before the English had time to close the border on the very day that the German fliers left Mosul precipitately because of a false report.

#### VII. *War Preparations in Syria.*

At first we all were convinced that the English would not dare to attack Syria openly. It was clear that they hoped, through de Gaullist intrigues, to win the Army of the Levant and thus conquer the country by subversion. And this hope was not unjustified according to the information that they were able to get concerning the Army of the Levant in the preceding months. But they had not reckoned with the attraction of the idea of German-French collaboration for the French. We had soon realized that every Frenchman in Syria, every officer, and every official could be won over to it if he only retained the illusion that he could thereby help his country. While they themselves were slow and hesitant in making their decisions, they expected of us rapid and soldierly action and absolute good faith when our word was pledged; however, they were then ungrudging in rendering of their reciprocal service and stuck it out. I was therefore on my guard against making a promise that I could not fulfill at once. This won their confidence and finally they let me participate in their most intimate political and economic, nay, even their military decisions.

When it became clear from the more and more threatening démarches of the English and American Consuls General, from leaflets and bombs dropped on Syrian airfields, that the English meant business, we concentrated our entire strength on influencing the Army through propaganda, and on counteracting de Gaullist agitation.

Guérard, whom I met every night in the hotel between 12:00 and 2:00 o'clock, worked with me in drafting speeches which General Dentz took, in part verbatim, and repeated before the officers' corps, the chamber of commerce, the French colony. The most reliable General Staff officers, who had also been influenced by us personally, drove to the military outposts, pledged their loyalty as soldiers and treated de Gaulism with contempt. Strong pressure was exerted on the press, which was influenced by American money; the radio was strengthened and reoriented.

On May 16 I followed the High Commissioner to Beirut, who within 24 hours furnished an empty apartment for me with office furniture and had an antenna put up for my radio communication with Berlin; he also placed at my disposal three automobiles of the office of the High Commissioner which, because of their distinctive appearance, had access everywhere.

The attitude of the Army was still vacillating. Almost daily I received reports of heated arguments in officers' circles and an unfortunate remark of the High Commissioner's, in which he spoke of "emergency landings of German planes at Syrian airfields," already exposed him to the repeated reproach of insincerity. For this reason he received the announcement of the arrival of a 33-man German liaison staff under the command of Colonel von Manteuffel with obvious displeasure. He urgently asked, for the sake of making his position less difficult with respect to the Army, to the French population, and to the English and American Missions, that we refrain from sending German officers to Beirut and that he be allowed to deal with German military authorities exclusively through me or, possibly, through the Italians. He expected, moreover, that the liaison staff would handle only questions of traffic between Germany and Iraq.

On May 17, at the airport of Rayak, which had never been touched by our planes, the first Frenchman, an officer, was killed by an English aerial bomb. I at once requested that the English Consulates in Beirut, Damascus, and Aleppo be closed and the Consuls and their entire staffs expelled. This request was complied with upon confirmation by Vichy. Thus, English espionage activity was, in general, confined to the Americans, who were carefully watched. The request of the High Commissioner to have the American Consul General also recalled was not granted by Vichy.

Our relations with the General Staff had, in the meantime, been so strengthened that I was allowed to inspect the French plans of defense. In so doing I had to note with alarm that General Dentz wanted to take up a position near Kisane, due south of Damascus, and confine the defense to Lebanon and the coastline. If Germany was really thinking of intervening in Syria—and at this point I could not yet doubt that this was so—this decision to abandon Syria was fatal

to our plans and absolutely had to be changed. Guérard and a few officers of the General Staff took it upon themselves, at my urgent request, to convince the General of the need for a defense of Syria. I myself advised him to withdraw his troops which had been stationed along the Turkish border to the south, since I thought I could guarantee that the Turks would not dare, despite their ardent desire for the possession of Aleppo, to enter Syria. At the request of the High Commissioner, I had this view confirmed by the Foreign Ministry in Berlin<sup>o</sup> and by the German Embassy in Ankara, whereupon he withdrew almost his entire northern army, about half a division, and had it take up a position south and southeast of Damascus. He agreed, I regret to say, only hesitantly to the proposal that the troops be made more mobile through the requisitioning of all available vehicles for the desert war. To be sure, he admitted the correctness of Schlieffen's thesis as applied in this area that attack was not only the best defense, but the only form of defense, but when motorization was finally carried out, it was already too late. Nevertheless, Colonel Collet's desertion with 3000 Circassians, almost all of whom returned on the following night, offered the welcome excuse for pointing out that Collet, against whom I had already warned the High Commissioner, being the best expert on the Damascene area, was in possession of all the plans of defense and that these therefore had absolutely to be changed. This argument was convincing, and the General shifted the line of defense very much to the south, to the areas of El Kuneitra, Esra [*Izra?*] and Es Suweida, that is, close to the Transjordanian border. Meanwhile our days were filled with efforts for the improvement of the supply situation, for the strengthening of propaganda, and for combatting the activities of English agents, which the High Commissioner with incomprehensible indulgence permitted. It was not until a Polish agent was discovered in our house and two English reserve officers were seized with a trunk full of teller mines, allegedly intended for the German representatives in Beirut, that he decided to establish a concentration camp. Also, not until we suggested it were secret transmitters watched and put out of commission. Still in expectation of Turkish approval for transit, I saw to it that the dispersal landing fields in the Jezira district in the northeastern part of Syria, near the Baghdad Railway, destroyed after the German-French armistice, were rebuilt.

Through the efforts of Guérard, I was able to establish close and lasting contact with Admiral Goutton, Commander in Chief of the Fleet and a friend of Admiral Darlan's, and with Air Force General Janneckeyn. Both discussed keenly and willingly the idea of German-French collaboration, and seemed greatly impressed with the

<sup>o</sup> Rintelen telegram No. 23 of May 18 (83/61268).

honorable treatment meted out to the defeated French Army by the German Command and the German soldiers.

VIII. *Representatives of the Wehrmacht in Syria.*

Relations between the representatives of the Foreign Ministry and the representatives of the Wehrmacht in Syria could not always be conducted without friction. I do not believe that this is to be attributed to lack of good will on the one side or the other, but principally to the difference in duties and in views. The representative of the Foreign Ministry regarded it as his duty:

- 1) to bring unobtrusively to Iraq the largest possible quantity of French arms;
- 2) in doing this to spare French sensibilities and the French sense of honor; in other words, to persuade, not to command;
- 3) if possible to deprive the English of an excuse for invading Syria, by their referring to German interim landings and German purchases of arms in Syria;
- 4) to aggravate, nevertheless, with all possible means the differences between the French and the English, in order thereby to frustrate and perhaps ultimately make impossible a rapprochement on the part of Vichy toward English policy.

Thus, the reiterated demand: as few German officers as possible in Syrian or Lebanese cities; reserved behavior at the airfields; no appeal to the rights of the victor.

The German officers understandably felt themselves to be representatives of a victorious army. They considered it undignified not to appear in uniform. They considered their being concentrated in the barracks of the Syrian airfields a galling imprisonment. Major Hansen of the Department of "Foreign Armies" on the General Staff, who stopped for a few days in Beirut, understood and approved our attitude. I got valuable hints from his intelligent and calm judgment. Unfortunately my wish that he be sent to Beirut as Military Attaché could not be granted. My relations with Colonel v. Manteuffel, the head of the liaison staff, who suffered noticeably from isolation at the Aleppo airfield, were difficult. He complained constantly about the unreliability and lack of discipline of his subordinates, suspected betrayal behind every French measure, and so flew in the face of Major de Russé, the especially obliging commandant of the airfield, that the latter went to Beirut, spoke of injury to his honor as an officer and asked that he be relieved. I had trouble in patching the matter up in the General Staff. Shortly after his arrival, Colonel von Manteuffel reported to Berlin that General Dentz was under increasing English influence.<sup>10</sup> He himself later termed this a mistake. When, after two previous brain concussions, he finally suffered

<sup>10</sup> In telegram No. 67 of May 27 (83/61373) Kramarz requested Rahn's view toward this report by Manteuffel. In telegram No. 60 of May 28 (83/61370-72) Rahn replied, expressing the same views as are here recorded.

a third, one following an automobile accident, his behavior toward his subordinates, his aides and finally also toward me became so overbearing and his statements so contradictory that it seemed to me he was in urgent need of a rest and I had to suggest that he be relieved. There were hardly any real and serious differences between us. I attribute the difficulties that he encountered exclusively to reasons of health and climate.

Of a more serious nature was an incident with Colonel Junk, the leader of the Iraq venture, who called me on May 31 from Aleppo, to tell me that the joint German-French defense of Syria had been decided upon in Paris with Darlan and Huntziger. He asked at once for permission to come to Beirut in uniform in order to discuss the details. He intimated, moreover, at decided criticism of the camouflaged activity in which I had engaged and declared that he now wanted to "put the cards on the table." I stated that I had no instructions as yet from Berlin on this score, but I called on the High Commissioner at once in order to get his approval for Colonel Junk's trip to Beirut. The latter declined gruffly; he had no instructions from Vichy concerning German-French military collaboration in Syria. The announcement of such a collaboration and the arrival of a uniformed German officer in Beirut would mean immediate war with England, and in the present state of affairs could still lead to a revolt in the Army. He finally decided, in response to my request, to order Air Force General Janneckeyn from Damascus to Beirut and to send him with me by plane to Aleppo. General Felmy<sup>11</sup> had meanwhile arrived there, and it was soon evident from his explanations that the statements of Colonel Junk were based on a misunderstanding. The incident was thus patched up.<sup>12</sup>

A flawless collaboration based on comradeship characterized my relations with Captain Roser, the representative of the Abwehr in Beirut. Only once was my intervention necessary, when I learned that Captain Roser and Major Arnold, who had been sent to Beirut specifically for this purpose, had instructions to secretly distribute among insurgent Arabs—that is, without the knowledge of the French—a shipload of arms destined for Syria. Roser had already negotiated concerning this with two of the nationalist leaders, Chükrü Kuatli [*Shukri al Quwatli*] and Emir Adel Arslan [*Amir*

<sup>11</sup> Hellmuth Felmy, General of the Luftwaffe, head of the German military mission to Iraq.

<sup>12</sup> In telegram No. 71 of May 31 (83/61402-04) Rahn reported Junk's request as well as the French High Commissioner's reaction and requested instructions. Ribbentrop's instructions transmitted in telegram No. 97 of May 31 from Fuschland dispatched to Rahn as No. 481 (83/61427) read as follows:

"There are to be no attacks by German planes against the English from Syrian territory. They could be considered only if Syria, for her part, should be attacked by England and request German assistance. German officers must not appear in uniform in Beirut. Please transmit this instruction which was issued in accord with OKW to Colonel Junk also."

*Adil Arsalan*], who were regarded with mistrust by the French. Major Arnold notified me, moreover, of the imminent arrival of about 20 members of the *Abwehr* in Beirut in order to carry out this operation. It was clear in this connection that, without the knowledge of the French, the ship could not berth, trucks could not be bought for the transshipment, large quantities of the gasoline rationed throughout Syria could not be bought, drivers could not be hired, and, above all, the distribution of arms could not be organized in a country that was in a state of alert. Moreover, a distribution by the old rebel, *Kuatli* [*Quwatli*], would have been interpreted by the French as an attempt at preparation of an internal rebellion. Also, the dispatch of a 20-man military mission to Beirut was contrary to clear-cut German-French agreements. Only later was it apparent, to the astonishment of Major Arnold and the obvious annoyance of *Quwatli*, that the French had meanwhile been informed and asked to cooperate. A few days later Major Arnold went to Berlin to report and did not return to Beirut. In response to my urgent request, Major Meyer-Ricks was assigned to me on June 22, that is, unfortunately, not until the last phase of the Syrian war, "camouflaged as a military attaché." I requested and obtained for him a liaison officer from the General Staff, and his zeal and circumspection in reporting eased substantially the burden of my work.

#### IX. *The "Arab Movement"*.

After a brief stay in Syria, I found to my astonishment that there was, at all events, no Arab movement there. True nationalist sentiment is unknown to the Syrian tribes, a wild, and for the most part, unlovely mixture of races and religions, spoiled by greed, intrigue, and jealousy, accustomed from olden times to bribery by rival powers. What Beirut wants, is opposed by Damascus. What Damascus advocates, is considered treason in Aleppo, Homs, or Hama. Independence is the pretext for unbridled speculation—freedom, the shield for unrestrained exploitation of the workers by the ruling class. Even the best racial part, the Bedouins, have succumbed to the general corruption and follow whichever power is the strongest, as the jackal follows the beast of prey. All of them demand arms—in order to plunder the neighboring tribe; all demand money—in order to extort still greater sums from the enemy power. Undoubtedly the European powers, above all, the French Mandate Government, are mainly responsible for this, and undoubtedly, among the youth of Syria, too, forces are stirring that clamor for a cleanup and national concentration. At any rate, I found nothing in Syria that would have been capable of militant action. At the moment of danger, they all failed, the swaggering leaders of the Arab freedom movement. In undisguised anxiety, they asked for our assistance in fleeing abroad, if they had not already preferred "as a precaution" to make contact with the

English. There remained only a few groups of professional bandits, smugglers, and common thieves, of whom the few genuine rebels, such as *Fauzi Kauktchi* [*Fawzi al-Qawuqchi*—he, too, half adventurer, half national hero—made use in their struggle. We tried to win these groups over to the fight against England and to cooperation with the French Army by assuring them that the French were not being paid their price in France itself at the expense of the Arabs for the defense of the Syrian area; that the declaration of the Reich Government concerning recognition of the Arab struggle for freedom<sup>13</sup> was considered unalterable and that only the fighter would have anything to say in the future in the reorganization of the Arab countries. Not a few of these people could be won by such and similar statements. They fought partly in the ranks of the Army of the Levant, partly in groups of their own; some tried to injure the English by acts of sabotage, for which we supplied them with abundant suggestions. After long and laborious efforts, I had to give up working with the old, national groups. Finally it proved to be the most effective measure, also with respect to the Bedouins, to threaten them with the severest penalties in the future, for every act of plunder, every attack on neighboring tribes, every interference with the Army of the Levant, and every instance of active support of the English. Through messengers I made this known throughout all the tribes—without forbidding the acceptance of English money—and, as the French found, I was entirely successful. Also, the simple command, transmitted to the party leaders, to quell all disorders, had the effect that the Syrian and Lebanese populations remained entirely quiet during the entire campaign; yet I was able to read in the reports of the Office of the High Commissioner to the Vichy Government given me for perusal that, from December 1940 to April 1941, at intervals of a few days or weeks, the French had had to deal with an almost uninterrupted series of petty revolts, strikes, and demonstrations. The authority of the German name was almost unlimited. It was possible to get anything from the population—only they did not want to fight.

#### X. *German Intervention in Syria.*

At the end of May the conduct of the Army of the Levant seemed so assured that its commitment in the event of an English attack could be counted on with a fair degree of certainty. So much the more necessary was it to strengthen its idea that an attack would not be directed against a threatening or already existing German occupation of the country. First it itself had to fight; then the German intervention could be regarded as welcome assistance and the last internal resistance to a military collaboration could be overcome. In view of the fact that German preparations, which to our knowledge

<sup>13</sup> See vol. xi of this series, document No. 190 and footnote 4, and document No. 596.



were going on in Greece, were not yet concluded, it seemed in any case advisable to exploit any possibility of a delay in the English attack. On May 31, Guérard addressed the following telegram to Admiral Darlan:<sup>14</sup>

"The collapse of Iraq may have the following consequences:

1. Combined English attacks from the south and east; at the same time, in the east, endangerment of the indispensable granary of Jezira.
2. Turkish reaction aiming for the protection of certain zones near Aleppo and along the railroad.
3. Internal de Gaulist revolt, against which preventive measures have to be taken at once.
4. German-French military collaboration, which should be studied under the following aspects:
  - a) general policy,
  - b) technical possibility of a large-scale operation of assistance which alone would be effective,
  - c) moral reaction of the French troops (the latter question will depend on the effectiveness of German aid, the moment of German intervention, the reason given).

If there is no certainty of an effective defense of Syria, it is better to gain time by statements about our purely defensive intentions and to point out that an attack against Syria would start an Anglo-French war and shift German-French collaboration from the peaceful sphere to the military sphere."

Thus, Guérard and his friends had themselves already come to accept the idea of a German-French military collaboration, and General Dentz could certainly also be brought around to it—if Berlin desired it. Without knowledge of the pending German-Turkish discussions,<sup>15</sup> on which the decisive question of supplies depended, I could not be clear on this point. On June 5 and 6, I reported to the Foreign Ministry that, according to reliable French information, Turkey was pressing for an English occupation of Syria, since she was otherwise in danger of encirclement and could not permanently withstand German pressure for transit permission.<sup>16</sup> We were, to be sure, hoping very much for this and were not particularly edified at the German-Turkish Friendship Pact<sup>17</sup> which followed soon after, and whose background became comprehensible to us only upon the outbreak of the war with Russia.

Despite all this, I secretly persisted in the conviction that a German intervention in Syria would come sooner or later, since, in the circumstances, relief for Rommel's army seemed feasible only from

<sup>14</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 581, footnote 2.

<sup>15</sup> On the German-Turkish discussions of May and June 1941, see vol. XII of this series.

<sup>16</sup> Rahn telegrams No. 79 of June 5 (70/50373) and No. 81 of June 6 (70/50375). See vol. XII of this series, document No. 602, footnote 2.

<sup>17</sup> For text, see vol. XII of this series, document No. 648.

Syria. Also, I was convinced, after the outbreak of the German-Russian war, that the English would attempt a thrust through Iran to the oil fields of Baku and that this could be prevented or, at any rate, seriously impeded, from Syria, if we wanted to avoid a break with Turkey.

Meanwhile we tried with all the means of propaganda at our command to strengthen the will of the French to fight. Through Minister Grobba I got in touch with the Arab outlaw, Fawzi al-Qawuqchi. As he had been sentenced to death in Syria, I obtained a pardon for him and advised the High Commissioner to establish contact with him through a liaison officer. The latter reported upon his return that he had come in the nick of time, just as Fawzi wanted to come to terms with the English because of the impossibility of an escape on Syrian territory. When he heard from us and of the revocation of his death sentence by the French, he placed himself with his entire group at the disposal of the French for the common fight against the British.

#### XI. *The English Attack.*

Early in the morning of June 8, Anglo-Australian troops attacked Syria south of Damascus, near Dera and at other points. The de Gaulist units held back. From the leaflets circulated by them and the English, it seemed that they had expected to be received with open arms by the Army and population in Syria. According to the testimony of prisoners, the English expected to be able to occupy the country in a few days. Instead of this they encountered a foe who was fighting more doggedly every day and was causing them heavy losses of men and material.

I made regular daily reports concerning the various phases of the battle and [so did] Major Meyer-Ricks after the arrival of the Military Attaché Staff. The British troops, English, Australians, New Zealanders, Hindu regiments, and native troops, numerically far superior to the Army of the Levant, and equipped with an overwhelming amount of material, especially of motorized arms, fought badly. The English command was obviously inferior to the French. It is incomprehensible that the English should have attacked for weeks on the difficult southwestern front and with their superiority in motorized forces should not at once have pushed an attack from an easterly and southeasterly direction on Palmyra-Homs-Tripoli and on Aleppo. The French would have been able to oppose such an attack with only a small force.

It is indicative of the fighting strength of the British troops that a handful of French Legionnaires, some 130 to 150 men, succeeded, in the final attack on Palmyra, in stopping at least 3500 troops of the well-known Major Glubb,<sup>18</sup> equipped with 800 armored cars, machine-

<sup>18</sup> John Bagehot Glubb, Commander of the Arab Legion of Transjordan.

gun carriers, and trucks in repelling them, and, in repeated counter-attacks, inflicting severe losses on them.

On the other hand, according to all expert opinion, the French fought too much in the classical French manner; slow in their decisions, inelastic, too intent on security. Also, their fighting spirit was strongly affected by emotional elements. It was necessary to call on the officers of the General Staff two, three, four times a day, to cheer them up, and inflame them by an appeal to their French military spirit and constant reminders of Dakar and Mers-el-Kebir. On the day that the war broke out, General Dentz told me—and this was the only bitter word that I heard from him: "Now the Near East is aflame, and it is you who have set it ablaze." When, on the other hand, I asked him, with reference to the reports published concerning the negotiations in Paris: <sup>19</sup> "Are not the French northern provinces worth more than ten Syrias?" he replied merely: "You know, indeed, that I shall fight—and to the last man."

In the afternoon of May [*June*] 8, with the aid of Captain Roser, I organized the departure of the German colony, and this went off smoothly. The commitment of strong British naval units on the Lebanese coast, which pounded the French positions meter by meter with a tremendous outlay of material, in a few days resulted in the loss of more than 3000 men. As was expected, General Dentz asked for help by the Luftwaffe. I seconded this request most strongly in my radio messages, since it seemed to me to be the beginning of a logical chain: First the French would ask for German help against the fleet, then against the motorized English troops; finally they would gladly reconcile themselves to a commitment of German ground forces. Not knowing German intentions, I naturally did not express these thoughts or make promises of any kind.

The attack of two German Stuka formations was enough to scatter the British fleet and force it to observe the utmost caution. While at the beginning it patrolled back and forth in a leisurely way in close proximity to the coast, and—as Dentz put it—chased the defenseless French coastal positions "for breakfast, as it were," it later returned only at long intervals, for rapid and ineffective bombardments. The spirited attack of the two small French destroyers on the far superior British naval force, which led to the loss of an English torpedo boat, played its part in admonishing the British to observe caution. An English counteraction, which continued at night right into the Bay of Beirut directly before our eyes, and presented a splendid picture, was unsuccessful and was not repeated.

On June 10th it was reported that Fawzi al-Qawuqchi, following our suggestion, had attacked the pipeline station H-1 on Iraq territory,

<sup>19</sup> See vol. xii of this series, document No. 559.

and, for lack of dynamite, had dismantled the pumps. H-2 had also been set afire by Bedouins friendly to us and had burnt out completely. At the same time 12,000 hectolitres of fuel oil had been destroyed. An aerial photograph which I had made, however, made it appear questionable whether destruction had occurred on such a large scale. Unfortunately, my intention to destroy the important H-2 station with two German detonation experts hastily summoned from Aleppo, was frustrated at the last moment by the arrival of heavily motorized English forces.

As the English were able, by lavish use of men and material, in just a few days to push the attack on Damascus to the French main line of defense near Onissus, due south of Damascus, it was possible, through our friends on the General Staff, to induce the General to launch a counterattack. The plan was to launch a double drive southwest, in the direction of El Kuneitra and southeast of Jebel ed Druz, on Izra, establish communications between the two groups, thereby cut the English off from their southern line of communications and then cut them up. At first the operation proceeded according to plan. It brought in valuable booty and, in the course of a few days, over 500 prisoners. Then there was a setback, due in part to the inadequate reserves of the French, principally, however, to psychological causes. As early as June 11, Darlan's unsure and irresolute speech,<sup>20</sup> in which the hard anti-English tone expected of him was completely lacking, had had a discouraging effect on the General Staff and the troops in the field. On June 18 the State Secretary for Air, General Bergeret, arrived and reported to the High Commissioner and the officers of the General Staff that German-French conversations in Paris had bogged down completely.<sup>21</sup> Not a single one of the German promises concerning the restoration of administrative unity with the northern provinces, concerning the reduction of occupation costs, etc., had as yet materialized. On that day, Dentz, who was visibly depressed, asked me: "Tell me, what are we fighting for here anyway?" I was able to calm him, and I believe I convinced him that the principal blame for the impasse reached in the negotiations lay with the French. Nevertheless, the fighting spirit of the General Staff was temporarily paralyzed. On June 21 Damascus fell without any apparent necessity, and the political director of the High Commissioner told me,—and this was his only comment on this report: "The fall of Damascus bears the name of Bergeret." In the night of June 22 to 23, the High Commissioner summoned me and told me that the situation was hopeless and that collapse was inevitable in 2 or 3 days, because some 600—in reality 800—English armored cars, trucks, and tanks had

<sup>20</sup> Apparently a reference to Darlan's radio address to the French people which dealt with Franco-German collaboration.

<sup>21</sup> See vol. xii of this series, documents Nos. 616 and 633.

arrived before Palmyra, and would very soon be threatening Homs, Tripoli, and Aleppo. Previously he had always had only requests to make of me; today he was giving me an order: to flee, for he had information that the English would shoot me at once if I fell into their hands. Then he added: "I have a further statement to make to you. The English assert that they attacked Syria because of the transit flights of German planes. That is not true. The attack had been prepared long in advance and would have come sooner or later." This chivalrous attempt of the old officer to relieve us of the responsibility for the death of so many French soldiers made a deep impression on me. I declined to leave Syria, but promised to go that same night to Aleppo with Möllhausen, who was present at the conversation. I had already, upon news of the fall of Damascus, sent the staff there, together with the transmitter and secret material.

A few days prior to this I had received the information that the native governments of Syria and Lebanon had asked the High Commissioner in high-flown, written statements to cease hostilities and to surrender. I had in my hands the original of the letter signed by Premier Naccache<sup>22</sup> which reflected all the pitiful fear of the dangers to life and property.<sup>23</sup> Then when two Syrians close to Naccache came to see me and made the naive request that I use my influence with the High Commissioner to declare Beirut at least an open city—as if it were only a matter of protecting the interests of these Levantine house-owners—I replied to them: "I admire the indulgence of the High Commissioner. In his place I would have had M. Naccache strung up on the highest cedar of Lebanon. This is the first thing. And second: If the English occupy Syria, there will be total war. That I promise you. You may study it in Alexandria."—and there I left them. This reply made the rounds of all Syria, caused much amusement, and won me many friends in the Army. The two governments did not insist on their demand. It was not until the day of the armistice that M. Naccache is supposed to have distributed his letter in the form of a leaflet.

### XII. *Economic Matters.*

Shortly after the commencement of hostilities, on June 13, I wired to Berlin:<sup>24</sup>

"In order to prevent stocks of goods here from falling into the hands of the English, I have arranged that the largest possible quantities of scrap rubber, wool, and wire be seized and sent through Turkey to Germany. I am trying to load them on the gasoline trains expected here anyway. Prices will follow. I should appreciate receiving directives regarding prices."

<sup>22</sup> Head of the Lebanese Government.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. III, pp. 742-743.

<sup>24</sup> In telegram No. 119 (70/50442).

After the prompt reply from Berlin, the business seemed to get off to a good start, but then began an endless and fruitless exchange of telegrams with Berlin<sup>25</sup> because the Syrian merchants, in expectation of the English victory and the inclusion of Syria in the Sterling bloc, were requesting cash payment for the goods upon their exportation to Turkey, but Berlin would agree, as its final offer, to only 60 percent upon testing in Istanbul and 40 percent upon arrival in Germany. This, in turn, was rejected by the merchants on the grounds that they had no interest in frozen balances in Germany. Although I informed Berlin that the French had given me as the sole "merchant" in Syria, in appreciation of the food deliveries which I had arranged for, unrestricted export permission, that 2,500 tons of wool were available, and that three opinions had been received from the Aleppo Chamber of Commerce concerning their quality, that the prices I had been able to obtain locally were up to 35 percent below those asked in Hamburg, and that I would pay only upon receiving the export papers, the credit I asked for was refused me.

Result: The 2,500 tons of wool and some 200-300 tons of old rubber available remained, on the whole, in Syria, and fell into the hands of the English. The 170 tons of wool already exported through my efforts were sold in Istanbul, at a considerably higher price, for shipment to Switzerland.

On June 14 I wired to Berlin:<sup>26</sup>

"Since the merchants here believe in an English victory and are counting on the inclusion of the Levant in the Sterling bloc, the price of gold has fallen about 30 percent. Through a direct wire to Vichy I obtained approval for the conversion of at least 20 million francs into Syrian pounds and obtained secretly the consent of the Office of the High Commissioner to my buying gold pieces here. Because of the favorable rate of exchange, which will perhaps rise again soon, I have started on my own responsibility to purchase gold, since gold appears to me more valuable, at any rate, than French francs. I have thus far purchased 13,975 Turkish gold pounds at the price of approximately 7.7 million francs."

Reply from Berlin:<sup>27</sup>

"Please discontinue the purchases of gold for the present. The official purchase price of the Reichsbank for one Turkish gold pound is 18.39 reichsmarks, while the price paid by you amounts to 27.50 reichsmarks. There is no interest here in the purchase of gold at such a price, even in French francs."

<sup>25</sup> Only a few of these telegrams have been found. They are filmed on serial 4756.

<sup>26</sup> In telegram No. 125 (70/50449).

<sup>27</sup> Unnumbered draft telegram of June 16 by Wiehl (4756/E233839).

My reply<sup>28</sup> to this:

"I proceeded on the basis of the following calculations: The Turkish gold pound is worth 25 to 26 pounds in Turkey. Thirty-three French francs are the equivalent of a Turkish pound (State Bank rate of exchange). If you wish, I shall re-purchase francs in Turkey with gold and credit the profit of about 5.3 million to the account of the Embassy, Paris. Please send telegraphic instruction."

No telegraphic instruction was received. No further gold purchases were made.

### XIII. Supplies.

When I arrived in Aleppo on June 22, after the somewhat dramatic farewell with General Dentz, I received a telephone call from the Office of the High Commissioner in Beirut: A telegram had just arrived from Vichy stating that four battalions with 40 planes were being dispatched to Syria as a reinforcement. This information, which had been communicated to the Army, had so strengthened its fighting morale, that it would perhaps be able to hold out for the 8 days it would take until the arrival of the transports. Moreover, the Luftwaffe had attacked the English columns near Palmyra at quarter-hour intervals and in large part dispersed them. The Bedouins, recruited and armed by us, were taking part in the battle. The small garrison of Legionnaires was holding Palmyra and had thus far victoriously repelled all attacks. The gasoline question was again decisive, since the supply of aviation gasoline was declining at a furious pace. Could we not arrange for transports through Turkey?

And with this I come to the darkest chapter of my Syrian experiences: Under pressure from the Reich Government, the Turkish Government had declared itself ready to approve the transit through Turkey of German aviation gasoline—some 70 cars.<sup>29</sup> The gasoline arrived in Haydarpaşa on June 1 and was there reloaded on the railroad on June 1, 2, and 3. To the unending regret of the Turkish Government, which failed completely to understand it, the major portion of the transports first got lost on the Turkish section. New reasons were forever being found for the delay: only so many Turkish cars could go to Syria as there were Syrian cars in Turkey; yet, there were 244 Syrian cars in Turkey as against 40 Turkish cars in Syria. Or: the line capacity was insufficient for these movements; yet the normal line capacity of some 10 trains in either direction was, according to French authorities, not reached on any one of these days because of the sharp decline in trade. Or: Turkish brake regulations forbid the braking of cars loaded with fuel, etc. It was nerve-racking. Finally I flew in Benoist-Méchin's special plane to Ankara, and asked the firm of Schenker, which had been commissioned to make the ship-

<sup>28</sup> Not found.

<sup>29</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 556 and footnote 4.

ments, to send a representative to every Turkish station to find out what the "technical difficulties," so often referred to, were. On the afternoon of the same day, the Secretary General in the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Ambassador Numan Menemencioglu, informed Minister Kroll, the German Counselor of Embassy, that he was fed up with the constant complaints and he guaranteed that the remaining gasoline shipments would reach Syria within 4 days. So, after 20 cars had only by dint of the greatest effort, been brought to Syria in 24 days, it suddenly became "technically possible," to get nearly 50 cars to Aleppo in 4 days.

There was another reason also for my journey to Ankara: in the middle of June the French Chargé d'Affaires in Ankara had requested Turkish permission for the transit of 750 men in civilian clothing and for 7 trainloads of military equipment, but this had been refused by the Turks on grounds of their absolute neutrality.<sup>30</sup> Then Admiral Darlan's Chef de Cabinet, State Secretary Benoist-Méchin, flew here by special plane in order at the last moment to get the Turks to change their minds and either to return a portion of the war material delivered by the French and never paid for by the Turks, or, at least, to obtain transit permission for war material.<sup>31</sup> I had returned to Beirut on June 24 in order to introduce Major Meyer-Ricks, who had arrived in the meantime, to General Dentz and the General Staff, and to prepare for the return of my staff, in view of the more favorable military situation. In the evening Benoist-Méchin called me from Aleppo and asked me urgently to come there. The High Commissioner placed a special plane at my disposal for this purpose. In Aleppo, Benoist-Méchin told me he had landed in Syria only in order to invite me to assist him in his Turkish mission. He did not wish to visit General Dentz in order to avoid painful questioning and in order that he might not achieve by his replies a similar effect to that of General Bergeret on his visit to Beirut. Actually German-French conversations in Paris had bogged down completely. And yet, the French Government was prepared to do everything; ultimately, even to go to war against England. Only it could not live in a state of war with Germany and England at the same time. If the Reich Government still entertained doubts as to the good faith of its statements, Darlan was also prepared to give practical guarantees, such as appointing General Dentz, who was immune with respect to an alignment with England, to the top command in North Africa, and requesting the Reich Government to send me there, too.

The Benoist-Méchin negotiations were, as was to be expected, unsuccessful. The talk might perhaps have taken another turn if we had known of the reports of Consul General Hoffman-Fölkers and

<sup>30</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 651, footnote 1.

<sup>31</sup> See document No. 71.

to which I later on accidentally obtained access in Adana, and from which it appeared that the Turks were not deterred by their absolute neutrality from channeling through Turkey Norwegian, Polish, and Rumanian refugees liable to military duty, in part, evidently, still in uniform, by the hundreds, and in Mersin putting them on shipboard for Egypt. And this even after the signing of the German-Turkish friendship pact!

XIV. "Desert War".

On June 27 I flew with the plane that Benoit-Méchin had given me for a few days, via Aleppo, to Beirut. There I learned that the English had suggested, through the intermediary of the American Consul General, that negotiations be started.<sup>32</sup> I called on General Dentz at once. Concerning the English offer and the course of the conversation, I wired from Aleppo in the evening as follows:<sup>33</sup>

"1.) Upon my return to Beirut, I learned of the following situation report of June 26 to Vichy by the High Commissioner (excerpt):

'English offensive in southern Lebanon on the road from Damascus to Beirut and Damascus in the direction of Homs checked, but heavy losses in troops and material. Without reinforcements the resistance cannot last more than one week. English troops tired out, but have an abundance of rolling stock; also superiority in artillery, tanks, and machine guns, continuous supplies and reinforcements (16th Brigade), future air base Damascus.

'If the English take Homs, our Air Force would be confined to Aleppo and threatened there; Lebanon, with exhausted troops, would be encircled; [there would be] a grain supply of 12 days and hostile native elements. In the event of the speedy arrival of the five battalions announced, the offensive could be stopped and the resistance extended. But only a substantial reinforcement with regard to tanks, antitank guns, and air force would permit us to drive the enemy back across the border.

'In the political field: English proposals transmitted by the American Consul General: General Wilson prepared to negotiate concerning suspension of hostilities. At the same time nothing was said about a political regime, but the example of Damascus would seem to indicate a de Gaullist administration. The offer is that officers and officials should have the choice of remaining—hence, to join the de Gaullists—or being sent home.

'Contrary to Catroux's proclamation, no sanctions are being imposed on the French who remain loyal to Vichy. No offer with regard to the troops; hence, possibly, the hope of winning them for the de Gaullists.

'Conclusion: Long resistance possible if Homs is held, which presupposes the immediate arrival of reinforcements. Only if a sufficient number of pieces of artillery arrive, can the enemy be routed. This depends on negotiations with Turkey, in which connection German intervention is decisive. The English proposal

means practically our complete elimination through cooperation with elements which are defecting to the de Gaullists. With German approval, I recommend sending English prisoners to France and, in the event of a defeat, negotiating for an exchange of prisoners.

'I shall not start negotiations of any kind without formal instructions. If resistance has become impossible, I shall, after peace and order are assured, destroy the arms and discharge the troops. Dentz.'

End of excerpt.

"2.) Disturbed over English attempts at negotiations, I at once had a long talk with the High Commissioner. I implored him not to compromise the newly-won laurels of his troops through negotiations and offered him further assistance in the equipping of Arab bands, with arms, above all, the group Fawzi al-Qawuqchi, in accordance with your offer in telegram No. 182 of June 25.<sup>34</sup> It seemed to me braver, in an extreme case, to attempt a desperate attack on Haifa than to let oneself be starved ignominiously into submission in Lebanon. Moreover, there was hope that the promised reinforcement of five battalions would soon arrive. The High Commissioner stated with warmth that he shared this view and put me in entire charge of the Fawzi group; at my request he authorized at once the seizure of 45 automobiles in order to give the Fawzi group mobility, provided six German members of the Foreign Legion as junior officers, ordered that arms, gasoline be supplied, sent for an Air Force General and gave the order that a transport plane be sent to Salonika at once in order to pick up the German arms. I then discussed with Meyer-Ricks and an officer of Fawzi's, who had been summoned in haste, the plan of action of the Fawzi group: after reinforcement and equipment with arms and vehicles, a flank attack on the English group at Palmyra. I am now in Aleppo to make the preparations. When the arms arrive, I shall fly with Meyer-Ricks to Deir-*ez-Zor*."

On June 24 Fawzi Qawuqchi was seriously wounded in an attack on a motorized English column. We had him taken at once in an airplane ambulance to Aleppo, where I saw him briefly and then sent him on to Athens in a German plane. So the Fawzi group was without a leader, and from past experience this meant: strife, dissolution, plunder, anarchy. On the 28th I made preparations for the re-equipment of the group, and on the 29th flew with Meyer-Ricks to Deir-*ez-Zor* on the Euphrates, where it was to stay at the moment. But what we had feared had happened. The Commandant of Deir-*ez-Zor*, who later on also failed us completely in the military field, had not succeeded in keeping the group together: it had gone off in the night "somewhere to the north, to Hassatche or Rakka." So, after being detained by an English reconnaissance plane longer than we liked in Deir-*ez-Zor*, we flew to Hassatche, where I had asked a Sheik of the Shammar who was friendly to us to come for a conference, since I had been informed that another Sheik of that tribe, who was under the

<sup>32</sup> See document No. 101 and footnote 4.

<sup>33</sup> Telegram No. 191 of June 28 (70/50524-26).

<sup>34</sup> Not found.

influence of the English, was planning an invasion of Syria from the direction of Iraq. I had grown accustomed from previous experience to appearing at such meetings dressed all in white, without headdress or arms and to observing and demanding a certain ceremonial. Our friend, who had appeared with an imposing retinue, promised to post his men at the border in order to impede the advance of the English—in return for which he was to receive arms and money after having been put to the test—and to send one of his people to his faithless cousin with a threatening message from me. In so far as I later learned, in actual fact the Iraq Shammar did not budge.

The Fawzi group was not in Hassatche. However, there were reports that it had clashed with French troops in Rakka. So we hastened to get there, and after much effort, succeeded. I alighted; Major Meyer-Ricks flew back to Aleppo without stopping in order to continue to observe the military situation in the south. In Rakka there was complete chaos. French troops had fired at the Fawzi people and killed one of them. Part of the group had gone off into the desert, to the north; another part was interned behind barbed wire. When I got there and hailed them with the Arab greeting, "*Dach-el-arab*," they were like children. Some wept; others kissed my hand. Others, again, talked at me so much that the interpreter could hardly follow. They said that the French had given them nothing to eat; they had been told that they would be delivered up to the English and that Fawzi himself had been sent off to France and would be hanged there. I was soon able to calm them. In the night I had the groups that were scattered in the desert assembled through messengers, and bade Colonel Malartre come to Rakka from Deir-ez-Zor, to map out a joint operation. At my suggestion, the Fawzi group took up a position north of Palmyra in order to disrupt British supplies, to relieve the small, brave band of Legionnaires in Palmyra, and if possible, later on to cover their retreat to the north. But the French always had an unfortunate touch in their handling of the Arabs. Only 2 days later there was another clash. The soldiers of the same Colonel Malartre killed three Fawzi people. The group withdrew to Aleppo in indignation and the Legionnaires in Palmyra no longer had cover and had to surrender.

On June 30 I flew back to Aleppo in an airplane ambulance in order to organize additional Arab groups as a cover for Palmyra, Homs, and Aleppo. I also made contact with the Druses and the Kurds, but was called back in haste to Beirut as the result of a report of another slackening of the French resistance. General Dentz told me that Vichy had at the time informed him that five replacement training battalions would be brought to Aleppo in 50 German transport planes on July 1, or July 3 at the latest. But he still had no information as to their whereabouts. To be sure, his troops were fighting doggedly, especially after the bestial acts of brutality com-

mitted by the English and Australians against wounded and prisoners had become known, but they were already very exhausted and in hope of the promised relief. And this did not come and did not come.

On July 3 Palmyra fell; on July 4—almost without a struggle—Deir-ez-Zor. On July 5 I got an urgent call from Captain de Bernonville, the French Security Officer, to come to Aleppo, where the Fawzi people had arrived and were threatening public safety. He informed me, moreover, that the French indigenous troops had scattered before the approaching English columns and that the road from Deir-ez-Zor to Aleppo was practically without cover. So I rode back at once to Aleppo, merged the remnant of the Fawzi group with a second group that had been hastily set up, under the unified command of Aref, an old comrade-in-arms of Fawzi, supplied them that very night with arms, ammunition, subsistence and equipment, and the next day, after a brief address, had them take the oath of allegiance to the Arab flag. This aroused wild enthusiasm and brought ovations for the Führer and for Germany. In the afternoon I stationed about 360 of them in Meskene and placed them, divided into small groups, under the military command of seven German members of the Foreign Legion, whom General Dentz had at my request placed at my disposal. That same night two patrols pushed as far as Palmyra and Deir-ez-Zor; in the following night the group attacked the airport of Rakka, which had been occupied by English motorized units, and killed 10 Englishmen, took five prisoners, and captured one tank, a number of trucks, and miscellaneous military supplies. The English withdrew to the north and east, and Aleppo seemed secure for the time being.

On July 7 I went back to Aleppo, where, upon news of the Arab presentation of the colors, numerous delegations, also about 10 Bedouin sheiks, had arrived from Homs, Hama, and the environs of Aleppo, in order to express their readiness to fight with the Aref group. In the midst of the organization of the reinforcements and supplies for Aref, I received on July 8 the news from the High Commissioner that he had been compelled upon orders from Vichy to ask the English for an armistice. Five hours later, after a breathless chase over the rough Syrian roads, I was with him.

I reported on the conversation to Berlin:<sup>35</sup>

"The High Commissioner told me, in explaining the military situation, that he had been forced to wire the English through American channels that upon orders from his Government he was asking for the immediate cessation of hostilities on land, water, and in the air, and for the commencement of negotiations for their definitive termination. He asked that a place be named for the negotiations. When I suggested that this was not in harmony with his previous attitude,

<sup>35</sup> In telegram No. 221 of July 9, dispatched July 10; see document No. 101, footnote 6.

he merely replied: What I have are 10 battalions, the largest consisting of 300 men. His instructions from Vichy (which arrived July 8, at 10 a.m.) concerning the aims in negotiation provide, among other things, for: recognition of the French rights to Syria and Lebanon, retention of a coastal area to include, if possible, Tripoli and Aleppo, free departure of the troops with arms, retention of the French administration under English supervision, in the areas occupied or to be occupied by the British; no de Gaullist government. The instruction further orders that there should be no destruction of economic values, thus not of the pipeline station of Tripoli, or of the oil supplies (over 100,000 tons); only destruction of tanking equipment for ships. It is evident from the instruction that Vichy has already approached England with a view to starting negotiations, but has received no reply. The objective of the negotiations envisaged by Vichy contains, in my opinion, an objectionable compromise formula of a general political nature. I therefore urgently request instructions concerning the opinion entertained at your end. Above all, on the question of the retention of a coastal area, are we interested in this as a later beachhead or will it facilitate the future solution of the Arab question if the French are completely removed? At first I advised the utmost strengthening of the resistance until the situation is clarified, and, in the event of negotiations, I advised the use of dilatory tactics; moreover, I registered serious objections to a lame compromise in the field of administration, which is really tantamount to a compromise with the de Gaullists. The High Commissioner wired to Vichy to this effect. Unfortunately he could not be persuaded to blow up, contrary to instructions from Vichy, the oil supplies and pipeline station of Tripoli. The political director, whom I entreated not to permit the English to receive as a gift an easing of their supply situation in the eastern Mediterranean with regard to oil and gasoline, shared this view and himself suggested that German pressure be applied at once to Vichy to the end that the High Commissioner receive a formal order to this effect. The High Commissioner promised me he would issue an amnesty to political prisoners."

#### XV. *The Armistice.*

The English took their time about replying to the General's proposal. On the other hand, they made every effort to accelerate their advance along the coast in order to capture Beirut before the commencement of the negotiations. With disparaging leaflets, which attacked also the personal honor of General Dentz, they tried to incite the population to revolt. When English motorized units were only 8 km. away from Beirut and, according to rumor, had penetrated to the suburbs, we withdrew to Tripoli, and late in the night to Latakia. I had already transferred the office there the day before, because the people of Aleppo, under the influence of the heavy bombardments of the previous nights, which, according to the English radio, were caused by our presence, had already begun to take an unfriendly attitude.

On July 10 I went to Tripoli, where a part of the French General Staff had already been transferred, and tried to get for the men of

the Aref-Fawzi group 350 Syrian blank passports in order to be able to get them through Turkey to Athens.

On July 11, I announced to the High Commissioner by wire the visit which I and Meyer-Ricks were going to make in Beirut, but I was stopped in Tripoli. There, General Dentz sent me word that the English had replied and agreement had been reached in principle concerning the commencement of negotiations. The demand had been made, however, as the first condition for the suspension of hostilities that I leave Syria at once with my entire staff. The High Commissioner therefore urgently requested that I cross the Turkish border before midnight. I later learned that the English had also requested that we and the Italians be surrendered to them.

We returned to Latakia, entered German visas into the 350 Syrian passports and sent them through a reliable officer to Aleppo for delivery to the Aref-Fawzi group.

Shortly after midnight, we crossed the Turkish border with secret material under seal and our transmitting equipment.

#### XVI. *Conclusion.*

The French have fought bravely up to the point of complete exhaustion and, in so doing, have lost some 9,000 dead and wounded. According to the information received thus far, no Frenchman has as yet exercised the option to go over to de Gaulle instead of returning to France. I was convinced and still am today that the making of 50 planes available for the transportation of the five French battalions from Salonika to Aleppo, would have enabled us to hold Beirut and Aleppo, that is, the Syrian-Lebanese gateways of invasion for the relief of Rommel's army, 4 to 6 weeks longer.

The opportunity is lost; a second one will perhaps be offered in French North Africa.<sup>36</sup>

<sup>36</sup> For Rahn's published account of his activities in Syria, see Rudolf Rahn, *Ruheloses Leben* (Düsseldorf, 1949), pp. 152-181.

No. 166

3579/E024568

*Memorandum by the Head of Political Division I M*

SECRET

BERLIN, July 30, 1941.

Pol. I M 2363 g. Rs.<sup>1</sup>

#### MEMORANDUM

According to a communication from the competent military authorities, in accordance with a decision by the Department of National

<sup>1</sup> The copy of the document which is printed here was filed in the Department for German Internal Affairs and was given there an additional file number, D II 99 g. Rs.

Defense the establishment of a Ukrainian national militia within the framework of the Wehrmacht according to the directives of the Führer is not being considered. The formation of auxiliary police units from reliable residents has been permitted to the High Command of the Army in the area of operations. Within the areas under the Reich Commissars responsibility for this falls to the civil authorities.

KRAMARZ

No. 167

F17/086-89

*General Antonescu to Adolf Hitler*<sup>1</sup>

BUCHAREST, July 30, 1941.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: Please accept, Your Excellency, the expression of my most sincere thanks for your appreciation and praise of the Rumanian soldier and of the German-Rumanian companionship in arms.<sup>2</sup> At the same time I would express to Your Excellency my deep gratitude for the words of appreciation and understanding with which you have rewarded my efforts to give the Rumanian people a new destiny of liberation.

It was a great satisfaction to me, Your Excellency, to be able to prove through the achievements of the Rumanian soldier that the Rumanian people are a nation on which it is possible to depend. And soldier as I am, I was at all times certain of the military prowess of the Rumanian people.

Certainly this people should have been able to accomplish more; and their military and especially technical organization, as well as their rearmament might have been far more advanced. The regime of moral disintegration which for 10 years, under the former rulers, held sway over this country, the unscrupulousness of many people who had command of the Army, could not so soon be repaired by my efforts and the work of the Rumanian officers' corps.

I am pleased, however, that the Rumanian soldier has done his duty and especially that he has won the recognition of the superb German Army and its great Führer.

Just as I have asked Minister von Killinger to be good enough to report in answer to your letter,<sup>3</sup> I would reaffirm to Your Excellency that in the campaign that we have begun in the east against Russian

<sup>1</sup>The file copy of this letter is in German. There are two other copies (F17/081-82, F17/083-85) each of which is incomplete. In the remaining sections of these copies some passages are considerably more legible than in the document printed and they have therefore been used in establishing a complete and clear text.

<sup>2</sup>Document No. 159.

<sup>3</sup>See document No. 159, footnote 2.

Bolshevism, the arch foe of European civilization as well as of my country, I shall fight on with the German Army until the final goal is attained. I therefore do not put forward conditions of any kind, nor do I have any proposals to make for a discussion of this military collaboration in a new field.

I shall perform the military task for which provision is made in Your Excellency's letter and shall take over the protection of this area.

I shall perform this task in the firm conviction that I am thereby not only serving the Rumanian people and the Rumanian population beyond the Dniester, but that, by being able to participate in the fight for the new order in Europe, I can at the same time comply with demands of civilization.

I fully share the conviction of Your Excellency that only through effort and through the unification of Europe can its destiny be assured for centuries to come.

With deepest thanks to Your Excellency for the information regarding the gigantic campaign against Russia and extending to you as well as to the glorious German Army my most sincere congratulations on the unparalleled military victory—a blood sacrifice for civilization and the future of Europe—I beg you to accept the expression of my most loyal sentiments of admiration.

His Majesty the King likewise thanks Your Excellency for the congratulations extended to him and requests that you accept the assurance of his highest consideration.

Yours, etc.

GENERAL ANTONESCU

No. 168

1527/373778-79

*The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 2511 of July 29

WASHINGTON, July 31, 1941—12:37 p. m.

Received August 1—1:10 a. m.

With reference to my telegrams No. 2349 of July 21<sup>1</sup> and No. 2473 of July 28.<sup>2</sup>

I. The occupation of the Portuguese island possessions continues to be discussed vigorously behind the scenes. In addition to the propagandistic preparation of American public opinion described in my

<sup>1</sup>In this telegram (1527/373711-12) Thomsen reported that various indications pointed toward attempts by the administration to make a moral case for the subsequent occupation of the Azores, the Cape Verde, and the Canary Islands.

<sup>2</sup>In this telegram (1527/373767) Thomsen listed various reasons why the occupation of Dakar by U.S. troops had been postponed for the time being.



telegram No. 0449,<sup>3</sup> it seems to be the aim of the American Government to obtain a Portuguese invitation on the model of the occupation of Iceland.<sup>4</sup>

II. As I have learned from a reliable source, the American Government is trying to involve Brazil in order to attain this objective.<sup>5</sup> The Brazilian Government is said to be encouraging the right atmosphere in Lisbon in favor of the occupation of the Portuguese island possessions by America, and thereby among other things is supposed to have also suggested the proclamation of an independent republic on the Azores. This new republic would then request military assistance from Washington through Brazil. For this delicate game Washington wants to use the Brazilian Navy, of whose pro-Anglo-American sympathies it believes it can be sure. The American Naval Attaché in Rio de Janeiro<sup>6</sup> is supposed to have received appropriate instructions about the middle of July.

The negotiations are being carried on in strict secrecy, for the further purpose of deceiving the Portuguese Minister in Washington, Bianchi, whose independent and patriotic attitude Roosevelt resents and whom the State Department fears, in that he might frustrate the American machinations.

III. As reported,<sup>7</sup> so far the occupation of the island groups in the Atlantic and also of Dakar has been postponed for political and military reasons. Further procedure will depend essentially on the success of the above-mentioned efforts to obtain some sort of invitation to take over the military defense. Nevertheless, according to my information, preparations have already been made for the forceful occupation of the Azores.<sup>8</sup> The American naval staff believes they could get along with a landing corps of about 4,000 marines as landing troops, who would be used together with about eight cruisers, a few torpedo boats and an aircraft carrier. The resistance of the Portuguese forces is not held in too high esteem, particularly if it were possible to eliminate coastal batteries from the air within a short time.

Please pass on II and III of this telegram to the Naval Command as a report from the Naval Attaché (Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires are receiving copies).

THOMSEN

<sup>3</sup> This was apparently an error. A typed marginal note states: "Cannot be traced."

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 118 and footnote 5.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. vi, pp. 504-510.

<sup>6</sup> Cmdr. E. D. Graves, Jr.

<sup>7</sup> Document No. 133.

<sup>8</sup> For details of American military preparations see Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, *The Framework of Hemisphere Defense* in the series *United States Army in World War II: The Western Hemisphere* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1960), pp. 116-122.

No. 169

617/249988-90

*The Minister in Afghanistan to the Foreign Minister*

Telegram

KABUL, July 31, 1941—6:55 p. m.

TOP SECRET

No. 259 of July 30

Received July 31—8:20 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 257 of July 28.<sup>1</sup>

The Minister President<sup>2</sup> expressed deep regrets about the Oberdörffer incident; he stated that the patrols sent out had believed they had the son of Amanullah<sup>3</sup> and the nephew of Ghoulam Sidiq<sup>4</sup> before them. A report to this effect was also spread by the Waziris, to whom the two had entrusted themselves. Interrogation of witnesses had shown that the two had fired first with sub-machine guns they had with them when they had realized they were surrounded. Only after Brandt had lost his turban were they recognized as Europeans. This account contradicts Brandt's testimony. A thorough clarification (group garbled) pursued. Gold and paper pounds as well as Indian rupees and afghanis and also all other objects except weapons which the two had carried along will be handed over to us. Brandt is to leave Afghanistan after his recovery.

The Minister President stated in strict confidence that the English Minister<sup>5</sup> had already filed a protest upon announcement that Hentig had been granted an agrément,<sup>6</sup> because the latter was known to the English as an "agitator". After the Oberdörffer incident the English Minister had protested anew and in almost the form of an ultimatum had demanded, on behalf of the Soviets, too, that the German colony be restricted, as it had now been demonstrated that the constant English references to agitation against England through the colony had proved to be true. The Minister President stated that in both cases he had rejected the English protest, pointing to Afghanistan's unshakeable neutrality. Afghanistan would also continue to do everything to preserve her neutrality. However, the Minister President asked me to use every means to see that such incidents could not be repeated, because they were in any case condemned to failure in view of our

<sup>1</sup> This telegram (617/249987) was one of a number of reports concerning an incident in which two German agents, Oberdörffer and Brandt, carrying out an assignment by the Abwehr to establish contact with the Fakir of Ipi, were shot by Afghan soldiers. Oberdörffer was killed while Brandt was wounded in the leg. Other documents dealing with this incident were: Kabul telegram No. 239 of July 20 (329/195562); Kabul telegram No. 242 of July 21 (617/249984); Kabul telegram No. 246 of July 23 (617/249985-86).

<sup>2</sup> Sardar Mohammed Hashia Khan.

<sup>3</sup> Former King of Afghanistan, forced to abdicate in 1929.

<sup>4</sup> Former Afghan Foreign Minister and Minister to Germany.

<sup>5</sup> Sir William Kerr Fraser-Tytler was British Minister until August 1941.

<sup>6</sup> See document No. 44.

unfamiliarity with the country and the people and the large English espionage network. Mir Sahib Khan, with whom the two had prepared the sally [*Vorstoss*], was a well-known English provocateur who had now stated that it had been the intention to hand the two over to the English upon their entry into the border area.

In the course of the 2-hour conversation the Minister President stressed several times his friendly feelings toward us. However, he replied to all my remarks that Afghanistan's situation as a buffer between two allies was so unfortunate that the Government requested urgently that everything be avoided that could give the English an occasion for exerting any sort of pressure. Among other things he pointed to the fact that the Soviet frontier had already been closed, so that for example gasoline could be imported only from India, as Iran could not be considered for gasoline exports. Furthermore, Afghanistan's entire assets were in the United States, whither most of the karakul was exported, and as the most important source of revenue, it had to go there in the future as well. If there should be a freezing of assets in America at the instigation of the English, and if the Indian border should also be closed, then the domestic difficulties resulting from this could possibly destroy Afghanistan. The Minister President does not believe in England's military designs against Afghanistan, although he did not consider Wavell's appointment<sup>7</sup> to mean that he was pushed aside, but rather to indicate a special English activity aiming perhaps at passage through Iran. The Minister President stated that the Government was ready, when the moment for intervention had arrived as a result of the approach of German troops, to let all of Afghanistan take up arms on our side. In that case he would then mobilize about 500,000 men including the border Afghans.

As regards our operations at the border, with which he was acquainted from papers and maps from Oberdörffer and Brandt as well as from Anzilotti's<sup>8</sup> earlier sally and from the present testimony of the provocateurs, he begged repeatedly that they be abandoned, since nothing was achieved thereby. India could be made amenable only with a strong army.

When I again broached the question of the Military Attaché,<sup>9</sup> the Minister President said that in Major Schenk we had the best military adviser. He was happy to cooperate with him. The basic tone of his statements was: Willingness for a close alignment, but to show this openly only when the weak country could no longer be endangered by enemy pressure.

<sup>7</sup> Early in July, Sir Archibald Wavell was appointed British Commander in Chief, India.

<sup>8</sup> See document No. 107 and footnote 2.

<sup>9</sup> Nothing has been found regarding the background of this matter.

Because the Prime Minister is afraid of enemy reaction, especially in case of repetition of an awkwardly planned operation similar to the Oberdörffer case, I should be grateful for telegraphic instructions as to what the further intentions of the Abwehr are this respect.<sup>10</sup>

PILGER

<sup>10</sup> Instructions not found. See, however, document No. 190.

No. 170

278/178888-89

*Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

U.St.S.Pol. 730

BERLIN, July 31, 1941.

On the basis of an instruction from Sofia the Bulgarian Minister today passed on to me the impressions of the conversations which Bulgarian Foreign Minister Popov had brought back from Rome.<sup>1</sup> They are essentially in accord with what is already known about this matter from the reports from Rome and Sofia.<sup>2</sup> The Foreign Minister sees a success in the following points:

Improvement of the atmosphere between Italy and Bulgaria. The Italians did not at all bring up again the modification of the boundary at Kačanik.<sup>3</sup> The Bulgarians were promised an improvement of the frontier at Ohrid and Resan even though in an undefined form and dependent upon the decision of the boundary commission.<sup>4</sup> In a still more undefined form they were given a certain prospect of fulfillment of their wishes with respect to the Bulgarian national shrines in St. Naum at Lake Okhrida.

The Bulgarian Foreign Minister furthermore obtained the impression from the conversations that the Italians are insisting that Florina and its vicinity should be Albanian. This point had not been the subject of the actual discussion, and the Italians had also indicated that the solution of this question had to be found in cooperation with Germany.

WOERMANN

<sup>1</sup> The visit to Rome of Minister President Filov and Foreign Minister Popov, originally planned for July 14, took place July 21-23.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram No. 1632 of July 22 (278/178867-69) Mackensen reported what the Bulgarian Ministers had told him about their negotiations with Mussolini and Ciano. Beckerle's telegram No. 809 of July 28 (278/178883-84) regarding this Rome visit was based on statements by the Italian Minister in Sofia and by the Bulgarian Foreign Minister.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 87 and footnotes 1 and 2.

<sup>4</sup> According to Mackensen's account of the Italo-Bulgarian negotiations (see footnote 2) both sides had agreed to establish a mixed commission which would have authorization to determine the boundary on the spot and to make certain changes in the line agreed upon in Vienna.

## No. 171

65/45770

*The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT  
SECRETTEHRAN, August 1, 1941—10:31 a. m.  
Received August 1—11:15 a. m.

No. 717 of August 1

A few days ago the British Minister<sup>1</sup> handed a note to the Iranian Foreign Ministry the text of which, according to a reliable source, is approximately as follows:

The British Government felt bound to call the attention of the Iranian Government to the fact that a great many Germans were living scattered over the whole country. Among these Germans there were some elements which gave the British Government cause for concern in view of its large oil and other interests in Iran. The British Government recommended the removal of these elements as soon as possible.

In its reply, the Iranian Government first pointed out that Iran was a sovereign, independent, and neutral country, which in its development had to make use of the assistance given by foreign citizens. Among these were also Germans who, like all aliens, were known to the Iranian authorities and like all aliens were under the surveillance of the police. Since it needed these aliens, the Iranian Government was not in a position to give consideration to the recommendation of the British Government.

ETTEL

<sup>1</sup> Sir Reader W. Bullard.

## No. 172

205/142881-83

*The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

STOCKHOLM, August 1, 1941—8:15 p. m.

No. 1095 of August 1

Received August 1—10:50 p. m.<sup>1</sup>

For the Foreign Minister.

Yesterday I advanced the German request for transit of another division<sup>2</sup> through Sweden<sup>3</sup> in a long conversation with Foreign

<sup>1</sup> Marginal Note: "Forwarded as No. 2617 to Special Train, Aug. 2, 1941."<sup>2</sup> The 6th Mountain Division.<sup>3</sup> There is no indication of any telegraphic instruction from the Foreign Ministry about this matter.

The instruction apparently was issued to Schnurre directly in Germany. In telegram 745 of July 29 (205/142848) Ritter notified Wied that Schnurre would arrive in Stockholm Thursday morning (July 31) and asked that an appointment with the Swedish Foreign Minister be made for Schnurre for that day but without stating the nature of Schnurre's mission.

Minister Günther and discussed it with him in detail. Directly after my conversation with Günther, the Finnish Minister<sup>4</sup> made the same request.<sup>5</sup> Günther then discussed the German-Finnish request by telephone with the King, who is in southern Sweden at the moment. Yesterday evening and this morning there was a Cabinet session of a limited group owing to the confidential character of its discussion.

Günther had me call on him this afternoon in order to inform me of the decision of the Swedish Government:

The Swedish Government was not in a position to comply with the German request for the *overland* transit through Sweden of another division. At the beginning of the Russian war it had given such consent once and for all, because there was at that time no other way, such as the sea route, available.<sup>6</sup> The Swedish Government had accordingly committed itself in Parliament and before the public. The German side, too, had stated at the time that it was a question of the overland transit of one division only.

A deciding factor in this decision by the Swedish Government, as the King has confirmed, had been the fact that the sea route through Swedish territorial waters, in the opinion of the Swedish Government, was usable without restriction and that for this reason there was no pressing necessity to make use of the land route. We were already using the route through Swedish territorial waters regularly for large-scale troop transports. In the time from July 29 to July 31, for example, six large steamers with several thousand men on board had sailed this way, some of them under Swedish escort. There had been two groups of three steamers each, aside from other German ships sailing separately. The Swedish Government could not understand why the additional troop transports planned by us should not also use this route. The Swedish Government would protect the Swedish territorial waters, which they placed completely at our disposal for these transports, against all attacks. An attack on German ships in Swedish territorial waters would be considered an attack on Sweden, and Sweden would take the consequences upon herself, in spite of the resulting danger to Sweden's neutrality. In this respect the Swedish Government had a different attitude from that of the Norwegian Government at the time when England had used the Norwegian territorial waters for aggressive acts of war.<sup>7</sup> If we so desired, an escort of Swedish warships could be provided.

Günther expressed the hope that this point of view of the Swedish Government would be understood in Germany. Personally, he added

<sup>4</sup> Jarl de Vasastjerna.<sup>5</sup> In telegram No. 921 of July 29 (205/142849-50) Ribbentrop informed the Legation in Finland that the OKW intended to employ another division there and that it would ask the Swedish Government, through Schnurre, to permit the transit of the division through Swedish territory. The division was to be transferred from Germany to Sweden and thence overland to northern Sweden and Finland. Ribbentrop asked that the Finnish Government be informed and that it support Germany's request in Stockholm.<sup>6</sup> See documents Nos. 16 and 17.<sup>7</sup> See vol. ix of this series, documents Nos. 17, 58, and 60.

that he would rather have had Swedish divisions dispatched to Salla. But for this the situation in Sweden was not yet ripe.

I left Foreign Minister von Günther no doubt that this answer of the Swedish Government would be considered entirely unsatisfactory by the Reich Government. I would report his answer to the Reich Government and ask for further instructions. Günther asked me whether, although the King shared the attitude of the Swedish Government, I would like to bring up the question with the King once more on my own initiative. I reserved my answer to this question.

I should like to ask for telegraphic instructions whether the German request for permission to transport overland should be carried to the King with a corresponding instruction from the Führer, or whether we should accept the sea transport proposed by the Swedish Government as feasible in practice. In the latter case please send more exact instructions on what specific wishes we have toward the Swedish Government in carrying out the sea transport.<sup>8</sup> I may add that it unfortunately weakens my negotiating position here decisively that, contrary to the point of view I have taken here, that only the land route can be considered for the transit of the divisions—the sea route has regularly been employed by us for large troop transports, particularly in the last few days.<sup>9</sup>

SCHNURRE  
WIED

<sup>8</sup> In telegram No. 1581 of Aug. 4 (205/142887-88) Ribbentrop informed the Legation that in view of the negative attitude of the Swedish Government, the OKW would not pursue the matter further but that the division would be shipped by sea with its motorized elements passing through Swedish territorial waters and the non-motorized parts going via Denmark, Oslo, and Trondheim, and thence by ship along the Norwegian coast. "Detailed instructions will follow in the next few days concerning our specific requests to the Swedish Government as regards the sea transport through Swedish territorial waters and in particular the escort by Swedish naval vessels."

Schnurre was also instructed to inform the Swedish Government that Germany would not persist in its request and at the same time to express Germany's regret over Sweden's decision, and to emphasize the need for secrecy about the matter.

<sup>9</sup> In telegram No. 1569 sent Aug. 3 (319/192436), Ritter assured Schnurre that the OKW had ordered that in the future all requests to Sweden regarding military transports were to be through the Foreign Ministry or through Minister Schnurre in Stockholm.

No. 173

5144/E302957-59

*Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Legal Department*

BERLIN, August 1, 1941.  
zu R 21 600.<sup>1</sup>

In the enclosed note verbale of July 19, 1941,<sup>1</sup> the Swedish Legation has stated that the Soviet Government recognizes The Hague

Rules of Land Warfare<sup>2</sup> and is willing to apply them on condition of reciprocity.

Before the World War Tsarist Russia was a party to the Hague Convention of 1907. However, quite generally the Soviet Government has stated that it is committed only to those international agreements concluded by the Tsarist Government which it specifically recognizes. This recognition is contained in the note verbale. However, this alone does not make The Hague Rules of Land Warfare binding for the present war between Germany and the USSR, because the Hague Convention contains the clause on universal participation and, for example, Italy and Slovakia are not parties to the Convention. The Russian statement passed on by the Swedes takes account of this legal situation in that the Soviet Government states that it is willing to go beyond a recognition and to apply The Hague Rules of Land Warfare in the relationship between Germany and Russia on condition of reciprocity.

The High Command of the Wehrmacht, to which the Swedish note has been communicated, has stated the following orally:

The Wehrmacht already has directives for warfare which correspond with The Hague Rules of Land Warfare. The High Command of the Wehrmacht is therefore of the opinion that the Swedish note verbale must be treated purely in accordance with considerations of foreign policy. Experience up to now has shown that the Soviet troops have often proceeded against German prisoners of war and wounded in a manner contrary to The Hague Rules of Land Warfare. If the Soviet Union wishes to apply The Hague Rules of Land Warfare, the High Command of the Wehrmacht expects that it will immediately issue appropriate orders to its troops and assure their being carried out.

From considerations of foreign policy, the matter is evaluated as follows:

1. An express rejection of the proposal made in the Swedish note that the Rules of Land Warfare be applied in the German-Russian war would be exploited propagandistically among the public in a manner highly detrimental to Germany. Therefore such a course of action cannot be recommended.

<sup>2</sup> Signed Oct. 18, 1907; for text, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1907*, pt. 2, p. 1204.

<sup>1</sup> R 21 600: Not printed (5144/E302956).

2. As the Soviet Union so far has not acceded to the prisoner of war agreement of 1929,<sup>3</sup> a German-Russian agreement on the reciprocal application of The Hague Rules of Land Warfare would be the sole way of creating a basis for organizing the care for the German prisoners of war in Russian hands.

3. The Hague Rules of Land Warfare contain in chapter 3 rules concerning the military authority on occupied enemy territory. As far as is known, however, the German Government intends to establish a civil administration in the occupied Russian territories. Enemy quarters have characterized the same procedure in the former Polish areas, in Norway and in Holland as a violation of The Hague Rules of Land Warfare. Although such assertions can be countered with good arguments, it is to be assumed that the Soviet Union would make the enemy standpoint its own. Furthermore, the provisions of The Hague Rules of Land Warfare presumably do not contain anything regarding the administration of the occupied territories which is contrary to the intentions pursued by the German Government. However, in announcing the German measures The Hague Rules of Land Warfare ought to be taken into account to a certain extent by making clear from the outset that these measures are compatible with the stipulations of the Rules of Land Warfare.

It is proposed that the Swedish note verbale be answered by stating that the general directives issued to the German Wehrmacht for the conduct of the war are in accordance with the provisions in The Hague Rules of Land Warfare, and that these directives also apply to the conduct of the war in Russia. If necessary it could be added that the German Government expected that the Government of the U.S.S.R. would give its troops the same directives.

<sup>3</sup> Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field, signed at Geneva, July 27, 1929; for text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cxviii, p. 303.

In a memorandum of Aug. 12 (1386/358922-23) Senior Counselor Albrecht of the Legal Department recorded the text of a telegram forwarded by the International Committee of the Red Cross which that organization had received from the Soviet Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in reply to an inquiry. In this message the Soviet Government after confirming its adherence to The Hague Rules of Land Warfare on the terms stated in the message transmitted through the Swedish Legation expressed its willingness to apply article 4 of the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929, but not the other articles of that Convention as these were already covered by The Hague Rules of Land Warfare. The Soviet message as well as the preceding correspondence between the Soviet Government and the International Committee of the Red Cross is printed in XVIIth International Red Cross Conference, *Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross on its Activities During the Second World War* (September 1, 1939-June 30, 1947), vol. I (Geneva, 1948), pp. 408-412; cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. I, pp. 1005-1024.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister through the Under State Secretary in the Legal Department<sup>4</sup> with the request for approval.<sup>5</sup>

DR. ALBRECHT

<sup>4</sup> Friedrich Gaus, Director of the Legal Department.

<sup>5</sup> According to a minute of Aug. 10 by Lohmann of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat (5144/E302960) a memorandum regarding application of The Hague Rules of Land Warfare was drafted by Gaus and with amendments by Ribbentrop sent to Hitler on Aug. 8. Following a communication from Hewel to Ribbentrop on Aug. 9 a draft note of reply to the Swedish Legation was submitted to Hitler by Steengracht on Aug. 10.

This undated draft (5144/E302961-62) after acknowledging the Swedish note denounced the conduct of the Soviet troops toward the German prisoners of war and stated that there could be no agreement with the Soviet Government about the treatment of war prisoners unless it gave proof "that it was now really willing and in a position to bring about a complete change in the conduct of its troops and other authorities with respect to German prisoners." A copy of the note which was finally handed to the Swedish Legation has not been found. See, however, document No. 389.

No. 174

205/142884-85

*The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT  
No. 1100 of August 2

STOCKHOLM, August 2, 1941—1:30 p. m.  
Received August 2—3:10 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 1070 of July 29.<sup>1</sup>

The Director of the Foreign Trade Department of the Foreign Ministry told me today of the reply which was planned on the question of the Norwegian ships in Göteborg. He explained that the Swedish Government had earnestly studied all possibilities in order to find some way to prevent these ships from sailing to England. According to the Swedish view, it would be best if the ships in question would sail to Norway. As was well known the Chief Bailiff (*Oberesektor*) in Göteborg had rendered a judgment which declared the Norwegian decree of May 18, 1930 [1940],<sup>2</sup> according to which the Norwegian ships abroad (clear text apparently missing) to the Norwegian Director of Navigation in London, to be invalid (cf. Report No. C-893 of June 23).<sup>3</sup> On the Swedish side, it is proposed that the Oslo shipping firms send captains who would be ready to bring the ships to Norway.

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 151, footnote 4.

<sup>2</sup> "Provisorisk anordning om rekvirering av skip og skipsbyggingskontrakter," *Samling av provisoriske anordninger, kgl. res. m.v., 1940-1945* (published by the Royal Norwegian Department of Justice and Police, temporarily at London, 1945), pp. 20-22. By this decree the Norwegian Government in exile requisitioned all the ships flying the Norwegian flag and ships being built under contract with Norwegian firms.

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

In case the Chief Bailiff should let these captains on board in spite of the objection which is to be expected of the Norwegian Legation in Stockholm, their crews could be sent in after them and with these the trip could be undertaken. If the objection of the Norwegian Legation were upheld by the Swedish courts, then the shipping firms should propose detention of the ships on the argument that the right to dispose of the ships was a matter of dispute and with the aim of getting a judicial decision on the right to dispose of ships. Considerable time would pass before issuance of a decision in the last instance and in this way there would be assurance that the ships remained in Göteborg. Hägglöf sees no other possibility of preventing the ships from sailing, because a Swedish law provides that clearance may not be denied to ships which produce their papers in accordance with regulations. It would be impossible to abrogate this law by administrative measures. Hägglöf nevertheless expressed the hope that the way which he proposed would attain the goal. In this connection he indicated the need for haste because in the last few days he had received news of certain preparations on the ships in question.<sup>4</sup>

WIED

<sup>4</sup> In telegram e.o. Ha. Pol. 5174/41g. (319/192434-35), identified in the reply as No. 1583 of Aug. 4, Eisenlohr instructed the Legation in Stockholm that Hägglöf's answer was completely unsatisfactory; that the way proposed by him was not practicable for it had been tried once before and had failed. Germany would hold Sweden responsible if any of the ships escaped.

In the reply telegram No. 1114 of Aug. 4 (319/192433) Wied reported having presented the matter to Günther who mentioned that as far as the Swedish authorities knew, only two ships were making preparations for a breakout and these would require some 8 days to make ready. He promised to obtain the names of the two ships. He urged, however, that the best method for holding the ships would be legal action by Norwegian shipping firms. He pointed out that if the Swedish Government on its own were to take measures against the ships it would run the risk of seizure of all its overseas tonnage by the British.

Telegram No. 1128 of Aug. 5 (319/192432) reported that the ships preparing to run out were the *Dicto* and the *Lionel*.

After Schnurre's return to Stockholm the matter was again pressed as is reported in telegram No. 1161 of Aug. 11 (319/192426) but when Schnurre and Wied demanded that Sweden take measures to seize the ships, or transfer them to the Baltic, or to put them in the Swedish service, Günther reiterated that such measures would be viewed by England as participation by Sweden in Germany's blockade measures. Günther would not take such responsibility himself but would present the problem to the Cabinet.

On Aug. 14 in telegram No. 1183 (319/192424-25) Schnurre and Wied were able to report the decision of the Swedish Cabinet as explained by the Foreign Minister. The Swedish Government, Günther declared, was not able de jure to take the measures which Germany demanded, but de facto Günther gave the assurance that the ships would not break out. His declaration applied not only to the 10 oil-burning ships in Göteborg harbor, but also to ships which meanwhile had been completed for Norwegian firms. If the de facto situation were to change then Germany would be notified in ample time. Schnurre proposed that on his return to Berlin he discuss with OKM further measures by which Germany could get the ships into her own hands.

No record of these discussions in Berlin or of the ensuing instructions to Stockholm has been found.

See, further, document No. 290.

## No. 175

B12/B001128-30

*The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

ROME, August 2, 1941—9:10 p. m.

No. 1732 of August 2

Received August 2—10:00 p. m.<sup>1</sup>

For the Foreign Minister personally!

Pursuant to my conversation of today with Minister Bene and Brigadeführer Greifelt,<sup>2</sup> I wish to report as follows:

The recent low daily figures of emigration caused by the war, and the general talk of a resettlement that would no longer be necessary, had created strong mistrust on the Italian side. That was why perhaps a certain tension arose in Bolzano that made it appear necessary to hold a consultation in Rome between Under State Secretary Buffarini, Minister Bene, who had come here from Holland, and SS-Brigadeführer Greifelt. This consultation took place in a comradely manner and with due appreciation of the difficulties caused by the war on both sides. It was possible to convince Buffarini again on this occasion that everything was being done on the German side to carry out of the decision of the Führer and the Duce which was clearly and unequivocally in the sense of a radical, ethnic solution. So far some 72,000 persons have emigrated. Within the next 6 months approximately 16,000 more persons will be able to emigrate as a result of possibilities discussed here, so that in the first 2 years, some 88,000 persons (equal to 47 percent of the Italian figure for optants, or 40 percent of the German figure), including farmers and other persons of property, will have emigrated. This percentage is considered satisfactory by Buffarini. The removal of persons with real property cannot take place on a sizable scale until it is possible to announce publicly the prospective new area of settlement.<sup>3</sup>

As a special difficulty existing on the Italian side, it appears that the Prefect of Bolzano,<sup>4</sup> by way of a personal union, is, on one hand, the deputy of Under State Secretary Buffarini, and in this capacity is responsible for the carrying out of treaties and agreements aiming at a radical ethnic solution, while, on the other hand, as Prefect of the Province of Bolzano, he is responsible for the further economic welfare of a heretofore flourishing province. The interests involved

<sup>1</sup> Marginal note: "Transmitted as No. 2624 to the Special Train."

<sup>2</sup> Ulrich Greifelt, Himmler's principal executive officer for the resettlement of the Volksdeutsche, Chief of the Staff Main Office of the RKFDV (Reich Commissariat for the strengthening of the German national community).

<sup>3</sup> Cf. vol. XI of this series, document No. 291 and footnote 1.

<sup>4</sup> Agostino Podestà.

in these two tasks are in part diametrically opposed,<sup>5</sup> so that the existing "personal union" must cause, has caused and, independent of the person, will cause the Prefect a conflict of conscience. Because the difficulties existing at the present time are largely attributable to this conflict of conscience of the Prefect, they were pointed out to Buffarini by the German side, and the thought was suggested to him for consideration whether it would not be desirable to abolish this personal union. Buffarini admitted these difficulties and their consequences, seized on the idea at once, and suggested for his part the appointment of a commissioner with his seat in Bolzano and authority to issue instructions to the four Prefects in question. He is going to think this over and together with Bene discuss it again with Greifelt on August 8. Buffarini stressed the fact that then a position of equal authority must exist on the German side. In my opinion, this already exists in the case of the German Reich representative, but, because of the repeated long absences of Minister Bene, unfortunately, with very limited effectiveness.

Since the appointment of a commissioner on the Italian side would mean a change in an existing condition, a corresponding change would have to be made in the text of the German-Italian directives of November 15, 1939.<sup>6</sup> This could be by means of an extension of the arrangements made for the economic part regarding the handling of all South Tirolese problems with respect to Italy as provided in the confidential correspondence between Ciano and Mackensen of December 11, 1939. In the event that Buffarini takes a positive stand on the idea of a special commissioner in the conversation to be held on August 8, please authorize me to arrange for this change with the Italians.<sup>7</sup>

The Reichsführer SS will receive a direct report through Brigadeführer Greifelt.

MACKENSEN

<sup>5</sup> Cf. vol. XI of this series, document No. 291.

<sup>6</sup> Not found.

<sup>7</sup> By telegram No. 1973 of Aug. 5 (4865/E249484) the Foreign Minister directed that Mackensen agree to the idea of an Italian special commissioner if Buffarini favored the plan.

In telegram No. 1827 of Aug. 11 (B12/B001193-94) Mackensen reported that Mussolini in principle agreed to the idea of the appointment of a high commissioner for all South Tirolese resettlement problems but that he was considering making the execution dependent on a parallel action by Germany.

In telegram No. 2487 of Sept. 19 (4865/E249515) Mackensen was informed that the German Government was planning to appoint Mayr, Consul General at Genoa, as High Commissioner for South Tirolese resettlement questions.

No. 176

205/142889-90

*The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 1105 of August 4

STOCKHOLM, August 4, 1941—7:00 p. m.

Received August 4—10:00 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 1581 of August 3.<sup>1</sup>

This afternoon I conveyed to the Swedish Foreign Minister the statement outlined under item 2 of the above telegraphic instruction. Günther once more expressed his personal regret that it was not possible for the Swedish Government to accede to the German request, and asked that we draw from this instance no broad inferences on Sweden's attitude toward the struggle against Bolshevism. The Swedish Government would do everything in its power to assure the safe passage of the German transports through Swedish territorial waters. He was looking forward to the forthcoming communication of our wishes.<sup>1</sup>

I emphatically recalled to Günther the need for absolute secrecy. Günther listed for me the members of the Government and the Armed Forces, whom he had informed of the matter in addition to the King; he will not go beyond this group. In the subsequent arrangement of the technical details he will also proceed in accordance with our wishes. He suggested that the group of persons in Finland to be informed on this matter be also kept as small as possible. I shall report separately on the rumors circulating in Stockholm in connection with the troop transports carried out during the past days.<sup>2</sup>

I request the earliest possible transmission of our further proposals. Our Naval Attaché will fly to Berlin tomorrow to discuss details with the Naval Operations Staff. I would request however that instructions be sent also directly to me by telegraph.<sup>3</sup>

SCHNURRE  
WIED

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 172, footnote 8.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram No. 1106 of Aug. 4 (205/142892) the Legation reported that Günther had mentioned that numerous rumors were current in Stockholm regarding a new, secret German-Swedish agreement regarding troop transportation. "They had their origin in the fact that last Sunday three ships filled with troops passed through the cliff zone of Stockholm and past some Swedish bathing resorts, whereupon the band struck up a tune and there was a lively exchange of greetings between the troops on deck and the population."

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 178, footnote 4.

## No. 177

1007/307696-97

*Memorandum by an Officer in the Intelligence Department of the Army General Staff*

LOCAL QUARTERS, August 5, 1941.<sup>1</sup>

RECORD OF THE VISIT OF THE JAPANESE MILITARY ATTACHÉ, LIEUTENANT GENERAL BANZAI, ACCOMPANIED BY MAJOR ENDO, AT THE INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT [O QU IV] ON AUGUST 4, 1941, IN JÄGERHÖHE <sup>2</sup>

1. The visit had been requested by the Japanese Military Attaché by letter and was arranged for August 4, 1941 in Jägerhöhe with the consent of the Chief of the General Staff<sup>3</sup> and the Commander in Chief<sup>4</sup> of the Army.

2. Lieutenant General Banzai stated that he came in agreement with his Ambassador and on official instructions of the Chief of the Japanese General Staff, Colonel General Sugiyama. He asked that the following information communicated by him be brought to the attention of the Commander in Chief of the Army.

3. Japan—Army and Government—is determined, despite all military, economic and (internal and external) political difficulties, in the spirit of the Tripartite Pact, to enter the war against Soviet Russia on Germany's side just as soon as the strategic concentration of troops would permit it.

The difficulties—which are presumably known—are to be found in the *military* field:

(a) the necessity of maintaining continued occupation of China;  
(b) the further demands on the military forces caused by the recent occupation of Indochina (reference to the necessity of this step in order to obtain an initial base for the later attack on Singapore—*desired by Germany!*)

(c) the situation of transportation to Manchukuo, both from the mother country and from China (single-track railways!)

4. Nevertheless the Japanese General Staff expects that by the end of August, 16 divisions, the *minimum* for opening hostilities against Soviet Russia in the Far East, can be assembled in Manchukuo. (This means strengthening the present Kwantung Army by about six divisions.)

Probably four army groups will be set up, the most important of which (Vladivostok?) is to be commanded by Lieutenant General Kawabe, the former Japanese Military Attaché in Berlin.

<sup>1</sup> O.U. (Orts-Unterkunft) in the original.

<sup>2</sup> Headquarters of the OKH, Mauer Lake in East Prussia.

<sup>3</sup> Colonel General Franz Halder.

<sup>4</sup> Field Marshal Walther von Brauchitsch.

The necessary mobilization measures have been in progress for some time. The exact date for the entry into the war has not yet been set.

5. Through threats of resigning Ambassador Oshima has exerted an appropriate influence on the activating of Japanese policy.

The leading figure in the Japanese cabinet, is now as before, the War Minister, Lieutenant General Tojo.<sup>5</sup>

MATZKY <sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> A summary of the contents of this memorandum was submitted to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat by Counselor Etzdorf, the Foreign Ministry's representative with OKH on Aug. 5 (1068/313421).

Matzky's memorandum was submitted to the Foreign Minister on Aug. 15 with a cover note by Ritter (1007/307694-95) which read as follows: "For the forthcoming visit of Ambassador Oshima. Enclosed is a memorandum regarding a statement by the Japanese Military Attaché concerning Japan's entry into the war against Soviet Russia. Field Marshal Keitel considers it desirable that the Foreign Ministry, too, tell the Japanese Government that it has taken note of this statement. Field Marshal Keitel would therefore like to ask the Foreign Minister to bring the matter up with the Japanese Ambassador during his forthcoming visit". Oshima's visit to Ribbentrop took place on Aug. 23. An unsigned memorandum of this conversation (F7/0096-88) on the film of the files of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat is only partly legible. The parts that can be read do not indicate that a statement as suggested in the foregoing was actually made by Ribbentrop on that occasion.

<sup>6</sup> Major General Gerhard Ernst Ludwig Matzky.

## No. 178

205/142894

*The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 1125 of August 5

STOCKHOLM, August 5, 1941—7:00 p. m.

Received August 5—10:45 p. m.

With reference to our telegrams No. 1105<sup>1</sup> and 1106<sup>2</sup> of August 4.

I have taken advantage of the discontent existing in informed military circles over the attitude of the Swedish Government, in order to discuss with the Foreign Minister once more the practical aspect of the transport question. The result is as follows: By analogous application of the transit agreement between Günther and me concluded on July 8, 1940,<sup>3</sup> the Swedish Government would give its consent to unrestricted transport of materials over Swedish railroads to Haparanda. The same would apply under the aforementioned agreement to transport of materials to Narvik and Trondheim. Materials would include horses and mules together with personnel needed for their care and as guards. This would reduce the transports by the hazardous sea route in considerable measure, because the entire equipment of the division could be shipped by this route. In

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 176.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 176, footnote 3.

<sup>3</sup> See vol. x of this series, document No. 132.



accordance with its basic decision the Swedish Government persists in its refusal to permit troop transports, but under the agreement of July 8, 1940, regarding furlough travel to Norway, it will be possible, with the tacit acquiescence of the Swedish Government, for small contingents of a few thousand men to travel to Narvik and Trondheim by Swedish railroads. The troops transported in this way must, however, conform to the requirements set forth under paragraph 3 of the agreement of July 8, 1940, which means that their small arms must be carried in a separate car and that they must maintain the appearance of furlough personnel. I am in no position to judge whether the separation of equipment and troops necessitated by this route is acceptable to us. I request that I be given instructions on this matter at the earliest opportunity.<sup>4</sup>

SCHNURRE  
WIED

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 1628 of Aug. 8 (205/142899) Ritter informed Schnurre that the first transport ships would probably leave Stettin on Aug. 26; that although Germany's wishes could not yet be formulated with precision they would comprise escort by Swedish warships and Swedish assistance during the voyage in case of need.

Cf. document No. 530.

### No. 179

265/173127

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

St.S. 494

BERLIN, August 5, 1941.

The Turkish Ambassador today introduced to me his new Counselor of Embassy. He soon brought the conversation around to the problem of the nationalities of Turkic ethnic origin who live on the fringes of Soviet Russia. He called my attention to the possibility of spreading anti-Soviet propaganda among these Turkic tribes. Then he expressed rather frankly the idea that the Caucasian peoples could eventually be united into one buffer state and hinted that an independent Turanian state might be established east of the Caspian Sea also.

Gerede stated this in the casual tone of a conversation. However, his remarks were by no means casual, since they agree to a large extent with the statements made by Ali Fuad in a conversation with Herr von Papen (see Ankara dispatch No. 2335 of July 14<sup>1</sup>). Gerede put his finger upon the decisive question by characterizing Baku as an entirely Turkish-speaking city.

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 125.

### No. 180

794/273240-2

*Memorandum by Minister Grobba*<sup>1</sup>

BERLIN, August 5, 1941.

Subject: Proposals relating to Gaylani's intended trip to Berlin (telegram No. 986 of August 1 from Therapia<sup>2</sup>).

Regarding the agreement he intends to conclude in Berlin with the German Government, which by being published is calculated to bolster his position in Iraq and assist the revolt now in progress there, Gaylani, as shown by his statements in Tehran, has obviously in mind an agreement in which the Gaylani Government is publicly recognized by the German side as the sole legal Government of Iraq. His performances in return therefore are likely to be what he has repeatedly offered, especially during his last premiership: a secret agreement with the German Government, involving close military, political, and economic collaboration.

In May Gaylani proposed:<sup>3</sup>

- (1) The invitation of a German military mission;
- (2) The invitation of a German adviser to the Iraq national bank of emission, who in effect would be a financial adviser;
- (3) The invitation of advisers for various branches of the administration, especially the police;
- (4) Cancellation of the Iraq Petroleum Company's concession and negotiations on new arrangements in this matter;
- (5) Abolition of the present Iraq currency tied to the pound sterling, and its replacement by a currency based on a German gold credit;
- (6) Delivery to Germany of all Iraq raw materials that can be spared.

<sup>1</sup> Grobba's signature is missing on the file copy of this document. The authorship is indicated by Woermann's memorandum of the next day, document No. 183.

<sup>2</sup> In this telegram (83/61948) Papen reported having been visited by former Iraq Minister President Gaylani who expressed hope that he would be allowed to proceed to Berlin where he expected "to conclude agreements with the Reich Government" calculated to strengthen his position in Iraq and the insurrection there.

Gaylani and the Grand Mufti had gone to Iran after the collapse of Iraq's military resistance to the British (see vol. XII of this series, documents Nos. 590 and 599). Reports on the political plans and activities of Gaylani and the Grand Mufti were made in Tehran telegrams No. 573 (71/50876-77) and No. 577 (71/50878-79), both of July 7.

In telegram No. 645 of July 17 (83/61446) Ettl reported having been informed by Gaylani that he expected to leave Tehran on July 20 and to cross the Turkish border on July 22.

<sup>3</sup> No record of proposals made by Gaylani in May as listed below has been found. Some requests by the Iraq Government at that time which are along similar lines are referred to in vol. XII of this series, document No. 457.

His counterdemands were:

- (1) Delivery of needed war materials on credit;
- (2) Granting of a credit of 1 million gold pounds;
- (3) Delivery of urgently needed commodities, especially medicines.

Gaylani, by taking up the struggle against the English, has proved his hostility against England. In this struggle, as already in the past, he has proved himself as a leader-type personality. By affiliation with the Gaylani family, which is respected throughout the entire Near East, he is qualified for the job of leader of the Iraq state. He has also demonstrated great understanding for a cooperation with Germany and proved himself a suitable partner for us. Our future interests in Iraq will therefore be best served if we reinstate Gaylani as Minister President in Iraq. We can leave the selection of his ministers to him; there is no objection against the reappointment of his previous ministers who all are lesser personalities than he.

The public recognition of his government by Germany will certainly strengthen his standing in Iraq and give new impetus to the insurrection now in progress there; but it should not take place until we can be sure that we will shortly occupy Iraq.

I should therefore propose that after his arrival in Berlin we negotiate with Gaylani about the subjects referred to above and conclude agreements which, however, would not become effective until his government is again accorded recognition by us. This will save us the necessity of trying to improvise a solution of these questions upon the occupation of Iraq.

I further suggest that the statement be made, in reply to his request for public recognition of his government, that the German Government was in principle prepared to do this, but that the moment would be opportune only when the entry of German forces into Iraq and the joint operation of German forces with Iraqi forces and tribal units was either imminent or had already started.

For Gaylani's appropriate lodging in Berlin I suggest that a drawing room and bedroom be reserved for him in the Adlon Hotel and his retinue be lodged in the same place. I would also suggest that he be received by the Foreign Minister and the Führer.<sup>4</sup>

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat through the Under State Secretary and the State Secretary.

<sup>4</sup> For the follow up, see document No. 183.

## No. 181

205/142897

*The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

STOCKHOLM, August 6, 1941—12:10 a. m.

No. 1130 of August 5

Received August 6—2:30 a. m.

According to a communication from the Chief of the Political Department of the Swedish Foreign Ministry<sup>1</sup> there was a captured English officer on the German furlough train<sup>2</sup> which passed through Sweden coming from Kornsjö to Hälsingborg. He was discovered by the Swedes and reported because he wore an English uniform.<sup>3</sup> The furlough train in question left Sweden in the direction of Germany on the 5th of this month at 2:00 a. m. with the captured English officer. The Swedish Government refrained from any measures leading to the release of the English officer during the transit over Sweden in order to avoid any complications. It intends, however, to remonstrate regarding the matter through the Swedish Legation in Berlin.<sup>4</sup> In the Foreign Ministry here they expressed their earnest wish that on the German side care be taken lest the captured English officer communicate to England the fact of his transportation over Swedish territory in a German furlough train by letter or any other means at his next opportunity.

WIED

<sup>1</sup> S. J. Söderblom.

<sup>2</sup> For the trans-Swedish furlough traffic, see document No. 178.

<sup>3</sup> According to the Swedish memorandum of Aug. 7, zu St.S. No. 497 (319/192429) it was a British Air Force officer.

<sup>4</sup> Weizsäcker's memorandum, St.S. No. 497 (205/142900-901), records a visit by the Swedish Minister who brought a memorandum regarding the incident (footnote 2) and who delivered orally a "sharp protest." Weizsäcker wondered if further action were called for inasmuch as the Military Attaché in Sweden had taken measures to preclude any repetition of the infringement and recommended that the military authorities be warned.

## No. 182

2293/483567

*The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 2486 of August 6

BUCHAREST, August 6, 1941.

Received August 6—11:20 p. m.

On the basis of the order of the Leader of the State to use 60,000 Jews for road-building in Bessarabia the police Prefects have had all able bodied Jews assembled in Bucharest, too, and in part taken away to labor camps. By this measure considerable damage was inflicted

on the Rumanian economy in which Jews were still occupying many positions because of the lack of suitable substitutes, particularly during the mobilization. In addition, German-Rumanian trade was endangered, because in the enterprises newly established by Germany (for example, the Rumanian Commercial Bank, and the shipping firms of Intercontinental and Carmen) Aryanization could not start until just now, and because Jewish merchants could no longer pick up from the custom houses the German goods they had bought.

I therefore advised the Deputy Minister President<sup>1</sup> to undertake the elimination of Jewish elements only systematically and slowly. Deputy Minister President Antonescu said that he had already proposed in the Council of Ministers on his own initiative that the measures be rescinded, as in this case [General] Antonescu had evidently overestimated the number of Jews who could be used. The Prefects have now received instructions to halt the measures. Furthermore, an interministerial commission was established, with the task of bringing back the Jews already deported, in so far as they are important to the war effort.

NEUBACHER  
KILLINGER

<sup>1</sup> Mihai Antonescu.

### No. 183

704/273238-39

*Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

BERLIN, August 6, 1941.

#### POSITION OF THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT ON THE ENCLOSED PROPOSALS OF MINISTER GROBBA<sup>1</sup>

(1) The Italian Government, which has not given up its claim to leadership in the Arab questions, follows our relations with Gaylani with a certain jealousy and in any case desires that he should come to Rome too. A visit to Italy by Gaylani will therefore have to be included in the program from the outset. But the visit should take place only after conversations with Gaylani here have led to some conclusion.

The program outlined by Minister Grobba considers Germany and Iraq exclusively. It will not be possible to avoid some degree of participation by the Italians, e.g., in the question of revising the concession of the Iraq Petroleum Company. The moment for calling in the

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 180.

Italians may not come until a certain degree of clarification has been achieved in the conversations with Gaylani here.

(2) Some of the questions listed in the program for negotiations, especially those relating to economic policy, require careful internal preparation before they are taken up with Gaylani. It is proposed that such internal preparation begin immediately and that the other ministries be consulted in so far as that is absolutely necessary.

WOERMANN

### No. 184

1131/323273-75

*Memorandum by an Official of the Department for German Internal Affairs*

BERLIN, August 6, 1941.

e.o. D IX 64.

Subject: Assumption of the administration in former eastern Galicia on August 1 by Governor General Dr. Frank.

*Discontent in all Ukrainian circles.*

33 enclosures: 30 petitions by Ukrainians and Ukrainian organizations;<sup>1</sup>  
2 reports by Professor Dr. Koch (enclosures I and II);<sup>2</sup>  
1 report (enclosure III) by the Representative of the Foreign Ministry with Sixth Army Headquarters.<sup>3</sup>

The news of the assumption of civil administration in former eastern Galicia by Governor General Dr. Frank had already become known in Ukrainian circles even before August 1, when he took over.<sup>4</sup> It caused *great disappointment* in these circles, and among other things gave rise to numerous letters and telegrams directed to the Foreign Minister *which protested against the "dismemberment of the Ukrainian national organism" and requested the abandonment of such plans* as would "frustrate the restoration of a separate state comprising the entire Ukrainian territories in accordance with the fundamental principles of newly organized Europe as proclaimed by the Führer, Adolf Hitler." Among the senders of these protests and petitions directed to the Foreign Minister the local affiliates of the Ukrainian National Organization (OUN) are most frequently represented with

<sup>1</sup> Not found. However, a number of letters and telegrams from Ukrainian organizations and individuals protesting the incorporation of Ukrainian territory into the Government General and into Rumania were found in another file and are filmed on serial 84.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (1131/323276-81).

<sup>3</sup> Hellenthal report of July 28 (1131/323282-83).

<sup>4</sup> See documents Nos. 114 and 119, footnote 1.

23 petitions, and their action gives the impression of being organized. However, other Ukrainian organizations, such as for example the Central Association of Ukrainian Students in Vienna, the World Association of Ukrainian Women, etc., are also represented with a total of 7 petitions.

Likewise from Ukrainian circles, but from resettlement camps of Ukrainian emigrants from Bessarabia and Bukovina, there are telegrams to the Foreign Minister protesting against the incorporation of Bukovina and Bessarabia in Rumania<sup>5</sup> and asking *that all Ukrainian areas be united into one whole*, which would make it possible for the emigrants to return to their homes.

Captain Professor Dr. Koch, the representative of the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories with Army Group South, likewise stated in the two enclosed reports (enclosures I and II) that the administrative transfer to the General Government had disappointed the Ukrainians and that their morale was low as a result of this.

On the other hand Professor Koch reports that in spite of our police actions compact units of Ukrainian nationalists of the Bandera group are systematically penetrating into the entire occupied area of the eastern Ukraine in order to engage there in propaganda for a Greater Ukraine.

I have the feeling that our administrative measure of placing Galicia under the General Government was not adequately explained to the Ukrainian population in advance as an administrative measure, and that it therefore caused this discontent.

In the eastern Ukraine such attitudes and feelings probably do not have to be feared *for the time being*.

I should also like to point out the churchly sentiment among the population that is being expressed (enclosure I, page 2).

The Representative of the Foreign Ministry with the Sixth Army Headquarters has suggested (enclosure III, report of July 26, pages 2), that the Ukrainian prisoners of war whose homes are in the occupied territory be released and permitted to return home as soon as possible. Regarding this I should like to remark that in an OKW proclamation dropped by plane from the middle of July on it was stated at the express instruction of the OKW that the Führer had ordered the release of all Ukrainian prisoners of war, if they would protect the harvest from being destroyed and burned.

Because of the connection between the Ukrainian question and general policy I believe that I should point to the feeling that has developed.

<sup>5</sup> A memorandum of Aug. 1 by Ritter (34/24813) recorded a conversation with Ribbentrop regarding the establishment of Rumanian civil administration in Bessarabia and Bukovina. The memorandum took for granted that Bessarabia and Bukovina would be returned to Rumania. See also document No. 159.

Submitted herewith to Counselor of Embassy Hilger with the request that he place the matter before the Foreign Minister.<sup>6</sup>

GROSSKOPF

<sup>6</sup> According to a covering memorandum of Aug. 7 by Grosskopf (1131/323272) this memorandum was submitted together with one that dealt with the harvest in the occupied territories and another one regarding civil administration in Estonia. The following marginal note is found on this covering memorandum: "Presented to the Foreign Minister on Aug. 10. The Foreign Minister said that nothing could be done in this matter. Hilger], Aug. 11."

## No. 185

1543/375578-80

*The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

WASHINGTON, August 7, 1941—6:49 p. m.

No. 2636 of August 7.

Received August 8—9:00 a. m.

For the State Secretary.

Although the American press has almost without exception put public opinion under the pressure of Russian propaganda, and the warmongers are utilizing this opportunity, an appraisal of the whole political situation must proceed from the fact that Roosevelt is resolved, as in the past, to maintain the median course of "non-belligerent means"<sup>1</sup> between the two alternatives of entering the war and isolation. To this have contributed:

(1) The circumstances of Hopkins' dispatch to Moscow.<sup>2</sup> My report that Hopkins went to Moscow in reply to an urgent call for help from Stalin<sup>3</sup> is confirmed by a remark of Early<sup>4</sup> of which I have recently been told.

(2) The fact that the United States has no current reason for a declaration of war against Germany. The Congress is not inclined tacitly to approve an undeclared war against Germany. Rather, it reserves its rights.

(3) The situation in the Pacific which makes it impossible for the United States to participate actively in a war against Germany as long as there is the risk of a two-front war for which America is in no way prepared.

<sup>1</sup> In English in the original.

<sup>2</sup> Harry Hopkins, Special Assistant to President Roosevelt, went to Moscow on July 28 to investigate possibilities for material assistance by the United States to the Soviet Union. Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. 1, pp. 797-798, 802-815.

<sup>3</sup> No report containing such a statement has been found. References to the Hopkins visit in Moscow are found in telegrams Nos. 2543 of Aug. 1 (1527/373788-89) and 2588 of Aug. 4 (1527/373804-05).

<sup>4</sup> Stephen Early, Secretary to President Roosevelt.

(4) The outcome so far of the debate on extension of the period of military service, reports of poor morale among the draftees, and the widespread opinion that America is not directly threatened, indicate a cleavage of public opinion that is so great that in the circumstances the moral impulse and the unity of the nation are lacking for a war which is not exclusively waged for the defense of the country. All the measures taken by Roosevelt to date indicate that despite his erratic nature and his opportunistic attitude he fully realizes that under these psychological conditions he cannot wage an effective war of aggression requiring every possible means.

(5) Moreover, the American army is in the beginning phase of its being equipped and trained; the two-ocean navy will not be ready until 1946 and the existing fleet is today scattered between the Atlantic and Pacific. The requirements for an American expeditionary force in the sense of 1917 are lacking, especially tonnage.

(6) America's own interests are never absent from Roosevelt's calculations. Roosevelt wishes to enter upon the inheritance of England, also with respect to the balance of power, the maintenance of which will have to be America's task in the future. The determining factors, to be sure, were the wish to help England to victory and to support Russia and China. But there was also the endeavor to achieve effective security against encirclement and attack in both oceans in case of a German or Japanese victory. This was to be achieved by gaining bases from England, by the forward thrust outside the Western Hemisphere into the Atlantic area, by the build-up of Alaska, Samoa, etc., and by influencing Russia in order to obtain bases in Siberia.

Under these conditions Roosevelt even under British pressure will consistently adhere to the policy of postponing decisions and prolonging the war. His efforts to avoid hostilities in the Far East in any circumstances are confirmed by the events of the last few days which clearly show that America does not have full freedom of action. The impression which the British and Russian propaganda are trying to create, as if Germany were now involved in a two-front war and therefore the opportunity for America to intervene were especially favorable, cuts no ice with Roosevelt. The many warnings addressed to Japan remain ineffective, because they are not backed up by sufficient military power and because the reinforcement of the Atlantic fleet cannot be cancelled as long as the danger of Russian collapse and of a German attack against England exist. A Japanese-Thai agreement for Japan's taking over the protection of Thailand at this time would at most be followed by a strengthening of the American sanctions against Japan as an American counter move, a half measure by which, as in the past, no decisions can be brought about.

THOMSEN

No. 186

386/211305-07

*An Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the Embassy  
in Paris*

Telegram

No. 792 of August 7 SPECIAL TRAIN, August 7, 1941—12:25 p. m.  
from the Special Train Received Berlin, August 7—1:10 p. m.  
No. 3915 of August 7

from the Foreign Ministry

Sent August 7.

For the Ambassador.

The Foreign Minister has received the following communication from the Military Commander in France:

According to the communication from the Military Commander in France, Ambassador de Brinon reported concerning his conversations with Pétain, Darlan, and Huntziger in Vichy on August 1 and 2, as follows:

1. The cause of the present crisis lies in the Ministerial Council of June 6, 1941.<sup>1</sup> At that time General Weygand protested against the Bizerte program after Darlan's report on the Paris Protocols of May 28, 1941.<sup>2</sup> In Weygand's opinion the implementation of this program involved the danger of an immediate English or Anglo-American attack on Dakar by naval and land forces and the possible defection of all of North Africa. The Ministerial Council of June 6, 1941, unanimously supported Weygand's opinion.

In the meantime the difficulties with Weygand have increased. Weygand had written Pétain a letter: "Je pousse un cri d'alarme."<sup>3</sup>

Weygand could no longer carry the responsibility for a collaboration with Germany that had brought France nothing. If the French Government reverted to the policy proposed by Darlan on June 6 and rejected by the Ministerial Council, then he (Weygand) would resign. In a letter of reply dated July 23, Pétain informed Weygand that there was no reason for a cry of alarm, and that the Government was only carrying out the policy formerly approved by Weygand.

Darlan had now resolved not to work with Weygand any longer and was working to get rid of him.<sup>4</sup>

2. The French Government had taken cognizance of the rejection of the note of July 14 (Abetz to Benoist-Méchin).<sup>5</sup> The Marshal intended to tell the Führer in a letter that he desired the

<sup>1</sup> For Weygand's account of this episode see Maxime Weygand, *Mémoires rappelés au service* (Paris, 1950), vol. III, pp. 428-437.

<sup>2</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 559.

<sup>3</sup> In French in the original.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 211.

<sup>5</sup> See document No. 162.

collaboration with Germany at any price.<sup>6</sup> He had no commitments with respect to England. In the fight against Russia he wanted to participate to the highest degree both in a moral and in a material sense.

At the moment he was not in a position to carry out the Bizerte commitments, since this would probably result again in the loss of part of the French empire.

Darlan for his part was resolved to keep the commitments.

Huntziger as the responsible War Minister did not want to undertake the risk of Bizerte because of the deficiencies in the defenses of Dakar. He reckoned on the possibility of a land attack from Freetown by the English within a short time.

The Ministerial Council of August 2 had resolved as an interim solution to carry out the "camion program" for the time being, and to make the African transport program the subject of personal negotiations once more by Admiral Darlan in Paris owing to the great risk involved (6th, 7th, 8th).<sup>7</sup>

The Marshal had the personal wish to discuss the over-all situation with a leading German figure and was seeking a way out by any means. The close, confidential relationship between Pétain and Darlan was untroubled.

3. The situation in Vichy was not confused as it appeared to be. A Governmental reorganization was not imminent. According to statements by Darlan and also by *Chef de Cabinet* du Moulin,<sup>8</sup> an anarchistic spirit reigned in parts of the Army.

Officers of the *Deuxième Bureau* were in contact with England. Colonel Lousterau<sup>9</sup> had been arrested at an airfield where he was about to pass a secret code to an English agent. Except for this case and Generals Baton<sup>9</sup> and Cochet,<sup>10</sup> no officers had been arrested up to date.

4. Following the report to the Military Commander of France, de Brinon had informed the (one group garbled) that the American agitation in Vichy was extraordinarily active. At the last reception of Admiral Leahy by the Marshal only supply questions had been discussed.

Supplement [from] German Armistice Commission:

*Re* item (2): The so-called "camion program" concerns the transfer to Libya via Tunis of the 400 trucks purchased for the Africa Corps in Metropolitan France.

The French delegation in Wiesbaden stated on August 4 that the French Government had given orders for the regular transfer of the vehicles in running condition.<sup>11</sup>

*Re* item (3): The extensive report concerning arrests of French officers which originated with the Counterintelligence headquarters in France have not been confirmed except for the arrest of Colonel Groussard, the former leader of the Groupe de Protection (G.P.).

<sup>6</sup> See document No. 417.

<sup>7</sup> This is a reference to Darlan's visit to Paris, Aug. 6-8, 1941.

<sup>8</sup> H. du Moulin de Labarthète, *Chef de Cabinet* to Pétain.

<sup>9</sup> Not identified.

<sup>10</sup> Gabriel Cochet, General, Air Force.

<sup>11</sup> See *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. v, pp. 46-51.

The G.P. was established at the time by the then Minister Peyrouton<sup>12</sup> as a bodyguard for the Government and has been expanded by Darlan as his personal guard (group garbled).

German Armistice Commission, Gruppe Wehrmacht I C No. 260/41-gKdos, August 6, 1941.

The Foreign Minister requests a report from you whether in your opinion the information contained in the communication, in particular in so far as it concerns the present crisis and the resulting conclusions, corresponds to the actual situation.<sup>13</sup>

SONNLEITHNER

<sup>12</sup> Marcel Peyrouton, Secretary General of the French Ministry of Interior, August 1940; Minister of Interior, Sept. 6, 1940-Feb. 15, 1941.

<sup>13</sup> See document No. 189.

## No. 187

4699/E226946-47

*Memorandum by an Official of the Department for German Internal Affairs*

BERLIN, August 7, 1941.  
zu D VIII 52g.<sup>1</sup>

Regarding the *postponement of the resettlement of the Volksdeutsche from southeastern Europe* until after the War I talked today with SS-Standartenführer Creutz, the deputy of SS-Brigadenführer Greifelt, and asked him whether the resettlement of the Volksdeutsche from Kočevje, which, as is known, is to start at the beginning of September, would also be affected by this.

SS-Standartenführer Creutz telephoned me on August 7, at 5:30 p. m. and informed me that he had had an opportunity of putting this question before the Reichsführer SS today. Regarding this, the Reichsführer SS said that he was present when the Führer gave the Foreign Minister his instructions in this matter. The Führer apparently had had in mind resettlement in the Balkans but not Kočevje, *i.e.*, Italian territory.<sup>2</sup>

Accordingly, the Reichsführer SS, as before, held the view that the Führer's instructions did not refer to the impending resettlement from Kočevje and that this resettlement could start at the date planned after conclusion of the agreement regarding this; bargaining concerning its first part would presumably be over by August 8.

<sup>1</sup> D VIII 52g.: Document No. 149.

<sup>2</sup> A German-Italian treaty establishing the definitive line of the German-Italian frontier resulting from the collapse of the Yugoslav State had been signed by Weizsäcker and Alfieri in Berlin on July 8. The German and Italian texts of this treaty with an appended map showing this line are in the files (2871/563654-702).

The previous document, D VIII 52/41g, and a memorandum of Aug. 2 of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat are attached.

Herewith submitted to Under State Secretary Luther.

GROSSKOPF

[Enclosure]

WESTFALEN, August 2, 1941.

The Führer has decided that there is to be no resettlement of Volksdeutsche from southeastern Europe for the duration of the war. After the end of the war it is planned that the Volksdeutsche will be removed and resettled.

From this point of view one should examine in each individual case which measures have to be taken at the time (Labor Service, etc.).

Returned to Under State Secretary Luther through the Foreign Minister's Secretariat.

STEENGRACHT

No. 138

67/47047-58

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat*

BERLIN, August 10, 1941.

Füh.<sup>1</sup>

RECORD OF THE BESTOWAL OF THE KNIGHT'S CROSS ON GENERAL ANTONESCU BY THE FÜHRER IN THE SCHOOL AT BERDICHEV (UKRAINE) ON AUGUST 7, 1941

The Führer personally presented the Knight's Cross to General Antonescu in the presence of Field Marshals Keitel and von Rundstedt, General Jodl and their immediate staff. Antonescu was accompanied by his Chief of Staff<sup>2</sup> and an aide.

Before presentation of the decoration the Führer stated that when he decided a year ago to give a guarantee of the inviolability of the Rumanian frontiers<sup>3</sup> he had been aware that this measure as well as others which followed later would cause Russia sooner or later to become the implacable enemy of Germany. In the further course of the developments Russia had then made more and more attempts at blackmail, so that he (the Führer) had to make up his mind to act

<sup>1</sup>No number is indicated. A marginal note reads as follows: "Not to be entered in the journals."

<sup>2</sup>General A. Joannitiu.

<sup>3</sup>See vol. x of this series, document No. 413.

quickly in order to anticipate the enemy who, as one now knew, was unbelievably well armed. In this connection he (the Führer) had asked himself what attitude Rumania would be likely to adopt. The fact that that country was today fighting on the German side, after having overcome its own internal crisis within a short time, was exclusively due to General Antonescu, whose courage, determination, devotion, and will to work represented values which were not measurable, to be sure, but which had had an extraordinary influence on the course of things. From the very beginning Antonescu has possessed the Führer's personal trust.

Since the weapons had begun to speak the General had shown courage and the qualities of a leader. Without hesitation he had immediately placed himself at the side of Germany, and it turned out that in the short time he had been governing Rumania he had accomplished astonishing things. In these circumstances it had given the Führer pleasure and deep satisfaction to know that German units, too, were under the command of General Antonescu.

The liberation of Bessarabia represented Antonescu's first success, and he (the Führer) wanted to use this occasion to award General Antonescu the decoration with which the German nation rewarded the courage, the heroism, and the qualities of leadership of its men.

General Antonescu thanked the Führer most sincerely for the accommodating attitude which he had always shown toward him. He gladly accepted the decoration on behalf of the Rumanian Army and the Rumanian people. In so doing he repeated the assurance which he had already given the Führer at his first meeting with him,<sup>4</sup> namely, that Germany could count on the Rumanian people fully and entirely; for after all it had not been General Antonescu alone who had marched with Germany; the entire people had stood behind him. Germany could place her trust in the brave and honest Rumanian nation in the future, too. Rumania felt honored to be able to fight against the common foe side by side with Germany, and in this way to contribute her share toward the defense of civilization.

Thereupon the Führer presented General Antonescu with the Knight's Cross as well as the Iron Cross first and second class.

In a short conversation in the presence of Field Marshal Keitel and Colonel Schmudt, which followed the bestowal of the decoration, the Führer stated that the quick clarification of the relationship with Russia had been very important. At the beginning of June he had gained the conviction that every further effort to reach such a clarification had merely been treated in a temporizing manner by the Russians, so that the unavoidable conflict could only have been postponed for 1 or 2 months at the most. Thereby the conflict would have hap-

<sup>4</sup>See vol. xi of this series, document No. 381.

pened at a time that was highly unfavorable for Germany; for after the middle of August and the beginning of September it was difficult for reasons of climate to start a military operation against Russia.

After long deliberations and after a thorough examination of his own conscience he (the Führer) had reached the conviction that the fight was unavoidable. He thanked Rumania for having immediately recognized this situation for her part and for not having made any kind of difficulties.

The problems that had to be solved were the same ones as at the start of the Russian campaign, that is, first the destruction of the living strength of the foe and second the destruction or capture of the important industrial centers and raw material bases of Russia. As far as the first question, i.e., the destruction of the living strength of the foe, was concerned, the Russians themselves had answered it by doing what the Führer had always hoped, to be sure, but what was by no means certain. They had accepted battle near the frontier. Considering their own tremendous concentration probably nothing else had been left for them to do, as a retreat by the strongly concentrated masses of troops had no longer been possible. In this manner essentially the major part of the Army had suffered crushing defeat, and had been taken prisoner or dispersed. Only fragments of the Army had succeeded in establishing a new front. These, however, were already forces of lesser quality.

The results of the German advance could be seen in the numbers of prisoners and amount of booty: 900,000 prisoners, 10,000 planes, 13,000 tanks, 10,400 guns and very considerable amounts of other material had been captured. Because according to World War experience there were at least two casualties to one prisoner, and the Russians had this time fought with particular fanaticism, one could probably assume that 3 to 4 million Russian soldiers had been put out of action. The fact that the Russians had suffered heavy losses was also indicated by the combining of troop units. Thus the first objective could be considered to have been attained. As regards the second objective, namely, the capture or destruction of the industrial centers and raw material bases, he (the Führer) hoped that in the coming month it would be possible to occupy Leningrad with its industrial center, the ore regions in the southern Ukraine, the industrial area around Kharkov, and the industrial area of Moscow. He hoped to achieve these objectives by the beginning of the bad weather season.

The Führer termed the next major objective the attack on Leningrad, which was to begin day after tomorrow, the straightening of the bulges still existing in the front, and the mopping up of the troop units which were still surrounded in the pockets. Furthermore, an advance had to be made in the south toward the ore areas, and finally, as the last operation, Moscow had to be taken.

Even with still greater achievement than had actually been attained it would not have been possible to accelerate the advance because supplies would not have kept up. In these circumstances it was a triumph for Germany that she could put into operation again practically the entire Russian railroad network in the portions of Russia occupied by her, in part with Russian rolling stock but partly also with German rolling stock after changing the gauge. However, supplies had to be assured in all circumstances, before the further advance could be begun, if one did not want to fall into the same error that another famous man had committed in his operation against Russia.

In the further course of the conversation the Führer then discussed with Antonescu a few strategic questions as to how to proceed in the Ukraine, especially with regard to the possibility of driving the Russian forces in the southern Ukraine into a pocket by having several tank divisions wheel around them.

Antonescu affirmed this possibility and explained with the aid of the map the plans which he had in regard to the army group placed under his command. He mentioned in this connection that in the area which he was now facing he would have cleared out all nests of resistance within 2 weeks; and stressed repeatedly that after the various pockets had been sealed off too many troops were assembled there, so that supply difficulties were to be feared. He suggested that above all the Italian divisions which were now being brought up be shifted farther to the north so that the concentration of troops might be prevented.

The Führer replied that the necessary orders for shifting Italians and also for the general directing of troops to the north had already been issued.

Antonescu stated further that in the south he wanted to occupy not only Odessa, but also Sevastopol and the Crimea, in order thus to seize the air bases of the Russians from which the Russian Air Force with its new bombers, which had a speed of 500 kilometers, was making heavy bombing attacks on Constanța.

With the aid of the map Antonescu also described his further plans concerning the advance in the Ukraine to the east and south by the troops under his command, without however providing precise data in this connection. He merely indicated with gestures of his hand the general direction of the advance planned by him.

After the conclusion of the conversation with the Führer, the latter had a conference with Field Marshal von Rundstedt, whereas Antonescu was informed in a room nearby of the further German intentions regarding Kiev, etc., by the responsible members of Field Marshal von Rundstedt's staff.



## No. 189

886/211820-21

*The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 2867 of August 8

PARIS, August 8, 1941.

Received August 8—9:55 p. m.<sup>1</sup>

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to your telegram No. 3915 of August 7, 1941.<sup>2</sup>

The picture of the situation in Vichy as drawn by Brinon has proved to be essentially correct and can be supplemented by the following reports which also come from a trustworthy source:

1. The main reason for the delay in carrying out the Bizerte program seems indeed to lie in military considerations of the French Government. It has lost 180 of its best airplanes in the Syrian campaign and it is afraid that it cannot defend itself sufficiently against English air attacks in the Mediterranean area and against Anglo-Saxon land or sea attacks on West Africa. The spokesmen for this position are not only General Weygand, who because of his hatred of Germany follows a policy of military collaboration with Germany only by command, but also Minister of War Huntziger, Air Minister Bergeret and Colonial Minister Platon. In contrast to Weygand, who by all means wants to avoid calling for German aid in case of need, the three last-named, according to a report by State Secretary Benoist-Méchin, stated last week in a ministerial conference that they, in case of an English or American attack against French possessions in Africa, would immediately call for German help. In this connection Darlan had expressed the hope that German-French General Staff talks, concerning the questions of the practical implementation of German help, might begin as soon as possible.

2. A further reason for the delay in the Bizerte program by the French Government lies in the pressure which the United States exerts on Vichy.<sup>3</sup> Without disavowing Darlan's policy in principle, Pétain still lives in the illusion that he can improve the relationship with Germany while at the same time retaining good relations with the United States. Leahy is supposed to have threatened Pétain in the name of his Government that in case of a military collaboration of France with Germany in North and West Africa, America would recognize de Gaulle as the official French Government and support measures by de Gaullist forces against French possessions in the Western Hemisphere.

3. In these circumstances Darlan has a difficult position in the Cabinet, since he is reproached for having, through the military collaboration with Germany, brought about the loss of Syria, provoked attacks against the African possessions that are difficult to ward off, and for letting the Antilles and Martinique run the danger of likewise being lost to the Anglo-Saxons.

<sup>1</sup> Marginal note: "Forwarded as No. 2680 to the Special Train, Aug. 8, 9:45 p. m."

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 186.

<sup>3</sup> See *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. II, pp. 321-377.

Darlan can master these reproaches and these opponents only in the area of domestic policy in that he succeeds in strengthening his position toward Pétain on the one hand and the Cabinet on the other. It is questionable whether he has the personal stature to accomplish these things. In spite of the increase in military rank intended for him,<sup>4</sup> he will probably hardly be able to put through his program without German support.

ABETZ

<sup>4</sup> As commander of the French armed forces; see document No. 211.

## No. 190

617/249995

*The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Afghanistan*

Telegram

No. 815 from the Special Train SPECIAL TRAIN, August 9, 1941—4:45 p. m.  
Received Berlin, August 9—5:30 p. m.  
No. 223 from the Foreign Ministry Sent August 9.

Reports received here indicate that strong pressure by England and Soviet Russia is being exerted at present on the Afghan Government to induce it to proceed against the Reich Germans there. In view of this state of affairs I ask you to make it incumbent on all Reich Germans in Afghanistan that they observe complete restraint for the time being so as not to aid and abet English and Soviet Russian efforts through any kind of incidents.

RIBBENTROP

## No. 191

245/161362-63

*The Chargé d'Affaires in Croatia to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 958 of August 10

ZAGREB, August 10, 1941.

Received August 10—2:15 p. m.

The situation in the insurrectionary areas in Bosnia is no longer dangerous. A small rebel group operating northeast of Sarajevo has been broken up by intervention of German military forces, including artillery. German losses are one dead and three wounded. Contrary to Croatian accounts, which blame these uprisings wholly on Serbian influences, the German military headquarters and thoughtful Croat circles agree that the ruthless, bloody methods of the Ustaše bear part of the responsibility for these outbreaks. The feeling against the Ustaše among the Croat military is very tense. The recall of several

senior officers is due to conflicts with the Ustaše. The Poglavnik has now been compelled to take account of this intolerable situation and yesterday ordered with immediate effect the disbanding of all Ustaša units, especially the so-called Irregular Ustaše, excepting only the regular Ustaša militia. A reorganization after the purge is being considered. Finally, drastic action is also to be noted in connection with criminal actions of an Ustaša official who, day before yesterday, was sentenced to death by the court-martial here, and executed. All Ustaša members of the Poglavnik's bodyguard who are on furlough or who are detailed elsewhere are by special order called back immediately to Zagreb. The measures ordered have created a certain nervousness among the public. In this connection it must be mentioned that, as revealed by a confidential statement by the Marshal, he will today establish contact with the leaders of the former "Croat Defense Guard" (Hrvatska Zaštita) of the Maček party.<sup>1</sup>

TROLL

<sup>1</sup>The Croatian Peasant party whose leader had been Yugoslav Deputy Minister President Vladko Maček.

## No. 192

1543/375596-98

*The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

WASHINGTON, August 10, 1941—4:52 a. m.

Received August 10—5:25 p. m.

No. 2675 of August 9

With reference to my telegram No. 2636 of August 7.<sup>1</sup>

American foreign policy is now on the horns of a dilemma, having to reconcile several mutually contradictory problems in foreign relations. In the first place, the course of the war in Russia has intensified, almost to the point of an ultimatum, Churchill's and Stalin's urgings that America should enter the war before the fall of Moscow. According to the best available information Churchill is said in the event of a refusal to have threatened an armistice and peace negotiations with Germany.

(2) Both to continue his imperialistic foreign policy (the so-called defense of the Western Hemisphere) and to cover up the failures of his financial and domestic policies Roosevelt needs the continuation and prolongation of the war against Hitler. This policy has borne fruit for Roosevelt in domestic policy as well as in the field of foreign affairs; his position with respect to South America became that of an overlord and at home he managed to obtain dictatorial powers hitherto unknown and undreamed-of in America.

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 185.

(3) The overwhelming majority of the American people lack the psychological predisposition for entering the war, just as the American Government lacks the practical prerequisites for actively waging a two-ocean war.

So far it is impossible to perceive or recognize how Roosevelt could solve these problems, all the more because for obvious reasons Roosevelt tries to conceal as far as possible the dilemma into which he has maneuvered America and to bypass those advisors and elements who normally help to shape American foreign policy. He neither informs nor consults the Senate, Congress, Department of State, American ambassadors and the other Departments. With others than a close circle of personal friends (Hopkins, Wallace, Frankfurter, Rosenman<sup>2</sup>) he is unwilling to discuss his plans, or to accept advice. Sumner Welles, too, is probably informed about Roosevelt's foreign policy plans only to the extent that the latter needs him as a technician for carrying out specific tasks.

Roosevelt's predicament outlined above is aggravated by the fact that following a successful and speedy termination of the war with Russia in our favor a German peace offer is expected here, which would be highly unwelcome to Roosevelt because of its effect upon the American people. Attentive observers do not think it impossible that Roosevelt, alone or with Churchill, will invent an Anglo-American "peace slogan", in order to anticipate a German peace move and put the blame for its rejection on Germany.<sup>3</sup> In this connection, the Anglo-American watchword against the totalitarian countries would have to be brought up to date so that Bolshevik Russia will fit into it and the effect of the slogan "Fight Bolshevism!" which has not failed to make an impact on America too, is canceled out. Roosevelt is engaged in an intense exchange of views with London on this subject, too. It is possible that the blessings of American foreign policy which have recently been proclaimed from the mouth of Sumner Welles<sup>4</sup> will find expression in the sense that the German "New Order" in

<sup>2</sup> Samuel Irving Rosenman, Counsel to Roosevelt as Governor of New York, 1929-1932; Justice of the New York Supreme Court, 1932 to 1943, when he resigned to become Special Counsel to President Roosevelt.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram No. 1538 to Washington of Aug. 10 (1543/375600), Woermann informed the Embassy of a report from Vichy according to which President Roosevelt was planning to make public a European peace program "in order to make things difficult for us, especially in the occupied territories".

<sup>4</sup> In a memorandum of Aug. 11 (1543/375601) Weizsäcker referred to these reports about "Roosevelt's plan to interfere by means of a so-called peace slogan" and added the comment:

"In my opinion it ought to be considered whether one could somehow interfere with this allegedly impending Roosevelt action by means of the press. I recommend that Dr. Megerle be asked to submit proposals."

<sup>5</sup> This refers to statements regarding the tasks of a future international organization, which were made by Acting Secretary of State Sumner Welles on July 22 at the dedication of a new wing of the Norwegian Legation in Washington. For text see Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1941, vol. v, p. 75.

Europe, and that of Japan in the Pacific, will be solemnly confronted by: The future assurance of world peace through disarmament, supervision of armaments, an open door for everybody to the essential raw materials of the world. Equal rights for big and strong, small and weak nations, in other words the new League of Nations under American leadership.

THOMSEN

## No. 193

265/173132

*The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister*

Teletype

BERLIN, August 11, 1941.

With regard to the question of Russian designs on the Dardanelles I wish to call attention to (1) DNB Istanbul (Blue Sheet 39 of August 10 No. 222<sup>1</sup>) and (2) the so-called Yellow Friend report of August 7 of the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow<sup>2</sup> to Ankara.<sup>3</sup>

As far as I am aware, the Turkish Government does not as yet know the text of the Molotov proposal of the end of November 1940 known to us<sup>4</sup> concerning Soviet-Russian bases on the Straits. To complete the disclosures made some months ago to the Turkish Ambassador in Berlin regarding this question<sup>5</sup> and to supplement the pertinent passage in the Führer's proclamation of June 22,<sup>6</sup> one might perhaps consider letting the Turks have the paragraph in question from the Molotov proposal in writing as irrefutable proof of the Russian designs.<sup>7</sup>

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>1</sup> This DNB release (265/173133) cited an article from the Turkish newspaper *Tan* which stated that the propaganda duel of the belligerents accusing each other of having designs on the Straits was gradually becoming annoying to Turkey. It urged that these powers therefore should prove their sincerity by bringing the documents concerned to the attention of the Turkish Government.

<sup>2</sup> Ali Haydar Aktay.

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

<sup>4</sup> See vol. XI of this series, document No. 404.

<sup>5</sup> Presumably a reference to Hitler's conversation with Ambassador Gereide on Mar. 17, 1941. See vol. XII of this series, document No. 177.

<sup>6</sup> See vol. XII of this series, Editors' Note, p. 1073.

<sup>7</sup> Marginal note: "The Foreign Minister at first had agreed to this mode of proceeding but now wants to take the necessary steps himself and to summon Gereide in the near future. W[eizsäcker], Aug. 12."

## No. 194

F2/0363-67

*Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to Ambassador Papen*

PERSONAL

IN THE EAST, August 11, 1941.

○ DEAR HERR VON PAPAN: Regarding your report of July 28<sup>1</sup> I should like to make the following comment:

One thing to begin with, there is no question of confidence whatsoever between you and me. I asked you, as you may recall, whether you were prepared to take over the important ambassadorial post at Ankara; and subsequently, following our conversation in March 1939, I suggested to the Führer that you be appointed to that post. I neither could nor would have done this had I had but the slightest doubt as to cooperation with you based on good faith and trust.

Neither does my telegram of July 23<sup>2</sup> addressed to you, which lies before me now, suggest anything that might give you cause to speak of a lack of confidence in you. Because—and here I come to the subject matter itself—the reason for sending the instruction of July 23 was, on the one hand, your report of July 14,<sup>3</sup> in which you say that perhaps it would not be an uninteresting development if, following conclusion of the Russian campaign, Turkey were allowed to take the initiative as a peace mediator; and, on the other hand, it was the fact that at the same time reports were received here from various agencies in Ankara according to which a German peace offensive had been or would be launched from there. The purpose of the instruction was to call your attention to the possible connection between these two things and to point out what extraordinary caution has to be exercised by your Embassy with regard to any acquiescence in such Turkish ideas. I have neither maintained nor assumed that the manner in which you acted was responsible for such press reports—something you apparently have read into my telegram. But, on the other hand, I wanted to call your attention to this fact. According to our experience, if the Turkish ideas mentioned in your report of July 14 had at all been discussed by you with any person whatsoever or if they had merely been considered fitting subjects for discussion (instead of their being opposed vigorously from the outset), the enemy propagandists, wishing to uncover any sign of weakness on the part of Germany, would immediately distort this and represent it as a new German peace offensive. From the wording of your report I gain the impression that in the excitement you have completely misunderstood this purpose of my

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 161.

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 145.

<sup>3</sup> Document No. 125.

telegram, and given it an interpretation that was far from my intentions.

As far as Turkish policy is concerned, I see the situation as follows: Turkey will want to continue to keep out of the war, if at all possible. For this reason she will not incur either Germany's or England's displeasure. Therefore, winning Turkey over completely to our side in the manner desired by us is feasible only—

1. if the Turks realize that Germany's position of power in the southeast is so great that Turkey's own display of power is insignificant in contrast and that Germany is at any time in a position to defeat England in the Near East, and

2. if, in addition, we could interest the Turks in the acquisition of new territories, which might include the well-known and previously discussed points: border rectifications at Edirne, the Greek islands at the entrance to the Straits, also, if need be, territorial acquisitions to the south and east of Turkey.<sup>4</sup>

I hope that these conditions will obtain after Russia is definitely smashed in the autumn of this year. A situation will then have been established which from the standpoint of political power and diplomacy will represent the maximum attainable; and should we even then be unable to win the Turks over to our side, then this aim can presumably not be attained through diplomatic methods at all.

Until that time comes I conceive of our diplomatic effort in these terms:

1. To strengthen the Turks in their confidence that we will never make any territorial demands on them but that, on the contrary, we will at all times regard them as the historic guardians of the Straits;

2. To promote and keep alive the hitherto somewhat dormant Turkish imperialist tendencies. In this connection I have read with interest your report concerning the following up of the Pan-Turanian idea,<sup>5</sup> and one of these days I shall send you some more information on that subject. In this respect your ideas are absolutely identical with mine;

3. To maintain a strong negative attitude to all peace feelers in general and to all idea of compromise, especially with respect to England. This therefore means that I am of the opinion that the more uncompromising the position taken by the Reich Government and, consequently by all Reich Missions abroad, is—in which connection of

<sup>4</sup> See vol. xii of this series, documents Nos. 154 and 303, footnote 5.

<sup>5</sup> Presumably Papen's report of Aug. 5 (1047/311692-95) dealing with the Pan-Turanian movement and its leaders. The report emphasized the interest of political figures in Turkey in this movement. For a published text of this report in French translation, see *Documents secrets du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères d'Allemagne: Turquie* (Paris, 1946), document No. 10. A brief dispatch of July 25 by Papen on the same subject, A 2756 (1047/311699-700) and a memorandum of Aug. 3 by Hilger commenting on that dispatch (1047/311697-98) are also in the files. See, further, document No. 298.

course there can be no exceptions whatever—the easier it will be for us to pursue our political objectives at the proper time; and this is true in general as well as with regard to Turkey in particular.

I should like to say in conclusion: Turkey will presumably move more and more into the center of international interest in the immediate future. We wish and want friendship with this state for all time to come. Nor do I see the slightest reason for conflicts between the interests of Turkey and those of Germany. On the contrary, I believe that by joining us Turkey will again be able to assume a much more important position of power in this part of the world than heretofore. Germany for her part has a great interest in having Turkey on her side in the further course of the war. We can accomplish this with respect to England only by having an overwhelming position of power and the complete coordination of Turkish interests with ours. Both ought to be possible. In this connection we must absolutely avoid pursuing political ideas likely to blur our position of power as well as the parallel interests of the two states, both before world and Turkish public opinion. The psychological effect of a sort of permanent German readiness for peace might induce the Turks to think that we did not have altogether such an iron determination to make the Führer's words come true, i.e., to grapple with the English wherever we can catch them. Your work, which after all has the aim of possibly obtaining Turkish assistance in this matter, would of necessity become more difficult.

I believe, dear Herr von Papen, that in this way I have once again given you a full explanation of my political views and at the same time I assume that neither with regard to the substantive nor the personal side of this matter will you entertain any longer the slightest doubt that might stand in the way of continuing our hitherto trusting and successful cooperation. Besides, I assume that within the foreseeable future an opportunity will be offered for a personal discussion of this subject so important for the future.

Heil Hitler,

Yours, etc.

RIBBENTROP

## No. 195

230/153316

*The Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the Military Commander in Serbia to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 493 of August 12

BELGRADE, August 12, 1941—9:05 p. m.  
Received August 12—10:00 p. m.

With reference to my telegrams Nos. 446 of August 1<sup>1</sup> and 476 of August 8.<sup>2</sup>

The situation has deteriorated since the telegram of August 1. Attacks and acts of sabotage have been on the increase with the exception of Belgrade. The destruction of a Communist band of 50 was successfully accomplished between August 7 and 9, requiring a three-day operation of 3,000 police and troops.

As a result of numerous attacks on the hitherto weak Serbian gendarmerie posts, the gendarmerie is now being concentrated into larger groups, which are being reinforced by the German military command. This is designed to strengthen the morale and the fighting spirit of the Serbian gendarmerie. In some instances there have been defections by gendarmes. Collaboration between the Chetnik leadership and the Communists has not yet been encountered, but the Communists are seeking to influence the Chetnik rank and file with false slogans and in some instances by coercive means, successfully as the Military Commander<sup>3</sup> has learned. In case the Chetniks make common cause with the Communists, it will not be possible to use the Serbian gendarmerie. The provisionally appointed [*Komissarisische*] government shows good will but is getting weaker and unsure. The SD and the German police are overburdened with work, as they are too weak numerically. Since the urgent request for German police reinforcements was rejected, the Military Commander in Serbia has now requested a division,<sup>4</sup> at the same time taking every conceivable security measure and activating the available troops to the greatest possible extent.

This telegram has been cleared with the Military Commander.

BENZLER

<sup>1</sup>Not printed (230/153303-04). This telegram reported terroristic acts, attributing them to the Communists while expressing the opinion that the danger of a general Communist insurrection in Serbia had passed.

<sup>2</sup>Not printed (230/153310-11). This telegram proposed ways of dealing with the Communist insurrection in Serbia; strengthening the police force of the Serbian Government; and playing the Chetniks off against the Communists.

<sup>3</sup>Gen. Ludwig Schroeder was Military Commander in Serbia from June 1941 to his death in August 1941. He was succeeded by Gen. Heinrich Dankelmann.

<sup>4</sup>See document No. 318.

## No. 196

82/60461-62

*The Chargé d' Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

No. 2709 of August 12

WASHINGTON, August 12, 1941—12:52 p. m.  
Received August 12—11:30 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 2699 of August 11.<sup>1</sup>

If the American Government is able to pursue a consistent policy it is, despite Hull's denials, that of attempting to "appease"<sup>2</sup> Japan. The aim of the American Government can only be to induce Japan to consider herself<sup>3</sup> bound by the Tripartite Pact if an incident in the Atlantic should occur and if Germany could be declared the aggressor. With respect to this policy it is apparently counting on aid from the Japanese court clique and the business circles represented by Mr. Wakasugi.<sup>4</sup> Naturally, it does not act from love of Japan; but America cannot risk a two-front war and needs a pacified Japan as long as the American stockpile of strategic raw materials from the Pacific is so low that the interruption of regular supplies of rubber, tin, and silk might seriously interfere with the American rearmament program and thus with aid for England, as well as with the whole private industry. War with Japan at this moment, apart from other implications, would bring on that interruption without the American navy's being able to prevent it. The synthetic rubber industry will not be able to function fully until a few years from now and the same applies to the tin reducing plants; nor can there be as yet a substitution for silk on a sufficient scale. I therefore believe myself not to be wrong in assuming that the American Government will seek a compromise with Japan also in the matter of supplies for the Soviet Union through Vladivostok.

This situation is apparently not fully realized in isolationist circles. Prominent isolationist leaders, convinced that at present the danger of war is greater in the Pacific than in the Atlantic, have approached me with the request that the German Government exert its influence in Toyko to prevent the Japanese from creating the conditions for an incident that could lead to war between America and Japan and thus to war between America and Germany. This move of the isolationists shows at any rate that they correctly appreciate the dangers of an in-

<sup>1</sup>According to this telegram (82/60458-60) recent American economic "reprisals" against Japan, in the light of American press reports were merely means of political pressure "to lure Japan away from the Axis powers and to neutralize her so that America would be freed from the permanent threat in the Pacific."

<sup>2</sup>"appeasen" in the original.

<sup>3</sup>Marginal note in Weizsäcker's handwriting: "Not?"

<sup>4</sup>Kauame Wakasugi, Minister in the Japanese Embassy in the United States.

cident which, considering its expected propagandistic exploitation by the Government, would greatly impair the political influence of the isolationists with the American people.

THOMSEN

No. 197

260/170121

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

St.S. No. 507

BERLIN, August 12, 1941.

The Minister of Finland told me today that the Japanese Minister<sup>1</sup> in Helsinki had suggested Finland's accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact.<sup>2</sup> Actually the Finnish Government did not feel that such a step was necessary. Its attitude toward communism was sufficiently clear.

M. Kivimäki then expounded on Finland's relationship to the Tripartite Pact.<sup>3</sup> He stated that the current war of Finland against Russia was after all the realization of this pact and if Finland were now belatedly to join the Tripartite Pact, this would have only declaratory value and would actually cause Finland more harm than good in the United States. I expressed my doubt about this and demurred in particular when the Finn mentioned that Finland's accession to the Tripartite Pact would even hurt Germany more than it would benefit her. Kivimäki however reiterated that the Finns would fail to understand nowadays what value there was in joining the Tripartite Pact. These remarks, he said, were valid, however, only as far as the immediate present was concerned.

I told the Minister that the Tripartite Pact was for us the crystalizing core for countries adhering to our policies. In this regard it was of great significance. I should like to interpret Kivimäki's statements therefore to the effect that he wished to indicate that Finland's attitude toward the Tripartite Pact was, for the moment, an open question.

I should like to note further that Kivimäki broached this subject and discussed it entirely of his own accord.<sup>4</sup>

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>1</sup> Tadaski Sakaya.

<sup>2</sup> Agreement and Supplementary Protocol between Japan and Germany, signed at Berlin, Nov. 25, 1936; with Protocol of adherence by Italy, signed at Rome, Nov. 6, 1937. For texts, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941*, vol. II, pp. 153-155 and 159-160, respectively. For the Secret Additional Agreements, see vol. VI of Series C, documents Nos. 57 and 58. Cf. Theo Sommer, *Deutschland und Japan zwischen den Mächten 1935-1940* (Tübingen, 1962), pp. 45-47; 493-499.

Blücher reported in telegram No. 701 of July 30 (260/170100) and telegram No. 733 of Aug. 4 (260/170115) that the Japanese Minister had approached the Finnish Government about its accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact.

<sup>3</sup> For text of the pact, see vol. XI of this series, document No. 118.

<sup>4</sup> In a minute of Aug. 14 (260/170133) Weizsäcker noted Ribbentrop's remark that for the time being he did not want to go into Finland's attitude toward the Anti-Comintern or Tripartite Pact.

No. 198

851/284420

*The Commander of German Troops in Denmark to the High Command of the Army*<sup>1</sup>

COPENHAGEN, August 12, 1941.

Abt. Ia Br. B.No. 1135/41 geh.

Subject: Increase of Effectives of the Danish Army. Formation of a Reinforced Danish Infantry Regiment against Soviet Russia.<sup>2</sup>

With reference to our letter Ia No. 330/41 off. of August 5, 1941.<sup>3</sup>

The following enclosures regarding the increase of effectives of the Danish Army and the dispatch of a reinforced Danish infantry regiment to fight against Soviet Russia are being transmitted:

(1) The reply of the Danish General Staff.<sup>4</sup> This has been dictated *verbatim* by the Danish Ministry of War. From it, it follows that the Danish Ministry of War as part of the *political* government of Denmark will not approve the request by the Danish General Staff regarding an increase in strength of the Danish Army which has been sent to us recently. According to our information the Ministry of War is in agreement with the entire Danish Government in this matter.

(2) A memorandum which gives some information about additional reasons for the Danish reply.<sup>5</sup>

An increase in the strength of the Danish Army is therefore no longer under consideration.

LÜDKE

*General of Infantry*

<sup>1</sup> The letter was also addressed to the Chief of the Armaments Office of the Army and to the Commander of the Replacement Army. The document printed here, together with the enclosures, was sent from the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the Foreign Ministry on Aug. 25 (851/284419).

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 142.

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

<sup>4</sup> Letter of Aug. 11 (851/284421) by Colonel Ramsing of the Danish General Staff. It referred to the original Danish request and informed the Commander of German Troops in Denmark as follows: "The [Danish] Ministry of War, having been informed of the conditions attached by the German side to the fulfilment of its request mentioned above, withdraws the request."

<sup>5</sup> A memorandum of Aug. 9 (851/284422-24) records statements made by Gen. E. Görtz, Chief of the Danish General Staff, regarding the political background of the withdrawal of the Danish request.

## No. 199

386/211336

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Paris*

Telegram

No. 830 of August 13 SPECIAL TRAIN, August 13, 1941—2:50 a. m.  
 from the Special Train Received Berlin, August 13—4:15 a. m.  
 No. 3977 of August 13  
 from the Foreign Ministry Sent August 13.  
 RAM 343/R

For the Ambassador personally.

At your next meeting with Admiral Darlan please tell him in the course of your conversation approximately the following:

The operations under way in the east fully occupied at this time the interest of the leading personalities of the Reich Government. This explained why we could not at present comply with the Admiral's wish for a renewed discussion about the problems arising between Germany and France.<sup>1</sup> That did not mean, however, that we on our part did not also have the desire to continue the discussions with the French Government at the proper time in order to reach a sincere understanding. As soon as it was possible to resume the discussions of the matters in question in detail, you would inform the Admiral.

The purpose of this communication to Admiral Darlan is to prevent the breaking off of the thread between the Vichy Government and us without, however, getting into concrete discussions at this time.<sup>2</sup>

Please report by wire the progress of your conversation<sup>3</sup> and afterwards come here.

RIBBENTROP

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 82.

<sup>2</sup> For the resumption of German-French military talks see document No. 265 and footnote 4.

<sup>3</sup> Document No. 211.

## No. 200

222/149903

*The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

[BUCHAREST, August 14, 1941.]  
 [Received August 14—11:03 a. m.]

No. 2588 of August 13

The Rumanian Government has received reports according to which Hungary will occupy the Serbian Banat on August 16. The Deputy

Minister President has asked me to [pass on]<sup>1</sup> this report to Herr von Weizsäcker with the remark that as far as the Rumanian Government knew the Führer had the intention to settle the question of the Banat definitively only after the end of the war.<sup>2</sup>

KILLINGER

The words within brackets were garbled in transmission and were supplied from a clear text found with an appended note by Weizsäcker (4672/E221601). See footnote 2.

<sup>2</sup> A note by Weizsäcker regarding this telegram (see footnote 1) for the Foreign Minister's attention reads as follows: "I neither know of such an intention of the Führer's nor have I spoken with the Rumanian Minister about this subject."

See, further, document No. 218.

## No. 201

142/127672-73

*Ambassador Ritter to the Foreign Ministry and to the Reich Plenipotentiary in Greece*

Telegram

URGENT

TOP SECRET SPECIAL TRAIN No. 930, August 14, 1941—6:10 p. m.  
 No. 841 of August 14

from the Special Train Received Berlin, August 14—6:45 p. m.  
 No. 992 of August 14 from the Foreign Ministry Sent August 14.

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 965 of August 7<sup>1</sup> and 1002 of August 12.<sup>2</sup>

I

For your own information only. The Italian Embassy in Berlin has twice expressed the wish of the Italian Government that Greek volunteers not appear in the Russian theater of war. Thereupon this question was again reviewed and the decision was made that Greek volunteer formations would not be organized for [the war in] Russia.

II

Please inform the Greek Minister President<sup>3</sup> in an appropriate manner that the Reich Government has taken cognizance with satisfaction of the intention of the Greek Government to participate in the fight against Bolshevism by establishing a Greek legion, but that the Reich Government would like to refrain from employing Greek volun-

<sup>1</sup> Not found.

<sup>2</sup> This telegram (142/127671) requested an early decision about the establishment of a Greek legion for combat on the eastern front in view of the fact that preparations by the Greek Government had reached an advanced stage.

<sup>3</sup> Gen. Georg Tsolakoglou.

teer formations at the Russian front. In so doing please avoid letting the refusal assume a character which is offensive to Greece. You can therefore point out in a general way that at the present stage of the operations in Russia the incorporation of new volunteer formations would involve difficulties, after numerous other volunteer formations had already been incorporated. Moreover, the numerous trucks that are indispensable in Russia cannot now be withdrawn from other formations for moving up supplies.

Please do not mention anything about the fact that the refusal results from the Italian initiative.

RITTER

Supplement for Under State Secretary Woermann:

With reference to the memoranda U.St.S. Pol. Nos. 756 of August 8<sup>4</sup> and 767 of August 12.<sup>5</sup> Please inform Minister Cosmelli that Greek volunteer contingents will not be permitted in the Russian theater of war. You can add that the Reich Government had originally taken a positive position regarding the Greek offer,<sup>6</sup> from the general standpoint that in order to demonstrate European solidarity in the fight against Bolshevism the participation of all the European states and nations was desired. However, at the wish of the Italian Government the Reich Government had now refrained from establishing Greek volunteer formations.

RITTER

Supplement for Minister Eisenlohr:

The High Command of the Wehrmacht has been informed.

RITTER

<sup>4</sup> In this memorandum (B13/001178) Woermann recorded Cosmelli's statement of the Italian Government's position that the appearance of Greek volunteers in the Russian theater of war was undesirable.

<sup>5</sup> According to this Woermann memorandum (142/127670) Cosmelli repeated his earlier statement that Italy did not want to see any Greek volunteers at the Russian front.

<sup>6</sup> Ritter's telegram No. 699 of July 22, forwarded to Athens as No. 863 (142/127665-66), had stated that upon presentation of the matter by the High Command of the Wehrmacht a decision had been made in favor of accepting a Greek offer to establish a legion of volunteers for the struggle against Bolshevism.

### No. 202

197/88326

*Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

U.St.S. Pol. No. 773

BERLIN, August 14, 1941.

According to a communication from Minister von Rintelen, the Reich Foreign Minister remarked with regard to telegram No. 435

from Santiago,<sup>1</sup> regarding the arrest of five Party members, that he assumed that it automatically justified the official resort to reprisals in this and similar cases.

I told Herr von Rintelen that preparations were in progress.<sup>2</sup>

WOERMANN

<sup>1</sup> This telegram has not been found. On Aug. 10, an official announcement by the Chilean Government stated that a Nazi plot had been discovered in south Chile and that several Nazi leaders had been arrested. Subsequent details of these arrests were reported in telegrams No. 519 of Sept. 10 (197/88344), No. 523 of Sept. 11 (197/88345-46), and No. 535 of Sept. 16 (197/88357).

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 351.

### No. 203

5077/E292456-57

*Stepan Bandera to Reich Minister Rosenberg*

BERLIN, August 14, 1941.

YOUR EXCELLENCY, HIGHLY HONORED REICH MINISTER: On August 6, 1941, Captain Professor Dr. Koch, as the authorized representative of Your Excellency, the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, in the presence of Professor Dr. Mende<sup>1</sup> handed to the representatives of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, OUN, the conditions after the fulfillment of which the German authorities will permit the activity of the OUN as well as of other Ukrainian political groups and movements friendly to Germany in the Ukrainian territories occupied by the German Wehrmacht.

The conditions read:

a. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, OUN, will refrain at the present moment from all partisan political propaganda, limiting itself to general national Ukrainian propaganda slogans.

b. The OUN will not carry on any propaganda for any living Ukrainian compatriot.

The two conditions are also to be imposed on other Ukrainian groups and movements.

c. Furthermore, a special demand was made of the OUN, which is to be considered as a prior condition to the negotiations concerning further cooperation by the OUN with the German authorities, namely to dissolve the Ukrainian Government established in Lwów on June 30, 1941.<sup>2</sup>

Regarding the conditions under a. and b., I, as leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, stated that the OUN, although it did not for its part see the usefulness of these conditions, was willing

<sup>1</sup> Gerhard von Mende, specialist for nationalities question in the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories.

<sup>2</sup> See documents Nos. 115 and 138.



to accept them for a temporary period determined by the requirements of the war, because Germany had made them a prerequisite to any cooperation.

However, the demand that the Ukrainian Government be dissolved is a matter of far-reaching significance to the Ukrainian people, to Ukrainian-German relations and, in our opinion, to the further development of the German policy concerning the new order of Eastern Europe. One cannot answer this demand with a short "yes" or "no"; rather it is absolutely necessary to take account of the factors that are inseparably linked with it. Since Captain Professor Dr. Koch, as representative of Your Excellency, refused to discuss our arguments in this matter, stating that he had no authorization regarding this, and since he rejected at the same time the request of the representatives of the OUN to clarify the standpoint of the OUN to Your Excellency in a personal audience, I have the honor herewith of setting forth in writing the standpoint of the OUN in this matter in the appended memorandum.<sup>3</sup>

Deeply convinced that Your Excellency will consider our objections in deciding about the cooperation of the OUN with the German authorities, I remain,

Yours, etc.

STEPAN BANDERA  
*Leader of the Organization  
of Ukrainian Nationalists*

<sup>3</sup>Not printed (5077/E292458-59).

## No. 204

F17/079-80

*Adolf Hitler to General Antonescu*<sup>1</sup>

At present FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, August 14, 1941.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: After the victories achieved in our common fight, our allied forces on the southern wing of the Eastern Front are now engaged in rapid pursuit. The area this side of the Bug River will be cleared of the enemy up to the Black Sea within a foreseeable time. In this situation it appears advisable to me to continue the exchange of views with you, General Antonescu, regarding the further conduct of operations. I consider that the next task in the combat sector north of the Black Sea is to prevent the enemy from building up an organized line of defense on the Dnieper, and thereby to create, also on the southern wing a basis for the seizure of the Crimean Penin-

<sup>1</sup>The final page of this letter is missing from the available copies on the film of files from the Foreign Minister's Secretariat.

sula, which presents a threat as an air base against the Rumanian oil region, and also for the pursuit further on.

Within the framework of these impending operations I propose, in amplification of my original thoughts, General Antonescu, that after reaching the lower Dnieper you take over with the bulk of your forces, the protection of the area between the Dniester and the Dnieper. Furthermore it would be especially desirable if the mobile Rumanian forces—Cavalry Corps and Armored Brigade—and the Mountain Corps were to participate in the coming operations east of the Dnieper, too. Should you concur in this I would suggest that the units participating in the operations east of the Dnieper, which will go a long way from their operational base, be allocated all possible reinforcements with regard to material, perhaps from the armies remaining behind for the protection of Bessarabia.

I shall direct the Commander in Chief of Army Group South, Field Marshal von Rundstedt, on the basis of the decisions taken by you, General Antonescu, to settle directly with you the questions arising from the cooperation of our allied armies, such as the reversion<sup>2</sup> of the LIV Army Corps to the Eleventh Army and the exploitation of the conquered territories for provisioning the operations.

I suggest that the cooperation of the allied air forces continue to be arranged between the headquarters on both sides. In this connection the protection of the movement of shipping in the western part of the Black Sea will also assume importance in the future.

<sup>2</sup>The remaining part of this letter could be read more clearly on another copy (F17/077-78).

## No. 205

4827/E241249-49/1

*The Deputy Director of the Legal Department to the Legations in  
Croatia and Hungary*

BERLIN, August 15, 1941.  
R 23646.

Subject: Executions on Croatian and Hungarian Territory.

Appended for your information are copies of two letters of July 21 and 25, 1941,<sup>1</sup> from the Serbian Red Cross to the Representative of the German Red Cross in Serbia regarding executions of Serbs on Croatian and Hungarian territory.

As regards the executions reported in the two letters, one will have to proceed from the idea that the struggle against communism, which

<sup>1</sup>Not printed (4827/E241256; E241250-55).

was rather widespread in Yugoslavia, demanded severe and drastic measures. It is suggested that you examine, if necessary in consultation with the Government at your end, what measures are to be taken in order to counteract a propagandistic exploitation of these incidents.

DR. ALBRECHT

No. 206

617/250004

*The Foreign Minister to the Legations in Iran and Afghanistan*

Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 845 of August 15 SPECIAL TRAIN, August 15, 1941—10:40 p. m.  
 from the Special Train Received Berlin, August 16—1:50 a. m.  
 From the Foreign Ministry Sent August 16.  
 To Tehran No. 560  
 To Kabul No. 235  
 For the Minister personally.

If amounts in gold currency could be usefully employed at your post for political purposes, please submit appropriate requests, referring to this telegraphic instruction.<sup>1</sup> The amount needed will be promptly dispatched to you. This may even involve large amounts provided these will yield adequate results.

RIBBENTROP

<sup>1</sup>The reply from Tehran has not been found. In Kabul telegram No. 300 of August 19 (329/195537) Pilger referred to earlier requests by the Legation and stated that "the immediate dispatch of a sizeable amount in gold pounds or dollar notes seems urgently necessary".

In a marginal comment on this Kabul telegram, Woermann asked Counselor Melchers for a statement of the amounts that had been sent to the Legation in Afghanistan. Such a statement listing the amounts sent and the names of the couriers is in the files (329/195539). It indicates that the Foreign Minister had approved that 1 million reichsmarks be made available, of which 490,980 reichsmarks had already been dispatched.

No. 207

4806/E237574

*The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 2624 of August 16 BUCHAREST, August 16, 1941—8:20 p. m.  
 Received August 16—10:20 p. m.  
 D III 361 g.

General Antonescu complained today that Bessarabian Jews who had been taken along by the Soviet troops were now being moved

back from the Ukraine to Bessarabia by German military authorities. There are involved for the time being 11,000 Jews, who are waiting at the Bessarabian border in the vicinity of Soroca for permission to enter. The General requests urgently that the return of these Jews to Bessarabia, which is contrary to the guidelines which the Führer had set forth to him in Munich regarding the treatment of the eastern Jews, be prevented, and that the German authorities be instructed to move the Jews routed in another direction. In this context I wish to remark that from the standpoint of domestic policy, too, the return of Jews to Bessarabia would represent an undesirable burden for Rumania. Please wire instructions.<sup>1</sup>

KILLINGER

<sup>1</sup>According to a minute of Aug. 19, by Rademacher (4806/E237567) this document was forwarded to Hewel with the request for information as to the treatment of the eastern Jews which Hitler was said to have suggested to Antonescu in Munich.

In a letter of August 27 (4806/E237568-69) Ritter informed the OKW of the substance of the telegram adding the following comment: "I have been unable to discover anything at the Foreign Ministry regarding guidelines which the Führer gave General Antonescu with respect to the treatment of the eastern Jews. The official record of the conversation between the Führer and Antonescu in the Führer's apartments in Munich does not contain anything on this subject. However, as the Führer talked to Antonescu in Munich also on other occasions it is entirely possible that the question of the eastern Jews was also discussed there. In any case, there is no reason to doubt the accuracy of General Antonescu's assertion.

"I therefore recommend that General Antonescu's wish be given consideration and that the German military authorities concerned be instructed not to move the Jews back to Bessarabia."

Ritter was notified of the decision by the OKW in this matter by a letter of Aug. 30 (4806/E237550). See also document No. 332.

No. 208

93/103960-62

*Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department*

BERLIN, August 16, 1941.

On August 13 I reported to the Foreign Minister on my impressions during my recent negotiations in Budapest, Rome, and Bucharest. The Foreign Minister ordered me to set down in writing certain points of this report. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed.

To be submitted herewith to the State Secretary.

CLODIUS

[Enclosure]

IMPRESSIONS OF MY RECENT NEGOTIATIONS IN BUDAPEST, ROME, AND  
BUCHAREST<sup>1</sup>I. *Hungary*

The Hungarian Government has tried as far as possible to take account of the German wishes in the economic field. Thus, among other things, it agreed to do away with the undervaluation of the reichsmark; it provided a credit of 200 million reichsmarks for financing German purchases of strategic goods from Hungary and greatly improved the conditions for activity of Reich Germans and Reich German capital in Hungary in compliance with our requests.<sup>2</sup> It was obvious, however, that the Hungarian Government was greatly concerned in this connection about preserving Hungarian independence with respect to the German preponderance which, naturally, is constantly growing. For this reason the German request that Hungary should agree to the purchase of the shares, now in American possession, of the only large Hungarian oil company "Maort" by a German group at first encountered considerable resistance. The significance of "Maort", which provides all of Hungary with oil, is for Hungary about the same as that of the Ruhr coal mining for Germany. The Hungarian Government argued that the American participation represented purely a capital interest, whereas Germany as owner of the majority [of the shares] would certainly intervene very actively at once. In the end the Hungarian Government, after thorough negotiations with the Minister President, nevertheless gave its consent upon the latter's personal intervention, on condition of the later internal settlement of the ownership relations between Germany and Hungary. Minister President Bárdossy prevailed in this question against considerable resistance within Hungary, and he himself assumed the responsibility for complying with the German demand, because he had become convinced that in the circumstances one could not act otherwise toward Germany, the ally to whom Hungary owed her large territorial expansion.<sup>3</sup>

Inasmuch as the Hungarian oil deposits are the largest in Europe after those in Rumania and Russia, compliance with the German request was of great importance for Germany's oil supply. The

<sup>1</sup> The parts of this memorandum relating to Rome and Bucharest have not been found.

<sup>2</sup> Clodius' telegram No. 1713 of July 31 from Rome (93/103901-03) presents a more detailed account of the Hungarian concessions.

<sup>3</sup> Clodius' telegrams from Budapest, No. 858 of July 24 (93/103886-88), No. 866 of July 26 (93/103885), and No. 870 of July 29 (93/103981-93), describe his negotiations with Bárdossy for gaining German control of the Maort company.

Reichsmarschall therefore repeatedly and urgently asked that this request be put through with the Hungarian Government.<sup>4</sup>

I gained the impression in Budapest that in the short time of his premiership M. de Bárdossy has been successful and that in spite of certain domestic policy difficulties (e.g., Jewish legislation, marriage laws) his position is quite strong. In matters of foreign policy Hungary has likewise become somewhat calmer, and M. de Bárdossy expressed himself rather moderately on the Rumanian question.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> According to a draft teletype message of July 25 from Clodius to Ribbentrop (2148/469006-08), he had discussed that day the matter of the Hungarian oil company, Maort, with Keppler and State Secretary Neumann of the Four Year Plan: "Both gentlemen insisted that we should insist on compliance with our demand, if necessary, by applying the strong political pressure required. The Reichsmarschall attached decisive importance to German acquisition of 'Maort' because every oil deposit in Europe had to be utilized for German military purposes to the utmost limit of its capacity. This, however, was possible only if the enterprise came completely into German hands with respect to technical and business management. The Hungarians could be given only a minority share; and furthermore, certain promises could be made to them regarding Hungary's domestic supply and with respect to the continued employment of Hungarian personnel to a major extent. In the discussion of the question whether it was not sufficient to assure full utilization of the enterprise by Germany for the duration of the war only and to leave Hungary the majority of shares after the war, State Secretary Neumann gave a negative reply. For business reasons, no German company could be expected to take over an enterprise during the war and afterwards to cede the majority of the shares."

<sup>5</sup> A note by Keppler of Nov. 26 (93/104401) records some remarks by Professor Bentz of the Reich Office for Mineral Exploration (Reichstelle für Bodenforschung) who had returned from Hungary. Production by the Maort company had gradually increased during the course of the year so that in October it reached 41,000 tons. The company managers had proposed a quota of 550,000 tons for the year 1942 but the Hungarian Government had set a ceiling of 480,000 tons.

## No. 209

46/31086-91

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*<sup>1</sup>

WESTFALEN, August 17, 1941.

## BRIEF FOR THE FÜHRER

Subject: The Roosevelt-Churchill meeting according to the information on hand.

The Roosevelt-Churchill meeting<sup>2</sup> had long been contemplated. Churchill apparently now insisted on an immediate meeting. Churchill is probably afraid that the main strength of the Russians has been very badly impaired and largely destroyed. He sees also how

<sup>1</sup> Marginal note: "Shown to the Führer. Hew[eil], Aug. 18."

<sup>2</sup> This refers to the Atlantic Conference between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, Aug. 9-12. See *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. I, pp. 341-378.

the Wehrmacht, in repeated battles of envelopment, is systematically smashing the Russian units still remaining and the new ones that are being formed. He must also, therefore, on his part, realize that our goal, that is, the disarmament and occupation of large parts of European Russia with her most important industrial centers, is definitely being attained; that the fate of the Stalin regime is thus becoming uncertain; that by and large, Russia, having been forced back to Asia, either through a special peace, or through collapse, will be lost as a potential ally; and finally that Germany's war potential will be enormously increased through the grain of the Ukraine and the raw materials and industrial possibilities of occupied Russia.

I believe, therefore, that Churchill has urged the early entry of the United States into the war. Roosevelt evidently refused this. It seems probable that he referred in this connection especially to Japan and to the fact that it is impossible for him to wage a two-front war at this time. The risk of being cut off from East Asiatic sources of essential military raw materials in the event of a war with Japan has probably also been a consideration. In addition to this is the fact of popular sentiment, as revealed in various reports from America, which indicate that there is no reliable majority among the American people at present in favor of Roosevelt's policy and of entry into the war. Roosevelt will therefore want to wait a while and see how the war and his own rearmament situation progresses, and will meanwhile try to induce England to hold out. He knows that England will make peace unless he promises all conceivable aid for the future. The war must go on, however, in order that he may complete his own rearmament which he wants to, and must carry through in any case, if only on account of Japan, and in order that he may secure his positions on the American continent and in South America at the expense of England and France.

For lack of really positive results of the meeting, they are beating the propaganda drum all the harder. Without any imagination they are drawing up eight new "Wilson" points,<sup>3</sup> which no longer make an impression on anybody; and although America herself must first of all arm, the whole world is being promised arms and other war material. To be sure, the Russians are at the same time being given to understand that they will have to pay for the arms themselves, while the Lend-Lease Law is reserved for England.

<sup>3</sup>The eight points of the joint declaration known as the Atlantic Charter, issued by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill on Aug. 14. For text see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. I, pp. 367-369.

The meeting planned in Moscow<sup>4</sup> is, in my opinion, also primarily a propaganda trick, to impress the world, and particularly Japan, and in order to strengthen what still remains of Russia's power of resistance and to keep her in the fight. Undoubtedly Roosevelt's policy at present lacks any real basis of power. It is a great big bluff, which Roosevelt can afford because the United States cannot be attacked straight away. What is certain is that Roosevelt's personal prestige is more firmly committed to his anti-German policy as a result of the Roosevelt-Churchill declaration. But there is really absolutely nothing else for him to do than to continue along this path for the time being because a German-English peace would be a catastrophe for him. Whether he has the courage and will yet succeed in the course of time in driving his country into the war through some incident or other, or whether he will realize the hopelessness of an English victory and retire to the role of the "augmenter" of North American power on the American continent, remains to be seen. I think that if all the "pros" and "cons" are considered, there will probably be no active intervention on the part of America in the war after our goal here in the East has been attained. It is even conceivable that the realization is dawning even at this time that it will be impossible to defeat Germany and her allies militarily in this war at all. Victory is therefore probably hoped for as a result of difficulties inside of Europe. This is also indicated by the fact that the new eight "Wilson" points are, so-to-speak, being presented to the world as the core of the results of this meeting, apparently in the hope by means of this humbug to incite the conquered nations against us and to confuse the nations of the [Axis] allies and set them against their governments. The Jewish emigrés in England and America will undoubtedly strengthen them in this belief. When they realize how utterly misleading these hopes are, they will perhaps talk in an entirely different vein after conclusion of the Russian campaign.

Whether Roosevelt and Churchill have, in view of today's situation, discussed plans for concrete military collaboration (except in questions of supplies to England via the Atlantic) in the various parts of the world, such, for example, as East Asia, Africa, the Near East, etc., must at least be doubted in view of the uncertainty of future political developments, especially in East Asia, and the problematic nature of the American rearmament status in all three areas. At any rate, they probably did not get beyond general considerations.

<sup>4</sup>In a joint message of Aug. 15 to Stalin, the President and the Prime Minister suggested that in order to arrive at speedy decisions regarding "the apportionment of our joint resources", preparations be made for a meeting at Moscow, "to which we would send high representatives who could discuss these matters directly with you". For text of the message, see Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1941, vol. v, p. 134.

I enclose herewith for the Führer some telegrams from Washington,<sup>5</sup> which are of interest because they shed light on the meeting between Roosevelt and Churchill from the perspective of Washington.

R[IBBENTROP]

<sup>5</sup> These enclosures have not been found. Reports and comments on the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting were sent in Washington telegrams Nos. 2752 (1543/375621-24) and 2759 (1543/375625-26), both of Aug. 14.

No. 210

F19/334-36

*General Antonescu to Adolf Hitler*<sup>1</sup>

AUGUST 17, 1941.

EXCELLENCY: I acknowledge the receipt of your letter of August 14<sup>2</sup> and have the honor to reply as follows:

1. I am happy to be able to contribute with Rumanian troops to the consummation of the victory beyond the Dnieper and to the saving of civilization, justice, and liberty among the nations.

The Cavalry Corps and the Mountain Corps are available for the operations east of the Dnieper.

The Armored Brigade, the material losses of which I am no longer able to replace, will participate in these operations with those forces that can be reorganized after conclusion of the operations against Odessa, in which it is participating.

I shall get in touch with Field Marshal von Rundstedt, Commander of Army Group, South, regarding the reorganization and provisioning of the Rumanian units which will operate east of the Dnieper.

Since it is practically impossible for me to assure the transportation of supplies for lack of motor vehicles, it will be necessary to have them transported by German vehicles.

The Air Force will likewise continue to cooperate with the Luftwaffe; for that, however, it is absolutely necessary that the losses it has suffered be replaced, at least in part, and that it be assured of means to obtain supplies.

For the protection of shipping in the western part of the Black Sea I have already placed all the Rumanian naval forces at the disposition of Admiral Schuster for escorting supply convoys.

<sup>1</sup> The document printed is based on the German translation of the Rumanian original of this letter, which, according to a memorandum of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat of August 19 (F19/340), was forwarded to Hitler on the Special Train on Aug. 19 at 8:00 p.m. The Rumanian original which was received in the afternoon of Aug. 19 is filmed on F19/337-39.

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 204.

The German LIV Corps was never, even for a moment, under my orders, with the exception of the 50th Division, which was employed in mopping up the area toward Ochakov.

I shall return that division, too, to the Eleventh German Army.

2. In conformity with Your Excellency's wish, I shall assume the responsibility for protection, policing, and security in the territory between the Dniester and the Dnieper. This territory must still be delimited in the north.

3. As I have already pointed out to Minister von Killinger,<sup>3</sup> I am not in a position, for lack of means and prepared personnel, to assume the responsibility for the administration and economic exploitation of any territory other than that between the Dniester and the Bug, the more so as the whole of Rumania, as well as Bessarabia in particular, is in need of a complete reorganization both administratively and economically.

4. In order to assure the order, administration, and economic exploitation of the occupied territories, I consider absolutely necessary with regard to the further prosecution of the war, the establishment of a unified command and the elimination of two authorities.

I therefore request that Your Excellency issue precise instructions to the effect that the rights and responsibilities with regard to the administration and economic exploitation between the Dniester and the Bug, as well as regarding the protection, security, and policing of the whole area between the Dniester and the Dnieper, are entirely the province of the undersigned.<sup>4</sup>

Accept, Excellency, the assurance of my distinguished consideration.

Yours, etc.

ANTONESCU  
*General*

<sup>3</sup> In telegram No. 2633 of Aug. 16 (222/149916) Killinger had reported that Antonescu had expressed his fundamental agreement with Hitler's wishes. Antonescu had added the reservation, however, that he was able neither to supply the Rumanian forces employed east of the Dnieper nor take over the civil administration in the area between the Dniester and the Dnieper.

<sup>4</sup> An arrangement in accordance with these proposals by Antonescu was laid down in detail in a directive by the OKW of August 24 (34/24829-31). Agreements "regarding security, administration, and economic utilization of the territories between Dniester and Bug (Transnistria), and Bug and Dnieper (Bug-Dnieper Territory)" were signed by representatives of the Rumanian General Staff and the German High Command at Tighina, Rumania, on Aug. 30. A copy of these agreements was sent to the Foreign Ministry by the OKW on Sept. 3 (34/24845-53).

## No. 211

386/211357-58

*The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry*

## Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 2450

PARIS, August 18, 1941—9: 15 p. m.

Received August 19—1: 10 a. m.<sup>1</sup>

For the Foreign Minister.

1. Darlan paid a visit to the Embassy this morning. In the course of the conversation I informed him, in accordance with the instruction of August 13,<sup>2</sup> that the operations under way in the east fully occupy the interests of the leading personalities of the Reich Government at the moment; therefore they could not comply with the Admiral's wish for discussions on the questions arising between Germany and France. As soon as it was possible to take up the discussion of these questions I would let the Admiral know.

Darlan replied that he would be very grateful for such an opportunity, since nothing had changed in the decision he had made on May 11<sup>3</sup> for France's collaboration with Germany in the fight against England.

2. Darlan, on his own accord, spoke of Weygand and stated that both Marshal Pétain and he desired his removal from North Africa as soon as possible, but had to find a suitable way to do it. He was considering sending Weygand to Washington as the French Ambassador. This would flatter Weygand's great vanity, without his being able to do any damage in the present situation in the United States. Following this, Darlan came to speak of the Franco-American relationship and Admiral Leahy, whom he tried to represent as a person without any influence. He, Darlan, had asked Leahy only a short time ago why the American policy was working to prolong the war, when after all America had already won her war against England. America had pocketed the English gold and occupied the most important English bases in the Atlantic.

Leahy did not know what to answer to this and had also made no reply to Darlan's question whether the United States felt comfortable in the company of the Soviet Union.

3. In today's discussion, I also pointed out to Darlan how necessary it was for the French Government to proceed forcefully against the machinations of the English, Americans, and de Gaullists in France. The American Embassy in Vichy disseminated unimpeded propa-

<sup>1</sup> Marginal Note: "Forwarded as No. 2790 to the Special Train, Aug. 19."

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 199.

<sup>3</sup> See vol. XII of this series, documents Nos. 490 and 491.

ganda material of the English in the French ministries, and large portions of the administration were infected through and through with de Gaullism.

Darlan stated that he intended to punish unrelentingly every case that came to his attention, and that he had given the new Minister of the Interior<sup>4</sup> instructions to proceed severely in this sense.

He himself intended, on the basis of his new position as Commander in Chief of the three armed services, to introduce a purge against de Gaullist elements primarily in the Army. Furthermore he planned to inspect a number of garrisons in order to gain a personal influence on the officers corps.

4. Regarding the members of the Territorial Guard in German captivity<sup>5</sup> Darlan stated officially that the French Government was willing to bring about the conditions for a pardon designated by the Reich Government.

The sentencing of Reynaud<sup>6</sup> and Mandel,<sup>7</sup> like that of the others accused before the State Court in Riom, was to occur according to political viewpoints by October 15, 1941, pursuant to Marshal Pétain's order.<sup>8</sup>

No evidence of warmongering intrigues implicating Reynaud and Mandel with Roosevelt and Bullitt has been found in the French ministries. The French Government hoped, however, to be able to make documents available from the Riom files and possible private files.<sup>9</sup>

ABETZ

<sup>4</sup> Pierre Pucheu.

<sup>5</sup> See document No. 74.

<sup>6</sup> Paul Reynaud, President of Council of Ministers, March-June 1940.

<sup>7</sup> Georges Mandel, French Minister of Interior, May-June 1940.

<sup>8</sup> In telegram No. 3409 of Oct. 31 (4601/E211366-67) Abetz reported a conversation with Benoist-Méchin who informed him that additional material incriminating Mandel and Reynaud had been uncovered, that there was a strong possibility that the two former Ministers would be convicted on the basis of legal considerations, and that even the death penalty might be invoked.

<sup>9</sup> In a memorandum of Dec. 19 (4661/E211379) for Under State Secretary Gaus, Abetz noted that Hitler, in a conversation with Ribbentrop, had announced his approval of having the members of the Territorial Guards relieved if Mandel and Reynaud would be sentenced to life imprisonment by the French Government.

## No. 212

142/127676

*The Foreign Minister to the Reich Plenipotentiary in Greece*

Telegram

No. 866 of August 18 SPECIAL TRAIN, August 18, 1941—10: 17 p. m.  
 from the Special Train Received Berlin, August 18—11: 00 p. m.  
 No. 1028 of August 18 from the Foreign Ministry Sent August 18.  
 RAM 352/R

For the Reich Plenipotentiary personally.

With reference to your report No. 51 g. of August 11.<sup>1</sup>

I cannot agree with the conclusions in your report. The considerations regarding economic policy which you bring forward cannot prevail over the fact that the alpha and omega of our policy in the Mediterranean area must be the alliance with Italy. I request that you never lose sight of this principle in dealing with the questions which arise at your post. Of course, our interests there must be preserved with respect to the Italian claims too, in so far as this is possible within the framework of a friendly exchange of views. Nevertheless, following a line of policy which would of necessity have to bring us into conflict with the Italian ambitions in Greece cannot be considered.

RIBBENTROP

<sup>1</sup> Not found.

## No. 213

195/139197-202

*Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

U.St.S. Pol. 788

BERLIN, August 18, 1941.

M. Bose gave me the attached letter for the Foreign Minister with the request that it be transmitted, and explained it orally.

Bose attaches special importance to the description of the dangerous deterioration of the political situation in India, also with regard to the increasing American influence on the Indian national resistance. He places this objective point of view in the foreground. However, Bose also sees his personal possibilities for later influence vanish if he remains inactive here any longer. A certain note of urgency in his letter is explained by this attitude of Bose's, and this should not be held against him.

If one considers the situation in India solely by itself, it would be urgently desirable to have the declaration regarding a free India issued soon, because it would supply the nationalist forces with a

weapon against Gandhi's<sup>1</sup> willingness to compromise which is growing under Anglo-American influence. Naturally the question cannot be viewed from this standpoint alone. Rather it is a question of choosing a favorable point of departure with respect to general policy. Thus, the entry of English troops into Iran would perhaps be an event that would offer a plausible occasion for an Indian declaration, which could then be placed in the even larger context of the British rape of the eastern nations. The provisional draft declaration submitted at the time in Fuschl is again appended.<sup>2</sup> This draft lacks the introduction, which would provide an essential part of the declaration and would have to be adapted to the specific circumstances in which the declaration is issued.

I told Bose that he had to recognize, after all, that the Führer was a master in choosing the moment for political actions; so that he could have full confidence.

I believe that it would have a good effect on Bose's present mood if the Foreign Minister wrote him a few personal lines in reply, and a draft is enclosed for this purpose.<sup>3</sup> Otherwise Bose could be informed accordingly by word of mouth.<sup>4</sup>

State Secretary Keppler likewise received a copy of the letter from Bose and is informed of this memorandum.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary.

WOERMANN

[Enclosure]<sup>5</sup>

HOTEL ESPLANADE, BERLIN, August 15, 1941.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: I feel constrained to take the liberty of addressing Your Excellency because the situation in India today is extremely serious.

I have been here since the beginning of April and my proposals were placed before Your Excellency soon after my arrival.<sup>6</sup>

The situation in my country was then exceedingly favourable for the success of my proposals. Unfortunately, no decision was arrived at by the German Government and since then, the situation in India has worsened considerably.

The outbreak of the war with Soviet Russia has been made to appear to India as an act of aggression and Soviet-British-American propa-

<sup>1</sup> Mohandas K. Gandhi, Indian nationalist leader, President of the Congress party.<sup>2</sup> Draft of May 19 (195/139203-04).<sup>3</sup> Not printed (195/139205).<sup>4</sup> See document No. 296.<sup>5</sup> The enclosure is in English in the original.<sup>6</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 300.

ganda has made the fullest use of it. Day after day, the Soviet-British-American propaganda machine has been telling the Indian people that Germany is out for world-domination and, in particular, for the domination of the Orient. I am alarmed to see how effective this propaganda is gradually proving to be.

Even prominent people who have spent their whole life in fighting England and have been in prison for long years, are being increasingly influenced by this propaganda and are thinking that if there is no hope of obtaining India's freedom through the help of the Axis, it is better to make peace with Britain on the best terms available. If this process is not arrested, the time will soon come when the majority of the Indian people will definitely take their stand on the Soviet-British-American side. We cannot hope to bring India over to the side of the Axis, if the Axis Powers do not first declare their policy regarding India.

India is being prepared as the central military base of the British Empire. An army of one million men is being raised in India which will be fully equipped by modern war-industries newly established there. If this plan succeeds, we have no doubt that even after the German occupation of England, the British Empire will carry on the war, using India as the base.

America is now playing an increasing role in the internal politics of Oriental countries, e.g., of China, where she has brought about an agreement between Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Communist Party.<sup>7</sup> With a new American Minister<sup>8</sup> and an American Military Attaché in India, America will also play a role in the internal politics of India. And if America succeeds in bringing about a similar compromise between Gandhi and the British Government, the position of the party standing for Independence and Revolution will be greatly weakened.

There is still time to save the situation in India, but if there is further delay in issuing the declaration regarding Indian Independence, I am afraid it will become extremely difficult for us to win over the Indian people to the side of the Axis. Once the majority of the Indian people go over definitely to the Soviet-British-American side, the declaration will no longer have any value for India.

Further, if there is no declaration regarding Indian Independence, the nearer the German armies move towards India, the more hostile

<sup>7</sup> This may refer to press reports published in Japanese-occupied China at the end of July regarding an alleged agreement between the Chinese Government and the Communists according to which the latter would disband parts of their armed forces in return for subsidies paid by the Government. Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. v, pp. 533-536.

<sup>8</sup> Announcement of an agreement regarding the reciprocal exchange of representatives between the United States and India was released to the press on July 21. The nomination of Thomas M. Wilson as Commissioner of the United States to India with rank of Minister was confirmed by the Senate on July 24. See Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1941, vol. v, p. 74.

will the Indian people become towards Germany. *The march of the German troops towards the East will be regarded as the approach, not of a friend, but of an enemy.*

If, therefore, the declaration is to come at all, it should come *before* the German armies are moving further eastwards.

The new Anglo-Soviet guarantee to Turkey<sup>9</sup> indicates that the British attack on Iran is imminent. The road to Afghanistan which has been open all these months will be cut after the British occupy Iran and it will then be difficult for us to work out our plans regarding India. With Iran under British occupation, there will be one solid bloc under British control, stretching from the Mediterranean to Burma. The work in the Tribal Territory and in India will then be much more difficult than before.

The joint announcement made by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill regarding their programme of post-war reconstruction<sup>10</sup> has been interpreted by the London radio to mean that India will get her freedom after the war. America has also decided to negotiate directly with the Dominions on outstanding problems of common interest, independently of Britain. All these facts further confirm the view that America will in future, intervene in the internal affairs of the British Empire and in consequence thereof, a compromise between Gandhi and the British Government appears highly probable in the near future.

I fully realise the complexity of your problem and I certainly cannot expect Your Excellency to do anything for India which may be considered prejudicial to your national interest. But India stands today at one of the cross-roads of her history and the situation there is deteriorating from day to day. If, therefore, we are to be effective in our work for India, we must act at once. I would, therefore, beg Your Excellency not to leave us in suspense any longer but to come to an early decision, whatever that decision may be.

Thanking Your Excellency,  
Yours respectfully,

SUBHAS CHANDRA BOSE

<sup>9</sup> See document No. 238 and footnote 3.

<sup>10</sup> See document No. 209.

No. 214

138/76975-83

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff*

BERLIN, August 19, 1941.

CONFIDENTIAL REPORT

An agent who has been a regular correspondent for leading Swiss newspapers for many years and who was now able, under this camou-



flage to visit Swiss editorial offices inconspicuously, has been in personal touch with well-informed editors of leading Swiss newspapers in Zurich and Bern.<sup>1</sup>

The agent has summarized the impressions gained by him in Switzerland in two separate reports, which are attached as enclosures.

Report I considers the Swiss domestic situation with reference to the English propaganda activities carried on there. Report II deals with specific diplomatic developments.<sup>2</sup>

Particular attention should in this connection be directed to the fact that part of the information contained in the reports is derived from within the Swiss Federal Council, where no one has even the slightest suspicion that the information could become known to any official Germany agency.

L[IKUS]

[Enclosure]

BERLIN, August 19, 1941.

Switzerland's international situation is currently being viewed by the Swiss as being less tense than it was only a short while ago. Swiss politicians and journalists are generally expressing the view that Switzerland's position of independence will probably not come under attack for the duration of the German-British war. Although the military measures for the national defense will be continued, they have diminished in intensity owing to the feeling of external security.

This sense of security, the Swiss believe, has been strengthened by the outbreak of the German-Soviet war because it is felt that Switzerland will not again find herself in the immediate proximity of a theater of war.

The major factor contributing to this sense of security of the Swiss evidently is the conviction that Germany, more than ever before, now has a direct interest in preserving Switzerland's position of neutrality and dependence<sup>3</sup> for the duration of the war. A number of reasons are cited in this connection.

Most remarkable, in my opinion, is the statement made by an active member of the Federal Council, Meyer,<sup>4</sup> who, through his past professional activities is particularly closely associated with the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, to the effect that in the sphere of business and finance

<sup>1</sup> A report of June 28 by the German Embassy in Bern on Swiss public opinion regarding the Russo-German war has been filmed on 4826/E241057-E241059.

<sup>2</sup> This report (138/76984-89) summarized intelligence reports from the British and French Legations in Bern.

<sup>3</sup> The original reads: "Neutralitäts-und Abhängigkeitsstellung".

<sup>4</sup> Presumably a reference to Alfred Meyer, a member of the Federal Council until 1939, former commercial editor of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*.

Switzerland was for all practical purposes no longer neutral. It was fortunate that this position of Switzerland's was not fully understood in London, but the fact remained that from the economic and financial standpoint Switzerland had become pro-German. Switzerland's contribution, viewed in this light, had to be regarded as important. The trade agreement recently concluded with Germany<sup>5</sup> was just the outer frame of this development from which Switzerland simply could not escape whether or not she wished to do so. In this connection the remark is made by other Swiss individuals that the Reich, to be sure, did make some gratifying concessions in this trade agreement which it is hoped will improve the country's coal supply and supply of other raw materials. Switzerland has, on the other hand, now committed herself to making continuing deliveries to the Reich on credit only, the value of which, according to various estimates, will perhaps run from 800 millions to 1 billion a year.

Extension of such credits to the German Reich has been described by a leading Swiss economist as a "political life insurance premium" for the Swiss Confederacy. Germany's attitude during the economic negotiations with Switzerland is being described as entirely "fair."

General Guisan<sup>6</sup> is regarded as the big man of Switzerland. His position at the present is stronger than that of the Federal Council. His popularity is without parallel for Swiss conditions. He is strongly relied upon to make no military concessions in any circumstance at the expense of Switzerland's traditional neutrality. Other high Swiss military figures in contrast to General Guisan are under mild suspicion of being on the side of Germany with their personal sympathies, as they were during the World War. There is almost talk of a "German course" in high military circles, and in this connection the well-known Swiss officer family of *Wille*,<sup>7</sup> but also the well-known Colonel [*Oberstdivisionär*] *Birchner* as well as others are being mentioned.

The Swiss appear to be convinced that for the rest the internal unity of the Swiss nation is greater than it was during the World War. Partisan political struggles have ceased as have social conflicts, and the Marxist Social Democrats can in fact be seen outdoing themselves to surpass all other political groups in the country by the eagerness of their professions of national solidarity.

The labor unions are constraining their members not to make any wage demands despite the rising cost of living, and not to provoke industrial strife in any circumstances.

<sup>5</sup> The second supplementary agreement (4982/E278747-48) to the Swiss-German clearing agreement of Aug. 9, 1940 (see vol. x of this series, document No. 318 and footnote 1) was signed in Bern on July 18.

<sup>6</sup> Henri Guisan, Commanding General of the Swiss Army, 1939-1945.

<sup>7</sup> Col. Ulrich Wille, Chief of the infantry arm of the Swiss Army to December 1940; cf. vol. xi of this series, document No. 138.

When talking about the European war situation, all Swiss show great reserve. The admonitions from the highest level to keep silent are evidently heeded to a very large extent. Yet it can remain no secret that popular sentiment overwhelmingly would like to see an English victory. In regard to the German-Bolshevik war, people show that they want National Socialist Germany to vanquish Bolshevik Russia. But at the same time the opinion is expressed by many that the National Socialist Germany would so weaken herself in the process of smashing Bolshevism that she would no longer be able to win against Great Britain.

With regard to judging the war prospects it is therefore apparent that the number of those still believing in the possibility of an English victory has increased lately. Swiss observers who claim to be objective affirm that especially since the outbreak of the war between Germany and the Soviet Union, the Swiss people are no longer positively convinced of Germany's victory.

The prevailing view in leading Swiss political circles, too, as was possible to observe, seems to be that the chances of victory have shifted in favor of Great Britain. This view is based on the following considerations:

1. Germany is not going to bring the Russian campaign to a conclusion this year. Adolf Hitler's plan of campaign has been only partially successful in Russia. Soviet Russia's resistance in the strength now shown has been a surprise as much to him as to the rest of the world, and even in the coming year Germany will be compelled to tie down large forces in the war against the Soviet Union.

2. The active war aid by the United States has become larger and more effective. No one doubts any longer Roosevelt's active entry into the war at an early date.

3. German air superiority over Great Britain is diminishing from month to month.

4. Military experts no longer see any likelihood of a German invasion of Great Britain.

5. For a war of long duration, the Anglo-Saxon powers in particular would possess the greater endurance.

These are by and large the considerations on the basis of which the international situation is being viewed by Swiss political circles at this time. But it is also added that it is impossible to see how Great Britain and the United States could ultimately overcome Germany's military might. There is no military power in the world capable of vanquishing the Wehrmacht of the National Socialist Reich. The inference drawn from this is that one will have to reckon with a war of long duration and that ultimately everything will depend on how the "home fronts" of the belligerents will stand up.

These considerations governing Swiss opinion are unmistakably influenced to a large degree by British propaganda. British propa-

ganda, according to a Swiss observer, operates rather through a whispering campaign than by visible means. British propaganda has largely implanted the notions that Germany is disappointed over the course of the campaign in Russia because casualties are reportedly tremendous, that German war equipment is being worn out at an unexpected rate, and that Germany, despite all partial successes, will not completely finish off the Soviet Union militarily. This approach taken by the British propaganda is supplemented by alleged reports over supposedly devastating effects of the "British air offensive" against Reich territory. Fantastic tales about the effects of British air bombardments are being circulated and believed.

While British diplomacy in Switzerland observes great outward restraint, it has all the more forceful aid and support from the American diplomats and journalists. This is the unanimous opinion of the Diplomatic Corps in Bern.

Swiss newspaper offices confirm that they are continuously subjected to heaviest pressure from the Federal Council and also from the General to exercise restraint in all expressions of opinion. There are many instances showing that vigorous action was repeatedly taken when there were lapses in an anti-German direction. Moreover, pressure in the same direction is constantly exerted by leading Swiss business circles, as indicated by several instances that have become known.

L[IKUS]

## No. 215

65/45243X-49X

*The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry*<sup>1</sup>

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TEHRAN, August 19 [1941].

TOP SECRET

No. 815 of August 19

Today I had a conversation with the Minister President,<sup>2</sup> lasting one hour, in which for the first time he appeared worried about the continued British pressure. When I asked what the enemy demanded, the Minister President replied that they always demanded one thing, namely the removal of the Germans. The Iranian Government knew very well there was no justification for this demand, but that it served merely as a pretext. From conversations with the British Minister

<sup>1</sup> Marginal notes:

In Ribbentrop's handwriting: "For F[ührer]."

"Shown to the Führer. Hew[el], Aug. 21."

<sup>2</sup> Ali Mansur.

it was obvious that England was greatly worried about the development of the war against Soviet Russia. England expected Soviet Russia's defeat, to be followed by a German attack on Iraq, Iran, and finally India.

The Iranian Government, on the other hand, tried to make it plain to the British Government that a German attack on Iran would work only to the disadvantage of Germany, and that in the long run Iran's policy of strict neutrality was the best protection for the British interests in Iran. The British had indeed recognized Iran's policy of neutrality, but the British Government stubbornly insisted that the Germans living in Iran would form a fifth column, at the very latest as soon as German troops stood at the Soviet-Iranian border. The presence of the Germans was therefore a threat to Iranian neutrality and British security. The Iranian Government, on the other hand, emphatically stated that neither now was there any German fifth column, nor would there be one in the future, and that the demand for the expulsion of the Germans amounted to interference with Iranian sovereignty, which was not a subject of discussion for a free and independent state. If England and the Soviet Union should use force, Iran, faithful to her policy of neutrality, would offer armed resistance. In his further frank comments the Minister President portrayed Iran's present isolated position. Apart from a few friendly remarks in the press, Turkey had remained silent with regard to Eden's threats<sup>3</sup> and the strong British-Soviet pressure upon Iran. The Iranian Government had thereupon taken the initiative in order to obtain an official utterance of the Turkish Government in favor of Iran. But so far the latter had refrained from speaking out. From this attitude the Iranian Government could only conclude that in the event of an English-Soviet Russian attack upon Iran no help could be expected from Turkey. Nor could any really effective military aid be expected, as the German forces were still too far away. If Iran were facing only one of her two hereditary enemies, the situation would be much easier. "Unfortunately, however, the Soviet Union still lives."

<sup>3</sup> Presumably a reference to statements made by Eden in the course of a debate on the war situation in the House of Commons on Aug. 6. These were as follows:

"There is in Iran to-day a large number of Germans. Past experience in many lands has shown that these German colonists, or however they may be described—whether they are experts, or whether they are tourists, or whatever they have been called—are extremely dangerous to the country in which they are found at a critical hour. So it is that we have drawn the attention of the Iranian Government—their serious attention—to the danger, in their own interests, of continuing to permit an extremely large number of Germans to reside in their country. I trust the Iranian Government will not fail to heed this warning, which is given in all friendliness and in all sincerity, and will take the necessary measures now to deal with this situation."

See *Parliamentary Debates*, fifth series, H of C, vol. 373, col. 2041.

The Iranian Government noticed with apprehension the approach of the bad weather season in the Soviet Union, which would put further great obstacles in the path of the Wehrmacht. In these circumstances the Iranian Government must try to gain time. In my reply, I first of all again reassured the Minister President that the Shah could firmly rely on the loyalty of the German nationals living in Iran. Concerning developments adverse to the Bolsheviks, their complete collapse in the Western Ukraine and the occupation today of Nikolayev were the best proof of the imminent and final German victory over the Soviets, which even the English expected. Actually the hardest part of the work had been accomplished, namely the destruction of the greatest part of the irreplaceable war material. The Soviet Union would not live much longer and thereby one of Iran's hereditary enemies would be disposed of. Nor would England, which today was maintaining herself only with the support of American crutches, escape her fate. The steadfastness of the Iranian Government was of decisive importance for the future of the country. Just as little reason as Iran had to be afraid of an attack by the German side, so was it certain that the entry of British troops into Iran would create an entirely new situation that would give Germany the right to strike the British, if necessary, in Iran too. I had to admit that at present, owing to the British-Soviet pressure, Iran's situation was delicate and that the time factor was of great importance. I was convinced that the German Government shared this view and that it was its wish and will to assist the Iranian Government in its plight by helping it to gain time. As the Iranian Government had again refused to accept the latest demand of the enemy for the removal of the Germans, I was in a position frankly to inform it that, because of the interruption of deliveries of goods and material from Germany, a number of German employees and technicians had become surplus or soon would be unemployed. All of these specialists were urgently needed in Germany, so that it was in the German interest that they should return home as soon as possible. This return movement was motivated by economic, and not at all by political, circumstances. The voluntary return of Germans was not only further proof of our good faith with respect to Iran, but might also be used by the Iranian Government as an argument that British-Soviet apprehensions were unfounded, provided the Iranian Government believed that time would be gained thereby.

The Minister President in his reply, stated that the Iranian Government was chiefly interested in preventing the British and Soviets from getting the impression that the pressure which they brought to bear upon the Iranian Government had been successful. He therefore urgently requested that the repatriation of the Germans should not

take place upon instructions or through a transport arranged by the Legation. If the German Legation today gave instructions for the departure of Germans—even if relating to women and children only—this would not only have devastating effects upon the morale of the Iranian people, but merely encourage the foe to make new demands upon and use new pretexts with the Iranian Government.<sup>4</sup> The departure, if carried out in consequence of economic difficulties, would be a natural occurrence, indeed a telling argument against the assertions of the opposing side. He believed that valuable time would be gained thereby.

To my question whether England had not detected that the Iranian policy was aimed at gaining time, the Minister President replied that this was probably the case, but the Shah and he himself knew how to talk with the English. Every week gained, during which the German forces victoriously advanced, improved Iran's difficult position. He was therefore especially grateful for the German assistance in gaining time. The Minister President added that Iran's friendship for Germany was sincere and firm. Iran would never join the camp of Germany's enemies. The Shah could visualize his country's happy future only in the closest cooperation with Germany.

As a result of this conversation, the organized departure of the women and children is, for the time being, not being carried out. On the other hand, on the basis of talks with managers of German enterprises, I shall arrange that all personnel no longer needed and not fully employed be sent home with their families. In the present situation this is the best solution for all parties.<sup>4</sup>

ETTEL

<sup>4</sup> Marginal note: "Yes. R[ibbentrop]."

## No. 216

52/60485-88

*Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department*

Dir. Ha. Pol. No. 185

BERLIN, August 20, 1941.

### REGARDING RUBBER NEGOTIATIONS AND GENERAL ECONOMIC NEGOTIATIONS IN TOKYO

1. The *rubber negotiations* carried on with the Japanese Government since February 1941 by our Embassy in Tokyo are not developing in a very satisfactory manner.<sup>1</sup> Although we tried to take account

<sup>1</sup> For the background of German-Japanese negotiations regarding rubber and general economic matters see vol. XI of this series, documents Nos. 341 and 424, and vol. XII, documents Nos. 190 and 429.

of the Japanese wishes as much as possible, e.g., by inducing the French to give to the Japanese the Indochinese rubber earmarked for the U.S.A., we could only achieve that if the Japanese carried to Japan on Japanese ships the 25,000 tons of Indochinese rubber earmarked for us. On the other hand, they refused our request that they obtain more rubber for us from other countries and that they provide the same transportation assistance for the 18,000 tons earmarked for France as for us. On the contrary, they wish to take for themselves the rubber earmarked for France, too. In June 1941 when we could not immediately comply with a sudden Japanese request for the immediate loan of 2,500 tons from our stocks in Japan, owing to our own extremely tight rubber situation, the Japanese began to apply quite disproportionate and, considering the German-Japanese friendship, astonishing means of pressure (stopping assistance with regard to transportation, impeding our measures in support of blockade runners and auxiliary cruisers in the Pacific Ocean, preventing exports). The telegrams from our Embassy even indicate concern that the Japanese would confiscate rubber belonging to us or earmarked for us and make further direct purchases in Indochina and Thailand impossible for us in accordance with their position that we should in the future carry on trade in the greater East Asian area only with Japan as intermediary.<sup>2</sup>

Because we have, at the present time, particularly since the Siberian Railway has been cut off, no means of economic pressure of any sort on Japan—on the contrary, we are largely dependent for our raw material purchases and transportation in the Far East upon Japanese help—we have had to restrict our wishes in the face of this Japanese attitude. In the last instruction to the Embassy in Tokyo<sup>3</sup> we only insisted on assistance in transporting our rubber and on a share in such amounts of rubber as Japan is able to purchase beyond her own needs, and we pointed to the interest that we, too, have in France's receiving her rubber. The Embassy was also authorized to agree to the loan of up to 5,000 tons to the Japanese. On the other hand, the Embassy was instructed to oppose most vigorously a possible confiscation of our rubber and to demand that the Japanese cease immediately applying their means of pressure.

The negotiations conducted by the Embassy so far had reference to a rubber settlement for 1941. The Wohlthat delegation<sup>4</sup> has been charged with the negotiations for 1942. We intended to insist as a matter of principle in 1942, too, on our right to carry on business directly with independent countries within the Greater East Asian

<sup>2</sup> A certain number of documents on this subject have been filmed on Serial 4684.

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

<sup>4</sup> See vol. XII of this series, documents Nos. 190 and 429.

area, such as Thailand and France on behalf of Indochina, and to make sure of this principle, any rate for the postwar era. To what extent it can continue to be enforced in practice during the war in the face of the Japanese effort to the contrary will depend upon the further military development (reopening of the Siberian railway, Japanese advance in Indochina and Thailand). Of the total amount of 100,000 tons expected in the Far East for Japan in 1942 we must claim at least 50,000 tons, and in case of a larger total correspondingly more.

2. So far there have also been few results from the *general economic negotiations* that have been carried on since April of this year by the Wohlthat delegation in Tokyo. The delegation reports that in the face of the restriction in the possibilities of trade resulting from the closure of the Siberian railway the Japanese interest in the negotiations is waning, and that since the resignations of Matsuoka and the Japanese chief of the negotiations, Saito, so far no new Japanese delegation chairman has been appointed. Immediately after the start of the Russian campaign Matsuoka had expressed himself in favor of an unswerving continuation of the negotiations, whereupon our delegation, too, received corresponding instructions.<sup>5</sup> We still consider it the right thing not to let the negotiations lapse, but to continue to negotiate regarding agreements that can enter into force as soon as the conditions of transportation again permit a fair-sized volume of trade, and also about arrangements for the exchange of urgently needed strategic goods which can be delivered even under the present limited transportation conditions.

3. The decisive strategic importance of an adequate supply of rubber for Germany has been stressed by Ambassador Ott time and again with all the necessary vigor to Foreign Ministers Matsuoka and Toyoda as well as the Japanese armed forces. The Embassy and the delegation point out, however, that given the present Japanese attitude an acceptable solution of the rubber question can be expected only if a pointedly political *démarche* is made by the highest authorities in Berlin, too. This is also true with regard to the continuation of the general economic negotiations.

I therefore suggest that the two questions be discussed as soon as possible by the Foreign Minister with Ambassador Oshima or, in case this is not possible in the near future, then by the State Secretary. It should be stressed that Japan, too, has an essential interest that the German war effort not be impeded by a scarcity of rubber; that in our latest instructions for the rubber negotiations we complied to the full with all Japanese wishes but that we must now expect that Japan not only remove all impediments to our rubber program but do everything in the future to assist its implementation; that we consider it impor-

<sup>5</sup> Not found.

tant, for economic as well as political reasons, to continue the economic negotiations intensively and in so doing attain concrete results soon in regard to the exchange of strategic goods by blockade runners. If we receive important raw materials (rubber, whale oil, metals and ores, soy beans), we shall also do everything we can to furnish Japan with important finished goods (armament material, machines, patents, licenses).

Submitted herewith to the Reich Foreign Minister through the State Secretary with the request for his approval and for instructions on whether the conversation with Ambassador Oshima should be conducted by the Reich Foreign Minister or the State Secretary.<sup>6</sup>

WIEHL

<sup>6</sup> On Aug. 22, Counselor Weber forwarded to Weizsäcker the Foreign Minister's instructions (82/60492) that he discuss with Oshima the rubber and general economic negotiations. See, further, document No. 278.

## No. 217

116/66993

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

WESTFALEN, August 20, 1941.

### BRIEF FOR THE FÜHRER

On August 16 the Italian Government demanded of Croatia that she hand over executive authority in the entire Adriatic littoral to the Italian military authorities in order to guarantee peace and security in this area.<sup>1</sup> This demand immediately caused great excitement in Zagreb. Pavelić has asked Minister Kasche whether he might appeal to us regarding mediation. In Berlin, too, the Croatian Legation has asked for German help.<sup>2</sup>

I have had the attached telegram<sup>3</sup> sent to Minister Kasche and instructed Berlin to proceed accordingly.<sup>4</sup>

R[IBBENTROP]

<sup>1</sup> This had been reported in Zagreb telegram No. 1005 of Aug. 16 (116/66967-68).

<sup>2</sup> Woermann's memorandum U.St.S.Pol. No. 786 of Aug. 18 (116/66974-75) recorded a step by the Croatian Chargé d'Affaires in this matter. Weizsäcker's memorandum, St.S.No. 536, of Aug. 19 (116/66991-92) dealt with a similar *démarche* by the Croatian Minister.

<sup>3</sup> Document No. 219.

<sup>4</sup> Marginal note at the head of the document: "Regarding this the Führer said that the Italians have gone mad. He fully agrees with the Minister's telegram. Hew[el], Aug. 20."

## No. 218

222/149924

*The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Rumania*

Telegram

SPECIAL TRAIN, August 21, 1941—1:05 a. m.

No. 876 from the Special Train

Received Berlin, August 21—2:10 a. m.

No. 2260 from the Foreign Ministry

Sent August 21, 4:00 a. m.

RAM 357 R.

With reference to your telegram No. 2588 of August 13.<sup>1</sup>

Please remain entirely noncommittal whenever the Rumanians bring up the question of the Banat, and answer if necessary that you have no instructions of any sort in this matter. For your personal information I wish to remark that we do not want this question to be revived in any way at this time.<sup>2</sup>

RIBBENTROP

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 200.

<sup>2</sup> In his memorandum St.S. No. 548 of Aug. 26 (222/149937) Weizsäcker recorded a visit of Bossy, the Rumanian Minister, who brought up the matter of the Banat, stating that Antonescu had Hitler's assurance that the boundary questions in the Balkans would remain open during the Russian campaign. Weizsäcker denied knowledge of any negotiations with Hungary regarding a time set for occupying the Banat or regarding the alleged assurances of Hitler to Antonescu.

## No. 219

116/66997-99

*The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Croatia*

Telegram

SPECIAL TRAIN WESTFALEN, August 21, 1941—1:55 a. m.

No. 965 of August 21 from

the Special Train [Received Berlin, August 21—2:10 a. m.<sup>1</sup>]

No. 830 from the Foreign Ministry

Sent August 21—7:05 a. m.

RAM 356/R

With reference to your telegram No. 1006 of August 16.<sup>2</sup>

In the matter of the demands addressed to the Croatian Government by the Italian Government our attitude must remain the same as we adopted at the time in the question of determining the boundary between these two countries.<sup>3</sup> As was the case then, nothing else

<sup>1</sup> Supplied from another copy (245/161417-18).

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (116/66969-72). This telegram reported the text of Mussolini's instruction to the Italian Minister in Zagreb demanding that Italy be given administrative authority in the Adriatic littoral. Cf. document No. 217.

<sup>3</sup> See vol. XII of this series, documents Nos. 394 and 440.

can be considered by us at this time than to advise the Croatian Government to reach an agreement on these questions directly with Italy. We feel sure that an agreement can be achieved which is fair to both sides just as it was at that time.

The first interpretation of the Italian demand as an attempted "annexation of foreign national territory" ~~which has also entered fortively your telegram No. 1006 of Aug. 16~~ has indeed proved <sup>4</sup> to be not entirely accurate,<sup>5</sup> also according to your telegram No. 1007 of August 17,<sup>6</sup> because it speaks of the retention of civil Croatian authorities in the areas concerned. A direct Croatian approach to the Duce will surely result in a further clarification of the Italian intentions and a diminution of the original Croatian excitement.

In dealing with this whole matter please never lose sight of the fact that the alpha and omega of our foreign policy in the entire Mediterranean area is the preservation of our cordial<sup>7</sup> alliance with Italy, and that in comparison the Croatian question can only have lesser<sup>8</sup> importance for us. Therefore we must indeed avoid in so far as possible letting the Croatian Government push us into the role of ~~a protecting power or even~~<sup>9</sup> an arbiter which we could only assume at the expense of our alliance with Italy and which we therefore would not assume in any case. Therefore, if possible please do not accept at your post direct appeals for our help aimed against Italy to be forwarded to us,<sup>10</sup> but point out to the Croats from the very outset again and again the necessity for direct, friendly<sup>11</sup> agreement with Italy.

RIBBENTROP

<sup>4</sup> The passage scored through was deleted before the telegram was dispatched.

<sup>5</sup> Originally the phrase "not entirely accurate" read "inaccurate." The correction was made in Ribbentrop's handwriting.

<sup>6</sup> Not printed (116/66973).

<sup>7</sup> This word was inserted in Ribbentrop's handwriting.

<sup>8</sup> Originally this read "subordinate." The correction is in Ribbentrop's handwriting.

<sup>9</sup> The words scored through were deleted before the telegram was dispatched.

<sup>10</sup> Originally this passage read: ". . . do not allow direct appeals . . . even to be articulated . . ." The correction is in Ribbentrop's handwriting.

<sup>11</sup> This word was inserted in Ribbentrop's handwriting.

## No. 220

245/161425

*The Minister in Croatia to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT  
SECRET

ZAGREB, August 21, 1941—7:40 p. m.

Received August 21—8:00 p. m.

No. 1030 of August 21

With reference to my telegram No. 1022 of August 19.<sup>1</sup>

Lorkovič states that the Duce has accepted the Croatian proposal. Accordingly, the civil administration in the disputed territory remains with Croatia who will appoint a civil commissioner who will ensure cooperation with the Italian High Command. Croatian troops will remain in the littoral. In case they are employed they will be placed under Italian command. The details for carrying this out will be settled between the Croatian Government and the Italian Commander in Chief, General Ambrosio. As a result of this the situation has quieted down.

KASCHE

<sup>1</sup>Not printed (245/161406). In this telegram Kasche had reported that Croatian-Italian talks in Rome and his own conversations with the Italian Minister in Zagreb indicated an improvement in the Italian-Croatian conflict.

## No. 221

65/45250X

*The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

SECRET

TEHRAN, August 21, 1941—8:00 p. m.

No. 841 of August 21

Received August 22—3:15 a. m.

The secretary of the Grand Mufti told me the following today in strict confidence:

Ever since his arrival, Mellini, Second Secretary of the Italian Legation, has been trying to induce Gaylani and the Grand Mufti to conclude political and economic agreements with Italy even at this time, in other words, before the conclusion of the war. His Government has supposedly attached him to the Legation for the express purpose of making such agreements. Apart from that, he has nothing to do with the affairs of the Legation. When the secretary countered that such agreements could be concluded only with the Axis, Signor Mellini replied that the Arab countries were Mediterranean countries and consequently part of Italy's living space. Germany was a Nordic country which had created a vast living space for herself

in the north and the east, and consequently was not interested in the Mediterranean area. The Italian Government and especially the Duce were most anxious to arrive at political and economic agreements of a general nature even at this time.

The Grand Mufti and he on the other hand took the position that if any agreements were to be concluded, they could only be concluded jointly and in full accord with Germany.

The secretary also dropped a remark that Mellini was very generous with financial contributions to Iraqis. It is not my impression, however, that this remark was made to suggest that the same be done by the German side.

ETTEL

## No. 222

587/243642-45

*Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department*

Dir. Ha. Pol. 186

BERLIN, August 21, 1941.

Subject: French Occupation Costs.

To the Foreign Minister's Secretariat with the request for transmission by teletype to the Foreign Minister.

When the French in May of this year during the negotiations over a reduction of the occupation costs requested a suspension of their installment payments and finally ceased the payments arbitrarily on May 11, Minister Hemmen lodged a protest, as ordered, and reserved his further decisions.<sup>1</sup> On June 11 the French resumed payments retroactive to May 11, [they payed] however, not 20 million reichsmarks but 15 million reichsmarks per day.<sup>2</sup> Thereupon Minister Hemmen, as ordered, informed the French by note of June 14,<sup>3</sup> as follows:

"The German Government cannot recognize a justification for this procedure by the French Government. When, nevertheless, it disregards for the time being the demand for a supplementary payment, it does so only because it expects that a new settlement will be accomplished by June 30. In the case that these expectations should not be fulfilled, the German Government reserves the right to request the immediate supplementary payment of the amounts with which the French Government will then be in arrears."<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 475, footnote 3.

<sup>2</sup> Hemmen reported this development, details of which were contained in a French note, in telegram Del. No. 287 of June 11 (378/209391-94). The text of the French note has been printed in *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. IV, p. 518.

<sup>3</sup> The draft of this note, which was dated June 12, has been filmed on 587/243571-72.

A new settlement was not achieved by the end of June. Negotiations continued on the basis of a reduction to 10 million reichsmarks and of a transfer of 3 million reichsmarks per day. Inasmuch as this adjustment would release the French, who continued up to then to pay 15 million reichsmarks, of the payments of several installments because of the higher amounts they thus turned over, a subsequent claim for the difference up to 20 million reichsmarks was suspended for the time being. At the end of July, the French accepted a new settlement on the aforementioned basis. Its implementation was, however, treated dilatorily at the order of the Reich Foreign Minister.<sup>4</sup> On the assumption that this would be only a short-term delay, I recommended in memorandum No. 183 of August 14<sup>5</sup> to leave it at the payment of 15 million reichsmarks for the time being, that is until the new arrangement became effective.

From the foregoing we have the right at any time to request again the payment of 20 million reichsmarks per day and with retroactive payments since May 11.<sup>6</sup> In this connection it should be considered, however, that the French, following the political-military negotiations, were permitted on May 7 the publication of a press communiqué, according to which, "an initial reduction of occupation costs from 20 to 15 million reichsmarks is being contemplated."<sup>7</sup> The demand to come up to 20 million reichsmarks again would put Darlan in a difficult position in the eyes of French public opinion. Ambassador Abetz also points out especially that a reduction to 15 million reichsmarks constitutes our counterservices for the French concessions regarding Iraq/Syria.<sup>8</sup> In these circumstances, the Darlan Government would at present hardly comply with a request for an increase of payments to 20 million reichsmarks. On the other hand, Ambassador Abetz rightly points out that the present situation is unsatisfactory, inasmuch as a daily credit of 15 million reichsmarks is easier for the French than a daily credit of 10 million reichsmarks plus a daily transfer of 3 million reichsmarks as provided for in the planned new arrangement. For this reason he proposes as a means of pressure an interim solution, according to which the French, in addition to their present daily credit of 15 million reichsmarks, would effect a transfer of 3 million reichsmarks per day.<sup>8</sup> However desirable such an interim solution would be, there are few prospects that the French would

<sup>4</sup> Wiehl referred to this in his memorandum of July 29 (1003/306517-20). See also document No. 110.

<sup>5</sup> Not found.

<sup>6</sup> Marginal note: "Which today would come to about one-half billion reichsmarks=10 billion French francs."

<sup>7</sup> The text of this communiqué was reported by Abetz in telegram No. 1398 of May 7 (221/149280-81).

<sup>8</sup> Paris telegram No. 2425 of Aug. 15 (386/211347).

accept it—a fact to which the Hemmen delegation also calls attention—especially since at the negotiations just concluded they agreed to our transfer requests only after prolonged resistance, even after a reduction of the credit to 10 million reichsmarks.<sup>9</sup>

There are two possibilities if the implementation of the new arrangement (for credit of 10 million reichsmarks plus transfer of 3 million reichsmarks, as agreed to with the French), the execution of which is being supported by all internal departments, should further be dealt with in a dilatory manner:

(1) Minister Hemmen would explain to the French that the new arrangement could not be executed for the time being; that, on the other hand, we could not be content with the unilateral reduction of payments to 15 million reichsmarks. We would therefore demand an immediate increase to 20 million reichsmarks with additional payments from May 11 on. In case the French would reject this, Minister Hemmen would be authorized to accept, without prejudice to our demands for additional payments, the interim solution proposed by Ambassador Abetz. In case the French rejected this too, we should, in the last resort, have to consider sanctions. Military sanctions, such as an extension of the zone of occupation, are not to be considered. Most of the economic sanctions, such as the restriction of the French commercial shipping permitted by us or of German deliveries to France, or of French trade relations with third countries, etc., would be against our own interests. The most expedient thing would be to confiscate French assets in the occupied zone (securities, jewelry, and other movable valuables) so as to utilize them for the transfer which has been rejected by the French. But even these sanctions would be risky in view of the repercussions on the attitude of the population in the occupied zone, which to a large extent works for us. The agreement of the Military Commander and the internal departments to any kind of sanctions would therefore be doubtful. Because the prospects that the French will willingly agree to such proposals by Minister Hemmen are very slim and because, on the other hand, the possibilities of applying sanctions are also very poor, I should not like to recommend these measures.

(2) We are content, for the time being, with the French payment of 15 million reichsmarks daily. If, however, contrary to my original<sup>10</sup> assumption we have to count on a dilatory treatment of the implementation of the new arrangement for a prolonged period, then

<sup>9</sup> Paris telegram No. 405 of Aug. 18 (386/211355-56).

<sup>10</sup> The typed word scored through has been crossed out and the words "so far" have been inked in.



I consider it necessary to renew the reservations in our Note of June 14, by a new note of perhaps the following content:

"In view of the fact that the French Government since May 11 has by unilateral action provided for the occupation costs at the daily rate of 15 million reichsmarks instead of 20 million, I have the honor, in behalf of my Government, to refer to my note of June 14. The expectation expressed therein that a new arrangement for the installments would be achieved by June 30 of this year, has not been fulfilled. In spite of this, the German Government has not up to now made use of its right to insist on daily rates of 20 million reichsmarks and on the additional payments of the amounts overdue since May 11. It attaches great importance, however, to stating explicitly that it reserves its right to exercise this prerogative at any time in the future."

If in this way our legal reservations are secured for the future, the first alternative can always be followed when the application of sanctions can be considered more favorably.

Herewith submitted in accordance with instructions to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary with reference to telegrams No. 2425 of August 15 of Ambassador Abetz and Nos. 404<sup>11</sup> and 405 of August 16 and 17 from the Hemmen delegation with the request for a decision.<sup>12</sup>

WIEHL

<sup>11</sup> Not printed (587/243640-41).

<sup>12</sup> According to Wiehl's memorandum No. 194 of Sept. 12 (587/243650-51), Ribbentrop approved the text of the note which was transmitted to the French Government on Aug. 26. For further developments see document No. 531, footnote 16; *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. v, pp. 250, 336; and Yves Bouthillier, *Le Drame de Vichy*, vol. II: *Finances sous la contrainte* (Paris, 1951), pp. 80-83.

### No. 223

616/249817

*Memorandum by an Official of the Department for German Internal Affairs*

BERLIN, August 21, 1941.

D IX 153.

Subject: Estonian suggestion for establishing an Estonian government and an Estonian army. One annex (report by Ungern-Sternberg of August 11).<sup>1</sup>

Secretary of Legation von Ungern-Sternberg, Foreign Ministry liaison officer with Eighteenth Army Headquarters, submitted<sup>2</sup> with the attached report of August 11 a memorandum by the last

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (616/249818-21).

<sup>2</sup> The German original reads here "angeregt" but it is clear from the report referred to that this word was written by mistake instead of "vorgelegt".

Estonian Minister President J. Uluots addressed to General von Küchler, the Commander in Chief of the Eighteenth Army, regarding the formation of an Estonian government and an Estonian army as well as an Estonian army command. The military has left the memorandum unanswered.

Submitted herewith to Counselor of Embassy Hilger with the request that he inform the Foreign Minister at a convenient opportunity of this phenomenon in Estonia, and likewise regarding the hope in some intellectual Estonian circles for a possible stronger association with Finland later on.

At the same time I should like to request a decision whether we can comply with a suggestion by Pol. V concerning forwarding this report to Reich Minister Rosenberg. It is not necessary to ask the Reich Minister for the Eastern Territories to take a position in the matter because the policy of establishing indigenous advisory councils [*Vertrauensräte*] which has already been adopted is unequivocally clear.<sup>3</sup>

GROSSKOPF

<sup>3</sup> In a memorandum of Aug. 24 which Hilger sent Grosskopf (616/249823) he recorded having presented the memorandum of the former Estonian Minister President to Ribbentrop who agreed to having the document forwarded to Rosenberg and "expressed the wish that the memorandum should be left unanswered."

### No. 224

4360/E080497-98

*The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

SECRET

No 10206

Subject: Tungsten purchases.

With reference to your instruction Ha. Pol. 5058 g. of July 30<sup>1</sup> and Ha. Pol. 5163 g. of August 9.<sup>2</sup>

Through increased purchases of tungsten concentrates and additional purchases of still unprocessed tungsten it has been possible for the local German purchasing firms to acquire a total of 245 tons of tungsten in the past month.

According to information from the Minero-Silvicola, tungsten mines or participations in tungsten mines in a total value of 32 million

<sup>1</sup> Not found. In a minute of Aug. 20 (4359/E080241-242) Schüller noted that the Legation in Portugal had been asked (in directive Ha. Pol. 5058 g.) whether there were any political objections to purchasing a tungsten mine belonging to the Beralt Tin Mines, Ltd.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

escudos have been acquired here by order of the syndicate made up of the Gesellschaft für Metallurgie, the I. G. Farbenindustrie, the Krupp firm and other firms. This involves in particular the Campanhia Minera del Norte de Portugal (12 million), Dr. Jose Maria da Silva, Vale da Cabra (10 million), Empreza Minera Sabreso (3 million), Minas de Cerva (7 million).

Furthermore, the Minero-Silvicola has acquired an option on a number of other mines to a total value of 39 million escudos, among them in particular the Mina Belanca (25 million).

There are no fundamental political objections here to an attempt also to acquire a majority in the firm, Beralt Tin Mines, Ltd. Considering, however, the capital strength of the company, which is in English possession, it does not appear that this attempt would be likely to succeed. In these circumstances it would probably be advisable to carry on the negotiations through a suitable straw man who would have to work very closely with the local experts from the Reich in order to avoid a loss of prestige in case of the expected failure in the negotiations.

According to confidential information from the local German firms entrusted with the export of tungsten to Germany, one will have to count on intervention by the Portuguese Government in the export of tungsten in the near future. Because of the increase in the price of tungsten, a real "gold rush" has set in, particularly in the northern part of the country, as a result of which the necessary workers are being withdrawn both from agriculture and the big mining companies. This development has already led to a doubling of the wages of farm workers and has drawn the attention of the tax authorities, because the profits made from the "wild" tungsten mines cannot be reached by taxes.

The English mining company, Panasqueira, and the American Portuguese-American Tin Company are also energetically calling for relief. Because the Portuguese Government cannot permanently remain inactive toward this, perforce only temporary development in the mining industry, one can count on governmental measures, possibly even a governmental supervision of the ore production.

The Legation will continue to watch this development and if necessary make the necessary representations against such measures, which could restrict the export of tungsten to Germany in some form or other.

HUENE

No. 225

1007/307668-71

*The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry*<sup>1</sup>

Telegram

MOST URGENT TOKYO, August 22, 1941—10:43 a. m., summer time.  
No. 1607 of August 22 Received August 22—11:45 p. m.

[Pol. VIII 4632 g.]<sup>2</sup>

The announcement known to you regarding American shipments of aviation gasoline to Vladivostok<sup>3</sup> has placed the Japanese Government in a serious dilemma.

At the Foreign Ministry and with the Army and the Navy which, for lack of a unified political leadership, are the deciding factors, I have pointed out that to permit such shipments, apart from having the effect of supporting the Soviet Union, would in America give the impression of weakness and induce her to engage in still more extensive provocations. After the Panama Canal was closed to Japanese shipping,<sup>4</sup> Japan had a right, politically if not juridically, to prevent American shipments to Vladivostok through the access routes to Japan. The United States would be careful not to make this a cause of war.

From conversation I have received the impression that while detailed consultations are being held about the measures to be taken, no decision has been made as yet. Legal misgivings are being voiced, to begin with, to the effect that blockading of the access routes would go beyond the American measures taken thus far and might be regarded as an act of war. The person I talked to tried, moreover, to minimize the importance of the United States shipments which are now being sent to the Soviet Union.

The handling of these shipments shows the uncertainty of the leading Japanese elements regarding the decision Japan should take in questions of high policy.

In the Navy there is a noticeable tendency to exaggerate the danger of any operation in the north. America, which, if possible, wants without fighting to bring Japan to her knees by means of coercive economic measures, it is said, is even wishing for a Russo-Japanese

<sup>1</sup> Marginal note: "Same text to Washington as No. 1633."

<sup>2</sup> Taken from another copy (1680/395767-70).

<sup>3</sup> The Department of State made public on Aug. 5 an exchange of notes between Acting Secretary Welles and Soviet Ambassador Oumansky providing for economic assistance to the Soviet Union by the United States and stating that favorable consideration would be given "to requests for the extension of available American shipping facilities for the purpose of expediting the shipment to the Soviet Union of articles and materials needed for the national defense of that country." See Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1941, vol. v, p. 109.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. iv, p. 301.

war. Thereby the army, already weakened by the China campaign, will be completely committed without being able in the circumstances to achieve quick successes. These naval circles say that it is impossible in the foreseeable future to clear the Siberian route. The chief purpose of an operation in the north is thereby nullified. On the other hand, the Navy is demanding an operation which, without further specification, is called operation in the south for the purpose of safeguarding vitally essential raw materials. It is taken into consideration that in the event of an advance to the south the Soviet Union will probably remain neutral, whereas in the event of an action in the north it must be expected that the Anglo-Saxons, too, will enter the war. An advance to the south would, first of all, include Thailand after Indochinese bases have been consolidated by the transfer of sufficient army units. This would eliminate a flanking threat from the west and would threaten the Burma Road. Singapore, if it cannot be captured, could be blockaded by the superior Japanese navy. It would then be easy to seize Borneo with its rich oil fields. The eastern flank would be made secure by seizing Manila before or after the operation.

In the discussions I strongly stressed the dangers to Japanese policy which have arisen also in the past as a result of differences of opinion between the Army and the Navy. Experience shows that unless they agree, an order from the Emperor, with whom the decision lies, is not to be expected. In view of the changed situation a showdown with the Soviet Union should be given priority. So far it has not been possible to convince the Naval High Command of the correctness of this view.

In the Army, too, whose preparations in the north and at home are continuing, misgivings about an early war with the Soviet Union are increasing. No decision can be taken without the Navy, whose air force and to a certain extent also whose fleet units are necessary for an operation against Vladivostok. I was confronted with the argument that in view of the numerical superiority of the enemy and the length of the front the focal point of a Japanese operation had to be skillfully selected. Fear of provoking a war with the so-called ABCD [American-British-Chinese-Dutch] states, in addition to the Soviet Union, by any strong ultimatum was paralyzing the present cabinet's power of decision. Konoye said recently that Japan was in the most difficult situation of her entire history. The present political leadership of Japan believes that in view of the weakening effect of more than four years of conflict in China it cannot successfully conduct a war against the above-mentioned group of powers. There is no denying that Anglo-Saxon measures of intimidation have to that extent actually produced the intended effect. In these circumstances the

Japanese Government is confining itself primarily to exerting pressure on the Soviet Union in order to deter her from going through with the importation of arms from America and, in addition, participating in the encirclement of Japan. This is also plainly evident from the press.

As in the earlier crisis it is to be expected now, too, that friends of America and Anglophile circles will try through the Japanese Embassy in Washington—which is in sympathy with them—and other underground channels to bring about a compromise with America and thereby eliminate the nightmare of encirclement. The Foreign Minister assured me that the Japanese-American negotiations about a general settlement which were begun in the spring have not been continued. I have now learned that after the resignation of the Cabinet in July Ambassador Nomura, presumably in the hope of a more accommodating attitude on the part of the new government, did not deliver the Japanese note of reply that was transmitted to him (cf. my telegram No. 1247 of July 15).<sup>5</sup> In view of America's unwillingness to compromise in the China question, etc., which has always prevented an understanding heretofore, and in view of the aggravated tension, which further obstructs the possibility of an accommodation, such attempts cannot succeed. Such a policy of renunciation would not be permitted by the armed forces and the nationalists. However, we have to reckon with the danger that the clear-cut decision which is called for will be further delayed.

OTT

<sup>5</sup> See document No. 123.

No. 226

95/107025

*The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

SECRET

No. 2888 of August 21

MADRID, August 22, 1941—12:40 a. m.

Received August 22—2:25 a. m.

The Spanish Foreign Minister returned yesterday from northern Spain to his country seat near La Granja. When I visited him there today he showed himself to be somewhat pained that the new Spanish Ambassador in Berlin had not yet been received in spite of the fact that he had already been there for 4 weeks.<sup>1</sup> In Berlin it was

<sup>1</sup> A memorandum by Weizsäcker, St.S. No. 496 dated Aug. 6 (95/106985), records that he received the new Spanish Ambassador on that day. Inasmuch as no date had been set for the presentation of his credentials, Weizsäcker assured him that he could conduct himself toward the Foreign Ministry as if he were already accredited.

known that Count Mayalde was his personal confidant and just as unconditionally friendly to Germany as he himself and filled with the conviction that Germany had to win in this war, not only in the interest of Spain but also in the interest of Europe.

I would be grateful for telegraphic instruction for the purpose of informing the Minister approximately when it is intended to have the reception of Mayalde.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Weizsäcker's memorandum St.S. No. 534 of Aug. 18 (95/107019) records a conversation with Mayalde who asked about the travel plans for the Foreign Minister and mentioned that Serrano Suñer had wondered about the fact that Mayalde had not yet been received whereas Espinosa had been received but a short time before.

Mayalde was received by Hitler on Sept. 11 together with the Portuguese Minister, Count Tovarde, and the Danish Minister, Mohr (*Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, October 1941, p. 879).

STOHRER

No. 227

1099/318795-97

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey*

Draft Telegram

SECRET

WESTFALEN, August 22, 1941.

I. It may be expected even at this time and still more so as the military operations progress, that Russian warships or merchant vessels with military personnel on board or Russian units and aircraft will try to escape to Turkish territorial waters or territory. We regard it a matter of course that such Russian armed forces will immediately be disarmed and interned by Turkey in accordance with the rules of international law. Nevertheless, I consider it useful to call the Turkish Government's special attention to this question. For example, Russian warships or merchant vessels with military personnel on board might try on some pretext or other to remain for a longer period of time in Turkish territorial waters without permitting themselves to be interned. It is therefore necessary that the Turkish local authorities be given clear instructions to intervene immediately in such borderline cases also.

II. Of special importance in that connection are the Russian merchant vessels in the Black Sea. It can be assumed with certainty that with the progressive occupation of the Russian ports on the Black Sea by German troops, England will put increasingly strong pressure on Russia to transfer the Russian merchant vessels to the Mediterranean, that is place them at the disposal of England in the struggle against Germany. This question is therefore of great im-

portance to us. The situation being what it still is, there would be little prospect of success if we should demand of Turkey that Russian merchant vessels be flatly refused passage through the Dardanelles and that the merchant vessels be handed over to Germany. However, we do expect of the Turkish authorities that they will do everything possible under the provisions of the Montreux Convention<sup>1</sup> to obstruct and delay the passage of Russian merchant vessels through the Dardanelles (cf. my telegram No. 726 of June 22<sup>2</sup>). That would at least leave time to report the passage of Russian merchant vessels to the naval forces of Germany and her allies.

I request that you bring up these questions with the Turkish Government in an appropriate manner and indicate that we will consider Turkey's attitude in this question as a test of her attitude toward Germany. I request further that in these questions you cooperate very closely with the Military Attachés and the local consular authorities.<sup>3</sup>

[Foreign Minister]<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For text of the Montreux Convention of July 20, 1936, on the regime of the Straits, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CLXXXIII, p. 213.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 2, footnote 1.

<sup>3</sup> Typewritten marginal note: "Copy to Naval Captain Bürkner with the request to investigate whether the Admiral, Southeast is already doing everything possible in conjunction with the Rumanian, Bulgarian, and Italian Navies to prevent the Russian merchant fleet from breaking out of the Black Sea. Westfalen, Ritter, Aug. 22."

<sup>4</sup> Ritter's typed signature on this copy of the document was deleted and the words "Name of the Foreign Minister" substituted.

No. 228

911/294606-609

*Field Marshal Keitel to Field Marshal Mannerheim*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET MILITARY FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, August 30 [22], 1941.<sup>2</sup>  
The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht  
No. 44 1418/41 gK Wfst/Abt.L (I Op.)

Your Excellency: The successes of your offensive, on the one hand, and the break-through of Army Group North between Lake Ilmen and the Narva, on the other hand, bring the operations of our allied forces into closer and closer contact. It thus seems to me to be necessary,

<sup>1</sup> The document printed here is a copy which was forwarded on Aug. 30 (911/294605) by the OKW to Ambassador Ritter in the Foreign Ministry.

<sup>2</sup> The copy of the letter bears the incorrect date Aug. 30. The correct date was Aug. 22. See Earl F. Ziemke, *The German Northern Theater of Operations, 1940-1945* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 196, footnote 13. In his report No. 761 of Aug. 24 (911/294610-11) General Erfurth wrote: "Field Marshal Mannerheim received me this afternoon to talk to me about the letter of the Chief of the OKW, which has been handed to him yesterday."

on the part of the German Military Command, to have an exchange of ideas with you, dear Field Marshal, above and beyond the existing liaison.

I should like to develop our point of view as follows:

1) On the *front between the Gulf of Finland and Lake Ladoga* the enemy is still holding his front toward the north. For us it is a question of cutting off Leningrad and the Karelian Isthmus from the South by a thrust from the Army Group North. The later the enemy withdraws from your front, to the South, in face of this danger, the better it will be. He will stand between two fires and, with every regrouping to the South, will be open to your vigorous second thrust.

We do not intend to take Leningrad at the first assault. The city shall rather be encircled and destroyed from the air and by artillery fire as a preparation for occupation.<sup>3</sup> From the German point of view it is preferable that fairly strong Finnish forces participate later on from the north in the encirclement of Leningrad at which time the junction of our assault groups would be established between Leningrad and Lake Ladoga.<sup>4</sup>

2) On the *front between Lake Ladoga and Lake Onega* your aim remains, I assume, to reach the Svir sector. In the interest of the entire operation the formation of a bridgehead somewhere near Lodeynoye Pole and Svirstroi is desired. From it a mobile group could be committed to join with the German forces south of the Lake of Ladoga.

3) *The aim of Colonel General von Falckenhorst's army remains to take Murmansk in any event in order to exclude any possible use of this harbor for further conduct of the war.* To continue the attack the mountain corps will be supplied with another mountain division, besides the forces from the Norwegian sector that are being regrouped to Kirkenes. Likewise a strengthening of the air force is being prepared. My request, dear Field Marshal, is that you leave your 14th Regiment with the mountain corps for the time being. For this imminent difficult task the mountain corps cannot be strong enough.

Eastward of the Salla region the attack has again been taken up concentrically from the North and the South by the XXXVI corps. The reinforced regiment of the 163d Division which, at one time was sent to Rovaniemi, is taking part in this too. As soon as it should be released it will again be sent back to its division.

The attack of the III (Finnish) Army Corps seems to me most promising in the direction of Loukhi.

4) In the way of *special operations* there are in the Baltic Sea area the capture of the Baltic Islands and of Hanko.

An operation against *Sarema* and *Khivma* is being prepared. It will be carried out when the Eighteenth Army has mopped up Estonia.

The attack on Hanko depends on the transportation of heavy artillery there, thus among other things, on the liberation of the Karelian Isthmus. Dive bombing units will also have to be employed for the attack on Hanko. Inasmuch as Hanko remains possibly the last base

<sup>3</sup> Cf. document No. 388.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. document No. 283.

of the Red Fleet, from which it could delay the urgently desired pacification of the Baltic Sea, it is of the utmost importance to us too that the time of attack be set as early as possible. I should be grateful to you, my dear Field Marshal, for a communication of your views in this connection.

Care has been taken, through a blockade of the exits in the Danish area, and the Red Fleet cannot escape from the Baltic Sea.

In conclusion may I express the deep admiration that we Germans feel for the heroic and extensive actions of the Finnish Army and beyond that, for the Finnish people during the great events of our time. I am certain that the campaign will lead to a complete success and, in particular, will put Finland in possession of the areas belonging within her "Lebensraum."<sup>5</sup>

Yours, etc.

KEITEL

<sup>5</sup> For Mannerheim's reply see document No. 248. In his report No. 761 of Aug. 24 (911/294610-11) General Erfurth records a conversation with Mannerheim which touched upon Keitel's letter as well as the Field Marshal's reply.

## No. 229

95/107031-32

*The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

MADRID, August 22, 1941.

To my telegram No. 2888 of yesterday<sup>2</sup> regarding the ill feeling of the Spanish Foreign Minister regarding the delay in the reception of the new Spanish Ambassador Mayalde I should like to add the following.

Serrano Suñer felt particularly hurt in that his confidant Mayalde had not yet been received while it had been made possible for the former Spanish Ambassador Espinosa twice to come to headquarters during recent weeks for farewell visits,<sup>3</sup> apparently even with transport by special plane. The Minister added that naturally the taking of leave by an ambassador was quite a usual procedure. Furthermore he was convinced that the German Government had not learned of the undisciplined and ugly fashion in which Ambassador Espinosa had spread propaganda against him, his Foreign Minister, in Germany after Espinosa's recall. E[spinosa] had even gone so far as to burst out with insults against him at a function attended by a dozen

<sup>1</sup> This message was filed in the State Secretary file which indicates that it was received in Berlin. The signature is typed, yet the document lacks the usual identification marks of a telegram. It is not clear how it was transmitted and there is no date of receipt.

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 226.

<sup>3</sup> Hitler's remarks to Ambassador Espinosa de los Monteros at the Wolfschanze on Tuesday, Aug. 12, are recorded in a memorandum by Counselor Steengracht (F3/0316-0308).

No record has been found of another visit by Espinosa at Hitler's headquarters.

or two Germans and in the presence of members of the Spanish Embassy. He had even gone so far as to declare that he would have his revenge against the Foreign Minister for his recall from Germany.

The most unheard of thing, however, was that E. spread it about that he was recalled by the Spanish Foreign Minister because he was too much pro-German. He [Serrano Suñer] was certain of the friendliness and reliability of the new Ambassador Mayalde; but there were well-grounded doubts in regard to the honesty of the German sympathies of the former Ambassador.

The Minister concluded that he felt compelled to tell me these painful things in strict confidence and to ask me to recommend the reception of Count Mayalde at the earliest possible time.<sup>4</sup>

STOHRER

<sup>4</sup>In telegram No. 1961 of Aug. 28 (95/107047-48) Ribbentrop instructed Stohrer to reply in a conversational way to Serrano Suñer that the reception of the new Ambassador by Hitler would take place within a short time. Furthermore Stohrer was to point out that Mayalde had no reason to be impatient for other Chiefs of Mission, Danish and Portuguese, had already been waiting for a longer time. Hitler, it was explained, was preoccupied with military decisions at the front and other matters which were not so urgent had to be postponed. In any case Count Mayalde had been told that there was no obstacle to his performance of his functions.

No. 230

65/45240X-42X

*The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Iran*<sup>1</sup>

Telegram

TOP SECRET

WESTFALEN, August 18, 1941.

[No. 884 of August 22 from the Special Train]<sup>2</sup>

[Sent from the Special Train, August 22—12:00 midnight.]

[Received Berlin, August 23—4:30 a. m.]

No. 589 from the Foreign Ministry

Sent August 23.

RAM 361/R

For the Minister personally.

I request you to ask for a personal reception by the Shah and to tell him the following on instructions from the Führer:

The Reich Government has observed with satisfaction that, in accordance with the directives of the Shah, the Iranian Government

<sup>1</sup> Marginal notes:

"[For] F[ührer]."

"Shown to the Führer."

"The Führer agrees to the dispatch of this telegram if account is taken of the revision which he himself wrote on page 2 (middle). Hewel, Aug. 22."

See footnote 3.

<sup>2</sup>The information within brackets has been supplied from another copy (65/45831-32).

is resolved to continue its present policy of neutrality and to defend Iran's sovereignty against all attempts to encroach upon it. It has faith that the wisdom of the Shah will find ways and means to safeguard, in the future, his sovereignty over the entire territory of the Iranian state against any encroachment from the outside, until the present period will have passed, in which the powers at war with Germany are trying to bring pressure to bear upon the decisions of the Iranian Government.

The Reich Government believes that this period can only be of short duration. In their struggle against the Soviet Russian armed forces the German troops, as the Shah is aware, have penetrated far into the Ukraine and in their victorious advance have today reached the area north of the Crimean Peninsula. The Reich Government is firmly resolved to occupy further territories of the Soviet Union in the course of this autumn,<sup>3</sup> a scheme which will be facilitated by the now plainly<sup>4</sup> perceptible ebbing of Russian powers of resistance. Any attempts of the English perhaps to set up a new front against us in the Caucasus are doomed to failure from the outset, because of the superiority of German troops. The Reich Government trusts that until this brief period of danger will have passed away the Shah will resist with all means at his disposal any such attempt on the part of the English, which would carry the devastations of war also into Iranian territory. You are instructed to inform the Shah of these intentions and views of the Reich Government and to convey to him the expression of the Führer's sentiments of sincere friendship for the Shah.

Report by wire on the course of the interview.<sup>5</sup> Avoid, if possible, letting the fact of your reception by the Shah become known to the outside in any way.<sup>6</sup>

RIBBENTROP

<sup>3</sup>The passage after the word "occupy" was revised in Hitler's handwriting and originally read: "the entire southern territories of the Soviet Union in the course of this summer."

<sup>4</sup>The word "plainly" (stark) was added in Ribbentrop's handwriting.

<sup>5</sup>Document No. 240.

<sup>6</sup>Marginal note: "Approved by the Foreign Minister and to be dispatched. Rintelen, Aug. 22."

## No. 231

95/107038

*An Official of the Embassy in Spain to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

MADRID, August 23, 1941—12:00 noon.

No. 2921 of August 23

Received August 23—2:30 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 1884 of August 19.<sup>1</sup>

The agreement concerning employment of Spanish workers in Germany was signed yesterday evening.<sup>2</sup> Thanks to the great accommodating spirit of the Spaniards, especially in regard to the transfer question (which in large measure can be traced to the repeated personal intervention of the Foreign Minister) the negotiations of the last days could be brought to a final conclusion in a relatively short time. The quick termination of the negotiations which ran counter to all expectations can be traced, aside from Spanish accommodations, also to the skillfulness of the German leader of the delegation. He could get the Spaniards to adopt plenary and committee sessions which followed each other in much quicker succession than is suitable to the usually much slower method of negotiations of the Spaniards.

The members of the delegation returned to Berlin in the last few days. The leader of the delegation, Geheimrat Roediger, who will bring the signed text, departed this morning with a scheduled Luft-hansa plane, and will arrive at Tempelhof this afternoon.

Regarding press communiqué, see special teletype message of the press division.<sup>3</sup>

HEYDEN-RYNSCH

<sup>1</sup> In this telegram (3882/E047807) Clodius accepted the proposal of the Spanish Minister of Trade, transmitted to Berlin in Madrid telegram No. 2836 of Aug. 18 (95/107016), according to which the Spanish Government would make available the necessary amount of pesetas for the Spanish workers in Germany and this amount would be deducted from the Spanish Civil War debt to Germany.

<sup>2</sup> The text of this agreement has been filmed on 5103/E295251-263.

<sup>3</sup> Madrid telegram No. 2928 of Aug. 23 (95/107038-39). See, further, document No. 453.

## No. 232

4937/E264159

*An Official of Political Division II to the Consulate at Tetuán*<sup>1</sup>

BERLIN, August 23, 1941.

Pol. II 2004/I.

With reference to your report No. 899 of July 21.<sup>2</sup>

For your information: Our Moroccan policy has to adjust itself to the necessities of the conduct of war by the allied Axis Powers and to our specific relationship to the other Powers interested in Morocco. The previous declaration of the Axis Powers regarding our attitude to the Arabic peoples<sup>3</sup> had no relevance to Morocco.

In this situation it will not be expedient in conversations to go into our Moroccan policy.<sup>4</sup>

By order:  
DR. KOESTER

<sup>1</sup> Sent through the Embassy in Madrid.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

<sup>3</sup> See vol. XI of this series, document No. 190 and footnote 4, document No. 496, and document No. 596 and footnote 6.

<sup>4</sup> The same instruction was sent to the Consulate at Tangier (4937/E264158).

## No. 233

2123/462504-06

*Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department*

BERLIN, August 25, 1941.

e.o. Ha. Pol. 5597 g. I.

RECORD OF THE INTERMINISTERIAL CONFERENCE ON IRAQ AT THE  
FOREIGN MINISTRY ON AUGUST 23

Present:

Counselor Dr. Ripken	Foreign Ministry
Senior Counselor Dr. Davidsen	Foreign Ministry
Minister Grobba	Foreign Ministry
Dr. Seydel	Foreign Ministry
Herr Kellermeier	Foreign Ministry
Dr. Esser	Foreign Ministry
Ministerialrat Freiherr von Süs-	
kind-Schwendi	Reich Ministry of Economics
Regierungsrat Lahr	Reich Ministry of Economics
Ministerialrat Dr. Reichmann	Reich Food Ministry
Regierungsrat Dr. Strathmann	Reich Food Ministry
Ministerialrat Dr. Scherer	Reich Ministry of Finance
Major Dr. Zinnemann	OKW-War Economy and Armaments Office
Captain Wiesner	OKW-War Economy, VII [Wi VII]
Herr von Hesse	Reichsbank

Herr Ripken announced that new discussions aiming at military, political and economic cooperation between Germany and Iraq were going to be held with Minister President Gaylani, who was expected in Germany shortly.<sup>1</sup> General assurances providing, for instance, that Iraq would place at Germany's disposal all the raw materials that could be spared, in return for which Germany would supply Iraq to the same extent with industrial products, were insufficient. Rather it was necessary, although the time might seem a good deal premature, to submit to Gaylani the completed draft, subject to negotiation of details, of an agreement designed to run for four or five years, which Gaylani upon his return could submit for ratification to the government appointed by him; this draft could possibly also serve as a model for other agreements between Germany and the states of the Near East and Middle East.

It was the consensus that the agreement should be developed on the following basic principles:

1. Abolition of the present Iraq currency linked to the sterling and its substitution by a currency based on German gold credit. To this end, Germany is to supply one million sterling (gold), to be shipped to Baghdad in monthly instalments of about £80,000. The paper currency emitted should be about three and a half times the value of this amount.

2. German economic advisers for the following fields are to be dispatched:

- a) Industry and commerce
- b) Agriculture
- c) Finance (customs, taxes, credit)
- d) Iraq State bank of issue
- e) Communications and transport

The respective ministries are requested to designate suitable candidates for the different posts. As a result of earlier discussions, Bank Director Lebrecht, presently economic adviser to the German Embassy at Ankara, and Dr. Wrede, of the Reichsbank, have been nominated for c) and/or d).

3. The ministries are also requested to furnish the Foreign Ministry with lists of the major commodities, taking into account Iraq's wishes communicated to the Ministry of Economics last May.<sup>2</sup>

4. The question whether war material to be supplied to Iraq should be placed at Iraq's disposal in the form of military aid or be set off against deliveries of commodities from Iraq, especially petroleum, will be studied by the OKW.

5. The OKW also will undertake to supply a more powerful broadcasting station for Baghdad, possibly from Russian stocks.

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 180 and footnote 2.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 180 and footnote 3.

6. Whether the existing agreements between Germany and Italy which stipulate that in joint economic activities of the Axis Powers, each country is to share in the exploitation in the ratio of 50 percent, should be applied to this agreement, remains reserved for later decision on a higher level.

7. Minister Grobba stated that the treaty concluded between Iraq and England<sup>3</sup> would be made available upon request for inspection by the interested ministries.

DAVIDSEN

<sup>3</sup> It is not clear whether this refers to the Anglo-Iraq Treaty, signed at Baghdad June 30, 1930; for text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cxxxii, p. 363.

No. 234

F17/064;  
F17/047-052

*Memorandum by SS-Standartenführer Veesenmayer*

BERLIN, August 24, 1941.

Attention Counselor of Legation Weber, Foreign Minister's Secretariat "Westfalen."

In accordance with the Foreign Minister's directive of August 17<sup>1</sup> I herewith transmit attached a proposal for the Ireland operation which I have prepared with the request that it be submitted to the Foreign Minister as promptly as possible.

VEESENMAYER

[Enclosure]

PROPOSAL FOR THE IRELAND OPERATION<sup>2</sup>

BERLIN, August 24, 1941.

The latest possible date for this operation appears to be the time from September 15 to 25, 1941. Prerequisites are dark, clear nights before the autumn gales begin.

A thoroughgoing personal discussion on July 11 in Lorient with Lieutenant Colonel von Harlinghausen, bearer of the Knight's Insignia of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves, brought out that he is willing to transport by airplane the three men who are to go on this mission. He does not anticipate particular difficulties for this operation; he has prepared a well-adapted Heinkel 59 (especially seaworthy and noiseless) and assigned an experienced aircraft pilot who has

<sup>1</sup> Not found.

<sup>2</sup> A note by Ribbentrop at the top of this document indicates that it was put into the special portfolio where the Foreign Minister kept documents which he intended to show Hitler (Führermappe).



repeatedly carried out undertakings of this sort with success. The over-all responsibility is in his own hands.

The landing will take place only if the landing place can be definitely identified and no particular risks are present. The descent will be made by gliding in from a great height and the debarkation by rubber boat. Each of the three men will receive an English folding bicycle to take along so as to have greater mobility on land.

After careful examination and by common agreement Brandon Bay was chosen as the landing place; it is a bay of Dingle Peninsula which is favored for the following reasons:

1. Favorable air approach from Brest, where the start is to take place.
2. Sheltered location and hence good prospects of safe debarkation.
3. The men who are to be landed will have available to them numerous safe hiding places on Dingle Peninsula which, as a result of the short distances, can all be reached within an hour's march.
4. There is a possibility of quickly crossing over to the Valencia Peninsula [island] with the help of friendly fishermen.
5. Lough Gill, an inland lake near the landing place, offers especially favorable facilities for hiding the luggage to be taken along (radio equipment and money). The Dingle Peninsula is furthermore much favored by tourists, which will make our men less conspicuous.

Participants in the enterprise are the Irishman Frank Ryan and two men who, up to this time, were members of the training regiment Brandenburg,<sup>3</sup> Sergeant Clissmann and Private First Class Reiger.

Frank Ryan participated in the enterprise with Sean Russell and after the latter's death on the U-boat he returned here as directed.<sup>4</sup> He is one of the leading Irish nationalists, has been for many years a member of the leaders' council of the Irish Republican Army, and a participant in numerous fights against England. In 1929 the Secret Service carried out an unsuccessful assassination attempt against him, and he has often been in jail since. He has extensive connections with the Irish republican circles up to de Valera's closest entourage and to de Valera himself, as well as to the Irish regular army, the nationalist

<sup>3</sup> A special formation for commando warfare.

<sup>4</sup> Nothing more on this matter has been found in German Foreign Ministry files. For earlier contacts of German agencies with Sean Russell, Chief of Staff of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), a secret, militant nationalist organization, see vol. VIII of this series, documents Nos. 562 and 605. According to a published account by a former German Abwehr official Sean Russell died of natural causes on board a German submarine which was to take him to Ireland. See Paul Leverkuehn, *German Military Intelligence* (London, 1954), pp. 104-105.

Irishmen in Northern Ireland, and especially to leading Irishmen in America.<sup>5</sup>

Clissmann lived for over 5 years in Ireland (1933-34 and 1936-39), married the daughter of a well-known Irish nationalist, and has been on close terms of friendship with Frank Ryan ever since 1930. He has undergone military training, has already participated in an operation against England, speaks perfect English with an Irish accent, and has extensive connections in Ireland.

Reiger, who also had military training, speaks English perfectly and is a specially trained radio operator.

The operation was initiated and prepared in cooperation with the High Command of the Wehrmacht, Department II of the Abwehr, and by joint agreement is submitted for approval.

The military objectives assigned to Clissmann, according to a letter of August 23 from the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the Foreign Ministry (enclosure I<sup>6</sup>), are as follows:

(1) Establishing liaison with the Irish Republican Army and activating the sabotage operations of the Irish Republican Army, on the English island, and at the same time bringing the Irish Republican Army the sum of money which it is expecting.

(2) Establishing radio communications by means of a radio set [*Afu Gerät*] which is to be taken along.

(3) Transmitting military information, including weather reports, since at de Valera's demand radio traffic of the Legation with the Foreign Ministry had to be cut down to the very minimum.<sup>7</sup>

(4) Preparation of underground resistance in the event of Ireland's occupation by the English or Americans.

Supplementing item (3) a telegram of August 22 from Operational Staff 1 C to the Foreign Ministry is also attached (enclosure II).<sup>8</sup> References in the files of the Foreign Ministry appear in radiogram No. 207 from Dublin, No. 2800 from Washington.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Further accounts of Ryan's activities are found in Veessenmayer's memorandum to Woermann of Nov. 24 (91/101409-17) and Clissmann's memorandum to Woermann of Dec. 5 (91/101391-97). These documents discuss the policies and personalities of the Irish Republican Army and that organization's relations with the Irish Government and with Germany.

<sup>6</sup> Not printed (F17/053).

<sup>7</sup> Hempel had reported such requests by the Irish Government in telegrams Nos. 318 of Apr. 11 (91/100688-88) and 383 of May 9 (91/100703).

<sup>8</sup> This telegram expressed the interest of the Luftwaffe in obtaining weather reports from Ireland (F17/054).

<sup>9</sup> In this telegram of Aug. 12 (91/100772-73) which was transmitted via Washington Hempel reported de Valera's urgent request that radio transmissions from the Legation be limited to exceptional cases. In view of de Valera's statements Hempel strongly recommended that the Embassy transmitter cease broadcasting weather reports.

In addition to the foregoing military tasks there are the following political tasks for Frank Ryan and Clissmann:

- (1) To establish a generally effective liaison with the Irish Republican Army.
- (2) To transmit an urgently needed financial subsidy to the Irish Republican Army, for which purpose the Foreign Minister has made available 40,000 pounds sterling.
- (3) If expedient, to attempt bringing about an understanding between the Irish Republican Army and de Valera, which the latter has so far tried in vain. That is the very task for which Frank Ryan has the most promising qualifications. Politically this could promote the strengthening of the all-Irish policy of neutrality and, if necessary, of the Irish national will to resist. From the point of view of propaganda Frank Ryan has a particularly marked influence with the Irish in America which, if skillfully mobilized, can be politically useful.
- (4) The possibility of influencing through Clissmann the attitude and policies of the Irish nationalist activists.
- (5) To furnish the Reich with a clear picture of Ireland's domestic and external situation through objective reporting.
- (6) To observe carefully English and American efforts in southern and northern Ireland.
- (7) In the event of Ireland's occupation by England or America, to organize the resistance, thereby to tie down enemy forces to the greatest possible extent.

To carry out this operation later than the middle of September 1941 is, aside from the weather, not advisable for the following reasons:

- (1) With the progress of the war in the east, Ireland is becoming more and more a focal point of English-American interests. That involves intensified surveillance and accordingly slimmer chances of success for the proposed operation.
- (2) After the landing has been accomplished, at least 4 to 8 weeks are required for the start of operations.
- (3) It appears inadvisable to restrain Frank Ryan any longer because being a confirmed activist, his powers of resistance and willingness for action are beginning to slacken after a forced stay in Germany of over a year's duration; and in the event of too long an absence from Ireland the effectiveness of his influence is bound to suffer there, too.<sup>10</sup>

VEESENMAYER

<sup>10</sup> Marginal notes:

In Ribbentrop's handwriting: "September, 1-2 months."

In Sonnleithner's handwriting: "October, or November, or December."

"U.St.S Woermann arrange whatever is necessary. Submit again after 5 days. R[intelen], Sept. 6."

Through a minute of Sept. 6 (91/101448) Woermann informed Clissmann that Ribbentrop, after consultation with Hitler, had decided to postpone the project. In the absence of Veessenmayer the Foreign Ministry would consult with the Wehrmacht if the project could be undertaken at the end of October, in November, or December.

No. 235

1007/307662-64

*Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter*

WESTFALEN, August 24, 1941.

Enclosed is a noteworthy report from the Naval Attaché in Tokyo<sup>1</sup> on the situation in Japan.

The report agrees in the main with the Embassy's telegram No. 1607 of August 22.<sup>2</sup>

RITTER

[Enclosure]

*Teletype of August 22, 1941, From Naval Attaché, Tokyo, to Navy, Berlin*

RESULT OF A DISCUSSION WITH NAVAL OFFICERS IN  
IMPORTANT POSITIONS

1. Japan will not attack Russia. A collapse is expected during the winter at the latest, and there is no inclination to sacrifice forces for an operation whose success is not assured and which, even if successful, will not solve the urgent problem of providing raw materials.

Besides, a war would undoubtedly bring about a conflict with England and the United States. Japan would then be confronted with the necessity of conducting offensive operations to the north and at the same time, in order to obtain raw materials, to the south—which, however, would be impossible. The Navy hopes to overcome the strong preference of the Army for action in the north.

2. The impression is that the United States is doing all it can to involve Japan in a war with Russia and, in order to avoid incidents, there will probably be no interference with the transportation of gasoline to Vladivostok. For the present it is also believed that the widely heralded departure of the gasoline ships is only a bluff.

3. After the air bases in Indochina have been consolidated and sufficient army units have been transported there, Japan will occupy Thailand before the year is over. The reasons are: eliminating the threat to the flanks, naval control of the Gulf of Siam and the eastern ports of the Isthmus, especially Singora, safeguarding the supplies of rice, rubber and tin, and advancing the base of attack against Burma and Singapore. A peaceful solution is hoped for. It is not expected that Russia will take any action. It is assumed that England and the United States will remain passive. The risk of a conflict with the latter is being accepted.

<sup>1</sup> Rear Admiral Paul Wenneker.

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 225.

4. The next step planned is occupation of the Dutch oil fields, simultaneously with an attack on Manila, and the blockading of Singapore by cutting off all access routes.

5. Concluding remark: I wish to emphasize that these are the views of the Navy. Whether the Government and the Army are of the same mind is doubtful.

### No. 236

61/40185-88

#### *Memorandum by an Official of the Political Department*

BERLIN, August 24, 1941.

Minister Kroll on whom I called August 24 as instructed, expressed his complete satisfaction over his visit in the Special Train. He was able to fulfill completely the purpose of his trip<sup>1</sup> and hopes only that it will be made possible for him to come to Berlin every 3 or 4 months for a short period. In this connection, Herr Kroll is especially hopeful that Under State Secretary Woermann will call him to Berlin for a report whenever the situation requires it.

In the Special Train he lunched with the Foreign Minister, and in the evening he had a discussion with Ambassador Ritter who had him stay for an additional day in order that he might have a detailed conversation with General Jodl. This conversation took place without Ambassador Ritter's asking the Foreign Minister about the matter.

Minister Kroll described the results of his discussions approximately as follows:

The Turkish problem was not acute at the moment, and it was difficult to judge when this condition would change.

General Jodl explained that we did not have nearly sufficient forces at this time for a large campaign such as a war against Turkey would require.

The Foreign Minister shared this opinion.

Ambassador Ritter was of the opinion that the Turkish problem was bound to become acute in any case. The people from the OKH believed that complications with Turkey would develop faster if the English were to enter Iran. The Foreign Minister also pointed out the possibility of the Turkish problem's arising more quickly in the event the English entered Iran.

All the officials with whom he [Kroll] had spoken agreed moreover that the English would occupy at least the southern part of Iran. He himself believed that this would only force Turkey further toward our side.

With respect to the question of restoring the bridges over the Maritsa, General Jodl told him that there was no conceivable military

<sup>1</sup>No documents have been found which indicate what was involved.

interest in reopening them to traffic before the scheduled date (December).

He [Kroll] had set forth a program for our policy in the event that the problem should arise, which was fully approved by all concerned.

In no case must a date be chosen for this which preceded the destruction of Russian power; that is to say, Russia must then be weakened to such a degree that the bulk of the German Army could be released.

Our requests must in no circumstance take the form of an ultimatum, because in that case the Turks would reply by armed force, even without having any prospects of victory. Instead, a carefully prepared, friendly discussion must be conducted. In this connection one should consider inviting Saracoglu to Berlin. In contrast with Saracoglu's trip to Moscow<sup>2</sup> one must not press but rather allow things to develop organically.

In this context Turkey must be offered great prospects and must be persuaded that we do not want to assign her a second-class position in the new Europe, but rather important and honorable duties, possibly as the "factor of stabilization" in the Near East and eastern Mediterranean, in place of England, who will be forced out; in this way a certain balance with Italy would be established.

In order to prove to Turkey that we are sincere and that we wish to work with her on a long-range basis, we must help her in obtaining her wishes with regard to her security. These are with respect to:

1. Edirne.
2. Creation of buffer states under Turkish influence in the Caucasus region.
3. Rectifications on the Turkish-Syrian frontier (Baghdad Railway and Aleppo) as well as on the Turkish-Iraq frontier (Mosul).
4. Solution to the question of the [Aegean] islands in order to give Turkey security against Italy after removal of the Russian threat. To do this one could quietly proceed to relieve the German occupation troops on Mytilene and Chios by Italian forces, something which had been requested by the OKW, but was repeatedly rejected by the Foreign Ministry; because the wish of the Turks to get rid of the Italians again would make the solution of these problems more pressing.

The Foreign Minister had asked him [Kroll] whether actually anything could still be done with Turkey. He had given a very definite, affirmative reply. The friendship pact<sup>3</sup> was just a beginning. Matters were not likely to develop suddenly. Turkey would have to be pried loose from her alliance with England by using the Anglo-Russian alliance as a lever. Naturally, he [Kroll] could not guarantee that the passage of troops could be obtained through the plan which he proposed. But if one wanted to obtain anything at all then this,

<sup>2</sup>Apparently a reference to Saracoglu's visit to Moscow, Sept. 25-Oct. 17, 1939. See vol. VIII of this series, documents Nos. 81, 116, 211, and 268.

<sup>3</sup>German-Turkish Treaty of June 18, 1941, printed as document No. 648 in vol. XII of this series.

in his opinion, was the only course to be taken. He questioned the Foreign Minister's remark that everyone in Turkey could be bought, pointing out that Ismet İnönü, the man who, in his opinion, was the one who alone mattered (this was also the opinion of the Foreign Minister) could not be bought in any way.

During the conversation which lasted 1 hour, General Jodl had remarked that after conclusion of the war with Russia the Turkish business would perhaps not even be necessary. As he did not go into this question further, it was arranged with Ambassador Ritter that the latter would ask him sometime in confidence what he had meant by this remark.

Minister Kroll will send a memorandum of his discussions<sup>4</sup> with the next courier. Ambassador Ritter has already asked that this memorandum be sent to all offices and Missions concerned for their information.

Minister Kroll asks Under State Secretary Woermann to consider these matters as intended solely for his own information and not to discuss them with Ambassador Papen either.

Herewith submitted to Under State Secretary Woermann in accordance with instructions.

SMEND

<sup>4</sup> Not found.

No. 237

343/199827-30

*Memorandum by Counselor of Embassy Hilger*

WESTFALEN, August 24, 1941.

D IX 171.

Subject: Draft for "Supplementary Instructions for the Handling of Propaganda against the Soviet Union."

With reference to your D IX 143 of August 19, 1941,<sup>1</sup> D IX 144 of August 20, 1941.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (343/199890-97), a memorandum by Grosskopf criticizing propaganda directives regarding the kolkhoz system. These had been forwarded by the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories and had been discussed in an interdepartmental conference of Aug. 19.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (343/199883-84; 343/199875-78), a memorandum by Grosskopf commenting critically on a draft for "Supplementary Directives for handling the propaganda against the Soviet Union." The draft had been worked out by the Wehrmacht Propaganda Department in accord with Rosenberg and then forwarded by the Representative of the Foreign Ministry with the OKW by letter of Aug. 18.

Grosskopf's memorandum expressed "the strongest possible objection" to certain sections of the directives which in his opinion meant that the system of collective farms would be maintained. He requested that the matter be taken up in the Russia Committee and presented to the Foreign Minister.

On the basis of the enclosed memorandum I reported to the Foreign Minister today about the further handling of propaganda with respect to the abolition of the collective system. In view of the position taken by State Secretary Backe and the situation created by it, I proposed to the Foreign Minister, in agreement with the other members of the Russia Committee [*Russland-Gremium*] present here, that the compromise solution be accepted and that the contents of the "Supplementary Directives for Handling the Propaganda Against the Soviet Union" drawn up by the OKW be approved.

The Foreign Minister approved the proposal of the Russia Committee and stated that he agreed with the instructions mentioned above. Furthermore, he ordered that the leaflets drafted earlier by the Russia Committee be changed correspondingly and then printed, if need be. Further details in this connection should be agreed upon between Minister Grosskopf and me during my impending stay in Berlin.

In this connection the Foreign Minister repeated his instructions that I should go to Berlin on August 26 in order to discuss current questions with Minister Grosskopf and Colonel von Wedel.<sup>3</sup>

The letter, No. 12/41, of August 18 of the Representative of the Foreign Ministry with the OKW is being sent back as an enclosure,<sup>4</sup> as requested.

Herewith submitted to Minister Grosskopf.

HILGER

[Enclosure]

WESTFALEN, August 22, 1941.

MEMORANDUM

Subject: The position of the members of the Russia Committee (Ambassador Count von der Schulenburg, Counselor of Embassy Hilger, Referent Rost) at Westfalen with respect to the question of propaganda regarding the abolition of the collective system.

The Russia Committee—including Senior Counselor Grosskopf—unanimously takes the position that the German propaganda aimed at the Soviet hinterland and the Red Army must emphasize the abolition of the collective system, rejected by the overwhelming majority of the rural population of the USSR, and the re-establishment of private peasant enterprise as this slogan, above all, seems capable of introducing insecurity and disintegration into the ranks of the Red Army. It is not without good reason that, in all the reports of the representatives of the Foreign Ministry with the Army headquarters, it is pointed out time and again that the great mass of the Soviet

<sup>3</sup> Of the Propaganda Department of the OKW.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 2.

people are only interested in one question—collective system or private enterprise—and that therefore the promise to abolish the collective system represents the most effective means of propaganda.

The Committee, however, realized from the very beginning that the abolition of the collective system could not be permitted to lead to an immediate, unauthorized partition of the collective land, since such an elemental movement would now and later jeopardize the harvest. Consequently the leaflets drawn up by the Committee expressly point out that a transition from the collective system to private ownership may take place only after the restoration of order, and in an organized manner.

In opposition to this view of the Committee, regarding which a number of experts on Russia had expressed their agreement in an oral exchange of views, the Reich Ministry for Food and Agriculture (State Secretary Backe) holds the view that the principle of the collective system must not be tampered with, because this system offers the only sure guaranty that the harvest will not be scattered to the four winds but will benefit the German food supply. State Secretary Backe fears that German interests will be seriously imperiled by the proclamation of the principle of the abolition of the collective system, particularly since he considers it unavoidable that there will be a repercussion upon the rural population of the territories that are already occupied.

In a discussion with Ministerialdirektor Riecke of the Ministry for Food and Agriculture on August 21, 1941, the idea was expressed by us repeatedly and emphatically that propaganda and practical execution are two different things. From the standpoint of the necessity of supporting military actions one need not forgo the propaganda effect of the most attractive slogan. The question of how the promise regarding the abolition of the hated collective system would later be redeemed is, at the moment, not so acute in view of the urgency of an effective propaganda.

According to reports from Berlin the conflicting opinions came to a head in an interdepartmental conference on August 19, 1941.<sup>5</sup> At that time it was not possible to put through a decision to have the complete abolition of the collective enterprises placed in the foreground of the propaganda. After hours of negotiation the decision was made that the OKW should issue the leaflet forming enclosure 1)<sup>6</sup> on August 19, 1941. In accordance with this the OKW requests early approval by the Foreign Ministry of the enclosed draft of "Supplementary Directives for the Handling of Propaganda Against the Soviet Union" together with guidelines.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 1.

<sup>6</sup> Not printed (343/199831-32).

<sup>7</sup> Not printed (343/199833-38).

The contents of these directives represent a compromise between the point of view of the Russia Committee and that of the Ministry for Food and Agriculture. In view of the fact that more extensive concessions cannot be obtained from the Ministry for Food and Agriculture at the present time and that the leaflet (enclosure 1) has already been issued by the OKW, the Committee respectfully proposes to the Foreign Minister, while adhering to its fundamental point of view, that existing objections be put aside for the time being and that approval be given to the directives submitted by the OKW.

No. 238

265/173180-82

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey*

Telegram

URGENT

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL TRAIN, August 25, 1941—12:45 a. m.

No. 888 of August 24

from the Special Train Received Berlin, August 25—3:00 a. m.

No. 1205 of August 25

from the Foreign Ministry Sent August 25—7:10 a. m.

For the Ambassador personally.

I am telling you the following for your information:

On August 19 I received Ambassador Gereide here at Headquarters and first explained to him the military situation in the east, where Russian losses already amounted to about 6 million.<sup>1</sup> In the next few weeks the remainder of the Red Army would probably be destroyed and the greater part of European Russia would be occupied, whereby Russia's power of resistance would be smashed. In any case Stalin would be unable to rebuild the Red Army to any appreciable extent after such blows. German losses in Russia, in contrast, were not even so great as in a single big battle of the World War.

With regard to the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting<sup>2</sup> I told the Ambassador that Roosevelt had evidently turned down flatly Churchill's demand for America's entry into the war, because he no doubt realized that a two-front war against Europe and Japan, which would then result, could not be carried on by the United States, for these reasons:

1. the antiwar sentiment of the people;
2. totally inadequate armament.

Roosevelt was doing everything just to keep England fighting, constantly promising mass deliveries of material—which was a big bluff.

<sup>1</sup> A memorandum of Aug. 20 by Schmidt (67/47031-46) records this conversation with considerable detail.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 209 and footnote 2.

The German-English war would continue until England finally sued for peace. After the collapse of Russia, Germany would turn against England with full force.

In discussing the points relating to Turkey I told Gerede that the Anglo-Russian guarantee<sup>3</sup> appeared to me like effrontery toward Turkey. It would be respected only so long as Turkey was important to Russia. Later, as a result of the guarantee, demands would surely be made for air bases on the Dardanelles, permission for Russian divisions to enter Turkish territory, etc.; we even had definite reports that the English had promised the Russians that at the proper time they would not oppose such Russian aspirations. In this connection I showed Gerede the original of Count Schulenburg's telegram of November 25, 1940, from Moscow,<sup>4</sup> which quoted Molotov's statements on the question of Russia's accession to the Tripartite Pact and according to which Russia, as a condition for her accession, demanded in addition to a Russian-Bulgarian mutual assistance pact the "establishment of a base for land and naval forces of the USSR within range of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles by means of a long-term lease." I pointed out to Gerede that our rejection of this demand had been a basic cause of the German-Russian enmity, precisely because the Führer did not want to let the monster, Bolshevik Russia, advance any farther. If M. Numan believed, as I had heard, that Germany had followed this policy only because of her own interest, it might be said in reply that this stand had been only 10 percent in the interest of Germany and 90 percent in the interest of Turkey.

In reply to my question about Turkey's attitude toward the Turkish peoples near the border in the Caucasus and east of the Caspian Sea, Gerede stated emphatically that his country had no ambitions outside its present boundaries, at least none based on official policy. The Pan-Turanian idea was no longer alive in Turkey. When I asked him further what position Turkey would take if England should wish to establish a new front in the Caucasus, the Ambassador replied evasively that Turkey would be on her guard. Gerede also gave vague and evasive answers to my further questions whether the present official policy might not change, how the situation was in Syria, and whether a closer alignment of Turkey with Germany might not be possible after the collapse of Russia. Evidently he had instruc-

<sup>3</sup> A reference to notes handed to the Turkish Foreign Minister by the Ambassadors of Great Britain and the Soviet Union on Aug. 10. These notes contained declarations by the two Governments couched in identical terms assuring Turkey that they had no aggressive intentions with regard to the Straits; that they would respect scrupulously Turkey's territorial integrity; and that they were prepared to assist Turkey in the event of an attack by any European power. For text, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. III, pp. 891-892.

<sup>4</sup> Vol. XI of this series, document No. 404.

tions not to enter into such discussions. After his return to Berlin he again emphasized to Herr von Weizsäcker that Turkey had no ambitions and that his conversation with me had not been of an official nature. As Herr von Weizsäcker has further reported, Gerede's visit to me gave rise to rumors in the Berlin diplomatic corps about pressure on Turkey to permit the passage of German troops, which the State Secretary of course denied immediately.<sup>5</sup> I ask you accordingly to deny any false versions of the subject of the conversation that you may encounter there, for the rest, however, not to give any indication of its content but merely use my statements to Gerede also at your post.

RIBBENTROP

<sup>5</sup> In a memorandum of Aug. 22, St.S. 545, (265/173166) Weizsäcker recorded having been informed by Alfieri that such rumors were circulating in the diplomatic corps.

### No. 239

82/60520-25

#### *The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan*

Telegram

RAM 364/R SPECIAL TRAIN, August 25, 1941—1:25 a. m.  
 No. 890 from the Special Train Received Berlin, August 25—3:00 a. m.  
 No. 1383 from the Foreign Ministry Sent August 25—10:15 a. m.

The attitude of certain Japanese circles set forth in your telegram No. 1607 of August 22<sup>1</sup> is incomprehensible. It shows that these circles, misjudging the situation with regard to power and the military aspect, are unaware of Japan's own strength and the weakness of the United States and England.

I request that you counter the irresolution there with the following arguments in your conversations with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister and all other circles accessible to you:

1. The German Wehrmacht has up to now captured 1.3 million Russian prisoners. The number of Russians killed, according to observations on the battlefields and careful estimates, far exceeds twice that figure. As regards the total number of wounded Russians it is impossible to make any exact determination. On the basis of general experience, however, they too may be estimated at more than a million. Consequently, the losses of the Red Army up to the present amount to about 6 million men.

This number is verified and corroborated by the observations made with regard to the Russian divisions thus far committed and destroyed on the German-Russian front. Of the 260 Russian divisions known to

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 225.

have been committed thus far on the German front, 200 have been completely destroyed; the remaining 60 divisions are badly battered.

At present 40 new Russian divisions are being organized behind the front, consisting of men 16 to 45 years old, with no previous service. These new divisions have no General Staff officers at all and only a small percentage of active front line officers. Their equipment in heavy weapons is quite inadequate. Some troop units have fewer rifles than men. Many troops were found to have only one or two machine guns per battalion. Some of them no longer have any Russian rifles at all but are equipped with captured Polish rifles.

In connection with these figures and observations two facts are of paramount importance: One is that the nucleus of the Red Army on the German-Russian front is destroyed. The Red divisions still remaining on this front are no longer up to full fighting strength. The second fact is the following: If one takes into account the divisions stationed and tied down in other parts of Russia, such as East Asia, Siberia, the Caucasus, etc., and if one judges from the recruitment capacity in its ratio to the total population, which experience shows to be about the same in all countries, it is evident that Russia no longer even has any manpower reserves worth mentioning, to say nothing of the total lack of material which cannot be replaced.

This leads to the conclusion, as far as Japan is concerned, that a military intervention against Russia in the east in these circumstances will not constitute any risk for an army like the Japanese, especially since the army in Siberia consists of only a few hundred thousand men.

2. The fact that the United States has reacted to Japan's occupation of Indochina only with economic sanctions,<sup>2</sup> which moreover cut both ways, the fact that the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting<sup>3</sup> produced only words, and the fact that the United States has made the hopeless and almost desperate attempt to keep Japan out by means of insincere negotiations are clear signs of weaknesses on the part of the United States, proving that it will not risk any serious military action against Japan. This is no news to the military expert, for he has long known that the Army and the Air Force of the United States are not yet ready and that its Navy is still inferior to the Japanese Navy. Moreover, a large majority of the American people are opposed to war. The propaganda speeches of a few politicians and the propaganda articles of the Jewish newspapers give a completely false picture of the real attitude of the American people.

<sup>2</sup> Japanese as well as Chinese assets in the United States were frozen by Executive Order No. 8832, signed July 26. On Aug. 1, President Roosevelt issued an order prohibiting exports to destinations other than the Western Hemisphere, the British Empire, and unoccupied countries of petroleum products, and also of certain materials such as wood pulp, metals, machinery, vehicles, rubber and chemicals. See *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. iv, pp. 842-855.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 209 and footnote 2.

3. It follows from this that Japan still has freedom of choice. The longer she waits the more the ratio of forces might change to her disadvantage. Japan therefore runs the risk of missing the unique chance offered by the present situation to secure her rear and thereby to assume a quite different position with respect to the Anglo-Saxon world, of not achieving her objectives with respect to a Greater East Asia, and of later being exposed, in an unfavorable position, to an attack from the United States, which would in the meantime have become stronger militarily.

There should, therefore, be but one decision for Japan, namely to eliminate quickly the Russian opponent in East Asia and thereby secure her rear position in the north, and then to realize her Greater East Asian goals in the south.<sup>4</sup> The earlier elimination of Russia in East Asia resulting from this would also release the German forces sooner for renewed action against England. England will then be even less able to risk opposing Japan in the pursuit of her goals by transferring new forces to East Asia.

4. The nightmare of encirclement will not be eliminated by a hesitant policy and by inactivity. The threatening encirclement will be broken only by activity and by a decision to act quickly, just as Germany at one time broke the encirclement that threatened her.

5. If Japan permitted unhindered passage even of a single shipment of war material from the United States to Vladivostok, a troublesome precedent would be created. For the present it seems that the United States intends to begin only with an isolated shipload and with only the relatively harmless delivery of engine fuel in order to probe the situation and determine the attitude of Japan. This first shipment of fuel will soon be followed by larger quantities of fuel, and before long, guns, airplanes, and armament of all kinds will follow. How will Japan later justify stopping the fifth or sixth shipload if she has permitted the first shipments to pass without objection? It would be childish to believe Russian or American assurances that the fuel or the guns will be used exclusively in the West against Germany. Even if that were true, Germany would have to expect Japan, in the spirit of the Tripartite Pact, to block such direct military support of an enemy of Germany. Actually, however, every such shipment will strengthen the war potential of the Russian Army of the East against

<sup>4</sup>The record of a conference of Hitler's with his military and naval advisers, held on Aug. 22, contains the following statement by Hitler in reply to a question regarding Japan's political intentions:

"The Führer is convinced that Japan will carry out the attack on Vladivostok as soon as forces have been assembled. The present aloofness can be explained by the fact that the assembling of forces is to be accomplished undisturbed, and the attack is to come as a surprise move." See U.S. Navy Department, ONI, "Führer Conferences on Matters Dealing With the German Navy, 1941," vol. II, p. 27.

Japan. Japanese soldiers would later have to fight against the weapons for which Japan would now permit unhindered passage; or in any event the threat to Japan in the rear would be increased if she should later decide to advance southward. Japan should therefore be seriously warned of the dangers to which she will expose herself if she permits passage for war material of any kind from the United States to Russia. If Japan wants to avoid as far as possible any provocation of the United States, she can still do so by refraining from sinking American ships or seizing them permanently as prizes. It would be enough to bring North American ships to Japanese ports, to unload them there, and then release them again. In this connection it would be announced from the very outset that the North American flag would be respected and the ships therefore released, and that only the war material destined for Russia would be confiscated or held.

Another more common procedure with a similar objective would be for Japan to follow the Pan-American example and proclaim a security zone around East Asia, perhaps in conjunction with the Governments of Manchukuo, North China, and Indochina. The Pan-American provisions for the American security zone<sup>5</sup> could to a large extent be copied. In any case it would have to be stipulated that no war material of any kind might be transported to belligerent powers through this security zone.<sup>6</sup> In this way Japan would beat the United States with its own arguments and deprive it of the possibility of raising objections.<sup>6</sup> The establishment of such a security zone in East Asia would at the same time strongly emphasize the idea of a Greater Asia, in the same way as Roosevelt is pursuing a Pan-American hemispheric policy. However, even if Japan should simply confiscate or destroy such ships carrying war material, the Americans will not in our opinion dare to carry things too far.<sup>7</sup>

6. Now that the Wehrmacht has penetrated deep into Russian territory in two great jumps, we are entering the third phase of this campaign. It should be borne in mind in this connection that in the operations carried out thus far the guiding idea of our tactics has not been to gain territory or successes enhancing our prestige, nor merely to push our enemy back, but as a matter of principle, and always the idea was the battle of encirclement and thereby destruction of the enemy and his material. In a vast number of pockets, large and small, the Soviet Army has been systematically destroyed in this manner. The same thing will be done in the future to remaining units of the Russian Army still fit for combat. Our objective, namely the definitive

destruction of the army inasmuch as it is still able to fight and the occupation of the important centers of grain-raising, raw materials, and industry and production in the Soviet Union will be achieved in the course of this year. We still have at least a couple of months, if not more, for this task. After completion of these operations there will no longer be any possibility of a regeneration on any large scale for the Soviet Union, either in manpower or material, so that as a result of the campaign of this summer and autumn Russia will be eliminated, at least as a potential and significant ally of England. Next spring we will engage any Russian forces that may still turn up in a definitive combat with smaller units of the German Army that we will leave in the east.

For Germany victory over Russia is of particular importance because:

1. As a result of the seizure of the Ukrainian territories there will no longer be any food problem for all the future;

2. Because of the seizure of the rich raw materials areas and the industrial centers the German raw materials problem will likewise in the main no longer be any problem, and the German war potential will be tremendously increased;

3. And, above all, Germany will now be free in the rear as a result of the elimination of the threat in the east. She will be able to withdraw a large portion of her army from the east and to release part of it for work on airplane and submarine construction and part of it for other theaters of war and to turn with the full weight of her national strength against her last enemy, England.

I request regular radio reports about further developments.

RIBBENTROP

No. 240

65/45853-54

*The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

Unnumbered

TEHRAN, August 25, 1941.

Received August 25, 11:25 p. m.

I just returned from an audience with the Shah to whom I conveyed the Führer's message<sup>1</sup> in accordance with instructions. After the Shah had expressed his sincere thanks for the message, he described the events of the day. According to this, at 4:30 a. m. the Soviet Am-

<sup>5</sup> See vol. VIII of this series, document No. 306 and footnotes 1 and 3.

<sup>6</sup> Marginal note in Weizsäcker's handwriting: "?".

<sup>7</sup> Marginal note in Weizsäcker's handwriting: "!".

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 230.



bassador<sup>2</sup> and the British Minister<sup>3</sup> handed to the Minister President at his private home a note informing him that Russian and British troops had begun to enter Iranian territory at that time and that military operations had started. These measures had become necessary because the Iranian Government had not replied to the demand for the removal of the Reich Germans. The Shah continued that the English and the Russians had begun the operation all of a sudden from Palehvi to Bandar Abbas. The Iranian ports of the Gulf had been occupied, Iranian warships sunk, open cities, even villages, bombed. More than 1,000 tanks and several hundred airplanes had been used for the operation. The Iranian Army was not able to conduct a successful war on two fronts against this powerful enemy. He [the Shah] didn't want to ask Germany for military aid because it could not be rendered at this time. He urgently requested, however, that steps be taken with the Turkish Government so that the latter would bring influence to bear upon the English and Russians that they cease hostilities against Iran and at the same time grant safe conduct for the return voyage of the Germans from Iran by a route which would be arranged through diplomatic channels.<sup>4</sup>

In conclusion the Shah stated that he knew very well that the accusations against the Reich Germans were nothing but a pretext.

The Shah obviously is so impressed by the sudden attack by the English and Russians which took place today that he is no longer seriously determined to offer resistance in this war on two fronts. Today's statement by the Minister President before Parliament also points to this. In this declaration he gives a historic description of the British-Soviet pressure upon the Iranian Government and of the attitude of the Iranian Government. Simultaneously an account of

<sup>2</sup> Alexey Tchernikh.

<sup>3</sup> Sir Reader W. Bullard.

<sup>4</sup> In a memorandum of Aug. 26 (65/45278X-80X) Weizsäcker commented on Eitel's conversation with the Shah and proposed the following with regard to these particular points raised by the Shah:

"It would be out of the question for us to approach our enemies through Turkey in this manner, in the role of supplicants, as it were; but a friendly talk could be held with the Turkish Government to the end that it should on its own motion and on the strength of its treaty obligations do everything which is possible.

"It is suggested that Ambassador von Papen be instructed to undertake such a démarche, and that we also talk with the Turkish Ambassador here to this effect.

"... The Shah has suggested to Minister Eitel that he should endeavor through the intermediary of Turkey to obtain a safe conduct from England and Soviet Russia for the Germans in Iran by a route to be arranged through diplomatic channels.

"It is suggested that Ambassador von Papen be instructed to undertake such a démarche with the Turkish Government. Since occupation of Tehran is to be expected soon, it is primarily the Russians from whom safe conduct will have to be obtained."

In telegram No. 904 of Aug. 27, forwarded to Therapia as No. 1229 of Aug. 28 (65/45894-96) Ribbentrop instructed Papen to convey these requests by the Shah to the Turkish Government.

today's British-Soviet attack on Iran is given. The enemy was everywhere engaged in hostilities with Iran's Army.<sup>5</sup> The Iranian Government had started discussions to explore the reason for this attack; the Government would communicate the result of this discussion at the proper time. At the end the Minister President asked the population to show sang-froid, firmness, and calm.<sup>6</sup>

ETTEL

<sup>5</sup> In the copy of this document in the Foreign Minister's file (65/45276X-77X; 45304) this sentence reads: "The enemy nowhere had a motive for involving Iran's Army in hostilities." In the copy here printed the sentence has been corrected in longhand.

<sup>6</sup> The copy in the Foreign Minister's file bears the notation: "Shown to the Führer. Hew[el], Aug. 26."

## No. 241

535/240000-03

*The State Secretary to the Embassy to the Holy See*

BERLIN, August 25, 1941.

Pol. III 1642.

In the opinion of the Reich Government, the provisions of the Reich Concordat<sup>1</sup>—in so far as they are still applicable at all—can be applied only in the Reich area as it existed at the time the Concordat was concluded in the year 1933. They are not applicable, on the other hand, in the so-called "new Reich area", which comprises the Ostmark, the Sudeten German areas, the Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia, the Memel area, and the incorporated eastern areas and Eupen-Malmédy. Nor are they applicable in the General Government, in Alsace, in Lorraine, Luxembourg, and in the liberated areas of Lower Styria, Carinthia and Carniola.

In the absence of a contractual agreement the Vatican does not consider itself obligated to get in touch with governmental authorities before filling the higher offices in the Catholic Church in these new areas. On the contrary, it claims here the right of free and unrestricted appointment to office. This claim, which for example led to undesirable consequences with the appointment of the Apostolic Administrator in Innsbruck,<sup>2</sup> cannot be recognized by the State. The Reich Government has therefore resolved to demand of the Vatican that in all cases of appointments to higher Church offices in the new Reich areas it get in touch with the Reich Government in advance.

This demand also includes the appointments of apostolic administrators, permanent chapter vicars and other substitute bishops, which

<sup>1</sup> See Series C, vol. I, document No. 371.

<sup>2</sup> Bishop Paul Rusch. Material on this controversy is to be found in serial 3068.

were not regulated in the Reich Concordat. In order to close this gap in the Reich Concordat and create uniform conditions for the entire Reich area, the Reich Government attaches the greatest importance to the Vatican's being willing to make a prior inquiry as to the political suitability of the candidates also in case of filling these officers in the Old Reich.

I therefore request that you transmit to the Cardinal Secretary of State a note verbale worded as shown in the enclosure. I should like to point out that the text was agreed upon with the Chief of the Party Chancellery, approved by the Foreign Minister, and can therefore not be changed.<sup>3</sup> Should the Holy See wish to discuss the matter orally, please request that a written reply be made first. Please report on the execution of your instructions.<sup>4</sup>

FREIHERR VON WEIZSÄCKER

ENCLOSURE—DRAFT

NOTE VERBALE

zu Pol. III 1642 II.

The recent appointments by the Holy See of several Apostolic Administrators for the administration of episcopal offices in the areas under German sovereignty gives the Reich Government occasion to make the following communication:

Considering the importance which adheres to the occupation of all the higher offices of the Roman Catholic Church, the Reich Government does not wish to waive its right, based on its sovereignty, to be consulted before occupation of these offices. On the contrary, it must stress the importance of being given the possibility to register objections of a general political nature before occupation of the offices of an archbishop, a bishop, a coadjutor with the right of succession, as well as an independent prelate (*praelatus nullius*) in the entire new Reich area together with Alsace, Lorraine, Luxembourg, and the liberated areas of Lower Styria, Carinthia and Carniola, as well as the General Government. It must also claim this right in those cases in which the administration of the above-mentioned Church offices is to be exercised by an apostolic administrator or, beyond a certain period, by a chapter vicar or some other substitute bishop.

In the interest of a uniform procedure for the entire sovereign area of the Reich, the Reich Government must also stress the importance of there being in like manner a confidential consultation with

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 148 and footnote 6.

<sup>4</sup> In telegram No. 54 of Aug. 29 (535/240031) Menshausen reported that he had handed the note to Under State Secretary Monsignor Pardini (Tardini). Tardini had remarked that the note needed to be studied carefully because it contained new aspects which could be considered as precedents by other states.

the Reich Government also within the area of the Old Reich before appointment of Church dignitaries of the last-mentioned kind (apostolic administrators, chapter vicars and other substitute bishops), in order to give it the opportunity to express any objections of a general political nature against the proposed candidates.

The Reich Government therefore requests the Holy See to give it, in the future by means of an appropriate communication, the opportunity before appointment to all Church offices of the above-mentioned sort to bring forward any existing objections of a general political nature.

No. 242

*Record of the Duce's Conversation With the Führer*<sup>1</sup>

The FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, August 25, 1951/XIX.

I

In his first conversation with the Duce immediately after the latter's arrival at Headquarters,<sup>2</sup> the Führer gave the Duce a general outline of the situation, together with a detailed account of the military developments.

The Führer began by acknowledging to the Duce that it had been a wise decision to liquidate Greece along with Yugoslavia before launching the Russian campaign. Greece and Yugoslavia were in reality two potential and active enemies of the Axis, and eliminating them in time proved a great advantage at the moment when it became necessary to take action against Soviet Russia in order to eliminate the grave Bolshevik menace and to achieve effective control of Europe.

The Führer then made a special point of acknowledging that for the first time since the beginning of the conflict, the German military intelligence service had failed. It had in fact not reported that Russia had a very well armed and equipped army composed for the most part of men imbued with a veritable fanaticism who, despite their

<sup>1</sup> This document is translated from a photostatic copy of an Italian version found in a collection of Italian Foreign Ministry documents brought to Lisbon during World War II. The originals were later returned to the Italian Government. No German text of this document has been found. The Italian record here translated is the same as is printed in Galeazzo Ciano, *L'Europa verso la catastrofe* (Milan, 1948), pp. 669-675.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram No. 1952 of Aug. 3 (B12/B001143) Ribbentrop directed Mackensen to invite Mussolini for the period Aug. 14-17. In telegram No. 1744 of Aug. 4 (B12/B001145) Mackensen reported Mussolini's acceptance of the time and program, and that General Cavallero would come along although Ciano's attendance was uncertain because of his ill health. Further messages regarding the postponement and final, definitive arrangements of the meeting are to be found in serial B12.

racial heterogeneity, were now fighting with blind fury. The Bolshevik army as a whole could be viewed as made up of two large masses: one, the larger, consisting of peasants who fought with unreasoning obstinacy, and the other made up in the main of industrial workers who strongly believed in the words of Marx and fought with fanaticism. For opposite reasons, both were fighting to the last man; the former out of primitive ignorance, the latter because they were bewitched by the mystique of Communism.

The Führer added that he would not let himself be ensnared by the Soviets into continuing the battle inside cities by street fighting, for which the Russians were exceptionally well prepared. He had no intention of destroying the large cities, but would leave them to fall by themselves after he had won the battle of annihilation against the Soviet military forces emplaced around them. That was his plan for Leningrad, which had an urban area comprising about 4 million inhabitants. It would fall as soon as the total destruction of the Soviet forces ringing the city was accomplished. By avoiding street fighting, which yields no useful results, he would above all be able to save important forces.

The Führer had no doubt whatsoever as to the outcome of the struggle. He thought there was no point at the moment in dwelling on a consideration of what might at some future date become a line of resistance set up by the Soviets; he was inclined to believe that the Red military strength would inevitably collapse not later than October under the incessant blows that were being, and would be, inflicted upon them. A contributing factor, as time went on, would be the conquest, already begun and soon to be completed, of the major Soviet industrial centers and mining regions, for example the Don river basin. Whether this collapse would come soon, within a few months, or next spring, could be considered of secondary importance because already the means of victory were in Germany's hands. Inasmuch as the German losses to date, despite the fierceness of the struggle, had not exceeded the low figure of 68,000 men, and the war booty that had fallen into German hands was so immense, far exceeding the needs of the armed forces of the Reich, the Führer had decided to concentrate the production effort from now on exclusively on the construction of submarines, tanks, and anti-aircraft artillery.

Regarding military plans for the future, the Führer told the Duce—in absolute secrecy—that after completion of the Russian campaign he intended to deal England the final blow by invading the island. To that end he was now marshaling the necessary resources by preparing the appropriate naval and land material needed for the landing. In the opinion of the Führer, that would mark the final act of the conflict.

Concerning *France*. The Führer held that there would be no point in dealing with that problem while the battle was still in progress in Russia. He had found justification for his feeling of distrust of the French, whom he was watching carefully and with respect to whom he intended to maintain a negative attitude. The French question would be taken up again at the end of the war.

Reverting to the Russian campaign, the Führer stated that the grain harvest in the Ukraine had in large part fallen into German hands. It should be borne in mind, however, that next year's Russian harvest must be used chiefly to supply the occupied countries. The Führer repeated his praise of the Finnish troops, who had fought admirably, and he had words of praise also for the Rumanians, the Hungarians, and the Italians. Referring to these last, he said they had acquitted themselves in brilliant fashion in their first engagements.

The Führer's remarks were delivered in an orderly and precise manner, which conveyed an impression of absolute calm and serenity. It was for this reason, among others, that the Duce thought it appropriate to let the Führer develop his thoughts without interruption, and postpone to a subsequent conversation the specific questions he wanted to ask concerning the progress of the military operations and certain territorial problems.

## II

In the course of the second conversation which the Duce had with the Führer on the evening of August 25, the Duce set forth his views on certain questions of major importance.

*Turkey*: Turkey, the Duce noted, was continuing to pursue a wavering policy between the Axis and England, and that policy was being closely watched. It might be profitable, he said, to make some new efforts to win Turkey over to our side by offering her some compensation and by using as a lever Turkey's sensitiveness about her military position. The Führer agreed with the Duce's thought. The attitude of Turkey naturally was influenced directly by the developments in the Russian campaign. Consideration might be given, however, to offering her perhaps a minor boundary rectification in Bulgarian territory and some future concession in Syria at the end of the war. The possibility of offering German armored forces could also be considered.

*Crete*: The Führer expressed to the Duce his desire to have an Italian division transferred to Crete to take the place of the German Alpine Corps, which he wished to send to the Russian front preparatory to operations in the Caucasus. The Duce gave his assent.

*Spain*: The Führer spoke in bitter terms about Spain, expressing his genuine and profound disappointment with that country.

A mountain formation similar to the Rock of Gibraltar had been found in the French Jura, on which German specialized detachments

had undergone prolonged training carried out with great enthusiasm and effectiveness. If Franco could have made up his mind in January or February, the big special 620 [mm.] heavy mortars (of which the Duce had seen two examples, the *Thor* and the *Odin* on his visit today to Brest Litovsk) would have been extremely effective against Gibraltar thanks to the crushing force of their 2,000 kg. projectiles.

The Duce, while concurring with the Führer's thought, observed that for all practical purposes and given Spain's particular situation and special circumstances, it was pointless to bring further pressure to bear to induce her to take an active part. There was no question that she was already, and would increasingly be, impelled by her interests to support the Axis, and that therefore it would be useful to keep her in reserve at present and until the time came when the Spanish trump card could and would have to be played in our game.

*France:* With respect to France, the Duce outlined to the Führer the anomaly of the situation which had developed in the relations with that country. These were governed at present by the Armistice Agreement,<sup>3</sup> but the Agreement no longer performed its function because its powers had been canceled by the development of events. It would therefore be necessary to talk to the French at a given moment, profiting incidentally from the fact that Pétain was in deep water as a result of the unending domestic and external difficulties with which he had to contend.

The Führer repeated to the Duce that the feelings he entertained toward the French were those of antipathy and distrust, and that he was fully aware of what the Duce had said concerning the anomaly of the relations between that country and the Axis Powers. He thought it advisable, however, to postpone any substantial and serious talks because it was essential, in order to strip the French of any hopes and illusions, to bring the campaign in Russia to a definitive conclusion.

*Sweden:* The Führer spoke in rather harsh terms about the Swedes, calling them cowards. Sweden maintained a treacherously hostile attitude toward Germany and raised endless difficulties to German requests for troop transit.<sup>4</sup>

*Switzerland:* The Führer spoke in adverse terms also about Switzerland, which, while moving with great circumspection, entertained feelings of unadulterated aversion toward the Axis.

*Japan:* The Duce expressed his point of view concerning Japan, observing that that country had a complex and difficult domestic political situation which was at the bottom of the uncertainty in her foreign policy. There was no question, however, that Japan was

strongly animated by a nationalistic dynamism that caused her to gravitate toward the Axis; in a certain sense, her policy followed a straighter line than did that of Spain. It was fairly probable that one day she would fully align herself with the Axis. It was therefore necessary to appraise her capabilities realistically and judge her present and future attitude.

*United States:* The Duce pointed out that the "Potomac meeting"<sup>5</sup> had, in the last analysis, not caused Roosevelt's political stock to rise, and that, rather, it had even dropped somewhat since the declaration in question. However that might be, the attitude of the United States was now clear enough and, as matters stood, it was preferable to avoid any useless polemics.

The Führer gave a detailed analysis of the Jewish clique surrounding Roosevelt and exploiting the American people. He stated that he would not for anything in the world live in a country like the United States, which had a concept of life inspired by the most vulgar commercialism and had no feeling for any of the most sublime expressions of the human spirit, such as music.

*The Mediterranean:* The Führer stated that he was satisfied with the situation in the Mediterranean. The Duce agreed, noting that the new front opened up against Great Britain in Iran had relieved English pressure in the Mediterranean.

*Italian participation in the campaign in Russia:* The Duce expressed to the Führer his ardent desire for the Italian Armed Forces to participate in the operations against the Soviets on a larger scale. Italy, the Duce stated, has an abundance of manpower and could send an additional six, nine, and even more divisions. The Führer replied that he greatly appreciated that offer and thanked the Duce heartily. He added, however, that the great distance of the Russian front from Italy and the logistical difficulties would cause a serious problem with respect to transportation and the proper functioning of large masses of military forces. The Duce affirmed on his part that Italy could render a major contribution to the war effort against Russia, and suggested that further contingents of Italian troops be used to take the place of German troops sent on leave. The Führer took note of this proposal, which would be given further study, and touched upon the possibility of employing the Italian troops in the Ukraine, where the average winter temperature as a rule does not go lower than six degrees below zero [centigrade].

The Führer finally drove home once more the point he had already made in his preceding conversation, namely, that he did not intend to

<sup>5</sup>This is most likely a reference to the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting at Argentia, Newfoundland, Aug. 9-12, which produced the Atlantic Charter. To get to Argentia, President Roosevelt had embarked on the U.S.S. *Potomac* at New London on Aug. 3.

<sup>3</sup> See vol. ix of this series, document No. 523.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 172.

wage a war of destruction or of prestige; but a war of annihilation of the enemy armed forces in order to liberate Germany and Europe from the recurrent threat of conflict and create the necessary basis for constructing the new European order. He concluded by expressing his very keen desire, once the war was ended, to come to Italy and spend some time in Florence, the city he preferred above all others for the harmony of its art and the beauty of its natural surroundings.

This project was enthusiastically received by the Duce, who immediately invited the Führer to come to Florence, once the war was over, and assured him of the affection and friendship with which the Italian people would welcome him again as their most honored guest.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Hitler's appointment book indicates that the visit lasted over the 4 days, Aug. 25 to Aug. 28, when the Italian delegation started homeward at 8:00 p.m. ("Führer's Tagebuch 1934-1943," p. 77, deposited in the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., Manuscripts Division, captured German documents).

### No. 243

65/45265X-66X

#### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, August 25, 1941.

According to similar reports of foreign broadcasting stations, the English and Russians have invaded Iran.

I propose the following program for immediate action:

1. Renewed encouragement to the Iranian Government to offer resistance, both through Minister Ettl with reference to the instruction sent him from the special train on August 22,<sup>1</sup> and through the Iranian Minister in Berlin,<sup>2</sup> likewise in accordance with the foregoing instruction adapted to the new situation.

2. The demand of Turkey that she show her true colors, first by publicly expressing disapproval of the Anglo-Soviet action and by refraining from giving any indirect or direct support to the Anglo-Russian action. This is to be done both through Ambassador von Papan and through the Turkish Ambassador<sup>3</sup> here.

3. Corresponding steps with the Government of Afghanistan, both in Kabul and in Berlin.

4. Immediate cessation of all German arms deliveries to Iran.<sup>4</sup>

5. Facilities have already been organized in Turkey for receiving Reich Germans leaving Iran. Whether departures can still succeed on any substantial scale, appears doubtful.

6. A decision must be taken whether a declaration on free India and a new declaration on the Arab countries are to be made at this juncture.

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 230.

<sup>2</sup> Moussa Noury-Esfandiary.

<sup>3</sup> Hüsvrev R. Gereede.

<sup>4</sup> Marginal note in Ribbentrop's handwriting: "Yes."

ture. This appears to be an especially opportune moment. A fitting occasion like this will be hard to come by again. Final proposals would be submitted at once if the decision is in the affirmative.

7. Extensive propaganda exploitation of the Anglo-Russian invasion.<sup>5</sup>

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>5</sup> Marginal note in Ribbentrop's handwriting: "Yes."

### No. 244

105/113986-00

#### *Circular of the Foreign Minister<sup>1</sup>*

Telegram

No. 891 of August 25 SPECIAL TRAIN, August 26, 1941—12:15 a.m.  
from the Special Train Received Berlin, August 26—1:15 a.m.  
Muiltex No. 660

from the Foreign Ministry Sent August 27 [26].<sup>2</sup>  
RAM 365/R

For your information and guidance of your conversation I inform you as follows:

1. The campaign against Soviet Russia as it has so far progressed has already led to the destruction of the core of the Red Army standing on the German-Russian front. Up to now the Wehrmacht has taken 1.3 million Russian prisoners. According to the observations at the battlefields and careful estimates, the number of Russians killed amounts to well over double this number. Exact figures concerning the total number of Russians wounded are not possible. However, on the basis of general experience these may also be estimated as mounting to over a million. From this it is evident that the losses of the Red Army so far amount to about 6 million men.

This figure is confirmed by our observations concerning the Russian divisions so far committed and destroyed on the German-Russian front, from which it is evident that approximately four-fifths of the Russian forces have already been entirely destroyed, while the remainder are badly battered. Only a very limited number of new Russian units can still be organized. Russian divisions consisting of 16 to 45-year-olds that have appeared at the front of late, composed mainly of untrained men and with only a few officers, very badly equipped with heavy arms (some troops have only one or two machine guns per battalion), and in part no longer with Russian rifles but Polish ones captured earlier, indicate that there are not even human

<sup>1</sup> This circular was sent to all Missions except the Embassy in Japan. See document No. 239.

<sup>2</sup> The dispatch date of Aug. 27 found on this copy of the document is clearly an error. The copy from the files of the Embassy in Italy (2281/482357-61) indicates that the circular was dispatched on Aug. 26, 10:30 a.m.

reserves worth mentioning in Russia any longer, not to mention the total lack of material that is absolutely impossible to replace.

2. Now that the Wehrmacht in two great jumps has penetrated far into Russian territory we are entering the third stage of this campaign. In this connection it should be remembered that in the operations thus far the main idea of our tactics was not to gain territory or successes for the sake of prestige, or merely to push back the foe, but as a matter of principle, and always the main idea was the battle of encirclement and thus the destruction of the foe and his material. In an endless number of pockets, large and small, the Soviet Army has been systematically destroyed in this manner. The fate of the remaining portions of the Russian Army still able to fight will not be different. Our objective, namely the definitive destruction of the Army inasmuch as it is still able to fight and the occupation of the important centers of grain, raw materials, industry, and production of the Soviet Union will be attained in the course of this year. After completion of these operations there will no longer be any possibility of large-scale recovery for the Soviet Union, whether as regards persons or material, so that as a result of this campaign Russia will be eliminated as an ally of any consequence for England.

For Germany the victory over Russia is of particular importance, because:

(1) As a result of the capture of the Ukrainian territories there will no longer be any food problem for all the future.

(2) As a result of the capture of the rich raw material areas and industrial centers, the German raw material question will on the whole likewise no longer be a problem and the German war potential will be tremendously increased.

(3) And in particular, as a result of the elimination of the threat in the east, Germany will now be unhampered in the rear. She will now be able to turn against her last opponent, England, with the full force of her entire national strength.

3. In recognition of this danger threatening England, Churchill has recently urged increasingly the quick entry of the United States into the war. This question presumably also supplied the main subject of the demonstrative meeting in the Atlantic, which Roosevelt and Churchill brought about in the first half of August<sup>3</sup> and which led to the subsequent proclamation of a joint peace program.<sup>4</sup> The whole thing represents merely a big propaganda bluff which, contrary to the intentions of those who brought it about, clearly reveals the limits placed on Roosevelt's will to fight. In actuality it is impossible for Roosevelt to wage a war on two fronts, which is something he must definitely reckon with in case of America's entry into the war in view of Japanese determination to adhere to the policy of the Tripartite Pact. The American policy toward Japan, which is restricted to economic sanctions and verbal threats, while attempting on the other

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 209.

<sup>4</sup> For text of the Atlantic Charter contained in President Roosevelt's message of Aug. 21 to the Congress see Department of State, *Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1943), p. 717.

hand to lure Japan toward the slippery path of insincere negotiations in order to eliminate the danger of her intervention, clearly betrays the weakness of the American position. The truth is that no part of the American armed forces is armed or ready for entry into a war on two fronts, the less so as the twofold task of having to arm themselves and at the same time supply the whole world with weapons and other war material far exceeds American capacities. In addition there is the public mood in the United States, in view of which there can be no question of a reliable majority of the American people being in favor of the Roosevelt policy and entry into the war at the present time. In this situation it is natural that Roosevelt had to reject flatly Churchill's wish for an immediate entry of the United States in the war.

4. In order nevertheless to deceive the world with a picture of resolution and strength, Roosevelt and Churchill announced their program for peace, which represents nothing more than a bad plagiarism of the Wilson points, in the hope that they can set the conquered nations against their governments with this swindle. But even today it is clear that the world will not fall for this deception. The truth is that Roosevelt and Churchill, the main culprits in the present war, simply have nothing to offer the world except prolonging and extending the war; on top of this, through the war alliance with Bolshevism they have entirely and conclusively compromised the cause for which they are fighting.

5. In her situation which is constantly becoming more hopeless England is now trying, together with the Soviets, to build up a new front against Germany in the Caucasus, while crudely violating the neutrality and sovereignty of Iran with the most threadbare justification. This unscrupulous rape of a small state is the best conceivable illustration of the slogan "fight against the aggressors," upon which the peace program of Roosevelt and Churchill is built. Probably decisive for this action was the intention to aid the Bolsheviks in this manner in order to delay their final collapse as long as possible and to destroy Baku while there is still time. At the same time this entry of English troops into Iran shows in particular how greatly England already feels threatened in the central positions of the British Empire from Suez to Singapore. She increasingly feels the fateful hour approaching and therefore grasps at every means possible for holding these central positions, upon which England's riches depend. It could not be more clearly evident that it is the success of our arms that dictates the course of action to our opponent, and that he himself is slowly realizing what is involved in this struggle, which only 2 years ago people in London and Washington imagined to be so easy.

Please express the foregoing viewpoints and ideas in a suitable manner with the means available to you.<sup>5</sup>

The same text to all Missions.

RIBBENTROP

<sup>5</sup> Multex telegram No. 663 of Aug. 26 (105/113991) to Rintelen forwarded the following additional instructions with regard to the document printed:

"In order to avoid misunderstandings it is pointed out that the foregoing circular may be made use of orally only."

## No. 245

1517/872640-43

*The Chargé d'Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

ROME, August 26, 1941—3:00 p. m.

SECRET

Received August 26—5:30 p. m.

No. 1980 of August 26

Today the Director of the Commercial Policy Division of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Trade,<sup>1</sup> by direction of Riccardi, the Minister of Foreign Trade, handed to Counselor of Legation Graeff, a letter of this day's date addressed by the Minister to Minister Clodius, which, in translation, reads as follows:

"DEAR CLODIUS: I refer to the many negotiations which for some time have taken place within the framework of the meetings of the governmental committees on the question of our imports from Germany—negotiations which have clearly revealed the fears that Italy entertains with regard to the schedule of these imports.<sup>2</sup>

Despite the assurances given on the German side, the situation shows no improvement; in fact, it is getting worse. Therefore with reference to our recent conversations,<sup>3</sup> I consider it appropriate to explain to you, who have always been especially accessible on all problems affecting the economic relations between our two countries, the seriousness of the problem and the need for expediting remedial action.

Apart from the sufficiently well known and delicate situation that developed some time ago in regard to coal,<sup>4</sup> one may say that in all important sectors of imports the Italian purchasing organizations, despite their exertions, have been in a position to realize only in part the provisions of the governmental agreements. That is the case, among other things (to mention only a few of the most significant areas) with iron and steel, scrap, cast iron, manganese ore, chromium ore, paraffin, glycerine, naphthalene, caustic soda, etc., while in the field of deliveries of machinery the deplorable difficulties are well known.

I consider it useful to send you herewith a survey showing the status of the imports of the most important products at the end of last July, from which you may get a good idea of the situation. The gravity of this situation is apparent if one considers at present that, in general, deliveries are involved which directly or indirectly affect the conduct of the war itself, and for which, precisely in view of their absolute necessity, your Government has assumed a formal obligation to carry them out. You are familiar, on the other hand, with the efforts that were made by the Italians in the sphere of our exports, efforts which in the case of various products contained in the agreements of Com-

<sup>1</sup> G. Dall'Oglio.

<sup>2</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 652 and footnote 1.

<sup>3</sup> Clodius had been in Rome at the beginning of August for economic and financial negotiations. The complete record of these negotiations has not been found. A German-Italian protocol and exchange of notes of Aug. 5 and 6, concerning economic measures in Greece has been filmed on 2033/445548-63.

<sup>4</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 641 and footnote 1.

mittee A,<sup>5</sup> represent a great sacrifice with respect to the most urgent requirements of the domestic supply situation. Moreover, in many other fields (for example, garden products, potatoes, processed fruits and vegetables, canned foods, textile products in general) we have exceeded the contractual obligations resulting from the agreements in the certainty that we, too, for our part, could surely count on the imports that our Governments have considered absolutely necessary. The alarming situation that has developed in the field of our imports from Germany and from the areas controlled by Germany, demands the immediate resort to all means that would tend to bring about a rapid improvement. Therefore I would ask that, independent of the conversations we will have on this matter on the occasion of our next meeting in Rome or in Germany,<sup>6</sup> you press the authorities in question with your customary energy to the end that the deliveries be made at the rate required by the present incessant needs. Meanwhile I send you my best regards. Yours sincerely, Riccardi."

End of translation.

In the survey attached to the foregoing letter, there are given for a number of products the quotas agreed upon for the year 1941, the resulting quantities to be delivered for the first 7 months of 1941, the actual imports in the first 7 months of 1941, and the corresponding deficiencies. There are for these 7 months the following deficiencies in tons:

Coal	674,713	Caustic soda	3,830
Iron and steel	154,877	Buna	286
Iron and steel scrap	35,900	Pulpwood	5,063
Cast iron	26,400	Cellulose	25,063
Aluminum	6,306	Benzol	2,059
Copper	1,890	Toluol	1,511
Nickel	140	Acetone	175
Manganese ore	3,194	Cresylic acid	50
Chrome ore	3,495	Propyl alcohol	92
Vanadium	10	Phthalic acid anhydride	242
Bismuth	2	Centralite	455
Antimony	140	Magnesium	291
Manganese bioxide	100	Glycerine	897
Pitch coke	4,875	Naphthalene	2,624
Paraffin	2,563	Nitro-cellulose	2,264
Turpentine	1,065	Rhodium	kg. 2

In a talk with the expert from the Embassy, Director General Dall'Oglio further clarified the above statements of Minister Riccardi, and pointed out especially the extent to which Italian shipments

<sup>5</sup> No record of these agreements have been found. In Rome telegram No. 1739 of Aug. 3 (2033/445546) Clodius refers to conversations with Riccardi and Favagrossa regarding mutual deliveries of raw materials and mentions complaints by both parties regarding the schedule and quantities of deliveries.

<sup>6</sup> Clodius was again in Rome at the end of October. See document No. 440.

had been made to Germany, and that, in the fields of foods and textiles, they had been made with jeopardy to the Italian internal supply situation.

BISMARCK

## No. 246

142/127681

*The Foreign Minister to the Reich Plenipotentiary in Greece*

Telegram

No. 894 from the Special Train, August 26, 1941.  
Special Train Received Berlin, August 26—4: 40 p. m.  
No. 1092 from the Foreign Ministry Sent August 26—6: 50 p. m.  
RAM 366/R

With reference to your telegram No. 1152 of August 21.<sup>1</sup>

In the question of a reorganization of the Greek Government please maintain complete reserve and leave every initiative in this respect wholly to your Italian colleague. It appears doubtful to me whether it would serve our purpose to bring to power there a cabinet made up of energetic personalities who would possibly make nothing but difficulties for us. At the time we brought the Tsolakoglou Government into existence it was mainly in order to take the wind out of the sails of the then Greek Government on Crete.<sup>2</sup> Tsolakoglou has indeed fulfilled this task. As long as the Tsolakoglou Cabinet serves the purpose of keeping the Greek administrative machinery going, we can be quite glad, as we look at it from here, to have General Tsolakoglou at the head of this Cabinet.

RIBBENTROP

<sup>1</sup> In this telegram (142/127678) Altenburg reported that the Italian Plenipotentiary had received authorization to negotiate regarding a reorganization of the Greek Government.

<sup>2</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 410.

## No. 247

2281/482355-56

*Circular of the Foreign Ministry*<sup>1</sup>

BERLIN, August 26, 1941.

Pol. V 4552 g.

In view of the developments in the east émigrés of all sorts (Russian, Ukrainian, White Russian, Caucasian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Estonian, etc.) have offered the Foreign Ministry and German Missions abroad their services in the new organization of Russia. For your confidential information I wish to make the following remarks with regard to this:

For the present on grounds of principle we have no interest in the cooperation of these émigrés in establishing a new order in Russia, so that, in general, reserve is advisable with respect to these groups; above all political promises are to be avoided. The forwarding of offers to the Foreign Ministry is to be limited to special cases. As a rule it will probably be sufficient to thank the applicants and reply to them that note has been taken of their wishes.

It remains desirable as before to maintain contact with émigrés in whom we are interested for the sake of information.

I suggest that the consular offices under your authority be notified.

By order:  
WOERMANN

<sup>1</sup> This circular was sent to the Embassies in Turkey, Spain, Italy, and Paris, to the Legations in Croatia, Switzerland, Hungary, Rumania, Finland, Denmark, Portugal, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Sweden, to the offices of the Foreign Ministry in Athens, Belgrade, Brussels, The Hague, Prague, and Krakow and to the Consulate at Tangier.

## No. 248

911/294612-16

*Field Marshal Mannerheim to Field Marshal Keitel*<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET MILITARY

HEADQUARTERS, August 26, 1941.

Abt.L I H Op.

No. 441451/41 gk

Commander in Chief of the Finnish Armed Forces.

Your Excellency: I am very grateful to you, dear Field Marshal, for your letter<sup>2</sup> and especially for the message that you sent to the Finnish Army and to the Finnish people.

<sup>1</sup> The document printed here is a copy from the files of Ambassador Ritter. It carries an OKW file number and the date Aug. 29 from Hitler's Headquarters.

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 228.



An exchange of views, in the sense that you have in mind, is certainly of the greatest importance for the execution of joint operations and I should like to present to you, dear Field Marshal, quite openly, the difficulties and the limits that I see at present for the continuation of operations.

To accomplish the job given to the Finnish armed forces, the country's reserves, even at the very beginning, had to be used without regard for maintaining life on the home front (agriculture and industry).

Thus, at the outset of the war, about 500,000 men were under arms although the wounds of the winter war had still not healed over. Aside from these workers employed in the war industry, about 30,000 construction workers for bridge and road construction and 80,000 *Lottas* (women volunteer workers of the defense corps organization) are being employed for maintenance, air raid protection, and communications in the army forces. This means that about 16% of the population is engaged in war activities.

Monthly casualties are now considerably higher than during the winter war and, since the middle of August, it has no longer been possible to maintain the military potential that has been diminishing through casualties. It will not be successful either although the class of 1922 has already been called up.

Thus in the middle of August the fourth platoon of the infantry companies was disbanded and the disbandment, in September, of a division has been scheduled as a possibility in order to provide for replacements for the fighting troops.

Regarding the wishes expressed and the possibilities of satisfying them, I shall give my views in the sequence given in your letter.

1) The cutting off of the Karelian Isthmus from the north began on July 30, 1941, with the offensive west of Lake Ladoga. The advance seems to be proceeding satisfactorily until now and the troops have already reached the eastern bank of the Vuoksi to the shore of Lake Ladoga. I have also launched an attack in a south eastern direction from Vyborg.

The enemy seems to be digging in south of the eastern Vuoksi and has organized the defense there, according to intercepted radio messages.

A further advance will probably run into greater resistance.

To the south, close to the old boundary, the enemy had already completed in peace time a deep zone of fortifications which, in case the enemy had to some degree organized his defense, will apparently be very difficult to cross due to a lack of armored forces, heavy artillery and dive bombing. The fortifications that were confirmed by our

agents up to November 1939 are entered on the enclosed map.<sup>3</sup> This contains only a portion of the structures, however, and the ones that were built after the winter war and which, after the idea in Russia that Finland was to serve as a base of attack for a German Army had won ground, are wholly lacking; those certainly constitute a considerable number.

In my opinion, an advance from the south to take these fortifications from the rear would thus be easier. It would also be very difficult for me to convince the Government to permit a crossing of the old boundary west of Ladoga.<sup>4</sup> The forces of the Finnish Armed Forces will nevertheless pin down the enemy troops that would cling to these fortifications.

2) The operation to get rid of the threat to the flank from the Suvilakhti-Suojärvi region has now been ended and in the next few days I shall renew the advance against the Svir by way of Olonets and Petrozavodsk.

Even though it will be possible to reach the Svir with the troops available, a crossing of this river would, according to what has hitherto been experienced with the enemy's resistance, present great difficulties and can hardly be carried out without the support of German fighter squadrons. The possibility of providing a mobile group that should advance south of the Lake of Ladoga in order to unite with the German troops cannot as yet be considered because the engagements near Petrozavodsk and around the crossing points could turn out to be very hard.

3) I understand the reasons mentioned by the Field Marshal about maintaining the 14th Regiment; the unit replacement of my troops is, however, getting more difficult from day to day and I ask that, if at all possible, the regiment be returned to me again by the middle of September.

4) I stated already during the negotiations through my authorized officers that an attack on Hanko with the troops at my disposal could not be carried out.<sup>5</sup> I had also proposed that the Hanko sector should

<sup>3</sup> Not found. A map showing some of the Russian fortifications was attached to Erfurth's report No. 441468 of Sept. 1 (911/294602-04).

<sup>4</sup> With his letter of transmittal of Aug. 27 (911/294617-21) General Erfurth included some confidential statements which Lt. Gen. Hanell, Mannerheim's Chief of Staff, made in connection with Mannerheim's letter to Keitel. In the case of the border crossing, the Finnish Constitution stipulated that the Commander in Chief obtain prior assent of the Government.

In his report No. 441468 of Sept. 1, Erfurth mentioned that Mannerheim had conceded his, Erfurth's, arguments regarding German-Finnish operations around Leningrad and, as a result, had obtained permission from President Ryti to cross the old border on both sides of the Leningrad-Vyborg road. See also document No. 264.

<sup>5</sup> See vol. xii of this series, document No. 554.

be left to German troops so that the offensive in the East might be carried out successfully. In the middle of July I was forced to transfer the only unit suited to attack in this sector to the Karelian Army.

Before the successful conclusion of operations in the East, I see no possibility of attacking Hanko unless the enemy's morale collapses. So far there are no recognizable signs of this happening. If troops were later to be released for the attack on Hanko, this attack would, in my opinion, not be successful without considerable use of German fighter units.

In line with the outcome of the negotiations I had ordered the Army's strategic concentration in such a way that an advance would have been possible either west or east of Lake Ladoga.

At the end of June the request was expressed on the part of the Germans that the Finnish Army should advance east of Lake Ladoga in order to meet the German troops on the Svir near Lodeynoye Pole. The offensive was started on the day agreed upon.

In order to fulfill the request that the Finnish forces should attack also on the Karelian Isthmus, an offensive was launched at the end of July west of Lake Ladoga, which as cited in paragraph 1 is still going on.

A simultaneous advance on both sides of Lake Ladoga, which is dominated by the enemy, demands sufficient reserves because of the great depth of the operations. A joint reserve for both directions would have no meaning because fast transport facilities do not exist in sufficient quantities.

In line with what has been agreed upon, the Finnish division which was placed under Army Headquarters, Norway for the Salla-Kandalaksha operation, should be brought back after Kandalaksha has been reached at the latest. Because it could be assumed that this operation would be concluded very rapidly, I had counted on the return of this division as a reserve for the operation against the Svir. Now, however, because the difficulties have turned out to be very great, it appears to me that I cannot count on these reinforcements in the immediate future.

It is to be expected that the resistance during the advance against the Svir will be considerably greater, in case an advance of the German troops from the South against the Svir must be abandoned.

The demands that were made of the Finnish armed forces have been considerably increased because of the changed situation and I bear them in mind when I consider how to satisfy them successfully. The difficulties that have turned out to be much greater everywhere than could have been assumed, make me cautious in promises about the future operations of the Finnish Army.

My intention is to continue the offensive on the Karelian Isthmus to the old boundary and there to pin down the enemy with the strongest possible forces. As soon as the situation on the Karelian Isthmus had cleared up to some degree, as far as I can see in the next few days, I shall take up the offensive that has already been started against the Svir.

The danger of Bolshevism for all of Europe has only become clear in this war and gratitude for what Germany has done has grown deeply in every Finn. I should like to express to you, dear Field Marshal, my admiration for the deeds of the Wehrmacht and I am convinced that the war against Bolshevism will lead to a prosperous future for the entire world.

Yours, etc.

MANNERHEIM

No. 249

1543/375684

*The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 2935 of August 27

WASHINGTON, August 27, 1941—8:35 p. m.

Received August 28—8:05 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 1633 of August 26.<sup>1</sup>

If Japanese naval circles should seriously consider taking Manila in the course of a southern operation, such an act of aggression would undoubtedly be answered with an American declaration of war on Japan. In this connection it should be borne in mind that a war on Japan would, in such circumstances, be extremely popular and might at one stroke overcome the reluctance of the American people for war; this would naturally affect the war situation in general, as soon as our obligations arising out of the Tripartite Pact became effective. The assertion of the Japanese Navy that there is danger of a flank attack from Manila is not valid under present conditions, since there are in the Philippines no modern bases for the American fleet. Japanese expansionist policy in the southern area, if pursued gradually and if it avoids American sovereign territory, will in my opinion, be tolerated by the United States of America, although the Americans will lose face in the process. As the numerous American attempts at appeasement show, the American Government does not want a war with Japan because it is not prepared for a two-front war, and it can, therefore, under existing conditions, make no decisions that could stop

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 225.

the systematic advance of the Japanese in the southern area. An attack on Manila, however, would force the Americans to make a decision which, as we see it from here, cannot be in our interest.

THOMSEN

No. 250

230/153341-42

*The Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the Military  
Commander in Serbia to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

BELGRADE, August 27, 1941—10:45 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received August 28—1:30 a.m.

No. 557 of August 27

With reference to your telegram No. 1092 of August 18.<sup>1</sup>

Since my telegram of August 12<sup>2</sup> the situation has become more acute. The communist movement is spreading and is operating with nationalist slogans which begin to meet with a response. The misery of the Serbian refugees expelled from Croatia and Hungary and their stories keep adding to the fuel. Contacts with Communists and other rebels in Macedonia, Croatia, Montenegro, etc., are growing closer. Isolated successes that have undoubtedly been attained in combatting the rebels, as well as the arrest of a number of leaders and raids on centers have not brought any improvement in the over-all situation. Even though conditions are not the same in all parts of the country, the attacks on transportation installations, municipal offices and mining installations are increasing. Municipal archives are being systematically destroyed, and delivery of harvests and collection of taxes are impeded by terror. German troops can move about in the country either by car or by train practically only in convoys. In Belgrade the situation is relatively quiet.

The provisionally appointed government is in the process of dissolution. The Finance Minister has resigned for the reason that he could not raise the sum of 6.5 million reichsmarks per month fixed by the Military Commander for occupation costs. The installment due on August 15 was not paid. Furthermore, two days ago two ministers of the Ljotić group, namely the Minister of Economics and the Minister for Social Welfare, asked to be relieved of their offices; as did the Minister of Labor, for reasons of health. The installation of the new Serbian government body of popular men who are willing to fight

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (230/153331). In this telegram Ribbentrop informed Benzler that his reports on the situation in Belgrade had been discussed with Veesenmayer who would inform him about Ribbentrop's views in the matter.

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 195.

communism vigorously encounters difficulties but is nevertheless being attempted. Negotiations are in process.

BENZLER

No. 251

233/156708-07

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

St.S. No. 550

BERLIN, August 27, 1941.

I asked the Argentine Ambassador to call on me today in order that I might, in continuation of the conversation begun by Under State Secretary Woermann,<sup>1</sup> give him a talking-to and point out to him the dangers which as a result of the intrigues of third parties threaten our previously excellent relations.

In my conversation with the Argentinean I went far back.<sup>2</sup> I was not sparing in my praise of the earlier Argentine policy, which had been so irreproachable and self-reliant. Then I described the intrigues in the Patagonian<sup>3</sup> and Misiones cases,<sup>4</sup> which had finally ended with the complete rehabilitation of the German defendants. All this could have been avoided if the promptings of malevolent, non-Argentine elements had not been followed.

After some further general remarks I took up the incidents of recent date.

When I criticized the Taborda Commission,<sup>5</sup> the Ambassador disavowed this commission in no uncertain terms, just as he had done to Woermann. We were in complete agreement, however, that the Argentine Government could not throw off its full responsibility for the evil effect of the Taborda Commission.

I then took up successively the confiscation of the German courier pouch and of German parcel post packages to our Embassy and the arrest of numerous Germans on flimsy pretexts.<sup>6</sup> I also talked to the

<sup>1</sup> A record of this conversation of Aug. 25 has been filmed on 233/156693-94.

<sup>2</sup> A memorandum of Aug. 26 by Senior Counselor Freytag (2048/447047-50) listed and explained the points to be taken up by Weizsäcker.

<sup>3</sup> See vol. ix of this series, document No. 203, footnote 1.

<sup>4</sup> See vol. xii of this series, document No. 38.

<sup>5</sup> In telegram No. 962 of June 20 (233/156543) Thermann reported that the Argentine Chamber had approved a commission of investigation under the chairmanship of Damonte Taborda. In telegram No. 1048 of July 2 (233/156548-49) he reported that this commission was investigating German citizens and institutions in Argentina for unauthorized political activities and dissemination of Nazi propaganda, which were supposedly supported by funds from official German agencies.

<sup>6</sup> In telegram No. 1193 of July 26 (233/156572-73) Thermann reported the seizure of three diplomatic pouches by order of the investigation commission of the Argentine Chamber of Representatives. In telegram No. 1306 of Aug. 9 (233/156639-40) he reported the detention of 73 parcels by Argentine customs authorities. In telegrams Nos. 1401 of Aug. 22 (233/156684) and 1405 of Aug. 23 (233/156686) he reported the arrests of numerous Germans.

Ambassador with the utmost urgency about the systematic destruction of the German school system in Buenos Aires.<sup>7</sup> On that point too I found that the Ambassador showed understanding for our view. He was well aware of the significance of these institutions, which had been in operation for half a century. I furthermore remonstrated with the Ambassador about the press attacks on Herr von Thermann and his staff. I sharply criticized the interrogation of Consul General Barandon by the Tabora Commission.<sup>8</sup> In conclusion I also brought up the discrimination and vexation to which the DNB was subjected in Buenos Aires.

I used sharp words but a calm manner in bringing all this to the attention of the Argentinean, who, contrary to his former custom, became rather meek.

In order to give still more effect to the whole conversation I requested the Ambassador to make a personal appeal in my name to his Foreign Minister, a close acquaintance and friend of mine, who undoubtedly would understand perfectly well that these goings on had to be stopped.

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>7</sup> This was reported by Thermann in telegram No. 1393 of Aug. 21 (233/156682-88).

<sup>8</sup> Thermann reported this incident which involved the German Consul General in Valparaiso, Chile, in telegram No. 1406 of Aug. 23 (233/156687).

No. 252

65/45905

*The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 895 of August 28

TEHRAN, August 28, 1941.

Received August 28—8:50 a. m.

Minister President Foroughi has just made a brief declaration of the Government in the Parliament.<sup>1</sup> According to this, in order to prevent further bloodshed, the Shah has ordered the Iranian troops to make no further use of arms. There were no additional remarks. Accordingly there exists now a unilateral state of truce.

ETTEL

<sup>1</sup> In telegram No. 886 of Aug. 27 (65/45289) Ettel had reported the resignation of the Iranian Cabinet, and in telegram No. 892 of Aug. 28 (65/45892) the formation of a new government under Minister President Ali Foroughi and with Ali Soheyl as Foreign Minister.

No. 253

265/173196-98

*Ambassador Ritter to the Embassy in Turkey*

Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 1241

WESTFALEN, August 26, 1941.

Sent August 28.

[Pol. I M 2620g Rs.<sup>1</sup>]

I. Regarding point 5 of your telegram No. 1096 of August 23.<sup>2</sup>

The Foreign Minister requests you to make every effort to bring about at this time the change in the Turkish position which you consider possible later on as regards the question of the passage of Russian merchant vessels. Perhaps the Foreign Minister's conversation with the Turkish Ambassador, reported in our telegram No. 888 of August 24,<sup>3</sup> will furnish the internal occasion and the invasion of Iran by Russian and English troops the external occasion for the Turkish Government to renounce openly the commitments of the Montreux Convention and to impose a general ban for the time being on the passage of merchant vessels through the Dardanelles or at least to subject such passage to extensive surveillance combined with licensing in individual cases. If, as we assume, the Turkish Government expects a modification of the provisions of the Montreux Convention in favor of Turkey, as a result of the present military events and the change in the political power situation in the Black Sea, Turkey herself must also take timely action to initiate such a development. The best way of doing so would be for Turkey herself to cancel those commitments now. Reasons or pretexts for doing so could be found, given a positive readiness on the part of Turkey. For example, it might be pointed out that the Montreux Convention was concluded under quite different military and political conditions and that the present military and political configuration could not then be foreseen, as is evident from the very fact that Germany was not a signatory to the Montreux Convention, whereas she has now become

<sup>1</sup> The file number is supplied from the reply telegram (see footnote 4).

<sup>2</sup> This telegram (265/173177) reported the results of a démarche by Papen in the matter of possible passage of Soviet ships through Turkish waters (cf. documents Nos. 2 and 227). According to this telegram the Turkish Government would not permit the passage of Russian warships and would meet with armed resistance any attempt to force passage through the Straits. Ships escaping into Turkish territorial waters would be interned although the Turks considered it more likely that they would be scuttled. Point 5 of this telegram read as follows:

"With respect to merchant vessels the Government does not believe that it has a basis for refusing them passage. It considers that the latter is hardly likely in view of our presence off the Dardanelles. It is my view that Turkey will take a different position in this matter too as soon as there are clearer indications of the Russian defeat."

<sup>3</sup> Document No. 238.

the dominant power in the Black Sea area. Furthermore, it could be asserted that in the present circumstances the passage of merchant vessels may be misused for the through transport of crews and of war material thus compromising Turkey's neutral position. If Turkey should not close the Dardanelles to merchant vessels until later and if the Russian merchant fleet should have succeeded earlier in escaping to the Mediterranean, the subsequent closing would then be pointless and Turkey would have contributed to strengthening the means of combat of the Russo-English side, whereas it must be Turkey's interest for the future that Russia succumb in the present struggle.

If Turkey should decide on a general closing of the Dardanelles, we must of course expect that when exceptions are granted such transit as is absolutely essential to Germany, especially petroleum shipments, for example, will secretly be approved in each individual case.

If Turkey should not decide on the closing of the Dardanelles to merchant vessels, we must at least expect her to use the possibilities of surveillance given under the Montreux Convention in such a way that passage will be rendered difficult and delayed. I assume that the Embassy and the Consulate General have taken all necessary steps, in consultation with the Naval Attaché, so that the passage of Russian merchant ships can be detected immediately in every case and will be reported by the promptest means to the Admiral, Southeast.

There are reports here that negotiations about the sale of Russian merchant ships are pending between the Turkish and Russian Governments. Fourteen merchant steamers and 12 tankers are said to be involved. It is impossible to determine here whether these reports are well founded. I request that you find out as far as possible whether such negotiations are actually taking place. If we could rely on Turkey's not turning these merchant vessels over to England or in some other way permitting them to sail in the interest of England, a sale to Turkey might be the means of keeping the Russian merchant vessels out of the clutches of the English. In such a case, however, the Turkish Government would have to speak frankly with the Reich Government and come to an agreement with us on the conditions for recognition of the change of flags. If, however, there is a danger that Turkey thereby intends to do England a favor, the Turkish Government should be warned against such a purchase. The Reich Government and the armed forces of Germany and her allies would not recognize the change of flags if the purchase is made without the knowledge and approval of the Reich Government.

II. With regard to the Russian warships there are likewise reports here which indicate that manipulations are being planned for the purpose of getting the Russian warships through the Dardanelles,

contrary to law and contrary to the assurances of the Turkish Government. According to these reports the intention is first to place the Russian warships in the Black Sea under the English war flag. If in the subsequent negotiations the Turkish Government also refuses to let the warships under the British flag pass through the Dardanelles, they are to be interned in Turkey for the time being as a matter of form, in the hope that some way will later be found to escape from internment and reach the Mediterranean. I request that you keep such possibilities in mind.<sup>4</sup>

RITTER

<sup>4</sup> In telegram No. 1124 of Aug. 30 (265/173208) Papen reported having discussed the problem of the Russian Black Sea fleet with Saracoglu and İnönü. In the opinion of the Turks the problem would not become acute until the ports of Novorossisk and Batum were in German hands.

No. 254

319/192416-20

*Minute by the Head of Division W V of the Economic  
Policy Department*

REGARDING THE DISCUSSION AT MINISTERIALDIREKTOR WIEHL'S OFFICE  
ON AUGUST 28, 1941, CONCERNING ECONOMIC NEGOTIATIONS WITH  
SWEDEN

e.o. Ha. Pol. 5691 g.

Present:

Ministerialdirektor Wiehl, Minister Schnurre, Counselor van  
Scherpenberg (Foreign Ministry)  
Ministerialdirektor Walter (Reich Ministry of Food and Agri-  
culture—Chairman of the Government Committee for  
Sweden)  
Major General Becker, Major Radtke (High Command of the  
Wehrmacht—Military Economy and Armaments Office)  
Ministerialrat Ludwig (Reich Ministry of Economics).

At the opening of the discussion Ministerialdirektor Walter gave a survey of the subject and purpose of the impending economic negotiations with Sweden.<sup>1</sup> He pointed out that in view of the trend of German exports on the one hand and of the program of imports from Sweden on the other, a current clearing deficit had to be reckoned with, estimated roughly and subject to change at about 200 million Swedish kronor. In order to prevent this from interfering with our imports from Sweden, negotiations had to be conducted with the Swedish Government for a clearing credit at least equal to that amount. It should

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 347 and footnote 2.

be noted that such a credit could be obtained from Sweden only on the basis of an amendment of existing laws, i.e., through action by the Riksdag.

In order that such an arrangement may be obtained without detriment to our hitherto favorable access to imports of strategic raw materials, semifinished and finished products, the following conditions are essential:

(a) a guarantee that our exports in the civilian sector will be maintained at an adequate level;

(b) a central control of Wehrmacht purchases in Sweden for supply purposes;

(c) a relaxation of exports of war material to Sweden (possibly in connection with additional German purchases of strategic finished products).

Ministerialrat Ludwig gave a survey of the extremely unfavorable trend of German exports to Sweden and pointed out the direct harm to German import interests in strategic areas resulting from shortages in deliveries from Germany. Such harmful effects are already evident on a considerable scale, especially in the lumber and cellulose sectors, in the production of high-grade steel, and in the execution of our shipbuilding program in Swedish shipyards.

He mentioned the present threat of further retrenchments in Germany, which would now be possible only at the expense of the export industry and would thus inevitably lead to a further reduction of our exports, including those to Sweden.

On the question of control of German Wehrmacht purchases, Major Radtke stated that OKW had already, on the basis of a recent discussion in the Ministry of Economics, issued the pertinent orders, and this matter was thereby presumably settled.

On the question of war-material deliveries Major General Becker pointed out the great difficulties involved, which were well known.<sup>2</sup> In the case of captured Russian material the transportation problem was still insoluble. The problem will, however, be re-examined by the competent military authorities<sup>3</sup> in the light of the known list of items that the Swedes want,<sup>4</sup> and particularly from the viewpoint of how far we might still be able to go in offering captured material; collection on the spot would, for example, have to be left to the Swedes.

It was agreed that the crucial question was that of German exports

<sup>2</sup> See document Nos. 92 and 98.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 98 and footnote 7.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 59.

to Sweden. In order to be able to take full advantage of the war-economy potentials offered to us by Sweden through her sources of raw materials and her highly developed industry, Sweden's industry and economy must be kept intact. This is possible only if we supply them with sufficient goods.

The only way to ensure such a flow of supplies, it is believed, is to place exports to Sweden in a preferred category, as was done at one time in the case of exports to the Soviet Union by an order of the *Reichsmarschall*. In the case of Sweden this should be so much easier, since, in contrast to Russia, Swedish imports from Germany consist mainly of articles of daily use and include only a very small quantity of critical material. Moreover, the total volume of these exports is considerably smaller than was the case with Soviet Russia, although in the opinion of the Ministry of Economics it is very difficult to give any concrete figures for the German industrial capacity that would be monopolized by such preferred treatment of exports to Sweden.

On the basis of the study of the situation that had been undertaken it was agreed that in the interest of the German war economy a measure such as described above was urgent and desirable.

It was therefore arranged that Minister Schnurre, in carrying out the instruction already given him some time ago by the Foreign Minister, should first of all, in a conversation with State Secretary Landfried,<sup>5</sup> obtain the general approval of the Ministry of Economics. In addition, the matter should also be brought within the purview of the Minister of Armaments and Munitions, Dr. Todt, in order, finally, to obtain the decision of the *Reichsmarschall*. Major General Becker promises that General Thomas, who is expected to have conversations with the *Reichsmarschall* and Field Marshal Keitel on Saturday, August 30, will be informed by him in time about the result of the foregoing discussions.

VAN SCHERPENBERG

<sup>5</sup> A minute by Schnurre of Sept. 2 (2116/460504) noted that in the discussions on the German exports to Sweden, a letter addressed by Keitel on Aug. 17 to the Minister of Economics had played a role. The letter indicated that the totality of German exports would have to be scrutinized to determine if any could be justified in the present circumstances. A future export, Keitel stated, could be permitted only if it assured the importation of critical raw materials essential for the war. State Secretary Landfried on the basis of this letter took a negative view toward all requests for exports.

## No. 255

535/240020-23

*Note Verbale From the Apostolic Nunciature*

No. 41804

BERLIN, August 28, 1941.

[zu St.S. No. 560].<sup>1</sup>

The Apostolic Nunciature has the honor to confirm the receipt of the note verbale No. Pol. III 960 of the Foreign Ministry of May 19, 1941.<sup>2</sup> In regard to the confiscation of various properties, the note denies the right of the Church to dispose over temporal goods in the incorporated eastern areas, namely to possess and to administer them. Furthermore, approximately in the middle of this note verbale the following remark is added: "Furthermore, it is also of no importance whether the Catholic Church as a whole has a right of supreme ownership over the property of the corporate bodies belonging to its organization, since under canon law this is a matter of internal church law that has no application here."

The Apostolic Nunciature considers it its duty to make the following remarks in reply to this statement:

1. The right of the Church to church property is expressed clearly and distinctly in Canon 1499 with the following words: "Section 1. The Church, like other persons, has the right to acquire property on the basis of all forms of acquisition recognised by natural law or by positive law. Section 2. The right of ownership of these goods belongs, under the supreme authority of the Apostolic See, to the juridical person who has acquired them legally."

This right exists with the constitution of the Church itself; thus it has a general character resulting from the nature and the mission of the Church. Owing to its high origin this right remains in force at all times and in all places. This the Church has steadfastly maintained and it has defended this right whenever it was violated, in that it always stigmatized every forcible expropriation of Church property and protested against it until compensation was made.

2. This right of the Church is not based on any contractual agreements with the states; it exists independent of them. The Concordat with the Reich, as well as the one with Prussia or the one with Bavaria and the other agreements serve only for expressly recognizing these rights and underpinning them by means of a contractual obligation

<sup>1</sup> St.S. No. 560: In this memorandum of Aug. 29 (535/240019) Weizsäcker noted that the Nuncio had handed him the note verbale. "After a quick glance, in the presence of the Nuncio, I called his attention to the last paragraph of the note, the wording of which was misleading, inasmuch as the Foreign Ministry had never admitted a violation of existing legal principles. As to the contents of the note, I remarked that the legal theory expressed in it was by no means accepted everywhere or at all times."

<sup>2</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 567.

on the part of the Government concerned; by no means, however, is this right created or even only conceded through them.

3. This right of the Church exists also in full force in the occupied areas and must be respected by the occupying power. This is a principle of international law which was expressly stated at the Second Peace Conference in The Hague (October 18, 1907) in the Fourth Convention. Indeed one reads in the annex to this convention with regard to the laws and usages of land warfare the following articles, the French text of which is as follows:

"Article 46. Family honor and rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions and practice, must be respected. Private property cannot be confiscated.

"Article 47. Pillage is formally forbidden.

"Article 55. The occupying State shall be regarded only as administrator and usufructuary of public buildings, real estate, forests, and agricultural estates belonging to the hostile State, and situated in the occupied country. It must safeguard the capital of these properties, and administer them in accordance with the rules of usufruct.

"Article 56. The property of municipalities, that of institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, even when State property, shall be treated as private property.

All seizure of, destruction or willful damage done to institutions of this character, historic monuments, works of art and science, is forbidden, and should be made the subject of legal proceedings."

Inasmuch as is also stated in the above-mentioned note verbale, the Haupttreuhandstelle-Ost has violated these principles by the express confiscation of the property of the Catholic Church as well as of Catholic foundations, orders and associations, the Apostolic Nuncio in agreement with the position taken by the Church in similar cases registers due protest and demands that this confiscation be rescinded in the sense that the arbitrarily confiscated property be recognized as belonging to the legal owners and, as soon as the urgent necessities of war permit, also the free use of the real estate and premises belonging to them be returned to them. We cannot doubt that in the meantime they will have been granted a suitable compensation.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> On Aug. 29 the Nuncio handed Weizsäcker another note verbale (535/240025-28) which enlarged upon the arguments of the previous note and which cited specific examples of confiscation of church property.

See, further, document No. 260.

## No. 256

82/60541-42

*The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry*

## Telegram

MOST URGENT TOKYO, August 29, 1941—12:10 a. m., summer time.  
No. 1664 of August 28 Received August 29—11:30 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 1657 of August 29.<sup>1</sup>

The Foreign Minister,<sup>2</sup> with whom I had made an appointment, sent word to me that he was to have an audience in the Imperial Palace today and therefore asked me to call on Deputy Foreign Minister Amau.

The Deputy Foreign Minister told me that Konoye had sent the message to Roosevelt because of the impression that the Government of the United States wished to clear the atmosphere in the Pacific.<sup>3</sup> Prince Konoye had consequently sent Roosevelt a message of a general nature motivated by the aim of relaxing tension in the Pacific. Japanese-American negotiations had been broken off after the occupation of Indochina. A number of factors, such as the freezing measure<sup>4</sup> etc., had then worsened relations considerably and brought up problems which needed to be settled. It was an objective of the Tripartite Pact to keep America from entering the war. Japan had served this purpose first by trying to deter Roosevelt by sharp language. However, these tactics had not been successful; on the contrary, Roosevelt's attitude had stiffened still further as a result of the language used by Japan. Germany, on the other hand, had ignored Roosevelt's provocation and in an admirable manner had refrained from giving him any pretext for entering the war even on the occasion of the closing of the Consulates.<sup>5</sup> Roosevelt's game had thereby been rendered considerably more difficult. Japan thought it tactically advisable at the moment to adopt the same method as Germany. In reply to my question Amau said that Konoye's step did not aim at continuing negotiations within the framework established before the occupation of Indochina; in the meantime new problems had arisen, which had to

<sup>1</sup> This telegram (82/60540) reported that following a special meeting of the Japanese Cabinet an announcement was issued according to which Ambassador Nomura had presented to President Roosevelt on Aug. 28 a message from Prime Minister Konoye "regarding the problems of the Pacific pending between Japan and the United States."

<sup>2</sup> Admiral Teijiro Toyoda.

<sup>3</sup> For the text of Konoye's message and the account of its presentation to President Roosevelt by Ambassador Nomura, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941*, vol. II, pp. 571-573.

<sup>4</sup> This refers to the order freezing Japanese assets in the United States. See document No. 239, footnote 2.

<sup>5</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 634.

be settled if peace in the Pacific was to be maintained. Japan would of course do nothing in this connection that was incompatible with the Tripartite Pact. The Japanese Government still stood by its [offer of] cooperation of July 2.<sup>6</sup> The object of Konoye's action was merely to prevent the entry of the United States into the war.

I told Amau that although I had no instructions from my Government I could state at this time that my Government attached the greatest importance to learning the exact contents of Konoye's message. I could not hide the fact that I had serious doubts about the advisability of a conciliatory gesture by Japan in the face of the American provocation, which had found expression only recently in the dispatch of an American military mission to Chungking.<sup>7</sup>

It is to be feared that the Japanese step will give Roosevelt the additional time he wants on account of the incomplete state of American armaments. I rejected Amau's comparison with the policy toward America followed by Germany.

In view of the importance of the questions raised I again asked to be received by the Foreign Minister as soon as possible.

The Deputy Foreign Minister promised to forward my request to be given the contents of the Konoye message and to be received by the Foreign Minister.

A further telegraphic report will follow.<sup>8</sup>

OTT

<sup>6</sup> See documents Nos. 63 and 64.

<sup>7</sup> Announced by the White House on Aug. 26. See Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1941, vol. V, p. 166.

<sup>8</sup> Document No. 259.

## No. 257

230/153345-46

*The Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the Military Commander in Serbia to the Foreign Ministry*

## Telegram

MOST URGENT BELGRADE, August 29, 1941—4:55 p. m.  
No. 562 of August 29 Received August 29—5:40 p. m.

1. It having become increasingly apparent that the locally available German military and police forces, despite their most intensive efforts and not inconsiderable losses, are insufficient for suppressing the mounting Communist activity, while on the other hand requests for reinforcements were rejected, an attempt had to be made to have the Serbs themselves crush this Communist activity so as to prevent the union of Communist and nationalist elements which is developing.



The provisionally appointed government, as previously reported,<sup>1</sup> was no longer in a position to do this.

2. The Military Commander has therefore decided to entrust the popular former War Minister General Milan Nedić, who is known as a vigorous adversary of the Communists, with the formation of a government. He left him a free hand in selecting his collaborators and will hold him alone responsible for the prompt suppression of the rebellion in the country. Today Nedić submitted the list of his collaborators. According to this Ačimović will retain the Ministry of the Interior. The Ljotić group is represented by three ministers. Otherwise, the list comprises for the most part colorless personalities, with the exception of General Josip Kostec, the Minister of Posts and Transportation, who enjoys a reputation for efficiency. While not all the names are satisfactory, Nedić's proposal was accepted so that the struggle against the Communist terror can be vigorously taken up without delay. Formation of the new government will be announced on Saturday morning.<sup>2</sup>

3. In order to enhance General Nedić's authority with respect to his colleagues in the Ministry and in the country, he will bear the title Minister President and his collaborators will be designated as Ministers.

It has been made sure, however, that the de facto new government body will be given no substantive powers exceeding those given to the old provisionally appointed government. The reorganization, in addition, deals a blow to the shadow government of Simović in London, which will have the ground cut out from under its feet.

4. The Military Commander has made General Nedić no promises in recompense for suppression of the Communist rebellion. What is being considered is merely increasing the strength of the gendarmerie from 5,000 to 10,000, and the formation of local auxiliary combat units for home defense purposes, up to a total strength of 5,000. With this Nedić expects to restore order, but the essential condition for this is that the population should be solidly in back of him. As the government on the whole is not any stronger than the previous government, all will depend on whether Nedić's personality will have the anticipated attraction. Should he fail, the only alternative left to the Military Commander will be administering the country without Serbian assistance and undertaking the military suppression of the rebellion with German forces alone.

5. I recommend that formation of the government be treated in the German press as an internal Serbian matter and only briefly, with

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 250.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram No. 567 of Aug. 29 (230/153348-49) Benzler supplied a list of the members of the Nedić government.

the possible mention that this would give the Serbian people one more chance of freeing themselves from the communist scourge by their own efforts.<sup>3</sup>

BENZLER

<sup>3</sup> Kasche reported from Zagreb in telegram No. 1066 of Sept. 1 (230/153402-03) that "the establishment of the Serbian Government of Nedić has aroused concern here." Marshal Kvaternik termed Nedić a former foe of Germany and considered the establishment of the Nedić government as an action whose effects would be disadvantageous for Croatia.

No. 258

4881/E253249-50

*The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister*<sup>1</sup>

Teletype

SECRET

BERLIN, August 29, 1941.

To the Special Train

In the economic negotiations with Turkey, scheduled to begin in Ankara on September 8, one of the most essential questions for Germany is whether it will be possible to obtain from the Turkish Government the resumption of chromium ore and copper deliveries. In view of the attitude assumed by the Turkish Government in this respect even in the last few years before the war, it is out of the question that it should consent to such deliveries, unless Turkey in turn obtains war material from Germany.<sup>2</sup>

In view of the importance of chromium ore and copper the High Command of the Wehrmacht has approved the delivery of war material up to 20 million reichsmarks. The terms of delivery for this, as far as possible, will be arranged in such a way that at least the larger portion of the deliveries will not be made until a later date so that there is no direct strengthening of Turkey; in view of the small quantities involved this would occur, moreover, only to a very slight extent even in the event of immediate delivery of the full amount.

Herewith to be submitted to the Foreign Minister with the request for his approval that Herr Clodius, if he obtains appropriate counter-concessions, may make an agreement with the Turkish Government

<sup>1</sup> It appears that this document was originally drafted as a memorandum by Clodius which was submitted to Weizsäcker through Wiehl. The memorandum as printed here was dispatched over Weizsäcker's signature with a paragraph added by him (cf. footnote 3).

<sup>2</sup> A Weizsäcker memorandum submitted to Ribbentrop on July 19 (2109/456541-44) had pointed out that the forthcoming economic negotiations would attempt to settle German-Turkish trade on the basis of a clearing agreement as it existed prior to September 1, 1939. This memorandum also discussed in greater detail the respective needs of Germany and Turkey with regard to chromium and war material.

also for delivery of war material within the modest limits mentioned in the foregoing.<sup>3</sup>

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>3</sup> In a memorandum of Sept. 6 (2109/456521) Woermann recorded that Rintelen had asked him to inform Wiehl as follows:

"1. The Foreign Minister agrees to the Clodius memorandum of Aug. 29 signed by the State Secretary regarding the German-Turkish negotiations. Thus Clodius can offer also war material in return for corresponding concessions.

2. Without referring to the Foreign Minister, Clodius is to be given telegraphic instructions that the negotiations should be conducted within the framework of sober, economic negotiations and not be treated as a political issue."

A draft telegram of Sept. 7 by Wiehl (265/173228) transmitting these instructions to Clodius is in the files.

No. 259

82/80548-49

*The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 1660 of August 30

TOKYO, August 30, 1941—10:00 a. m.

Received August 30—8:15 p. m.

[Pol. VIII 4774 g.]<sup>1</sup>

With reference to my telegram No. 1657 of August 29.<sup>2</sup>

The Foreign Minister received me this afternoon in the presence of an interpreter. In accordance with your telegram No. 1383 of August 25,<sup>3</sup> I first gave him a picture of the general situation, emphasized the military weakening which the Soviet Union has in the meantime undergone, and pointed out the incomplete state of American armaments. In view of this situation Japan was free, without running any risk, to make the decisions necessary to safeguard her position and her prestige.

I asked the Foreign Minister for particulars about Konoye's message to President Roosevelt. I feared that this step might create the impression in the United States that Japan was prepared to renounce any forceful action in the Pacific and I repeated our well-known arguments about the conclusions which the Americans might all too readily draw from that. Toyoda replied that he could only confirm the statements made by Deputy Foreign Minister Amau on the previous day<sup>4</sup> about the nature of Konoye's message and avoided entering into a discussion of the advisability of the Japanese step. [He said that] Japan merely aimed to keep the United States from entering the war, in accordance with the objective of the Tripartite Pact. In reply to

<sup>1</sup> The file number is supplied from another copy (1680/395792-93).

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 256, footnote 1.

<sup>3</sup> Document No. 239.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 256.

my question about the first impression produced by Konoye's message, he stated that the first discussion had only been a brief one and in view of the general nature of the message it had undoubtedly not yet brought about any statement of the American Government's position. No report had yet been received from Ambassador Nomura; he would, however, inform me about any reply from the United States, as I had urgently requested in view of the importance of the matter, as soon as a reply was received. Toyoda did not comply with my request to let me have the text of Konoye's message.

During the conversation Toyoda was, in keeping with his nature, very reserved. I am told that the advisability of Konoye's message is vigorously debated in army and navy circles. Although, in view of the attitude of Konoye's Government, it was to be expected that attempts would be made to establish a modus vivendi with the United States, even if it were only temporary, the news of a message from the Prime Minister to Roosevelt came nevertheless as a surprise. The prominence given to this step by the American press made an embarrassing impression here and left the uneasy feeling also in government circles that the reaction might possibly be different from what was hoped for. The Government tried to keep the treatment of the event by the press within restricted limits.

OTT

No. 260

535/240035

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

St.S. No. 565

BERLIN, August 30, 1941.

With reference to St.S. No. 560 of August 29, 1941.<sup>1</sup>

In regard to the Nuncio's note transmitted to me yesterday concerning the claims of the Catholic Church to ownership of Church property in the incorporated eastern territories, I told him today that in this note he treated the formerly Polish area as "occupied territory." This error aside, however, the Nuncio himself would hardly have the hope of prevailing with us with his legal theory, namely, that canon law was effective even where there are no contractual agreements with the State.<sup>2</sup>

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 255, footnote 1.

<sup>2</sup> Marginal note apparently in the handwriting of Dr. Herbert Siegfried: "Pol. III is waiting for a statement of Dept. R (Sept. 11)."

## No. 261

116/67021-22

*The Director of the Department for German Internal Affairs to the Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the Military Commander in Serbia*

Telegram

BERLIN, August 30, 1941.  
zu D VIII 1874.<sup>1</sup>

Drafting officer: Regierungsrat Dr. Goeken.

The Zagreb Legation wires as follows:<sup>2</sup>

"The Military Commander in Serbia had State Councilor Turner make the communication that further resettlement in Serbia of Serbs from Croatia was no longer supportable.<sup>3</sup> Turner's statements that the resettlement quota for Serbs from Croatia is already exhausted are by no means accurate. Turner's earlier statement to Veesenmayer proves that some arbitrary calculation is being made there."

Please report by wire especially concerning how many Serbs have so far been deported from Croatia to Serbia.<sup>4</sup>

LUTHER

*Minute:*

Sturmabführer Eichmann of the Reich Security Main Office stated upon inquiry that at the suggestion of Minister Todt last week the current resettlement transports of Slovenes were halted by order of the Reichsführer-SS for strategic reasons. Since no directive had been issued by the Reichsführer-SS to halt the preparations for admitting the Volksdeutsche from the Val Canale, the Val di Gardena, Ljubljana and Kočevje, who are to be settled in the areas of Lower Styria and Southern Carinthia evacuated by Slovenes, the Reich Security Main Office and the Reich Commissariat for the consolidation of the German National Community had submitted a proposal to the Reichsführer-SS that the evacuation of Slovenes in Lower Styria should be continued to the extent necessary for accommodating the Volksdeutsche mentioned. A decision had not yet been made by the Reichsführer-SS.

<sup>1</sup> D VIII 1874: Not found.

<sup>2</sup> The following are excerpts from Zagreb telegram No. 1064 of Aug. 27 (116/67020).

<sup>3</sup> On the resettlement of Serbs and Slovenes see vol. XII, of this series, document No. 589 and document No. 116 in this volume.

For an account of the transfers of population in the territory of Yugoslavia, based on German and Croatian documents cf. Andrija-Ljubomir Lisac, "Deportacije Srba iz Hrvatske," *Historijski Zbornik* (IX), Nos. 1-4 (Zagreb, 1956), pp. 125-145.

<sup>4</sup> No reply found.

Sturmabführer Eichmann supplied the following data regarding the evacuation of Slovenes from Lower Styria and Southern Carinthia thus far:

About 7,000 Slovenes (wave 1: intellectuals) have been deported to Serbia from these two areas. 7,000 to 8,000 Slovenes have been deported to Croatia from Lower Styria from wave 2 (those who had moved in after 1914). That is thus a total of about 15,000 Slovenes, who have so far been pushed out of these two areas. Because the number of Volksdeutsche mentioned must certainly amount to more than 20,000, and because in the opinion of the Reich Security Main office at least twice the number of Slovenes must be deported so as to take them [the Volksdeutsche] into the Reich, this would result in a number of at least 40,000 to 50,000 Slovenes in all to be evacuated. In the Zagreb agreements<sup>5</sup> the transfer of 170,000 Slovenes had been envisaged.

Regarding the deportation of Serbs from Croatia to Serbia, Sturmabführer Eichmann stated that according to his information about 12,000 Serbs had been deported in the regular way. The number of Serbs deported illegally, which was far higher, was not known to him at the moment.

<sup>5</sup> Of June 4. See volume XII of this series, document No. 589.

## No. 262

260/170152-53

*The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

HELSINKI, September 1, 1941—2:15 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received September 1—2:55 p. m.

No. 865 of September 1

In considering the situation in Finland, the following must be taken into account:

1) According to the official version, Finland is waging a defensive war against Soviet Russia because of the Russian attack on Finnish territory on June 25.<sup>1</sup> Finland's war against Russia is not connected "genetically" with the German-Russian war but since then it has been connected operationally with it.

2) Finland's army is putting up a first-rate fight in close harmony with German troops and has so far been waging a defensive war in the offensive form.

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 15.

3) The Finnish people do not wish to be drawn into a European struggle aside from the Finnish-Russian conflict, and especially with regard to England, do not wish to go beyond a break in diplomatic relations.<sup>2</sup> Finland attaches great importance to having good relations with the United States.

4) Finland has 16 (sixteen) percent of her population under arms. The economy cannot be sustained by the population remaining behind.

5) Feeding of the population could be ensured with difficulty during the summer by additional supplies from abroad but will cause great difficulty in the future.

6) The losses sustained by Finland in the field are higher than could be estimated and are detrimental to morale; the latter improved under the influence of the latest military successes.

7) The official war aims have so far not been announced by the Government. The recovery of former territory is considered the obvious minimum claim that is also compatible with a strict interpretation of the defensive war. The Officers' Corps, rightist circles with the exception of the Finns of Swedish origin,<sup>3</sup> a large part of the Agrarian Party and the Right-wing Socialists hope to acquire Eastern Karelia as far as the Svir border.<sup>4</sup> Open discussions of this war aim are still, at the moment, causing opposition, the strength of which must not be underestimated.

8) Strong forces among the people and in the army imagine that the military advance will go only as far as their war aims. Whether the military and political leadership can divorce itself from this in its decisions, will depend on the war situation, losses, and morale in the country.

9) Some prominent men clearly see that Finland needs not only territorial expansion but also security, which is only obtainable through the defeat of Russia.

BLÜCHER

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 160.

<sup>3</sup> The German reads "von Schweden" which usually would mean "of Sweden." There is a marginal note at this point: "so received." Wipert von Blücher, *Gesandter zwischen Diktatur und Demokratie* (Wiesbaden, 1951), p. 245, renders the passage "der Schweden."

<sup>4</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 592 and footnote 3, and document No. 636 and footnote 3.

No. 263

1062/308613-15

*The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TEHRAN, September 1, 1941.

No. 922 of September 1

Received September 1—3:25 p. m.

At 11:30 a.m. I had a talk with the Foreign Minister,<sup>1</sup> during which I expounded to him in very serious words the view of the Reich Government regarding the responsibility of the Iranian Government for the fate of the German colony. My question whether he had anything definitive to tell me concerning the discussions with the Russians and the English about the German colony was answered by the Foreign Minister in the negative. He had spoken to the British Minister along the line of the statement I had made to him several days before that the German colony would make the journey to Turkey through Iraq and Syria.<sup>2</sup> The British Minister had replied that the British Government was prepared to receive the Germans in Ahwaz. The Foreign Minister gave a negative reply to my specific question whether the British Minister had given any guarantees that the Reich Germans would be sent on to Turkey. The Foreign Minister was likewise unable to answer my further question as to what the English intended to do with the German colony in Ahwaz. I then told the Foreign Minister that the situation was entirely clear to me now. The English intended to intern the German colony in any event. If the Iranian Government were to expel the Reich Germans, it would amount to delivering them into the hands of the enemy. This would not only indicate the complete impatience of the Iranian Government but also arouse a storm of indignation among right-minded people the world over. I had to warn him most urgently against any such expulsion without first making sure of safe conduct because the consequences for the Iranian Government would be very grave. The Foreign Minister was unable to reply to this but said that the Minister President<sup>3</sup> was in the next room and that he would ask him to join the talk. I repeated to the Minister President what I had told the Foreign Minister. The sub-

<sup>1</sup> Ali Soheyl.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram No. 904 of Aug. 29 (65/45300-01) Ettel reported having told the Iranian Foreign Minister that Germany preferred to have the German residents travel from Iran to Turkey through Iraq rather than through Russian-occupied territory.

<sup>3</sup> Ali Foroughi.

sequent conversation with the Minister President brought out that the English had avoided so far making any definite statements about their intentions regarding the German colony. The Iranian Government had not yet had any talks with the Russians at all about free passage to Turkey through the occupied territory. My question whether the Iranian Government had at least been in touch with the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires to obtain backing against England and Russia in the question of the truce was answered in the negative by the Minister President. He said he would immediately telegraph Ankara and would request the support of the Turkish Government in the question of safe conduct through the areas occupied by the British or the Russians. He would also get in touch at once with the Russian Embassy to ascertain the Russian position. In the further course of the conversation the Minister President expressed the view that negotiations might be greatly aided if I were able to offer a guarantee that no German would remain in hiding in the country. I replied to him that I would take all measures calculated to enable me to give such a guarantee with a clear conscience, provided however that the opposite side granted safe conduct through the occupied territory. If the Reich Germans were to be expelled without there being granted a safe conduct to Turkey, I would not be able to assume any guarantee whatever that Reich Germans, who did not care to fall into enemy hands, might not go their own ways.

The conversation with the two men who are at present the responsible figures of the Iranian Government proved unsatisfactory in the utmost degree. I am no longer in any doubt that the Iranian Government is prepared to throw the German colony to the wolves if Tehran is threatened with enemy occupation. I have not yet been informed of the official terms of the truce. Apparently the signature will take place this afternoon and an announcement will be made tomorrow at the session of the Parliament. If I should become definitely convinced that the conditions stipulate expulsion of the Germans without safe conduct to Turkey, no other course would be left but to transfer the German colony to the grounds of the Turkish Embassy.<sup>4</sup> The fate of the German colony will then depend on the pressure the Turkish Gov-

<sup>4</sup> In a subsequent telegram of Sept. 2 which also bore the number 922 (65/45325), Eitel stated that he had abandoned the idea of moving the German colony to the Turkish Embassy after having been told by the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires that the Turkish Government no longer saw a necessity for assuming the protection of the Germans because there would be no entry of British and Soviet troops into Tehran.

ernment is able to bring to bear on the English and the Russians in the matter of the safe conduct.

ETTEL

No. 264

260/170154-55

*The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 866 of September 1

HELSINKI, September 1, 1941—9:24 p. m.

Received September 1—10:50 p. m.

1) Yesterday the President visited Field Marshal Mannerheim at his headquarters. According to a report from a German military source, the President requested of the Field Marshal that, in view of the heavy casualties, the old boundary on the Karelian Isthmus not to be crossed and that plans for an offensive in Farther Karelia should also be restricted.

2) The Foreign Minister, whom I then asked whether there was any change in the Finnish strategy, denied this and remarked that the Finnish officers were observing the agreements concluded earlier with the German officers.<sup>1</sup>

3) A member of the Finnish Cabinet remarked that there were differences in the Government regarding future strategy. The Foreign Minister, the Minister of Public Instruction,<sup>2</sup> and the Minister of the Interior<sup>3</sup> were for the continuation of current strategy. The Minister of War<sup>4</sup> and the socialist members of the Cabinet were for defensive strategy, now that Vyborg had been taken, the old boundary reached at most points or crossed, and that Hanko would fall automatically. The President had agreed with the latter point of view.

4) The situation quickly came to a head after the fall of Vyborg inasmuch as the question of crossing the old border became urgent. I should like to propose, as the first countermeasure, that a high German officer fly here to (group missing) [present the?] Knight's Cross

<sup>1</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 554.

<sup>2</sup> Antti Kukkonen.

<sup>3</sup> Ernst Friherre von Born.

<sup>4</sup> Maj. Gen. Rudolf Walden.

to Field Marshal Mannerheim and, on the return trip, visit the President in Helsinki.<sup>5</sup>

5) I am assured that those persons now thinking about a defensive strategy have not the slightest thought of concluding a separate peace or of demobilizing.

6) Further report will follow.

BLÜCHER

<sup>5</sup>In a teletype message of Sept. 2 to Ribbentrop (260/170158) Weizsäcker endorsed Blücher's suggestion that a high ranking German officer confer a German decoration on Mannerheim and also visit President Ryti.

The suggestion of honoring Mannerheim by a visit and a decoration had already been put forward by the Chief of the Liaison Staff with Field Marshal Mannerheim, General Erfurth, in his letter of Aug. 27 to OKW. See document No. 248, footnote 4.

General Jodl came by air to Finnish General Headquarters on Sept. 4 and on behalf of Hitler conferred on Mannerheim all three classes of the Iron Cross. Jodl also brought assurances that Germany would deliver to Finland 15,000 tons of rye. See Waldemar Erfurth, *Der finnische Krieg 1941-1944* (Wiesbaden, 1950), p. 68.

No. 265

P6/P00322-45

*The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the Reichsmarschall and Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe, to the Commander in Chief of the Navy, to the Commander in Chief of the Army, and to the Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs*

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, September 1, 1941.

TOP SECRET MILITARY

The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht  
Wehrmacht Operations Staff  
Department of National Defense  
No. 44 1465/41 g.Kdos Chfs.  
By officer only

The attached memorandum of the High Command of the Wehrmacht "The Strategic Situation in Late Summer 1941 as Basis for Further Political and Military Plans" was presented to the Führer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht.

The Führer has approved the memorandum and ordered its circulation for personal information to the Commanders in Chief of the branches of the Wehrmacht and to the Reich Foreign Minister.

A further circulation or duplication of the memorandum is, however, at the express wish of the Führer not to be made.

KEITEL

[Enclosure]

*Memorandum of the High Command of the Wehrmacht*

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, August 27, 1941.

TOP SECRET MILITARY

High Command of the Wehrmacht  
W F St/L, No. 441465/41 g.K.Ch.  
By officer only

Six copies  
Copy No. 2<sup>1</sup>

THE STRATEGIC SITUATION IN LATE SUMMER 1941 AS BASIS FOR  
FURTHER POLITICAL AND MILITARY PLANS

I

*The Probable Military and Military-Political Situation in Late Autumn 1941.*<sup>2</sup>

1. In the east in a campaign of only 8 weeks mighty successes have been achieved. Even if Soviet Russia can numerically cover her losses in prisoners, dead, and wounded from her enormous reserves of manpower, the losses in officers, commissioned and non-commissioned, in well-trained soldiers, and above all in material are in any case irreplaceable. The enemy's resistance is still not completely broken, although a surprising collapse comes within the realm of possibilities.

At the moment, then, one cannot say definitely how many forces can be made free in the east at the onset of winter and how many will still be necessary for the further conduct of operations next year.

In case the campaign in the east should not yet lead in the year 1941 to the complete destruction of Soviet Russia's capacity for resistance—a case with which the Supreme Command has always reckoned—then the military and political reactions for the over-all situation could be the following:

The intervention of Japan against Russia can be delayed. This would be all the more urgent the longer a lengthening of the campaign

<sup>1</sup> Copy No. 2 was received by the High Command of the Navy. According to the distribution list (P6/P00346) copy No. 4 was sent to the Foreign Minister but this copy has not been found. The Navy's copy has numerous marginal comments but no attempt has been made to reproduce them inasmuch as they do not reflect opinions or views of the Foreign Ministry.

<sup>2</sup> The memorandum was based on a shorter memorandum of Aug. 6 (P6/P00312-21) drawn up by Warlimont, Chief of the Department of National Defense of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff and entitled "Brief Strategic Survey on the Continuation of the War after the Eastern Campaign."

Cf. Walter Warlimont, *Im Hauptquartier der deutschen Wehrmacht 1939-1945* (Frankfurt am Main, 1962), pp. 206-207.

The Halder Diary in the entry for Sept. 13 contains extensive excerpts from the memorandum.

in the east offers the Anglo-Saxon powers the possibility of rendering help even by way of Vladivostok.

On the other hand, however, such an attempt on the part of America that is recognizable can be the occasion for Japan to intervene.

In *Iraq* and in *Syria* an English base has developed from which at this time a juncture with Soviet Russia is being sought on Iranian territory; we cannot prevent this without the cooperation of Turkey.

*Turkey* will view this development with great displeasure. Despite this there are no indications that Turkey will step out from her waiting neutral attitude before she is convinced of the definitive collapse of Russia.

A military action against Turkey—who certainly will no longer enter into the war against us unless we attack her—would militarily bring only disadvantages. The desired political success is not to be achieved even by military pressure.

The only way that possibly would promise success is to win Turkey through purely *political* means supported by further successes, particularly in the southern part of the eastern front.

2. In the Mediterranean area and in the west there are no signs indicating an essential change of the military situation. It is doubtful whether the English forces are now strong enough to undertake a renewed attack against the Sollum front with a simultaneous sortie from Tobruk.

Without a serious German threat from the direction of Syria-Iraq the *English position on the Suez Canal* will constantly get firmer.

Supported by the inflowing American reinforcements, coming for the most part over *French Equatorial Africa* and around the *Cape*, the build-up of strong offensive forces against Libya will be able to proceed almost undisturbed.

On the other hand we must reckon with an increasingly hard pressed situation for the German-Italian forces in Libya if we do not succeed in placing their supply over the Mediterranean on an essentially broader basis, or in taking Tobruk before a new English offensive. The German-Italian preparations for attack will, however, take up to the beginning of October.

*Spain* will not weaken in her moral support for the German conduct of the war: she will, however, not make the decision for her own entrance into the war until she considers the German-Italian power position in the Mediterranean as fully assured or until she herself is attacked.

France, divided as she is among her politicians, her soldiers, and in her public opinion as to the way in which she can mitigate or remove the consequences of her severe defeat, is waiting and is endeavoring to

improve her own situation depending on the development of the military and political situation of the Axis.

3. As for the *English* and the *Americans*, something along the following lines of thought may be assumed to be their evaluation of the situation:

Now and in the future it is no longer possible to defeat Germany on the Continent. The *aim* must therefore be to increase the difficulties of supply in Europe, particularly in the occupied areas, and thereby, in conjunction with heavier air attacks, gradually to weaken the external and internal political position of the Axis Powers.

The *danger of invasion* can be regarded as removed for the time being. The *fleet* has made up its losses in fair measure by new construction and by purchase in America and it has carried out essential organizational and technical improvements for attack and for defense.

The superiority of the *Luftwaffe*, weakened as it is by the eastern campaign, can be overtaken by the increased Anglo-Saxon production of 1942; the English Air Force will be able ever more effectively to strike the larger cities and industries, particularly in the western part of the Reich.

The *strategic situation in the Mediterranean and, beyond that, the over-all strategic position can, however, only be fundamentally changed if, by preventing German-French cooperation, they succeed in:*

- a. removing the German-Italian *bridgehead* in *North Africa*;
- b. thereby gaining possession of the entire *North African coast*;
- c. in this fashion gaining the sea and air mastery in the *Mediterranean*;
- d. opening the way to the Americans for an invited entrance into the theater of war in *French Morocco* (Casablanca) and *French West Africa* (Dakar);
- e. critically hemming in the *strategic possibilities of the German-Italian conduct of war* by sea and in the air;
- f. drawing the *blockade* of Central Europe tighter and thereby
- g. placing *Italy* under a military and economic pressure of such strength that she collapses.

Along with this Russia's will to resist must be upheld by establishing the connection with Russia over Iranian territory and Germany must be prevented from seizing the Caucasus oil region. So much for the probable line of thought of the two Anglo-Saxon opponents.

## II

*Our Own Decisions for the Future Conduct of the War.*

1. The *aim* remains to defeat England and to force her to make peace.

The terror attacks of the *Luftwaffe* and aerial attacks on industry have proved to be insufficient for this. The former have been endured

by the English people in gloomy resignation; the latter have indeed damaged production but they have not in great measure forced it to cease. Our own experience, which, to be sure has been with manifoldly weaker hostile attacks, confirms this judgment.

As means of striking the English island, the heart of the hostile resistance, in such fashion as to decide the war there remain: invasion, or investment.

2. *Invasion*, if it succeeds in full measure, is undoubtedly the surest means of ending the war quickly, at least in Europe.

The prerequisites for such a decision are:

a. *Domination of the air*, at least over the Channel and the surrounding zone.

b. *The mass commitment of those means of warfare which hitherto have been most successful* (dive bomber units, naval warfare by small-scale instruments) against the English fleet so that it can be beaten back in the attack which it is sure to make in the Channel, or at the least so that it can be prevented from effecting enduring great successes against our transport fleet.

c. *Mass production of highly effective, self-propelled naval craft*, which could, in accordance with the varying landing conditions of the individual sectors of the coast, land troops and material on a *broad front*, doing this, if possible, without re-transfer into smaller craft.

d. The creation of a strong *parachute and glider force* with appropriate air transport space.

Such preparations demand a considerable sector of the German armament industry and *in part* can be carried out *only* at the cost of other armament commitments. They would probably require the period up to the late summer of 1942.

The attack against the English island itself by the landing of troops already represents a great risk and one which constantly increases with the passing of time. Furthermore one cannot prepare such an attack in a short period, but one ought to have in view even with regard to the *further armament production*, particularly for the Luftwaffe but also for the Navy, the choice of objectives which one wishes to make for continuing the war against England after Russia's defeat. There are two courses:

a) To leave it to the English to attack the great European area dominated by the Axis Powers, but on our own part to conduct the attack further on the periphery only and to continue the siege of England with all means; or

b) Ourselves to land in England.

The first course requires, as far as aerial armament is concerned, only the fighter planes necessary for defense, but on the other hand requires a great number of long range aircraft for attacks against ships.

The second course is not to be entered upon except with a powerful number of fighters and very strong dive bomber units.

For these reasons a definitive decision regarding the course to be followed in the further struggle against England is desirable even at this time.

In spite of this one must, with full recognition of this situation, declare that this decision cannot yet be taken. One thing is certain and that is that England, for as long as she continues to struggle, must never be allowed to believe that the danger of an invasion has been removed. Otherwise the strong armies which are now tied down in England could be made available for the struggle on the periphery in so far as shipping space permits or else made available for her war industry, either of which consequences would be only disadvantageous for us.

The German aviation industry must, in spite of the disadvantages connected therewith, choose a course which for the time being takes into account both possibilities.

3. Independent of the decision which can only later be taken whether or not the invasion is seriously to be prepared, the *siege of England* by the Navy and the Luftwaffe must continue to be conducted by every possible means as being the best tested kind of campaign according to our experience up to now and which in the long run can have a deadly effect.

According to the calculations of the Navy it is necessary for this to bring the figure of sinkings from a monthly average of 800,000 BRT up to 1 million BRT.

The *armament industry's* prerequisites for this have been ordered.

There are further possibilities in the matter of *operations and in organization* in order to concentrate the missions of the Navy and of the Luftwaffe more sharply on this important aim. The proposals now on hand from the Naval War Staff aim at:

The formation of long range reconnaissance squadrons with the greatest possible range for the submarine warfare;

Concentration of the strongest aerial forces (Atlantic air squadrons) for the conduct of the campaign against England's supplies along her coasts and on the Atlantic;

Large-scale employment of the new aerial mines and torpedoes;

Continuation of systematically conducted attacks against the English harbors including their wharves and against the English warships with the main effort against the aircraft carriers and destroyers, especially the newly constructed ones.

These proposals of the Naval War Staff which in part proceed from the introduction of a new model of reconnaissance and bombardment airplane (He-177) will not yet be fully carried out in 1942 because:



The new model will make its appearance at the front in significant numbers only in the summer of 1942 and even then not in sufficient quantity. The siege of England can therefore only be begun with sufficient aerial forces when the Eastern campaign is essentially terminated and the Luftwaffe is again rested up and expanded. According to the conception of the Navy it would therefore be all the more necessary to improve the prospects for successful continuation of the battle of the Atlantic by means of new, strategically located bases. As such bases are to be considered:

*Bizerte*, as the North African harbor most capable of discharging cargo and the one to be reached with the least danger. The Spanish mainland and possibly also the Canary Islands as air bases.

*El Ferrol, Cadiz, and Gibraltar* as bases for naval surface craft.

*Casablanca* as an air and naval base.

*Dakar* predominantly as a submarine base with aerial defenses.

The value of these bases for the continuation of the German war operations is very great. Demonstration in detail is superfluous. It suffices to point out that at the time we have at our disposal no base for surface craft which opens the way for us into the Atlantic, for Brest is open to effective attacks of the English Air Force; the passage through the Denmark Strait between Greenland and Iceland is scarcely possible in the summer and is possible in the winter only at great risk.

*El Ferrol, Cadiz, Gibraltar, and Casablanca* offer in this regard quite different possibilities whereas *Dakar* again lies within the range of hostile aircraft based on Freetown and is therefore suitable more as a base for submarines.

All of these bases have in common the fact that in order to gain them we need the political agreement of Spain or France.

It may be that Spain would possibly bow to a strong military pressure although the value of an alliance achieved by compulsion could not be very great. All military measures will be of no avail with respect to the French colonial empire. To be sure we could occupy all of metropolitan France after the defection of the colonies, and then by the employment of much harsher methods than before we could exploit the French population and resources to the very last ounce for German purposes and thereby, in view of her scanty biological reserves, gradually extinguish France. We could also occupy the French Mediterranean harbors. But for the further conduct of the war we could not by a long way make up for the transfer of the French African colonies and of the French fleet to the enemy, quite apart from the enormous political advantage which America would draw from this possibility of a disintegration of European solidarity which is beginning to develop. With the recognition that the enemy has

available for this same purpose a wealth of military and political means, and that the possession of these French bases could be of sufficient importance to decide the war, a great political commitment would be necessary and would be justified, it being understood that the political success would be militarily exploited. Whether such a political commitment can be undertaken depends less upon our good will than on the French Government.

The Navy in its memorandum<sup>3</sup> speaks only of the battle of the Atlantic, but for forcing England under it is of almost as great significance to win the battle of the Mediterranean. The prerequisite for each is the defeat of Soviet Russia.

If England after our victory in the east is still not ready to give in, her situation will nevertheless be completely hopeless if we should succeed in overcoming the political differences of France, of Spain, and of Turkey among themselves and with respect to Italy to such a degree that all three states would take part in the war on the side of the Axis. This highest aim is perhaps not to be achieved in its full scope. In considering the political alternatives, whether to win over the one or the other state, it is the military value of the three states for us which is to be compared:

a. If *Turkey* were on our side, English and Russian forces to begin with would be tied down along her borders. This would permit us the more rapid seizure of the Caucasus oil region and put us in position in the year 1942 by way of Transjordan to attack Egypt from the east. In such a case we would have to support Turkey with munitions and material.

b. If *Spain* were in the war against England, she would in any case be a heavy burden for us as regards material. She would bring us the naval bases of *El Ferrol* and *Cadiz*, the elimination of the English base at *Gibraltar*, and perhaps even the seizure of the Rock itself and therewith the domination of the entrance into the Mediterranean. As long as the Rock is not taken we do not ourselves dominate the Strait in a positive sense although we would close it for the enemy.

The military value is thus very great but only if at the same time the French colonial empire in Africa does not shift its attitude.

The concept of subduing the French colonial empire in Africa with the aid of the Spanish bridgehead represents something very difficult to achieve. Spanish Morocco would very probably be lost through joint Anglo-French operations before German forces could get in there.

The possession of *Gibraltar* would, however, have lost its essential significance if North Africa fell into Anglo-French hands.

The cooperation of the Spanish fleet in the struggle against England is to be estimated as of slight importance.

c. *France*. The entrance of France into the war against England would immediately result in an easing of our situation in North Africa.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. U.S. Navy Department, ONI, "Führer Conferences on Matters Dealing With the German Navy, 1941," vol. II, pp. 13-18.

The domination over the North African coast in its full extension westward from Egypt would thereby fall to the Axis. The threat to the German Africa Corps and to Italy would be removed; Malta would lose its importance; the bases of Casablanca and Dakar could be utilized by the German Navy.

The commitment of the French fleet on our side, however, would mean an increase of power which cannot be estimated too highly. On the other hand the forces of the French, especially in West Africa, are limited, while to the south of them in Gambia, the Gold Coast, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone an even stronger center of English power is being built up.

If then France takes this step on her own, or if she gets forced into the war against England by concessions to Germany (making the harbor of Bizerte available), then she must in advance obtain and exploit the possibilities for reinforcing her position in West Africa and we must be in position to intervene in her support where it is necessary.

The possibilities on our part to intervene in the struggle for Dakar, even if we had available air strength, still remain slight.

From these considerations it follows:

The entrance of Turkey into the war is for us at any time, but the earlier the better, of great military advantage. Even without German help she is strong enough to stand off the Anglo-Russian forces now available on land, at sea, and in the air and she can offer valuable help for the domination of the Black Sea. Even by assuming a threatening attitude she will tie down strong English and Soviet Russian forces and give relief to our conduct of the war in Southern Russia.

It is otherwise with France and with Spain. Unless German ground forces and air forces stand available to be able to reinforce the French and Spanish positions or to exploit them offensively, the value of the entrance into the war by either of these countries, but especially by Spain, remains problematical. The fact that it would be possible for the Navy to make immediate use of Spanish and French naval bases does not change matters very much.

As against the advantage of being able to place the supply of the Italian theater of war on a broader basis and to protect it better, there stands the danger of the loss of Dakar to the English, especially because the French air forces around Dakar are inadequate in strength and in respect to maintenance.

### III

#### *Summary.*

Militarily and politically England pursues two great aims: by means of the connection established with Soviet Russia over Iran to uphold Russia's will to resist and to prevent Germany from seizing

the Caucasus oil fields; sooner or later to gain the whole of West and North Africa as a zone of operations.

Spain and Turkey are at the least to be held as non-belligerents.

Large-scale landing attempts against the European area are not to be expected. The bulk of the English reinforcements are at this time flowing not toward Egypt but toward Haifa and Basra.

For our own further conduct of the war, therefore, the following is submitted:

1. The collapse of Russia is the next and most decisive war aim which must be forced by the employment of all forces that can be spared from the other fronts. In so far as this will not be fully achieved in 1941, the continuation of the eastern campaign in 1942 occupies the first place.

The conquering of territory on the southern wing will have great political and economic effects.

We must strive to achieve a change in our favor of the political attitude of Turkey. The military situation in the southeast would thereby be significantly improved.

2. Only after the elimination of Russia as a power factor is the battle against England in the Atlantic and in the Mediterranean to be taken up in full measure, if possible with the help of French and Spanish positions.

Even if Russia is in large measure crushed this year the forces of the Army and of the Luftwaffe will scarcely be available before the spring of 1942 for decisive operations in the Mediterranean, in the Atlantic, and on the Spanish mainland. Meanwhile, however, in order to relieve the strained situation in the Mediterranean, and to impede the English sea transport toward Haifa and toward Tobruk, German minesweepers, motor torpedo boats, and submarines are to be transferred to the Mediterranean.

3. It is important, at least until next spring: not to let the political and military relations with France and Spain be severed, but, on the contrary, to increase them; to keep France on the leash; and beyond that to influence her to make such reinforcements of West Africa as to be capable of meeting any English-American attack. For this purpose it should be our aim to disseminate the belief among the French people and soldiers that France will not face destruction with the victory of the Axis. This is the essential psychological prerequisite for a will for battle of the French colonial armed forces against England. The difficulty of this task lies in the consideration of the justified interests of our Italian ally.

From the military point of view, however, this is absolutely necessary for defeating England *within a reasonable time* and therefore it must be attempted.<sup>4</sup>

4. On this widened basis we can then only by next spring allot the support of the Luftwaffe in larger measure to the expanding commitment of submarines in order to continue the investment of England with greater success than in recent months.

5. Operations in the eastern Mediterranean theater are possible only when we have reached Transcaucasia.

6. The invasion of England can be *earnestly* considered only if in spite of the collapse of Russia all means should fail to induce Spain or France to participate in the war on the side of the Axis, and if thereby the battle in the Atlantic and in the Mediterranean should

<sup>4</sup>On Aug. 18 the OKW authorized resumption of German-French military discussions for implementation of the Paris Protocols.

In its directive W St. K (M) 3641/41 g Kdos of Sept. 8 (8589/603016-19) the OKW laid down supplementary principles to apply in such discussions:

"1. The negotiations are to be so conducted that military relations with France are not broken off, but France for the time being is not to be urged into the war against England. The principal psychological prerequisite for the will in the French colonial armed forces to fight England, and at the same time the surest guarantee that German military concessions will not be misused, is to drive home the fact that only through German-French military collaboration can France preserve her colonial empire and that only an Axis victory can save her from destruction.

"2. The military reinforcement of French West Africa, especially as regards the air and air defense arms, and the supply situation, must be brought to the forefront of the discussions. The measures envisaged to that end in the French reorganization plan, which go beyond the Paris Protocols, can be approved in so far as they can be carried into effect with the resources on hand. Without allowing the purpose to be recognized at this time, mobile forces are to be released to the extent that they would be helpful, if the occasion arises, in securing West Africa offensively by seizure of Gambia. Furthermore, development of the Sahara trails for limited overland traffic would be useful in case the sea routes might be interrupted. The setting of a date for bringing Dakar into use as a German base is to be left open for the time being.

"3. Reinforcement of North Africa is to be restricted for the time being to certain improved provisions for the weapons at hand, that is in ammunition, replacement parts, fuel and lubrication, etc., and to the most necessary increases in stationary, defensive weapons. Further military concessions, even though within the framework of the submitted reorganization plan, cannot be considered until there is further clarification of the general military-political situation and the positions of military command in North Africa are filled with absolutely reliable pro-Axis personnel.

"Otherwise there is no change in the directive of August 18, 1941, pursuant to which the approval of the Chief of OKW must be obtained before any reinforcements for North Africa are authorized and the respective proposals must be accompanied either by the approval of the Italians or, in any case, their comments.

"The date for putting Bizerte into use remains open.

"4. Account must be taken of Italy's legitimate interests. The general agenda for the discussions must accordingly be established in cooperation with Italy. The results, as prearranged, must be submitted to the OKW for approval prior to the opening of the German-French negotiations."

not produce such successes as to enable us to reckon with the conquest of England in this fashion.

KEITEL

Three Appendices<sup>5</sup>

1. General map of Atlantic bases.
2. Range of penetration of German airplanes from European and West African bases.
3. Distribution of forces in the Mediterranean and in Africa.

<sup>5</sup>Not found.

No. 266

765/270488-89

*Memorandum by Minister Eisenlohr*

BERLIN, September 1, 1941.

Pol I M 2320 g Rs. II.

Drafting officer: Counselor von Grote.

Subject: Germans arrested in the U.S.A. under suspicion of espionage.

The Foreign Minister by teletype message No. 673 [637] of July 11<sup>1</sup> from Special Train, Westfalen, gave instructions that a report be submitted with reference to Washington telegram No. 2110 of July 5<sup>2</sup> on the question as to who of those arrested worked with the Abwehr and who with the SD.

There was a delay in carrying out the instruction because the OKW, in connection with the investigation, objected to the criticism of the activity of the Abwehr in the U.S.A. made by the Embassy Washington in telegram No. 2110. Clarifying the matter required numerous consultations between the Foreign Ministry and the Abwehr as well as a joint discussion of all cases known to us between the officials of the Consulate General in New York and the Abwehr. The following can now be reported in conclusion:

(1) Of the 17 persons arrested whose names became known from reports of the Embassy in Washington and also from press reports, four worked for the Abwehr. Only one of those arrested is known to the SD and that person did not have instructions nor did he submit reports on his own.

(2) The substantive work of the four who had been active on instructions of the Abwehr has produced militarily valuable results and cannot be criticized. Criticism with respect to other individual cases was recognized as justified by the Abwehr.

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 81, footnote 3.

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 81.

(3) The generalizations and the sharpness of the criticism expressed especially in the penultimate paragraph of telegram No. 2110 does not appear to be justified on the basis of the result of the discussions.

The matter can be considered as closed.<sup>3</sup>

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary in accordance with instructions.

EISENLOHR

<sup>3</sup> Instructions substantially on the lines of this memorandum were sent by Eisenlohr to the Embassy in the United States in telegrams Nos. 1646 (765/270495-96) and 1647 (765/270497) of Aug. 28. Additional material on this espionage case is filmed on serial 765.

### No. 267

230/153406-07

*The Foreign Minister to the Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry  
With the Military Commander in Serbia*

Telegram

TOP SECRET SPECIAL TRAIN, September 2, 1941—2: 35 a. m.  
No. 930 of September 2 from the Special Train

Received Berlin September 2—3: 15 a. m.

No. 1159 from the Foreign Ministry Sent September 2.

With reference to your telegrams Nos. 562 of August 29<sup>1</sup> and 569 of August 30.<sup>2</sup>

In the given circumstances the establishment of a new Serbian government appears to me, too, to be expedient and I have no substantive objections to it. However, your reports impel me to make the following comments:

1. The installation of a new government doubtless belongs among the matters in which the Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry should participate in accordance with points 2 and 3 of the Führer's decree of April 28.<sup>3</sup> Although it is not expressly mentioned in your reports that you participated, I assume that this was the case, and request that you confirm this to me. Otherwise please wire why this was not done.

2. Much as I value independence and willingness to assume responsibility in my officials, I nevertheless desire that I be informed in advance in such important matters, and that my decision be obtained. Only in cases of special urgency can there be a departure from this by

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 257.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (230/153347). This telegram reported the favorable impression made in Belgrade by the formation of the Nedić government.

<sup>3</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 365, footnote 1.

way of exception. No such special urgency obtained here. In the future please report in advance in such cases.

3. If the new government has the inner strength expected of it for crushing the communist forces, it is to be expected and feared that it will afterwards use this strength to make troublesome demands of one sort or another of the Reich Government. Please therefore watch this jointly with the Military Commander, and prevent the new government from turning against Germany in its mental attitude and conduct. We must retain the possibility at all times of imposing the necessary limits on the new government or of recalling it.

4. The most important thing seems to me to be to carry out the total disarmament of the population. Please send a written report on what has been done in this regard since the armistice agreement, and furthermore, in consultation with the Military Commander and Veessenmayer, what else must be done with this end in view.<sup>4</sup>

RIBBENTROP

<sup>4</sup> Replying to this instruction in telegram No. 581 of Sept. 2 (230/153404-05) Benzler assured Ribbentrop that he had been fully consulted by the Military Commander regarding the establishment of the Nedić government and that no promises had been made to the latter which would give it the right to make troublesome demands of the German Government. The written report about the disarmament of the Serbian population requested in point 4 of the instruction would follow. Such a report has not been found.

### No. 268

1517/372662-63

*The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

SECRET

No. 2060 of September 1  
Del. No. 15

ROME, September 2, 1941—8: 55 a. m.

Received September 2—11: 10 a. m.

On the basis of the complaints made recently by Minister Riccardi and General Favagrossa<sup>1</sup> concerning German deliveries of raw materials which are overdue,<sup>2</sup> this question was discussed in detail with Giannini and the Ministers concerned. We pointed out in this connection that these arrearages were relatively small in comparison with the great performances of the German economy and the German transportation system, even during the Russian campaign. If Germany had stated at the beginning of the Russian campaign that, in consequence of this special situation, she could temporarily not keep the promises she had previously made, the Italian Government would

<sup>1</sup> General Carlo Favagrossa, Under State Secretary for War Production.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 245.

surely have found this justified. If we had decided not to issue such a statement and had tried, despite the new situation, to honor the old commitments<sup>3</sup> with all the means at our command, we should not now be reproached for relatively small arrearages. The Italians have in general recognized this point of view. To be sure, General Favagrossa is obviously still very uneasy about the future deliveries of items of military importance. For this reason we have, for our part, pointed out that the Italians, too, are in arrears with a number of essential military deliveries. An exhaustive report concerning the details of these conversations is being sent at the same time by courier.<sup>4</sup>

I would mention in regard to this matter that the German attitude above described was in accordance with the attempt to justify our behavior to Italy. We must not fail to realize, however, that there are actually considerable arrearages, and that for political and military reasons, it is necessary in the future to do our utmost to see that the obligations we have assumed are fulfilled. There is no doubt that the frequently hesitant attitude of the authorities charged with the implementation of the German-Italian agreement has actually in many cases resulted in our failure to a considerable extent to meet our obligations.

CLODIUS  
MACKENSEN

<sup>3</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 652 and footnote 1.

<sup>4</sup> Not found.

## No. 269

2077/450407-09

### *The Embassy in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

SECRET

No. 2061 of September 1  
Del. No. 16

ROME, September 2, 1941—9:04 a. m.

Received September 2—11:10 a. m.

We took the occasion of the letter that Minister Riccardi addressed to me a few days ago<sup>1</sup> on the basic development of German-Italian trade and payments to discuss this matter for our part in detail with Giannini, Riccardi, and Favagrossa. I took the following stand, especially in speaking to Riccardi: The Italian view that our trade balance with Italy was very passive in the past half year, was incorrect. In the first 7 months of 1941 we shipped goods of the value of approximately 690 million reichsmarks, and received goods of the value of

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 245.

only 580 million reichsmarks. The mistake in the Italian figures is explained by the fact that war material is not included, because it is carried in special accounts. It just shows that the settlement made on June 19<sup>2</sup> at Italy's request to the effect that war material was not to be paid for in clearing, to which we agreed for political reasons, was not permanently tenable. We now had to insist that the deliveries out of German military stores again be paid for in clearing. Another gap in payments resulted from the fact that approximately 135 million reichsmarks in deliveries of war material had not yet been paid for at all because no agreement could be reached on the prices. Moreover, large sums for deliveries of war material had erroneously not been paid for through clearing, although orders to private German firms were involved. Another reason for the unfavorable status of clearing was that Italy had increased her prices quite disproportionately in the last half year. It was incomprehensible, moreover, that Italy should still be making difficulties in connection with the importation of German goods through the import license system, although in view of the situation today, it was precisely in the interest of Italy to admit German goods. The German economy today had to balance about 350 million a year in remittances by Italian laborers from Germany with German shipments. Such a great special service could only be possible if Italy, for her part, created all the conditions for it. I have accordingly requested:

1. The re-inclusion in clearing of the payments for war material out of German military stores.
2. Agreement on a general price freeze after a prior suitable advance in German coal prices, which have remained too low as a result of the price commitment made to Italy in January of this year.<sup>3</sup>
3. Liberal handling of import regulations by Italy.

Minister Riccardi stated that these demands were justified. He would this very week obtain a decision from the Italian Ministers in question and then present the matter to the Duce for a decision. He promised a reply within 10 days.

The Italians were somewhat surprised that Riccardi's letter had touched off such a counteroffensive. I believe, however, that from the psychological point of view, it was very advantageous to take this occasion to emphasize our position and Germany's considerable achievements.

I also informed Count Ciano through Anfuso, requesting that the Duce be informed of this state of affairs.

CLODIUS  
MACKENSEN

<sup>2</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 652 and footnote 1.

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

## No. 270

205/142943

*The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 1325 of September 2 STOCKHOLM, September 2, 1941—5:55 p. m.  
Received September 2—8:20 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 1318 of September 1.<sup>1</sup>

The ban on the recruitment of Swedish volunteers for foreign armies was announced today through the Swedish press and radio in the following form:

"The Ministry of Defense announces that applications for the permit required for entry into foreign military service will not be granted. This does not involve any change in the previously regulated handling of applications for joining the Finnish Armed Forces as volunteers."

*Social Demokraten* and *Dagens Nyheter* express their views on the matter in short articles. *Social Demokraten* stresses that the Swedish public will welcome the measure. Strict neutrality is thereby observed. The only exception is Finland. *Dagens Nyheter* says that the World War tactic by which volunteers were allowed to join foreign armies has been changed. Recruiting activities are not abolished by a government declaration. The public, it says, is awaiting with suspense the answer to the pending questions.<sup>2</sup>

WIED

<sup>1</sup> In this telegram (205/142939) Wied reported a discussion with Söderblom, Head of the Political Department of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, who explained that the initial intention of the Swedish Government had been to refrain from any official pronouncement regarding volunteers. The Government subsequently learned that interested parties intended to apply for permission to volunteer for armies hostile to Germany whereupon the Government decided to permit no entrance into foreign armies with the exception of Finland's.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram No. 1348 of Sept. 5 (205/142946-48) Wied reported a conversation with Colonel Kellgren, Chief of the Swedish National Defense Staff, who expressed his own personal disapproval and regret and that of the Swedish High Command of the Armed Forces regarding the decision of the Government. Wied reported that the conversation indicated a strong feeling among the majority of the Swedish officer corps against the position taken by the Government.

On the other hand the conversation brought out that there was more feeling among the population against the transport by rail of German soldiers, and a distinct decline of interest in Germany's conduct of the war and in the Wehrmacht.

## No. 271

129/121157-58

*Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

U. St.S. Pol. No. 824

BERLIN, September 2, 1941.

Recently in a talk with the Portuguese Minister, I mentioned in passing the reports that the United States wished to use Brazil as a front for occupying the Portuguese islands in the Atlantic Ocean.<sup>1</sup>

The Minister told me today that he could positively state that these reports were false. No step whatever along these lines had been taken by the United States with Brazil. If any should be taken, it would be foredoomed to certain failure.

I tried to keep alive in the Minister a feeling of distrust and told him that such a step need not, after all, have been taken through official channels.

Count Tovar then said that he was very well satisfied with the new adjustment of Portuguese-Brazilian relations. The commission sent to Brazil had been a complete success.<sup>2</sup> The United States was obviously following the policy of isolating the entire American continent not only from the Axis Powers but from Europe as a whole. Portugal was following all the more the policy of maintaining relations not only with Brazil but also with the rest of Latin America. In this respect one can consider it as a success that the Portuguese Chief of Propaganda, Ferro, who had made a successful trip through Brazil, had now been invited by the Argentine Government to go there too.

The Minister stated that Spain, unfortunately, did not wish to understand the situation. Spain had treated the friendly gestures made by the South American states with coolness and, for its part, was not doing enough to promote relations. I replied that this was at present partly a result of the support that many Latin American states had given to the Reds in the Spanish Civil War and also a result of the reception of Red emigrés in Latin American countries.

Count Tovar confirmed this but felt that Spain had to see the matter from a broader political point of view and to carry on a more active policy of friendship with the Latin American states in the interest of all of Europe.

WOERMANN

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 168.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram No. 1556 of Aug. 14 (235/157255-56) Prüfer reported that the Portuguese commission which had departed from Rio de Janeiro the previous day did not seem to have had any great political success.

No. 272

535/240033-34

*The Apostolic Nuncio to the Foreign Minister*

No. 42000

BERLIN, September 2, 1941.

Herr Reichminister:

Your Excellency: Several serious occurrences, not of recent date but which came to my knowledge only now, impel me to add a supplement to my letter No. 41650 of August 14, 1941,<sup>1</sup> namely, at the point where I said: "several cathedrals, as for example the one at Posen, have been permanently closed since the start of the Polish war."

Unfortunately that is not the only case. A number of other churches, most of them parish churches, were the subjects of such police procedure. Contrary to all popular Catholic feeling, not only among the Poles but also among the German Catholics, the police ordered the closing of the cathedrals at Gnesen, Leslau (formerly Wloclawek) and Pelplin. The parish church at Lissa was likewise closed, the only Catholic place of worship for this large town comprising 20,000 Catholics; moreover, in the city of Posen alone no fewer than ten churches were closed, including the Church of the Resurrection, the largest parish church in this city. Of the ten closed churches the Bernardine Church is serving as a storehouse for theater scenery, and the Dominican Church is being used as a storehouse and sales place for old furniture.

It has also been reported to me that in the rural part of the Warthegau still more parish churches have been closed, but as yet I do not have exact data on this. I believe that it is not necessary to add comments to this; they are obvious not only for religious but also for social and local reasons and also in consideration of the contemporary events.

I most urgently ask Your Excellency to intercede with the competent authorities so that these incidents will not be repeated and the closed churches will be reopened for the religious use of the faithful.

I use this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my high consideration. Yours, etc.

CESARE ORSENIGO  
*Archbishop of Ptolemais*  
*Apostolic Nuncio*

<sup>1</sup>In this letter (1551/376839-841) Orsenigo complained about the religious restrictions in the Warthegau.

No. 273

492/233039-44

*The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry*

Cipher Letter

MADRID, September 2, 1941.

TOP SECRET

No. 2425 gRs.

In the enclosure I am transmitting a copy of the report by the Military Attaché<sup>1</sup> concerning a conversation with the Chief of the Spanish Army General Staff, General Asensio.<sup>2</sup>

A few months ago I reported that "a number of Spanish heads were haunted by the idea" of one day carrying out the Gibraltar operation independently and without foreign assistance. However, up to now this idea has never been supported by persons to be taken seriously.

General Asensio, formerly the High Commissioner in Morocco, is a decent character, a good officer, reliable pro-German, but not independent toward his superiors. I have no doubt that the idea that Spain should carry out the Gibraltar operation alone, which he advocated toward the Military Attaché, does not originate with him himself but was advocated by him by order of Minister of War Varela.<sup>3</sup>

Varela, as reported at various times, is probably the only important Spanish general who is to be considered our enemy; he leans strongly toward England, and holds the opinion that the war will not be won by us. V[arela] is on the point of marrying into a rich Bilbao family that is strongly Anglophile and which, like many other Spanish financiers and industrialists, fears that with a German victory our principle of the common good before individual profit will be applied, and thus their material interests will be reduced. Varela owes his position more to the great courage he demonstrated in various wars (he twice possesses the highest Spanish war decoration, the Laureada) than to special qualities otherwise needed for his office; nevertheless I cannot assume that he really believes in the possibility of a successful, purely Spanish operation against Gibraltar. Rather, I consider the cue he has given to be nothing else than an attempt to sabotage the measures instituted by the German military authorities for the German action to be carried out with Spanish participation, and therewith Spain's entry into the war.

<sup>1</sup>Dated Aug. 27, not printed (492/233045-47).

<sup>2</sup>Gen. Carlos Asensio.

<sup>3</sup>J. E. Varela Iglesias.

As is known, Varela belonged among the Spanish military men who at the beginning of the year, in opposition to the Spanish Foreign Minister, spoke out against Spain's immediate participation in the war because of inadequate military and economic preparation of Spain, and won Franco over to this view.<sup>4</sup> From the Military Attaché's report it is clear that V. continues to hold this view, although in the meantime, as reported, understanding for the necessity of Spain's entry into the war has increased in Spanish military circles.

The view already held in the winter by the Spanish Foreign Minister, that Spain must participate in the war, has remained the same.<sup>5</sup> Señor Serrano Suñer has only further acknowledged to me this view of his in recent months through occasional but unmistakable remarks. However, as a result of the instruction issued me in February<sup>6</sup> I have no longer taken up the question of Spain's possible later entry into the war. However, up to very recently the Foreign Minister has repeatedly gone into the question of Spain's entry into the war with my Italian colleague,<sup>7</sup> who, as is known, 2 months ago by order of Ciano had to sound him out concerning Spain's possible accession to the Tripartite Pact.<sup>8</sup> He repeatedly stated most energetically that Spanish unity could be restored only by a resolute entry into the war; that the regime could be saved and the Spanish national aspirations be fulfilled only in this way. From these conversations the Italian Ambassador gained the impression that Spain will no longer make any special difficulties if she is again approached by the Axis in regard to participation in the war or permission for German troops to carry out the Gibraltar or Portugal operations (a prerequisite for this, however, is that Serrano Suñer remain at the helm in spite of strong opposition from military circles, in particular, and that Spain be asked to enter the war at a time when the Spanish people have enough to eat).

Thus the attempt at interference originating with Varela can only be regarded as a special excursion on the part of the Minister of the Army. This can, nevertheless, cause considerable disruption to our preparations. The three armed forces Attachés fear quite correctly that the present comradely willingness and helpfulness of subordinate Spanish authorities will be prejudiced by the attitude of the Army Minister and therewith the tasks in question, which they are being currently assigned by the various German military authorities, and the investigations by the various commissions and experts sent from Germany will be impeded and handicapped, unless some counteraction ensues. This could be undertaken without further ado by appro-

<sup>4</sup> See vol. XI of this series, document No. 479, and vol. XII of this series, documents Nos. 28 and 46.

<sup>5</sup> See document No. 34.

<sup>6</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 73.

<sup>7</sup> Francesco Lequio.

<sup>8</sup> See document No. 156.

appropriate representations with the Spanish Foreign Minister. I even consider it probable that Señor Serrano Suñer would greatly welcome a complaint about Varela, since recently he has repeatedly made critical remarks to me about the Army Minister and his Anglophile attitude. Señor Serrano Suñer will therefore certainly be glad to complain to the Generalissimo in our sense, all the more since the latter has several times expressly spoken out in favor of advancement of the preparations for the operation. However, we should remember that Franco thinks a great deal of Varela.

Considering the above-mentioned instruction issued me at the beginning of the year and maintained in effect during the Königsberg discussions until replaced by other instructions, however, I believe that I should not undertake such a démarche with the Spanish Foreign Minister without prior express authorization, since it must lead to discussion of the question of the Spanish entry into the war and our possible renewed interest in this.

I therefore request instructions.<sup>9</sup>

Quite independent of the question of the political advancement of the military preparations for an operation on the Iberian Peninsula, however, it appears desirable both to me and to the three armed forces Attachés that these preparations be instituted by *one* office in Germany, so that there be no overlapping and duplication, and that too much German activity not occur in Spain which, of course, would have to become known to our enemies.

Authoritative participation and information of the Foreign Ministry concerning all military preparatory measures in Spain is naturally to be taken for granted.<sup>10</sup>

STOHRER

<sup>9</sup> See document No. 467.

<sup>10</sup> See documents Nos. 302 and 314.

No. 274

253/164976

*The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

BUENOS AIRES, September 3, 1941—5:07 p. m.

SECRET

Received September 4—3:30 a. m.

No. 1477 of September 3

The radical deputy, Manubens Calvet, made a motion in the Chamber of Deputies for interpellation of the Foreign Minister on the following questions:

How much does the Foreign Minister know about use made by the German Ambassador of Reich Germans residing in Argentina for



activity hostile to the state? To what extent does the Foreign Ministry hold the German Ambassador responsible for this activity? Does the Government consider that the time has come for declaring the Ambassador *persona non grata*?

I am trying to find out how the Government will answer the interpellation, especially the last point. If, as a result of internal political weakness and external political pressure, the Government should decide to give in and issue the desired declaration against me, I should like to request urgently that in one way or another I first be recalled, in order that no action like that of Bolivia,<sup>1</sup> so damaging to our reputation, may be repeated here.

A telegraphic report on the result of the inquiries which I immediately started will follow.<sup>2</sup>

THERMANN

<sup>1</sup> See documents Nos. 135 and 158.

<sup>2</sup> In a memorandum of Sept. 6 (253/164973) Woermann recorded a telephone message from Rintelen forwarding the Foreign Minister's view on telegram 1477: a premature recall of Thermann under pressure from Argentina was out of the question; in such a case the Argentine Ambassador in Germany would be expelled.

See, further, document No. 293.

## No. 275

95/107067-69

*Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department*

BERLIN, September 3, 1941.

Dir. Ha. Pol. 188.

The Spanish Minister of Commerce, Carceller, in two talks held with me,<sup>1</sup> barely went into any specific economic questions. Instead, he dwelt on the possible political repercussions of the general economic situation in Spain. He made the following statements, obviously well prepared in advance:

During the last few months the Spanish Government, partly as a reflection of its own feelings, in part also through German-inspired newspapers and radio accounts has displayed an increasingly pronounced pro-German attitude as reflected in the attitude of its personnel toward the English and American Missions in Madrid. Every day now Spanish newspapers carry sharp attacks and frequent villifications of England and the United States. As a result, Spain was not obtaining any goods from overseas due to the denial of American export licenses and British navicerts. There was a grow-

<sup>1</sup> Wiehl's memorandum Ha. Pol. 189 of Sept. 3 (2174/471462-63) records the second discussion with Carceller which largely covered the same ground as the first.

ing shortage of fertilizers, coal, copper, tin for canning purposes, rubber, and textile fibers so that a breakdown of Spanish industry may be expected in about 2 to 3 months. He did not wish to make complaints or to repeat Spain's wishes for deliveries which could not be fulfilled by us.<sup>2</sup> What he did feel was important, however, was to present the situation here frankly, so that we may take it into account in our estimates.

Germany, he said, was fighting for Europe's liberation and reconstruction. Spain's policy to align herself in this with Germany was established beyond question and would be followed loyally. It was now up to us to mark out the guidelines for Spain's attitude, and Spain would follow them, even if it lead to war. Spain was ready to continue the present policy, although the consequence thereof was a deterioration of her relations with England and America and an increasingly critical weakening of its economic resources. It would still be possible, however, that a certain modification of these policies would be more in line with German intentions for the immediate future. If Germany felt it was important to keep Spain in a somewhat viable and fighting condition over the next 2 to 3 months, an attempt would have to be made to restore the flow of imports from overseas. This, however, could only be done if the overtly hostile attitude of Spain toward England and America were somewhat toned down. Such a course might also be useful to Germany's own economic interests in that some Spanish imports from overseas, for instance leather goods, tin, textile fibers, etc., could be surreptitiously passed on in manufactured form to Germany,<sup>3</sup> something which the economic section of the German Embassy was constantly advocating.

On the other hand, the press section of the Embassy was bringing more and more influence to bear on the Spanish Government in a way that of necessity would cut off these imports. There was thus a certain contradiction in Germany's attitude toward Spain, and his frank exposition might perhaps inspire the putting of an end to this.

I expressed doubt that England and America would be induced to cooperate in the matter of overseas imports by a certain moderation on the part of Spain. The blockade of continental Europe was the principal weapon of England and also of North America. The enemy powers would hardly be disposed to lift this blockade in Spain's favor because of such moderation, but would act only because of some convincing change in Spanish policy. Señor Carceller did not agree with this. He declared emphatically that there would of course be no question of a change in Spanish policy. He was con-

<sup>2</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 46.

<sup>3</sup> For Carceller's conversation on that subject with Mr. Willard L. Beaulac, Counselor of the United States Embassy in Madrid, on Aug. 6, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. II, pp. 911-913.

vinced, however, that a certain moderation could bring about a resumption of imports. Naturally the Spanish press would be bound to continue supporting the German side as before, only there would have to be a halt for the time being to sharp attacks, insults and vituperation against Germany's enemies. It would also be highly effective (and Carceller mentioned this point several times) if the American Ambassador in Madrid would finally be granted his wish for a personal audience with the Caudillo, something which had been denied him for months.<sup>4</sup> If Franco would see the Ambassador for only 15 minutes, it could be assumed that the American Government would, for instance, issue export clearance for six Spanish tankers which are lying in American ports ready to sail, loaded with paid-for gasoline. When this seemed to me to be an overly optimistic view, Carceller said that all Franco would have to tell the Ambassador was that the Spanish Government intended to continue in its present policy. Each party could then interpret this in its own way, the Americans as a continuation of Spanish neutrality, the Spaniards as a continued policy of unlimited support of Germany.

In the end I promised Señor Carceller to bring his remarks to the attention of higher authorities and to review his economic wishes (listed in a special memorandum<sup>5</sup>) with the responsible agencies.

Submitted through the State Secretary to the Foreign Minister.

WIEHL<sup>6</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. II, pp. 902-908, 923.

<sup>5</sup> This memorandum has not been found. There are, however, two minutes by Counselor Schüller of the Economic Policy Department of Aug. 29 (3882/E047794-98) listing various items that might be discussed with Carceller.

<sup>6</sup> For a final report by Wiehl on his conversation with Carceller see document No. 285.

## No. 276

82/60572-76

### *The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 1713 of September 4

TOKYO, September 4, 1941—10:50 a. m.

Received September 5—5:05 a. m.

Prince Konoye's attempt to avoid a conflict with the ABCD [American-British-Chinese-Dutch] coalition and possibly the Soviet Union by means of a direct message to President Roosevelt<sup>1</sup> resulted from the following situation.

Even after the ouster of Matsuoka the third Konoye Cabinet was committed by the decision of July 2<sup>2</sup> taken in the presence of the

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 256, footnote 3.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 63, footnote 6.

Emperor to an extensive mobilization, which by its nature was aimed at the Soviet Union. Konoye therefore has greatly strengthened the obstructionist elements in the hands of the new Cabinet [*in die Hände des neuen Kabinetts die retardierenden Elemente*] and placed a large share of responsibility upon the Navy. Covering the rear to the north was thereby greatly impeded. As reported, the Army leaders according to the most recent inquiries have also become more restrained with regard to a conflict with the Soviet Union. It is argued that the Japanese Army, tied down and weakened by the China war, cannot afford a winter campaign against the Soviet Union. In view of the resistance put up by the Russian Army against an army such as Germany's, the Japanese General Staff is apparently doubtful of being able to achieve decisive successes against Russia before winter sets in, being influenced presumably also by the thought of Nomonhan,<sup>3</sup> which is vividly remembered especially by the Kwantung Army. The exaggerated view of Russia's strength is supported partly by the mistaken argument that even in the face of the collapse of the Ukrainian front the Soviet Union still had sufficient armed forces for offensive action against Iran on the nearby Caucasus front.

In view of this appraisal of the situation the Kwantung Army is said to have pressed for a decision from Imperial headquarters. I am told by a generally reliable source that in the last few days the Imperial headquarters has reached the decision to postpone any action against the Soviet Union. Another decision is envisaged as soon as there is clear evidence of disintegration in the Far East army or when it is definite that the Japanese Army has great numerical superiority.

While the Army, therefore, is for the foreseeable future following a policy of wait-and-see in the north, the activist elements of the Navy have again been demanding with a little more insistence an advance in the south. I have reported about the plans of these circles (occupation of Thailand, then a blockade of Singapore, an attack on Borneo, and neutralization of Manila).<sup>4</sup> The younger naval officer corps cherishes the hope that the recent reshuffling of the Naval Command, especially the assumption of an important combat command by the activist Viviani[?] Kondo, heretofore Chief of the Naval Staff, and his replacement by the likewise activist Rear Admiral Ito, will promote these plans. The reasons advanced by this group for an early advance in the south are weighty. The Navy still has oil reserves to meet requirements for 2 years. Imports from the Netherlands Indies have stopped without any prospect of their being resumed. These

<sup>3</sup> This refers to the fighting along the Manchukuo-Mongolian border in which Soviet and Japanese as well as local forces were engaged throughout the summer of 1939. The fighting was ended by an armistice agreement of Sept. 15, 1939, between Molotov and the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union. See Degras, *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, vol. III, pp. 373-374.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 225.

supplies must not be used up, unless Japan is willing to submit without defense to the dictation of the Anglo-Saxons. The activists in the Navy are convinced that the United States will probably oppose an operation against Borneo immediately and will certainly not permit Japan to engage in a peaceful exploitation. Any attempt to drive a wedge between the United States and England is doomed to fail from the outset. After the beginning of the German-Russian war the neighboring states have psychologically speaking grown into a united structure opposed to isolated Japan. Such was also the opinion expressed by the Press Chief of Imperial Headquarters, Colonel Mabuchi (cf. DNB Nos. 212-216 of September 1), and Admiral Kondo. The conclusion is that if Japan has to fight the coalition, she will have to open hostilities at once with the United States. The impossibility of maintaining the present state of tension with the United States psychologically and materially without coming to a clash induced the circles influencing Konoye to make the primitive attempt of making a direct approach to Roosevelt. I have been reliably informed that Konoye at first wished to conduct the negotiations secretly. However, when Nomura's visit to Roosevelt was announced by the American press on the very same day, Konoye quickly summoned the Cabinet to a special meeting and had to admit that despite American provocation Japan had taken the initiative toward an exchange of views. From similar statements made during the last few days I have been able to learn that the Navy and the other activist circles were given to understand that Konoye's message represented a final step, not even seriously intended, to convince the Japanese people that a peaceful settlement was impossible. It is obvious, however, that this is not the aim of the circles around Konoye; their aim is rather to reach a modus vivendi with the United States, though only temporarily. I am of the opinion, however, that in view of the real and deep-seated conflicts of interest this attempt to achieve a more than transitory détente cannot succeed either. During the last few weeks the domestic political situation has become increasingly grave, so that a crisis must be expected to break out at any moment. As I reported, the third Konoye Cabinet has been unable to give the Japanese people clear leadership in the face of the difficult questions of domestic and foreign policy awaiting solution. The Cabinet is rather inclined to avoid any decision, play the activist groups off against each other, and thereby paralyze them. The attempted assassination of Hiranuma,<sup>5</sup> the demonstrations of nationalist organizations, the resignation of the well-known nationalist leader, Admiral Suetsugu, from the leadership of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association established by

<sup>5</sup> Extremists attempted to assassinate Minister without Portfolio Hiranuma on Aug. 14.

Konoye, must be viewed as signs of crisis. The negotiations with the United States may drag on for some time yet; a settlement which could be obtained only by the most far-reaching Japanese concessions would immediately lead to serious internal upheavals. This is confirmed to me by all circles on which the Embassy exerts constant influence in accordance with your telegram No. 1383 of August 25.<sup>6</sup>

OTT

<sup>6</sup> Document No. 239.

### No. 277

84/24842-44

*The State Secretary to the Permanent Deputy of the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories*

BERLIN, September 4, 1941.

Pursuant to the letters exchanged between our departments and our discussions on the participation of the Foreign Ministry in the treatment of the questions of the occupied eastern territories<sup>1</sup> I am sending you the enclosed memorandum concerning the questions of competence that have so far remained open (cf. letter Pers. 2658 g. of July 15, 1941 from the Foreign Ministry).<sup>2</sup> I confirm to you that the Foreign Minister has agreed to the arrangement recorded in the enclosure and would like to ask you to confirm to me for your part, too, the concurrence of Minister Rosenberg.<sup>3</sup>

After receipt of this confirmation the Foreign Ministry will again get in touch with you concerning the appointment of representatives with the Reich Commissars.

WEIZSÄCKER

[Enclosure]

a. The appointment of representatives of the Foreign Ministry with the Reich Commissars in the occupied eastern territories will be made according to the following procedure:

The representatives of the Foreign Ministry with the Reich Commissars will continue to be carried in the budget of the Foreign Ministry. They will be appointed by the Foreign Minister. Their appointments will be made in accord with the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories.

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 111 and footnote 3.

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 111.

<sup>3</sup> No such document has been found.

b. The representatives of the Foreign Ministry with the Reich Commissars will be expressly obligated to give the Reich Commissar to whom they are assigned a carbon copy of each of their reports.

c. With regard to having the Foreign Minister regularly informed by the Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories concerning the developments in these territories because of their connection with the over-all formation of German foreign policy as mentioned under 1) of the Foreign Ministry's letter Pers. 2658 of July 15, 1941, or with regard to having the Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories informed by the Foreign Minister. This will in general be done on the level of the Ministers themselves, if necessary between their permanent deputies.

d. The Foreign Ministry representatives with the Reich Commissar (No. 2 of the letter mentioned above) will receive the following instructions:

"II. The function of the Foreign Ministry representatives with the Reich Commissars is *advisory*. The representatives will assist the Reich Commissars in dealing with foreign policy problems which affect the Reich Commissariat concerned. They will handle propaganda measures with respect to third countries. They will report to the Foreign Minister and will refrain from exerting any influence of their own upon the organization of the Reich Commissariats. Problems which affect the foreign policy of the Reich will be dealt with directly by the Foreign Minister and the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories."

### No. 278

82/60567

#### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

St.S. No. 579

BERLIN, September 4, 1941.

I asked the Japanese Ambassador to call on me today in order to explain to him and impress upon him our view regarding the German-Japanese negotiations with regard to supplies of rubber and raw materials.<sup>1</sup> In order that there should be no misunderstanding remaining between the Ambassador and me I gave him what I had to say in the form of the appended memorandum,<sup>2</sup> telling him, however, that this was not a note, but an oral expression of opinion by me, which I gave him for his convenience.

I illustrated the content of these rather technical economic statements for the Ambassador from the political standpoint and asked him to do what he could to make them understand in Tokyo, too, that

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 216 and footnote 1.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

these important economic questions cannot be decided by a departmental particularism detached, as it were, from our joint policy. I asked Oshima whether the specialists working on these questions in Tokyo were really entirely aware of the extent to which we were the protagonists of the struggle and of the wishes of Japan in the political sphere.

I believe that Oshima, who usually approaches such problems only hesitantly, understood my statements and that he will probably pass them on accurately to his Government.<sup>3</sup>

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>3</sup> In a telegram of Sept. 5 (4684/E225196) Wiehl notified Ott of the discussion between Weizsäcker and Oshima and indicated that the Ambassador would probably forward the memorandum to Tokyo.

### No. 279

233/156728-29

#### *Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

U. St.S. Pol. 835

BERLIN, September 4, 1941.

The Argentine Ambassador saw me today and asked on instructions from his Government about the meaning of the arrest of eleven Argentine citizens in Paris.<sup>1</sup>

I did not admit to the Ambassador, as had been considered to begin with, that this was a matter of reprisals because of the arrests of German citizens in Argentina.<sup>2</sup> I rather stated that we had received information from Paris that there were a number of foreigners, the arrested Argentineans among them, who were under suspicion of having acted against the security of the state. The arrests had taken place for this reason. Señor Olivera said he would, as a result, report to his Government that the arrests had not taken place because the arrested were Argentineans but rather because of specific reasons for suspicion. He must add that the possibility had been considered in Argentina that it was a matter of reprisals. To this I replied that the given offices had received information for some time about anti-government machinations of foreigners in occupied France and that up to now we had not investigated these matters. Now the moment had arrived, however, when we considered it necessary to act. The Ambassador obviously understood the meaning of this, but did not think it appropriate to discuss this point at length. He added that he

<sup>1</sup> In an undated directive (253/165014-15), probably sent Aug. 21, Albrecht, the Deputy Director of the Legal Department, advised the Embassy in Paris that because of the arrest of Germans in Argentina, ten Argentineans should be arrested there. In a memorandum of Sept. 1 (233/156722) Albrecht recorded that the Argentineans had been arrested.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 251 and footnote 6.

had learned the names of those arrested. They all were prominent members of the Argentine colony. He could say off hand that the suspicion would not be borne out. The Ambassador asked how long the arrest would last. I replied that each case would be examined and treated individually and that the decision would be made by the competent authorities according to objective principles.

Señor Olivera conducted the conversation in his usual verbose politeness. I have the impression that he understood what was involved but that he considered it sensible to appear as if he believed that this was an entirely normal action against foreigners.

WOERMANN

### No. 280

65/45355-57

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff.*

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, September 4, 1941.

Subject: Disbandment of the Legation in Tehran.

With reference to my telephone conversation last night with the Foreign Minister<sup>1</sup> I wish to record the following as the result of my latest conversation with the Führer.

The Führer expressed the wish that first every effort be made to get the Germans out of Iran and also that the Legation be disbanded and withdrawn. I confirmed to the Führer that everything was being done to repatriate the Germans. When I inquired whether a disbandment of the Legation was to be in connection with breaking off diplomatic relations, the Führer said that in this case there was no need to adhere to international usage. The personnel of the Legation, he said, should be gradually withdrawn until no one was left. It did not matter what the Iranians would then do. The reason why the Führer is giving orders to pull all Germans out of Iran is, apart from political motives, his desire to have complete freedom of action in Iran when our troops will have advanced further. He would like to prevent having his military freedom of action restricted by the presence of Germans in Iran. In accordance with instructions I pointed out to the Führer that it was for the moment not feasible on technical grounds for us to initiate a withdrawal of the Germans and that we had to depend on negotiation for this. Because of the refusal of Turkey to serve any longer as a protective power<sup>2</sup> the problem had become more difficult. What held out most promise at the moment was to negotiate directly with the Iranian Government

<sup>1</sup> No record found.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 263, footnote 4.

and in doing so, to exploit a conflict between Britain and Russia which very likely existed. In their efforts to prevent as much as possible a Russian penetration of the country the English apparently are willing to leave to the Iranian Government the greatest possible degree of sovereignty. By emphasizing that internment of the Germans in obedience to English pressure and contrary to the promise of the Iranian Government represented a fundamental infringement of Iran's sovereignty, it may be possible to induce the Iranian Government to take a firmer stand against the English and the Russians in this matter. Moreover—and this may well be our best card—various forms of reprisals are open to us, chief among which would be taking action against the population of the Jersey Islands. The Foreign Minister would therefore make the suggestion that the German Legation in Tehran be left until the fate of the Germans was decided one way or another. The Legation should remain as long as there was still any prospect for exerting any influence on the fate of the Germans. As soon as a decision had been made, the Foreign Minister would disband the Legation and withdraw it, a measure which probably would be more easily carried out than the withdrawal of the German civilians. The Führer declared himself in agreement with this proposal.<sup>3</sup>

HEWEL

<sup>3</sup> In telegram No. 978 of Sept. 7 (65/45373-76) Eitel reported that the Iranian Foreign Minister had informed him and the Italian Minister that notes had been presented by the British and Russian Envoys demanding the departure of the German, Italian, Hungarian, and Rumanian Legations from Iran. According to Eitel he had vigorously protested and stated that a departure of the Legation could not even be considered until safe conduct had been assured for the departure of the German colony.

### No. 281

4865/249331-32

*The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

SECRET

ROME, September 5, 1941.

No. 148g.

Minister Anfuso, upon his return to the Foreign Ministry, after reporting to the Duce, today informed Minister Prince Bismarck, who was visiting him, that the Duce had been very painfully affected by the following confidential report he had received from one of the Italian officials who have to do with the employment of Italian laborers in Germany.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For a previous Italian complaint about the treatment of Italian workers in Germany, see vol. XII of this series, document No. 71.

The report was to the effect that the Italian official in question had had a talk with the Kreisleiter of Recklinghausen with regard to an incident involving a German woman who, according to a report in the possession of the Kreisleiter, had had intimate relations with an Italian laborer, and whose hair had been cut off and her face smeared with asphalt.

The attitude of the said Kreisleiter in regard to the race problem and interbreeding between members of various nations was evident from the following circular, signed by him personally:

"A mixture is undesirable in any case, but the mixture of the blood of a German girl with a foreigner of related blood, such as workers from occupied territories (Norwegians, Danes, etc.) and even enemy nations (Englishmen) is preferable to mixture with foreigners of alien blood (the Italians are to be included in this category). Goldbeck."<sup>2</sup>

After communicating this report as given above and again pointing out how very much the Duce had been agitated about its contents, Signor Anfuso asked that the German Government be informed in strict confidence about the incident.

In view of the growing difficulties in connection with the employment of Italian labor in Germany, I would appreciate it if this report could be looked into and if I might be informed of the result of the investigation.<sup>3</sup>

MACKENSEN

<sup>2</sup> A memorandum by Weizsäcker of Oct. 3, St.S.No. 665 (1517/372725) records that Alfieri that day submitted a formal statement of complaint dated Sept. 27 (1517/372726-27) regarding the disparagement of the Italian race implied in the German treatment of incidents in the relations of Italian workers with German women. The same statement attributed to Kreisleiter Goldbeck and dated Aug. 15 was included in the Italian complaint.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram No. 987 of Sept. 13 (1517/372688) the Reich Foreign Minister through Rintelen directed that Mackensen's report be sent to Reichsleiter Bormann for investigation.

See, further, document No. 397.

## No. 282

1543/375746-48

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the United States*

Telegram

MOST URGENT SPECIAL TRAIN, September 6, 1941—6:30 p. m.  
No. 960 from the Special Train

Received Berlin, September 6, 1941—6:50 p. m.  
No. 1738 from the Foreign Ministry Sent September 6.

We are transmitting to you below the announcement concerning the incident involving a German submarine and apparently an American destroyer, which will appear in the morning papers on September 7:

The American and British news services published a report to the effect that in an encounter of the American destroyer *Greer* with a German submarine on the morning of September 4, the submarine had attacked the destroyer with torpedoes. The torpedoes had missed their mark. The destroyer had then by way of counter-attack pursued the submarine with depth charges.

As against this Germany now officially states:

On September 4, at 62 degrees 31 minutes north and 27 degrees 6 minutes west, a German submarine was at 12:30 p.m. attacked by depth bombs in the German blockade area<sup>1</sup> and pursued. The German submarine was not in a position to determine the nationality of the attacking destroyer. In justified self-defense it thereupon, at 2:39 p.m., fired a double salvo, which missed. The destroyer continued the pursuit with depth bombs until around midnight.

If an official American agency, namely, the United States Navy Department, asserts that the attack was started by the German submarine, this can only have the purpose to give at least an appearance of justice for the attack of an American destroyer on the German submarine in violation of neutrality. The attack itself is proof that Mr. Roosevelt, contrary to his assertions, has previously given the American destroyers, in violation of neutrality, the general order not only to report the position of German ships and submarines, but, what is more, to attack them.

Mr. Roosevelt is in this way trying with all the means at his disposal to provoke incidents in order to incite the American people into war against Germany. End of the announcement.

Please, through the channels at your disposal, immediately upon the receipt of this telegram, get in touch with the leading isolationist members of Congress and try in a suitable confidential manner to make it clear to these members of Congress that there is a unique opportunity here to expose Roosevelt's war-mongering policy and deal it a decisive blow to the advantage of the isolationists. It might be conceivable, for example, that one or more of the most influential isolationist members of Congress would now refer, in a way that had best be left to the judgment of those on the spot, to the official German communiqué concerning the incident, which is diametrically opposed to the Roosevelt announcement, and make the following motion in the interest of instructing the American public in accordance with the truth:

1) Immediate recall of the destroyer and the interrogation of its crew before an investigating committee of Congress concerning the incident of the German submarine, and

<sup>1</sup> See vol. x of this series, document No. 291 and vol. xii of this series, document No. 210.

2) In the event that it is established that the American destroyer attacked the German submarine, the issuance of a statement by the Government as to who gave to this destroyer or to the American naval forces the order to shoot.

The following should also be noted in this connection: There is no doubt that the statements from the German submarine are absolutely true. This is a matter of an official report by the captain of the submarine. According to this, there must be an order in effect among the American naval forces at once to attack German naval forces or submarines upon their appearing, because it is quite clear from the report of the captain that the submarine, without for its part having made any preparations for the attack, was deliberately attacked by the American destroyer.<sup>2</sup> There is therefore, as I have said, a unique chance here to deal a decisive blow to the Messrs. Roosevelt, Knox and Stimson, who, as we well know, have not up to now risked admitting to the American public the existence of any such orders, and to expose them as those who, against the will of the American people, want in any event to provoke an incident with Germany and thus to drive America into the war against Germany.

There is especial interest in the case here at the highest level, and I ask you to make every effort to induce the isolationists to proceed in Congress in such a manner.

Please send a report at once by telegram.<sup>3</sup>

RIBBENTROP

<sup>2</sup> In a letter of Sept. 9 (1543/375766) Minister Eisenlohr asked the Naval War Staff to instruct the Commander of the German submarine to report additional particulars about the encounter with the *Greer* as soon as such a report could be sent without endangering the submarine. Eisenlohr listed several specific questions regarding the circumstances of the encounter to which an answer was requested. On Sept. 14, Counselor Grote of Political Division I M recorded (1543/375808) that the Naval War Staff had transmitted the following statement from the Commander of the Submarine *Aim*: "Adequate reply through radio channels to very detailed questions not advisable. U-652 due back in approximately one week. Suggest waiting for oral report of the Commander."

<sup>3</sup> Document No. 292.

No. 233

8589/E603009-13

*Führer's Directive*

CHEFSACHE

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, September 6, 1941.

TOP SECRET MILITARY

The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht  
OKW/WFSt/Abt. L (I Op.) No. 441492/41 g.Kods. Chefs.

By officer only

DIRECTIVE No. 35

The initial successes against the enemy forces in the area between the inner wings of Army Groups South and Center, have, with a

view to the progressive encirclement of the Leningrad area, created the basis for a decisive operation against Army Group Timoshenko, which is now tied down on the central front by offensive fighting. Army Group Timoshenko must be beaten and annihilated within the limited period of time left before winter weather sets in. To attain this it is essential to concentrate all Army and Luftwaffe forces that become available on the wings and that can be transferred in time.

In accordance with the presentation of the Commander in Chief of the Army, I order for the preparation and execution of these operations:

1. On the *southern half of the front*, it must be the objective of the forces of Army Group South advancing northward across the Dnieper, in coordination with the attack of the southern wing of Army Group Center, to annihilate the enemy lodged in the Kremenchug-Kiev-Konotop triangle. As soon as execution of this mission permits, the elements of Second and Sixth Armies and Second Panzer Group no longer needed must be regrouped for new operations.

Army Group South, as of about September 10 at the latest, must launch a surprise push of the mobile units reinforced by infantry divisions and supported by Fourth Air Force concentrated for massive blows, out of the bridgehead won by Seventeenth Army in a northwesterly direction via Lubny, while Seventeenth Army gains room in the direction of Poltava and Kharkov.

On the lower Dnieper, the offensive against the Crimea must be continued with the support of Fourth Air Force, as must also the offensive out of the Dnepropetrovsk bridgehead if forces are available for that purpose. A drive by mobile units south of the lower Dnieper in the direction of Melitopol would bring substantial advantages for the mission of Eleventh Army.

2. In the *Army Center*, the preparations for the operation against Army Group Timoshenko must be carried forward in such manner as to permit at the earliest possible date (end of September) the launching of the attack which would have as its object the annihilation of the enemy in the area east of Smolensk by a double envelopment—with strong, *massed* armored forces on the wings—aimed in the general direction of Vyazma.

To this end, heavy concentrations of *mobile forces* must be formed: On the southern wing—probably in the area southeast of Roslavl and with a northeastern direction of thrust—out of the available forces of Army Group Center together with 5th and 2nd Armored Divisions released for the purpose.

In the sector of Ninth Army—probably with direction of thrust via Byeloy—by transferring the strongest elements that can be obtained from Army Group North.

Only after the bulk of Army Group Timoshenko has been beaten in this tightly contained operation of annihilation by close-in envelopment, will the army center be required to launch the pursuit in direction of Moscow, resting on the Oka on the left, and on the upper Volga on the right.

The *Luftwaffe* is to support the attack with Second Air Force, which is to receive timely reinforcements especially from the north-eastern sector, providing for main concentration on the wings and committing the bulk of the divebombing units (VIII Air Corps) with the mobile units on both attacking wings.

3. On the *northeastern front*, encirclement of the enemy forces fighting in the Leningrad area (which also requires seizure of Schlüsselburg) must be carried through in cooperation with the Finnish Corps attacking on the Karelian Isthmus in such a manner as to permit release to Army Center, on September 15 at the latest, of substantial portions of the mobile troops and of First Air Force, especially VIII Air Corps. Previous to that, a tighter encirclement of Leningrad to the east at least must be sought and, in addition, if the weather permits, an all-out air attack is to be launched against Leningrad; there the most important objective is destruction of the water works.

In order to help along the Finnish advance through the fortifications laid out along the old Russo-Finnish frontier, and with a view to narrowing the combat zone and eliminating enemy air bases, it is necessary as soon as possible to launch forces of Army Group North across the Neva sector toward the north.

Kronstadt Bay must in cooperation with the Finns be sealed off by mine fields and artillery so as to prevent any escape of enemy forces into the Baltic (Hangö, Baltic islands).

The battlefield around Leningrad must be screened off to the east also on the lower Volkhov as soon as troops can be made available for the purpose; a link-up with the Karelian Army, in direction of the Svir, should be sought only after annihilation of the enemy around Leningrad is assured.

4. With regard to the *further development* of the operations, preparations must be made for providing cover for the Moscow offensive of Army Group Center from the sector of Army Group South by means of a flank securing force (made up of mobile troops becoming available there) which is to advance in a general northeastern direction, and for launching a drive by forces of Army Group North on both sides of Lake Ilmen for the purpose of securing the northern flank and linking up with the Finnish Army of Karelia.

5. Anything that saves time and so speeds up the respective deadlines would benefit the over-all operation and the preparations for it.

ADOLF HITLER

## No. 284

93/104069

### *Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

BERLIN, September 6, 1941.

Minister von Rintelen has stated the following regarding the memorandum with respect to the German-Hungarian frontier.<sup>1</sup>

1. The Foreign Minister was of the opinion that the question of drawing the boundary on the Mur river was so unimportant that he did not wish to decide it himself.

2. The Foreign Minister agreed to having the conclusion of the frontier treaty put off because of the frontier with respect to the Medjumurje.<sup>2</sup>

WOERMANN

<sup>1</sup> Woermann's memorandum, U.St.S. Pol. 836 of Sept. 5 (93/104047-50) summarized the problem regarding the conclusion of a German-Hungarian boundary treaty. It explained that the final disposition of the Medjumurje was in dispute between Hungary and Croatia and that a German-Hungarian determination of the frontier in this region might appear to prejudice the issue in favor of Hungary.

<sup>2</sup> In his memorandum St.S. 606 of Sept. 16 (93/104074) Weizsäcker recorded that Sztójay had handed him a letter with two enclosures (93/104075-082/2) setting forth the Hungarian position on the question of the Medjumurje.

## No. 285

95/107071-72

### *Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department*

SECRET

BERLIN, September 6, 1941.  
Dir. Ha. Pol. 192.

The following is to be added to my memorandum No. Dir. Ha. Pol. 188 of September 3<sup>1</sup> regarding my conversations with the Spanish Minister of Commerce Carceller, which was submitted to the Foreign Minister by State Secretary von Weizsäcker on September 4 with the recommendation that it be sent to Ambassador von Stohrer for his information and possible comment:<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 275.

<sup>2</sup> In his cover note (95/107070) Weizsäcker recorded that Carceller had mentioned to him the same things he had told Wiehl. It was Weizsäcker's impression, however, that "the Minister of Commerce had presented this subject not in accord with the Spanish Foreign Minister."

Wiehl's telegram No. 2028 of Sept. 4 (2174/471458-60) mentioned the remarks by Carceller and stated that a memorandum informing them would follow by courier.

Wiehl's telegram of Sept. 10 (3882/047836) informed Stohrer that the Reich Foreign Minister wished an expression of Stohrer's views regarding Carceller's remarks.

Stohrer replied in report No. 2471 of Sept. 16 (2174/471474-80), taking the position that Carceller's idea of restricting public expressions in Spain of a pro-German policy might have undesirable consequences.



Carceller stated subsequently that immediately before his departure from Spain he had been received by the Caudillo for a lengthy conference and had explained his point of view to him just as clearly as he had done here. Thus it is to be assumed that he made his statements by order of Franco. On the other hand Carceller mentioned nothing about coordinating his statements with Serrano Suñer; rather, from the various remarks which he made to Herr Brandau, who was assigned to him as interpreter and guide by the Protocol Division, it can be deduced that he is in a certain opposition to Suñer.

On the evening before flying back to Madrid from Berlin Carceller invited Herr Brandau to the Hotel Adlon for a meeting of almost an hour. Herr Brandau reports on this as follows:<sup>3</sup>

"In the course of this conversation he told me that he would welcome it if I could call on Ministerialdirektor Wiehl once more in order to underline a few points out of the conversation he had with him. He said that he had been especially interested in this particular conversation, and that had also been the reason why he had broken off his visit to Leipzig earlier than intended, in order to come to Berlin.<sup>4</sup> It was absolutely necessary to bring about a speedy clarification of the situation. It was up to the German Government to do this. The German General Staff had to determine whether it fitted in with its plans for Spain to enter the war or not, and Germany only had to have full confidence that Spain was and remained at her side. Spain was ready for everything, no matter what was planned by the German side. Spain would, without further ado, accommodate herself into the framework of the all-European policy led by Germany; but then she should not be treated like Cinderella and left unnoticed, but should be included in the over-all German economic planning. Only in this way could one give the Spanish people an objective, even though [it were] a distant one."

From this there appears to be no doubt that Carceller expects a reply to his statements made here.<sup>5</sup>

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary with the request for instructions as to whether the matter should be passed on to Herr von Stohrer for his information and comment.

WIEHL

<sup>3</sup> Brandau's report of Sept. 4 had been filmed on 3882/E047819-25.

<sup>4</sup> Carceller had come to Germany to visit the Leipzig Fair as is noted in Wiehl's memorandum Ha. Pol. 189 of Sept. 8. See document No. 275, footnote 1.

<sup>5</sup> In a memorandum of Sept. 22 (3882/E047858-859) Wiehl noted Stohrer's comments to Carceller's suggestions and concluded that these suggestions should be disregarded at this stage. As to Stohrer's proposals to strengthen Spain's war potential, Wiehl asked for instructions whether this should be followed up in view of Ribbentrop's previous decision to exercise restraint in this matter. No further instruction has been found. In a minute of Dec. 24 (3882/E047865-68), however, Sabath noted that on Sept. 29 Ribbentrop had reiterated his instruction regarding German restraint toward Spanish economic requests.

## No. 286

216/147755

*Minute by the Director of the Political Department*

BERLIN, September 6, 1941.

Minister von Rintelen telephoned that the Bose matter had been presented to the Führer. The sense of the decision is that we should adhere to the operation but postpone it for the time being, for the reason that an Indian declaration could give the English at the present time a pretext for invading Afghanistan. The Foreign Minister intends to write Bose a reply in this sense.<sup>1</sup>

WOERMANN

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 296.

## No. 287

65/45379-84

*The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Iran*

Telegram

MOST URGENT  
No. 671  
RAM 386/R

"WESTFALEN", September 7, 1941—2:38 p.m.

With reference to your telegram No. 967 of Sept. 6.<sup>1</sup>

In view of the situation brought on by the negative attitude of the British Minister the question arises as to what instructions you should give the German colony there. Inasmuch as you yourself consider that there is the danger that the British Minister's threat to have the German colony arrested by the Russians may be put into effect, it may be more advisable for you not to place any obstacles in the way of an evacuation of the German colony to Ahwaz, should the case arise, because:

- (1) Transportation from Ahwaz to Turkey is still possible, and
- (2) in the event of a final failure of our efforts in this matter, an internment by the English is still to be preferred to surrendering the colony to the Bolsheviks.

<sup>1</sup> This telegram (65/45367) reported that the Director of the Central European Department of the Iranian Foreign Ministry had confirmed an earlier statement regarding the completely negative attitude of the British Minister who "not only threatened continuation of the war but in addition threatened in unequivocal terms the arrest of the German colony by the Russians unless the German colony were put at the disposal of the English at Ahwaz." He further demanded that the members of the German colony be in Ahwaz 3 days after signature of the armistice which had not yet taken place.

I mention for your information that in the course of this day we will have the Swiss Government transmit the following communication to the British Government:<sup>2</sup>

"The Iranian Foreign Minister informed the German Minister in Tehran on September 6 that the British Government had given him official notice through the British Minister of its refusal to grant the safe conduct demanded by the Iranian Government for the departure of the German colony to a neutral country, and informed him that the British Government insisted on the surrender of the entire German colony which it wishes to transport to India.<sup>3</sup> In view of this communication the Reich Government sees itself compelled to order the immediate internment and deportation of all British subjects in the Channel Islands of Jersey and Guernsey, who came from the United Kingdom and have heretofore been left at liberty, and who number several thousand. The Reich Government would be prepared, however, to refrain from carrying out this measure if the British Government on its part would desist from interning the Germans in Iran and would promise safe conduct for these to depart for Turkey."

End of communication.<sup>4</sup>

You will be informed as to the results. Please treat the question of a continuance of the Legation in Tehran, following the removal of the German colony, as being still completely open and do not make it the subject of any communications to the Iranian Government.

RIBBENTROP

<sup>2</sup> Telegram No. 962 from the Special Train, No. 915 from the Foreign Ministry (1662/393633-34) embodied the instruction to Bern.

On Sept. 18 the Legation in Bern forwarded the text of a British note (1662/-393706-08) which insisted that the cases of the German subjects in Iran and of the British subjects on the Channel Islands were in no way parallel and which termed the threatened German reprisals "unjustifiable and illegal."

See, further, documents Nos. 306 and 317.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram No. 962 of Sept. 6 (1662/393631-32) Ettl had first reported regarding the completely negative attitude of the British Minister who demanded surrender of all members of the German colony at Ahwaz whence they were to be transported to India.

<sup>4</sup> In telegram No. 969 from the Special Train, No. 918 of Sept. 8 from the Foreign Ministry (1662/393644-45), Ribbentrop somewhat revised the text of the communication for the British Government, expressing the willingness of the German Government to refrain from deporting British subjects from the Channel Islands and also to grant safe conduct for 132 British volunteers from the Finnish war who were stranded in Sweden, provided that the British Government would refrain from interning the members of the German colony in Iran.

## No. 288

482/231287

*The Office of the Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the Military Commander in Serbia to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 608 of September 8

BELGRADE, September 8, 1941—10:45 a. m.

Received September 8—12:30 p. m.

D III 417g.

It is evident that Jews have participated in numerous acts of sabotage and rebellion. It is therefore most necessary that steps be taken speedily for the seizure and removal of at least all male Jews. The figure under consideration in this connection probably amounts to about 8,000. A concentration camp is being built at the moment, but it appears advisable in view of future developments to get these Jews out of the country as quickly as possible, i.e., on empty freight barges down the Danube in order to unload them on Rumanian territory (island in the Danube delta). Please bring about the preliminary conditions which accordingly are necessary with regard to toleration by Rumania.<sup>1</sup>

VEESENMAYER  
BENZLER

<sup>1</sup> In a memorandum of Sept. 11 (482/231286) Sonnleithner recorded that Ribbentrop had commented with regard to this suggestion that "this measure could not be carried out without the approval of the Rumanians and that presumably another way would have to be found."

In telegram No. 1207 of Sept. 11, dispatched Sept. 12 (482/231284) Luther informed the Office of the Plenipotentiary in Belgrade that "a removal of Jews to the territory of a foreign state could not be approved." He suggested that the Jews be placed in labor camps and employed on public works. Sonnleithner's memorandum and Luther's telegram are printed in Leon Pollakov-Josef Wulf, *Das Dritte Reich und seine Diener* (Berlin-Grünwald, 1956), p. 26.

## No. 289

329/195525-26

*The Minister in Afghanistan to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 328 of September 8

KABUL, September 8, 1941—6:20 p. m.

Received September 11—2:30 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 268 of September 5.<sup>1</sup>

The hostile feeling against England and Russia on the part of Government and people produced by the Iranian events still persists.

<sup>1</sup> This telegram, which is identified on the margin as Pol. VII 4902 g., has not been found. A draft telegram of Sept. 3 with Woermann's signature (329/195527-28), the contents of which are quite closely related to those of the telegram printed here, may have been the draft of this missing instruction.

Although the Government has taken account of this feeling by sharply criticizing what had happened through public statements in the newspaper *Anis* and on the radio, nevertheless it is dominated by its original fears that the Iranian events could be repeated here. The King<sup>2</sup> and Cabinet are without a doubt anti-Bolshevist; their attitude toward England is opportunistic and therefore they are inclined to compromise.

The momentary situation is characterized by growing economic pressure (stoppage of gasoline imports, impeding of transit trade with the resulting loss of import duties, impediments to the disposal over dollar assets), as well as by the fact that the English, of late, are causing continued unrest among the border tribes. The Kabul garrison had to intervene in the Mohmand area last week.

Day before yesterday the new English Minister<sup>3</sup> handed the King his credentials. The Afghan Government has the impression that English steps against the German element here are to be expected in the next few days. It stressed anew that it would handle the matter by diplomatic negotiations while fully preserving its sovereignty, and stated in this connection that it considered Iran's conduct incomprehensible and erroneous.

As the Afghan wishes have so far been treated with reserve by you (cf. also the closing sentence of telegram No. 219 of July 8),<sup>4</sup> the present moment does not appear appropriate for making promises *here*. I suggest a discussion with Abdul Majid,<sup>5</sup> who is still to be considered as the representative of his Government, particularly for the reason that positive assurances can be given at your end with greater emphasis on the basis of our military intentions.

Although the strengthening of a neutral and pro-German attitude is mainly dependent upon the advance of the German front lines, I suggest that I be authorized to offer the Afghan Government financial help for influencing the tribes with money in order to put a stop to the uprisings fomented by England.

PILGER

<sup>1</sup> Mohammed Zahir Shah.

<sup>2</sup> Sir Francis Verner Wylie.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed (617/249971).

<sup>4</sup> The Afghan Minister of Economics, who had been sojourning in Germany and Switzerland since the early part of the year. See vol. XII of this series, documents Nos. 158, 467 and 598. A memorandum by Melchers of Sept. 16 (329/195520) recorded that the Afghan Commercial Attaché had hinted that Abdul Majid who was then in Switzerland was considering "whether he should turn away from the present Afghan Government."

## No. 290

205/142954-55

*The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

STOCKHOLM, September 8, 1941—6:45 p. m.

No. 1369 of September 8

Received September 8—8:40 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 2000 of September 6.<sup>1</sup>

Accompanied by Counselor of Legation Geffcken this afternoon I visited Foreign Minister Günther in accordance with instructions and conducted the discussion about the Norwegian ships in the form which was arranged in Berlin. At the start Günther said that it was out of the question for the Swedish police to put new crews on board and to remove the old crews without their having a valid court decision.

He denied that he had ever given consent to anything pointing in this direction. The question of the validity of the Norwegian decree of May 18, 1940,<sup>2</sup> must be decided judicially in the last instance before any executive action would be possible. There has so far been no such decision in spite of the well-known action of the Chief Bailiff of Göteborg which was simply a determination to refuse issuance of a temporary order. To my objection that the matter was not of a juridical but rather of a political sort, and that an unsatisfactory solution would have the most severe consequences for German-Swedish relations, Günther replied that he had to protest. Sweden had never been involved in any dealings which could be viewed as being against Germany or as directed against German interests. All that Sweden did was to operate in accordance with existing laws. It was completely incomprehensible to him, Günther, that Germany did not wish to permit this and that she uttered such threats. In the further course of the discussion I indicated that the idea of bringing the ships to Norway had come from the Swedish side.<sup>3</sup> We now wished to follow this suggestion and we had to expect that in this we would be supported by Sweden. The judicial procedures consumed too much time and the danger of sabotage was too great. Günther finally promised that he would reexamine the whole complex of questions including that of prevention of sabotage and indicated that he would have an answer by the end of the week. He stated further that the assertion was not correct that one of the steamships lying in Göteborg had been provided with oil (cf. your telegram No. 1985 of September 5).<sup>1</sup> All of the ships had had certain supplies which they had recently ex-

<sup>1</sup> Not found.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 174, footnote 2.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 174.

changed among themselves in such manner that some of them possessed sufficient oil for a trip. The shipowner Stenersen has been advised through the consulate at Göteborg not to undertake any further step until I have had a new discussion with Günther.<sup>4</sup>

WIED

<sup>4</sup> See, further, document No. 300.

## No. 291

1247/837754

*Extract From the Notes of the Representative of the Foreign Ministry  
With the High Command of the Army*<sup>1</sup>

SEPTEMBER 8, 1941.

## JAPAN

1) *View of State Secretary von Weizsäcker:*

One should continue to press Japan to attack Vladivostok. (1) For military reasons, because this will relieve us militarily. (2) For reasons of foreign policy, because it will prove that Japan has clearly opted in favor of the Axis and will strengthen the general position of the latter; if the present state of affairs continues there is danger that Japan will no longer be able to rouse herself. The risk of a possible military failure must be accepted.

2) *Führer* is opposed to putting continuous vigorous pressure on Japan manifestly because he is concerned that this would be interpreted as a sign of weakness (as if we had need of Japan).

<sup>1</sup> These notes in Eitzdorf's handwriting are not signed.

Point 3) of this note (1247/337754-56) which deals with Japan is a summary of Ribbentrop's telegram No. 1383 of Aug. 25 printed as document No. 239, and of Ott's telegram No. 1713 of Sept. 4 printed as No. 276.

[EDITORS' NOTE. On September 8 and 9 the Regent of Hungary, Minister President Bárdossy and the new Chief of the Hungarian General Staff, Field Marshal Szombathelyi, visited Hitler at his field headquarters in East Prussia. Hitler's invitation to Horthy was conveyed in Ribbentrop's telegram No. 926 of September 1 from the Special Train, forwarded to Budapest as No. 1525 of September 1 (93/104001). The details of the visit were arranged in a series of telegrams exchanged between the Legation in Hungary and the Foreign Ministry September 3-6 which are filmed on serial 93. Rintelen's telegram No. 957 of September 6 from the Special Train, forwarded to Budapest as No. 1569 (93/104057), instructed Minister Jagow to make sure that "the strictest secrecy was observed with regard to the

journey of Regent Horthy to the Führer's headquarters and all preparations connected with it." The only record of the discussions with Horthy and his advisers at Hitler's headquarters found in German Foreign Ministry files is the following entry in an unsigned foreign policy survey of September 18 prepared by the Foreign Minister's Secretariat (46/31108-13):

"The visit of the Regent of Hungary, von Horthy, at Führer's headquarters has had the result with respect to the participation of Hungarian troops in the campaign in the east that Hungary will increase the number of her contingents of troops participating in the campaign. On the occasion of the visit the Hungarians requested a rectification of their Carpathian frontier with the part of former Soviet Russian eastern Galicia which belongs at present to the General Government; this was promised to them. For the rest, the visit offered an opportunity for counteracting the strong influence exerted on Hungary by Anglo-American propaganda, which can normally be observed. In view of present and future successes of German arms we can at any event be sure of Hungary's continued cooperation with the Axis Powers."

The Halder Diary has the following notations for September 9:

"Visit of the Regent of Hungary together with the new Chief of the General Staff: Tour of the headquarters. Debate, somewhat lively in parts regarding the further participation in the operations by the Hungarian mobile corps. The new Chief of the General Staff takes the selfish view that what matters is to preserve Hungary's forces in consideration of her task in the Balkans. Moreover, the Hungarian mobile corps seems to take the view that for once other Hungarian forces should be employed. Naturally the difficulties in replacing losses in material have to be admitted.

"In the end the concession is made that the mobile corps will be left until termination of the operations, and in case it should be withdrawn later a replacement is promised."

## No. 292

1543/375763-64

*The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

WASHINGTON, September 9, 1941—8:45 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received September 10—8:10 a. m.

No. 3098 of September 9

With reference to your telegram No. 1738 of September 6.<sup>1</sup>

The way Germany handled and politically exploited the *Greer* incident has evidently not failed to have an effect here, and public opinion is worried over the possible consequences. The interventionists have

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 282.

not been able to agree on a uniform policy as to how to parry this German propaganda attack on the other side, and are therefore awaiting Roosevelt's speech.<sup>2</sup>

Concerning the importance and effect of his statement, speculation differs widely. It is assumed that his speech will be especially aggressive and provocative in tone, while he will actually confine himself to addressing an appeal to the American people that they should rouse themselves from their lethargy in order to achieve as soon as possible the goal of making America the arsenal of democracy by using every effort and, in addition, to demanding again a financial plan in accordance with his May speech.<sup>3</sup> The practical result is expected to be that rearmament will be expedited at the expense of normal peacetime habits of the American people, and also that the American lanes of approach will be protected by means of far advanced American bases in the western part of the Atlantic.

Roosevelt will presumably announce various alleged defense measures for keeping the forces of the Axis Powers out of the western Atlantic, with the double aim of protecting lines of communication, especially with Iceland, and at the same time facilitating the delivery of military supplies for England, at least up to the German blockade zone, by American forces. In doing this, Roosevelt will repeatedly stress the fact that all these measures are designed merely for defense against German encroachments in the waters of the Western Hemisphere. He hopes thereby to be able to calm the American people and to delude the isolationist opposition into thinking that it is not his policy, but Germany's aggressive warfare, that is responsible for the incidents and their consequences.

In order to demonstrate the danger and the insincerity of Roosevelt's foreign policy by using the *Greer* incident, in accordance with instructions, and through suitable contacts, I got in touch with several of the leading interested Senators, numerous Congressmen, various journalists and suitable organizations, some of whom gave me reason to expect that they would press for a Congressional investigation. The success of their efforts would, however, in the main depend on

<sup>2</sup> In telegram No. 3069 of Sept. 6 (1543/375754-55) Thomsen reported that it had been announced in connection with the incident involving the *Greer* that President Roosevelt would make a radio address "of the greatest possible importance" on Monday evening (Sept. 8). Owing to the death of President Roosevelt's mother, the address was postponed to Sept. 11. See, further, document No. 304, footnote 1.

<sup>3</sup> Apparently a reference to President Roosevelt's recommendation of May 1 to the Chairman of the House of Representatives Ways and Means Committee that three and one-half billions of additional taxes be levied to help defray defense expenditures. For text, see Rosenman, *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, vol. x, p. 144.

the measures that Roosevelt will announce and on the extent to which they could be exploited against him politically. My contacts went to work so circumspectly that one will not be able to see the German influence.

THOMSEN

No. 293

233/156732-33

*The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

BUENOS AIRES, September 9, 1941—11:21 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received September 10—8:45 a. m.

No. 1526 of September 9.

With reference to my telegram No. 1525 of September 9.<sup>1</sup>

The Foreign Minister then brought up the unpleasant position in which I personally had been placed by the violent attacks of the Commission and the press agitation.<sup>2</sup> Unfortunately, the Government was powerless to do anything about this sort of thing, but in its own interest wished to avoid anything that might encumber or disturb German-Argentine relations. In particular, the acting President attached the greatest importance to a continuation of the friendly relations that had hitherto existed with Germany. Unfortunately it was to be feared that the Commission reports would be approved by the Chamber and the Senate and would be used as a basis for further agitation against my person, which might in the end lead to serious incidents. He would therefore like to ask in all friendliness and strictly confidentially whether the German Government could not on its own initiative take some ameliorating step. My 8-year tour of duty here was in itself of exceptionally long duration already; a transfer to another post would therefore seem quite normal; or, if that were not feasible, taking an extended home leave after such a long stay in the unhealthy climate here, or something similar. My departure would, of course, be attended by every honor; it was merely a matter of preventing a further deterioration of the whole atmosphere and the agitation against me personally, which was gradually becoming threatening.

I confined myself to listening to the Foreign Minister's statements—prompted by fear of the street crowd and the Commission, highly tortuous, and permeated with repeated assurances of the high-

<sup>1</sup> Not found.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 251.

est regard for my work here and regret over the extremely unpleasant development that had occurred—and merely replied that I could not take any stand on this question but instead had to leave it to the Argentine Government to clarify its position to the German Government. The Foreign Minister stated that such a step by the Argentine Ambassador in Berlin had been contemplated.<sup>3</sup>

I assume that the démarche will be made within only a few days, since the Government apparently would like to bring about a decision before replying to the requested interpellation (cf. telegram No. 1477 of September 3),<sup>4</sup> which in view of the parliamentary vacations must in any case come before the end of this month.

With regard to the intensified campaign conducted against me by the press and even with posters, cf. DNB telegram No. 62.<sup>5</sup>

THERMANN

<sup>3</sup> Weizsäcker's memorandum, St.S. 584 of Sept. 10 (253/164953-54) records a conversation with the Argentine Ambassador who presented a note verbale suggesting that the German Government recall Ambassador Thermann in order to anticipate a debate in the Argentine Parliament regarding his person. Weizsäcker expressed astonishment at the action of the Ambassador.

<sup>4</sup> Document No. 274.

<sup>5</sup> Not found.

In telegram No. 1133 of Sept. 13 (253/164930) Woermann informed Thermann for his personal information that he should not expect that his recall would take place in response to Argentine pressure.

See, further, document No. 528.

### No. 294

2109/456518

#### *The Embassy in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 165  
of September 9  
Del. No. 5

ANKARA, September 9, 1941—11:48 p. m.  
Received September 10—7:45 a. m.

The first conversations showed that the Turkish Government is willing to conclude both a clearing agreement without time limit and a trade agreement without time limit. Discussion of these agreements has begun on the basis of the drafts proposed by us.<sup>1</sup> The Turks, moreover, do not insist on restricting the exchange of commodities, but rather are prepared to expand it to the largest volume possible under present-day conditions of production and transportation. Yet

<sup>1</sup> Not found.

they absolutely insist on not making deliveries in advance and firmly demand that these should take place item by item on both sides. In the matter of war material in particular they place great importance on obtaining at least part of the shipment immediately. My first impression is that the Turkish attitude will be very stubborn in this question and that, above all, chrome ore and copper deliveries will be obtained only in coincident exchange against war material. Apart from his negative attitude in this one question which, to be sure is especially important to us, Numan obviously tries to be accommodating and to see to it that the negotiations take place in a friendly atmosphere.

CLODIUS  
KROLL

### No. 295

65/45396

#### *The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT  
No. 991

TEHRAN, September 9 [1941].

In the session of Parliament which just ended, and about which a more detailed report will follow during the afternoon,<sup>1</sup> the Foreign Minister made public the exchange of notes between the Allies and the Iranian Government. This reveals that the Allies are no longer demanding the expulsion of the German colony from Iran, but its surrender by the Iranian Government to the Russians or the English.<sup>2</sup> Additional demands were: The breaking off of diplomatic relations between Iran and Germany, Italy, Rumania, and Hungary; finally, the Allies demanded that the Legations of these countries be forthwith prohibited from using code or radio transmitters.

ETTTEL

<sup>1</sup> In Tehran telegram No. 2 of Sept. 10 (65/45410-15).

<sup>2</sup> In telegram No. 15 of Sept. 12 (65/45440) Etttel reported having received an Iranian note stating that the British and the Soviet Governments intended to grant safe conduct for the return to Germany of the women and children of the German colony in Iran.

## No. 296

195/139208

*The Dirigent of the Political Department to the Director of the Political Department*

Telegram

No. 973

SPECIAL TRAIN, September 10, 1941—3:50 a. m.  
Received September 10—4:10 a. m.

Through the Foreign Minister's Secretariat; with reference to U. St.S. Pol. Nr. 788 of August 18.<sup>1</sup>

The Foreign Minister requests that you summon M. Bose and tell him approximately the following by way of explanation:

The Foreign Minister continues to have the greatest interest in his plans, and thanks him sincerely for his letter. If in the past we had desired, and still desire, that the moment for the publication of a declaration regarding a free India should be postponed, it is connected with the situation as a whole. This made it appear to us advisable to wait until our operations in the east began to have a stronger impact on the situation in the Near East and Southern Asia. As matters stand today, a proclamation of a free India by the Axis powers might possibly have the effect that England would then occupy Afghanistan in order to consolidate her position in India, and that she would muster still additional forces to the Near East. However, we had to avoid bringing about such English measures prematurely. The Foreign Minister wanted to discuss orally with M. Bose the opposite views expressed in his letter; as soon as the Foreign Minister was back in Berlin he would ask M. Bose to see him.<sup>2</sup>

RINTELEN

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 213.<sup>2</sup> See document No. 521.

## No. 297

482/231283

*The Office of the Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the Military Commander in Serbia to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 621 of

September 10

BELGRADE, September 10, 1941—6:50 p. m.

Received September 11—2:40 a. m.

D III 423 g.

With reference to my telegram No. 608 of September 8.<sup>1</sup>

A quick and Draconian settlement of the question of the Serbian Jews is the most urgent and expedient requirement. I request an

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 288.

appropriate instruction from the Foreign Minister in order to take up the matter most vigorously with the Military Commander, Serbia. No resistance of any sort is to be expected on the part of the Serbian Government and population, all the less so since the partial measures thus far have proved to be very effective. An order to the same effect from the Reichsführer SS to the Chief of the Einsatzgruppe of the Security Police and SD—Standartenführer Fuchs would advance the matter very essentially.<sup>2</sup>

VEESENMAYER  
BENZLER

<sup>2</sup> Marginal notes: "Party Comrade Rademacher. Please take over the matter from Pol. IV. I fail to see proposals from Belgrade. Talking generalities will not advance a solution. Please telephone Minister v. Rintelen, Special Train, regarding this. Lu[ther], Sept. 11."

## No. 298

265/173234

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

St.S.No. 590

BERLIN, September 10, 1941.

Nuri Pasha, who was recommended to us by the Embassy in Ankara,<sup>1</sup> paid his visit to me today. He developed his views on the Pan-Turanian question made familiar to us by Herr von Papen.

I told Nuri Pasha that in the areas in which he was especially interested the German Reich had no political, but only economic, interests. What Turkey was striving for there was certain to meet with German approval from the outset. It seemed to me, however, that his own (the Turkish) Government was pursuing different ideas in this respect. I therefore wished to ask whether he should not first of all exert influence at home. Nuri Pasha conceded this; actually he had been trying to do what was necessary in this regard for a long time.

With regard to his stay here Nuri Pasha commented as follows: His time was not limited. He thought he could be useful here by advising the German authorities on all questions concerning the Caucasus, with which he was thoroughly acquainted—in its geographic, ethnographic, military, and economic aspects. Once the German advance toward the Caucasus had penetrated beyond Rostov and reached the important trunk railroad line in the vicinity of Armavir,

<sup>1</sup> Nuri Pasha, a brother of Enver Pasha, young Turk leader and Turkish Military Commander in World War I, had been mentioned by Papen as one of the leaders of the Pan-Turanian movement in the report referred to in document No. 194, footnote 5. According to a Woermann memorandum of Aug. 22 (265/173167) Ribbentrop had received a letter from Papen announcing that Nuri Pasha was coming to Germany to attend the Leipzig Fair and would pay a call at the Foreign Ministry.

the fate of the Soviet troops around the Caucasus would be sealed. He himself was in a position to bring about an uprising of at least 100,000 men in the Caucasus.

As a precaution I inquired about Nuri Pasha's relations with the Turkish Ambassador here. It seems that they are in contact with each other.

I advised Nuri Pasha to get in touch with Under State Secretary Woermann with regard to further discussions.<sup>2</sup>

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 361.

## No. 299

1543/375782

*The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

WASHINGTON, September 11, 1941—3:17 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received September 12—2:00 a. m.

No. 3125 of September 11

For the State Secretary.

With reference to my telegram No. 3098 of September 9.<sup>1</sup>

On Thursday<sup>2</sup> noon, just a few hours before the Roosevelt address,<sup>3</sup> Senator Nye, as indicated in the above telegraphic report, introduced in the Senate a resolution calling upon the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs to undertake a Congressional investigation of the *Greer* incident for a clear determination of the facts. The crew and officers of the *Greer* are to be called to testify and the ship's log is to be examined. Further, the investigating committee is to require production of all orders which the Naval Operations Staff issued to the *Greer* and other vessels en route between Iceland and U.S. ports, and prepare a report for the Senate. Concurrently, Senator Bennett C. Clark demanded that the Secretary of the Navy produce for the

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 292.

<sup>2</sup> Sept. 11.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 292, footnote 2.

investigating committee the log of the *Greer* for the two days prior to and following the incident.<sup>4</sup>

Introduction of this resolution was purposely so timed as to cause embarrassment to Roosevelt and give him no time for any countermove.

In addition, immediately following the Roosevelt speech tonight, Lindbergh, as the first isolationist, is to speak from Iowa over the radio network of the Mutual Broadcasting Company against the warmongers.

THOMSEN

<sup>4</sup> In telegram No. 3153 of Sept. 12 (1543/375800) Thomsen reported that the action by Senators Nye and Clark had "borne fruit" and that Senator Walsh, Chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, had announced that Secretary of the Navy Knox and the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, would be called before his Committee.

The resolutions introduced by Senator Nye (S. Res. 164) and Senator Clark (S. Res. 165) were transmitted to the Secretary of the Navy by Senator Walsh with the request that the pertinent information, including also a series of specific questions regarding the *Greer* incident be furnished to the Committee. The information was supplied in a letter with enclosure of Sept. 20 from Admiral Stark to Senator Walsh. No hearings were held in the matter. For text of Admiral Stark's communication see World Peace Foundation, *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, vol. iv, pp. 93-95. A summary of Admiral Stark's statements was published in the *New York Times* of Oct. 15, 1941 (p. 6, col. 1) and commented upon by Thomsen in telegram No. 3563 of Oct 15 (1857/422160-62).

## No. 300

205/142960-61

*The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

STOCKHOLM, September 11, 1941, 7:20 p. m.

No. 1396 of September 11

Received September 11—10:50 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 2070 of September 11<sup>1</sup> and to my telegram No. 1389 of September 11.<sup>2</sup>

The Foreign Minister asked me to call today in order to give me the final answer in regard to the Norwegian ships. He explained that in this matter the Swedish Government could not depart from the legal course. He hoped that Germany would understand this and he added that he could assure me on his word of honor that Sweden,

<sup>1</sup> In this telegram (2116/460507-08) Ritter referred to Günther's assurances to Schnurre on Aug. 14 that until further notice the ships would not run out, and that if the de facto situation were to change, Germany would be notified (cf. document No. 174, footnote 4). The German Government, however, had information from Göteborg and Malmö that surprise runout was being prepared. Germany, Ritter stated, would hold Sweden responsible if there were any breakout. He pointed out that with a minimum of good will toward Germany by Sweden the ships would be unable to get the necessary fuel oil for a breakout.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.



contrary to certain rumors, had never given England any return services for her permission for the Göteborg overseas traffic.<sup>3</sup> In a further discussion between State Secretary Boheman and Ministerialdirektor Söderblom on the one side and Counselors of Legation Dankwort and Geffcken on the other side the following procedure, which had been recommended by the legal advisers of the Swedish Government, was proposed: The Norwegian shipowner would make the following motion with the Chief Bailiff in Göteborg (or in Malmö as the case might be) with reference to his property rights along with other possible motions:

1) In accordance with paragraph 191 of the law for compulsory execution [*Zwangsvollstreckungsgesetz*] the former crew of the ship should be removed and the shipowner's own crew should be brought on board. Possibly a motion should be made for 2) arrest or for 3) prohibition of disposal of the ship [*Verfügungsverbot*]. If the principal motion were not approved but one of the possible motions were approved, this would take place in the form of a provisional arrest or prohibition of disposal. The shipowner would then within 30 days have to bring an action in the court [*Rathausgericht*] in Göteborg, or in Malmö as the case might be. Such action would have to be directed against the captain. In case the Chief Bailiff were to refuse all of the motions then appeal would be possible to the superior court and to the supreme court. Only a week should pass until a decision by the latter. The actual suit over the right of disposal over a ship would not last more than a few months. This procedure would have to be followed for each individual vessel. But once a precedent were established the decisions in the other cases would be made rapidly. If there were fear of sabotage the shipowners could turn to the police officials and demand a police guard for the ships. To the question whether the Swedish Government could give assurances that the ships would not run out before a possible motion for arrest the Foreign Minister and Boheman answered in unison that we could reckon on it that no ship would run out in less than a week. In case an earlier breakout should be planned the Legation would be notified. The shipowner Stenersen will discuss the matter tomorrow morning with the attorney here together with the shipping expert Riensberg. According to the views of the Legation there are in the present state of affairs only two possibilities: either to follow the course proposed by the Swedish Government or else to let the ships sail out and be brought in by German

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 91.

naval vessels.<sup>4</sup> The shipowner Stenersen would much rather move for immediate arrest. I would be grateful for the earliest possible instruction.<sup>5</sup>

WIED

<sup>4</sup> In a later telegram of Sept. 11, No. 1397 (205/142962-63), the Naval Attaché reported that the *Dicto*, the *Lionel*, and the *Rigmor* were preparing for a breakout; that the *Lionel* had an English captain on board; and that the *Rigmor* had 200 tons of bunker oil, that was four times as much as was needed for the trip to England. Possibly the *Montana* and the *Raila* were also preparing to breakout.

<sup>5</sup> These instructions have not been found. See, further, document No. 329.

### No. 301

260/170179-80

*The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 929 of September 11

HELSINKI, September 11, 1941—8:40 p. m.

Received September 11—10:50 p. m.

Today, after we had dined privately, President Ryti discussed with me, confidentially the following points:

- 1) Rumors of a separate Finnish peace were a foreign concoction originating in Moscow.<sup>1</sup>
- 2) The Finnish Army would advance to the points agreed upon in earlier discussions with the German High Command of the Army.<sup>2</sup>
- 3) As soon as the military situation permitted it, the Finnish Army ought to be reduced to approximately 140,000 or 150,000 men so that the economy could again be revived. Finland could not at present fulfill her commitments abroad because of the labor shortage and the clearing settlements are developing adversely.
- 4) The *small* Finnish nation with a large territory must lay emphasis on a *short* boundary. The Svir boundary with a glacis before it would fulfill this need. If Leningrad would not continue as a metropolis, the Neva would form the best boundary on the Karelian Isthmus.
- 5) Finnish territorial wishes did not only include Farther Karelia but also the Kola Peninsula.
- 6) Among the Finnish Socialists too the understanding of the need for adjusting the boundary was growing. He had spoken repeatedly and successfully with Tanner, the Socialist leader, about this.
- 7) It would be most advantageous to Finland if, in the future, she no longer bordered on Russia. He would be grateful if Germany annexed the far less populated areas east of the future Finnish east-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. I, pp. 59-61.

<sup>2</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 554 and footnote 10, and document No. 592 and footnote 1.

ern boundary. They would be of special value to Germany because of their richness in timber and its readiness to be shipped via the Dvina and Archangel. He had instructed Kivimäki to spread similar views in Berlin.

8) It was politically necessary to destroy Bolshevism this time. At the same time Leningrad would have to disappear as a metropolis.

I was receptive to these explanations, which were of the most confidential character, but am asking for information on the German point of view regarding the problems raised.<sup>3</sup>

BLÜCHER

<sup>3</sup> A log book entry by Hewel of Sept. 11 (1924/431786-87) shows that the telegram was submitted to Hitler on Sept. 13 and that the "Führer wants to be generous in regard to territorial questions. Kola Peninsula a special case. Wants to receive authoritative Finnish personality." For Ribbentrop's reply, see document No. 331.

### No. 302

95/107081-82

*Minister Eisenlohr to the Embassy in Spain*

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, [September 11, 1941.]<sup>1</sup>

[No. 2090 of September 11]<sup>1</sup>

Pol. I M 2724 g. Rs.

For the Ambassador personally.

I. For military reasons the following structural changes are necessary in the Irun railroad station:

- a. Widening of the existing loading ramp and construction of a new loading ramp;
- b. Construction of a connection between the two existing loading platforms;
- c. Clearance work.

The start of the work, which would require 2 to 3 weeks even if railroad troops would be employed, cannot be delayed until the time when military actions might become necessary. Rather the work must be done at this time as a precautionary measure.<sup>2</sup>

II. Please discuss the matter with the Spanish Foreign Ministry in an appropriate manner and obtain Spanish consent to the expansion of the Irun railroad station.

The practical execution of the construction work can, if necessary, be transferred to a Spanish contractor. The Chief of Transporta-

<sup>1</sup> The date and number of this telegram are taken from a reference in Madrid telegram No. 3188 of Sept. 15 (95/107084) which was in reply.

<sup>2</sup> According to notes of Aug. 11 (1901/428175) taken by Counselor Etdorf, the Foreign Ministry's representative with the OKH, one division for Operation *Felix* was to be taken from the eastern front.

tion<sup>3</sup> suggests that for reasons of camouflage "Sofindus"<sup>4</sup> be employed for any negotiations with Spanish authorities, which could presumably also clarify the question of costs. Please give your opinion on this suggestion.

There is an urgent military interest in speedy positive execution. Wire your report.<sup>5</sup>

EISENLOHR

<sup>3</sup> Lt. Gen. Rudolf Gercke.

<sup>4</sup> Sociedad Financiera Industrial Ltda. See vol. III of this series, Editors' Note, p. 1.

<sup>5</sup> In telegram No. 3188 of Sept. 15 (95/107084) Stohrer pointed out that this directive seemed to contradict the instructions given to the Naval Attaché and the chief intelligence officer at the Embassy, according to which a policy of restraint without further military preparations was to be undertaken. In telegram No. 2214 of Sept. 24 (95/107089) Ritter countermanded Eisenlohr's instruction.

### No. 303

230/153419

*The Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the Military  
Commander in Serbia to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

SECRET

BELGRADE, September 12, 1941—12:30 a. m.

No. 633 of

September 11

Received September 12—1:30 a. m.

As matters stand this evening the Nedić government does not seem to be able to master the insurrectionary movement with its own forces, because the newly-organized formations thus far employed are evidently proving to be unreliable. Under the influence of nationally camouflaged communist slogans, individual Chetnik groups are now also taking up positions against the German occupation troops, although so far there has been no fighting involving them. Minister President Nedić and Minister of Interior Ačimović, with whom the situation was thoroughly discussed today and regarding whose sincere intentions there is no doubt, share this view entirely and have stated openly that the only remaining solution is to crush the revolt solely with German forces. The Nedić government is considering resigning. Whether this will be done or whether the Nedić government will continue in office in some new form or other is being left open at the present time and will probably be decided within the next 48 hours. The Military Commander, Serbia will press for the present government to remain. Objectively the continuance of the government will not make any difference, but perhaps would lessen a too sudden shock effect and thus the danger of a general insurrection throughout the

whole country. We must now prepare, however, for having to crush the insurrectionary movement alone. In the opinion of the military authorities, which I consider to be correct, the maintenance of order in Belgrade is assured even under the conditions described.

BENZLER

No. 304

318/192281-82

*The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT Washington, September 12, 1941—6:23 p. m.  
No. 3146 of September 12 Received September 13—9:15 a. m.

For OKM and OKW Ausland.

Save for an isolated hint addressed to Japan that America's traditional policy of the freedom of the seas applied not only to the Atlantic but also to the Pacific [and] all oceans, the President's address,<sup>1</sup> which overflowed with distortions, lies, and insults, was primarily addressed to Germany. It is important from the viewpoint of naval policy that Roosevelt, while avoiding the expression "customary protection", gave the order with immediate effect to extend protection not only to American merchant vessels but also to those of other flags in all waters essential to the national defense, [and] to open fire on German-Italian naval forces on sight in such waters. The President declared that the mere presence of German-Italian submarines in any waters essential to America's national defense would be construed as an attack and countered by military means. He gave clear warning that German-Italian warships would henceforth sail such waters at

<sup>1</sup> President Roosevelt's fireside chat, broadcast from the White House on Sept. 11. It referred to the attack on the destroyer *Greer* as an act of "piracy" which had followed similar attacks such as the sinkings of the *Robin Moor* (see vol. XII, document No. 657), of the Panamanian merchant ship *Sessa* near Greenland on Aug. 17, and of the United States Merchant Ship *Steel Seafarer* in the Red Sea on Sept. 5.

Referring to German submarines as "rattle snakes of the Atlantic" the President then announced the new American policy in the following terms:

"In the waters which we deem necessary for our defense, American naval vessels and American planes will no longer wait until Axis submarines lurking under the water, or Axis raiders on the surface of the sea, strike their deadly blow—first.

"Upon our naval and air patrol—now operating in large number over a vast expanse of the Atlantic Ocean—falls the duty of maintaining the American policy of freedom of the seas—now. That means, very simply, very clearly, that our patrolling vessels and planes will protect all merchant ships—not only American ships but ships of any flag—engaged in commerce in our defensive waters. They will protect them from submarines; they will protect them from surface raiders."

For the full text see Rosenman, *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, vol. x, pp. 384-392.

their own risk. The President advisedly omitted any precise definition of the waters essential to America's national defense in order to reserve freedom of action to himself. It would probably not be amiss if, as Admiral Stirling (Ret.)<sup>2</sup> and a large section of the press have done, one were mainly to include in these waters which in the last analysis could comprise the entire world, the sea lanes to Iceland marked out for the deliveries under the Lend-Lease Act, and possibly, in addition, the sea lanes to England and South Africa, that is to say, a large portion of the north, middle and south Atlantic; furthermore, the sea routes to West African ports, through which American aircraft for England have lately been flown to the Middle East, and all other sea routes to South America. Aside from the Red Sea, special mention finally was made of the sea routes to Vladivostok and Rangoon. Thus the envisaged action of sweeping all regions of the sea essential to America's national defense clear of submarines and surface merchant-destroyers is technically limited only by the number of available American naval and air force units. In addition to the previously publicized incidents, which are supposed to justify his new measures, the President mentioned that last July a German submarine had stalked an American battleship over many miles to get into firing position. For the first time he mentioned an American outpost in Labrador, without giving any details. While he described the order to the Navy as not identical with full war measures (shooting war),<sup>3</sup> (group garbled) country did not want, putting the responsibility for America's entry or for refraining from entering the war upon the Führer, the President has by this order materially aggravated the situation in the Atlantic, all the more because it must be expected that the units of the Atlantic fleet in interpreting these orders will not merely wait for Axis naval units to appear but rather keep hunting them down.<sup>4</sup>

THOMSEN

<sup>2</sup> Admiral Yates Stirling, Jr., former Chief of Staff of the United States fleet.  
<sup>3</sup> In English in the original.

<sup>4</sup> The strategic and political aspects of President Roosevelt's speech were dealt with in a report presented to Hitler by the Commander in Chief of the Navy in a conference at Hitler's headquarters on Sept. 17. In Annex 1 of this report the Naval War Staff proposed certain changes in the orders issued to German naval units with the aim of intensifying naval warfare also with respect to American ships and the American security zone. The record of the decision taken reads as follows:

"On the basis of a detailed discussion of the situation as a whole. In which it appears that the end of September will bring the great decision in the Russian campaign, the Führer requests that care be taken to avoid any incidents in the war on merchant shipping before about the middle of October. Therefore the Commander in Chief, Navy and the Commanding Admiral, Submarines withdraw the suggestions made in Annex 1. The submarines are to be informed of the reason for temporarily keeping to the old orders."

See U.S. Navy Department, ONI, "Führer Conferences on Matters Dealing With the German Navy, 1941," vol. II, pp. 33-45.

No. 305

65/45443

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*

SEPTEMBER 12, 1941.

The Soviet Government has furnished the Iranian Government a list of Reich Germans in Iran whose surrender is demanded, apparently for the purpose of interning them in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government must realize that within the area under German control there are sufficient numbers of Soviet citizens who could be the object of reprisals in the event Reich Germans should really be forcibly deported from Iran. On the other hand, if the Soviet Government should refrain from any internment whatsoever of Germans from Iran, releasing such persons as may have already been interned, and would be willing to grant the German colony in Iran an unhindered departure for Turkey, the Reich Government would for its part permit 194 Soviet citizens in German hands, with regard to whom the Soviet Government has expressed an interest, to depart from Reich territory for Turkey.<sup>1</sup>

R[IBBENTROP]

<sup>1</sup> Marginal note: "Transmitted by telephone to Under State Secretary Woermann so that it may be sent on via Sofia by telegraph. R[intelen], Sept. 12."

The draft of a telegram (281/180352-53) instructing the Legation in Sofia to ask the Bulgarian Government to forward the text of this message as a communication to the Soviet Government is in the files. Sofia telegram No. 1017 of Sept. 13 (281/180351) acknowledging the receipt of this instruction indicates that it was sent as telegram No. 1341 of Sept. 12.

In telegram No. 1104 of Sept. 26 from Sofia (278/178943) Beckerle reported that the Soviet Foreign Commissariat had handed a note to the Bulgarian Legation in Moscow stating "that the Soviet Government rejected without examination the impudent reply of the German Government."

No. 306

65/45477

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff*

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, September 12, 1941.

The Führer told me today in connection with retaliatory acts against the internment of Germans in Iran that it was his wish that for every German deported, ten selected Englishmen be deported from the Jersey Islands<sup>1</sup> to the *Pripet Marshes*. He further wishes that the property of such interned civilians be distributed among the inhabitants of the Jersey Islands who are of French descent. He would like this deportation to extend also to other prominent British civilians, among them Churchill's nephew. The important thing to do, he

<sup>1</sup> See documents Nos. 280 and 287.

said, was that the reason for this deportation be made crystal clear to the interned Englishmen and also to the world. Steps should be taken to arrange for publication in the press and on the radio.<sup>2</sup>

HEWEL

<sup>2</sup> Marginal note: "Not to be transmitted by teletype. W[eber], Sept. 14."

No. 307

535/240038

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

St. S. No. 593

BERLIN, September 12, 1941.

The Nuncio asked me today how matters stood regarding the confiscation of monasteries in Germany. He wanted to know from me whether there was a new directive that restraint should be practiced toward the monasteries.<sup>1</sup> Yesterday, however, he had again heard of a confiscation that had just occurred of a monastery in Berlin. The decree for this confiscation bore a prior date, namely August 11.

I acted as if I were not informed in the matter.

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>1</sup> In a memorandum of Aug. 22 (535/239998) Haidlen reported that Reichminister Kerrl had sent a personal letter to Himmler in which he expressed his concern over the confiscation of monasteries and that Hitler had issued an order that further confiscations of monasteries should cease. The text of the order was not known in the Foreign Ministry. In a memorandum of Sept. 3 (535/240039) Haidlen noted that the Reich Chancellery refused to comment on the directive. "The Party Chancellery confirmed that further confiscation of monasteries was being discontinued for the time being. The existing confiscations were to remain in force. The directive regarding the suspension of confiscation was top secret and must not be made known to the outside." For the text of the directive, see document No. 340.

No. 308

67/47018-30

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat*

RAM 47 g. Rs.

BERLIN, September 13, 1941.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND ITALIAN AMBASSADOR ALFIERI AT GENERAL HEADQUARTERS ON SEPTEMBER 12, 1941

Alfieri explained his request to be received by the Foreign Minister on the ground of his forthcoming visit to Rome, in the course of which he would also report to the Duce on the position taken by Germany on the major current issues. The Foreign Minister replied that there was little new that had happened since the Duce's visit.<sup>1</sup> Generally

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 242.

speaking one could say that matters were progressing well on the Russian front; Leningrad was being encircled and the ring was becoming tighter from day to day. The artillery had been moved up so close to the city that the lines of fortifications were already under mortar bombardment. It could be expected that the food situation would become critical in the near future because it was impossible to store enough supplies to sustain a population of several millions for any prolonged period of time.

In response to the question asked by Alfieri, whether the Russian resistance continued to be as stubborn as before, the Reich Minister replied that lately it had greatly diminished and he referred, in that connection, to a report which he had received both directly from Turkey as well as by way of Rome<sup>2</sup> to the effect that the British were much more concerned about Russia's internal situation than about the situation at the front, which, properly speaking, was already bad enough. There is talk in English circles that Stalin is getting tired and might possibly be replaced by a military figure. Although, naturally, the importance of such favorable reports must not be exaggerated, it is obvious that Russia's situation is anything but good and that the English, as is apparent also from another source, are in any case gravely concerned about the further development of the situation in Russia.

As the interview continued, the conversation also turned to the latest Roosevelt address.<sup>3</sup> The Foreign Minister briefly outlined his personal ideas on a reply to Roosevelt, which he, however, would have to discuss with the Führer first. For one thing, it would be necessary to establish the record of the events. It was not the German U-boat that had attacked the American destroyer, but on the contrary the destroyer had been tracking the U-boat for hours and attacking it with depth charges.<sup>4</sup> Only after that had the U-boat fought back by firing torpedoes. Besides, the order to shoot mentioned now by Roosevelt in his address had been issued by him to the Navy a long time ago. That was apparent not only from the destroyer's actions in the last-mentioned case, but also from remarks made by Knox<sup>5</sup> in July. Together with this it would be necessary to state that anything that might happen from now on would be Roosevelt's responsibility alone. That would have to be followed by a reply of the Führer to Roosevelt's challenge, emphasizing once more that any ship entering

the specified zone of operations would do so at its own peril, and that German naval vessels would defend themselves against American vessels.<sup>6</sup>

Answering a question by Alfieri whether Roosevelt intended anything serious, the Foreign Minister replied that Roosevelt hated National Socialist Germany, while the American people, for its part, had no desire to go to war. For that reason Roosevelt probably hoped that by provoking an incident he would have a chance to draw the American people into the war.

The Foreign Minister informed Alfieri confidentially that he had directed the German Chargé d'Affaires in Washington to get the isolationist Senators, through intermediaries, to demand an investigation of the Greer affair by the Naval Affairs Committee of the American Senate.<sup>7</sup> If officers and crew members of the destroyer and ranking officials of the Navy Department were to be interrogated before that Committee, it is probable that revelations most embarrassing to Roosevelt would come to light. The Foreign Minister showed Alfieri a press report which indicated that several isolationist Senators actually were contemplating introducing a motion in the Senate calling for an investigation. The Foreign Minister expressed doubt, however, that this investigation would materialize. The American Government would probably contrive to suppress it.

Alfieri next came to speak of Japan. The Japanese Ambassador was constantly away from Berlin and he had therefore been unable to get in touch with him. All he (Alfieri) knew was that the Japanese held the view that they were acting in the spirit of the Tripartite Pact if, by practicing a certain amount of duplicity, they kept the United States from entering the war. The Foreign Minister replied that he was not clear in his mind about Japan. He had received little information on the latest development and within the next days he would request Ambassador Ott to send him a report in that regard.<sup>8</sup>

However, he did not share the view held by the present Japanese Government, but rather believed that it would be better also for Japan in her position toward the United States if she were to announce in plain terms that she was strong enough to back up the new order and, in faithful fulfillment of the Tripartite Pact, would declare war on America if Roosevelt were to engage in a conflict with Germany. A number of countervailing influences were at work in Japan, however, so that the picture was not clear. On account of that he (the Foreign Minister) would, in the previously mentioned directive to Ambassador Ott, ask the Japanese to give more detailed information

<sup>2</sup>In telegram No. 2139 of Sept. 9 (1517/372682-84) Mackensen transmitted the text of a telegram from the Turkish Military Attaché in Moscow to the Turkish Foreign Ministry which was given to him by the Italian Foreign Ministry.

<sup>3</sup>This was the President's fireside chat of Sept. 11, 1941. See document No. 304, footnote 1.

<sup>4</sup>See document No. 282.

<sup>5</sup>William Franklin Knox, United States Secretary of the Navy, 1940-1944.

<sup>6</sup>See U.S. Navy Department, ONI, "Führer Conferences on Matters Dealing With the German Navy, 1941," vol. II, pp. 33, 37-45.

<sup>7</sup>See document No. 282.

<sup>8</sup>Document No. 316.

on their talks with the United States, and would have the German viewpoint outlined to them once more by the Ambassador. No one, however, could in any way alter the fact that the Japanese were in the same boat with the Axis Powers. They could not leave the Axis in the lurch if they did not wish to give up their entire territorial conquests in China as well as their new order in the Far East. Any Japanese government which did that would be instantly swept away by the military.

The Foreign Minister agreed to a suggestion by Alfieri that the 27th of September, the anniversary of Japan's accession to the Tripartite Pact, should be given special recognition in some manner. He would have to think over, however, in what form that should be done.

In response to a question by Alfieri about Turkey, the Foreign Minister replied that no new developments had occurred there and that, as a matter of fact, Ambassador von Papen, who was in Berlin, would come to General Headquarters within the next days to present a personal report.<sup>9</sup>

In that connection, Alfieri mentioned certain misgivings about Gerede's speech at the Leipzig Fair,<sup>10</sup> which had been expressed to him in the diplomatic corps and in particular from the Bulgarian and the Rumanian side. These members of the diplomatic corps remarked that Gerede had not given sufficient consideration to the fact that he was speaking in the name of the entire diplomatic corps, and so had perhaps spoken out too plainly. Alfieri had forcefully countered these remarks and declared that anything said by Gerede applied equally to all countries. He had furthermore stressed that, for his person, Gerede was a friend of Germany's. To this the Foreign Minister commented that Gerede was a man of good will, but very cautious.

Answering Alfieri's question about Spain and more particularly about any contemplated operation against Gibraltar, the Foreign Minister stated that first the situation in the east had to be resolved before it would be possible to tackle Gibraltar or to launch an offensive against the Suez Canal, about which Alfieri had also inquired.

Alfieri then inquired about the status of France. He had heard that Pétain was pressing Germany, if not for a final peace treaty, then at least for a broader clarification of their mutual relations.

The Foreign Minister replied that there was nothing new to tell about France. No proposals of any kind had been made by France. Besides, Ambassador Abetz was to arrive at General Headquarters

at an early date to make an oral report.<sup>11</sup> Generally speaking, he (the Foreign Minister) could say, however, that the development in France was taking a fairly satisfactory course, although the situation there was, of course, closely watched by Germany at all times. There were, however, many Frenchmen still who thought it would be better to wait a little longer before finally committing themselves to collaboration with Germany.

In connection with Hungary, where the Foreign Minister had answered a question of Alfieri's by saying again that there was nothing new to report, Alfieri came to speak about the question of awarding a decoration to the Duce. He emphasized that he was raising that point not as the Italian Ambassador, but as a private person. When passing through Königsberg on the morning of his arrival, and seeing in the papers, very prominently displayed, the report of the award of the Knight's Cross to Horthy, it had occurred to him that Antonescu, too, had received that decoration<sup>12</sup> while, on the other hand, with Italian forces also fighting at the Russian front, no decoration of any kind had been awarded so far. Such a fact, as he would say strictly as a personal opinion and in confidence, might give occasion to certain misinterpretations among the Italian public.

Replying to a question by the Foreign Minister, Alfieri said that the King of Italy had conferred on the Duce the Supreme Command of the Italian Armed Forces for the duration of the war, and in conclusion stressed once more the absolutely confidential and strictly personal nature of his remarks on that point.

In connection with the problems arising out of the employment of large numbers of Italian workers in Germany, which had already been adjusted in part by Dr. Ley and the Italian delegate, Lombassa, Alfieri came to speak of the marriages between Italian workers and German women.<sup>13</sup> He mentioned a discussion which he had had on this subject with Dr. Gross of the Race and Settlement Office. Dr. Gross had taken the position that marriages of that kind were not to be encouraged, but should rather be discouraged as far as possible. Generally speaking that was also the attitude taken by the Duce. In the case of the Italian workers in Germany, however, the situation was of a particular order and ought to be resolved more tolerantly, so as to preclude any misunderstandings from arising among the Italians who, if difficulties were to be placed in the way of such marriages, might construe a certain inconsistency between these measures and the comradeship in arms between the two Axis Powers.

Concerning the rumors current in Germany about discontent of the Italian people and shortages of food, Alfieri stated that these matters were being exaggerated. Naturally, the Italian people were

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Franz von Papen, *Memoirs*, pp. 481-482.

<sup>10</sup> In this speech delivered at a reception for foreign visitors and exhibitors at the Leipzig Fair on Sept. 1, Gerede emphasized German-Turkish friendship and the growing importance of the German market for foreign countries. For text, see *Frankfurter Zeitung*, Sept. 3, 1941.

<sup>11</sup> See document No. 327.

<sup>12</sup> See document No. 188.

<sup>13</sup> See document No. 281.

feeling the war in their own country, but the Duce was completely reassured about morale and the food supply situation. He felt concern only in regard to Italy's supply with strategic raw materials, including petroleum. This question had also played a part in the Favagrossa-Thomas talks,<sup>14</sup> but because of the operations in Russia, Thomas had declined to make any promises before October or November. Thereby a very difficult situation was created for the Italian Navy. It might perhaps be advisable if either the Foreign Minister or the Führer gave an intimation to Marshal Keitel about facilitating these negotiations.

When the Foreign Minister remarked that in his opinion the matter to be dealt with first was to bring the Russian campaign to a conclusion, and that things could only be attended to one after the other, Alfieri pointed out the difficult position of the Italian fleet in the Mediterranean. In view of the steadily mounting attacks of English submarines on the supply lines to North Africa, he thought that some help had to be given here.

In conclusion, the Foreign Minister asked Alfieri to convey to the Duce his sincerest regards and to Count Ciano his best wishes for an early recovery.<sup>15</sup>

Following the conversation, Ambassador Alfieri was briefed by Colonel Steinhäuser with the help of maps on the latest developments on the Russian front. Special emphasis was given to the fact that the German troops before Leningrad had at several points broken through the first line of defense, which is considered the strongest; that Estonia was completely pacified; and that the operations against the islands Dagö and Ösel would be launched within the next days. Alfieri was also informed in detail about the large encirclement completed in the southern sector of the central front, mention being made of the possibility of the annihilation of about 35 to 40 divisions encircled there. The impending crossing of the Panzer Group over the three bridges on the lower Dnieper, which had been a little delayed by adverse weather was also pointed out to him. In addition he was told of plans for an offensive against Moscow at some later date. In the course of the conversation, in response to a question by Alfieri, the Soviet casualties were estimated to number 6-7 millions in prisoners, killed, and wounded.

(SCHMIDT)

<sup>14</sup> No record of these conversations has been found.

<sup>15</sup> In telegram No. 1695 of July 29 (B12/B001111-12) Mackensen reported that he had been unable to see Ciano. Anfuso explained in confidence that it was not a throat infection, as initially stated, but inflammation of the kidneys which would require a week of full rest and, after that, a period of recuperation away from Rome.

In telegram No. 2093 of Sept. 3 (1517/372670-71) Mackensen reported that Ciano had sufficiently recovered from an operation to take 2 to 3 weeks' rest at Leghorn.

No. 309

535/240042-44

*Counselor of Embassy Menshausen to State Secretary Weizsäcker*

SECRET

ROME, September 12, 1941.

DEAR HERR STATE SECRETARY: Supplementing the report A 479 of August 23<sup>1</sup> regarding the Vatican's attitude toward the war against the Soviet Union, I should like to give you a description of the atmosphere on the basis of conversations with well-informed and in part also authoritative persons:

Aside from the arguments repeated in the report, that are more adjusted to public opinion, the reports at the Vatican concerning the Church policy in Germany were probably a determining, if not decisive, factor for the reserve so far observed by the Pope in our fight against Bolshevist Russia. In a number of conversations with high Vatican officials it was indicated, when asked about the reasons for this reserve, that to judge from the development of matters in Germany and the areas in our possession one had to fear that after the defeat of Bolshevism the Catholic Church, and indeed all Christianity, would, so to speak, go from the frying pan into the fire. If the Pope should now speak against Bolshevism, against which the Holy See had after all spoken repeatedly in principle, he would also have to take a position against "the anticlerical measures and tendencies hostile to Christianity in Germany"; the reports "continually received" at the Vatican on this subject provided "overwhelming material" to justify such a step; the Pope's silence was the best proof that he would like to avoid everything that could injure Germany.

A highly-placed person familiar with the mood in the Vatican and close to the Italian Government described, in a confidential conversation, the reasons for the Pope's reserve in our fight against Bolshevist Russia in the following terms: When the Church policy measures in the Reich had become visibly more severe, Pius XII had believed that he could no longer be responsible for further silence on the subject. However, when the war against Soviet Russia began he had refrained from the step considered necessary in order not to injure Germany and her allies in this phase that was so decisive for the fate of the world. To go beyond this and to take sides publicly and unequivocally in the fight against Soviet Russia had been made impossible for him by Germany.

In his heart, one is assured time and again, Pius XII stands on the side of the Axis Powers. In this connection reference is made to the words which he addressed to Italy in his last radio speech on June 29,

<sup>1</sup> In this report (535/240045-49) Menshausen discussed the public pronouncements made by the Pope and other Vatican officials regarding the Vatican's attitude toward the war against the Soviet Union.

1941: "With you (Rome) we bless the whole Italian people which, with the advantage of being able to encompass the central point of the unity of the Church, unites the manifest signs of its divine mission." Moreover there were indications enough which characterized the attitude of the Vatican: The speech of such a prominent person as the Secretary of the Congregation of the Propagation of the Faith, Archbishop Constantini (the relevant portions of which are given in the above-mentioned report),<sup>2</sup> was of special importance in this regard because it could not possibly have been held without the consent of the Holy See. The demonstrations of the Italian clergy and numerous articles which have appeared in the Catholic press all over Italy, in which the importance of the fight against Bolshevism is illuminated, could also be attributed to directives given by the Vatican or by the Catholic Action.

With appropriate compliments and Heil Hitler,  
I remain, Yours, etc.

MENSHAUSEN

<sup>2</sup> Archbishop Constantini's remarks, according to Italian press reports as quoted by Menshausen, were as follows: "Yesterday on Spanish soil, today in Bolshevist Russia herself, in that immense country where Satan seemed to have found among the heads of the republics his deputies and best co-workers, brave soldiers also of our fatherland are now fighting the greatest battle. We wish with our whole hearts that this battle may bring us the final victory and the fall of Bolshevism which aims at revolution and negation."

### No. 310

82/60606-10

*The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOKYO, September 13, 1941—11: 50 a. m. summer time.

No. 1797 of September 13      Received September 14—2: 50 a. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 1789 of September 12.<sup>1</sup>

I have just been received by the Foreign Minister, as usual in the presence of an interpreter.

<sup>1</sup> In this telegram (82/60602-03) Ott reported that he had inquired of Deputy Foreign Minister Amau regarding the alleged arrival of a reply from President Roosevelt to the Konoye message and that he had mentioned certain rumors with respect to the contents of the reply. Amau admitted that a reply had been received stating however that "he was not in a position to give me information about the contents of the reply any more than about the Konoye message itself." Further statements on the subject by Amau followed closely those which he had given Ott on an earlier occasion (see document No. 256).

Ott finally told Amau that he was not satisfied with the information which he had received so far regarding the Japanese-American relations and that he was therefore compelled to request to speak to Foreign Minister Toyoda.

Toyoda stated first of all that Roosevelt's speech<sup>2</sup> seemed to him to show that the President had found that domestic sentiment was not yet sufficiently prepared for war. To be sure, the armaments industry and Jewish finance, which controlled many newspapers, favored participation in the war; on the other hand Roosevelt still had to take into account the opposition of labor, church circles, German-Americans, etc. Thus far Roosevelt had not succeeded in overcoming their opposition.

I replied that in a certain area Roosevelt had already begun war technically, without officially declaring war. The main obstacle, it seemed to me, was the American people's fear of a two-ocean war. The American Government was trying to give the American people the impression that there was no danger of a two-ocean war. It was using the present Japanese-American negotiations as an important argument. I was therefore compelled to (clear text missing) great importance to informing my Government about the exact state of the negotiations in order to be able to cope with the numerous rumors circulating about the subject of the negotiations. The American proposals of which we were informed at one time<sup>3</sup> showed the clear purpose of causing Japan to withdraw from the Tripartite Pact. The Japanese Government had emphatically rejected that demand. It was important for me to know whether the basis of the American attitude had in the meantime changed. In this connection I repeated the alleged proposals of Roosevelt mentioned in the telegram previously cited.

The Japanese Foreign Minister replied that, as we knew, negotiations had been carried on for a long time between Japan and the United States. We had been informed at the time of the latest statement of Japan's position on July 14.<sup>4</sup> As a consequence of the subsequent Cabinet change and the Japanese advance into Indochina, Ambassador Nomura had not carried out this instruction at the time. The negotiations had been broken off. The substance of Konoye's message was the proposal that these old negotiations be resumed. In a reply of September 5 Roosevelt had agreed to this and assented to an exchange of views.<sup>5</sup> The American-Japanese talks were being conducted in Washington by Ambassador Nomura and the American Government; in Tokyo only supplementary talks would be held. He had in the meantime seen the American Ambassador only once. The rumors I had mentioned concerning American help in improving

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 304, footnote 1.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 88 and footnote 6.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 123 and footnote 1.

<sup>5</sup> For text of President Roosevelt's reply handed to Ambassador Nomura on Sept. 3 see *Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941*, vol. II, pp. 591-592. For Hull's record of the Roosevelt-Nomura conversation on Sept. 3 and for the text of an oral statement which the President read to Nomura on that occasion see, *ibid.*, pp. 588-591.



Japanese-Russian relations, extensive American economic concessions, and a Japanese commitment to refrain from any action in the south and north, were branded by Toyoda as completely false; the substance of the message and of the talks was the same as that of the Japanese reply of July 14. Ambassador Nomura had made it clear from the outset that Japan would not assume any commitment contrary to the Tripartite Pact.

At my request this statement was expressly reconfirmed, and I repeated my request for the text of the Konoye message and Roosevelt's reply. Toyoda replied that he could not, unfortunately, grant my request, since that would require Roosevelt's consent. To my question whether we assume that Roosevelt had, similarly, not made the text accessible to Churchill either, Toyoda made no reply. I also pointed out to Toyoda that obviously the Americans were spreading the rumor that a personal meeting between Roosevelt and Prince Konoye was being considered. Toyoda said that this rumor was untrue and he referred to an American denial. Such a conjecture was only natural, however, since meetings of statesmen had been a frequent occurrence recently.

The Japanese Foreign Minister then stated that he had to call my attention to the extraordinary significance for Japan of cutting the line of communication through Siberia. As a result of the German-Russian war and the occupation of Indochina, Japan had for all practical purposes been cut off from all foreign sources. Japan was therefore in a very unenviable position. He could inform me, with the request for strictly confidential treatment, that Foreign Minister Matsuoka, too, had expressed grave apprehensions about the cutting off of the Siberian line of communication. When, in the opinion of the German Government, might one expect a reopening of the Siberian route? On the basis of certain information the Japanese had been under the impression that an end to the German-Russian war might be expected in about 2 months.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup> In telegram No. 2231 of Sept. 16 (82/60626) Mackensen reported having received from Anfuso the texts of two telegrams from the Japanese Ambassador in Tokyo regarding the conversations which he and Ott had with Foreign Minister Toyoda about Japanese-American relations. Mackensen stated that the following excerpts of one of these telegrams seemed to be significant:

"Toyoda stated to me that the resumption of Japanese-American discussions was due to the absolute necessity of eliminating in some way or other the crisis in the Pacific resulting from the interruption of the earlier negotiations and caused especially by the longer duration of the war between the Soviets and the Axis Powers. Berlin had stated earlier that this war should not last longer than 2 months. Toyoda added that the Japanese Government was seriously concerned about the fact, not anticipated at the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, that the Trans-Siberian Railway, which represented the only safe means of communication with the allies, was now cut."

I replied to the Japanese Foreign Minister in accordance with the statements of your telegram No. 1383 of August 25<sup>7</sup> and said in summing up that the main force of the Soviet Union in European Russia would be defeated by the end of this year and would be mopped up together with the remnants next spring. In my opinion the opening of the Siberian route depended on the resultant political effects and on the pressure which Japan on her part would exert on the Soviet Union. In that connection I asked about the state of military preparations in Manchuria, to which Toyoda briefly replied that the preparations were not yet completed. The Japanese people had been severely disappointed by the closing of the Siberian route; a reopening would greatly strengthen the bonds between the Axis Powers and Japan spiritually and materially.

I asked the Japanese Foreign Minister how he could envisage success for the Japanese-American negotiations in view of the American opposition to the Japanese policy in East Asia. He replied that an agreement would, to be sure, be extraordinarily difficult; however, it was the task of responsible statesmen to try to overcome difficulties.

With regard to the shipment of American oil to Vladivostok,<sup>8</sup> Toyoda stated that Japan was still trying to have it stopped.

In conclusion I again pointed out to Toyoda that I saw great dangers arising for Japan as a result of the American-Russian game and asked him to keep me regularly informed about any progress in the Japanese-American discussions, including concrete details. The Japanese Foreign Minister promised to keep me informed.

In view of the subtle game which the Anglo-Saxons and the Japanese clique associated with them are playing, using all sorts of trickery, it seems to me more important than ever that we bear in mind the highly formalistic character of the Japanese, in order not to give our opponents any opening for their cleverness of interpretation with regard to the Tripartite Pact. In this connection I should like to refer to the statements I made in my telegram No. 893 of June 6,<sup>9</sup> part II (group garbled) regarding the presumable attitude of the Cabinet at that time, of which Matsuoka was still a member.

Since a number of further interludes must be expected, I should appreciate it if I could be informed of any remarks by the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin and of any statement made to him.<sup>10</sup>

Ott

<sup>7</sup> Document No. 239.

<sup>8</sup> See document No. 225.

<sup>9</sup> Vol. xii of this series, document No. 596.

<sup>10</sup> Nothing found.

## No. 311

1662/393674-76

*The Minister in Iran to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TEHRAN, September 13, 1941.

No. 18 of September 13

Received September 13—12:15 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 14 of September 12.<sup>1</sup>

As the Foreign Minister did not keep his promise to cancel military measures, notably the posting of machine guns directed against the Legation at Shimran, I broke off the meeting begun at 5:00 p. m. for the purpose of clarifying the list of persons to be surrendered, which was attended on the Iranian side by Director General Sayah and the Director of the Central European Department, Entezam, as well as by two high-ranking police officials, and also by general consent by the Swedish Chargé d'Affaires as neutral party. I declared that discussions could only be resumed after the machine guns had been withdrawn.

The negotiations were resumed after an interruption of 1 hour, the machine guns having been removed.

When the checking of the lists was completed at 10:00 p. m., Director General Sayah announced to our complete surprise that the persons clearly identified in the lists would have to be at the Tehran railway station by midnight.

I pointed out how impossible it was for technical reasons to comply with his request, and declared that the departure must in the first place be preceded by due notification from the police to each person concerned and secondly, that departure could not take place before the morning of September 13 at the earliest.

There ensued a discussion in which the representatives of the Iranian Foreign Ministry presented the highly pitiful spectacle of indecisive and despicable officials, lacking any sense of responsibility. The reason for this was the fact that once again the Iranian Foreign Minister had made binding promises to the enemy powers which he could not fulfill. In the present case he had promised that 10:00 p. m. of September 12 would be the final and last time limit for the departure of the Germans who are to be surrendered. In the course of the conversation M. Sayah admitted in tearful accents that the British Minister had baldly stated to the Iranian Foreign Minister that if this time limit were not observed, the consequence would be the oc-

<sup>1</sup> In this telegram (1662/393666-67) Ettel reported a talk with the Iranian Foreign Minister, in the course of which he protested against the surrounding of the Legation by Iranian soldiers and police, in connection with Iranian assertions that there were armed men within the Legation building.

cupation of Tehran by English and Russian troops who would themselves then round up the German colony.

Heated telephone conversations of the two above-named representatives of the Iranian Foreign Ministry with the Foreign Minister and the Court Minister<sup>2</sup> produced no results. Each person shied away from making another approach to the British Minister and presenting to him the true state of affairs with a request for a postponement of the time limit by a few hours. Inasmuch as the deadline for departure to which the Iranian Government had committed itself had already been passed, and preparations for departure at night would require at least 3 hours, I persisted in my views thereby bringing to an end any further incredible scenes between the Director General and the Director of the Central European Division.

After the two, shaking and trembling, had left my office at 10:45 p. m., I called my staff together and explained to them that the moment now had come where further delay of the departure of the comrades on the list would not only be useless but would jeopardize the safe conduct promised for women and children. I was forced to assume after Eden's last speech about Germans in Iran<sup>3</sup> that the English and Russians would make good their threat that they would themselves come and get the German colony. I had therefore decided to place the facts before the menfolk in an assembly at 11:30 p. m. and to make it plain in this connection that in order to avert any jeopardy to women and children those with respect to whom it had been clearly established that their names were on the surrender list would have to make their departure. There was the additional fact that I should not supply the enemy with any pretext that the Germans were responsible for exceeding the time limit.

This plan was carried out in the manner described and there was opportunity during the assembly mentioned above to carry out the instructions of your telegrams No. 11<sup>4</sup> and No. 12<sup>5</sup> of September 12.

Particular praise is due the activity and comradely help of Swedish Chargé d'Affaires Ripa who, after the representatives of the Iranian Government had failed completely, obtained the British Minister's

<sup>2</sup> M. Djam.

<sup>3</sup> Presumably a reference to the statements made by Eden in the House of Commons on Sept. 10 in reply to questions from the floor. Speaking about the closing of the Legations of Germany, Italy, Hungary, and Rumania in Tehran, Eden then added that "steps are being taken by the Iranian Government to hand over the German community in Iran to the British and Soviet Governments." See *Parliamentary Debates*, fifth series, H of C, vol. 374, col. 159.

<sup>4</sup> This telegram, sent over Weizsäcker's signature (65/45433), instructed Ettel to see to it that the departure of the German colony, if it could be no longer avoided, was carried out in a disciplined manner and to tell the colony that everything possible would be done to achieve their eventual repatriation or exchange "for which there are reasonable prospects in view of the objects for a barter which we have here."

<sup>5</sup> Not found.

consent to an extension of the deadline to 5:00 a. m., in view of the circumstances presented to him.

I have reported in telegrams Nos. 16 of September 12<sup>6</sup> and 17 of September 13<sup>7</sup> on the further course of the departure.<sup>8</sup>

ETTEL

<sup>6</sup> Not printed (1662/393670).

<sup>7</sup> Not printed (65/45445).

<sup>8</sup> In a memorandum of Sept. 19 (65/45516-21) which was submitted to Hitler on Sept. 20, Ribbentrop reported on "the fate and conduct of the German colony in Iran" and highly praised their morale and great loyalty to Germany and to Hitler. According to the memorandum, Ettl had left Tehran on Sept. 17 accompanied by 250 women and 140 children, including infants, and was to conduct them to Turkey where all preparations to receive them had been made. Three hundred twenty-one German men of military age were to be turned over to the Allied occupation forces by the Iranians, 292 to the British and 29 to the Russians. Approximately 100 men over 45 years of age were left in Tehran under the care of the Swedish Legation, and it had not yet been determined whether they would be allowed to depart or be interned.

### No. 312

M180/M005728-30

#### *Directive of the High Command of the Wehrmacht*

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, September 13, 1941.

TOP SECRET MILITARY

The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht  
WFSt/Abt. L (IV/Qu) No. 002034/41 g.Kdos

Reference: Wehrmacht Commander, Norway Sect. Ia No. 3410/41  
g.Kdos of September 3, 1941.

Subject: Situation in Norway.

To the Wehrmacht Commander in Norway, Colonel General von  
Falkenhorst; with copy to Dienststelle Oslo.

According to reports before me, the anti-German attitude of the Norwegian population has reached intolerable proportions. Any continuation or indeed aggravation of this situation directly endangers the German troops and the defense of Norway.

All military commands shall therefore be instructed henceforth to administer far stricter punishment than before with respect to all offenses punishable by military authorities. The military propaganda must also make it plain that any offense directed against the Wehrmacht or the military security of the country will put the life of the perpetrator in immediate jeopardy.

The *Judge Advocates* are to be informed that in cases of punishable acts by Norwegians, which are committed directly or indirectly against Germany, the maximum sentence is to be imposed. In the present situation only the death penalty will really act as a deterrent. It is to be demanded in all serious cases. In particular, acts of espio-

nage, serious acts of sabotage and attempts to enlist in foreign forces, are in principle to be punished by death. Generally death sentences will also have to be imposed in serious cases of illicit possession of arms.

These points of view will have to be taken into account in decisions whether to confirm or set aside a judgment. The judge advocates are to be instructed accordingly.

The *conduct of the troops* toward the population must conform with these instructions. In the event of clashes, weapons are to be used immediately. The greatest reserve must be demanded in contacts with Norwegians.

The *Wehrmacht Commander Norway* is requested to keep the High Command of the Wehrmacht informed about the detailed measures taken.

A copy of this letter has been transmitted to the Reich Commissar.

*The Chief of the High Command  
of the Wehrmacht*  
KEITTEL

### No. 313

482/231280

#### *Memorandum by an Official of the Department for German Internal Affairs*

BERLIN, September 13, 1941.  
zu D III 424 g.<sup>1</sup>

I am unable to see the necessity for the deportation of the 1,200 male Jews, if not to Rumania then to the General Government or to Russia, as desired by the office of the Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry in Belgrade. Russia, as an area of operations, is entirely unsuited for the reception of these Jews. If they are already a danger in Serbia, they will be much more so in Russia. The General Government is already over-saturated with Jews.

In my opinion it ought to be possible, given the necessary harshness and determination, to keep the Jews in camps in Serbia. If the Jews continue to fan disturbances there one should proceed against them with intensified martial law. I cannot imagine that the Jews will

<sup>1</sup> D III 424 g: Belgrade telegram No. 636 of Sept. 12 (482/231281). In this telegram Benzler stated that it was impossible to put Jews into labor camps under present conditions and requested that the Serbian Jews be deported from Serbia, possibly to the General Government or Russia. Benzler particularly requested the immediate evacuation of 1,200 Jews interned in a camp at Sabac. For a text of this document see Pollakov and Wulf, *Das Dritte Reich und seine Diener*, p. 27.

continue to conspire after a considerable number of hostages have been shot.

I therefore propose the attached instruction.<sup>2</sup>

Submitted herewith to Under State Secretary Luther with the request for instructions.

RADEMACHER

<sup>2</sup>This instruction was sent to Belgrade as telegram No. 1251 over Luther's signature on Sept. 18 (482/231279). It was along the lines of Rademacher's suggestions in the document printed.

### No. 314

1084/317147

*The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the Foreign Ministry*

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, September 13, 1941.

TOP SECRET MILITARY

High Command of the Wehrmacht

No. 002014/41 g.K.WFSt./Abt. L (I Op.)

Führer's Headquarters, September 10, 1941.<sup>1</sup>

For Ambassador Ritter.

In the memorandum "The Strategic Situation in the Late Autumn 1941" approved by the Führer and sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs<sup>2</sup> it was stated, among other things, that our political and military relations with Spain must not break off before next spring, but on the contrary must be expanded. Military actions on the Iberian Peninsula are, however, undesirable until the eastern campaign has been concluded and sufficient German forces are available—in spring 1942 at the earliest.

In order to prevent unrest from developing in Spain because of military reconnaissances and discussions, which the enemy can exploit for his purposes, the High Command of the Wehrmacht has issued the accompanying order.<sup>3</sup> It might be suggested that a similar arrange-

<sup>1</sup>The copy of this document from the files of the Foreign Ministry which is here printed bears the notation that it is a fresh copy (Abschrift). It bears both dates as indicated.

<sup>2</sup>See document No. 265.

<sup>3</sup>OKW/WFSt. Abt. L (Op) No. 441505/41 g. K Chfs. of Sept. 8, 1941. (This has been filmed on frame 5508312, serial 781, roll 781, and the film microcopy has been deposited in the National Archives.) It stipulated:

"The political prerequisites for deepening the military relations with Spain are not yet given. It is again pointed out that branches of the Wehrmacht are not authorized to carry out reconnaissances in Spain or to undertake military discussions with the Spaniards.

"In case reconnaissances should be considered to be absolutely necessary for *Felix* in spite of the presumable 3 months' preliminary alert these are to be reported in detail in the OKW/WFSt., Abt. L. Their execution and their camouflage is the mission of the Chief of Ausland/Abwehr.

"For the Military Attachés a reserved attitude is also bidden in the question of Gibraltar."

ment be made for economic discussions, too, which can be associated with military plans.

As soon as the time has come—from the military point of view—to clear the way for negotiations with the Spanish Armed Forces by means of political steps, the High Command of the Wehrmacht will let this be known.<sup>4</sup>

The Chief of the High Command  
of the Wehrmacht  
By order:  
WARLIMONT

<sup>4</sup>See further, document No. 467.

### No. 315

2281/481152-58

*The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

TOP SECRET

No. 157

ROME, September 13, 1941.

Subject: Report by Italian Ambassador to the Holy See, Attolico, concerning the conversation of American Ambassador Taylor with the Pope.

In the enclosure I submit a German translation<sup>1</sup> of a report by the Italian Ambassador to the Holy See concerning his conversation with Cardinal Secretary of State Maglione, in which the latter gave Signor Attolico a detailed description of the conversations between the American Ambassador to the Vatican, Mr. Taylor, and the Pope and the Cardinal Secretary of State. As is known there, Mr. Taylor arrived here on Tuesday of this week after a lengthy absence, in order to bring the Pope a message from President Roosevelt, and he will return to America again in the next few days.<sup>2</sup>

Signor Anfuso gave Minister Prince Bismarck the original text of Ambassador Attolico's report appended in the annex only hesitantly and at his request, with the remark that this was an exceedingly confi-

<sup>1</sup>The Italian version has been filmed on serial 2281/481159-164.

<sup>2</sup>For the origin of Myron C. Taylor's mission to the Vatican, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1939*, vol. II, pp. 869-874, and vol. VIII of this series, documents Nos. 486 and 490. For Taylor's trip in 1941, see William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *The Undeclared War, 1940-41*, pp. 794 ff. The text of President Roosevelt's message of Sept. 3 to the Pope is printed in Myron C. Taylor, *Wartime Correspondence Between President Roosevelt and Pope Pius XII* (New York, 1947), pp. 61-62.

dential document. I should therefore like to ask that the report mentioned also be handled there in strictest confidence.<sup>3</sup>

VON MACKENSEN

[Enclosure]

*Royal Italian Embassy to the Holy See*

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

ROME, September 11, 1941/XIX.

Subject: Taylor's discussions in the Vatican.

With the knowledge and consent of the Pope the Cardinal Secretary of State summoned me to the Vatican today at 1:00 p. m., *immediately after* Ambassador Taylor who, after having already been received by Cardinal Maglione yesterday morning, and by His Holiness yesterday evening, came again this morning to the State Secretariat almost as if for a farewell visit; whereas he himself goes to Florence today, the Cardinal Secretary of State also left for Casoria at 4:00 p. m. today.

The discussions with Maglione lasted considerably longer than those with the Pope, because the Cardinal Secretary of State—besides the fact that he uses an interpreter because of the English language—also has the habit himself of making a summary at the end of every interchange that occurs with the aid of such mediation.

The content of the three conversations—the two yesterday evening amount practically to the same thing—can be summarized as follows:

Ambassador Taylor explained that the main objectives of his visit were two in particular:

1. To show that the extraordinary mission to the Vatican, conferred on him by the President, had not been interrupted;
2. To explain to the Holy See America's position with regard to the war.

The first point corresponds entirely with what Monsignor Tardini had already told me day before yesterday (my report of September 9).<sup>4</sup> Obvious reasons of an internal nature demanded of the American President, at a moment when public opinion in America is still in the process of formation, that he resume contact with the Holy See.

Regarding the second point, Roosevelt's envoy stressed that in America the sympathies are all on the side of the English. They

<sup>3</sup> In telegram No. 57 of Sept. 12 (535/240050-52) Menshausen reported Taylor's visit of that day to the Vatican and that Tittmann would be left in Rome to represent Taylor, which was interpreted as an indication that American intervention in the war was not imminent.

<sup>4</sup> Not found.

do not hate the German people; "still much less the good Italian people," but they do *not* love Hitler.

On the other hand it is the general conviction or rather the general "feeling" in the United States that Hitler has virtually lost the war (sic).

All of this, however—Taylor continued—while it creates in public opinion uniform agreement as regards a war forced by Germany, i.e., a defensive war, is not sufficient to attain a like unanimity for a war of initiative, i.e., for an aggressive war.

However, the Ambassador warned, Hitler should be cautious. No one in America had wanted the war with Spain, either, but the incident with the "Maine" was sufficient to reverse the situation and lead to war. All of that will depend on the "German provocations."

After these introductory statements—to which the Cardinal listened in intentional silence for almost the whole time—Ambassador Taylor went over to the question of the situation of the Catholics in the United States; in this he gave the appearance, however, of according it only secondary importance; basically, even though indirectly, he urged Rome's intervention in order to alter the present status of things.<sup>5</sup> (Cf. the report of September 9 referred to.)

Here the Cardinal immediately interrupted and stated that actually the attitude of the Vatican in the matter has always been to recommend calm and good sense. Making war was the affair of Caesar and not of God. Therefore the Catholics as such ought not to meddle in it.

This having been said, Maglione gave Taylor a picture of what the Holy See had *already* done through Monsignor Cicognani,<sup>6</sup> which I have already reported. The Cardinal added that the Holy See would be able to "continue" to work in the same sense through the same channels and with the same system, but no more.

The above exhausts the content of the conversations yesterday, for the one which Taylor had with the Pope was the same as that with Maglione.

The conversation today, however, which was meant to be a purely formal visit, almost a duty visit, had particularly interesting moments although it was shorter than the one yesterday.

After he had spoken of the gift of his villa in Florence to the Pope and of his desire to complete it (a matter regarding which Maglione at once referred him to Monsignor Montini), the American Ambassador again spoke of the war, whereby he deplored its terrors and suffering and described the gravity of the problems which the "postwar

<sup>5</sup> This is most likely a reference to the negative attitude of American Catholics to lend-lease support for the Soviet Union which, it was hoped, might be changed through the intervention of the Pope. Cf. Langer and Gleason, *The Undeclared War, 1940-1941*, pp. 793-94.

<sup>6</sup> Amleto Giovanni Cicognani, Apostolic Delegate in the United States.

period" would bring. One of the greatest dangers and gravest concerns of the postwar period is considered by the United States to be the increase in unemployment which will follow the demobilization of war industries.

The Cardinal remarked to this that unfortunately the destruction of the war was and would be so great that at least in Europe one would not have to fear any very great, not to speak of insurmountable, unemployment. Rather, he added, one of the areas in which the United States could then help most was precisely that of providing and making available the raw materials which were necessary for the resumption of work and for the reconstruction of Europe. However, Roosevelt's representative immediately showed that he was concerned only with the problem from its American side and in regard to the immediate interests of his country. In Europe, he said, they produced more cheaply and will also continue to produce more cheaply than in America. The ships (Cardinal Maglione had just mentioned the tremendous amount of work which was necessary merely to restore the shipping tonnage for world trade) which are built in Italy will always be cheaper than those built in America . . .<sup>7</sup>

Ambassador Taylor then came to what—in Maglione's opinion—was perhaps meant to form the main subject of this second conversation. What intentions did the Pope have in regard to the peace? Was he perhaps thinking of attempting something for this purpose? For in that case President Roosevelt would like to be informed about it in advance . . .

In response to these feelers which were meant—in their intentions and in their form—to be very discreet, the Secretary of State—without even asking the Pope, who was only informed about it today—replied without further ado that the Pontifex Maximus did *not*—I say *not*—have the intention to undertake any attempt of this sort particularly at this moment.<sup>8</sup>

This is the content of the second conversation, at the conclusion of which Taylor stated that he intended to depart as quickly as possible, but that in case his presence were desired for any reason, even after his return to America, he had no objection to coming across the Atlantic Ocean once more.

I thanked the Cardinal—and through him the Pope—for the courtesy shown me in informing me of the above. Also considering the haste he was in (we were still together at 2:00 p. m. and he had to

<sup>7</sup> Omissions indicated in the original.

<sup>8</sup> According to a note of Nov. 3 (1247/337800) taken by Counselor Etsdorf, the Foreign Ministry's representative with the High Command of the Army, Ambassador von Bergen at the Vatican was to be replaced by a more active personality who was in a better position to spot peace feelers there.

leave for Casoria at 4:00 p. m.) I did not feel justified, at least for the present, in extending the conversation.

I considered it my duty, however, to point out—quite personally—that it was in the interest of the Holy See to avoid that any "continuation" of the Vatican activity in regard to the American Catholics could appear in any way influenced by Roosevelt. Maglione explicitly agreed to this.

In his last conversation with me the Cardinal had expressed the opinion that Taylor's return signified a pause in the cycle of American intervention. Referring to this earlier statement, I asked him whether he was still of the same opinion today.

Maglione replied that certainly his impression on this point was now no longer entirely the same as it was at the first moment, but that he nevertheless continued to believe that the intervention of America was not to be considered immediately imminent and that—in Taylor's words—very much depended on the occurrence of what in the American language was termed Hitler's "provocations."

Finally, I asked Maglione whether Taylor had stated how and for what reason Hitler was considered in America as virtually beaten. The Cardinal told me that with this statement Taylor had expressed a "feeling" and perhaps also merely a wish.

I do not know whether other Ambassadors were asked to the Vatican today for the same purpose.<sup>9</sup>

ATTOLICO

<sup>9</sup> On Sept. 15 Mackensen transmitted a report of Ambassador Attolico of Sept. 13 (2281/481165-69) which dealt primarily with President Roosevelt's letter to the Pope. See, further, document No. 330.

No. 316

82/60611-14

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL TRAIN, September 13, 1941—7:50 p.m.

No. 979 of September 12

from the Special Train Received Berlin, September 13—8:40 p.m.

No. 1561 of September 14

from the Foreign Ministry

Sent September 14.

RAM 397/R

For the Ambassador personally.

In connection with President Roosevelt's speech of yesterday<sup>1</sup> I re-

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 304, footnote 1.

quest that you call on the Japanese Foreign Minister and make the following oral statement to him:

1. President Roosevelt's speech did not surprise the German Government in the least. Even before this speech we had noted that the policy of the United States toward Germany showed an increasingly provocative character. Obviously Roosevelt is trying by all available means to precipitate matters, in the realization that in view of the overwhelming German victory over Russia, which is becoming more evident day by day, it might be very difficult for him to persuade the American people, who are not anxious for war, to enter the war against Germany even at this time. It is obviously his aim, before the American people are fully aware of the shift in power relations resulting from the elimination of Russia and, consequently, of the hopelessness of a war against Germany, to bring about a situation that will make it possible for him as a result of incidents at sea affecting American prestige to proclaim that the situation, which will actually have arisen in the meantime, amounts to a state of war between Germany and America. It is manifestly his purpose by pettifogging distortion of facts which unmistakably brand America as the aggressor to represent Germany as the aggressor, although among those who give some thought to politics there can hardly be anyone today who does not see that despite all American provocations German policy toward America shows extreme restraint. Roosevelt's purpose with this distortion is of course to obscure the fact of American aggression, which would call forth the case of alliance provided for under the Tripartite Pact, in the hope of thereby making it more difficult for the Japanese Government to enter the war against America; in other words, he would like to demolish the Tripartite Pact, because he knows very well that the United States is far from adequately armed to carry on a war against Europe and Japan simultaneously and that American public opinion fears nothing so much as a two-front war.

2. The content of Roosevelt's speech makes it necessary to note first of all that the alleged cases of German attacks on American shipping cited by Roosevelt either do not exist or are represented in a totally false light, such as the *Greer* case, in which America was clearly the aggressor.

In the *Robin Moor* case the German submarine involved acted, as is well known, according to the generally recognized rules of war against merchant shipping. In the *Steel Seafarer* case a ship loaded entirely with war material for the British armed forces was sunk at night by an airplane a short distance south of Suez, i.e., in a part of the Red Sea that had been publicly declared an operational area by Germany and Italy, while the *Sessa* case did not involve a United States ship at all but a Panamanian ship. It is therefore a question of totally different cases, quite arbitrarily selected, which furnish not the slightest proof of the allegations made by Roosevelt.

Moreover, when Mr. Roosevelt implies in his speech that he has only now issued the order to fire at German submarines, this is contrary to the truth. Actually the American Naval Command admitted months ago that such an order to fire had been given to the American naval forces, as has long been known from repeated statements made by Secretary of the Navy Knox last July. By publicly announcing this order to fire Mr. Roosevelt has now made known before the whole world his determination to attack. This proves clearly that President Roosevelt, in opposition to the will of the American people, intends by every possible means to drag his country into the war against the Axis Powers.

3. The German Government will not let itself be deflected from the policy it has followed thus far even by the new, outrageous provocation contained in Roosevelt's speech and will continue to act with calm toward the United States. It goes without saying, of course, that the German naval forces will, if necessary, defend themselves against open American acts of aggression. It is expected that an official announcement will shortly make this quite clear to the world.

4. Various reports have given the Reich Government reason to believe that the Japanese Government is now carrying on negotiations with the American Government, which are presumably designed, in harmony with the basic idea of the Tripartite Pact, to keep America from entering the war. In view of the recent development in the relations of the United States with Germany and Italy and of the sharp deterioration of these relations as indicated by Roosevelt's speech, you have been instructed to point out again to the Japanese Government that the Reich Government deems nothing better calculated to achieve the aim sought by the Japanese Government than an unmistakable, new statement by the Japanese Government to the effect that any further act by Roosevelt on the road of aggression against the Axis Powers will inevitably lead to a state of war between Germany and Italy on the one hand and America on the other; and that this will call forth the case of the alliance provided for in the Tripartite Pact and immediately lead to Japan's entry into such a war against America.

You are further instructed to ask the Japanese Government for information about the present state of its negotiations with the United States and whether it will follow the suggestion given above by transmitting such a statement to the Government in Washington in the course of the now pending negotiations. We are certain that in such an event Roosevelt would immediately moderate his provocative attitude and would probably no longer have the courage to draw the American people into the war.

I request that you report at once as to how your statements are received by the Japanese Foreign Minister and about the Japanese

Government's position regarding our suggestion.<sup>2</sup> We would welcome it if your discussion with the Japanese Foreign Minister at the same time resulted in shedding more light on Japan's purpose in her present talks with Washington, which seen from here is not entirely clear at this time.<sup>3</sup>

RIBBENTROP

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 324.

<sup>3</sup> Rintelen forwarded to Thomsen the text of this instruction to Tokyo "For his personal and confidential information" in telegram No. 980 of Sept. 13 from the Special Train, dispatched to Washington as telegram No. 1786 on Sept. 14 (82/60615).

### No. 317

65/45473-74

*The Dirigent of the Political Department to the Foreign Ministry*

Teletype

WESTFALEN, September 14, 1941—12:22 a. m.

No. 984 of September 13 Received Berlin, September 14—12:40 a. m.

To the Minister's Secretariat in Berlin.

For Under State Secretary Woermann.

As was already reported to you by telephone, the countermeasures which have been prepared against the British Channel Islands in retaliation for the internment of Reich Germans from Iran shall be carried out in such a manner, if possible, that for every German in Iran who is interned, ten British citizens from the mother country living on the Channel Islands will be interned by Germany. In conformity with the measures taken by the English, only men are to be affected, including particularly all the more prominent persons. These Englishmen are to be taken to a special internment camp in the Pripet Marshes and their further treatment is to correspond exactly to that which is meted out to the Germans in Iran. The tangible property of these persons on the Channel Islands shall be confiscated and used for the benefit of the population of French origin on the Channel Islands.<sup>1</sup> The date for carrying out this measure will be fixed later. However, everything is to be prepared in such a manner that it can be

<sup>1</sup> The words scored through were crossed out in the original. The following marginal notes comment on this passage:

"To be withheld for the time being. R[ibbentrop]."

"Not to be transmitted with the rest. Refers to the deleted part of the sentence. R[intelen], Sept. 13."

put into effect at a moment's notice. Execution of the measure shall be followed by an appropriate press release, likewise to be prepared. The Foreign Minister requests a report as soon as the preparations have been completed.<sup>2</sup>

RINTELEN

<sup>2</sup> In a memorandum of Sept. 14, Counselor Albrecht of the Legal Department (65/45470-72) discussed the conditions of internment with respect to German citizens in Great Britain and British citizens in Germany expressing the opinion that: "If the English from the Channel Islands who are now to be placed into camps are treated less favorably it is to be feared that the treatment of German internees in English hands will grow worse to an equal extent". Albrecht also suggested that the new British internees should be brought to Germany and be moved to the eastern territories only if there should be justified complaints regarding the accommodations for the Germans from Iran. The memorandum also stated that "if the property of the newly interned is taken away and distributed it would mean the beginning of the liquidation of enemy property and would furnish the English with the presumably desired pretext for the general liquidation of German property which it has up to now been possible to avoid."

On Nov. 8 Weizsäcker instructed the Legation in Switzerland (98/109047-49) to transmit to the British Government a communication in reply to the British note, transmitted on Sept. 18 (see document No. 287, footnote 2) which asserted that Germany was fully justified in interning the British citizens on the Channel Islands. However, in view of a new German proposal for a general and mutual exchange of civilian internees, which had been addressed to the British Government through the United States Embassy in Berlin, the German Government "had decided to refrain, for the time being, from carrying out the reprisals mentioned in the expectation that the British Government will agree to the proposal communicated to the American Embassy."

### No. 318

230/153421

*Ambassador Ritter to the Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry  
With the Military Commander in Serbia*

TOP SECRET SPECIAL TRAIN, September 14, 1941—10:25 a. m.  
No. 988 of September 14 from the Special Train

Received Berlin, September 14—11:00 a. m.

No. 1220 of September 14  
from the Foreign Ministry Sent September 14.

Secret for Officer in Charge.

The High Command of the Wehrmacht informs us that in view of the worsening of the situation in your area the decision has been made to transfer one division from France to Serbia.<sup>1</sup>

RITTER

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 195.



## No. 319

205/142970-71

*The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

STOCKHOLM, September 15, 1941—1:10 p. m.

No. 1427 of September 15 Received September 20—3:10 p. m.<sup>1</sup>

For Air Ministry Attaché Group.

The following agreement has been reached with the Swedish Air Force in conjunction with the Swedish Foreign Ministry,<sup>2</sup> concerning flights over Swedish territory:<sup>3</sup>

(1) The courier route Norway—Hamar—Skellefteå—Finland will be flown by direct-flying courier planes, in each direction, on a maximum average of four times a week, and also by ambulance aircraft, which will be permitted to make intermediate landings at Östersund.

(2) The courier route Norway—Kongsvinger—Vansbro—Ockelbo—Norrundet—Finland will be flown by direct-flying courier planes, in each direction, on a maximum average of 1½ times a day. The planes that cannot fly directly may fly the route Östervallskog—Bjurvik (Graensen radio beacon) Bromma—Örskär.

(3) The courier route Germany—Hällevik—Vagnhäräd—Bromma—Örskär—Finland will be flown only in exceptional cases. Intermediate landing in Bromma.

(4) The courier route Germany—Malmö—Vernamo—Tranas—Arboga—Gaevle—Finland will be flown by direct-flying 6-motored courier and hospital planes approximately three times a week in each direction.

<sup>1</sup>The date of receipt reads Sept. 20. A typed marginal note at the end of the document reads: "Forwarded by the Telegraph Office to the Reich Air Ministry, Sept. 15."

<sup>2</sup>Telegram No. 1232 of Aug. 21 from Stockholm (205/142916-17) lists the German proposals for expansion of the courier air traffic beyond the concessions of the agreement of June 29. See document No. 42.

<sup>3</sup>The text of the agreement itself was apparently dated Sept. 12. Stockholm telegram 1753 of Oct. 22 (205/143046-47) states: "German military aerial traffic over Sweden is regulated by the agreement of September 12, 1941. Cf. Stockholm telegram 1427 of September 15, 1941."

The telegram added the comment that the agreement permitted a total of 146 overflights per month including planes from the area of the Reich but excluding hospital planes. The Luftwaffe Attaché did not believe there were good prospects for a further expansion of the traffic and recommended maximum use of the permitted flights. He forwarded the Swedish suggestion that the Lufthansa course, Oslo—Kongsvinga—Norrundet—Pori or alternately Oslo—Bjurvik (Graensen)—Bromma—Oerskaer—Pori, be flown by military planes with civilian markings (pilots in mufti) to an increasing extent. "English courier planes likewise fly with civilian markings and crews in mufti."

According to Stockholm telegram No. 1528 of Sept. 25 (205/143014) Boheman told Dankwort that since the outbreak of the German-Russian war there had been no flights of British courier planes beyond Stockholm to Russia, and that the Swedish Government had turned down a British request for such flights. Even before the outbreak of the German-Russian war, Boheman said, there was no English aerial route over Stockholm to Russia.

(5) Transmission of communications in accordance with Telecommunications Regulations [*Fernmeldebetriebsordnung*] (FBO).

(6) Advance notification by radio at least 2 hours before entry over Swedish territory.

(7) Germany will provide all the gasoline and oil required for any tanks that may be needed for intermediate landings in Sweden. Normal landing stop one hour.

(8) Overnight stops due to some obstacle that has arisen (weather conditions, engine trouble) by agreement between the air-traffic control chief at Bromma and the pilot. Otherwise only when notification is given in sufficient time before the take-off.

(9) Night flights only when notification is given in sufficient time before the take-off. However, a flight made 40 minutes before sunrise or 40 minutes after sunset will not be considered a night flight.

(10) Flying altitude at least 1,000 m., weather conditions permitting. This does not apply, however, to ambulance aircraft.

(11) Deviations from the routes laid down under 1-4, above, will be permitted only in emergencies or when weather conditions make it necessary.

(12) All planes must be unarmed.

(13) If on account of special circumstances additional overflights are desired, it will be necessary to apply for a special permit and await the decision in each individual case.

(14) The Agreement will go into effect as of September 14. Maps will be sent to the separate agencies, in so far as this has not already been done. A radio beacon will be set up by the Swedish air force north of Gävle for the direct route Oslo—Pori. Further details on this will follow.<sup>4</sup>

Air Attaché  
WIED

<sup>4</sup>Telegram No. 1928 of Nov. 15 (205/143100-101) reported new Swedish concessions which extended the agreement of Sept. 12 to permit 60 overflights weekly exclusive of hospital planes, an increase of 106 flights per month.

## No. 320

230/153422-23

*Ambassador Ritter to the Legation in Bulgaria*

Telegram

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL TRAIN, September 15, 1941—3:05 p. m.

No. 994 of September 15 from the Special Train

Received Berlin, September 15—4:30 p. m.

No. 1355 from the Foreign Ministry

Sent September 15.

In connection with the rather serious and politically most undesirable disorders and armed local uprisings in Serbia it is apparent time and again that the moving forces, organizers and suppliers of arms

are located outside the confines of Serbia, and from there keep the Serbian population stirred up. These are primarily Communist and Jewish circles. There are indications that the uprisings in Serbia are being instigated and supported especially from Bulgaria, both by the native Bulgarian Communists and, more particularly, by the Russian Legation in Sofia.

The Reich Government has now decided to strengthen the German military forces in Serbia in such a manner as to make it possible, in collaboration with loyal Serbian groups, to crush and disarm the rebels and restore security within a short time. If this accomplishment is to be more than a mere momentary success, it is essential, in addition, that these connections across the Serbian border be uncovered, cut off, and rendered harmless for good. This can be achieved only in close and continuous collaboration with the neighboring states, especially Bulgaria.

The Foreign Minister accordingly asks you to acquaint the Bulgarian Government with this view and request its active and continuous cooperation with the German Government. The interest in tranquillity and undisturbed peaceful work of construction by the people is so general and unanimous in the countries concerned that the Foreign Minister entertains no doubt that nothing more than this appeal is needed to secure the agreement in principle of the Bulgarian Government. An identical request is being addressed to the Italian Government and the Croatian Government. For the moment what is involved is only an agreement in principle to cooperate. As soon as this has been received from all the countries concerned, detailed proposals will be forthcoming regarding the cooperation of the administrative agencies concerned. I shall reserve this for a subsequent telegram at the appropriate time.

I also request the Legation to submit, on its own or in consultation with the Bulgarian Government, detailed proposals for such collaboration. The necessity of collaborating with the governments outside Serbia has been particularly stressed by the High Command of the Wehrmacht. You are therefore requested also to inform the Wehrmacht attachés of the foregoing and enlist their participation in dealing further with the matter. It might be possible, in consultation with the Wehrmacht Attachés, also to enlist the services of other military organizations operating there, specifically representatives of the Abwehr. In case officers of the German Police are operating

in your area, they are to be informed and their participation is also requested. Report by wire.<sup>1</sup>

RITTER

<sup>1</sup> The Embassy in Rome and the Legation in Zagreb were each sent the text of this instruction on Sept. 15 in telegrams Nos. 2374 and 951, respectively (230/153423-25). Each was asked to take the same step with the given government.

In Sofia telegram No. 1052 of September 18 (278/178929-31) Beckerle stated that the Bulgarian Government had fought the Communist danger vigorously and that the idea that the Communist movement in Serbia received support from Bulgarian territory was absolutely unjustified.

Mackensen replied in telegram No. 2217 of Sept. 16 (230/153426) and reported Anfuso's statement that the Italian Government was of course prepared to cooperate with Germany and the two other neighboring states in the elimination of this center of unrest. In telegram No. 2233 of Sept. 17 (230/153427) Mackensen further reported that Mussolini fully approved Anfuso's statement and that he would have the Italian Ministers in Bulgaria and Croatia informed accordingly.

Kasche replied in telegram No. 1173 of Sept. 16 (245/161528) that the Croatian Government had received the suggestion "with joy and complete approval."

## No. 321

1543/375809

*The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

WASHINGTON, September 15, 1941—8:11 p. m.

No. 3193 of September 15

Received September 16—9:00 a. m.

Following upon the earlier statements by the pro-Administration Senators Connally and Pepper made to reporters in an effort, apparently inspired, to reassure the public by limiting the term "defensive war",<sup>1</sup> to which the order to shoot issued to the American Navy applies, to the waters of the Western Hemisphere patrolled by the American Navy, Secretary of the Navy Knox, in an address before the American Legion convention in Milwaukee today,<sup>2</sup> gave a clear-cut definition of the concept. He announced that beginning September 16 the American Navy would give protection to ships of all flags carrying war material under the Lend-Lease Act between the American continent and the waters around Iceland "as completely as it is possible for us."

This shows that the definition initially left deliberately vague in Roosevelt's address<sup>3</sup> essentially serves the purpose of complying with Churchill's wish for active American war aid, and of intimidating us as well as Japan; further, that the American Navy, while it is not in a position to exercise effective control of the entire Atlantic includ-

<sup>1</sup> In English in the original.

<sup>2</sup> For text, see the *New York Times* of Sept. 16, 1941, p. 4, col. 6.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 304.

ing the route to Suez around Africa, can provide full protection of convoys between the American continent and Iceland. Knox's statement is a clear indication of the President's awareness that the American naval forces lack the capacity for commitment outside this limited scope because of commitments in the Pacific.

At the same time I am cabling the relevant extracts from this address by Knox *en clair* as No. 3194.<sup>4</sup>

THOMSEN

<sup>4</sup> Not filmed.

### No. 322

281/180302

#### *Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

BERLIN, September 15, 1941.

Minister von Rintelen told me today that the Foreign Minister had been shown the memorandum of the State Secretary,<sup>1</sup> according to which Gauleiter Bohle has urged that Stalin's son<sup>2</sup> and high-ranking Russian officers taken prisoner be used as bargaining points with the Soviet Union in the question of the Germans in Iran.

The Foreign Minister was of the following opinion:

At the present advanced stage it was hardly a matter any more of offers to the Soviet Union; rather, the question was chiefly one of reprisals. On grounds of principle, he did not want to mix military questions of the prisoners of war with questions of the civilian internees, and he would leave Stalin's son out of the picture.

He asked that the State Secretary tell this to Gauleiter Bohle. Herewith submitted to the State Secretary.

WOERMANN

<sup>1</sup> Weizsäcker memorandum of Sept. 14 (65/45476).

<sup>2</sup> A memorandum of July 19 by Grote of Political Division I M (105/113766) had confirmed earlier reports that Stalin's oldest son had been taken prisoner.

### No. 323

142/127691-93

#### *Memorandum by the Director of the Economic Policy Department*

BERLIN, September 15, 1941.

#### *The Supply of Food for Greece*

I. Since, according to an earlier directive by the Führer<sup>1</sup> the responsibility for supplying Greece is to be Italy's, deliveries of food

<sup>1</sup> This seems to refer to Führer Directive No. 29 of May 17 (printed as document No. 536 in vol. XII of this series) which stated that Italy had general responsibility for the administration and protection of Greece.

from Germany had not at first been envisaged. Following reports by Field Marshal List and the Reich Plenipotentiary in Athens, Minister Altenburg, a memorandum regarding the food situation of Greece was submitted to the Foreign Minister on July 25th of this year.<sup>2</sup> In it it was suggested that 10,000 to 15,000 tons of grain should be made available on a loan basis and to be returned out of the new Greek harvest; it was pointed out, however, that the Reich Ministry of Food had thus far categorically refused any assistance in view of the German food situation and that it would agree even to a loan only upon explicit instructions from above. At that time the Foreign Minister decided that the old instructions would remain in force.

II. Following new reports by the Reich Plenipotentiary and the military authorities indicating that the situation in Athens was developing very unfavorably and that German military interests and interests with regard to the military economy were beginning to suffer, the following was taken into consideration in an interdepartmental conference on August 29 with the approval of the Reich Ministry of Food: 10,000 tons of wheat which otherwise would have gone to Germany will be supplied from the Banat. Italy will likewise make available 10,000 tons of wheat at once. Furthermore, it was planned to arrange matters so that 40,000 tons of grain in the months from October to December 1941 and 15,000 tons each in the months from January to June 1942 would be supplied from the countries of southeastern Europe. With regard to the deliveries from the countries of southeastern Europe one considered primarily western Thrace, which is now Bulgarian, and Turkey; these had so far played no part in supplying Germany. The deliveries were envisaged with regard to supplying the urban population, especially in Athens, and the most important mining enterprises. After Thrace had been ceded, Greece had indeed become a deficiency area, and it was not possible to supply the urban areas from the new Greek harvest because of the lack of means of transportation, particularly, however, because of the reluctant attitude of the agrarian producers which can be observed everywhere in southeastern Europe and especially in Greece. According to available reports, the supplies in Athens were sufficient for a few days only.

In the meantime 5,000 tons were moved out of the Banat, which will arrive in Athens in the course of these days. Furthermore, 2,800 tons have already arrived from Italy. In addition, 5,000 tons which we had promised are in the Banat ready to be unloaded and will be

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 155.

transported during the next few days via Salonika. Minister Altenburg has particularly requested to speed up this transfer as much as possible in view of the present situation in Athens.

III. Now a new situation has developed as a result of the following circumstances:

1. The Bulgarian Government has stated that it is not in a position to supply any grain for Greece, not even from western Thrace, in view of Bulgaria's own supply situation.

2. According to newspaper reports, which, to be sure, have not yet been confirmed, an action by the American Red Cross with English toleration to supply Greece with food from Turkey is under way.

3. About a week ago, the Foreign Minister again expressed his opinion that there are no reasons of foreign policy for supplying Greece with food at the expense of an adequate supply of food for Germany.<sup>3</sup>

4. The Reich Ministry of Food has recently stated again that deliveries to Greece from German stocks cannot be made without injury to Germany's food situation.

IV. Thereupon the commercial policy committee decided on September 12 to postpone for the time being further deliveries in excess of the 10,000 tons mentioned. The Four Year Plan was asked, after all harvest results are available, something which is to be expected toward the end of September, to draw up a plan for the distribution of the food supplies available for all occupied territories—this in consultation with the military and civilian authorities concerned and taking into account Germany's military interests and those relating to the military economy. The representative of the Four Year Plan has emphasized even at this time that supplying Belgium and probably Holland and Norway as well will be more urgent from the standpoint of military economy than supplying Greece.

WIEHL

<sup>3</sup>In a telegram of Sept. 19 (4697/E226792) Wiehl informed the Legation in Athens of this opinion held by the Foreign Minister. The file copy of this telegram has no number but it appears from Athens telegram No. 1565 of Sept. 26 (4697/E226797) that this instruction was sent as telegram No. 1251 of Sept. 20. The instruction also pointed out that Germany, however, might supply Greece with food in order to assure the flow of necessary imports from Greece or to prevent the creation of centers of unrest in the country.

No. 324

82/60621-22

*The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

**MOST URGENT** TOKYO, September 16, 1941—2:10 a. m., summer time.

**SECRET**

Received September 16—12:45 p. m.

No. 1811 of September 15

With reference to your telegram No. 1561 of September 13<sup>1</sup> and my telegram No. 1797 of September 13.<sup>2</sup>

As directed, I called on the Japanese Foreign Minister today in order to carry out the above-mentioned instructions.

Toyoda listened attentively to my remarks and had his interpreter take detailed notes. With regard to the contents of my statements he said that he could not give any reply before he had consulted the Cabinet. As for himself he wished to point out that as Deputy Naval Minister at the time of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact he had had something to do with bringing it into being. There had been no doubt about Japan's obligation to come to the aid of the Axis Powers in case of an American attack. However, consultations had to be held within the Government, as would be the case in every country, and with the parties to the Tripartite Pact concerning the moment for intervening and the measures to be taken. He would immediately submit the suggestions of the German Government to the Cabinet and inform me about its position.

With regard to the Japanese-American negotiations he could not tell me anything beyond the statements reported in the previously cited telegram. Since then, there had been no further development. The Japanese Government did not intend to send a new message stating its position regarding Roosevelt's reply, in which he agreed to the resumption of negotiations. Rather, the negotiations were henceforth to be conducted directly through Ambassador Nomura. The basis of these discussions was the unchanged text of the Japanese reply of July 14, of which we had been informed at the time.<sup>3</sup>

As this last point seemed to me to be of special importance, I requested the Italian Ambassador also to ask Toyoda about this matter. My Italian colleague received a similar answer, but I believe that Toyoda was less definite to him regarding the fact that the text of the basis of negotiations was identical with the Japanese reply of July 14.

Toyoda tried to be friendly and understanding during our talk. As in the previous talks with him, he was otherwise very reserved,

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 316.

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 310.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 123.

which may in part be due to a feeling of ineffectiveness. Apart from the above-mentioned cautious reference to his personal role in the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, he tried to avoid committing himself in reply to my statements. A telegraphic report will follow.<sup>4</sup>

OTT

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 342.

## No. 325

1680/395820-21

*The State Secretary to the Embassy in Japan*

Telegram

SECRET

No. 1572

BERLIN, September 16, 1941—9: 10 p. m.  
e.o. Pol. VIII 5190 g.

Drafting Officer: Minister Boltze.

With reference to your telegram No. 1797 of September 13.<sup>1</sup>

For the Ambassador personally.

Ambassador Oshima who is at present on a 12-day journey of information through Holland, Belgium, and France was at Headquarters on August 23<sup>2</sup> where the Reich Foreign Minister made statements to him along the lines of the telegraphic instruction RAM 364 of August 25.<sup>3</sup>

I myself informed Oshima on September 4 about the status of the Japanese-American conversations in as far as we have reports about them. Oshima was grateful for this because his Foreign Minister has kept him almost completely in the dark up to now. According to his account, private information, too, which Oshima used to receive from his friends in Tokyo, bypassing the Japanese Foreign Ministry, has almost completely stopped since the beginning of the Russian campaign. On the other hand, Oshima described to me the way in which he, for his part, had taken a position on the subject Japan-America through detailed telegraphic reports to Tokyo without having been requested by his Government to do so. This position taken by Oshima is entirely in accord with what we desire.

At the conclusion of the conversation I tried further to encourage the somewhat depressed Ambassador by telling him that I was firmly convinced that in the last analysis the military instincts would prevail in the Japanese people and accordingly also in Japanese policy.

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 310.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 177, footnote 5.

<sup>3</sup> Document No. 239.

## No. 326

8589/603025-27

*Führer's Directive*

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, September 16, 1941.

CHEFSACHE

TOP SECRET MILITARY

The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht  
OKW/WFSt/Abt. L (I Op.) Nr. 441538/41 g.Kdos. Chefs.

By Officer only

1. I assign to the *Wehrmacht Commander in the Southeast*, Field Marshal List, the task of crushing the insurrectionary movement in the southeastern area.

It is important first to secure in the Serbian area the transportation routes and the objects important for the German war economy, and then for the long run to restore order in the entire area by the most rigorous methods.

In Croatia (up to the line of demarcation) the measures necessary against bandits are to be taken in agreement with the Croatian Government through the agency of the German General in Zagreb.<sup>1</sup>

2. *For the duration of the execution* of these tasks all army forces located in the area of the insurrection or to be brought there are to be concentrated under the command of the Commanding General of the XVIII Army Corps, General of Infantry Boehme. He will exercise executive authority in the area of insurrection itself in accordance with the directives of the Wehrmacht Commander, Southeast. All military and civilian authorities are subject to his orders to this extent.

The Wehrmacht Commander, Southeast will regulate the more specific delimitation of his authority. The requirements of the Four Year Plan are to be taken into account in principle.

3. The *Commander in Chief of the Army* will dispatch into Serbian territory for the time being, in addition to further security forces (these also for Croatia), an infantry division,<sup>2</sup> armored trained and captured tanks, and will prepare in case of need the dispatch of a further division as soon as one becomes available in the east.

I request that the detailed measures be reported to the High Command of the Wehrmacht.

4. *The Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe* will support as heretofore the operations in the area of insurrection with the forces available and will designate to the Wehrmacht Commander, Southeast, a leader for the tactical cooperation with General of Infantry Boehme.

<sup>1</sup> Edmund von Glaise-Horstenau.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 318.

5. *Hungarian, Rumanian, and Bulgarian* army and air forces cannot be included in the operations without the permission of the High Command of the Wehrmacht; but Hungarian and Rumanian boats offered for the protection of the *Danube traffic* may be used in addition to the Danube flotilla. Their tasks are to be regulated in such a manner, that their contact with one another is avoided by appropriate employment of the German flotilla.

The use of *Croatian* troops in the Serbian border areas next to Croatia has been granted by the Croatian Government and can therefore take place.

The *Italian High Command* will be advised of the intended measures and will be asked to take appropriate action in accord with the *Wehrmacht* Commander, Southeast, in the area occupied by the Italians.

6. The *Foreign Ministry* will carry out a joint *political action* of the Balkan countries against the communist centers [*Leitstellen*] in these countries.

The Wehrmacht Commander, Southeast will receive further information in this matter through the representative of the Reich.

ADOLF HITLER

### No. 327

1247/337765-68

#### *Unsigned Memorandum*<sup>1</sup>

Subject: Statements by the Führer to Ambassador Abetz on September 16, 1941.

The French are a decent people, as he, the Führer, had been able to observe, especially from the good behavior of the prisoners of war; consequently they were also to have a part in the "new Europe" and would then undoubtedly experience great prosperity. This presupposed, however, that the French were sensible enough to adapt themselves without reservation to the "new order" and would give up all coalition plans. Unfortunately, there was always the danger that French chauvinism would be stirred up anew. Could it ever be overcome?

He (the Führer) did not want to make any change in the tactical treatment of the French as long as the campaign in the east was not "wound up"; for he did not believe in doing two things at the same

<sup>1</sup> The document printed here is from the personal file of Hasso von Eitzdorf, the Representative of the German Foreign Ministry with the High Command of the Army. The draft, in Eitzdorf's handwriting, has been filmed on 1247/337769-73. There is no indication on either copy of where this conversation took place, but it can be assumed that it was at Hitler's headquarters.

time and he had enough patience to watch the French still longer. In the meantime, however, the thread should not be broken off, and Senior Counselor Rahn should call on General Dentz at once and say some friendly words to him because of his courageous resistance in Syria, in which the Führer would gladly have supported him if he had been in a position to do so.<sup>2</sup> He (the Führer) intended in the course of the winter to increase the occupation troops in France to about 50 divisions (including several armored divisions) by spring-time. Then he could and would do some plain talking to the people in Vichy. Above all, the domestic political situation in France and Vichy's relations with the United States would then have to be definitively settled; nor could the question of France's participation in the war against England be ignored.

As for our claims against France, the Führer remarked (leaving open the question of when and in what sequence he would speak about them to the French): He would demand Alsace-Lorraine but no other "territory", nor any areas yielding raw materials, for we had enough of them in the east (an ore deposit in the Ukraine occupied by us had already been found to contain millions of tons at a depth of 500 m.; at 1,000 m. it would amount to billions). One problem over which he had long been "racking his brains" was the Pas de Calais.<sup>3</sup> He needed the Channel coast as a security zone against England, which, if it were now to be relinquished, could perhaps not be reconquered until after months or years of fighting; for one could not in the future count on having the same luck as he had had before. In any case the Pas de Calais had to be kept secured militarily.

Another serious problem was posed by the Italian claims against France, which the Führer termed excessive. If the Italians had fought better and had attacked mainly where they were now making demands, it would have been a different matter. What would be least painful for the French to give up, the Führer asked Herr Abetz: Corsica or Tunis? (Abetz: Tunis, if there is no other choice.)

The question whether the occupation costs might be reduced was touched upon only briefly by the Führer. Later, and also today, discussions about it were held with the Foreign Minister, the outcome of which is as yet unknown.<sup>4</sup>

The question whether the militia of the Rassemblement National may be given uniforms is a matter that the Führer wants to discuss with Field Marshal Keitel. If a genius should some day assume leadership of this movement, the Führer said, it might become a center

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 165.

<sup>3</sup> The French départements Pas de Calais and Nord were placed under the German Military Administration for Belgium. See vol. xi of this series, document No. 206.

<sup>4</sup> No record of these discussions has been found.

of future resistance (militia-SA). As long as he could be safe on that score, he would use the movement and play it off against other domestic political factors.

Laval was not for the time being to return to Vichy. A second attempt would undoubtedly be made to assassinate him; this time, however, he would really be shot dead.<sup>5</sup>

The Führer also brought up the plans in the east.

The "Petersburg [Leningrad] poison well," from which the Asiatic poison had been "overflowing" into the Baltic all these years, had to be obliterated from the face of the earth.<sup>6</sup> The city was already encircled; all that remained to be done now was to blow it to pieces with artillery and from the air, thereby also destroying the water pipes, electric power plants, and everything needed by the inhabitants for their subsistence. The Asiatics and Bolsheviks had to be driven out of Europe; the "episode of 250 years of 'Asiatics'" [*Asiatentum*] had come to an end. The Urals would be the boundary, behind which Stalin and his ilk could do whatever they pleased. By occasional incursions beyond the Urals he would see to it, however, that Stalin would not be left completely undisturbed even there.

Once the Asiatics had been driven out, Europe would no longer be dependent on any outside power; America, too, could "get lost" as far as we were concerned. Europe would itself provide all the raw materials it needed and have its own markets in the Russian area, so that we would no longer have any need of other world trade. The new Russia, as far as the Urals, would become "our India," but one more favorably situated than that of the British. The new Greater German Reich would comprise 135 million people and rule over an additional 150 million.

<sup>5</sup> On the assassination attempt on Laval, see Otto Abetz, *Das offene Problem* (Köln, 1951), p. 207.

<sup>6</sup> See document No. 388.

### No. 328

1551/377135-36

#### *Memorandum by the State Secretary*

St.S. 609

BERLIN, September 16, 1941.

The Hungarian Minister related to me today the contents of a conversation between the Reich Foreign Minister and M. de Bárdossy concerning the taking over of the Banat by Hungary. Sztójay's

account was correct, I believe, in stating that M. de Bárdossy mentioned this matter only in the latter course of the Horthy visit,<sup>1</sup> and then just accidentally, as it were. Furthermore, he did not present Hungarian occupation of the Banat in any way as a matter of urgency.

A new situation, however, had now developed: The Rumanian Deputy Minister President had confirmed the fact, already known in any case, that Rumanian troops had occupied the right bank of the Danube opposite the Iron Gate. This disposition, which changed the existing situation, surely had been carried out with approval of the Government of the German Reich. This prompted the Hungarian Government to request the Reich Government to agree that Hungary carry out similar military security measures in the former Yugoslav Banat, by occupying points of military importance.<sup>2</sup> For several weeks now, the so-called maize war [*Kukurutzkrieg*] had been going on in the Banat which might easily degenerate into general anarchy. On that account, the Hungarian Government considered it absolutely essential to forestall such a development. It would have postponed this request for a while yet, but now that military dispositions have been taken by Rumania, surely for similar purposes, it considered the execution of corresponding measures by Hungary as justified and timely.

I told Sztójay that the parallel did not seem quite exact to me because the Rumanians could not regard the territory on the right bank of the Danube, which he had mentioned, as territory that would be awarded to them at a later date. Besides, I still doubted that any Rumanian troops had crossed the Danube at all. Our information in this regard was uncertain and contradictory. But if Rumanian soldiers should have crossed over to the right bank of the Danube, they were no longer there at this time.

I added that I did not mean by this to dismiss summarily the instruction which Sztójay had received from his Government, and that I would submit it to the Reich Foreign Minister.<sup>3</sup>

Herewith submitted to the Reich Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>1</sup> See Editors' Note, p. 466.

<sup>2</sup> Marginal note: "State Secretary should summon him this very day. Absolutely not true; we ask that no measure be taken regarding the Banat."

<sup>3</sup> Transmitted to the State Secretary by telephone. R[Intelen], Sept. 18."

<sup>4</sup> Unsigned marginal note: "Under State Secretary and Dirigent of the Political Department: Please clarify once more the facts regarding the crossing of the Danube by Rumanian troops."

## No. 329

205/142977-78

*The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT                      STOCKHOLM, September 17, 1941—9:10 p. m.  
 No. 1456 of September 17              Received September 17—11:40 p. m.

For Ambassador Ritter.

(1) Today's conversation with Foreign Minister von Günther revealed the surprising and previously unknown fact that the Norwegian ships have been chartered to England by the Norwegian Maritime Office, so that they are now at England's disposal.

This is also borne out by a letter to the Legation from the shipowner Stenersen, stating that English captains are on board the ships and that the motorship *Dicto* is lying in the free port to take on a cargo of war material. This latter assertion by Stenersen has not yet been verified here but in view of the present control by the English is not improbable.

(2) I defined the Reich Government's position to Foreign Minister von Günther as follows. We demand that:

1. The ships be turned over to their rightful owners, i.e., the Norwegian shipowners—immediately and without recourse to judicial proceedings;

2. Pending actual restoration of the ships to their Norwegian owners the ships must not in any circumstances be allowed to leave port;

3. This shall also apply to new Norwegian vessels being built in Swedish shipyards, which must upon completion be turned over to the Norwegians who contracted for them.

(3) Foreign Minister von Günther brought up the old Swedish counterarguments against the German demands:

Compliance with the German demands would be incompatible with Sweden's neutrality. Sweden was not waging any trade war with England and therefore could not on legally valid grounds prohibit the sailing of the ships to England. Any property rights of the shipowners would have to be enforced through judicial proceedings. Only the regular Swedish courts could render the decision regarding property rights. Pending such a decision the ships must and could be detained by arrest. An arrest could be effected by the Norwegian shipowners in a few days.<sup>1</sup> Any ensuing judicial action could be carried to the last instance in not more than six months.

<sup>1</sup> In telegram No. 1476 of Sept. 19 (205/142988-89) the Legation reported that Günther had stated: As regards the ship *Rigmor* a motion for arrest of the captain had been made by the Norwegian shipowner Stenersen and the arrest had taken place within 24 hours of the complaint. The ship *Rigmor* was thereby held fast.

Edye, the shipping expert of the Reich Commissar for Norway, had been summoned to Stockholm, would arrive by air on the morrow, and would urge the

(4) In reply to my serious representations to the effect that the sailing of even a single Norwegian ship to England with an English captain on board, with the English flag, possibly even carrying a cargo of war material, would most gravely jeopardize Swedish-German relations, Günther, who showed some understanding of this aspect of the matter, stated that he would discuss the German demands again with his ministerial colleagues. He promised me an early reply.<sup>2</sup>

SCHNURRE  
 WIED

Reich Commissar to induce the other Norwegian shipowners to proceed in the same way as Stenersen in order to hold the ships.

Schnurre reported further that he had disputed severely for an hour and a half with Günther regarding the negative attitude of Sweden, and had suggested the inevitable consequences if Sweden persisted, such as the cutting off of the Göteborg overseas traffic.

<sup>2</sup> See, further, document No. 335.

## No. 330

2281/481173-79

*The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

TOP SECRET

ROME, September 17, 1941.

No. 157/g. [sic]

Subject: Report of Italian Ambassador to the Holy See, Attolico, concerning a conversation with the Pope.

With reference to my report 157/g. of September 15, 1941.<sup>1</sup>

In the enclosure I submit a German translation<sup>2</sup> of a further report by Ambassador Attolico to the Foreign Ministry here concerning his conversation with the Pope. Anfuso gave me this report today. I again point to the necessity of the strictest secrecy.

Our Embassy to the Holy See does not know of this report or of the previous one.

VON MACKENSEN

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 315 of Sept. 13.

<sup>2</sup> The original Italian version has been filmed on serial 2281/481180-184.

[Enclosure]

*The Royal Italian Embassy to the Holy See*

SECRET

ROME, September 16, 1941/XIX.

Subject: Taylor's conversations at the Vatican.

As reported in today's *L'Osservatore Romano*, I was received by the Pope this morning. I asked to see him not so much to find out more than I already knew but, above all, to obtain his confirmation.



As the Pope is receiving the American Ambassador, it is well not only that he should receive the Italian Ambassador but also that the visit be a matter of public knowledge. In fact, I must say that, although I was received after Mr. Taylor, *L'Osservatore* reports my call as having been made first.

I had not seen the Pope for a long time. Thus there was no lack of material for conversation. But naturally, I did not fail to inquire once again, by asking him directly, for information about Mr. Taylor's visit.

I must say at the outset that the Pope told me nothing which I have not already reported. The words used by the Pontiff were exactly the same as those used previously by the Secretary of State and later by Monsignor Tardini.<sup>3</sup> From the multiplicity of the versions, I received confirmation of what I had been told about Ambassador Taylor's method of holding conversations. He has the custom of carrying with him a sheet of paper containing a summary of the points to be taken up and the questions to be asked. He plays the same record for the Pope, the Cardinal Secretary of State (and today Monsignor Tardini, also) and carefully jots down the answers.

In essence, I told the Pope that according to the general feeling Mr. Taylor's trip must have other purposes than merely a resumption of relations . . .<sup>4</sup>

Pius XII smiled and said: I see that you think that this is not enough. Then he himself proceeded to give me an account of the interview.

So as not to repeat myself, I give below an outline of the interview and its objectives:

1) Resumption of relations. Desire to efface the impression of a break in the relations between the United States and the Holy See. Hence, a demonstrative purpose par excellence, as proven by the frequent and repeated visits.

(Taylor called on the Pope a second time today and will see him a third time on Friday, to pay his respects before leaving and to present his wife, whom the Pope has not yet seen. In short, Taylor needs to let it be known that he has seen the Pope not once but several times.)

2) Informative purpose. To acquaint the Holy Father with American public opinion and to try to clarify Roosevelt's position. There is absolutely nothing to add, in this connection, to what I have already reported (my report of the 11th of this month).<sup>5</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Assistant to the Cardinal Secretary of State.

<sup>4</sup> Omission indicated in the original.

<sup>5</sup> Document No. 315, enclosure.

3) In relation to the first two points, to bring about the Vatican's intervention with the Catholics of the United States in order to end the opposition to the President. In this connection, I received from the Pope explicit confirmation that the Holy See will do nothing more than it has already done, namely, recommend to the Catholics as such, and principally to the Bishops, that they keep out of political controversies as much as possible.

I am unable to say how much this pleased Mr. Roosevelt's envoy. The impression I received yesterday from one of the Vatican eavesdroppers—the newly baked Marchese Travaglini—is that on this point, perhaps the principal one of his visit, Mr. Taylor failed in his purpose.

4) Secondary objectives. Settlement of the previously announced gift of the famous villa in Florence to the Vatican.

5) In conjunction with this, also some settling of his own affairs. In my opinion, Myron Taylor also intends on the eve of the outbreak of war to take back as many of his personal effects as he can. How far this purpose was carried out we shall know only after his departure, from the number of suitcases and trunks that the illustrious Ambassador and friend of Roosevelt takes with him to America.

These—and none other—were the purposes of the visit. That they should justify a trip by Clipper is something that must also be considered in the light of the American spirit of superior snobbery. Mr. Taylor was eager to repeat to the Pope, again today, that he is ready to return to Rome. From these statements—which I consider without substance and due, I repeat, to mere snobbery—the Holy Father saw fit to infer that after all, if this is true, the United States' entry into the war must not be so imminent as it seems. On this point the Pope shares the doubts of Monsignor Montini more than the certainty of Tardini (my report of the 13th).

While conversing with the Pope, I made a point of bringing up the subject of Bolshevism. But the Pope gave me the same reply as that of the Cardinal Secretary of State and his assistants, although with greater emphasis and assuredness. The Holy See, he said, has already spoken out, in good time, on Bolshevism and has *never* changed. If anything, it is the others who have changed. Germany was first in making every effort to get along with Bolshevism: not the Holy See.

But if I should talk of Bolshevism—and I would be fully prepared to do so, continued Pius XII, should I then say nothing about Nazism? The situation in Germany, he told me, has become infinitely worse since

the day of his departure from Berlin. Even if the Führer has ordered the "suspension" of the persecutions, this does not mean that Christ has been readmitted to the schools from which He was removed and that the numerous convents and religious institutions now closed will be reopened, or that the German children will no longer be made to recite that parody of the Our Father in which they thank Hitler for their daily bread.

The Pope dwelt on this point for about thirty minutes. In fact, he said that he was glad of the opportunity to ask me a question:

"I was told long ago that in Germany they already had it in mind to do away with the Vatican, because there was no place for it in the new European order, etc., etc. Now, I am assured that even in his meeting with Mussolini the Führer stated that it was necessary to 'put an end to' the Vatican. Is that true?"

In the face of such a question, I could have said that I wished to investigate the matter before replying. But I preferred to answer with a vigorous, firm denial which, I must say, seemed to make the Pope feel glad and almost relieved, thus showing how much his conviction, I might almost say his nightmarish fear, of new and more ruthless persecutions weighs on his mind.

He speaks as though one day he might, *manu germanica*, be driven out of Rome. But—mark me—he does not speak of it out of fear. I have never realized as well as I did this time that the state of the relations with Germany affects the general attitude of the Vatican, even to some extent as far as we are concerned, and undoubtedly a great deal as far as the war is concerned.

Continuing his conversation, the Holy Father said:

"I, too, feel that, in view of the long duration of the war with Russia, a word from me on Bolshevism would be most beneficial and timely in Italy and the entire world; but have I said anything or perhaps published anything in *L'Osservatore Romano* about the Pastoral letter of the Bishop of Münster or that of the German Bishops? However, if some day I 'must' speak, I shall speak, but I will say everything."

The Pope mentioned to me the many years he had spent in Germany and his attachment to the Germans. Even here in Rome, he receives *every day* at the Vatican all the Germans who come to see him, without even requiring them to kneel before him, as do all the

others; and at times he even interrupts the daily report of the Secretary of State in order to receive them.

"Oh, if only Germany had left me in peace . . . my attitude toward this war, especially at this time, would have been quite different . . ."

The Pope kept me for more than an hour. He told me to come and see him whenever I wished.

ATTOLICO

### No. 331

260/170194

*The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Finland*

Telegram

TOP SECRET SPECIAL TRAIN, September 17, 1941—6:10 p. m.  
No. 1004 of September 17 from the Special Train

Received Berlin, September 18—7:35 p. m.

No. 1174 of September 18

from the Foreign Ministry

Sent September 18.

RAM 407/R

For the Minister personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 929 of September 11.<sup>1</sup>

For the guidance of your conversation, I am informing you of the following: The thoughts of President Ryti on Finnish territorial wishes at the coming peace treaty which he discussed with you were received here with interest. Our attitude toward such wishes is altogether positive. Details must, of course, be reserved for the future. With regard to the Kola Peninsula and to the future fate of Murmansk, it should be said that we ourselves are interested in this area so that we should like to keep future decisions open in this respect.<sup>2</sup>

In talks on such questions with members of the Finnish Government, you can take the attitude, within the framework of the above, that this is your personal opinion. It can only be desirable for us if the Finns' wishes now also extend to former Russian territory.

RIBBENTROP

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 301.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 114.

## No. 332

4806/E237548

*The Foreign Ministry to the Legation in Rumania*

Cipher Letter

BERLIN, September 8, 1941.

Sent September 18.

zu D III 421 g.<sup>1</sup>

With reference to our telegram No. 2362 of September 2.<sup>2</sup>

In the matter of the moving of Jews back to Bessarabia, which was brought up for discussion at your post, the High Command of the Wehrmacht has issued the following order:

"According to a report of August 16 from the German Legation in Bucharest General Antonescu has complained that German military authorities in the Ukraine intend to send back to Bessarabia Jews who had been taken along by the Bolsheviks.<sup>3</sup> General Antonescu urgently requested that this be prevented, referring in this connection to the consent given by the Führer.

There must be no intervention by German authorities in so far as a transfer of Jews is involved between the territory of the Rumanian state and the area between Bug and Dniester, which is soon to come under Rumanian administration. Transfers from these areas into occupied territories under German administration and vice versa must be stopped in the future."

By order:  
RADEMACHER

<sup>1</sup> D III 421 g.: OKW letter of Aug. 30 (4806/E237550) referred to in document No. 207, footnote 1.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (4806/E237560.) This telegram from Luther stated that Eleventh Army headquarters had not moved any Jews from the Ukraine to Bessarabia. However, after the Rumanian authorities had moved Jews across the Dniester into the Ukraine at two places early in August, units of the German Army and Security Police moved them back to Bessarabia.

<sup>3</sup> Document No. 207.

## No. 333

93/104091-92

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

St.S 617

BERLIN, September 18, 1941.

This afternoon I asked the Hungarian Minister to call on me and with reference to his démarche of September 16 (St.S. No. 609<sup>1</sup>) told him the following concerning the admission of Hungarian soldiers into the Banat:

The assumption underlying his démarche, namely the report of a crossing of the border by Rumanian troops over to the right bank of

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 328.

the Danube, was due to a misunderstanding. Neither were there any Rumanian soldiers on the right side of the Danube at the Iron Gate now, nor had any Rumanian soldiers ever been there. But even if his statement concerning such a Rumanian step had been correct, it could not be involved in behalf of the Hungarian wish regarding the Banat. I told Sztójay that we wished to ask the Hungarian Government to let matters regarding the Banat rest where they stood at the time of the conversation recently held between the Reich Foreign Minister and M. de Bárdossy,<sup>2</sup> i.e., not to look upon the Banat as an immediate issue and therefore to refrain from dispatching troops as they wished to do.

The Minister then tried to put forth once more the idea that at least certain Hungarian administrative personnel should be admitted to the Banat. There was a situation now where the Nedić regime might establish such a foothold in the Banat that some fine day Hungary would have to use force to wrest this territory from the Serbian Government. One preliminary to that was the so-called maize war [*Kukurutzkrieg*] which the Hungarian had mentioned day before yesterday.

I then asked Sztójay to drop this idea. All required measures had now been taken by us, relying on our own resources to ensure order in Serbia, the disturbance of which we had lately viewed with great patience.

Sztójay thereafter ceased to insist.

Herewith to the Reich Foreign Minister (by teletype).

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 328.

## No. 334

205/142985-87

*Ambassador Ritter to the Legation in Sweden*

Telegram

SECRET

SPECIAL TRAIN, September 19, 1941—3:45 p. m.  
No. 1013 of September 19 from the Special Train

Received Berlin, September 19—4:15 p. m.  
No. 2170 from the Foreign Ministry Sent September 19.

With reference to your telegram No. 1456 of September 17.<sup>1</sup> For Minister Schnurre.

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 329.

A further decision is to be taken only when the reply promised you has been received.<sup>2</sup>

On the basis of the new facts communicated to you I ask that you meanwhile state to the Foreign Minister:

1) The facts that the Norwegian ships have apparently been chartered to England for a long time, that English captains are on board, and that, as is being said, war materials for England are being loaded on individual ships have evoked a most unfavorable impression with the Reich Government. These facts were surely known to the Swedish Foreign Minister and to the Swedish Government for some time. But despite manifold and urgent negotiations over the question the Swedish Government said nothing on these points. It follows from this that the Swedish Government has not dealt openly with us. It was behind our backs and not only with the knowledge, but also with the active support of the Swedish Government that the preparations were made for the Norwegian ships to break out for England. This active support emerges from paragraphs 2 and 3.

2) The standpoint of the Swedish Foreign Ministry that "compliance with the German demands would be incompatible with Sweden's neutrality" is decisively rejected by us. On the contrary we must make the formal complaint to the Swedish Government that it has up to now taken an unneutral attitude in England's favor in this question and to the disfavor of Germany and Norway. From the legal standpoint and from the standpoint of common sense it would have been natural and obvious for the Swedish officials to have respected the claims and wishes of the indicated private Norwegian owners. It cannot now be further questioned that the Norwegian owners wish to bring the ships which belong to them back to Norway. If against this clear legal situation third parties, as for example the "Göteborg Shipping Office" of the exiled Norwegian Government, or Englishmen, lay claim to the Norwegian ships, it would have been the responsibility of such third parties to prove to the Swedish courts that the claims of the owners were not valid, or that the decrees of the exiled Norwegian Government took precedence. If the Swedish Government had accepted this legal standpoint, this would have been neutral. The Swedish Government has, however, done the opposite. It recognizes the right of disposition of a third party, it protects charter contracts which were concluded against the wishes of the owners, and it demands of the shipowners that they prove their clear and primary legal claims before the courts.

3) As regards the loading of individual ships with war materials for England, we have been thoroughly aware of the fact that in earlier negotiations the Swedish Government always declined to make any pledge that it would grant no export licenses for England. To this extent we cannot make a formal complaint to the Swedish Government. But the fact that it has granted export licenses for war material for England precisely for these controversial ships throws a most

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 329.

peculiar light on the attitude of the Swedish Government. It compels us in the future to judge the attitude and the declarations of the Swedish Government with still greater caution than we have exercised hitherto.

I ask in this connection that you clarify beyond all doubt whether a permit by the harbor police is necessary in order to transfer oil from one ship to another when both lie in Swedish harbors and whether special approval is connected with this. The reports of the Legation, No. 1411 of September 12, and No. 1416 of September 13<sup>3</sup> do not fully clarify this question. The question is not whether there is an absolute prohibition as was indicated in No. 1416, but whether an official permit is required for transferring fuel oil from one ship to another. Should such an official approval have been requisite and have been issued, then it would constitute proof of assistance by Swedish officials.

RITTER

<sup>3</sup> Neither found.

No. 335

2116/460514

*The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Legation in Sweden*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

[No. 2171 of September 19]<sup>1</sup>

BERLIN, September 19, 1941.

e.o. Ha. Pol. 6136 g.

For Minister Schnurre.

As a result of the Stockholm Legation's telegram 1456<sup>2</sup> regarding the attitude of the Swedish Government toward the question of the Norwegian ships, the Foreign Minister wishes a memorandum on the present situation of our economic relations with Sweden with special regard to what possibilities we have for putting the thumbscrews on the Swedes.

I ask for an immediate statement of your views in outline.<sup>3</sup>

WIEHL

<sup>1</sup> The telegram number is taken from the reply, document No. 336.

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 329.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 336.

No. 336

2116/460516-18

*The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT STOCKHOLM, September 19, 1941—9:00 p. m.  
 No. 1477 of September 19 Received September 19—11:35 p. m.  
 Ha. Pol. 6152 g.

With reference to your telegram No. 2171 of September 19.<sup>1</sup>

For Ministerialdirektor Wiehl.

1. Present status of the economic relations with Sweden. Sweden delivered commodities to Germany to the amount of 540 million RM, within the last year including about 10 million tons of iron ore valued at 120 million RM; cellulose, 40 million RM; lumber valued at 75 million RM; ball bearings, 25 million; iron and steel, especially high-grade steels, valued at 40 million RM. Other deliveries were in the form of finished products, especially tools and machines. To this must be added the delivery of supplies to German troops in Finland and Norway, the most important of which were barracks, food, and equipment. Another major item of services performed by Sweden is in the field of transport, where the entire Swedish merchant fleet in the Baltic has been brought 100 percent into service for the shipment of Swedish raw materials and bulk commodities. German contracts for ship construction placed with Swedish shipyards run to a total value of 60 million RM.

2. German counterdeliveries are as follows: Coal and coke, about 5 million tons, valued at approximately 100 million RM; chemicals, especially fertilizer, valued at 60 million RM; textiles, about 70 million RM; finished industrial goods, 100 million RM; armaments, 12 million RM; rolling mill products (iron and steel), 30 million RM.

3. German counterdeliveries are insufficient to compensate for the steadily increasing Swedish deliveries. The clearing deficit anticipated for the year 1941 is 130 million RM. The German demand at the present economic negotiations is that this deficit be bridged by a Swedish credit.<sup>2</sup> The Swedish Government has granted this to a large extent.<sup>3</sup>

4. The bulk of the supplies and material to the troops on the German fighting front in Finland and to Norway is moved over Swedish railroads or through Swedish territorial waters under Swedish convoy escort. The latter method of transportation has gained increasing

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 335.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 254.

<sup>3</sup> See Document No. 347.

importance in recent weeks because the sea route to northern Norway is practicable now only under heavy risk.

5. Possibilities of applying pressure on the Swedes are afforded by coal and iron deliveries, and deliveries of armaments and other products essential to the Swedish economy. But by doing this we would disrupt the German-Swedish trade on which we depend to a much greater degree than do the Swedes. I would therefore advise against stopping the shipment of coal and other deliveries to Sweden, because we would thereby defeat our plan, already realized in a great measure, of making Sweden the arsenal of Germany. On the other hand the medium through which reprisals could be applied and to which Sweden is most sensitive, is the overseas route from and to Göteborg, which was reopened only recently through my own intervention.<sup>4</sup> True enough, the Göteborg route, by which overseas raw materials are imported to Sweden, is indirectly beneficial to us. The Swedish Navy, for instance, which provides convoy escort for German transports, gets the oil it needs in this way. Other Swedish industries working for us get the raw materials needed for their production in this manner. Nevertheless, I believe that prohibiting this traffic is the only and most effective means of hitting Sweden in a most sensitive spot without unduly affecting our own interests.<sup>5</sup> Regarding the status of the question of the Norwegian ships, I refer to my telegram No. 1476 of this evening.<sup>6</sup>

SCHNURRE  
 WIED

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 91.

<sup>5</sup> In forwarding Schnurre's telegram on Sept. 20 to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat (2116/460515) Wiehl expressed his concurrence in Schnurre's views, particularly as regards means of exerting pressure on the Swedes.

<sup>6</sup> See document No. 329 and footnote 1.

No. 337

318/192260

*The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT WASHINGTON, September 19, 1941—10:04 p. m.  
 No. 3261 of September 19 Received September 20—8:05 p. m.

Secretary of State Hull sent me today a note in which the American Government, acting at the same time on behalf of all American citizens concerned with the ship and its cargo, demands full reparation for the losses [sustained as a consequence] of "the unlawful sinking of the American vessel *Robin Moor* by German submarines on May 21, 1941,

in the south Atlantic Ocean."<sup>1</sup> I am wiring the full text at the same time en clair under No. 3262.<sup>2</sup>

The demand for reparation is made in the form of an offer for a lump sum settlement by which the American Government is prepared to accept the amount of 2,967,092 U.S. dollars (in words: two million nine hundred sixty-seven thousand ninety-two) in satisfaction of all of its own claims for damages and of those of its citizens; on condition, that payment of this amount be effected in Washington by the German Government within 90 days, that is to say, before December 19.

I limited myself to acknowledging the receipt and to stating that I would transmit the contents of the note to the Reich Government.

THOMSEN

<sup>1</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 630, footnote 2.

<sup>2</sup> Of Sept. 19 (4669/E221459); for text of the note, see Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1941, vol. v, p. 364.

### No. 338

911/294600

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Paris*

Teletype

TOP SECRET

WESTFALEN, September 19, 1941.

No. 4477

RAM 412/R

For the Ambassador personally.

An order from the Chief of the OKW<sup>1</sup> will be transmitted within the next few days to Military Commanders to take vigorous measures against Communist intrigues. This order will be transmitted to you for your information.<sup>2</sup> On that basis please give every support to the measures initiated by the military authorities and do not interfere from the political standpoint. Relations between Germany and France and the interests of France, too, are served best by the ruthless extirpation of Communist centers of disturbances.

RIBBENTROP

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 344.

<sup>2</sup> In a memorandum of September 21 (911/294599) Ritter informed Woermann of the directive to Abetz and transmitted Ribbentrop's request that identical instructions be sent to all other Chiefs of Mission and representatives of the Reich.

### No. 339

2231/482438

*The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Italy*

BERLIN, September 19, 1941.

Pol I M 2804 I gRs.

Subject: Suppression of the insurrectionary movement in the south-eastern area.

With reference to our telegram No. 2429 of September 18.<sup>1</sup>

I am enclosing the text of the Führer's directive of September 16<sup>2</sup> for your information.

Field Marshal List will go to Zagreb in the immediate future and use this visit for discussing with the German and Croatian authorities concerned a joint procedure for fighting the Communist uprisings in Serbia and the neighboring countries.<sup>3</sup> It has been decided that a further German division will be employed in Serbia in order to suppress more quickly the Communist unrest there. This division will probably be employed in the direction of the Sava up to the Croatian border.

Please inform the Government at your post of Field Marshal List's tasks and the purpose of his visit in Zagreb. This information is meant to prevent any possible sensitivity on the part of the Italians, although as such it is natural that the Wehrmacht Commander, South-east should inspect the troops placed under his command, and although contact with the Croatian authorities lies within the framework of the cooperation agreed upon with the surrounding countries.

By order:  
EISENLOHR

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (4865/E249238). This telegram informed the Embassy of the substance of Hitler's directive of Sept. 16.

<sup>2</sup> This text (2231/482439-40) is a shortened version of document No. 326, omitting points 3 and 4 of this Directive.

<sup>3</sup> The Legation in Zagreb was informed of Field Marshal List's visit to Zagreb and of Hitler's directive of Sept. 16 in Ritter's telegram No. 1006 of Sept. 18 from the Special Train, which was forwarded to Zagreb as No. 993 on Sept. 19 (3579/E024585-86).

### No. 340

2165/470687-89

*An Official of the Reich Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs to the State Secretary*

BERLIN, September 19, 1941.

DEAR HERR STATE SECRETARY: At your request I am sending you on instruction of the Minister:

1. A copy of the Führer order of August 6, 1941, concerning the conduct of the Wehrmacht in religious questions in the eastern areas.

2. A copy of the Führer directive of July 30, 1941, concerning the suspension of confiscations of church and monastic property.<sup>1</sup>

Heil Hitler!

Yours, etc.

DR. STAHN

[Enclosure 1]

The High Command of the Wehrmacht  
Az 31 v AWA/J (Ia)  
4798/41

AUGUST 6, 1941.

The Führer has issued the following guidelines for the conduct in religious questions of the Wehrmacht toward the civilian population in the newly occupied *eastern areas*:

1. Religious or church activity of the civilian population is to be neither promoted nor prevented. Members of the Wehrmacht are unconditionally to keep away from such activities of the local inhabitants.

2. The chaplain services of the Wehrmacht are intended exclusively for the members of the German Armed Forces. The military chaplains are to be explicitly forbidden to undertake any sort of official church activity or religious propaganda as regards the civilian population.

3. It is likewise forbidden to admit or to summon civilian clergymen from the Reich or from abroad into the occupied eastern areas.

4. These regulations do not apply to the Bessarabian area occupied by Rumanian troops nor to the Finnish front.

KEITEL

[Enclosure 2]

National Socialist German Workers Party  
Party Chancellery

SECRET

FÜHRER HEADQUARTERS, July 30, 1941.

PERSONAL

Bo/Kü.

Herr Gauleiter . . . . .

Honored Party Comrade . . . . .

The Führer has ordered:

The confiscations of church and monastic property shall be halted immediately until further notice. Independent measures may not be taken by the Gauleiters in any circumstances even if special circumstances in individual cases urgently require the utilization of church

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 307.

or monastic property on the basis of the legal regulations. If in a special case a Gauleiter considers these conditions to obtain, a report must first be made through me to the Führer.

Heil Hitler!

M. BORMANN

No. 341

278/178934

*The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Bulgaria*

Telegram

SPECIAL TRAIN, September 20, 1941—1:20 a. m.

No. 1018 of September 19 from the Special Train

Received Berlin, September 20—1:35 a. m.

No. 1388 of September 20

from the Foreign Ministry

Sent September 20.

RAM 410/R

With reference to your telegram No. 1036 of Sept. 16.<sup>1</sup>

In the question whether Bulgaria should maintain or break off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, please take a noncommittal attitude and do not take a position in either one sense or the other.<sup>2</sup>

RIBBENTROP

<sup>1</sup> Not found.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram No. 1098 of Sept. 25 (278/178942) Beckerle reported that he had been entirely noncommittal when the Bulgarian Minister President in the course of a conversation told him that Bulgaria would welcome a rupture of relations with Russia but that "she would not do the Russians the favor of breaking off relations of her own accord."

No. 342

82/80634-36

*The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT TOKYO, September 20, 1941—8:30 a. m., summer time.

SECRET

Received September 20—5:25 p. m.

No. 1850 of September 20

With reference to your telegram No. 1561 of September 14<sup>1</sup> and my telegram No. 1811 of September 16.<sup>2</sup>

Foreign Minister Toyoda, in the presence of (group apparently missing) [the Deputy?] Foreign Minister, today gave me the reply

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 316.

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 324.

of the Japanese Government to the German suggestion regarding a statement to be addressed to the American Government, the text of which he handed to me at my request. In translation the text reads as follows:

"As you know, one of the principal aims of the Tripartite Pact is to prevent the war from spreading and consequently to keep the United States from entering the war. In the negotiations with America thus far the Japanese Government has tried to impress this point upon her, so that Japan has fulfilled her task of restraining America from entering the war. The Japanese Government will carefully study the points suggested to it by the German Reich and will, as far as possible, act in accordance with them in its future negotiations with America. The Japanese Government expresses the wish that the Reich Government may trust it to conduct the present negotiations between Japan and America in the spirit of the Tripartite Pact."

I intimated to the Japanese Foreign Minister that this reply struck me as being far from precise. In order to achieve the result we were aiming at, namely deterring the United States, in line with the Tripartite Pact, from proceeding further on the road of aggression, it was necessary in our opinion to send to the Government of the United States a moderate, but at the same time unequivocal, communication similar in substance to what had been suggested [by] us. I therefore asked how a statement to the United States was to be worded, since its effect depended on that. The Japanese tried at first to avoid a clear answer, but were then persuaded to make a rather unimpressive attempt in my presence to draft a statement to be sent to the Americans. The Foreign Minister finally told me that he would seek a formulation which he would send me as soon as possible. I replied that I would so inform my Government immediately, and would appreciate an early transmittal of the promised statement.

In a previous conversation, Deputy Foreign Minister Amau assured me that since my last talks with the Foreign Minister there had been no further developments in the negotiations with the United States.

I am told confidentially by sources within the Foreign Ministry that the United States apparently does not want to consider Japan's attempt at arriving at a general settlement excluding questions of detail, and that it insists on negotiations about concrete details, especially in regard to the virtually insoluble China questions. If the negotiations should take such a course, the Konoye Government's attempt at a settlement would soon be resisted by the entire opposition, reinforced by the China Army and the Navy engaged in China.

A telegraphic report will follow.<sup>3</sup>

OTT

## No. 343

205/142091-94

### *The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry*

#### Telegram

MOST URGENT STOCKHOLM, September 20, 1941—7:45 p. m.  
No. 1486 of September 20 Received September 20—9:55 p. m.

With reference to our telegram No. 1476 of September 19<sup>1</sup> and your telegram No. 2170 of September 19.<sup>2</sup>

To be shown immediately to the Secretariat of the Foreign Minister and to Ambassador Ritter.

I. Foreign Minister von Günther had me summoned to him again this noon. He informed me that there had been no change in the position of the Swedish Government. The Swedish Government, on the legal grounds which it had adopted, refuses to deliver the ships to the Norwegian shipowners without resort to legal proceedings. Neither can it envisage how any particular ship could be prevented from sailing, if it so desired. The Swedish Government hopes that Norwegian requests to stop sailings would be filed early enough, as was done in the *Rigmor* case, to provide the practical means for preventing departure.<sup>3</sup>

II. I delivered to Foreign Minister von Günther the statement set forth in the above-cited telegraphic instruction. He protested against the imputation that the Swedish Government had made preparations behind our backs for the escape of the Norwegian ships. The Swedish Government on the contrary had from the outset persisted in the position, maintained also today, that the ships could depart upon compliance with the normal clearance regulations.<sup>4</sup> The fact that the ships were chartered to England was not new but had been known for a year. War material in the strict sense of the word was not included in the cargoes, since no export licenses had been issued by the Swedish Government. Other goods had been bought by the British and Norwegian side and put into warehouses a long time ago, so that it would be incorrect to say that export licenses for these goods had been issued in connection with the contemplated departure of Norwegian ships. Neither had the harbor police issued any permits for the loading of fuel.

III. Foreign Minister von Günther followed up these statements with a forceful analysis of the aims and direction of Sweden's policy. He recounted all that Sweden had done to meet Germany's demands

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 329, footnote 1.

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 334.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 329 and footnote 1.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 151.

<sup>3</sup> Document No. 359.



in relation to military matters and the war economy, e.g., transportation of troops now totaling almost 500,000 men through Sweden or Swedish territorial waters; the transportation of several hundred thousand tons of war material and supplies for the German forces; convoy escort for German troop and material transports in the past and in the future; full compliance with our demands regarding aviation, etc. The Swedish Government is aware that Sweden could remain free and independent only on the basis of Germany's friendship. To preserve that friendship was Günther's foremost goal. In relation to England, Sweden maintained the principle of neutrality, having no desire to let herself be drawn into the conflict between England and Germany. Maintaining Sweden's decision not to keep the Norwegian ships from sailing followed from Sweden's principle of neutrality toward England. He asked that his arguments be conveyed to the Minister and be taken into account in any judgment regarding the Swedish Government's decisions.

IV. Since we have exhausted our arguments and threats, it remains now for us to decide whether we wish to follow up our words with sanctions. My views on this point may be summarized as follows:

Cutting off Sweden from German deliveries (coal, iron, chemical products, textiles) would militate against our own interests. The Swedish economy would be disrupted and disabled from working for us on a full scale as heretofore. The details were outlined by me in yesterday's telegraphic report No. 1477.<sup>5</sup> I would suggest in our own interest to forego taking any such sanctions. The application of sanctions, however, could be considered respecting the Swedish overseas traffic from and to Göteborg.<sup>6</sup> The Swedish Government would have to be informed in that case that our assent to the Göteborg traffic would be withdrawn the moment the first Norwegian ship escapes. We could also reserve to ourselves the right, by way of reprisal, to seize as prizes any Swedish overseas ships en route to Göteborg at such time. The next three Swedish overseas ships are expected to arrive at Göteborg on October 5. Three other ships are set to sail from Göteborg on the same date.

V. I do not expect much of other German sanctions because we must increasingly depend on Sweden as hinterland and supply base of our fighting forces. Almost every day big demands for services and deliveries are received on which the Swedish Government must be approached. To cite only one example I may mention the now beginning transfer of the elements of the 6th Mountain Division in Norway, which must be shipped to the front through Swedish territorial waters and under Swedish convoy escort because of the hazards of the sea

<sup>5</sup> Document No. 336.

<sup>6</sup> See document No. 91.

route around northern Norway. Punitive sanctions leading to a break with the Swedish Government would cut us off from these resources.<sup>7</sup>

VI. The Navy Attaché has in agreement with me reported separately to OKM. I would request that you ask to be shown his telegram Embassy No. 1486 of today's date.<sup>8</sup>

SCHNURRE  
WLED

<sup>7</sup> See document No. 172 and footnote 8.

<sup>8</sup> Thus, but the Legation's telegram No. 1486 is the one here printed. See, further, document No. 371.

No. 344

2281/482441-44

*Circular of the Foreign Ministry*<sup>1</sup>

BERLIN, September 20, 1941.  
Pol I M 2813 gRs.

For your information only:

On September 16, 1941, the Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht issued a basic directive addressed to the Military Commanders in the occupied territories regarding the struggle against and suppression of insurrectionary movements.

The text of this directive—for your information only—is enclosed.

By order:  
EISENLOHR

[Enclosure]

TOP SECRET

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, September 16, 1941.

The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht

WFSt/Abt. L (IV/Qu)

Nr. 002060/41 g. Kdos.

Subject: Communist insurrections in the occupied areas.

1. Since the start of the campaign against Soviet Russia, Communist insurrections have broken out everywhere in the areas occupied by Germany. The forms of the action range from propaganda measures and attacks against individual members of the Wehrmacht to open uprisings and widespread guerrilla warfare.

<sup>1</sup> This circular was sent to the Embassy in Italy, the Embassy in Paris, the Legations in Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania, the Plenipotentiary of the Reich for Greece, the Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry with the Military Commander in Serbia, the Field Office of the Foreign Ministry in Brussels, and to the Representative of the Foreign Ministry at the staff of the Reich Commissar for the occupied Netherlands.

It must be noted that what is involved here is a *mass movement, uniformly directed* by Moscow which must be charged with the responsibility even for separate incidents of seemingly minor importance in areas heretofore quiet.

In view of the many political and economic tensions in the occupied areas one must also expect *nationalistic and other circles* to exploit this opportunity in order to create difficulties for the German occupying power by joining the communist uprising.

In this way there is developing to an increasing degree a *danger to the German conduct of the war* which is first reflected in a general insecurity for the occupation forces and which has already led to the transfer of forces to the main centers of unrest.<sup>2</sup>

2. The *measures employed so far* for dealing with this general communist insurrectionary movement have *proved to be inadequate*.

The Führer has now ordered that *everywhere the harshest methods* are to be used in order to crush the movement within the shortest possible time.

Only in this manner, which has always been used in the history of the expansion of the power of great nations, can tranquility be restored.

3. In this context the following *guidelines* are to be observed:

a. In every *case* of rebellion against the German occupying power, no matter what the individual circumstances may be, *communist origins* must be assumed to be present.

b. In order to nip the agitation in the bud the harshest methods must be employed *immediately at the first occasion*, so as to make the authority of the occupying power prevail and to prevent any further spread. It must be kept in mind that a human life is often considered to be of no value in the countries concerned, and a deterrent effect can be attained only through unusual severity. In these cases in general the death penalty for 50 to 100 Communists must be considered an appropriate atonement for the life of a German soldier. The manner of execution must intensify the deterrent effect.

The reverse procedure of first employing relatively mild punishments and being satisfied with threatening more stringent measures as a warning is not in accord with these principles and is therefore not to be used.

c. The *political* relations between Germany and the countries concerned are not decisive for the military occupation authorities.

Rather it is to be considered, and also to be pointed up in propaganda, that severe measures also liberate the native population from the communist criminals and thereby benefit them.

Nor will skillful propaganda of this sort consequently have the result that the harsh measures against the Communists lead to undesirable repercussions among the well-disposed portion of the population.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 318.

d. *Native forces* of the countries will in general fail in the execution of such forcible measures. Reinforcing them involves increased danger to our own troops and must therefore not occur.

On the other hand much use can be made of premiums and rewards for the population in order to secure their assistance in a suitable manner.

e. In so far as in exceptional instances courts-martial are held in connections with communist uprisings or other offenses against the German occupying power, the most severe punishments are ordered.

The only real deterrent here is the death penalty. In particular acts of espionage, acts of sabotage and attempts to enter foreign armed forces must be punished with death as a matter of principle. Also in cases of illicit possession of weapons the death penalty is in general to be imposed.

4. The *Military Commanders in the occupied areas* will see that these principles are immediately made known to every military authority whose task it is to deal with Communist insurrectionary actions.<sup>3</sup>

KEITEL

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 312.

## No. 345

82/60638-39

*The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

WASHINGTON, September 21, 1941—10:50 a. m.

TOP SECRET

Received September 22—9:15 a. m.

No. 3285 of September 21

For OKW, Ausland; OKH, Attaché Department; RLM, Attaché Group.

The Japanese Military Attaché,<sup>1</sup> obviously acting on the basis of very urgent instructions, discussed with me the possibility of British or American military intervention in the event of a Japanese attack on Russia or of Japanese occupation of Thailand or the Netherlands Indies. He was obviously supposed to ascertain my views in detail and discuss with me the misgivings of Japan.

I adhered to the views set forth in my reports and reminded him that at present the British had no offensive power in the Far East and were glad not to be attacked. The United States of America would avoid a military intervention in the Far East in view of the

<sup>1</sup> Major General Saburo Isoda.

situation in Russia, the fear of a two-front war, the dispersal of her naval forces, and the unpreparedness of her land and air armaments as long as Japan refrained from attacking the Philippines and cutting off American imports of tin and rubber from the Netherlands Indies. One was a question of honor, the other a question of vital importance for the United States.

General Isoda, obviously because of new instructions which he brought with him in a long memorandum, was far more frank and receptive to my statements than previously. Reading constantly from his memorandum he discussed the following problems:

Japan naturally had to be prepared for a military intervention by the Americans, however unlikely it might be. The Japanese Navy was confident of victory if the American Navy should push forward into the western Pacific. The only danger was that the Americans might confine themselves to war on merchant shipping and privateering and keep their navy in Hawaii and on the American West Coast. I (clear text is missing here) that in such a case Japan on her part would cut off American imports from the Netherlands Indies. The United States would have to open the route to that area and use its navy to do so. America did not yet have adequate supplies of rubber and tin. For that reason she was trying to gain time and put Japan off.

These statements seemed to make a strong impression on Isoda. He said there was only one worry that still bothered him: Japan's dependence on maritime trade and the importation of raw materials. To be sure, America depended on the Far East for tin and rubber, but Japan was far more vulnerable.

The effect of the well-known American economic measures<sup>2</sup> was plainly evident.

I drew a comparison with Germany, which, likewise threatened by economic strangulation, was forcing her way into the open and threatening the enemy. Japan would be able to do likewise. Isoda seemed to be convinced on this point too. When I pointed out to him that one also had to discern the weaknesses of the enemy and that behind the glittering American façade there lay concealed great anxieties and uncertainty, he replied that he now understood why the central aim of American policy was to gain time. He now knew all he needed to know.

BÖTTICHER  
THOMSEN

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 239, footnote 2.

No. 346

129/121172-73

*The Minister in Portugal to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 2021 of September 17

LISBON, September 21, 1941—6:19 p. m.

Received September 22—2:45 a. m.

With reference to your telegram of September 13 No. 1465 to my telegram No. 1967<sup>1</sup> (group missing).

(1) The head of the Portuguese special mission, Julio Dantas, confirmed to me Salazar's statements<sup>2</sup> as well as those of the other members of the special mission,<sup>3</sup> according to which no official communication has been transmitted to the Portuguese Government by Brazil on the question of the Azores. As the member of the mission had already told me, however, unofficial discussions had been held repeatedly, from which the mission definitely got the impression that the Americans had promised the Brazilian Government to get in touch with it before any active intervention in the Portuguese island possessions.

(2) From a confidential talk which, at my suggestion, General-direktor Eltze held with the Under Secretary of War,<sup>4</sup> who is friendly with him, the following statements of the Under Secretary are worthy of attention:

The Portuguese Government is satisfied with the result of the special mission's trip. The Portuguese are trying to draw the Brazilians to them and would welcome it if Spain too would do the same thing with the Latin-American countries which have ties with it, in order to create in this way a unified Latin America and detach it from the United States. Unfortunately, Spain is not sufficiently concerned about Latin America just as she is not sufficiently pursuing a friendly policy toward Portugal. The relations of military men on the two sides are good and it is only unfortunate that similar cooperation is lacking in the political field. Germany can help much here to induce Spain to adopt a more positive attitude toward Portugal.

<sup>1</sup> Neither found.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram No. 1926 of Sept. 7 (1459/366798) Huene reported that Salazar had told him most emphatically that his Government had no information about Brazilian intentions to occupy the Azores or about alleged U.S.-Brazilian talks on that subject.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 271 and footnote 2.

<sup>4</sup> Fernando des Santos Costa.

(3) Summing up the observations made in Rio de Janeiro and Lisbon, the Portuguese-Brazilian-American problem presents itself at the present time as follows:

The Americans have exchanged notes with Brazil,<sup>5</sup> which has resulted in America's promise to Brazil to inform her in advance of any active measures to be taken. In return, Brazil, for her part, might have promised her own intervention in case Portugal wishes it. To be sure, Portugal has received no official information about these agreements, but the special mission was at least informed unofficially of the American promise. In this connection the Brazilians mentioned their rejection of American pressure and their ties with Portugal.

HUENE

<sup>5</sup> In telegram No. 1642 of Aug. 28 (1543/375678-79) Prüfer transmitted information on "U.S. notes" presented to Brazil concerning military cooperation between the two countries. The text of the agreement has been printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. vi, pp. 506-510.

### No. 347

205/143002-04

#### *The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT STOCKHOLM, September 22, 1941—7:10 p. m.  
No. 1498 of September 22 Received September 22—10:50 p. m.

With reference to my unnumbered written report of September 14.<sup>1</sup>

The result of the government committee negotiations concluded today<sup>2</sup> corresponds in the main to the line set forth in my above-mentioned report. The principal Swedish concession is a willingness in principle, within the framework of the trade negotiations beginning in Berlin at the end of October, to negotiate for 1942 about a credit operation to cover existing and anticipated clearing deficits and in the meantime help to bridge the acute difficulties by advance payments on future German deliveries.

The scale of this stop-gap action, which *to begin with* is limited to 100 million kronor, does, to be sure, fall short of what we would like. This ceiling on the amount, which is about 50 million kronor

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (2116/460510-13).

<sup>2</sup> The complex of documents termed the German-Swedish Economic Agreement of September 1941, signed by Walter on behalf of the German Government and by Hägglöf for Sweden is filmed on 2116/460522-35.

The conclusions of the negotiations of the German and Swedish governmental committees of June 1941, signed July 1 by Ludwig for Germany and by Hägglöf, Ha. Pol. VI 2111, are filmed on 319/192482-85.

The agreement of April 9, 1941: 319/192496.

less than what we need, as Sweden herself acknowledges in view of our further import requirements for 1941, but which from the Swedish viewpoint is regarded, not without reason, as a special accommodation is apparently attributable to current foreign-policy considerations. This is evident especially from the fact that the competent technical ministers (Minister of Finance and Minister of Commerce)<sup>3</sup> had not, according to our information, been opposed to raising the amount to 150 million kronor. Even the Foreign Minister, to whom the Minister and I had again explained the need of a large-scale solution on Saturday before the meeting of the Swedish Cabinet, did not in any way dispute the justification of our standpoint.

Nothing more could be obtained than a promise that a further increase in the advance payments would be discussed again at the impending negotiations in October, in connection with which the Swedes did not rule out such an increase.

Even the amount of 100 million kronor does, after all, constitute a decisive alleviation of the stringent clearing situation, at least for the next few months. Moreover, the Swedish Government is putting strong pressure on its lumber industry to offer deferred payment terms for additional German purchases of wood and cellulose, whereby such payments would for the most part not become due until the spring of 1942. The exceptionally stringent year 1941 would thereby be further relieved of these additional payments, amounting to about 30-40 million kronor.

The other questions negotiated, the most important of which was an agreement about a procedure for expediting and consolidating war-economy orders, were satisfactorily settled. The question of an Austrian conversion loan has been deferred.

An oral report is reserved for the beginning of October. Regarding the subcommittee mentioned in the written report of September 14, however, the following may be stated even now.

The subcommittee is to facilitate a speedy handling of the additional war-economy orders to be presented for discussion by the Germans, on as favorable terms as possible within the framework of the existing possibilities of payment and of Sweden's productive capability. The priorities to be established by the Germans for the individual orders are to be decided in Berlin.

In order to achieve this goal as soon as possible, which is primarily in the interest of Germany, the subcommittee must be ready to start work at the earliest possible date. The present situation not only disturbs the Swedish market but gets the Swedes into the habit of saying *no* to irregular requests and by bringing private Swedish firms into the picture makes it possible for the enemy intelligence service

<sup>3</sup> Minister of Finance, Dr. E. J. Wigforss; Minister of Commerce, J. F. Domö.

to find out where German shortages exist. I therefore consider it imperative that the subcommittee be appointed at once. In our opinion it must include the following:

(1) A member who has a grasp of the current trade-policy situation, especially in so far as payment possibilities are concerned. To fill this need I propose Commercial Attaché Behrens. I request that he also be appointed as a member of the government committee since Commercial Counselor Vinell of the Swedish Legation in Berlin has already been a member of the Swedish government committee for a long time.

(2) Another member, to be appointed by OKW—Military Economy and Armaments Office—who would represent the interests of the military economy. It would be this member's duty, whenever necessary, to call in representatives of the individual branches of the Wehrmacht as experts representing their interests. I would be pleased if this membership could be assigned to Colonel Drews. Please inform me immediately. I am going to Copenhagen this evening for negotiations with the Danes.<sup>4</sup>

WALTER  
WIED

<sup>4</sup> For the special German-Swedish agreement on war materials, see document No. 565.

For the German-Swedish general economic agreement of December 1941, see document No. 565 and footnote 4.

### No. 348

4669/E221458

*The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister*

Teletype Message

BERLIN, September 22, 1941.

I recommend the following telegraphic instruction for Washington in reply to their telegrams Nos. 3261<sup>1</sup> and 3262<sup>2</sup> regarding the *Robin Moor*:

Telegraphic instruction to Washington.

For the Chargé personally.

Please reply to the *Robin Moor* note as follows:

"Mr. Secretary of State: On September 19 you sent me a new note with reference to your communication of June 20 of this year<sup>3</sup> concerning the American steamer *Robin Moor*. I have the honor to reply that the two communications addressed to me are in form and tone not such as to lead to an appropriate reply by my Government. In this regard I refer to my note of June 25 [24]<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 337.

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 337, footnote 2.

<sup>3</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 657.

<sup>4</sup> See *ibid.*, footnote 8.

and must also observe that according to existing usage I am not the appropriate office for an American request addressed to my Government.

Accept, . . ."

End of note.

As I have rejected American actions in this matter earlier, in no case should receipt have been acknowledged or a telegram been sent en clair forwarding the contents of the new American note. Ribbentrop.

End of telegraphic instruction to Washington.<sup>5</sup>

An account of the events, drafted by Minister Eisenlohr, follows separately.<sup>6</sup>

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>5</sup> The actual instruction sent to Washington has not been found. The communication sent by Thomsen to the Secretary of State on Sept. 26 differed slightly from the text proposed in the document printed and did not have the part of the last sentence which follows the passage "my note of June 25 [24]." See Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1941, vol. v, p. 364.

<sup>6</sup> This last sentence is omitted from another copy of this draft instruction which has the date of Sept. 21 (38/26591). It is possible that the account by Eisenlohr to which reference is made here is identical with an unsigned memorandum of Sept. 22 (4669/E221460-62) addressed to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat, which deals with the background of the American note of Sept. 19.

### No. 349

8589/E603031-38

*Führer's Directive*

CHEFSACHE

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, September 22, 1941.

TOP SECRET MILITARY

The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht

No. 441578/WFSt/L(I Op.) g.K. Chefs.

By officer only

DIRECTIVE No. 36

I. Unusual terrain difficulties, inferior communications, and Soviet reinforcements which were constantly channeled to Karelia and Lapland were the reason that the weak forces of Headquarters, Army of Norway and the Fifth Air Fleet, despite outstanding performance and unflinching courage, have so far not succeeded in reaching the Murmansk Railway. Interference by the enemy with our sea lines of communication on the Arctic coast has further reduced the prospects of the Mountain Corps' reaching Murmansk this year.

Yet it was possible to tie down and draw away from the Russian main front considerable enemy forces, to push the enemy everywhere over the old Finnish borders and eliminate so far any threat to northern Finland, especially the nickel mines.

II. The ultimate aim of the operations in northern and central Finland, to destroy the enemy forces stationed around Murmansk and along the Murmansk railway, must be maintained.

The importance of this area is in the nickel mines, which are vital for the German conduct of the war. The enemy is aware of that importance. One can expect the English to establish themselves around Murmansk and Kandalaksha with strong air combat forces, perhaps even to operate with Canadian or Norwegian troops, and to bring to Murmansk war material on the largest scale. One must also expect air raids, even during the winter, on the nickel mines and the living quarters of the miners. Our own efforts must match the extent of this danger.

III. I therefore order:

(1) *Headquarters, Army of Norway*

(a) In the sector of the III (Finnish) Army Corps attacks shall be discontinued; forces released thereby are to be transferred to the XXXVI Army Corps.

(b) The XXXVI Army Corps shall make every preparation to resume the offensive in the direction of Kandalaksha in the first half of October, with the objective at least to cut off Murmansk from its rail connection before winter comes. Furthermore it should be examined whether a continuation of this offensive in winter offers better prospects for success than in the autumn.

The Finnish High Command will be requested to dispatch the 163rd Division in good time by rail via Rovaniemi to Headquarters, Army of Norway.

(c) The attack of the *Mountain Corps* in the direction of Murmansk is, for the time being, to be discontinued, and continued with the northern wing only so far as is needed to improve the position and deceive the enemy. In view of the tasks of the Navy, it is, however, necessary to seize at least the western part of the Rybachi Peninsula before the advent of winter and thereby to eliminate enemy activity by artillery and patrol craft against the entrance to the port of Liinahamari.

Reconnaissance and deliberations regarding such an attack shall begin immediately and the result is to be reported as soon as possible. Special weapons which are still to be brought up for use against land and sea targets and which are suitable for employment, will be allocated.

Whether the intentions of the Army Headquarters for the winter can be realized for leaving two reinforced mountain divisions in the area around Petsamo and for putting the 2nd Mountain Division into rest quarters in and around Rovaniemi, can be decided only later, but this remains desirable. The later relief of the 3rd Mountain Division by the 5th Mountain Division or a newly constituted mountain division is also contemplated.

(d) In order to shift the supply train of the Mountain Corps to the Arctic Highway, fleets of trucks will be bought and rented in

Sweden.<sup>1</sup> If this trucking capacity should not suffice, additional trucks will be ordered from the homeland.

(e) I have directed Minister Todt<sup>2</sup> to build as quickly as possible, with ruthless utilization of Russian prisoners of war, a field railway from Rovaniemi along the Arctic Highway to Petsamo.

(f) For the resumption of the offensive against Murmansk it is contemplated to bring in all the modern offensive weapons that are usable in the tundra.

(2) *Navy*

Its mission is to attack the enemy supply route to Murmansk even during the winter, especially in the period when the Luftwaffe is more or less at a standstill.

For this purpose a suitable auxiliary base is to be established for light naval craft—preferably in Petsamo Bay—if it is possible to seize the western portion of the Rybachi Peninsula. The supply service by sea to Kirkenes and Petsamo, even if interrupted at times, must again and again be attempted and reopened.

The coastal defense in Petsamo Fjord and the fjord at Kirkenes must be reinforced to an extent where it can deal with attacks even from heavy naval vessels.

(3) *Luftwaffe*

It is of decisive importance that the Fifth Air Force, with strong forces that are equipped for action in winter, should remain in the area of northern Norway.

These forces are to be apportioned in such a way that up to the beginning of the bad-weather season the intended continuation of the Kandalaksha operation and the seizure of the western part of the Rybachi Peninsula can effectively be supported. In the meanwhile the sea supply route and the rear communications of the enemy, as well as his supply and storage installations must be constantly harassed.

This struggle must be continued during the bad-weather season at every opportunity and be extended to include interference with enemy supply trains and construction of fortifications.

To that end our Luftwaffe ground organization must be retained as far as possible in the north Norwegian and Finnish theater and effectively made winterproof.

Protection against air raids must be secured for the quarters of our own troops, for their supply, but especially for the nickel mines and for the sea base to be established there.

<sup>1</sup> See documents Nos. 357 and 418.

<sup>2</sup> Fritz Todt, Reich Minister of Armaments and Munitions, Inspector General of German Highways.

The ground organization and supplies shall be replenished to such an extent that the resumption of the drive upon Murmansk at a given time can be supported with strongly reinforced air formation.<sup>3</sup>

ADOLF HITLER

<sup>3</sup> In a directive of Oct. 5 (8589/603053-56) Keitel issued special directions supplementing Directive No. 36 chiefly in regard to supplies and equipment.

No. 350

4828/E241289;  
4828/E241293-97

*The Minister in Croatia to the Foreign Ministry*

2458/m

September 22, 1941.

Subject: Conference concerning resettlement.

The conference concerning resettlement prescribed by the Foreign Ministry took place here today. A list of the participants<sup>1</sup> and the minutes are appended.

Point 4 of the minutes indicates the grave misgivings about continuing the resettlement at all. As the Führer has ordered the disturbances to be put down, the continuation of the resettlement must also be reviewed for that reason. Certainly, the resettlement creates unrest among the population in the Reich and in Croatia which in the long run will give a new impetus and new strength to the disturbances.

I request a decision in this matter, because I myself could not assume the responsibility for such a decision in view of the facts of the situation here.<sup>2</sup>

KASCHÉ

[Enclosure]

ZAGREB, September 22, 1941.

MINUTES OF THE CONFERENCE ON THE RESETTLEMENT FROM THE REICH TO CROATIA AND FROM CROATIA TO SERBIA, HELD ON SEPTEMBER 22, 1941, IN THE GERMAN LEGATION IN ZAGREB UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE GERMAN MINISTER

Offices represented: Foreign Ministry, Berlin  
Croatian Government  
German Legation, Zagreb  
Field Office of the Foreign Ministry in Belgrade

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (4828/E241290-92).

<sup>2</sup> See, further, document No. 360 and footnote 3.

Military Commander in Serbia  
Chief of the Civil Administration in Lower Styria  
Chief of the Civil Administration in Southern Carinthia  
Reich Commissar for the Consolidation of the German National Community  
Reich Security Main Office  
Einsatzgruppe of the SD in Serbia  
Liaison Leader, Zagreb with the Einsatzgruppe, Serbia

1. It was determined:

The numbers of Serbs and Slovenes resettled from the Reich to Croatia and from Croatia to Serbia, respectively, can be determined exactly only in so far as the railroad transports are concerned. The remaining figures can probably not be determined even subsequently with anything approaching accuracy. There is mutual agreement on the following figures:

The following were resettled:

<i>From the Reich to Croatia:</i>	persons
In railroad transports	9,343
Voluntarily, probably	17,000
	<hr/>
	26,343
<i>From Serbia to Croatia:</i>	
Croatians, voluntarily, probably	11,800
Slovenes, probably	500
	<hr/>
	12,300
A good estimate of those from Croatia resettled in Serbia by June 4, 1941, in the course of the agreed-upon resettlement	30,000
Serbs to Serbia	30,000
	<hr/>
	98,643

Serbia has received entrants:

In transports from Croatia up to August 25, 1941	12,436
In transports after August 25 up to September 20	1,674
According to counts in Serbia, probably	104,000
	<hr/>
	118,110

Furthermore, Serbia has received 6,720 Slovene resettlers from the Reich.

According to general data, the Croatian Government has reckoned the influx from Serbia, Macedonia, the Voivodina, Dalmatia, and the Reich at a figure of 95,000 without transports. Included in this are the figures recognized by both sides in the tabulation above.

The Military Commander, Serbia, stated that he was willing to accept in addition 3,200 Serbs who are now in the resettlement camps.

Implementation will be arranged between the Croatian Government and the Military Commander, Serbia.

The Croatian Government states that it is willing to accept up to 1,000 Slovene resettlers who are still in camps in the Reich. Implementation will be arranged between the Croatian Government and the Chief of the Civil Administration in Lower Styria.

Point 2.

The Croatian Government and the Military Commander in Serbia are in agreement that all shortcomings in regard to the taking along, and arbitrary removal, of money and valuables from one territory into the other and vice versa are to be considered as settled. No further claims will be made on this score by either side.

Point 3.

The Croatian Government and the Military Commander in Serbia are in agreement that in the future the resettlement of individual persons or of individual families can be carried out by mutual agreement. The request will be made through the Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry with the Military Commander in Belgrade and the German Legation in Zagreb. It will be carried out within the framework of the ordinary border traffic. The taking along of money and valuables will be mutually determined in the individual cases.

Point 4.

The third wave of the Slovenes to be resettled from the Reich to Croatia is estimated at:

from Lower Styria, up to 45,000 persons  
from Carinthia, up to 20,000 persons.

Lower Styria points out that this very autumn it must settle up to 20,000 Germans from Kočevje. For this reason it must undertake the corresponding removals. However, on account of the unrest connected with it, one could not remove this small number alone, but would have to remove the entire number of persons concerned.

The Croatian Government objects that the present political situation makes it impossible to receive this number. On the one hand these difficulties were caused by the special situation of the littoral under Italian military administration. On the other hand Croatia had to support a very large number of refugees from insurrectionary areas. Furthermore, Croatia could not settle any resettlers in these areas of insurrection. Settling them in Srem and Slavonia, the supply areas, which have an ethnically very mixed population, was not possible for the reason that the food supplies for the whole country would be most seriously endangered thereby.

The representative of the main office of the Reich Commissar for the Consolidation of the German National Community presented the views of his office. As matters stood he was of the opinion that in

these circumstances the decision could not be made in this conference.

Minister Kasche stated that he would report this and submit it for decision by the Reich Government and the Führer.

No. 351

197/88380-81

*Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, September 23, 1941.

U.St.S. Pol. No. 685

The arrests of Chilean nationals in Germany have shown the Chilean Government and the Chilean public that we know how to react to the arrests of Reich Germans, and so have not failed of their effect.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, the arrests, which are assumed by the Chilean public to be in the nature of reprisals, have aroused a great storm in Chile, so that the possibility of counterreprisals is to be reckoned with. At the same time it is to be remembered that there are some 40,000<sup>2</sup> Reich Germans in Chile, some of whom are in very good positions, while in Germany and the occupied territories there are only 100 Chileans, who are mainly students, artists, or tradesmen.

The Chilean Ambassador<sup>3</sup> also pointed out, in discussing the question here, that a Chilean national, a woman by the name of Meyer, had been in jail since January without having been brought to trial, and the steps taken by the Chilean Embassy had proved unavailing.<sup>4</sup> The case is well known here. It involves a Communist who is not to be released. The Chilean Ambassador also mentioned that in Paris some Jews of Chilean nationality had been imprisoned for some time, for whom, contrary to the instructions of his Government, he had not intervened here. They also should remain in prison.

It seems, in fact, that in view of the present situation, an elastic use of the reprisal system against Chile is in order, so that our actions do not lead to a further considerable deterioration in German-Chilean relations, and thus produce unfavorable effects on the trial of the Germans in Chile.

It is therefore proposed that the imprisoned Chileans be temporarily released, not all at once, but in the course of a number of days. Thereby the fiction will be maintained at the same time that it is not reprisals

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 202 and footnote 1. In a memorandum of Sept. 22 (197/88370-71) Woermann recorded a conversation with the Chilean Ambassador about these arrests and handed him a list of names of the arrested persons.

<sup>2</sup> The typed figure of 40,000 was crossed out on the original and 8,000 was inserted in ink.

<sup>3</sup> Tobias Barros Ortiz.

<sup>4</sup> Weizsäcker recorded this conversation in a memorandum of Sept. 20, St.S. 628 (197/88364).



that are involved, but that each individual case is being judged on its merits. It will then be necessary before coming to further decisions to wait and see whether the Chilean Ambassador is right in his opinion, that the Germans will soon be released on bail or acquitted.

Submitted herewith to the Reich Foreign Minister through the State Secretary, with the request for a decision.<sup>5</sup>

WOERMANN

<sup>5</sup> Ribbentrop's decision regarding Woermann's suggestion has not been found. In a memorandum of Oct. 1 (197/88392) Erdmannsdorff recorded Ribbentrop's instruction that the Chilean Ambassador be told that the German Government learned with satisfaction of the release of 13 German citizens in Chile and that the examination of the cases of the Chileans, arrested in France, would be expedited. In a memorandum of Oct. 3 (197/88398-99) Erdmannsdorff recorded that he had told the Chilean Ambassador that the four Chilean citizens who had been arrested anew in occupied France would be released.

### No. 352

265/173267-68

*The Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT ANKARA, September 24, 1941—12:50 a. m.  
No. 233 of September 23 Received September 24—12:15 p. m.  
Del. No. 31

With reference to Del. No. 26.<sup>1</sup>

Numan informed us that the Foreign Minister had had a 2-hour interview with the English Ambassador<sup>2</sup> today.<sup>3</sup> The English firmly insist that the chrome ore agreement with them be maintained to the fullest extent.<sup>4</sup> In this connection Numan informed us of the fact which was news to us that the chrome ore agreement bound Turkey not to exceed the production of 250,000 tons yearly and to deliver this total amount to England. Consequently Turkey would not be able to

<sup>1</sup> Ankara telegram No. 221 of Sept. 20 (4886/E253402); it reported an inquiry by Menemencioğlu whether a German reply regarding the delivery of heavy guns might be obtained by Sept. 22 when Saracoglu was scheduled to have a decisive conversation with the British Ambassador in the matter of chromium deliveries.

Ankara telegram No. 199 of Sept. 17 (265/173239-41) had reported Britain's insistence that Turkey renew with her the existing chromium ore contract which would expire in January 1942, and it mentioned the delivery of a British note on that matter.

<sup>2</sup> Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. III, pp. 952-953.

<sup>4</sup> For the background of the confidential Anglo-French-Turkish Chromium Agreement of Jan. 8, 1940, and subsequent developments, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1940*, vol. III, pp. 944-957. With a letter of transmittal of Dec. 19, 1941 (2361/488835-37) Papen sent a copy of the text of the agreement of Jan. 8, 1940, to the Foreign Ministry "for strictly confidential information."

furnish chromium ore to any third power without committing an overt breach of contract—which she could not do—unless the English yielded voluntarily part of their contractual rights. In reply to my question how it was possible at all that Turkey had concluded such an unusual contract with a limitation on production, Numan said that England had at that time asked the same terms for the seven most important Turkish export commodities as for chromium ore. Turkey had declined this, but later had to yield in the case of chromium ore for some special reasons.

England's economic performances in return were substantial. In the last few days another 50 guns had arrived.

Numan suggested that we conclude a treaty while mutually waiving [the demand for] delivery of chromium ore and of war material. I declined this and pointed out that I had stated from the very first day that deliveries of chromium ore were an essential component of of the entire treaty. Since the German Government regarded it as impossible that Turkey had really accepted such extensive commitments toward England, I had no definitive instructions whatever in the event that there should be no chromium ore deliveries at all. However, from my knowledge of the views of the higher authorities in Germany, I would assume that in the circumstances the German Government would probably prefer not to conclude any treaty at all. Numan listened to this statement without taking a position. He only remarked that I still owed him the reply from Berlin regarding the delivery of medium and heavy guns, which had been requested 10 days ago.<sup>5</sup> The conversation terminated on Numan's statement that the Foreign Minister would continue to put "pressure" on the English. The English Ambassador, however, seemed to have very strict instructions from his Government. The Turkish Government's insistence in this question had already produced considerable tension. The atmosphere of today's conversation had been quite unfriendly. When I pressed him, he promised a final reply by Thursday.

I once more request prompt telegraphic instructions in the matter of the deliveries of war material. Heavy guns are our last trump card, which I can make use of in the negotiations. Otherwise, as I predicted in telegram Del. No. 23 of September 19,<sup>6</sup> the only possibility is to break off the negotiations.

For the rest, the situation with regard to the negotiations has developed in accordance with telegram Del. No. 5 of September 9,<sup>7</sup> although the Turkish ability to deliver is on several important fields stated to be a good deal less than we had assumed.

CLODIUS

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 1.

<sup>6</sup> Not printed (2109/456509).

<sup>7</sup> Document No. 294.

## No. 353

260/170199-200

*The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry*

## Telegram

MOST URGENT

HELSINKI, September 24, 1941—3:45 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received September 24—5:00 p. m.

No. 997 of September 24

1) The day before yesterday the former Norwegian Minister<sup>1</sup> called on the Finnish Foreign Minister in order that he might, at the instruction of the Foreign Minister of the Norwegian Government in exile<sup>2</sup> (group garbled) to transmit a communication of English Foreign Minister Eden.<sup>3</sup>

2) In Eden's communication it is stated that Finland is waging aggressive war against England's ally, Russia. Since it is impossible to isolate the various wars from one another England now considers Finland as a partner of the Axis.

If Finland continues to invade purely Russian territory then England could be compelled to treat Finland as an open foe not only for the duration of the war but also at the peace negotiations.

England has always been friendly toward Finland although Finland (group apparently missing) Englishmen in that she expelled them from the country.<sup>4</sup> Despite this, England would be satisfied if Finland would soon again become a good friend. Essential for this is that Finland stop at the old boundary and end the war. Then a new relationship could develop between England and Finland with oversea trade<sup>5</sup> which, however, could not be complete as long as German troops remained in Finland.

3) In transmitting the communication the Norwegian Minister referred to the friendship which had always existed between Norway and Finland as well as to the danger that future operations of war might bring the possibility that Norwegians and Finns would stand against each other. Norway asked that the Finns not neglect to have consideration for the Norwegians. Norway and Finland had to think of the future and give consideration to the transfer of friendship to the time after the war. In conclusion the Minister emphasized

<sup>1</sup> Johan Michelet.

<sup>2</sup> Trygve Halvdan Lie.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram No. 1035 of Oct. 1 (260/170205-06) Blücher forwarded the text in English of the British communication. This note was released to the press in London on Sept. 24 (see *Keating's Contemporary Archives, 1940-1943*, p. 4820). Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. I, pp. 71-72.

<sup>4</sup> Apparently a reference to Finland's request for the withdrawal of the British Legation from Finland. See document No. 160.

<sup>5</sup> See vol. xxi of this series, document No. 643 and footnote 1, and document No. 160 in this volume.

the common Nordic interest. The Minister left an aide-mémoire regarding these accompanying remarks.<sup>6</sup>

4) The Foreign Minister informed only the President, the Minister President, and the Minister of Defense.<sup>7</sup>

5) The Foreign Minister considers this démarche as a new attempt of the English Government to reach an understanding with Finland after the earlier attempts by way of North America<sup>8</sup> and by radio had failed. The Foreign Minister will take his time with this matter. At present he is considering giving an answer and by the same channel. The answer would naturally be negative and give the chief weight to refuting the imputation of aggression and would emphasize the necessity of being guided in the war by strategic considerations.<sup>9</sup>

6) The Foreign Minister further believes that the English démarche is to be interpreted as a warning. If the English later were to undertake an expedition in the North they would be able to claim that they had warned Finland in time.

Finally the démarche also signifies a threat.

7) The Foreign Minister characterized the accompanying remarks of the Norwegian Minister as "soft soap" [*"Seifenschaum"*].

8) I told the Foreign Minister that the situation of England must be desperate if in spite of repeated rebuffs she strives to gain the good graces of small states. Furthermore it was incorrect for the former Norwegian Minister to have carried out the démarche. I urged that he decline to undertake an answer or else to make the answer through another channel.

9) I touched on the sore point that the Norwegian Legation remains here and I reserved the matter of coming back to it.

<sup>6</sup> In telegram No. 1043 of Oct. 1 (260/170207-08) Blücher forwarded a German translation of the text of the Norwegian aide-mémoire dated Sept. 22.

<sup>7</sup> In telegram No. 1060 of Oct. 4 (260/170212) Blücher reported that the latest draft of the Finnish reply was to be submitted to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Finnish Cabinet; that the reply for London would be sent by way of the Swedish Legation; and the text of the reply would be published next morning.

<sup>8</sup> This is apparently a reference to the conversation which Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles held with the Minister of Finland, Hjalmar J. Procopé on Aug. 18. See *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. I, pp. 56-57. Welles' memorandum of the conversation was released to the press in Washington on Nov. 7. See Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1941, vol. v, pp. 362-363. In telegram No. 3878 of Nov. 7 (260/170302-04) Thomsen forwarded the text of the memorandum to the Foreign Ministry.

In telegram No. 810 of Aug. 19 (260/170137) Blücher reported from Helsinki: "A Finn who has connections with England has heard from his friends there that if Finland would conclude peace with Russia now she could receive the boundaries which she demanded. Furthermore these boundaries would be guaranteed for all time by Russia and England." Blücher further reported that President Ryti did not take the matter earnestly, and that it was known only by him and those immediately concerned.

<sup>9</sup> In telegram 1064 of Oct. 6 (260/170215-16) Blücher reported that work on the reply to the English note was continuing but would probably be concluded that day. In telegram No. 1070 which was sent at 8:30 that evening (260/170217-19) Blücher forwarded the English text of the Finnish reply. In telegram No. 1071 of Oct. 7 (260/170220-22) he forwarded a German translation.

10) The Foreign Minister reckons strongly that there will shortly be an English landing in Murmansk.<sup>10</sup>

11) I asked for telegraphic instructions in case I should give the Foreign Minister particular suggestions for his answer.<sup>11</sup>

BLÜCHER

<sup>10</sup> In telegram No. 1111 of Oct. 13 (260/170236-37) Blücher reported the English text of the British reply, dated Oct. 11, which was delivered by the American Minister in Helsinki. Among other things it stated:

"The British Government wish to make it clear that their action so far from being designed merely to provide a pretext for an attack on Finland was on the contrary sincerely intended to indicate the means by which relations between Great Britain and Finland might be improved, while pointing out the very regrettable but inevitable consequences that must ensue, if the Finnish Government persisted in invading purely Soviet territory."

<sup>11</sup> Such instructions have not been found. See, further, document No. 461.

### No. 354

2281/481925-27

#### *The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

SECRET

ROME, September 24, 1941.

No. 1/41g.

Subject: Memorandum of an informant concerning the views of Count Ciano on the present situation.

The informant repeatedly mentioned in my reports has sent me a memorandum dated the 20th of this month which, according to him, contains the views of Count Ciano on the present situation. Since the informant has very close ties with the Palazzo Chigi, I have no doubt that these views are essentially, at any rate, correct. In translation, the memorandum reads as follows:

"The prospects for the development of the operations in Russia are better than in the preceding weeks. The war in Russia is, however, only a chapter in the great drama, and the chief problem is to put an end to it.

"From the military standpoint, the Germans have brought to an end in a brilliant manner the campaigns in Poland, in Norway, in the west, and in the Balkans. The war, however, on the whole, in addition to being a military matter, is also a political matter, in so far as it is necessary to fit it into the general situation. It cannot now be denied that Italy was right when she pointed out after the conference of Salzburg, that England would enter the war and that it was necessary also to count on the possibility of America's joining up with Great Britain.<sup>1</sup>

"Let us look at the situation as it actually presents itself:

"Today a decisive final victory seems impossible either for the one side or for the other. In order to conquer Germany and Italy, Eng-

land and America would have to land on the Continent a tremendous army, which would have to be in a position to defeat the 300 divisions that the Axis has at its disposal. But neither England nor America has such an armed force at her disposal, and even if either did, there is no merchant marine that would be in a position to transport and supply it. It is also to be considered that, in view of the attacks of the Luftwaffe, the landing would not be possible. The English are relying on subduing Germany with large-scale aerial attacks. But this is an illusion. It has been shown that the air attacks, terrible as they are, are not enough to subdue a nation that has the will to resist. Germany has at her disposal, moreover, large reserves of raw materials and it will not be possible to force her to capitulate by means of the blockade. It should be considered, furthermore, that Europe is beginning to tire of the war and that the difficulties will increase. The English propaganda is very active and is being conducted with faith in its ability to stir up disorders and revolts in the occupied territories. On the other hand, in order to win, Germany would have to land in England. But the prospects for the success of such an undertaking, which was not attempted in 1940 after Dunkirk, now appear very dubious, if the whole enterprise is not altogether impossible.

"Graziani was wrong in not marching against Egypt at the time when the English had only a small force there. The Germans were wrong in not attempting a landing in England at a time when a bold surprise attack might perhaps have ended the war successfully. Now the English feel secure because they have American aid. They are therefore determined to reject any compromise peace. Thus the war will be long and hard.

"It appears from all this that the war was badly planned politically, even if Germany has won many military victories. It was in the interest of England to expedite the outbreak of the war in order to surprise Germany at a time when her rearmament at sea was still incomplete. It was in the interest of Germany to put off the outbreak of the war in order to build up the necessary fleet with a sufficient number of cruisers and submarines. If Germany had entered the war with 300 or 400 submarines, the situation would have developed differently.

"These pessimistic thoughts are widely shared. The fortunate development of the most recent operations in Russia has, however, lifted morale considerably.

"Some people mention that it would be necessary to hold a 'pledge' in one's hand in order to force peace on England. This pledge might consist in the occupation of Suez and of Egypt, with the result that the British Empire would be divided into two parts and the British positions in Asia would be compromised as a result. But because of the difficulties in the Mediterranean the venture against Egypt could be attempted only through Turkey. The occupation of Egypt and the threat to the passage to India would be a sufficient pledge for

<sup>1</sup> See vol. VII of this series, document No. 43 and Editors' Note, p. 35.

forcing peace upon England. The situation would undergo a complete psychological and political transformation as a result."<sup>2</sup>

V. MACKENSEN

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *The Ciano Diaries*, entry for Nov. 6, 1941; Enno von Rintelen, *Mussolini als Bundesgenosse* (Tübingen and Stuttgart, 1951), p. 157.

No. 355

1517/372703-04

*The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

TOP SECRET

ROME, September 25, 1941—3:00 p. m.

No. 2315 of September 25

Received September 25—3:10 p. m.

Count Ciano just asked me to see him and, manifestly impressed, handed me a carbon copy of a report that arrived here through the Embassy in Berlin, concerning the treatment of Italian laborers. This I shall send you, in translation, by closed circuit coded teletype under No. 2316.<sup>1</sup>

Ciano told me in a very friendly manner that he had asked me to come to see him in order to request me, for my part, also, to use my influence in Berlin to the end that the matter be given the most serious consideration. Alfieri, too, was being informed accordingly and would make representations in the matter.<sup>2</sup> Ciano added that he had assumed the responsibility, which, after all, was not a light one, for withholding the report from the Duce.<sup>3</sup> The latter was, indeed, as I knew, quite sensitive in all matters affecting laborers employed in the Reich, and he, Ciano, would not like to trouble the Duce even more with a report which, as he put it, was really very serious. He could only express the hope that everything might be done in order that this sort of thing would not be repeated. If such things became known among the people, it would seriously prejudice sentiment. When I remarked that the circumstances perhaps had to be examined more closely, Ciano brought up the fact that an official report of an agency was involved.

I thanked Count Ciano for not bringing the matter to the attention of the Duce, but would consider it a very good thing, provided that the statements in the report prove to be correct, if I could very soon tell him something about the measures we have taken.<sup>4</sup>

MACKENSEN

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 356.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 281, footnote 2, and document No. 375.

<sup>3</sup> See, however, *The Ciano Diaries*, entries for Sept. 24 and 25, 1941.

<sup>4</sup> See, further, document No. 375 and footnote 2.

No. 356

1517/372705-07

*The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

TOP SECRET

ROME, September 25, 1941—5:56 p. m.

No. 2316 of September 25

Received September 25—6:50 p. m.

With reference to my telegraphic report No. 2315 of September 25,<sup>1</sup> I transmit to you herewith the text of the report concerning the treatment of Italian laborers, handed to me today by Count Ciano (translation):

"We direct your attention to a matter of great importance, regarding disciplinary measures taken against Italian laborers.

"The laborers who are guilty of crimes or misdemeanors of any kind whatever are arrested by the German police and handed over to the courts. There can be no objection to this. It is just that our workers should be punished if they are guilty of anything. It would be necessary, however, that all cases of arrest be brought to the attention of our commissioners (*delegazione*). The latter would have to be notified by the Royal Consulates, which, pursuant to the agreement reached in Rome, through exchange of notes between the Foreign Ministry and the Germany Embassy (October 31, 1935–January 10, 1936),<sup>2</sup> would have to be informed by the police of the arrest. As a result of this agreement, it was, in fact, made certain that the cases of arrest of (Italian) countrymen would be brought to the attention of the competent Royal Consulates. Accordingly, we recently directed the attention of our local agents to this matter in order that they might get in touch with the Royal Consulates, with a view to being informed in the individual case.

"A serious state of affairs is, however, the existence of concentration or forced labor camps, at various places in Germany, where, upon the mere denunciation by the firms or even of the supervisors, workers are sent, regardless of their nationality, who are guilty of breaches of discipline, such as leaving their place of work, idling on the job, attempting without permission to return to their native land, etc. This fact is serious because it is outside the purview of the law and therefore creates greater difficulty in learning about the individual case, in determining the facts, and examining the circumstances. The existence and the significance of the said conditions strike at the depths of our Latin sense of justice and the dignity of the civilized nations.

"The workers are sentenced to a forced stay of from 15 to 40 or 45 days, without having the slightest opportunity to offer a defense,

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 355.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

and naturally without our local agents' being informed of the incident.

"Protests of the commissioners to the police agencies, or to the German Labor Front have proved unavailing. When representations were made the reply was given that the German workers were treated in exactly the same way.

"We report below on some of the incidents reported by the Fifth Delegation in Wattenstedt, which occurred in the forced labor camp at Hallendorf (Camp 21). In this camp, the workers, who have become mere numbers and are clothed like penitentiary inmates, are employed at forced labor for over 16 hours, after having first been photographed and subjected to all sorts of physical examinations. Every pause in the work is punished with clubbings and beatings, and savage watchdogs are set on the workers, who are reduced to a pitiable condition by their bites. Laborers who became ill, and who asked for a medical examination, were beaten black and blue, so that they need a long period of hospitalization in order to recover.

"A few days ago, after making representations and protests, the deputy commissioner at Wattenstedt received from the Prefect of Police in Braunschweig permission to see the 12 Italian laborers forcibly detained in Camp 21. He succeeded in speaking with them at the Hallendorf police station and in showing the police officer what a condition these unfortunate people were in. The police officer himself could not conceal his indignation. In fact, our workers were in a pitiful condition as a result of the cudgelings and mistreatment they had suffered, and furthermore, they had bloody sores on their legs, from the bites of the dogs that had been set on them by the guards. There were also sick and fever-ridden people there, who were nevertheless compelled to perform labor that was beyond the strength of a person in ordinary condition.

"In view of what they found, there was nothing else for the Prefect of Police to do but to intervene personally to have the dogs removed, the sick put in the hospital, as well as to give the assurance that he had seen to it that the mistreatment and all abuse of power would cease and that he would punish the guilty persons.

"The request of the Fifth Delegation was granted, moreover, that it be informed of every case of commitment to a forced labor camp, in order that it might intervene in due time.

"We are informing your office of the foregoing in order that you may take suitable measures, and we would ask that you instruct us as to the further attitude we should take."<sup>3</sup>

MACKENSEN

<sup>3</sup> In telegram No. 2326 of Sept. 26 (1517/372709) Mackensen wired that the incidents in Germany as reported were so serious that he could not make any additional requests for Italian laborers; he would first need to be able to explain the remedial measures taken in Germany.

No. 357

205/148012-18

*The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT STOCKHOLM, September 25, 1941—12: 40 p. m.  
No. 1526 of September 25 Received September 25—2: 30 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 1521 of September 24.<sup>1</sup>

As an indication of the situation on the Swedish truck market I give you the following details in amplification of the remarks of yesterday by the Chief of the Commercial Department of the Swedish Foreign Ministry. Ministerialdirektor Hägglöf pointed out especially that the Swedish truck factory Volvo was committed for a certain percentage in work as an assembly plant, that is, the plant was assigned for producing new trucks from American parts. Unfortunately this important importation by way of Göteborg has been cut off by the English since August of this year on the grounds that Sweden delivered 500 trucks to Finland.<sup>2</sup> In other cases also England has stopped the importation through Göteborg by telegraph as quickly as Swedish deliveries to Finland became known. Thus for example a short time ago Sweden gave over to the Finnish Army 20 tons of chocolate from her own army reserve supplies whereupon the English immediately canceled the navicerts for chocolate, cocoa, etc. If then today Sweden would export rubber tires, further English restrictive measures in the field of rubber would be unavoidable. The Göteborg traffic,<sup>3</sup> however, is of great significance not only for the internal Swedish supply situation but also for Sweden's capacity to make deliveries to Germany and Finland. Up to now goods to the value of 117 million kronor have been imported by means of the Göteborg traffic and goods in value of 73 million kronor have been exported. M. Hägglöf at this point added as a personal remark that such figures showed how little suited a cutting off of the Göteborg traffic would be as a measure of retortion.<sup>4</sup> As regards the Swedish Army's supply of trucks, M. Hägglöf continued, there were completely inaccurate figures in circulation. It was indeed true that since the outbreak of the war the military authorities had collected the biggest possible motor

<sup>1</sup> In this telegram (205/143009-010) Wied assured the Foreign Ministry that the Legation was rendering full support to Count Beissel in his efforts to purchase trucks in Sweden.

See document No. 418 and footnote 1.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 41 and footnote 4.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 91.

<sup>4</sup> See documents Nos. 336 and 343.

vehicle park. But this was a matter of putting into service used vehicles, of which meanwhile a part had naturally become unusable or had broken down. Finally Sweden this year was faced with a completely new and comprehensive problem of transportation because of the insufficient importation of coal. Sweden on this account had to bring out from her own forests—often over impossible roads—wood supplies of hitherto unknown proportions. In the question of tires the possibility of erecting a buna factory in Sweden was touched on. M. Hägglöf was interested in this and the Legation would be grateful if an instruction could be issued as soon as possible in response to our report C 1325 of September 16.<sup>5</sup> Sweden is now making a nation-wide collection of used rubber goods. Possibly Swedish supplies of rubber could be stretched out through buna so that in this way a delivery of trucks with tires could be examined again on the Swedish side as a possibility.<sup>6</sup>

WIED

<sup>5</sup> Not found.<sup>6</sup> See document No. 98, footnote 6. See, further, document No. 418.

## No. 358

265/173281-84

*The Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department  
to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ANKARA, September 26, 1941—2:40 a. m.

No. 238 of September 25

Received September 26—11:10 a. m.

Del. No. 32 of July 20 [sic]

[With reference to] Del. No. 31.<sup>1</sup>

1. Numan expressed his warm gratitude for the promise to deliver heavy guns.<sup>2</sup> He would immediately inform the Minister President and Foreign Minister of this great gesture of friendship on the part of Germany.

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 352.<sup>2</sup> This presumably refers to a preliminary decision by the OKW in the matter of war material, which was forwarded to Ankara in Foreign Ministry telegram No. 56 of Sept 23 (4885/E253383) sent over the signature of Counselor Moraht of the Economic Policy Department. On condition of Turkish deliveries of chromium the OKW was willing to let Turkey have specific numbers of anti-tank guns, mountain guns, cannons and howitzers as well as other war material.

I told him that the German Government took it as a foregone conclusion that in view of this additional sacrifice the chromium ore question would be solved in our sense. Thereupon Numan, on my request, reiterated the reasons which made it impossible, without England's consent, to make deliveries to a third country, prior to January 8, 1943. The English had in the meanwhile presented another note in which without any political argument they put forth their incontestable legal position. The American Ambassador had also intervened, without being legally entitled to do so; this was pointed out to him.<sup>3</sup> I repeated that if we should be left with the sole possibility of either making a treaty without chromium ore and war material, or of not concluding any treaty, the German Government would presumably decide to forego the treaty. I, in any case, favored the second alternative. Numan asked me to explain to my Government once more that the Turkish Government was in a dead-end street and that, notwithstanding its urgent desire to arrive at a result with us, it could, in the face of plain legal provisions, not act otherwise. The Turkish Government was willing to supply us after January 8, 1943, with any desired quantity of chromium ore. It was further willing to stockpile the quantity earmarked for Germany from the very beginning of the [present] treaty period, so that after January 8, 1943, it could be promptly shipped. As Germany—according to his information—was sufficiently supplied at least until the end of 1942, it would be the same to us if we received the aggregate quantity for the period of the treaty only at the beginning of 1943. (I want to remark in this connection that we have envisaged the duration of the treaty as being about a year and a half because of the long-term nature of the German deliveries.)

When I maintained a negative attitude, Numan said the Turkish Government was finally prepared to conclude with us a treaty for several years providing for large deliveries of chromium from January 1943 on. I replied that for the sake of fairness, at least to some extent, we would then, like England, have to get the entire output over three years. Numan, of course, answered that Turkey would never enter into such an exclusive treaty. He was, however, willing to make public the fact that our treaty also provided for substantial deliveries of chromium ore. Numan further promised to increase in 1942 the deliveries of copper from the previously offered 6,000 tons

<sup>3</sup> For Ambassador MacMurray's discussion of this matter with the Turkish Foreign Minister on Sept. 23, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. III, pp. 950-951.

to 12,000 tons, as compensation for the omission of chrome ore deliveries. In addition he would do his utmost to comply with the German demands for increases in olive oil and cotton.

Numan conducted the whole discussion very much with a view to the political aspects. He pointed out informally how undesirable it would be for both countries to break off negotiations. We would in any case gain more if through a generous and friendly attitude we would continue to win Turkey over. He repeatedly mentioned that part of the world press would turn the rupture into a vast propaganda campaign. I replied that I was indifferent to the propaganda aspect of the matter. The English press would in any circumstances attempt to minimize the result; the only thing which mattered in the end was to maintain a clear and correct line of policy between Turkey and Germany.

I never before heard Numan insist on any question in such urging, almost begging, terms. Again and again he reverted to the great political and psychological importance of the conclusion of the big agreement precisely at this moment. The Turkish Government would, if we should want it, play up the significant scope of the agreement entirely as we would want it. But despite its desire to comply with the German requests it could not sacrifice its honor by breaking its word. I was aware, he said, how urgently Turkey needed aircraft, but if Germany tomorrow should deliver 250 military aircraft, Turkey could still not give a single ton of chromium ore for it at the moment. I maintained my negative attitude up to the end of the conversation, but avoided, in accord with the Ambassador, a final rejection and promised to report again to my Government.

2. Please let me have telegraphic instructions at the earliest.<sup>4</sup> I do not consider it right to conclude a treaty of lesser scope without war material. Hence there remains the possibility of either breaking off negotiations or of accepting Numan's last offer and securing the chromium ore supplies at least from January 1943 on, thus excluding the English to a large extent. Because heavy guns will in any case not be available for delivery until about that time, the demand of the OKW for item by item delivery would be observed with regard to this principal part. To be sure, other war material would have to be supplied as soon as possible in return for copper and guaranteed supplies of strategic material. The representative of the Reich Ministry of Economics thinks that from the economic point of view it is preferable to conclude a treaty that includes war material, even if the chromium ore will not be available until January 1943.

CLODIUS

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 366, footnote 3.

No. 359

1680/395849-50

*The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

SECRET

No. 1900 of September 26

TOKYO, September 26, 1941—11:10 a. m.

Received September 26—12:00 midnight.

Pol. VIII 7628 g.

With reference to my telegram No. 1850 of September 24 [20].<sup>1</sup>

Deputy Foreign Minister Amau today handed me the statement which the Japanese Government is planning to send to the American Government. It reads as follows:<sup>2</sup>

"The Imperial Japanese Government have repeatedly affirmed to the American Government that the aim of the Tripartite Pact is to contribute towards the prevention of a further extension of the European war. Should, however, the recent tension in the German-American relations suffer aggravation, there would arise a distinct danger of a war between the two powers, a state of affairs over which Japan, as a signatory to the Tripartite Pact, naturally can't help to entertain a grave concern.

"Accordingly, in their sincere desire that not only the American relations will cease further deterioration but the prevailing tension will also be alleviated as quickly as possible, the Japanese Government are now requesting the earnest consideration of the American Government."

Without going specifically into the involved form of the statement I told Amau that it seemed doubtful to me whether the intended objective, namely keeping the United States from further aggressive action, would be substantially promoted by it. I asked to be informed whether the Japanese Government had decided to send this statement to the American Government and said I would be grateful for information about the time and place of transmittal. Amau confirmed that the wording was drawn up on the basis of a Government decision. The time had not yet been set; a suitable occasion would be used for it. I replied to Amau that a statement would be useful only if it were delivered immediately, since the situation might change at any moment. In these circumstances it would perhaps be advisable

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 342.

<sup>2</sup> The following passages enclosed within quotation marks are in English in the original.

to hand it to Ambassador Grew. Amau promised to transmit my request and indicated that a reply would be made.<sup>3</sup>

In reply to my question about the state of American-Japanese negotiations Amau said that they would now be conducted partly in Tokyo, with Ambassador Grew serving as an intermediary. He could assure me that since our last talk on September 20 no further development had occurred and no progress had been made. Unfortunately, he could not give me any information about details.

In reply to my question whether the United States was aiming at a detailed solution of the China question but Japan was unwilling because of existing difficulties to take up that question in detail, he made the remark that this described the situation rather accurately.

Orr

<sup>3</sup> Appended to this document is a minute of Oct. 14 (1680/395852) by Counselor Sonnleithner of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat which reads as follows:

"The Foreign Minister requests that it be ascertained whether the statement by the Japanese Government anticipated in telegram No. 1900 of Sept. 26 was actually given to the American Government."

It appears from intercepts of Japanese messages that the text of the Japanese statement as printed here was actually sent to Washington in an instruction which Toyoda sent to Washington on Oct. 16. A parallel instruction of the same day explained why Japan did not wish to present a stronger statement for which the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo were pressing. See *Pearl Harbor Attack: Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*, 79th Cong., 1st sess., pt. 12, Joint Committee Exhibits Nos. 1-6, pp. 71-72; see also *Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941*, vol. II, p. 686, and *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (New York, 1948), vol. II, p. 1034.

For further German efforts in the matter see document No. 434, and footnote 1.

### No. 360

116/67044

*SS-Obergruppenführer Heydrich to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop*

Telegram en clair

Unnumbered

BERLIN, September 26, 1941—1: 25 p. m.

Received September 26—2: 45 p. m.

MY DEAR FOREIGN MINISTER: The resettlement work in the southeast has come to a standstill at the present moment.<sup>1</sup> Croatia has so far deported 118,110 persons in legal and illegal transports to Serbia, whereas the Croatians have so far taken only 26,341 persons from the Reich. In addition there are 12,300 persons from Serbia whom Croatia accepted. In accordance with the order of the Reichsführer SS [as] Reich Commissar for the Consolidation of the German National Community, 12,000 Volksdeutsche from Kočevje are supposed to be

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 350.

resettled in Lower Styria beginning October 15, 1941. To do this, the evacuation of about 45,000 Slovenes is absolutely necessary. In consideration of its internal situation the Croatian Government refuses to accept these people who are to be evacuated. This is jeopardizing the settlement within the country of the Volksdeutsche from Kočevje as ordered by the Führer.<sup>2</sup> Please exert influence on the Croatian Government so that this absolutely necessary settlement within the country of these Volksdeutsche can be concluded before the start of winter.<sup>3</sup> Unfortunately from here I can see no way of avoiding the issue, particularly since the troublesome inclusion of Croatia in the over-all work of resettlement in the southeast, which I opposed at the time, was brought about at the time by Minister Kasche.

Heil Hitler!

HEYDRICH

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 187.

<sup>3</sup> On Oct. 13 Luther informed the Legation in Zagreb in telegram No. 1141 (4828/E241298) that "in accordance with a decision made by the Reichsführer SS it is not necessary at the present moment to urge the Croatian Government to take into Croatia 38,000 Slovenes from Lower Styria."

### No. 361

265/173285-92

*Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

U.St.S.Pol. Nr. 897

BERLIN, September 26, 1941.

I. The person of Nuri.

I had talks on September 11, 18, and 25 with Nuri Pasha, the champion of the Pan-Turanian movement.<sup>1</sup> The second of these talks took place in the form of a lunch together with Ambassador von Papen and Counselor of Embassy Hilger.

Regarding the person of Nuri it should be said in advance that he spent his whole youth under the spell of his brother, Enver Pasha. The latter was himself a champion of the Pan-Turanian movement. Enver, after serving Moscow temporarily subsequent to the Turkish collapse, died in the fight against the Bolsheviks in Turkestan in 1921.

Nuri Pasha also fought as an officer in Tripoli against Italy, and in the World War in the Caucasus against the Russians. He is in his early fifties and is an obviously prosperous factory owner in Turkey. His Pan-Turanian ideas have a certain romantic flavor in memory of Enver Pasha.

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 298.



## II. The Pan-Turanian Idea.

The ideas which Nuri Pasha developed are in general known from the reports of the Embassy in Ankara<sup>2</sup> and can be summarized as follows:

1. The Pan-Turanian movement wishes to create independent states for the Turkic peoples living outside the territory of present-day Turkey. Thus, these areas are not to be annexed by Turkey, aside from certain frontier rectifications, but are to receive their political direction from Turkey.

2. According to Nuri Pasha this involves mainly ethnic groups residing in the territory of the present *Soviet Union*. Of present Soviet territories claim is laid primarily to Azerbaidzhan and Dagestan north of it, thus not all of Transcaucasia; also the Crimea, as well as by and large the area between the Volga and the Urals, stretching northwards to the Soviet Tatar Republic (capital: Kazan). In this connection it is recognized that some of these areas have ethnic Turkic majorities, and that some have minorities. Furthermore, essentially all of ancient Turkestan is included in this area, inclusive of the western portion of former Eastern Turkestan, now Sinkiang, which belongs *formally to China* and is now under Soviet influence. Furthermore Nuri claims the northwestern portion of *Iran* down to Hamadan as being ethnically Turkic, and a border top of the Caspian Sea along the old Soviet border. Finally, of *Iraq* territory the area of Kirkuk and Mosul is included as well as a strip of Syria.

A map sketch<sup>1</sup> regarding the area thus circumscribed is appended.<sup>3</sup>

Furthermore I append map 2, showing the gradual annexation of Turkestan and Transcaucasia by Russia in the nineteenth century.<sup>3</sup>

3. In answer to the objection that in accordance with Ataturk's policy Turkey wanted to remain a purely national state and, aside from certain frontier rectifications, did not pursue any objectives outside her present national territory, Nuri said that this had only been a policy of expediency in the mind of Ataturk, the motive of which had been fear of the Soviet Union. [By going] together with Germany and in particular with the present prospect of smashing the Soviet Union this motive disappeared. Furthermore, as mentioned, the Turkish ambitions were not of a territorial nature.

4. In reply to the objection that first the Turkish Government and the Turkish people had to be won over to these ideas, Nuri said that the entire Turkish people could be won over for this and that at the proper moment a government would surely come to power which would adopt these ideas. For the rest Nuri stressed in response to a remark to that effect that he was not acting now, either, behind the back of the Turkish Government; on the contrary, before his departure for Berlin he had informed the Minister President.<sup>4</sup>

5. Nuri answered the question about the circle of persons in Turkey who are involved, by stating that large portions of the Army were in favor of these ideas; in particular he mentioned the Com-

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 194, footnote 5.

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

<sup>4</sup> Refik Saydam.

manding General at the Caucasus front who is closely related to him, and who could play a decisive role at the proper time.

## III. Evaluation.

In evaluating the question whether support for the Pan-Turanian ideas is in the German interest one must in my opinion distinguish between the more tactical interest at the moment and the interest in a really practical implementation.

As far as the momentary interest is concerned, it is obvious that Turkey can realize the Pan-Turanian ideas only in an alliance with Germany, so that a Turkey with a Pan-Turanian orientation would of necessity have to be a Turkey with pro-German orientation. The Pan-Turanian ideas at the same time represent a Turkish imperialism at the expense of the Soviet Union, so that to that extent, too, our game would be played. All of this speaks in favor of treating the Pan-Turanian ideas cautiously at least for the moment, giving the necessary consideration to the divergent attitude of the present Turkish Government.

The creation of new ethnically Turkic states which are satellites of Turkey must be judged by other criteria. In so doing I shall leave out of consideration the plans which play a part in the Pan-Turanian ideas, of an actual enlargement of Turkish territory possibly by [acquisition] of the oil region of Mosul or of the Transcaucasian area with Batum and Baku; recovery of the Mosul region should certainly not be encouraged from the standpoint of our oil interests but would perhaps be tolerable, whereas it would be entirely out of the question to give the area of Batum and Baku into Turkish hands.

For the rest there is in my opinion a decisive difference between the area in the Caucasus and between the Volga and the Urals intermingled with Turkic peoples, on the one hand, and the area of Turkestan east of the Caspian Sea. After the defeat of the Soviet Union large areas of the old Russian Empire ought to come under German and not foreign influence. It would not be in our interest if states were created in Transcaucasia and between the Volga and the Urals which would be politically aligned with Turkey and whose attitude would thus depend upon the vicissitudes of the policy of Turkey, who will certainly continue to be wooed by all the powers. The case of Turkestan is different. If Russia has been decisively weakened while the English have not been driven out of India, English imperialism will certainly seek to seize these economically promising areas (cotton) that have only partially been opened up by the Turko-Siberian railway. These areas will not belong to Germany's sphere of influence even in the future, if only on account of their geographic location. Consequently, in my opinion we should

encourage here the creation of ethnically Turkic states aligned with Turkey.

#### IV. Immediate program.

Nuri Pasha expressed a few wishes which he felt could be realized at once:

a. The Russian prisoners of war of Turkic ethnic origin and in addition all those who are Mohammedans should be separated out and brought together in a special camp on the model of the camp near Wünstorf in the last World War. Later on, one could examine whether a separate combat unit for the Pan-Turanian movement could be formed out of these prisoners of war.

According to information from the Chief of the Prisoner of War Department of the OKW, Reichsleiter Rosenberg has already addressed a request of this kind to the OKW.<sup>5</sup> At the moment the OKW cannot as yet carry out such a separation. However, as soon as its hands have become somewhat freer, it intends to proceed to the separation of the Russian prisoners of war according to ethnic and racial origin. It is to be expected that the OKW will comply in so far as it is possible with a request by the Foreign Ministry for separation of the ethnically Turkic and Mohammedan Russian prisoners of war.

Authorization is requested for taking up the matter officially with the OKW. Doubtless several months will pass before it is carried through.

b. Nuri Pasha desires that the administration of areas inhabited by Turkic peoples be given to the indigenous Turkic and Mohammedan population; whereby in the present situation the Crimea could be considered the first area of that sort.

It is suggested that this wish be passed on to the OKW in the form that in enlisting the local population in the administration of the territories under military occupation the ethnically Turkic and Mohammedan population be given adequate consideration; and a decision is requested as to whether we should also get in touch with Reichsminister Rosenberg in this matter through Senior Counselor Grosskopf.

A decision in accordance with points a and b would not result in any commitment to the Pan-Turanian ideas of Nuri Pasha. The separation of the Mohammedan prisoners of war and the enlistment of the Mohammedan population in the occupied eastern territories is very generally to be recommended on the basis of our policy toward Islam and the Orient.

<sup>5</sup> Albrecht's memorandum of Sept. 24 (1047/311680) records that Lt. Col. Breyer, Chief of the Prisoner of War Department of OKW, had received from Rosenberg the request that the ethnic Turkic captives be separated out from the Russian prisoners of war.

c. Nuri Pasha wishes himself to play an active role in the Pan-Turanian movement. He visualizes this in such a way that after establishment of camps for the Mohammedan and ethnically Turkic prisoners of war he will somehow participate in sifting and organizing the human material there. He assumes that he could do this with the tacit toleration of the Turkish Government. Authorization is requested first to enter into a nonbinding exchange of ideas in this respect with the OKW also.

Nuri Pasha furthermore envisages the establishment of a central office for a Pan-Turanian propaganda in Berlin, in which he and his friends would participate. This question should be postponed for the time being.

Nuri Pasha, who is somewhat disappointed that we are not entering his camp with flying colors, will probably stay in Berlin about another week and then await further decisions in Turkey.

Maps have for the time being been appended only to the copies for the Foreign Minister and Political Division VII.<sup>6</sup>

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary.<sup>7</sup>

WOERMANN

<sup>6</sup> See footnote 3.

<sup>7</sup> Unsigned marginal note: "I believe that in the case of a further German advance toward the Caucasus Nuri Pasha would render us good service there."

### No. 362

4865/E249552-61

*The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

SECRET

ROME, September 27, 1941.

150/41 g.

Subject: Resettlement of the South Tirolese.

With reference to your telegraphic instruction of September 20-No. 2445.<sup>1</sup>

In accordance with instructions I am hereby reporting on the present status of the South Tirolese resettlement question and the problems that will face the German Commissioner, now to be appointed. Since, pursuant to the orders given,<sup>2</sup> I have thus far not taken up the problem of South Tirol in my reports, my statements, except for the political observations that can be made here in Rome and my frequent discussions with Minister Bene and SS-Gruppenführer Greifelt, are

<sup>1</sup> In this telegram (4865/E249516) Rintelen relayed Ribbentrop's request for a written report by Mackensen on the status of the resettlement problem.

<sup>2</sup> These orders have not been found.

based in the main on the reports of the former and [those] of Consul General Müller, which have been regularly sent to the Embassy for information.<sup>3</sup>

#### 1. *The mood in South Tirol.*

Among the people of the South Tirol the view has become established during the past year or so, especially on account of military events, that we are no longer seriously pushing the transfer of the German South Tirolese, particularly so far as the land-owning population is concerned, because the region will, after all, return to Germany when the war is over. The view is maintained with great stubbornness that, if only out of gratitude for German military aid, the Duce will give up the South Tirol after the war. Such ideas are also to a high degree fostered by the Reich Germans entering and passing through from Germany, including members of the Wehrmacht. Counterinfluences from responsible German quarters have been practically without effect.

Among the Italian authorities, up to the Duce, these rumors have caused an extraordinary amount of ill feeling. I cannot help noting again and again that here in Rome even the higher authorities, although probably not the Duce as yet, attach an exaggerated importance to them. That such rumors reach even him, I know from statements by Anfuso, who spoke to me some time ago about such and other rumors prejudicial to our relations, which are circulating in the Reich according to the reports of the Italian Missions there.<sup>4</sup>

#### 2. *Attitude of the Italians.*

In the main the attitude of the Italians in the question of the South Tirol is at present determined by two factors. On the one hand the Duce, as confirmed only very recently with unmistakable clearness by Under State Secretary Buffarini, holds firmly to the principle of a radical ethnic solution, i.e., the resettlement of all racial-German inhabitants of the South Tirol. In line with that is the attitude of the central agencies in Rome, which are urging that the resettlement be expedited. Perhaps they also see herein a means of counteracting the undesirable effect of the above-mentioned rumors.

On the other hand, it is the wish of the agencies responsible for the future development of the treaty areas to preserve a suitable economic basis for the provinces—a wish which on many points cannot be brought into harmony with the ethnic solution. Italy does, to be sure, have the necessary number of people who can settle the towns and the regions suitable for wine and fruit growing in the South Tirol, but there are almost no people who could replace the emigrating German

mountain farmers, who play a very important role in the total economy of the South Tirol. For that reason there has developed a powerful propaganda, which set in already during the option period<sup>5</sup> for the purpose of making the people opt for Italy and remain in the country and which even today is very actively trying to picture to the German optants their future in the Reich in an unfavorable light but making golden promises to "stay-putters." The practical effect of this attitude is seen in the numerous difficulties caused by the local authorities in the implementation of the administrative resettlement measures. It must be noted that the orders from Rome looking toward the carrying out of the radical ethnic solution have thus far caused little change in this attitude of the provincial authorities. A not inconsiderable role in this attitude is played by the still living tradition of the Irredentist nationality struggle, which has the effect that the Italian authorities charged with carrying out the resettlement still retain their dislike for the South Tirolese German community and treat the interests of the South Tirolese optants in a manner which is far from friendly or even just.

In the latest discussions which Minister Bene and SS-Gruppenführer Greifelt had in Rome with Under State Secretary Buffarini it was again possible, to be sure, to eliminate a large part of the individual administrative difficulties for the present; it must be expected, however, that despite the Italian promises given in these discussions troubles will come up again and again locally. Some improvement, however, can be expected from the fact that the Italian Government now intends to appoint a special high commissioner for all resettlement questions and that his functions will no longer be combined with the local Italian interests of the provincial agencies as they have been in the past in the person of the Prefect of Bolzano.<sup>6</sup>

Without doubt, however, the attitude of the local Italian agencies of the South Tirol, which aims to delay the resettlement, will continue to encumber political relations in general between Germany and Italy. As things are now, this could be most effectively counteracted if the German side would seriously and vigorously carry out the principle of the radical ethnic solution, i.e., if the German side would constantly do everything in order actually to get a substantial number of South Tirolese optants out of the South Tirol regularly and settle them in Reich territory. In view of the fact that the future settlement area cannot yet be designated this, to begin with, will be possible only within certain limits.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Regarding the option see vol. VIII of this series, document No. 382, footnote 5.

<sup>6</sup> See document No. 175, footnote 7.

<sup>7</sup> See vol. XI of this series, document No. 291 and footnote 1.

<sup>3</sup> Some of these have been filmed on serial 4865.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *The Ciano Diaries*, entries for June 30, July 6, and July 13, 1941.

### 3. *Carrying out of the resettlement.*

Because of numerous technical difficulties the agencies concerned have not been able during the last few months to transfer to Germany more than 500 persons a month permanently. Since the head of the Repatriation Agency, Dr. Luig, in his audience with the Duce about 2 years ago mentioned the figure 250 persons per day, i.e., about 7,500 per month, as the average figure for the resettlement, all the Italian agencies, which constantly revert to this number, have received the impression that the German side is deliberately delaying the execution of the resettlement. In connection with the above-mentioned rumors the intermediate and lower Italian agencies therefore formed the opinion—erroneous but much exploited by propaganda—that Germany thereby aims to have as many South Tirolese in the country as possible at the end of the war in order to facilitate a transfer of the country to Germany.

The tension in this respect has been somewhat relaxed for the time being by the promise made to the Italians in the discussions held in August between Minister Bene and SS-Gruppenführer Greifelt on the one hand and Under State Secretary Buffarini on the other, to the effect that in the next 6 months about 16,000 persons would be resettled.<sup>8</sup> The main contingent is to be formed by the families of the recalled officials and of those compelled to leave, numbering about 5,000 persons; the separate peasant groups from Luserne, Fersental, Calantal, and Grödnertal, consisting of about 7,600 persons; and Reich Germans, numbering about 1,200 persons.

This program can be carried out if new, separate settlement areas in Greater Germany can be provided at least for these individual peasant groups forming the main contingent and the resettlement can be carried out directly from farm to farm. From what I have heard, the plan is to find a place for these groups in the Gau of Carinthia. If it should not be possible to settle these groups permanently in the Reich in the above-mentioned manner during the next 6 months, considerable additional difficulties must be expected. For, in the opinion of all those concerned, the foregoing groups are suitable only for direct resettlement in entire units. Quarters in a reception camp would, I am told, lead to the most serious friction and make the other peasant groups of the South Tirol far less willing to leave. This is all the more so because the considerable propaganda of the "stay-putters" and of the local Italian agencies, which is still in evidence, would make extraordinary gains if it should not be possible to carry out smoothly the permanent resettlement of these groups, which are regarded as a test case. All details, such as, e.g., the dispatch of advance parties of the peasants to be resettled, the prep-

<sup>8</sup> See document No. 175.

aration of the farms to be occupied, etc., must be handled with special care, particularly in this part of the resettlement action. The importance of these details is so great—and this cannot be emphasized often enough—especially because the people of the South Tirol consider the transfer an exceedingly heavy sacrifice and the thought of the future oppresses the entire country like a nightmare. The peasant population in particular is imbued to the core with love of the homeland and its beauties and is attached to its ancestral land with exceedingly strong bonds.

An organizational difficulty which cannot remain unmentioned in this connection is the great personnel expansion, described to me by the Germans and Italians, which has taken place in the German agencies set up in Bolzano for the implementation of the resettlement. The South Tirolese as well as the Italians complain that the number of experts employed in the South Tirol is out of all proportion to the results of their work. In view of the narrow provincialism of conditions in Bolzano such a defect, which would be insignificant in a larger framework, acquires a political importance that should not be underestimated.

Since I am not familiar with details, I am not in a position to make any useful suggestions for changes. I assume, however, that Consul General Mayr will take up this question, too, soon after entering upon the duties of his office.<sup>9</sup>

### 4. *Duties of the German Commissioner for the South Tirol.*

The German Commissioner in Bolzano, as the central authority with exclusive power, will have the duty of discussing all the questions set forth above with his opposite number, the Italian Commissioner,<sup>10</sup> and of finding a solution for them. His duties will, furthermore, include the handling and solution of all the questions—also those of a fundamental nature that have been left open in the various German-Italian agreements on the implementation of the resettlement.

In the treaty area there are still about 150,000 people opting for Germany; from this it follows that hardly any sphere of state or communal activity can be without interest to the Commissioner. Mention may be made here of questions like unequal allocation of rationed goods, inequality in the handling of business and import licenses, discrimination in the export quotas allocated for fruit and wine, discrimination in tax matters and in public welfare, trespasses by military, police, and municipal authorities, etc.

The fact that the whole face of the province of Bolzano takes on a new appearance because of the resettlement has had the further

<sup>9</sup> See document No. 175, footnote 7.

<sup>10</sup> In telegram No. 2525 of Oct. 13 (4865/E249580-83) Mackensen reported that Agostino Podestà, Prefect of Bolzano, would be nominated as the Italian High Commissioner.

result that a number of duties of a purely consular nature have already, because of their inevitable effect on the work of resettlement, been transferred from the German Consulate in Bolzano to the office of Minister Bene. The following, for example, may be mentioned; the supervision of tourist trade from Germany, the German school system, the care of the numerous South Tirolese members of the German Wehrmacht, the special questions arising out of the large number of German military transports, etc.

For the proper solution of these and other problems it is necessary that the German and Italian Commissioners be empowered by the German and Italian sides to carry on correspondence and discussions on all questions connected with the resettlement and have authority to transfer their negotiating powers for reasons of expediency to other agencies. This has already been done in the case of the negotiations of the German group of the Property Appraisal Commission with the Italian group, the correspondence of the Official German Immigration and Repatriation Office (*Amtliche Deutsche Ein- und Rückwandererstelle*) (ADEURST) with the Italian Migration Office and the Italian municipal, judicial and local military authorities, and the negotiations between the German Liquidation Trust Company, Incorporated (*Deutsche Abwicklungs-Treuhand-Gesellschaft m.b.H.*) (DAT) and the National Agency for the Three Venetias (*Ente Nazionale per le Tre Venezie*).

Experience has shown that simultaneous negotiation by various German agencies with the Prefecture have led to difficulties which it would have been better to avoid.

Recognizing this, the Reichsführer SS has already decreed under par. 1 of the directive of January 1, 1941, a copy of which is enclosed,<sup>11</sup> that only the Reich representative shall be authorized to negotiate with the Italian authorities. Strictly enforced, the directive will be a secure basis for the work of the future German Commissioner, especially if the authority of the Head of the Official German Immigration and Repatriation Office to negotiate, in certain cases, directly with the Italian Under State Secretary of the Interior, which was useful at times, is now revoked. Furthermore, I consider it necessary that the vote of the German Commissioner should be decisive in the formation of the opinion of the German delegation in the mixed German-Italian committee, which decides about the validity of doubtful options.

Internally, it would be in keeping with this delimitation of the external powers of the Special Representative if all the German agencies concerned with the resettlement were subordinated to the German Commissioner in so far as they deal with matters requiring

<sup>11</sup> Not printed (4865/E249546-51).

contact with the Italian agencies. The German agencies involved are the following:

- the German Consulate in Bolzano;
- the Official German Immigration and Repatriation Offices;
- the German Cultural Mission attached to it;
- the German Liquidation Trust Co., Inc., in Bolzano;
- the Special Representative of the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police in Bolzano.

The German group of the German-Italian Property Appraisal Commission is already completely subordinate to the Reich Representative.

The Working Group of the Optants (*Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Optanten*) (A.d.O.) is subordinate to the Head of the Official German Immigration and Repatriation Offices. Although the Reich Representative has in the past been able to communicate directly with the manager of this working group and vice versa, I still consider it necessary to place particular emphasis on this right in the delimitation of the powers of the German Commissioner. In order really to make the German Commissioner the final authority for all South Tirolese questions it is furthermore necessary to make the above-mentioned agencies subordinate to him, not only in conducting negotiations with the Italians but also in reporting to the Foreign Ministry, to the Reichsführer SS, or to the Reich Commissar for the Consolidation of the German National Community, in such a way that this reporting is done under his direction and he is thereby given the opportunity to express his opinion. At the same time the directives of the Reichsführer SS and Reich Commissar for the Consolidation of the German National Community to these agencies would likewise have to go through the hands of the German Commissioner. This does not, of course, apply to correspondence on administrative matters.

It is furthermore in the interest of unification of the German representation in the South Tirolese question, which past experience has shown to be urgently necessary, to empower the German Commissioner, in addition, to issue instructions to the various German agencies—without prejudice to their responsibilities to the offices to which they are subordinated—in so far as he considers it his duty to issue such instructions in the interest of foreign policy.

I shall report on the rank to be assigned to the future position of Consul General Dr. Mayr as soon as it is definitely known whom the Italians will appoint as High Commissioner.<sup>12</sup>

V. MACKENSEN

<sup>12</sup> In telegram No. 2525 (see footnote 10), Mackensen also suggested that Mayr be given the rank of Minister as had been the case with Bene in the past and which would correspond to the rank of Prefect of the Italian High Commissioner, Podestà.

## No. 363

482/231274-75

*The Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the Military  
Commander in Serbia to the Foreign Minister*

Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 701 of September 28

BELGRADE, September 28, 1941—2:30 p. m.

Received September 28—3:10 p. m.

D III 471g.

For the Foreign Minister personally.

I have repeatedly (cf. telegrams Nos. 608,<sup>1</sup> 621,<sup>2</sup> and 636<sup>3</sup>) requested the support of the Foreign Ministry with regard to the immediate deportation of local male Jews from Serbia, which was however denied me. Permit me to remind you that in Fuschl you expressly promised your help<sup>4</sup> in moving the Jews and also the Freemasons and pro-English Serbs, be it down the Danube or into concentration camps in Germany or in the General Government. The immediate solution of the Jewish question is the most important political task here at the moment, and is the prerequisite for a start in eliminating Freemasons and the intelligentsia which is hostile to us. The military operation in progress to put down the insurrection has now created a suitable moment for beginning the action. Furthermore, General Böhme as well as the Military Commander have again very emphatically asked me to make an effort on their behalf that the Jews be removed from the country immediately, if possible. For the time being 8,000 male Jews are involved, who cannot be accommodated in local camps because these must be used for accommodating about 20,000 Serbs from insurrectionary areas. As a result of the situation created by the insurrection it is likewise impossible to accommodate them in new camps and outside of Belgrade. We will have to cope here with the remaining approximately 20,000 Jews and their families. Deportation to an island in the Danube delta seems the simplest solution from the standpoint of transportation, since empty freight barges are immediately available. According to my information this procedure was also already used successfully in the deportation of Jews from Czechia.

I most urgently request, jointly with Veessenmayer, your support in this matter [which is] the first prerequisite for the lasting pacification we are striving for.<sup>5</sup>

BENZLER

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 288.<sup>2</sup> Document No. 297.<sup>3</sup> See document No. 313, footnote 1.<sup>4</sup> No record found.<sup>5</sup> Marginal notes: "Submit at once. Party Comrade Rademacher. Please return. Lu[ther], Oct. 1."

## No. 364

2116/460542-48

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister*BERLIN, September 28, 1941.<sup>1</sup>

RAM 48.

RECORD OF THE RECEPTION OF THE SWEDISH CHARGÉ D' AFFAIRES BY THE  
FOREIGN MINISTER ON SEPTEMBER 26, 1941<sup>2</sup>

The Foreign Minister received the Swedish Chargé d'Affaires, Counselor von Post, in the evening of September 26, 1941. The Foreign Minister stated by way of introduction that originally he intended to ask the Minister to see him, but with the Minister being absent from Berlin, he would now ask M. von Post to convey to his Government several statements dealing with our relationship to Sweden. The situation was that we had occasion to note continuous violent attacks on Germany and on the Führer and his policy in the Swedish press<sup>3</sup> and particularly at the proceedings of the Swedish trade unions in Sweden,<sup>4</sup> and that this occurred at the very time when the Führer was engaged in a gigantic struggle to relieve the world once and for all of the Bolshevik threat. The significance of this struggle, which was not merely a conflict between Germany and Russia but a matter concerning the whole of Europe, had become apparent to all European nations. Even our enemies of yesterday, the French, had joined in the battle to defeat Bolshevism through volunteers now wearing the German uniform.<sup>5</sup> Only two countries had excluded themselves from participa-

<sup>1</sup> The date has been taken from an appended sheet (F4/0329) listing the officials to whom copies of the memorandum were to be sent.<sup>2</sup> On Sept. 30 a photostatic copy of this record was sent to Prince zu Wied for his information (F2/0152).<sup>3</sup> In telegram No. 1435 of Sept. 15 (205/142972-73) Wied reported that the proclamation of a state of emergency in Norway had had a very unfavorable reaction in Sweden, particularly with the pronouncement of two death sentences on the first day, and this in Scandinavia where the death penalty had been abolished. Pro-German Swedes were forced to silence on this theme. "The impression on Sweden of the activity of Quisling had during the last year unfavorably influenced German-Swedish relations. The most recent events in Norway have now led to a serious encumbrance to these relations. The Nordic feeling of belonging together has been significantly strengthened. The typical Nordic spirit of contradiction has begun to work perniciously against everything that is German." Wied concluded: "Inasmuch as I have served in Norway and Sweden for almost 18 years and believe that I have learned to know the mentality here, I feel myself obliged to submit this report."

Cf. document No. 312.

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 1458 of Sept. 18 (205/142979-80) Wied reported a conversation with Günther who emphasized the strong reaction in Sweden against the German use of the death penalty in Norway. He drew attention to the close connection between the Swedish Social Democratic party and the Norwegian trade unions.<sup>5</sup> See document No. 78.

tion in this struggle: Sweden and Switzerland. Sweden had even gone so far as to forbid Swedish volunteers wishing to join the German colors to carry out their intent.<sup>6</sup> Instead of participation by Sweden in the struggle we were confronted with ever new instances of unfriendliness and insults on her part. He, the Foreign Minister, on the other hand, could not recall that the German press had ever insulted Sweden. We hoped that the present situation did not constitute the final stage of the development and that Sweden would eventually realize on which side she really belonged in the struggle; for in these very days, with German troops just having occupied Poltava, we could not imagine that the spirit of a Charles XII had become entirely extinct among the Swedish people.

The Foreign Minister then discussed the attitude of the Swedish Government in the question of the Norwegian ships in Swedish ports.<sup>7</sup> This attitude amounted to patent favoritism toward England by the Swedish Government. Germany could not understand this attitude. If any of the Norwegian ships were actually to depart from a Swedish port, thus augmenting the tonnage available to the English, the Reich Government would be compelled to view facilitation of such a departure as an unfriendly act by the Swedish Government. He, the Foreign Minister, did not know how the Führer would react to Sweden's action in such a case, but exactly because he was anxious to preserve the traditionally good relations between Germany and Sweden, he was constrained to point out in all earnestness the importance of what he had just said.

There were yet other aspects of the German-Swedish relationship, the Foreign Minister continued, which were unsatisfactory, but he would not now go into these matters to any length. He would only reiterate his regret that Sweden had excluded herself from participation in the battle against Bolshevism and, instead, adopted a position in the question of the Norwegian ships, which not only did not help Germany and her Allies, but practically amounted to a stab in the back. He was saying this in all candor and friendship in order to enable Stockholm to realize how Sweden's attitude was judged here in Berlin. As a remark of a more personal character the Foreign Minister also added that the Führer, more than anyone else, could not help but feel bitter that in the gigantic struggle which removed a deadly threat also from Sweden's future he received insults instead of thanks as a reward from the Swedish side, and that the Swedish press kept on sniping at Germany in the most unfriendly manner.

Counselor von Post, who had made notes of these remarks, stated on his part that it was true nevertheless that 2,000 Swedish volunteers

<sup>6</sup> See document No. 270.

<sup>7</sup> See documents Nos. 334 and 343.

had joined the fighting in Finland, to which the Foreign Minister replied that Sweden's reputation was not held in high esteem in Finland. He could assure him, on the other hand, that the Finns, as a courageous people, had won the heart of the German nation for the future.

M. von Post then stated in regard to the question of the Norwegian ships in Swedish ports that in this affair the Swedish Government was doing nothing else but adhere to the letter of the legal provisions, for which it could not be reproached.<sup>8</sup> The Foreign Minister replied by asking whether Sweden would persist in this purely legalistic approach even in the event that this would eventually bring Bolshevism to the country. The situation was such that England was allied with Bolshevism and that Churchill could only be pleased if Bolshevism were victorious all along the line and were also to overrun Sweden. Given such a situation, every action by Sweden favoring England was something on the order of suicide. We knew from a reliable source that Roosevelt and Churchill had agreed at their meeting<sup>9</sup> that it would be best to employ every resource that would bring about Germany's defeat by Bolshevism, regardless of whether or not the other European countries became bolshevized in the process. What intentions Soviet Russia entertained in regard to Sweden, he, the Foreign Minister, was able to tell M. von Post from personal experience. Here, in the air raid cellar of his house, Molotov had told him on his visit last year<sup>10</sup> that Soviet Russia must treat the question of the outlets from the Baltic Sea along the Swedish coast on a level with the question of the exit from the Black Sea. The Swedes should be able to gather from this the wide range of the goals pursued by Bolshevism. Despite this and in the midst of the greatest decisive struggle of world history, in which gigantic battles were being fought with tremendous tank armies on a scale never witnessed before, the Swedes were keeping themselves aloof from the struggle and even forbade Swedish volunteers to join the German troops in their battle. He, the Foreign Minister, had no intention whatever to plead with the Swedes that they should now permit the recruiting of volunteers, but he only mentioned this as an illustration of Sweden's totally incomprehensible attitude.

M. von Post then added a few remarks on the policy of the Swedish trade unions, which he characterized as shortsighted, whereupon the Foreign Minister assured him once more that the pro-English attitude of the Swedish trade unions was like a fit of blindness, for Churchill would in icy calm allow all Swedes to be put to death by the Bolsheviks if this would benefit the war against Germany. The Foreign

<sup>8</sup> See document No. 343.

<sup>9</sup> See document No. 209 and footnote 2.

<sup>10</sup> See vol. XI of this series, document No. 329.

Minister concluded his remarks to the Swedish Chargé d'Affaires in a friendly form, adding that he was well aware that the Chargé d'Affaires had rendered many a service to German-Swedish relations, but just because Sweden had so many friends in Germany he wanted to tell the Chargé d'Affaires quite openly what the views about Sweden's attitude were in Germany.<sup>11</sup>

R[IBBENTROP]

<sup>11</sup> In memorandum St.S. No. 673 of Oct. 7 (205/143088-39) Weizsäcker recorded a conversation with the Swedish Minister Richert who had just returned from an official visit to Stockholm. Richert expressed the appreciation of the Swedish Foreign Minister for Ribbentrop's views on German-Swedish relations. At the same time he mentioned that Günther strongly objected to Ribbentrop's view that Sweden was favoring Britain in the question of Norwegian ships in Swedish ports. Weizsäcker maintained the views of Ribbentrop.

### No. 365

4608/E193836

*Minute by the Director of the Political Department*

BERLIN, September 28, 1941.

e. o. Pol. IX 2523.

The discussion which I was instructed to have regarding the enclosed memorandum<sup>1</sup> has not been held.

I do not believe that the situation of our Reich citizens in North and South America would be improved if in accordance with this proposal reprisals were taken against Jews and Freemasons in Germany.

Incidentally I have heard that Minister Rosenberg has recently recommended to the Führer that reprisals should be taken against Jews in Germany in retaliation for the deportation of Volksdeutsche.

Herewith submitted to the State Secretary.<sup>2</sup>

WOERMANN

<sup>1</sup> Memorandum of Sept. 5 (4608/E193837-38), submitted to Bohle by Hübner, an official of the Auslandsorganisation. It proposed that it be announced that reprisals against Jews and Freemasons in areas under German control would be taken in retaliation for the "arrests and mistreatments of our fellow-Germans in the countries of America". From marginal notes on this memorandum it appears that on Sept. 6 Bohle passed it on to Weizsäcker who in turn forwarded it to Woermann.

<sup>2</sup> Marginal notes:

"Herr Erdmannsdorff. Please discuss with me. W[eizsäcker], Sept. 29."

"To Ambassador Dieckhoff with a request for an expression of opinion. Erdmannsdorff, Sept. 30."

"In my opinion such reprisals will not improve the situation of our Reich citizens in America, but worsen it. We shall then probably arouse groups against us which heretofore had still understanding for Germany. D[ieckhoff], Oct. 1."

"In 6 weeks. E[rdmannsdorff], Oct. 18."

"Submitted to the Dirigent of the Political Department. The secretariat of Pol. IX has presented this to me today. Shall any further action be taken? Freytag, Jan. 5 [1942]."

"No. To the files. E[rdmannsdorff], Jan. 6."

### No. 366

265/173297-99

*Memorandum by Minister Eisenlohr*

Dir. Ha. Pol. 198

BERLIN, September 28, 1941.

Subject: Negotiations for a German-Turkish Trade Agreement (Ankara telegram No. 238 of September 25, 1941<sup>1</sup>).

The Turks, invoking their commitment to the English, have definitely declined to supply us with chromium ore during 1942, but on the other hand, have expressed their willingness to promise in a treaty now to be concluded to undertake the delivery of substantial quantities of chromium ore beginning January 8, 1943; to supply in the meantime 12,000 tons of copper and to do their utmost to comply with German requests for increased deliveries of olive oil and cotton. Minister Clodius has now requested prompt instructions whether he should break off negotiations or accept the latest Turkish offer.

The Economic Policy Committee has expressed itself in favor of the second alternative.<sup>2</sup> To be sure, the representative of the Ministry of Economics has formally reserved his consent because he was unable to inform his State Secretary yesterday. I shall meet the latter today, however; and believe that I can count on his consent.

The following considerations were decisive for this positive attitude:

1. The conclusion of a treaty of smaller scope restricted to commodities of lesser importance would be interpreted as a German failure; the rupture of negotiations would be preferable to such a treaty.

2. The prospect of obtaining chromium ore in 1943 is valuable for the future. Nor is it impossible that if our political relations with Turkey continue to develop, the Turks, under the impression of our military successes in Russia, will change their position and supply us with chromium ore even in 1942. Conversely, an intensification of our trade relations will also affect the development of the political relationship.

3. Turkish deliveries of copper, but especially of cotton and oil promised for 1942, are exceedingly valuable to us.

Regarding the question of war material, the following should be said: The German armament deliveries, which were to include light guns with ammunition, technical material from the French booty, and heavy guns still to be manufactured, with ammunition, and likewise their early delivery so far have been promised by the OKW

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 358.

<sup>2</sup> The minutes of this meeting of the Economic Policy Committee of Sept. 27 (2109/456494-96) were recorded on that date by Eisenlohr.



in return for chromium ore only, on an item by item basis. If the Turkish proposal is accepted it would be necessary to get the OKW to accept that the heavy guns, in which the Turks are especially interested, and whose accelerated completion will take 14 months, will be reserved for item by item delivery in return for chromium ore beginning January 1943, but that the delivery of other war material to be charged against copper, cotton, and oil, that is, strategic supplies, should begin as soon as possible, that is to say, that its major part would be shipped still in 1942.

If the Foreign Minister approves the acceptance of the Turkish offer, the War Economy and Armaments Office is prepared to submit an appropriate proposal to the Chief of the OKW. It would be advisable to support this proposal by having Ambassador Ritter intercede with the Wehrmacht Operations Staff.

In accord with the opinion of the chief of delegation I recommend the acceptance of the Turkish proposal and request permission to take the necessary steps with the War Economy and Armaments Office to obtain the consent of the Chief of the OKW, for the above-mentioned modification in the terms which hitherto have been applied regarding war material, and to inform Minister Clodius accordingly.<sup>3</sup>

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister in accordance with instructions.

EISENLOHR

<sup>3</sup>In telegram No. 71 of Sept. 29 (9903/E693944-45) Eisenlohr informed Clodius that the Foreign Minister as well as the other offices concerned had agreed in principle to accept the latest Turkish offer as reported in Del. No. 32 (document No. 353). The approval by the Chief of the OKW was being requested.

However, in telegram No. 76 of Sept. 30 (9903/E693946-47) Eisenlohr informed Clodius that Keitel had rejected the idea of supplying Turkey with heavy guns even at a later date unless Turkey delivered chromium ore as early as in 1942. In return for Turkish deliveries of other strategic commodities he was willing to concede merely the delivery of new tubing for gun barrels, engineering equipment, also mines, explosives, and Hotchkiss machine guns from booty material. Eisenlohr emphasized that efforts continued to induce Keitel to change his position.

In telegram No. 266 of Oct. 1 (265/173314-15) Papen called this decision by the Chief of the OKW "incomprehensible", stating that Germany would now hardly be able to obtain vital raw materials such as copper, cotton, and vegetable oil from Turkey. Accordingly, he urged, it might be better not to conclude any commercial treaty at all. Papen also regretted Keitel's decision for the reason that it "deprived him of the possibility of detaching Turkey from England." See, further, document No. 374.

No. 367

2109/456487-88

*The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 254 of September 29

ANKARA, September 29, 1941.

Received September 29—11:00 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

Today's detailed discussion among Numan, Clodius, and me dealt with all aspects of the economic and political situation. Numan, referring to the Anglo-Turkish Treaty<sup>1</sup> which he read to us, told me once more of the impossibility of chromium deliveries in 1942. To my objection that Turkey ought to have refused to transfer France's share to England, he replied that France (group garbled) had been in arrears with deliveries of war material to a total of 14 million pounds sterling and that England had offered to deliver this war material herself. His statements confirmed that the Turkish Government had actually tried everything to make delivery to us of at least a portion of the chromium for 1942.

With respect to the political situation, Numan replied to my remonstrations that while Turkey had a vital interest in the defeat of Bolshevism, she did not want to declare her true feelings before the world. The English were fully aware that Turkey had a vital interest in the destruction of Bolshevism. In response to my request to define this position clearly before the world too, he stated that the Turkish Government wanted to wait for the moment when the clear definition of its position could be expected to reap the largest possible political benefit.

He then dealt in detail with Turkey's position with respect to England, emphasizing that adherence to agreements that had been entered into was of vital importance to Turkey's prestige, but that the treaty of alliance as such was no more than an ornament. For the rest I should discuss with Saracoglu the question of defining the Turkish position.

In conclusion, Numan again emphasized, as Clodius reported earlier,<sup>2</sup> that conclusion of a comprehensive trade agreement providing for chromium deliveries beginning in 1943 would undoubtedly create the best possible political impression. Most vigorous

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 352, footnote 4.

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 353.

Anglo-American protests were being anticipated. If we were to limit ourselves to the status quo, it would unquestionably be exploited by the opposing side, which would represent that as a serious deterioration of the German-Turkish relationship.

As your telegram No. 69,<sup>3</sup> point 2, has already stated that with the acceptance of the Turkish proposal for a comprehensive agreement chromium deliveries could be expected to begin in 1943, we would now request that a definitive decision be reached at an early date so that the negotiations can be concluded.

I shall induce Saracoglu tomorrow to treat the conclusion of the agreement, when it occurs, as an important event; Numan has already promised this.

PAPEN

\*Not found.

No. 368

535/240060-62

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

St.S. No. 650

BERLIN, September 29, 1941.

The Nuncio gave me today the appended note verbale with an annex,<sup>1</sup> regarding regulations concerning church policy in the Warthegau. The note verbale refers to an earlier detailed note from the Nuncio of August 14.<sup>2</sup> It is concerned with the basic question of the extent to which it is the intention to impede permanently the traditional functioning of the Catholic Church in the Warthegau.

For the time being I have only accepted the new note verbale of the Nuncio without expressing myself on particulars, but I consider it necessary to clarify whether the Reich Government intends to make the Catholic Church in the Warthegau entirely dependent upon itself and cut it off from the hierarchy and Rome. To judge from the present attitude of the Reichsstatthalter in the Warthegau<sup>3</sup> and from indications which Minister Kerrl made to me, one can count on the above procedure. I do not consider it correct, however, to deny the jurisdiction of the Nuncio for the Warthegau and I also wrote this

<sup>1</sup> This was decree No. 246 of the Reichsstatthalter of the Warthegau, "Decree concerning religious organizations and societies in the Reichsgau Wartheland, September 13, 1941" (535/240063-68).

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 272, footnote 1.

<sup>3</sup> Arthur Greiser.

recently to the Reichsstatthalter. His answer to my letter has not yet arrived.<sup>4</sup>

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.<sup>5</sup>

WEIZSÄCKER

[Enclosure]

Apostolic Nunciature, Germany  
No. 42661

BERLIN, September 29, 1941.

NOTE VERBALE

Already at an earlier date the Apostolic Nuncio became aware of a number of symptomatic orders in the field of church policy in the Warthegau which in an unexpressed manner impeded the traditional functioning of the hierarchy and the life of the Catholic Church. For this reason he considered himself obligated by means of a letter of August 14, 1941 (No. 41650)<sup>6</sup> and another of September 2 of this year (No. 42000)<sup>7</sup> to call the attention of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the German Reich to these incidents so that the latter might contribute with his influential mediation to the restoration of the impeded religious freedom in those areas and to the pacification of the Catholic population there both of German and of Polish ethnic origin.

The Holy See tried at the time to contribute to the pacification of the bilingual population of the Warthegau through special regulations, in that for example, contrary to the general provisions of Canon 216, Section 4 of the Church Legal Code, it permitted the establishment of parishes that were to include exclusively the German Catholics and others exclusively the Polish Catholics.

Nevertheless the Government of the Warthegau issued a decree dated September 13 of this year, of which a copy is here appended,<sup>8</sup> in which the existing Church hierarchy is entirely ignored. The Government of the Wartheland passes over the existing dioceses and parishes

<sup>4</sup> Weizsäcker's letter to Greiser and Greiser's reply have not been found.

<sup>5</sup> By means of a minute of Oct. 4 signed by Weber (535/240083) Ribbentrop directed Weizsäcker to take up the problem of decrees in regard to religious matters in the Warthegau with Kerrl, the Reich Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs, and to ask directly if Kerrl agreed with such decrees.

In a minute of Oct. 6 (535/240083-84) Weizsäcker replied that he would not have communicated directly with Reichsstatthalter Greiser if in religious matters he were under the authority of Reich Minister Kerrl. However, the Reich Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs had told him earlier, and had recently confirmed, that by order of the Führer he was to issue no directives regarding religious matters in the Warthegau. Weizsäcker added that if direct correspondence with the Reichsstatthalter did not clarify the matter he would then turn to Lammers.

See, further, document No. 547.

<sup>6</sup> Document No. 272, footnote 1.

<sup>7</sup> Document No. 272.

<sup>8</sup> Not printed (535/240063-68).

and establishes in their place new religious communities which it declares to be juridical persons under private law.

The Apostolic Nuncio protests most strongly against this decree, which passes over the existing competent Church hierarchy, as well as against the arbitrary procedure of publishing the relevant decree of September 13 without further notice, and requests rescision of the above-mentioned decree.

### No. 369

222/150080-82

*The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 3117 of September 30

BUCHAREST, September 30, 1941.

Received September 30—8:00 p. m.

[Deputy] Minister President Mihai Antonescu made the following statement today to the deputy of the Special Representative for Economic Questions:

Rumania had undertaken three obligations toward Germany:

1. To make available all petroleum supplies and reserves;
2. To supply Germany with Rumanian grain in so far as it was not needed for supplying the Rumanian population;
3. To provision the German troops in Rumania and to finance their requirements.

The petroleum reserves are used up. They were being unsparingly exhausted and given to the German Army.

Germany had received all of the grain which could be exported. It was only through a mistake in the statistics of the Minister of Supply, which the latter had had to pay for at once with the loss of his position, that in the agreement of May 29<sup>1</sup> the Marshal,<sup>2</sup> in indicating the maize supplies, had proceeded on the basis of figures which had not turned out to be true. Rumania herself was suffering badly from the scarcity of maize.

As regards the provisioning of the German troops and the financing of the needs of the Wehrmacht, Rumania had already gone to the limits of what was possible, and would also continue to do everything she could. He knew that in making further payments to the Wehrmacht Rumania was ruining not only her currency system but also her national budget, her price structure, and her taxes.<sup>3</sup> Rumania was ready to make this sacrifice too. So far she had had 90,000 dead and wounded. The operation against Odessa had had to be halted,

<sup>1</sup> This apparently refers to the "Confidential Protocol Regarding the Result of the Tenth Joint Session of the German and Rumanian Government Committees, May 9-29, 1941," which was signed in Bucharest May 29 (M209/M006829-49).

<sup>2</sup> By royal decree of Aug. 23, General Antonescu had been appointed Marshal of Rumania.

<sup>3</sup> Eisenlohr's memorandum of Oct. 5 (222/150098-101) records that Rumanian complaints that purchases by the Wehrmacht were raising prices and jeopardizing the currency began to be made toward the end of August.

however, because the ammunition was lacking which Rumania had shared with the German troops. The Russians were bringing up new divisions from the Caucasus to Odessa; this city was now better fortified than before.<sup>4</sup> He therefore had to fear that the sacrifice of the 56,000 soldiers that Rumania had so far lost before Odessa would be in vain, unless Germany rendered decisive help through deliveries of materials for the manufacture of ammunition and also for the rest of the economy as well; which alone would be able to remedy the imbalance between money and goods. All around Rumania communist fires were flaring up; if disturbances should break out in Rumania, this could not be in Germany's interest nor could she wish this to happen in the face of the wavering attitude of Turkey.<sup>5</sup> Germany therefore had to reduce the requirements of her Army in Rumania, and on the other hand make increased deliveries. In answer to the objection that Rumania herself had through her import restrictions kept German goods away until a few months ago, the [Deputy] Minister President said that the Marshal had given him the task of working out a plan with us for German deliveries which would approximately correspond to the Rumanian services for Germany. Up to April of next year this would amount for the German troops in Rumania to 18 (eighteen) billion lei for oil and 15 (fifteen) billion for grain exports totalling 33 billion lei. In reply to the question what concrete wishes Rumania had, Antonescu stated first that instead of deliveries being made from Germany merely in return for the Rumanian expenditures for war purposes and in order to increase the war potential, the Hermann Göring Reichswerke in taking over the legal contract of the Malaxa plant had now refused to make even minor deliveries of raw materials.<sup>6</sup> The negotiations with Minister Clodius on the delivery of armament equipment had also been broken off. His urgent request for deliveries of ammunition from Finland had been in vain. He therefore asked in the interest of the common cause that the German attitude toward Rumania in the economic field be changed, and that she be supplied with the urgently needed raw materials and ammunition.<sup>7</sup>

VON KILLINGER

<sup>4</sup> In telegram No. 2768 of Sept. 1 (222/149949) Killinger had stated that Rumanian casualties sustained in the heavy fighting around Odessa and the successful resistance of the Red Army had weakened Antonescu's prestige and had encouraged all those opposed to any Rumanian operations beyond the Dniester.

<sup>5</sup> In telegram No. 2882 of Sept. 9, forwarded to the Special Train as No. 3064 (222/149965-67), Killinger reported that General Antonescu was concerned about the attitude of Turkey and was convinced that Turkey's entry into the war against the Axis Powers would result in heavy attacks upon the Rumanian oil fields. In this context Antonescu complained that the protection for this petroleum region was "absolutely insufficient" at the present.

<sup>6</sup> The earlier part of this sentence was somewhat garbled in transmission. The text printed represents an attempt to establish the intended meaning of this passage.

<sup>7</sup> In telegram No. 1075 of Oct. 7 from the Special Train, forwarded to Bucharest as No. 2737 (222/150104-05), Ritter instructed Killinger to assure the Rumanian Government that the German Government and High Command would do everything possible to comply with Rumanian wishes and complaints. Keitel had already given strict instructions that no purchases be made in Rumania for German troops employed outside Rumania. Furthermore, the OKW had directed the War Economy and Armaments Office that Rumania be more adequately supplied with ammunition for guns of German origin.

## No. 370

129/121174

*Memorandum by an Official of Political Division IM*

BERLIN, September 30, 1941.

Pol. I. M. (Att) 9275 g.

The Air Attaché in Lisbon<sup>1</sup> reported in dispatch 66/41 g. of September 20<sup>2</sup> regarding the statements of the State Secretary in the Ministry of War, Santos Costa. Costa's most interesting ideas are given below in extracts:

1. In contrast with her earlier position, Portugal no longer intended to strengthen her armed forces to any substantial degree.

2. The task of the Portuguese armed forces was, first of all, to protect the islands and the colonies until a greater military power could come to the aid of Portugal. The troops on the Atlantic islands could hold the islands from 3 to 4 days against the attack of a major power.

3. Portugal intended to maintain strict neutrality. In case of an attempt to land by English or American troops, she would call on Germany for help. In case of an invasion by Germany or Spain on the other hand she would call on England for help.<sup>3</sup>

4. The Portuguese Government was endeavoring, together with Spain, to induce the Latin-American countries to strengthen the political and economic ties with the Iberian Peninsula and with it to Europe.

GROTE

<sup>1</sup> Major General Krahmer.<sup>2</sup> Not found.<sup>3</sup> In report No. 11454 of Oct. 25 (4865/E248944-945) Huene stated that Salazar would most likely not leave Portugal in case of a German occupation. President Carmona would stay only in case of a British or American landing in the Azores and would leave the country in case of an unprovoked occupation of Portugal by Germany.

## No. 371

205/143033-34

*The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

STOCKHOLM, October 1, 1941—10:30 a. m.

No. 1588 of October 1

Received October 1—12:15 p. m.

With reference to our telegram No. 1574 of September 29.<sup>1</sup>

The Chief of the Legal Department of the Swedish Foreign Ministry informed the Legation as follows regarding the current status of the motions for arrest brought against the Norwegian ships.

<sup>1</sup> Not found.

1) In the case of the *Rigmor*<sup>2</sup> the Court of Appeal canceled the negative decision of the Chief Bailiff of Göteborg,<sup>3</sup> which he had rendered in consequence of the English Government's objection of immunity, and approved the arrest. Thereby a precedent has been set which is favorable to our view.

2) In all the other cases the Chief Bailiff first called the opposing parties for statements regarding our motion for arrest but without at the same time ordering a provisional seizure of the ships.

Our attorney immediately introduced an appeal without awaiting the definitive decision in the first instance. In consequence of this the Court of Appeal on procedural grounds had to refer the matter to the Chief Bailiff for decision in the first instance. The further treatment of the matter by the Chief Bailiff will consist of his taking the statements of the opposing parties and then rendering his decision.<sup>4</sup>

3) In the Foreign Ministry here the state of the matter as a whole is viewed thus: that the Chief Bailiff, in accordance with the precedent of the decision in the case of the *Rigmor*, which our attorney will cite, will approve the arrests. But should this not occur in the first instance then the Court of Appeal will in all probability make the same decision as in the case of the *Rigmor*.

4) M. Engzell mentioned further that up to now none of the ships had asked for clearance so that within the next 8 days there could

<sup>2</sup> For the beginnings of the *Rigmor* case see document No. 329 and footnote 1.<sup>3</sup> In telegram 192 of Sept. 25 (205/143022-23) it was reported from Göteborg that the Chief Bailiff had initially canceled the order for arrest in the case of the *Rigmor*, accepting the English contention that the English Government had acquired the ship as its property from the Norwegian Government in London.It was also reported that the papers relating to six other ships had come from Norway and that actions of arrest had been refused by the Chief Bailiff in these cases also on the same grounds as in the case of the *Rigmor*.<sup>4</sup> In telegram No. 1896 of Nov. 7 (205/143036-37) Dankwort reported that the Chief Bailiff had the day before rendered his decision in the first instance. He refused the motions for arrest and for the removal of the captains from the ships on the grounds that by the Norwegian law of May 18, 1940, the right to dispose of the ships was transferred to the Norwegian Government. The Norwegian ship-owners therefore had no right to the ships. On the appeal of the attorney for the German Government the court at Göta overruled the Chief Bailiff and approved the provisional arrests. At the suggestion of the Swedish Foreign Ministry the Germans got the services of an additional attorney. At the suggestion of the Göteborg police, bail of 10,000 kronor was set for each case, and key parts of the engine of each ship were removed in order to prevent any escape.

be no question of a ship's leaving with the knowledge of the Swedish authorities.<sup>5</sup>

WIED

<sup>5</sup> In telegram No. 1921 of Nov. 13 (205/143096) Dankwort reported that the State Secretary of the Swedish Foreign Ministry had informed him that the English Minister had delivered a note protesting against the favoring of the German claims regarding the Norwegian ships. The protest was directed particularly against the issuance by the Swedish Government of an ad hoc law which concerned legal action regarding the ships after provisional arrest had been refused.

Telegram No. 1922 of Nov. 14 (205/143099) reported that the first session of the court of Göteborg on the suit against the captains of the Norwegian ships took place the day before. The motion of the opposing side for countermanding the arrests was denied. The next session of the court was set for Dec. 4.

The matter was still before the court at the end of the year 1941.

### No. 372

5083/E292817-19

#### Memorandum by the Chief of the Reich Chancellery

BERLIN, October 1, 1941.

Rk. 14392 B.

Subject: Occupied eastern territories.

1. On September 29, 1941, Minister Rosenberg reported to the Führer in my presence as well as in the presence of Reichsleiter Bormann concerning the political situation in the occupied eastern territories. Individual points of this report and the remarks made by the Führer are recorded in the following:

*a.* Gathering the harvest in the Ukraine:

Rosenberg reported that about 60 percent of the harvest found by the German troops, i.e., not destroyed as a result of military operations had been gathered in. The sowing, however, had not proceeded very favorably at the present time; because the winter grain could not be entirely sown we would have to sow a great deal of summer grain in the spring.

*b.* Rosenberg reported on the question of abolishing the kolkhozes and returning the rural farms to private property. The Führer expressed himself in favor of considering a step by step return of the kolkhozes to private property, but only to a limited degree and to such rural inhabitants as gave assurance through their industry and accomplishments that they would manage the land properly. Also such a return of the kolkhozes to private property could not take place everywhere, that is to say, not where it appeared advisable for reasons relating to the food supply to establish large agricultural enterprises, nor where land had to be vacated for the settlement of German peasants.

*c.* In the opinion of the Führer, an independent Ukraine is out of the question for the next decades. The Führer is thinking in terms of a *German protectorate over the Ukraine for roughly 25 years.*

*d.* We should contemplate an *indigenous secondary local administration* under German supervision.

*e.* Rosenberg reported about *getting people back into work.*

The Führer spoke in favor of an extensive release of Ukrainian prisoners of war, especially such as were willing to start immediately working in agriculture. He was of the opinion that the release of such prisoners was not a danger, since they would not consider a further participation in the war. Also such prisoners should be told that they would be freed of compulsory military service under the German rule.

*f.* Rosenberg reported on the *Volga Germans* and said that one must consider resettling them in the Caucasus or the Crimea. The Führer did not take a position with regard to this. He said we should wait and see how many Volga Germans we still found there and what condition these Volga Germans were in.

*g.* The Führer, in accord with Rosenberg, is of the opinion that in principle there should not be any return of *Russian émigrés*. The émigrés had done nothing for Russia; Russia had been conquered with German blood for the protection of Europe *against* Russia.

*h.* The Führer expressed himself to the effect that the *Neva* should become the *border of the Ostland* against Leningrad.

*i.* According to a remark by the Führer, the designations Lithuania, Latvia, Livonia, Ostland, etc., can be retained as geographical terms.

*j.* Rosenberg stated that he wanted later to give the title of "Land President" [*Landespräsident*] to the General Commissars in the Ostland. He had abandoned the designation "Land Captain" [*Landeshauptmann*] because in the Reich this term was used for a lower-grade official. The Führer expressed no objections.

*k.* Rosenberg complained insistently to the Führer about offices of the Wehrmacht and offices concerned with the economy which had refused him the requisite deliveries and coupons for the most necessary equipment for his officials (clothing, boots, blankets, weapons, automobiles, fuel, safes). Rosenberg gave the Führer a memorandum on this, which the Führer said he would discuss with Field Marshal Keitel.

*l.* All other matters regarding which Rosenberg reported to the Führer and on which the Führer made decisions are recorded in other documents.<sup>1</sup>

L[AMMERS]

<sup>1</sup> None found.

## No. 373

173/84449-55

*The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry*

CONFIDENTIAL  
Pol. 3

THE HAGUE, October 1, 1941.  
Pol. II 2750.

Subject: The visit of Reich Commissar, Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart, and Commissar General on Special Duty Oberdienstleiter Schmidt with the Führer on September 26, 1941.<sup>1</sup>

From the statements which the Reich Commissar made to the Commissar General and to me after his return and yesterday to the provincial deputies, and from the statements which Commissar General on Special Duty Schmidt made to his staff and the press officials, the following can be reported regarding the visit with the Führer:

Also present during the report, made by the Reich Commissar, and the subsequent conference were, besides the Führer himself, the Reich Commissar, Commissar General Schmidt, Reich Minister Lammers, and Reichsleiter Bormann.

The Reich Commissar gave the Führer an unvarnished account of the actual situation in the occupied Netherlands territories, mentioning both the bright and the dark sides equally and by no means avoiding the negative facts.

In the first place, economic and administrative matters were discussed, and the following developed:

1. The Führer decided that we should refrain from the projected compulsory transfer of Dutch workers to the Reich, because there would be no satisfactory results from such a measure in any case.

2. The Führer approved the dissolution of the denominational trade unions, associations, and parties.<sup>2</sup>

3. The Führer expressed his satisfaction with the figures given him regarding the Netherlands who have joined in the fight against Bolshevism (2,500 in the Standarte Westland, 3,000 in the Standarte Northwest, 4,000 to 5,000 with the NSKK).

4. The planned establishment of a Netherlands Reichsnährstand and a Netherlands Labor Front, to be organized as purely Dutch organizations, was approved by the Führer. In discussing these ideas the Führer stressed that placing the Netherlands on an equal footing with Belgium or France was out of the question, and he confirmed the assurances in favor of the Netherlands given earlier in this regard by the Reichsmarschall.

<sup>1</sup> Unidentified marginal note: "An additional report of Oct. 2, 1941 [is] in file "Russia."

See document No. 377.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 75, footnote 5.

5. Contrary to the tendencies existing with the Wehrmacht, the Führer ordered that nothing more was to be exported from the occupied Netherlands areas, so that the agricultural products produced in the Netherlands will be available for the feeding of the people in the occupied Netherlands areas and the Netherlands will thus be able to support themselves. The Reich Commissar can naturally permit exceptions. This measure will have a favorable effect on the general morale.

6. After the Reich Commissar had reported on the unfavorable effect of the general ban on exports suddenly instituted during the recent Leipzig Fair, the Führer ordered that export goods for the occupied Netherlands areas be released again and instructed Reich Minister Lammers to take the necessary steps.

7. The question was also discussed whether it was useful or necessary to confiscate the radio receivers of large segments of the Netherlands population. The Führer accepted the argument that the possession of radio receivers of their own familiarized the Netherlands with the German language to a large extent and thus made them receptive to German propaganda, too, and he left the further treatment of this question to the Reich Commissar.

8. In discussing the Jewish question the Führer indicated his satisfaction at the effects of the measures taken in the occupied Netherlands areas, which have resulted in the economic and personal separation of the Jews from the Netherlands.<sup>3</sup> For the immediate future it is intended to remove the approximately 15,000 Jewish emigrés from Germany living in the occupied Netherlands territories.

9. In order to combat the small acts of sabotage that have been on the increase during the past weeks also in the Netherlands, the most drastic measures have been ordered such as the taking of hostages and, if necessary, executions.

10. In discussing the economic situation the Führer expressed his great satisfaction that so far it has been possible to organize the Netherlands as a self-sufficient area; he stressed in this connection that with the satisfactory functioning of the administration and the economy the present unfavorable mood in the occupied Netherlands areas could be taken in stride.

Following the conversations on economic and administrative matters there was a very detailed discussion of the present political situation in the occupied Netherlands areas; in this connection the Reich Commissar, as he himself said, described the situation with meticulous thoroughness and objectivity, and especially the attitude of the NSB in general and particularly with respect to the NSNAP. The

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, vol. xxvii, document No. 1726-PS (U.S. Exhibit 195), pp. 531-37.

Führer approved the NSB course taken heretofore and termed it expedient, and he warned against reliance on any but National Socialist groups, even if, as is presently the case with the NSB, this National Socialist group is not yet consolidated ideologically. It was then the task of the German authorities to gain such a strong influence on the NSB and the individual persons that the National Socialist front could be held with them. Any working against each other by National Socialist groups was undesirable and should be stopped. In the existing circumstances it was necessary to remove the NSNAP from the political arena. This removal has in the meantime been accomplished in that the leader of the NSNAP, M. van Rappard, has prohibited the members of his party from any sort of political activity until further notice. Thus the responsibility now rests solely with the NSB, and Mussert and his people will have to demonstrate whether they will be in a position to win the Dutch people over to National Socialism.

The Reich Commissar added the following comment to his statement about his conference with the Führer:

The Führer had stated that he was entirely satisfied with the report on the situation in the occupied Netherlands territories and had expressed to him in warm words his approval, appreciation and thanks for what had so far been accomplished. The appreciation and thanks of the Führer also extended to his co-workers and should spur him and all of them to further accomplishment.

The most important task was now the development of the domestic situation in the occupied Netherlands territory in such a way that the aim of creating a National Socialist Netherlands would be attained. There was no doubt that the course which Mussert now had to take with the NSB was very difficult. He now had, however, a unique opportunity to show who he was and what he could do.

Now that all obstacles had been cleared away he no longer had any excuses either. The task of the German authorities was to support Mussert and the NSB even more than before. There was no possibility of reaching the objective with other groups. It was necessary to increase the controlling influence on the NSB and the various individuals so that there would be no possibility of failure. Naturally the influence exerted should not be apparent to the outside, because this would probably make the work of Mussert and the NSB among the population even more difficult than before.

The manner in which Mussert had attacked the NSNAP in his proclamation and editorial (see my report Pol. 3 of September 30, 1941)<sup>4</sup> should be condemned and rejected. All the more gratifying

<sup>4</sup> Not found.

was the attitude shown by van Rappard when he decided, without consulting German authorities, to forbid his party to operate politically until further notice in order to give Mussert and the NSNAP [*NSB*] the opportunity to win the Netherlands for himself and National Socialism. The directive for the guidance of conversations is as follows:

The Führer is content with the NSB course.

The NSB has the prospect of becoming the predominant political movement in the Netherlands.

The political task in the immediate future was also difficult for the German authorities; it had to be accomplished successfully, however, so that an autonomous administration controlled by us and stabilized conditions might be achieved prior to the organic integration into the Germanic Reich. The predominant political movement in the Netherlands ought to take over the power and leadership in the Netherlands; whether it was called NSB or something else was immaterial.

In confidence the Reich Commissar reported that the Führer was willing, in principle, to accept Mussert's oath of allegiance to the Führer as the Germanic Führer. It had been considered previously that Mussert wanted to swear allegiance to the Führer. But this had not been accomplished. The oath of allegiance to the Führer would be a strong, irrevocable bond for Mussert. When and in what form this oath would take place would develop later.<sup>5</sup> The leaders and members of the NSNAP are to be employed usefully in the administration and the economy so that they are not lost as National Socialists.

The NSB should do a great deal of work within itself in order to overcome the particularism which is expressed in the Netherlands in the many parties, sects, and denominations and which can naturally be found in the NSB too. The task assigned to the NSB was larger, and its completion depended upon Mussert and the NSB themselves.

What is most noteworthy in these statements seems to me to be that what is desired is not the annexation of the Netherlands, but an independent Netherlands state in the Germanic Reich. This has established much needed clarity, the effect of which among the Dutch people should be favorable and win over many persons who have heretofore kept aloof. To what extent the people will become reconciled to Mussert and the NSB cannot be predicted today. To judge from past experience it is possible that the rejection of Mussert and the NSB will become even stronger, particularly because now the possibility of an assumption of power by Mussert and the NSB will be considered imminent. An increased and still more accentuated rejection of Mussert and the NSB by the population can entirely frustrate their

<sup>5</sup> In a memorandum of Jan. 3, 1942 (173/84459) Luther noted that Mussert had taken an oath of allegiance to Hitler "the Germanic leader." This took place on Dec. 12, 1941. See Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie, *Het Proces Mussert* ('s-Gravenhage, 1948), pp. 319-322.

purpose or their task and in several months the situation could be such that Mussert, possibly also the NSB, will have to retire from the political stage in order to make way for others.

We must wait and on the German side must give Mussert and the NSB every possible help.

BENE

No. 374

265/173319-23

*Ambassador Ritter to the Embassy in Turkey*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL TRAIN, October 2, 1941—6:00 p. m.

Unnumbered from

the Special Train

Received Berlin, October 2—8:10 p. m.

No. 99 from the Foreign Ministry

Sent October 2.

For Clodius.

With reference to our telegram No. 76 of September 30<sup>1</sup> and to your telegram No. 258 of September 29.<sup>2</sup>

I. The fact that the Turkish Government admitted to us only in the final stage of the negotiations that the delivery of chromium in 1942 is impossible has produced vivid disappointment here and created a difficult situation. Please leave no doubt regarding this disappointment in the further course of your discussions. In spite of this, all authorities concerned, in accordance with our positive political attitude toward Turkey, have done everything to make possible the conclusion of a treaty which has substance and which saves the face of both parties toward the outside. For this purpose German armament deliveries were divided into three groups; whereby, however, the principle had to be adhered to that valuable armament material will be delivered only in return for chromium.

The first group consists of: French anti-tank mines, explosives and detonators for engineers, 500 Hotchkiss 8 mm. machine guns with ammunition, one set of bridge-building equipment for engineers (German construction).

With regard to this group we are prepared to forego the delivery of chromium in return and instead to accept copper or cotton. We

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 366, footnote 3.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (4886/E253403-05). This telegram commented on the information transmitted in Foreign Ministry telegram No. 68 of Sept. 27 (4881/E253236-37) regarding the terms for the delivery of war material according to the decisions of the OKW.

reserve for ourselves the right to determine in what proportion copper and/or cotton should be delivered.

The second group consists of: 20 7.5-cm. anti-tank field cannons (Krupp) with 100,000 rounds of ammunition, 40 rebored gun barrels (Bochumer Verein), 120-m. engineer bridge-building equipment, 64 7.5-cm. mountain guns (Bochumer Verein).

After the Turkish Government has now stated that it is unable to supply chromium in the year 1942 we should really draw the conclusion that we would decline making deliveries in this second group. However, we do not want to draw this negative conclusion but rather to propose a compromise. We want to give Turkey an option with regard to these deliveries in the event that it should turn out in the future that chromium can be delivered in the year 1942. In that case this group can be delivered item by item in return for chromium in the order in which the individual items are listed above, that is to say the mountain guns last. With regard to the 100,000 rounds of ammunition the demand must also be made that the amounts of copper required for this will be specially ordered and delivered above and beyond the other deliveries of copper.

The third group consists of:

(a) Ten 24 cm. howitzers L-28 (Skoda) with ammunition and fire-control equipment.

(b) 18 15 cm. cannons L-55 (Krupp) with ammunition and fire-control equipment.

(c) Fire-control equipment for the two guns in (a) and (b) which have already been delivered.

These deliveries can be definitely promised item by item in return for chromium after January 8, 1943. As is known, it is a considerable sacrifice for us to make production facilities available for this. We can make this sacrifice only if the delivery of chromium is absolutely assured. Therefore, simultaneously with the conclusion of the private delivery contracts regarding the three items of this group, a private purchase contract regarding the corresponding quantities of chromium in return is necessary and prerequisite in addition to the agreements from government to government.

II. With regard to the terms for delivery they remain as stated in our telegram No. 68 of September 27.<sup>3</sup> With regard to the mountain guns the terms for delivery are for about a year after the order has been placed.

III. I ask that you now make this final proposal to the Turkish Government. In case the Turkish Government accepts it you are authorized to conclude the agreement on this basis. In case the Turkish Government does not accept it there are practically no prospects

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2.



that this proposal can still be altered in favor of the Turks. Nevertheless, in this negative case, I ask you to report once more prior to breaking off negotiations.

IV. Only for your own strictly confidential information the following is also communicated:

There is no absolute assurance that the fire-control equipment can be delivered simultaneously with the guns to which it belongs. The manufacturing of this fire-control equipment is in competition with the manufacturing of fire-control equipment for our own urgent purposes. It is not impossible that the decision will have to be made further on that the fire-control equipment for our own requirements must have precedence. Nevertheless we are prepared to assume the risk of promising now in a treaty to deliver the fire-control equipment simultaneously. If it should develop later on that this promise cannot be kept completely, we must leave to the future the settlement of difficulties resulting from it. In this context I should add in case that it is important for the text of your agreement that this difficulty exists less with respect to the fire-control equipment belonging to the howitzers and more in the case of the fire-control equipment belonging to the cannons.

V. I see from your telegram No. 258 of September 29 that the treaty is to run until March 31, 1943. If it is not possible to extend the duration of the treaty in general, it must be taken into account and assured that the deliveries in the third group begin only after January 8, 1943, and that the counter deliveries of chromium item by item will be carried out even after March 31, 1943, if, for reasons of transportation or for other reasons not previously anticipated, the deliveries have not been completely carried out by March 31, 1943. We cannot make the sacrifice of putting off production facilities for our own purposes without obtaining complete assurance of counterdeliveries of chromium in the year 1943.

VI. Here in "Westfalen" I cannot determine whether the German authorities concerned have already determined what amounts of chromium should be demanded as deliveries in return. If this has not been done it should be settled from your end with the responsible authorities in Berlin.<sup>4</sup>

RITTER

<sup>4</sup> In telegram No. 289 of Oct. 3 (265/173327-28) Clodius reported that he had come to an agreement with Menemencioğlu regarding the basis of the economic agreement in accordance with the document printed.

In Ankara telegram No. 301 of Oct. 6 (265/173331-32) Clodius reported that the signing was to take place on Oct. 9 and submitted the draft of a press communiqué. See, further, document No. 390.

No. 375

1517/372720

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

St.S. No. 661

BERLIN, October 2, 1941.

The Italian Ambassador spoke to me at length again today about the complaints of the Italian laborers in Germany.<sup>1</sup> He had heard about new complaints again. Signor Alfieri will probably get in touch with Under State Secretary Luther soon and perhaps propose that Signor Lombrassa be summoned here from Italy some time so that he may form an opinion about the situation on the spot.<sup>2</sup> Alfieri was toying with the idea today of recalling all the Italian laborers from Germany. I told him that this was not only an economic problem in which our countries were both interested but also a political matter. A measure so extreme as the transportation back to Italy of some 100,000 Italian laborers would undoubtedly be observed abroad and be exploited to the limit by our enemies.

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 281, footnotes 1 and 2.

<sup>2</sup> According to a memorandum by Luther of Oct. 6 (1517/372737-39) Alfieri agreed to nominate a special official in the Italian Embassy who would cooperate with an expert of Luther's office on all matters concerning the care of Italian laborers in Germany. Furthermore Alfieri reported to Rome that the problem was being thoroughly discussed between him and Luther.

No. 376

482/231272-73

*Memorandum by the Director of the Department for German Internal Affairs*

SECRET

BERLIN, October 2, 1941.

Regarding the attached telegram from Minister Benzler of September 29 [28], 1941, in Belgrade<sup>1</sup> (the previous papers have already been requested through the Foreign Minister's Secretariat) I take the following position:

1. Benzler makes the removal of 8,000 Jews from the territory of Old Serbia the prerequisite for tackling the elimination of Freemasons and the intelligentsia which is hostile to us.

2. Benzler considers it to be incompatible with the action of pacification planned by us that these 8,000 Jews should remain, but he states that he would have to put up with the remaining approximately 20,000 Jews and their families.

3. Benzler requests approval for the deportation of the 8,000 Jews mentioned to an island in the Danube delta, i.e., to Rumanian territory.

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 363.

If the Military Commander agrees with Benzler to the extent that it is these 8,000 Jews who primarily are preventing the action of pacification in Old Serbia, then in my opinion, the Military Commander must see to it that these 8,000 Jews are removed at once. In other areas other military commanders have been able to cope with a substantially larger number of Jews without even talking about it.

In my opinion we cannot suggest to the Leader of the Rumanian state, who has anyway sufficient trouble with removing his own Jews, that he should accept 8,000 additional Jews from foreign territory. Moreover, it can be assumed with certainty that these 8,000 Jews a few days after their arrival at the island in the Danube delta would disappear and then would make their appearance in Rumania itself.

Therefore, I request authorization to discuss this question with Obergruppenführer Heydrich, who will come from Prague to Berlin within the next few days for a short stay. I am convinced that in consultation with him we will very soon be able to arrive at a clear solution of this question.<sup>2</sup>

LUTHER

<sup>2</sup> In telegram No. 1060 of Oct. 2 from the Special Train (482/231266) Luther was informed of Ribbentrop's request that he take steps "to get at once in touch with the Reichsführer SS and to clarify the question whether the latter might not take over 8,000 Jews in order to transport them to eastern Poland or any other place."

In a memorandum of Oct. 3 (482/231267) Luther asked Rademacher to explore the possibility of a discussion of this matter between Luther and Heydrich or a representative of the latter within the next few days.

In telegram No. 1364 of Oct. 5 (482/231265) Luther informed Benzler of an agreement reached with Heydrich that a special representative of the Reich Main Security Office would go to Belgrade in order to settle the questions raised in Belgrade telegram No. 701 (document No. 363).

In telegram No. 1413 of Oct. 15 (482/231262-63) Luther further informed Benzler that two representatives of the Reich Main Security Office accompanied by Counselor Rademacher would arrive in Belgrade on Oct. 18. See document No. 425.

### No. 377

105/114120-22

*The Representative of the Foreign Ministry With the Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands to the Foreign Ministry*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

Pol. 3

THE HAGUE, October 2, 1941.

Received October 6.

Pol. II 2762.

With reference to my report Pol. 3 of October 1, 1941—Subject: Visit of Reich Commissar, Minister Seyss-Inquart, and General Com-

<sup>1</sup> By a cover note of Oct. 21 (105/114119) Counselor Lohmann of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat submitted this report to Weizsäcker, for his information.

missar on special assignment Oberdienstleiter Schmidt with the Führer on September 26, 1941.<sup>2</sup>

Continuing my report of yesterday I am passing on in the following the reports which General Commissar Schmidt made in broad outline to his collaborators concerning the considerations which guide the Führer in shaping his over-all policy:

"It was necessary for us very consciously to pursue a policy with reference to the European area. The present German foreign policy could in the main be only a European policy, but not a world policy, for the latter was impossible for the reason that outside the European area the instruments of power necessary for the realization of definite objectives are lacking. It was all the more necessary, however, that the policy with reference to the European area was carried out as intensively and purposefully as was possible. In the past it had really been an absurdity that a great empire should have existed in the east of the European Continent with almost inexhaustible mineral resources and raw materials, which furthermore was only sparsely settled, whereas in the thickly-settled central and western European countries there existed a scarcity of raw materials and this need had to be filled in far-distant overseas areas. For this reason the areas in the European east, rich in raw materials, had to be entirely opened up for the thickly-populated areas of the west. If this was done successfully one could also in the main do without the overseas transports, which were time-consuming, complicated, and dangerous at times of warlike complications. On the other hand such a development had the advantage that after this war the German and also the European industry would no longer need any overseas markets, for the 130,000,000 persons in the European east are living at the present time in such frugality or at least at such a low standard of living that one could dispose of practically every sort of industrial product there, from the simple water glass on up. The almost frighteningly low cultural level which the Führer and his Wehrmacht had encountered among the people in the Soviet Union was in contrast to the great possibilities that were offered in these vast spaces in the fields of agricultural production and natural resources. Thus, for example, it had turned out that even at this time large quantities of rubber of good quality were being produced in the Kharkov area. The Führer had said in this connection that the samples presented to him made an excellent impression, and that by intensifying the cultivation of rubber there one could hope to make Greater Germany and if possible all of Europe independent of rubber deliveries from overseas in the future. With regard to the production of petroleum the case was similar. The large-scale enterprise had to be considered the best system of agricultural management in the east. The giant farms introduced by Stalin would offer the best possibility in the future, too, probably the only one, for intensive cultivation, since the real Russian intelligentsia was to be considered as having been destroyed and the people, to a large extent were used to living and being treated like animals. In any case, as far as intellectual ma-

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 373.

turity was concerned, there existed a mile of difference between the Russian peoples of the present time and the German people.

"In summary it had to be stressed that in the opinion of the Führer the new eastern colonies were to be considered safest and most useful from the German standpoint, because it was not necessary to travel over long water routes to rule them; it was sufficient to employ the power of the German Army. For this reason, also, the question how long the war in the east had to be continued would not matter. Once the vital European territory of the Soviet Union had been occupied and secured, the war east of the Urals could last another 100 years if necessary. It was important, however, that the bulk of the Russian industrial plants be moved to western Europe, so that in the future the western European industrial areas and eastern European agricultural and raw material areas could complement one another in a healthy manner."<sup>3</sup>

BENE

<sup>3</sup>In the files of the German Foreign Ministry there is a memorandum of Nov. 23 by Clodius (34/24867-82) which discusses at length the way in which the various European states could participate in the economic exploitation of the occupied Russian territories.

## No. 378

82/60675-79

*The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT Tokyo, October 4, 1941—2:57 a. m., summer time.  
No. 1974 of October 4 Received October 4—1:25 p. m.<sup>1</sup>

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to my telegram No. 1960 of October 2.<sup>2</sup>

As stated in the previous report, the Japanese-American negotiations are apparently not making any headway, unless the United States should radically alter its attitude on the China question, which it would find difficult to do. However, even after failure a certain feeling of being at a loss regarding what policy to pursue persists in Japan. For the first time in her history Japan feels physically isolated and surrounded by enemies. With optimism and aggressiveness, she has tried her strength against a militarily inferior China and despite brilliant individual successes has the impression of not being able to conclude this conflict successfully by military means. Even more than this feeling in the homeland, the many years of service in the zone

<sup>1</sup>Marginal note: "Forwarded to the Special Train as No. 3351, Oct. 4."

<sup>2</sup>This telegram (82/60669-71) reported that there was still complete official silence regarding the current Japanese-American negotiations, yet it discussed the presumable course of the negotiations on the basis of "information received by the Embassy through confidential channels."

of the interior [*Etappendienst*] by the army in China may be responsible for having lessened Japan's striking power and will to action. One cannot avoid the impression that the mobilization begun in July added to the feeling of weakness by revealing the numerous economic and material deficiencies.

Nevertheless, in the last few weeks the realization has grown that mere passive waiting will not promote Japan's goals or safeguard her existence. From close contacts with the leaders of the Army (Minister of War, Chief of the General Staff, Heads of the Political Department, and the Department of Foreign Armies) the following picture of their position emerges:

The inherent aim of the Tripartite Pact is to help bring about a redistribution of power in Europe and in the Far East by defeat of the British Empire. Warding off the United States and eliminating the Soviet Union can only be means toward this end. Since Germany has gone to war with the Soviet Union and to a large extent has been militarily successful in waging it, the important thing is to restore communications between the Tripartite Pact Powers through Siberia as soon as possible and to concentrate all efforts on fighting England in the Near and Far East, as well as in the British Isles. The operations in European Russia have shown that while the armies of the Soviet Union were defeated the political collapse of the regime did not automatically follow. Japan cannot before next spring undertake military operations against the Far Eastern Army, which is still considered to be capable of fighting, unless there should be a moral collapse of the regime. The toughness which the Soviet Union has demonstrated against Germany indicates that the route through Siberia could not be opened this year even by a Japanese attack in August or September. There are two ways by which this goal may be achieved in the future: either to exploit the heavy losses of the Soviet regime anticipated after the capture of Moscow in order to persuade the remnant of Russia to collaborate voluntarily (Japan could help here even this winter by exerting pressure at the right time on Russian supply lines in the Far East); or else to attack Siberia next spring from the west and the east, something which Japan will then be able to do despite the burden of the China conflict. In the latter case, however, the areas to be covered would still be immense and joint operations would not be easy, so that even then a political solution would be advisable after a certain time. A military operation by Japan against the Anglo-Saxon position in the south would not be dependent on the time of the year. Combining this with a German operation against the Anglo-Saxon position in the Near East would be desirable, but it is not absolutely necessary to wait for it. Victory over the British Empire will not be complete, however, until the Indian position is shaken by our joint actions.

I am reporting these statements made by the Minister of War in the presence of the Chief of the General Staff as they were presented to me, with the request that they be (group apparently missing) confidentially. They clearly show by their frank oddity how the leaders feel about a Russian campaign. The statements also showed that the plans aimed at the south, which must be carried out chiefly by the Navy, have not been very carefully thought out and prepared. Like the armed forces Attachés, I have gotten the impression that the thinking, at least of the Army, is superficial and that the state of the preparations do not ensure the success of a thrust to the south, beyond initial conquests. Reports agree that in French (one group garbled) very little has as yet been done in the way of putting up military installations. The comparatively scant equipment of the troops with modern material, the length of the lines of communication, but above all the feeling of not having any unified, strong-willed leadership robs the Japanese armed forces of the confidence necessary for success. It may therefore be assumed that the present government will try to postpone still further an operation in the south.

Activating Japan in the sense of the Tripartite Pact can most easily be achieved by holding before her, technically and politically, the possibility of operations having a tangible common aim (Siberian route or combined attack in the Near or Far East). For example, it would probably make a strong impression here if a long-range flight were made from the Russian front to Manchouli, as soon as this is technically possible. In view of the formalistic character of the Japanese I should like to raise again for favorable consideration the question whether an attempt should not be made after appropriate preparation to entrust the commission provided for in the Tripartite Pact<sup>3</sup> at the instance of the Japanese with consultation on common military, economic, and political problems. The feeling of not being consulted depresses those who otherwise are prepared to collaborate and hits them where they are most sensitive—in their self-esteem.

In the statements of the army leaders set forth above nothing is said about an entry into the war by the United States. I could see that in their military plans they almost completely disregarded or ignored the possible intervention of the United States and always spoke of the British Empire as *the* enemy. This is doubtless due in part to the desire not to give any clue as to the far-from-impressive progress of the Japanese-American negotiations. Still stronger, however, is the oft-reported atavistic fear of getting into a conflict with the United States the outcome of which would possibly be unforeseeable. The

<sup>3</sup> For the commissions of the Tripartite Pact, see vol. xi of this series, document No. 270 and footnote 3; vol. xii of this series, document No. 304.

leaders of the Japanese Government would want to wage such a conflict only in case of the most extreme necessity and would want to set the moment for it themselves or at least have a voice in the matter. This is in accordance not only with the character of the Japanese but also with the view of the leaders of the Japanese government that the question whether an attack in the sense of article III of the Pact has occurred must be determined by joint consultation of the three powers. I wish to point out that even in the negotiations about the Tripartite Pact which were conducted here with Ambassador Stahmer as leader of the negotiations and with me, Foreign Minister Matsuoka insisted on a concrete statement on this point.<sup>4</sup>

The feeling of not being able to avoid a conflict with the United States is growing; for us, however, it is of the greatest importance that Japan have a voice in deciding when, in such a contingency, it is to be jointly waged.

I need not make any special mention of the fact that I have argued in accordance with the instructions given to me and a guiding directive for conversations issued in Berlin with respect to the continuation of the fight against the Soviet Union and the military and political weaknesses of the Anglo-Saxons. Given the existing relationship between the forces within Japan, however, the attitude described above must at present be taken into account, especially since the view of the Navy largely corresponds to the statements of the Army leaders.

I shall report later about the attitude of political circles.<sup>5</sup>

Ott

<sup>4</sup> There is no mention of this in the available German records of these discussions. Cf. vol. xi of this series, document No. 44, footnote 2.

<sup>5</sup> Ott's telegram No. 2059 of Oct. 11 (82/80693-97) which refers back to the telegram which is printed here deals only with the Japanese Navy. No further report on the attitude of political circles prior to the Cabinet change of Oct. 18 has been found.

No. 379

195/139223

*The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

SECRET

ROME, October 4, 1941—2:05 p. m.

No. 2413 of October 4

Received October 4—2:30 p. m.

The Italian Foreign Ministry communicated today officially that Count Ciano had ordered the establishment of a special office in which, under the direction of the Indian, Schedai, all official, semi-official, and private activities connected with Indian liberation movement

are to be coordinated.<sup>1</sup> The office, which will be located on one floor of an office building, is being placed under the Foreign Ministry, which will detail to this office a liaison official with the rank of a secretary of legation.

The Foreign Ministry stated that the Embassy would be regularly informed about the activity of the office, and asked for its part to be informed on the activity of the Berlin India office.<sup>2</sup>

MACKENSEN

<sup>1</sup> In a letter of Sept. 21 (4757/E233877-83) addressed to Counselor Doertenbach of the German Embassy in Rome, Schedai gave a detailed account of his recent conversations in Germany whither he had gone at Woermann's request because "my presence was needed in Berlin for consultation regarding Indian work." In this account Schedai stressed repeatedly that he was urged by his principal Foreign Ministry contact, Trott zu Solz, as well as by Bose that he should stay in Berlin and work with them.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram No. 2641 of Oct. 8 (4757/E233911) Keppler informed Mackensen that it was the intention, as he knew, to set up an office for Bose in Berlin. He added: "However, the opening of the office and the strengthening of the India propaganda has been put off until a later, suitable moment."

### No. 380

95/107110

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*<sup>1</sup>

St.S. No. 667

BERLIN, October 4, 1941.

The Spanish Ambassador told me today by instruction of the Caudillo and Suñer that they required of him, Mayalde, that he immediately take up personal contact with the "Blue Division." The problem was that no news has been received from the Division for a long time. There was no communication at all, so to speak; that had to be changed. They were not informed about the activity of the Division and its fate. British propaganda was sowing the wildest atrocity stories about the Division in Spain.<sup>2</sup> The Government in Madrid was helpless in the face of this since it knew nothing itself.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> There is no indication of a signature on the copy here printed. Another copy (95/107161-62) bears the pencil notation: "Signed Weizsäcker."

<sup>2</sup> In a report dated Oct. 21 and registered in the Embassy in Madrid as No. 4753 (4894/E253933) the Consulate at Badajoz reported on rumors which were spread in Badajoz Province regarding the Blue Division. Along with reports that the Division had been destroyed or captured there was also a propaganda warning laborers not to go to Germany because the contracts would not be kept; that the workers would not be sent to the factories but to the front, and their dependents would not be paid. Such reports were spread by dependents of members of the Division who had not received the soldiers' pay but had been sent in vain from one office to another. Some 20 to 30 dependents had appealed to the Consulate for help.

<sup>3</sup> In a minute of Oct. 17 (95/107113) Ritter noted that all information concerning foreign volunteer units was made available to the Military Attachés concerned. The Spanish Military Attaché was known to show little interest for this information and his Ambassador was therefore uninformed about these matters. At present the Blue Division was deployed in such a way that a visit by the Spanish Ambassador was not feasible.

Mayalde believes that the Spanish Division was at the moment en route by train.

I myself referred the Ambassador to the Führer's words, in his speech yesterday, where it was stated that the Spaniards were now going into battle.<sup>4</sup> In these circumstances a visit with the Division would perhaps not be very easy. Possibly one could consider a rendezvous between the Ambassador and General Munos Grande at a half-way point; however, the High Command of the Wehrmacht would of course have to be asked. I would see what could be done.

The Ambassador recognized the existing difficulties, but again requested that the matter be accelerated in accordance with the thought of the Caudillo.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Hitler's speech in Berlin, Oct. 3, to open the Winter Relief Fund. A summary is given in *Bulletin of International News*, vol. xviii (1941), pp. 1741-1743.

<sup>5</sup> In a memorandum of Oct. 30, St.S No. 712 (95/107166) Weizsäcker recorded a brief conversation with the Spanish Ambassador who expressed his thanks for the courtesies shown to him on his visit with the Blue Division at the front.

### No. 381

82/60680-82

*The Embassy in Japan to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

SECRET

TOKYO, October 6, 1941—1:26 a. m., summer time.

No. 1994 of October 4

Received October 6—11:30 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 1654 of September 24.<sup>1</sup>

For economic as well as political reasons it is advisable to be considerate of Japan and to comply with Japanese wishes.

1. Economically we are entirely dependent on Japan for natural rubber, and we are dependent on her to a large degree for other strategic goods such as, for example, tungsten, tin, oils and fats, mica, shellac and tea. Japan likewise demands goods in return. Since the Anglo-Saxon freeze [of assets] there is hardly any foreign exchange

<sup>1</sup> From a draft in the files (4684/E225216) it appears that this instruction stated that deliveries earmarked for Japan and Manchukuo would be stored in Germany "for a period of time not yet to be determined." The instruction explained that this chiefly involved scarce and urgently needed strategic goods and it pointed out that further production for Japan and Manchukuo could only be justified for urgent political reasons.

that Japan could use. A halt in the production or a confiscation of goods ordered by Japan would therefore unavoidably result in a cessation of Japanese deliveries and assistance in transportation.

The cessation of trade with America, with the [British] Empire, and the Netherlands Indies, eliminating over 60 percent of Japanese foreign trade, has placed Japan under the strongest economic pressure. The interruption of the Siberian route deprived Japan of the connection with the only friendly, large industrial power in whose help, especially in the field of armaments, Japan had placed the greatest hopes. This development took Japan by surprise and suddenly made her conscious of her isolation and the weakness of her economic bases. As Japan does not feel strong enough to fight alone and without a route of secure communication with Germany, she is trying to gain time and is therefore negotiating with America. We can counteract this tendency only by active economic aid and by maintaining the belief in the reopening of the Siberian route. If we halt production of goods or confiscate them, the hopes of German aid and economic cooperation in the spirit of the Tripartite Pact will be frustrated and the danger of a Japanese-American détente will grow, which, even if it should only be temporary, would weaken Japan's readiness to cooperate with Germany in the field of the war economy. It is therefore in the German interest to treat Japanese wishes in such a way that an impression of our resolute and unreserved cooperation is created. (Cf. our telegram No. 765 of May 19<sup>2</sup> on lending rubber; No. 1589 of August 21<sup>3</sup> on pesos; No. 1691 of September 3<sup>3</sup> on coal hydration; No. 1670 of August 30<sup>3</sup> on the airplane factory; No. 1938 of October 1<sup>4</sup> on the Lurgi distilling plant.)

The treatment of the projects regarding coal hydration and the aviation industry in particular are considered a touchstone in Japan, the more so, as with respect to the latter project the Air Office of the Japanese Army refers to a promise by the Reichsmarschall.<sup>5</sup> I therefore request that this telegraphic report be discussed with the office of the Reichsmarschall. Furthermore, the arrival of the ships with strategic cargoes promised in your telegram No. 1539 of September 11,<sup>3</sup> sections A to I 5, would influence Japanese sentiment very favorably by the evidence that strategic goods are not shipped in the direction of

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (177/85109-10).

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed (4684/E225224).

<sup>5</sup> A memorandum of Sept. 22 by Wiehl (82/60640-46) deals at some length with the Japanese wishes referred to in the foregoing.

Germany only. Notwithstanding the basic attitude expressed here, the possibility may exist, according to observations here, that individual orders may be canceled. This should be done, however, only at the wish of the Japanese and in agreement with those Japanese who placed the orders.

WOHLTHAT

Supplement by the Embassy:

The political situation makes our continued economic help for the Japanese partner in the Tripartite Pact urgently necessary. As reported time and again, the Government at Washington has been trying in vain for months to induce Japan to abandon the Tripartite Pact so as to free the strong American and British forces, which so far have been tied up in the Pacific, for employment against the Axis Powers. The Japanese circles cooperating with the American efforts are operating with the argument of the few possibilities for economic aid which Japan can expect on the part of the Axis partner, and of late are exploiting the interruption of the Siberian route in a dangerous manner, as the Foreign Minister has indicated to me.<sup>6</sup> As opposed to this the expectations of the circles adhering to the Tripartite Pact, especially the Armed Forces, are directed toward gaining again a usable trade route with Germany in the near future. A German decision to halt production of goods for Japan could not remain secret here, would be welcomed by friends of a compromise and would further disappoint the hopes of the friends of the Pact, thus increasing the danger of the detachment of Japan from the Tripartite Pact.<sup>7</sup>

OTT

<sup>6</sup> See document No. 310.

<sup>7</sup> A memorandum of Oct. 15 by Eisenlohr (82/60720-21) explained that the points made by the Tokyo Embassy in the telegram printed here were brought about by a statement of the Reich Minister of Economics saying that Japanese wishes for delivery of war material and vital technical equipment could be met only if justified "by an urgent political interest" in view of the demands of Germany's own armament program. The memorandum then stated the following:

"To be sure, the ministries concerned had raised considerable objections on account of the secrecy with respect to certain arms and deliveries, out of concern over giving valuable German inventions to a competitor, and also on account of the demands of our rearmament on German production. However, they have adopted a more accommodating attitude in the meantime. Now the Reichsmarschall, too, has agreed that the construction of an airplane factory by the Junkers firm mentioned among the Japanese wishes should be dealt with in a positive way.

"Moreover, the Embassy in Tokyo has been authorized in a telegraphic instruction of Oct. 8 to communicate to the Japanese even at this time that 'their wishes will be complied with in every possible way as a proof of German-Japanese cooperation in accordance with the Tripartite Pact.'"

## No. 382

216/147758

*The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram en clair

No. 3031 of October 6

Paris, October 6, 1941—8:45 p. m.

Received October 6—11:30 p. m.

State Secretary Benoist-Méchin told me today in a conversation that difficulties with Japan are increasing in Indochina every day. Japan, while observing, with some exceptions, the military clauses of the agreement<sup>1</sup> was increasingly infringing upon the economic and political sovereignty of France. Darlan originally had given very strong personal support to the settlement desired by Japan in Indochina because he was afraid that any other policy might give the Anglo-Saxon armed forces a pretext for intervening and also because he wanted to establish good relations with a state that was a signatory of the Tripartite Pact. Japan's aggressive action with respect to France's sovereignty in Indochina had given rise to expressions of doubt within the French Government regarding the correctness of Darlan's policy; it was to be feared, moreover, that the opposition to his policy might stiffen in French military and administrative circles in Indochina.

I took a noncommittal attitude toward Benoist-Méchin's statement which obviously was aimed at German intervention in Tokyo.<sup>2</sup>

ABETZ

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 146 and footnote 2.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram No. 3062 of Oct. 8 (216/147759-60) Abetz reported that the French Foreign Ministry had handed a memorandum to the Embassy's representative in Vichy, Consul General Krug von Nidda, protesting the Japanese actions in Indochina and stating that France had informed the Japanese Foreign Minister that France would "resist by every possible means attempts by the Japanese military to exceed the limits of the agreements concluded." The French Government asked that these statements be conveyed to Berlin.

According to an unnumbered draft telegram of Oct. 8 (217/147762) Weizsäcker instructed the Embassy in Paris that a reply to the memorandum handed to Krug von Nidda was not necessary.

## No. 383

95/107127

*State Secretary Weizsäcker to Ambassador Stohrer*

BERLIN, October 6, 1941.

DEAR STOHRER: Yesterday I received your letter of the 2nd of this month<sup>1</sup> and I brought it up in today's staff meeting of directors lest Mayalde be hindered by careless inattention from getting accustomed here.<sup>2</sup>

I myself find Mayalde pleasant and I have no cause for complaint. I try to treat him well. My first impression of him was that he appeared almost too unassuming for his position here. I have no doubt that he will accustom himself to things here for no one here has anything against him personally. As you yourself say his linguistic shortcomings are an encumbrance.

In my view the kernel of the matter is that Mayalde and many other Chiefs of Mission here, as things now are, scarcely get to see the Foreign Minister or the Führer. With the exception of 48 hours Herr von Ribbentrop has had to stay away from Berlin for the last 3½ months. Thus it is that the Chiefs of Mission never see the responsible conductor of our foreign policy unless they are called to headquarters and they often complain about this among themselves. I myself am naturally always available to the gentlemen if they wish to talk to me, but I have the reputation for taciturnity which to me is incomprehensible.

Heil Hitler!

Yours, etc.

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>1</sup> In this letter (124/123158-61) Stohrer stated: that Mayalde had come back to Madrid on the instruction of Serrano Suñer in order to report on his first impressions of Berlin; that Mayalde had expressed himself as very well satisfied with his reception by Hitler (cf. document No. 226, footnote 2); but that he (Stohrer) had heard indirectly that Mayalde did not feel at all happy in Berlin.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 229.

## No. 384

5111/E295482

*Minute by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, October 6, 1941.

Press Department:

The use of uranium for blasting purposes must have been dealt with recently in the foreign press, especially the American press. I would

be grateful if material of this kind, which your office may possibly note, could be sent to me.<sup>1</sup>

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>1</sup> Minister Schmidt, the Director of the News Service and Press Department, informed Weizsäcker in a memorandum of Oct. 7 (5111/E295431) that he was forwarding reports about the manner in which this matter was being treated in the Swedish Press but that a parallel check on the American Press had produced so far no results. In a marginal notation of Oct. 9 on the same document Weizsäcker stated that further material would be valuable.

No. 385

2361/488717-19

*The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry*

TOP SECRET

THERAPIA, October 6, 1941.

No. A 5124

Subject: Egyptian efforts at rapprochement.

In the last few days Dr. Samir Zoulfikar Bey of Cairo appeared here, requesting that he would like to speak to me in confidence.<sup>1</sup>

Dr. Zoulfikar is the nephew of the recently deceased Egyptian Minister President Zoulfikar Pasha, and a brother of the Egyptian Minister in Tehran.<sup>2</sup> Officially he has come here in order to ask the Turkish Government for asylum for the Iranian Crown Prince and his wife (an Egyptian princess),<sup>3</sup> for the reason that the English have left no doubt that they will exile him from Iran within a short time because they wish to replace him with a Khajar prince.

Dr. Zoulfikar carried on his conversation with me by order of his King as well as in the name of the three leading Egyptian parties ("Wafd", the fatherland party, "Hisb el Watani", and the liberal-constitutional "Ahrar Dusturiye"). He is instructed to clarify the question of what fate Germany envisaged for Egypt, in case the German attack in Libya, which the English and Egyptians expected in the immediate future, should be successful. They desired an assurance that Egypt would not be allotted to the Italian Lebensraum, but that she would be recognized as a completely independent state on condition of her cooperation with the Axis.

<sup>1</sup> A letter of Sept. 25 from Samir Zoulfikar addressed to Papen (2361/488714-15) and a memorandum of Oct. 2 by Press Attaché Schmidt-Dumont (3883/E048277-80) regarding a conversation with Samir Zoulfikar are also in the files.

<sup>2</sup> See documents Nos. 49 and 66.

<sup>3</sup> Crown Prince Mohammed Riza Pahlevi who was married to Princess Fewzieh, sister of King Farouk, had actually acceded to the throne of Iran following the abdication of his father, Riza Shah Pahlevi, on September 16.

Furthermore the circles mentioned above wish to make an agreement with the Axis to the effect that Cairo will no longer be bombarded. The latest attack resulted in an exceedingly large number of casualties among the civilian population, whereas no English soldiers had lost their lives. As a result of an agreement with England, which has so far been kept by the British, Cairo has no factories, plants or depots of military importance of any sort, with the exception of the airfield at Heliopolis. The latest attack is being strongly exploited by the English against the Axis, whereas it is the principal desire of the circles mentioned to promote a favorable atmosphere for an occupation by the Axis, and if possible, even to come to the aid of the Axis troops at the decisive moment.

In this connection it should be noted that the English have made every preparation to evacuate Egypt. The transshipment port for English supplies is today Port Sudan. In Ismailia there are still tremendous troop encampments and supplies, to be sure, and there is also an aviators' school at Abu Sueir, but otherwise the command center of the English air force in Egypt has been transferred to Port Sudan. In Khartoum, too, preparations are being made for receiving large numbers of troops, and the railroad through Berber to Suakin and Port Sudan is being reinforced.

It would result in an exceedingly favorable propaganda success for the Axis if it stated that Cairo was an "open city" and would be treated as such militarily.<sup>4</sup> So far the English had stubbornly refused the request for such a declaration.

In order to establish continuous cooperation Dr. Zoulfikar or, if he should no longer receive an exit permit, Dr. Hafiz Ramadan, founder of the Watani party, will return here by the beginning of December. Should neither of the two men be permitted to leave, then Dr. Zoulfikar intends if necessary to fly in one of the King's airplanes with the Egyptian national emblem to a point in southern Libya where he could make contact with the German troops.

Dr. Zoulfikar will return to Egypt in the next few days. As his reference, among others, he cites Ambassador von Stohrer. He made the good and convincing impression on me of being an Egyptian patriot.

<sup>4</sup> The Legation in Sweden reported in telegram No. 1391 of Sept. 11 (266/173631) that the Egyptian Foreign Ministry through the good offices of the Swedish Minister in Cairo had addressed to the German Government a protest against a recent bombardment of Cairo by German planes in view of the fact that Cairo was an open city and a holy city for the Moslem world. Woermann thereupon instructed Minister Wied in telegram No. 2185 of Sept. 20 (266/173632) to reject any future protests against bombardments of Egyptian cities. He wrote that démarches in this matter made directly in Berlin would likewise be rejected as they ought to be addressed to the British Government "which, by its military measures, has made Egypt and her cities a theater of war."



I request instructions as to what further action is to be taken here in the matter.<sup>5</sup>

PAPEN

<sup>5</sup> The requested instructions, sent by Erdmannsdorff in telegram No. 1509 of Oct. 15 (2361/488727), read as follows:

"There is no intention of going into the questions touched upon by Zouffikar. Please treat the matter in a dilatory fashion at your post."

No. 386

260/170223-24

*The Acting Deputy Director in the Political Department to the Legation in Finland*

Telegram

[No. 1242]<sup>1</sup>

BERLIN, [October 7, 1941—4:55 p. m.]

[Received October 8.]

Pol. V 4340.

Drafting Officer: Senior Counselor Schliep.

With reference to your telegram No. 1045 of October 2.<sup>2</sup>

I. For the guidance of your conversation:

As long as the Eastern campaign lasts, the question of a political new order in the Baltic countries cannot be discussed. After these areas have been liberated from Bolshevism it is, first of all, a question of obliterating traces of the Soviet regime and of introducing an organized administration. For this, the indigenous element will, to a large extent, be employed for tasks of self-government in the administrative, economic, and cultural fields. The Estonian politician Mae and other reliable Estonians are being employed in positions of trust as advisors for the civil administration.

II. Strictly confidential information:

We are not interested in discussing the problem with foreigners. We do intend to bring the Baltic countries into very close association with the Reich. Constitutional details have not yet been laid down; these will probably only then be worked out in the further course of the political development, with the experience to be gained in the Reich Commissariat for the Eastern Territories.

ERDMANNSDORFF

<sup>1</sup> The number of the telegram, dates, and time of dispatch have been supplied from a copy (6435/H061066) in the Helsinki Legation file.

<sup>2</sup> In this telegram (260/170210) Blücher reported that Witting was very interested in the administrative reorganization in Estonia and asked for guidance in possible conversations.

No. 387

1857/422110-12

*The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 3462 of October 6

WASHINGTON, October 7, 1941—12:06 p. m.

Received October 8—1:50 a. m.

Strong opposition in the Congress against repeal or amendment of the Neutrality Act<sup>1</sup> compels Roosevelt to proceed with caution and deliberation.<sup>2</sup> His endeavor is naturally to abolish the Neutrality Act because it is in conflict with the avowed foreign policy of the American Government and because its repeal would impress Britain and Japan. Besides the need to take the parliamentary opposition and public sentiment into account, the general war situation also forces him to proceed step by step. The elimination of Russia and the new military situation resulting from it would require new decisions in which the repeal of the Neutrality Act, indicating that the United States is fully ready for war, might not appear to be a desirable solution. The President will therefore restrict himself probably to the arming of merchant vessels, for which there is a majority in the Congress. This step has more psychological than practical significance because there are not enough guns and gun crews and the possibilities for defense are problematical. The frequent emphasis that the American Navy should take action against "pirates" and that American merchant vessels ought to defend themselves against "pirates" means that any incidents

<sup>1</sup> Joint Resolution by the United States Congress "To preserve the neutrality and the peace of the United States and to secure the safety of its citizens and their interests," approved Nov. 4, 1939, and referred to as the "Neutrality Act of 1939". For text see U. S. Statutes at Large, 1939-1941, vol. 54, p. 4.

<sup>2</sup> The question of a repeal of the Neutrality Act was discussed among the American public and press with increasing frequency in the latter part of September 1941. Following a demand for repeal of the Neutrality Act made by Secretary Knox in an address of Sept. 23, Counselor Weber of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat informed Dieckhoff in telegram No. 1032 of Sept. 23 (1543/375861) from the Special Train that Ribbentrop requested a report on the significance of an immediate repeal of the Neutrality Act as demanded by Secretary Knox. Dieckhoff dispatched the report requested in a teletype message of Sept. 24 (1543/375862-63). After analyzing in detail how the various provisions of the Act would be changed, Dieckhoff summarized his conclusions as follows:

"To sum it up, the repeal of the Neutrality Act would have a far-reaching significance. American citizens and American vessels in future would be able to move everywhere without being restricted, the tonnage of the American merchant marine would thus be available for shipments from the United States to Britain, etc. and the crews could be American citizens. Furthermore, the repeal of the Act would eliminate the existing safeguards against incidents involving American citizens and American vessels; such incidents would then unavoidably happen, and public sentiment in the United States, which so far has been overwhelmingly opposed to entering the war, would gradually be eroded to such an extent that the President could sooner or later induce the Congress to declare war on Germany."

that might be provoked by these steps will not be used to declare war against Germany, but that the President is limiting himself to the waging of an "undeclared war" with the fleet and leaving it to Germany to declare war. The impression is again confirmed that the President will be willing to engage in total war only when all the following prerequisites are met:

1. Japan quits the Tripartite Pact;
2. Russia successfully continues her fight;
3. There is a prospect that American participation in the war would guarantee a quick victory.

In contrast to these prerequisites, the situation today is characterized by:

1. Defective preparedness of the USA, especially in the event of a two-front war, difficulties in transportation and in making deliveries;
2. Hopelessness of defeating Germany by military means;
3. Necessity to take public opinion into account. (The great majority of Roosevelt's followers, especially among the propertyless classes, adhere to the majority parties because of his social reforms, but not from enthusiasm about his foreign policy.)
4. Distrust toward Japan. Uncertain feeling that the Japanese in the last analysis may be engaged in double-dealing.
5. Grave worries about the consequences of Russia's elimination for Britain's key position in the Middle East.

Roosevelt's foreign policy is therefore as in the past directed at creating, by gaining time and exploiting the allies to the utmost, a situation where the aforesaid three prerequisites would enter in. As I know from reliable sources, Roosevelt and his advisers, especially Colonel Donovan,<sup>3</sup> the leader of the American Fifth Column, are dominated by the primitive belief that Germany, if the war is sufficiently prolonged, will crack up under the blockade, the air raids, and the internal revolt against National Socialism, and that America, as in 1918, will be able to deal the *coup de grâce*, without this time withdrawing from the supervision of Europe's reconstruction.

Although a certain element of surprise can never be ruled out in the case of Roosevelt, I still believe that the preceding remarks are a substantially correct statement of the situation as far as it relates to America's entry into the war. The story is different with regard to the rupture of diplomatic relations with Germany and her allies; this must be anticipated as the gesture of a strong man which entails no immediate risk and yet impresses the satellites. The time limit of three months set in the compensation claim for the *Robin Moor*<sup>4</sup> and

<sup>3</sup> William J. Donovan, served as unofficial observer for the Secretary of the Navy in Southeastern Europe, Dec. 1940-Mar. 1941; appointed Coordinator of Information, July 11, 1941.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 337.

in the suggested mutual exchange of nationals<sup>5</sup> almost suggests the date of the break. Yet it is possible that in this respect, too, the outcome of the war against Russia will have a sobering effect.

THOMSEN

<sup>5</sup> In telegram No. 3241 of Sept. 16 (1543/375337-39) Thomsen had reported a proposal made by Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long according to which the American Government would help to negotiate the mutual repatriation of German and British nationals and at the same time bring about the return of the American citizens from Germany and German-occupied areas.

## No. 388

M178/M005694-95

### *Directive of the High Command of the Wehrmacht*

CHEFSACHE

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, October 7, 1941.

TOP SECRET MILITARY

High Command of the Wehrmacht

No. 141675/41 g.K. Chefs. WFSt./Abt. L. (I Op.)

By Officer only

Reference: OKH (Op. Abt.) No. 41 244/g.K. of September 18, 1941.

The Führer has again decided that a capitulation of Leningrad or later of Moscow is not to be accepted even if the adversary should offer it.<sup>1</sup>

The moral justification of this attitude is plain before the whole world. Just as in Kiev the gravest hazard arose for the troops from blasts set with time fuses, the same, and worse, must be expected in Moscow and Leningrad. The Soviet radio itself has announced that Leningrad was mined and would be defended to the last man.

A threat of serious epidemics also exists.

No German soldier must therefore enter these cities. Those who want to leave the city toward our lines, must be repelled by firing. Smaller, not obstructed gaps which permit an exodus of the population toward Russia's interior should therefore be welcome. For all other cities the word is likewise that before seizure they are to be ground down by gunfire and air raids and their population induced to flee.

Risking the lives of German soldiers in order to save Russian cities from the danger of conflagration, or to feed their population at the expense of the German homeland cannot be justified.

<sup>1</sup> See the record of Hitler's remarks in the conference of July 16, document No. 114; a minute by the Naval War Staff (M178/M005691-93) on the subject of the future of Leningrad records this decision on Sept. 29.

The chaos in Russia will get all the worse and our administration and utilization of the occupied eastern territories will get all the easier, the more the population of the Soviet cities will flee to the interior of Russia.

This will of the Führer must be communicated to all commanders.  
The Chief of the High Command  
of the Wehrmacht  
By order:  
JODL

No. 389

105/114085-86

*Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Legal Department*

BERLIN, October 8, 1941.

Counselor von Post of the Swedish Legation today transmitted the enclosed pro memoria, which reproduced the essential points of a communication which the Soviet Government had asked the Swedish Government to forward.

The second paragraph of the pro memoria referred to the German note which was transmitted to the Swedish Legation concerning the recognition of the application of The Hague Rules of Land Warfare in the present war in the east.<sup>1</sup> In this note the point was made that before Germany could reach an agreement with the Soviet Government regarding the prisoners of war, the Soviet Government would have to change thoroughly its treatment of the German prisoners of war. The Soviet Government wanted to state that in its relations with Germany in the matter of prisoners of war it merely wished reciprocal observance of the rules of land warfare and did not intend to conclude any other agreements.

M. von Post then asked whether progress had been made in the question of visiting of prisoner of war camps by representatives of the protective powers. I replied that, as he knew, in July of this year we had taken a step with the Soviet Government through Bulgaria as the protective power for Germany, which has so far remained unanswered.

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 173, footnote 5.

In this situation it was not for us to undertake anything further.<sup>2</sup>  
Submitted herewith to the Legal Department, IV.

DR. ALBRECHT

[Enclosure]

PRO MEMORIA

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics categorically denies that it has not acted according to the Rules of Land Warfare with respect to captured German soldiers; the German prisoners of war have been treated according to the provisions of The Hague Agreement of October 18, 1907, concerning the rules and usages of land warfare.<sup>3</sup>

The Government of the Union has no intention whatever of concluding any kind of convention with the German Government regarding prisoners of war, and made only the demand (*revendication*) of the German Government that the internationally recognized provisions regarding the treatment of prisoners of war and in particular the principles of The Hague Agreement of 1907 regarding the rules and usages of land warfare be precisely observed.

<sup>2</sup> On Dec. 22 Ribbentrop submitted to Hitler a memorandum (4940/E273019-21) which dealt with the problems of the prisoners of war in the German-Soviet war. According to this memorandum the International Committee of the Red Cross had made proposals to the OKW with respect to arrangements under which the prisoners of war on both sides would be supplied with food and clothing from the United States; furthermore, there would be organized a mutual exchange of data concerning prisoners of war through the offices of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva. Ribbentrop recommended acceptance of these proposals particularly, as the OKW and Propaganda Minister Goebbels were also favorably disposed toward such a course of action.

On Jan. 9 Ritter recorded (4940/E273013) having been told by Ribbentrop that Hitler had rejected these Red Cross proposals. Later on Hewel explained to Ritter that in the course of a conference with Keitel and Jodl Hitler had rejected the proposal for two reasons:

"One reason was that he did not wish the troops on the eastern front to get the wrong idea that in case they were captured they would be treated by the Russians in accordance with treaties. The second reason was that the Russian Government, by comparing names could discover that not all Russian soldiers who had come into German hands were alive."

With respect to the efforts of the International Red Cross in the matter of the prisoners of war in the first phase of the German-Soviet war, cf. XVIIth International Red Cross Conference, *Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross on its Activities During the Second World War*, vol. I, pp. 408-424.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 173, footnote 2.

## No. 390

4895/E282528;  
4895/E282531-33*German-Turkish Exchanges of Letters*<sup>1</sup>THE CHAIRMAN OF THE GERMAN ECONOMIC DELEGATION TO THE  
CHAIRMAN OF THE TURKISH ECONOMIC DELEGATION

CONFIDENTIAL ANKARA, October 9, 1941.

M. CHAIRMAN: I have the honor to confirm the receipt of your letter of today's date,<sup>2</sup> which reads as follows:

"I have the honor to inform you that the Turkish Government agrees to issue licenses for the export of copper, chromium, cotton and olive oil to Germany in the following amounts:

Copper	12,000 tons
Chromium	45,000 tons
Cotton	7,000 tons
Olive oil	8,000 tons

Any differences that may arise between the values cited in List I<sup>3</sup> and the actual values of these quantities will be compensated for by an increase or reduction of the values provided in List I for the other categories."

Accept, M. Chairman, the assurance of my highest consideration.  
CLUDIUS

THE CHAIRMAN OF THE GERMAN ECONOMIC DELEGATION TO THE CHAIR-  
MAN OF THE TURKISH ECONOMIC DELEGATION<sup>4</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL ANKARA, October 9, 1941.

M. CHAIRMAN: I have the honor to confirm to you that the following was agreed upon between the German Government and the Turkish Government on the occasion of today's signing of the commercial agreement between Germany and Turkey:

During the period of validity of the agreement cited above, i.e., before March 31, 1943, the German Government and the Turkish Gov-

<sup>1</sup> These exchanges are part of a series of documents relating to the German-Turkish Commercial Agreement and Payments Agreement, both signed in Ankara, Oct. 9. The entire complex of agreements, protocols, letters, and confidential letters in German, French, and Turkish is filmed on serial 4995 and a table of contents is found on 4995/E282453-55. The texts of the Commercial and Payments Agreements were published in *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1941, II, p. 375, under date of Nov. 15.

<sup>2</sup> French text of Menemencioğlu's letter is filmed on 4995/E282567.

<sup>3</sup> Annexes of the confidential letter of Oct. 9 from Clodius to Menemencioğlu (4995/E282516-18) included List I and List IA.

<sup>4</sup> The file copy of this letter is not signed. The initials of Clodius and Menemencioğlu are found on a French copy of this letter (4995/282585).

ernment will conclude an agreement on the delivery of chromium ore by Turkey to Germany until December 31, 1944, on the following terms:

1. The amount provided for war material in List I A<sup>5</sup> of the confidential letter which forms an essential part of the commercial agreement concluded today shall be utilized in its entirety by the delivery of material to Turkey under the terms provided for in the agreement named.

2. The chromium ore to be exported from Turkey will constitute the equivalent for further deliveries of war material which are to be jointly agreed upon between the two Governments.

3. The Turkish Government will then approve the export of an annual amount of 90,000 tons of chromium for the periods from January 15 to December 31, 1943, and from January 1 to December 31, 1944, thus a total of 180,000 tons for the period from January 15, 1943, to the end of the year 1944.

Accept, M. Chairman, the assurance of my highest consideration.

THE CHAIRMAN OF THE GERMAN ECONOMIC DELEGATION TO THE CHAIR-  
MAN OF THE TURKISH ECONOMIC DELEGATION<sup>6</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL ANKARA, October 9, 1941.

M. Chairman: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter of today's date<sup>7</sup> which reads as follows:

"I have the honor to transmit to you below a list of the war material provided for in group 1 of List I A.

Spare parts for trucks and motorcycles (Stoewer, NSU, GKD, NAG, Magirus, Tempo, Büssing)  
Krupp cannon 7.5/60 (with sighting mechanism, altimeter, and ammunition)  
Bochumer Verein cannon 7.5/20 (with ammunition)  
Sighting mechanisms (for Krupp cannon 7.5/42)  
Altimeters (for Krupp cannon 7.5/42)  
Pontoons, engineer equipment (explosives)  
Heavy machineguns  
Spare parts for aircraft (Heinkel, Gotha, Fokke-Wulff)  
40 gun barrels (Bochumer Verein)  
2 diesel engines (for U-boats)  
4 periscopes (for U-boats)  
Or other material to be agreed upon  
Miscellaneous material."

Please accept, M. Chairman, the assurances of my highest consideration.

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 3.

<sup>6</sup> The file copy of this letter is not signed. The initials of Clodius and Menemencioğlu are found on a French copy of this letter (4995/282587).

<sup>7</sup> French text filmed on 4995/E282586.

No. 391

95/107129-32

*Ambassador Ritter to the Embassy in Spain*

Telegram

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL TRAIN October 9, 1941—7:45 p. m.

No. 1083 from the Special Train

Received Berlin, October 9—8:35 p. m.

No. 2367 from the Foreign Ministry Sent October 10—1:30 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 3250 of September 19.<sup>1</sup>

1. For your own information.

The transfer of the two German ships *Corrientes* and *Charlotte Schliemann* from the outer harbor of Las Palmas to the inner harbor is rather disadvantageous to the effectiveness of the German submarines in the battle of the Atlantic. The German Navy has, therefore, asked the Foreign Ministry that every diplomatic effort be made to cancel these measures of the Spanish Government and to make possible again in some way or other the supplying of German submarines from these two ships.

It has been resented here that a protest from the English Government sufficed to make the Spanish Government zealously comply with the English wishes, without even previously consulting with the German Government about it. But perhaps this may be excused by the fact that the Spanish Government wanted to anticipate possible English action by force against the two German ships in the outer harbor. In the further treatment of this question, however, there is no point in our criticizing the action of the Spanish Government in the past, but it is rather for us to make possible that in the future German submarines be supplied from Las Palmas as before. I request, therefore, that you treat the matter in an emphatically friendly but decisive manner.

II. I ask that you see the Spanish Foreign Minister and discuss with him the fact that the two ships *Corrientes* and *Charlotte Schliemann* have been transferred from the outer harbor of Las Palmas to the inner harbor. This transfer was made because of a one-sided decree of the Spanish authorities, without prior communication with the German Government or with the owners of the German ships. The German Government was only subsequently informed through

<sup>1</sup> In this telegram (95/107085) Stohrer reported that the British Government, in an official note to the Spanish Government, had requested the withdrawal of two German ships into the inner harbor of Las Palmas because they were apparently supplying German submarines. The Spanish Minister of the Navy had agreed to this request in order to prevent further incidents. See also document No. 122.

notification from the Spanish Minister of the Navy<sup>2</sup> to the German Naval Attaché<sup>3</sup> of the fact that the English Government in a note had demanded the withdrawal of these ships to the inner harbor, because these ships had "apparently" supplied submarines. The Reich Government must leave the decision up to the Spanish Government whether it was politically wise to comply with such an unusual request of the English Government without further ado. From the German point of view this is to be regretted, because it might convey acknowledgement of the Spanish Government that the supplying of German submarines from both German ships actually took place.

Through the interference of the Spanish Government disadvantages in various directions have now arisen for Germany.

1. The two German ships now lie in Las Palmas in full view of English firms. It is certain that the English naval forces will be immediately informed of a possible departure of the ships. Thus, the German ships would be endangered to the utmost by an eventual departure. The departure has practically been made impossible. Therefore, it must be requested that different anchorage places be assigned to the ships, which would assure an unobserved departure.

2. According to reports available here English sabotage is planned against both ships. The present anchorages favor such sabotage. We must expect from the Spanish Government that it will protect the German ships from any sabotage. From this point of view also a better anchorage would be desirable.

3. The chief disadvantage, however, is that the support of German submarines from this anchorage is impossible. After a thorough examination, the Head of the Spanish Government had previously made the promise that Spain would make possible such aid for German submarines (cf. secret dispatch No. 1119 of November 30, 1939).<sup>4</sup> The Spanish Government will acknowledge that the German Navy, in using this privilege, has been most considerate of Spain's position. The Reich Government considers it understood that the Spanish Government stands by its word now as in the past. The objective now is to make possible again the supplying of German submarines from these two ships in the future. Technical suggestions on this cannot be made from Berlin. The German Naval Attaché has been commissioned to find such possibilities in confidential collaboration with the Spanish Navy. Should no other possibilities be found, the two German ships must again be transferred to their previous anchorages in the outer harbor. Should the English Government make renewed protests, the Spanish Government should reply that investigations in the meantime have proved that the assertion of the English note was unfounded. The Spanish Government, therefore, had no occasion to maintain coercive measures against the German ships. Moreover, the Spanish Government was surprised that the English Government derived such demands and protests in view of Spain's neutrality, while

<sup>2</sup> Rear Adm. S. Moreno Fernandez.

<sup>3</sup> Cmdr. C. Meyer-Döhner.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed (1672/394818-24).

the English naval forces as is generally known customarily supplied themselves in harbors of neutral countries. The Spanish Government therefore, could not acknowledge the English representations as basically justified.

III. In agreement with the Navy I request that the Naval Attaché be instructed to carry on the further technical discussions with the Spanish Navy. I request the Ambassador, however, to intervene again if the technical discussions of the Naval Attaché should not produce satisfactory results.

IV. In your telegram No. 3250 of September 19, you report that the English note of protest reads that "apparently" submarines have been supplied by the two German ships. From the wording "apparently", it would be assumed that the English note does not advance strict proof for such a supplying. It would be desirable during the course of your discussions if you could obtain from the Spanish Government the text of the English note of protest.

Not only for further tactical treatment of the affair but also for judging the attitude of the Spanish Government, it would be desirable to clarify whether the English Government knows and has advanced details on the previous supplying operations.<sup>5</sup>

RITTER

<sup>5</sup> For Stohrer's reply see document No. 403.

## No. 392

95/107133-34

### *The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

TOP SECRET

MADRID, October 10, 1941—8:00 p. m.

No. 3520 of October 10

Received October 10—10:30 p. m.

With reference to my top secret cipher letter 2521 of September 28.<sup>1</sup>

The domestic policy crisis, particularly the fight against Foreign Minister Serrano Suñer, has reached a certain high point in the last few days<sup>2</sup> and has led to a very thorough and evidently very agitated conference between the Chief of State and his brother-in-law.

Suñer spoke to me today with exceeding frankness and at the same time great vehemence about the attacks made on him of late, particularly by military quarters. He stated that his opponents were reproaching him more and more for having done grave damage to Spain

<sup>1</sup> In this message (95/107121-23) Stohrer gave a detailed report of Spain's internal position at that time.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram No. 2386 of Aug. 21 (95/107023) Stohrer had reported continued political unrest and discontent.

through his foreign policy line in favor of Germany, because England and America, which would after all win the war, were now hostile toward Spain and were damaging Spain economically. General Aranda<sup>3</sup> had gone furthest. Probably at the instigation of former Foreign Minister Beigbeder,<sup>4</sup> he had taken up contact with the English Ambassador<sup>5</sup> and had been close to organizing a military plot to give a new direction to Spanish foreign policy. He had now submitted the relevant evidence to the Caudillo and opened his eyes to the grave danger inherent in this agitation. Not only the military but also a majority of the Ministers had secretly remonstrated with Franco in order to discredit him, the Foreign Minister, and his policy. He had told the Caudillo, and repeated it to me, that he had no hates and no loves, but that he only pursued a policy in accordance with Spain's own peculiar interests and this policy went along with Germany through thick and thin; for only Germany's victory could save Spain, and he believed firmly in our victory. All of these political intriguers, generals, and so-called politicians, who today were suing for England's friendship in expectation of an English victory, would be destroyed or at best expelled from the country in case of an English victory, just like the Caudillo and himself, Spain's unity would be destroyed, a Basque and a Catalonian republic would arise; in brief, the entire new Spain would be annihilated.

Through a strange accident the Minister (one group missing) to the telephone in the midst of his statements, where the Spanish Ambassador in Berlin passed on to him personally the disclosures about the great decisive victory in Russia which Reich Press Chief Dietrich made to the foreign journalists in Berlin.

The Minister congratulated me, then pounded on the table and said: "There, you see that I am right, and my opponents are wrong if they believe that I have now been weakened by all of these persecutions; I shall continue this policy, which is the only right one, with all the energy at my command. It does not matter to me in the slightest who is against me."

I had the definite impression that the Minister's statements were sincere; considering the situation, however, we must wait and see whether he is really strong enough to overcome once more the extraordinarily great opposition against him and to win out.<sup>6</sup>

The state of internal agitation has reached the point today that a clear decision must be made for or against Suñer within the foresee-

<sup>3</sup> Gen. Mata Antonio Aranda, Director of the Army Staff College.

<sup>4</sup> Juan Beigbeder y Adienza, Spanish Foreign Minister, Aug. 1939-Oct. 1940.

<sup>5</sup> Sir Samuel Hoare.

<sup>6</sup> In cipher letter No. 2624 g.Rs. of Nov. 6 (498/233903-10) Stohrer reported that the internal tension continued, that Serrano Suñer's foes had not given up; but that Franco feared to dismiss him lest such a move favor the monarchists and denote a change in Spain's foreign policy.

able future. I do not believe that his departure must necessarily mean such decisive change in the direction of Spanish foreign policy as the Minister expects.

STOHRER

No. 393

285/173342-44

*The Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 319 of October 10

ANKARA, October 10, 1941.

Del. No. 74

Received October 10—10:30 p. m.

For the Reich Foreign Minister.

In the course of my stay the Foreign Minister and Numan spoke with me repeatedly about the aims of Turkish foreign policy. In particular in the last conversations yesterday and today both tried insistently to explain to me that the Turkish standpoint was justified. In this connection Numan referred to the conversation which he had in the summer of 1938 with the Reich Foreign Minister.<sup>1</sup> The Foreign Minister asked me to convey his special personal greetings to the Reich Foreign Minister. He was very sorry that he had not yet had an opportunity to meet the Reich Foreign Minister personally. The quintessence of the Turkish presentation is approximately as follows:

In the struggle against Russia, Turkey is entirely on Germany's side and hopes for a quick German victory. Turkey had openly told the English this repeatedly. Turkey did not wish to intervene in the conflict. She would defend herself to the utmost by every means against anyone attacking Turkish soil, no matter whether it was Germany, England, or Russia. She would in no case let herself be misused for any kind of operation by England against Germany. On the other hand her alliance with England also prohibited her, for example, from permitting German troops to pass through in order to fight in the Near East. Numan tried time and again to demonstrate that this attitude on the part of Turkey also was in accordance with the German interests, because precisely through her neutrality Turkey protected Germany's right flank in the fight against Russia, without Germany's having to utilize military forces for this. The Foreign Minister said that it was natural that Turkey could not remain disinterested in the fate of 40 million people of Turkish origin in Russia. For reasons of

<sup>1</sup> Apparently a reference to conversations held in Berlin in July 1938. See vol. of this series, document No. 548 and footnote 1.

geography, to be sure, the union of these areas with Turkey in the case of a reorganization of the Russian realm was hardly possible; perhaps, however, the areas could receive administrative autonomy with a strong cultural affiliation with Turkey. It was necessary in the first place that thousands of young people from these areas should be sent to Turkey to study in order to create a feeling of Turkish nationality among the oppressed population. Numan, who it is my impression is still the spiritual leader of Turkish foreign policy, seems to deviate a little in these questions from the somewhat unclear statements of his Foreign Minister. He stressed repeatedly that Turkey had no aspirations outside her present borders.

With regard to the outcome of the war as a whole the Turks desire the total defeat of Russia and a compromise peace between Germany and England, which Numan conceives in such a way that Germany gives England a free hand in Eastern Europe (sic) whereas the new order in Western Europe is to come about in agreement between England and Germany. Numan explains his view by stating that he is convinced, that Germany, to be sure, cannot be conquered, but that on the other hand he finds it hard to visualize a German victory over England.

This evaluation of the situation as a whole results in the effort of Turkish policy to improve the relationship with Germany, especially since the start of the Russian campaign, but at the same time not to let the connections with England break off. The conclusion of yesterday's economic treaty<sup>2</sup> is regarded from this point of view mainly as a political factor by prominent Turkish individuals.

CLODIUS

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 390 and footnote 1.

No. 394

95/107137-38

*The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

SECRET MADRID, October 10, 1941—9:25 p. m., s[ummer] time.  
No. 3523 of October 10 Received October 10—11:40 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 3419 of October 3.<sup>1</sup>

The Spanish Foreign Minister has told me the following about the course of his recent conversation with the U.S.A. Ambassador, which

<sup>1</sup> In this telegram (95/107116) Stohrer reported that Sufier had finally consented to a reception of the Ambassador of the United States by Franco. The Spanish Government hoped thereby to diminish American economic pressure but would not make any political concessions to achieve this goal.

after great ill feeling was finally arranged through the Spanish Ambassador in Washington,<sup>2</sup> and about the Ambassador's audience with Franco, which took place in his presence:<sup>3</sup>

The Ambassador had indicated to Franco the prospect of far-reaching American concessions such as he had suggested earlier—loans, deliveries of raw materials, etc.—if Spain would stop the present policy hostile to England and America.<sup>4</sup> The Minister and Franco had replied that Spain was much more modest; she merely desired the delivery of gasoline and other goods for which England had already issued navicerts, and therewith the end of the at least partial blockade imposed by the U.S.A.

Referring to a statement made by Serrano Suñer in the preliminary conference, according to which America and England, through their policy of economic thumbscrews, would finally drive Spain into the war without any influence being exerted by Germany, the Ambassador asked Franco whether he had to regard this as a threat. Serrano Suñer, who was present at the audience, intervened and stated that his remark had simply served as a statement of fact, whereupon Franco expressly identified himself with the statement by the Foreign Minister.

The Foreign Minister has the impression that America will now come around to some extent. The American Ambassador intends to fly to Washington within the next few days.

STOHRER

<sup>1</sup> Juan F. de Cardenas y Rodriguez.

<sup>2</sup> For Ambassador Weddell's account of his conversation with Suñer and Franco, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. II pp. 924-929.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram No. 3665 of Oct. 19 (95/107163-64) Stohrer reported that the Spanish press had been directed by the Foreign Ministry to modify its attacks on England and America. This, Suñer explained, was done for economic reasons especially to ease the blockade of the Allies.

## No. 395

8589/E603060-05

### *Führer's Directive*

CHEFSACHE

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, October 10, 1941.

TOP SECRET MILITARY

The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht  
OKW/WFSt/Abt. L. (I Op.) No. 441969/41 g.K. Chefs.

By officer only

### DIRECTIVE No. 37

The swift, favorable development of the situation in the eastern theater of war together with the reports from the Headquarters, Army

of Norway concerning the condition of the troops and the future operational possibilities in Finland prompt me to issue the following orders:

1. Now that the bulk of Soviet Russia's armed forces in the main theater of operations has been smashed or destroyed, there is no longer any compelling reason for conducting offensive operations to tie down Russian forces in Finland. Seizure of Murmansk or of the Rybachi Peninsula or cutting through the Murmansk railroad in central Finland before winter sets in *can now no longer be accomplished* given the insufficient strength and striking power of the available forces and the advanced season.

The *most urgent task* remaining therefore is to hold the gains, to secure the Petsamo nickel mines against attacks on land, from the air and from the coast, and to carry out all preparations—starting already during the winter—for the final capture of Murmansk, of the Rybachi Peninsula, and the Murmansk railroad in the coming year.

The *timetable* shall be as follows:

(a) Shift by the ground forces to the defensive in favorable positions economical of manpower, improvement of the winter billets, and changeover to winter warfare.

(b) Relief movements and bringing up new forces.

(c) During the *winter*, concentrical attacks against the Murmansk railroad, specifically: with Finnish forces, from the south, against Belomorsk-Kem and, if possible, also Loukhi; with German forces, from the Verman sector, against Kandalaksha.<sup>1</sup>

(d) At the time most favorable for the purpose, seizure of the Rybachi Peninsula in its entirety, if possible, and attack against Murmansk.

These operations must be so timed as to permit at any given moment concentration of the bulk of attacking forces for main efforts against *single points*.

2. *The next mission of Headquarters, Army of Norway*, while assuring defensive operations in positions sparing of manpower, is to dispose its units in such a manner as to permit the forces which have been in combat for prolonged periods to be rehabilitated and equipped for winter warfare or, as may be the case, relieved by newly arriving reinforcements and withdrawn. Specifically:

(a) In the *Mountain Corps*, the 2nd and the 3rd Mountain Divisions are to be relieved by the reinforced 6th Mountain Division. One mountain division is to be left in northern Finland, while the other shall be moved to the area around and south of Rovaniemi. Its return to the Zone of Interior is scheduled to coincide with the arrival of the 5th Mountain Division (approximately January 1942).

<sup>1</sup> Guidelines for the execution of this directive, particularly regarding the offensive against Kandalaksha, were issued by Kettel on Nov. 21 (8589/603083-86).



Another newly constituted or reorganized mountain division will subsequently take the place of the mountain division left in northern Finland.

(b) *XXXVI Army Corps* shall be reinforced by the 163rd Infantry Division as soon as it is ascertained that the division is no longer needed for commitment in a concentric operation between the Karelian Army and Army Group North against the southern shore of Lake Ladoga.

Efforts are being made to arrange for relieving the *personnel* of the 169th and the 163rd Infantry Division in the course of the winter by divisions from Norway or from the homeland.

3. All *relief movements*, including those of the mountain divisions, are to be effected in a manner whereby the bulk of the heavy weapons, equipment, horses and pack animals are left behind on the spot and in consequence only the personnel with their light weapons are exchanged. This will save both time and transport space.

4. As regards the *SS units*, plans call for relief of the 9th SS Regiment, now attached to the 2nd Mountain Division, by an SS regiment made up of Norwegians and Finns, and for formation of a mountain brigade out of SS Battle Group North with the addition of an SS regiment from Austria. Execution of this measure will be coordinated by the High Command of the Wehrmacht with the general plan for exchanges of staffs and troops.

5. Since the Finnish High Command is planning a complete reorganization of the Army, the German and Finnish forces under command of III Finnish Corps are to be exchanged (6th Finnish Div. for SS Battle Group North). When this has been done, it is proposed to place the front of III Finnish Corps under the command of Field Marshal Mannerheim.

For the initial stage of the new operations, Field Marshal Mannerheim will be requested to reassign at least a few small Finnish units to the German group attacking Kandalaksha.

6. To the *Luftwaffe* the following immediate missions in the Finnish theater of operations are assigned, so far as the weather permits:

(a) To patrol the sea areas along the coasts of northern Norway and Finland to protect friendly and to combat enemy sea traffic;

(b) To assure the air defenses, especially of the Petsamo nickel mines, the ports of discharge, and the naval bases;

(c) To fly reconnaissance missions over the areas of future operations and to carry out sustained attacks against the enemy supply base of Murmansk and against supply movements to Murmansk by sea and by railroad;

(d) To make preparations for the employment of stronger forces in support of the forthcoming operations.

7. The *Navy* shall have the mission of attacking enemy supply movements to Murmansk by sea and of doing its utmost to support friendly sea traffic in the Arctic Ocean.

In order to accomplish this, it is necessary as soon as possible to provide reinforcements for the light naval forces as well as to introduce motor torpedo boats.

Kirkenes is to be developed and equipped as an improvised base.

The safety of friendly coastal traffic requires bringing up of additional coastal batteries. The relevant orders will be issued by the Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht.

Kirkenes and Petsamo are each to be reinforced over and above the submitted program by a battery of 21-cm. guns, and a 28-cm. battery is to be constructed at Vardö. Plans are also to be prepared for construction of a battery of the heaviest caliber on the Rybachi Peninsula when it is captured.

8. The *cooperation* between Headquarters, Army of Norway, the Navy, and the *Luftwaffe* must be very close especially during the coming months in order to check any attacks that might be launched against the front and the sea flank. To this end, in order to simplify mutual cooperation, the Navy shall designate a Naval Commander, North (*Marineführer Nord*), and the *Luftwaffe*—upon withdrawal of Fifth Air Force Headquarters to Norway—an Aerial Commander, North (*Fliegerführer Nord*).

9. The *orders for executing these measures* shall be issued by the Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht. Through him will be submitted to me:

(a) From Headquarters, Army of Norway:

Timetable for the regrouping movements.

Proposals regarding changes in equipment with a view to enabling all troops to fight in the tundra and the virgin forests of eastern Karelia.

Operational proposals and requests for Army headquarters troops. Proposals for the exchanges of staffs.

(b) From the Navy and the *Luftwaffe*. Their intentions in detail.

10. To the extent that Directive No. 36<sup>2</sup> is superseded by this order, it is annulled.

ADOLF HITLER

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 349.

No. 396

1857/422124-25

*Memorandum by Ambassador Dieckhoff*

By teletype to the Foreign Minister  
through the State Secretary

BERLIN, October 10, 1941.

REGARDING YESTERDAY'S MESSAGE OF ROOSEVELT TO THE CONGRESS  
DEALING WITH THE NEUTRALITY ACT<sup>1</sup>

1. Originally Roosevelt had hoped he would by now be able to urge the repeal of the Neutrality Act<sup>2</sup> by Congress. But in the last few weeks his soundings of public opinion showed him that he cannot risk that, for at this time sentiment in the United States is firmly opposed to an outright repeal of the Act. He then attempted to eliminate at least the two principal pieces of the Act (the prohibition of the arming of merchant vessels and of their sailing to English ports), but in conversations with the party leaders held in the last few days he had to realize that at the moment he can not risk that, either. In yesterday's message he therefore limited himself to demanding the repeal of the ban on the arming of merchant vessels, and in other respects merely expressed the hope that the Congress would sooner or later also repeal the prohibition for ships to call at English ports. His representatives in both houses of Congress accordingly last night introduced merely bills repealing article 6 of the Neutrality Act (prohibits the arming of American merchant ships).

2. The President obviously wants to wait to see how the vote on this bill will go, before deciding on further steps.

3. This development is *actively*<sup>3</sup> favorable to us. In view of the shortage of guns the arming of merchant vessels will have no immediate effects, but will take quite some time. Besides, by being armed the American merchant vessels are putting themselves from the outset in the wrong with respect to our naval forces.

4. The longer American merchant vessels are prohibited from calling at British ports, the longer we avoid the risk of an accumulation of incidents.

DIECKHOFF

<sup>1</sup> For text of President Roosevelt's message of Oct. 9, see Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1941, vol. v. pp. 257-259. Thomsen's account and interpretation of the message was sent with telegram No. 3500 of Oct. 9, dispatched Oct. 10 (1857/422128-31).

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 387, footnote 1.

<sup>3</sup> The word scored through was deleted before the teletype message was sent.

No. 397

1517/372782-63

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

St.S. No. 678

BERLIN, October 11, 1941.

The Italian Ambassador, whom I had asked to see me today, reverted of his own accord to the complaints of the Italian laborers in Germany. He gave me new material again (see enclosures 1-4<sup>1</sup>). I countered this allegation by handing Alfieri the detailed memorandum attached hereto<sup>2</sup> and met with understanding when I remarked to him that his informant, Minigutti, had gone too far and would probably do better by returning to Italy.

On the other hand there is still a rather considerable substantive discrepancy between the findings of the two sides; for this reason I repeated that it was necessary that the special expert to be appointed by Under State Secretary Luther meet with the corresponding member of Ambassador Alfieri's staff to clarify the facts thoroughly. Alfieri was of the opinion that Signor Lombrassa should come here as soon as possible in order to get in touch with Dr. Ley about the working conditions of the Italian laborers, which they have already discussed before.<sup>3</sup>

I suggested to Alfieri that Signor Lombrassa's trip be put off for a while until the discussion between the experts had produced more tangible results.

Alfieri declared to me repeatedly that he was doing everything on his part to prevent any undue excitement in Rome. On his visit to Rome in the near future he would also ask the Duce not always to read these things himself but rather trust that he, Alfieri, would intervene at the proper time. He would, however, as Ambassador have to see to it that complaints of this kind did not reach the Duce through some other channel and poison the atmosphere before he himself had a chance to say a word.

<sup>1</sup> Filmed on 1517/372773-80. Enclosures 1-3 contain details of mistreatment of Italian workers in Germany. Enclosure 4 deals with the case of Kreisleiter Goldbeck (see document No. 281).

<sup>2</sup> This undated memorandum (1517/372764-72) presents the German position. It explained that because of the war, camps had to be established where lazy and recalcitrant workers were being educated and disciplined—not punished. This was true for all workers, foreign and domestic and, as far as the Italian workers were concerned, was in accordance with article 2 of the German-Italian agreement of July 10, 1940.

The methods employed at these camps and the sending of Italian workers to them had been discussed repeatedly with Italian officials and the latter had voiced no objections. The memorandum goes on to deal with the individual cases cited in the note of the Italian Embassy and refutes all of the complaints mentioned therein.

See document No. 281, footnote 2.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 375.

Alfieri reacted sensitively to the letter in enclosure 4 written by Kreisleiter Goldbeck in Recklinghausen about the association of Italian laborers with German women. Alfieri said that the original of this letter was already in Rome.<sup>4</sup>

Unless it is a forgery, this order by the Kreisleiter in question really is highly objectionable in its wording.

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 281.

### No. 398

617/250047

#### *The Minister in Afghanistan to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 401 of October 12

KABUL, October 12, 1941—5:15 p. m.

Received October 12—6:00 p. m.

The Foreign Minister<sup>1</sup> informed me today that on October 9 the English Minister and on October 11 the Soviet Ambassador<sup>2</sup> made démarches with the Afghan Government on the subject of the German and Italian communities. At the Afghan request the English Minister promised free departure for the entire communities across English territory to a neutral place. The Afghan Government would continue to insist on this request even if this concession should be in any way altered by the enemy. The final discussion with the English Minister was set for October 14. Regarding the Legations, the English Minister had stated that no objections to their remaining would be raised. The Afghans want to agree to the demand of the enemy powers in order to avoid a repetition of the Iranian incidents. I stressed energetically to the Foreign Minister that in all circumstances only safe conduct for the entire colony could be the prerequisite for German consent.<sup>3</sup> The Minister expressed his full agreement and

<sup>1</sup> Ali Mohammad Khan.

<sup>2</sup> Konstantin Mikhailov.

<sup>3</sup> Marginal note in Weizsäcker's handwriting: "Guarantee?"

In the files there is a draft instruction of Oct. 13 by Weizsäcker (617/250050) for a reply. It pointed out that oral assurances for safe conduct through British territory were not sufficient and directed Pilger to insist on a written assurance from the Afghan Government, also on behalf of the British Government. The draft also stated there could be no question of Germany's consent to the Afghan action.

promised that everything would be done by Afghanistan to facilitate the departure of the colony across English territory in so far as possible. I have heard in this connection from semi-official sources that the attitude of the Afghan Government is allegedly very firm, doubtless influenced by public opinion, so that any enemy demand that, contrary to expectation, might mean internment and the like would meet with rejection.<sup>4</sup>

PILGER

<sup>4</sup> In telegram No. 434 of Oct. 24 (617/250082) Pilger reported that an Afghan note had been handed to the German and Italian Legations informing them that the English Minister had given formal assurances that the German and Italian nationals would safely travel under British protection to a country whence the Afghan Government itself could send them on to Germany.

Further details about the agreed route for the departure of the colony, set for Oct. 29 and 30, were given by Pilger in telegrams Nos. 438 of Oct. 25 (617/250088) and 443 of Oct. 27 (617/250090). In telegram No. 451 of Nov. 1 (329/195500) Pilger reported that the only Germans remaining in Afghanistan were 10 members of the Legation.

### No. 399

794/273201

#### *The Chargé d'Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 2514 of October 13

ROME, October 13, 1941—12:33 p. m.

Received October 13—1:05 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister personally.

Anfuso told me yesterday that Count Ciano had asked him to inform the Reich Government, through me, with the request for the strictest secrecy, that the Grand Mufti had arrived in Italy by a secret route a short while ago.<sup>1</sup> The English, as was known, were making every endeavor to get their hands on him. For this reason alone his presence in Italy should in no circumstances be made known. Even in the Foreign Ministry only very few officials knew anything about this. The Italian Government intends to have the Grand Mufti "disappear"

<sup>1</sup> In telegram No. 963 of Sept. 6 (65/45363) Eitel had reported the presence of the Grand Mufti in the Japanese Legation at Tehran.

In telegram No. 1279 of Oct. 14 from Therapia (794/273200) Kroll reported: "Gaylani told me that the Italians succeeded in smuggling the Grand Mufti out with the Italian colony of Iran. The Italians themselves have so far told us nothing about it."

here for a few months and then use him at the proper time for Arab propaganda.

BISMARCK

No. 400

173/84448

*Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Legal Department*

BERLIN, October 13, 1941.

The Swedish Minister<sup>1</sup> called on me today to tell me the following:

In February of this year, 430 Jews of Netherlands nationality were taken from Amsterdam to a German concentration camp near Mauthausen. In June of this year another 230 Dutch Jews followed. According to lists which the German police authorities in the Netherlands transmitted to the Jewish Council in Amsterdam, more than 400 of these prisoners have died so far. According to the lists it seems that these deaths occurred always on certain days. The prisoners are almost all of them rather young men. The Swedish Legation, which had to interest itself in the Netherlands nationals as representative of the protective power, had repeatedly requested that one of its officials be allowed to visit these prisoners. This request has so far not been granted, however. Mr. Richert repeated the request regarding a visit to the camp and asked at the same time that the Foreign Ministry look after the matter.

I reminded the Swedish Minister that these Jews had been taken prisoner because of the disturbances which had occurred in Amsterdam and in which Jewish-Communist elements had been the leading factors, and I promised further information.

Herewith submitted to R IV<sup>2</sup> with the request for further action.<sup>3</sup>

ALBRECHT

<sup>1</sup> Arvid G. Richert.

<sup>2</sup> Division IV of the Legal Department dealt with military law, prisoners of war, and civilian internees.

<sup>3</sup> No further documents have been found in the files. However, a document printed in Pollakov and Wulf, *Das Dritte Reich und seine Diener*, pp. 100-101, indicates that in a letter of Nov. 5 the Foreign Ministry asked the Reich Main Security Office to examine the matter and make its views known to the Foreign Ministry.

No. 401

4839/E244974;  
4839/E244976-78

*The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the Chief of the Reich Chancellery*

TOP SECRET

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, October 13, 1941.

Wfst/Abt.L (IV/Verw.) No. 002362/41 g. Kdos.

RK. 739 BgRs.

DEAR REICH MINISTER: The High Command of the Wehrmacht has thoroughly investigated the possibility of converting the present military administration in Belgium into a civil administration under a Reich commissar. As seen from a purely military point of view the following important reasons argue against such a step:

1. *Military:*

At the present time Belgium, as an operational area constantly threatened by the enemy, is heavily occupied by the Wehrmacht with troops and High Command staffs. The Army alone has a total of about 200,000 men with an army headquarters and seven divisional staffs. The Luftwaffe has transferred one air force administrative command headquarters, numerous air groups, and one antiaircraft division with the corresponding air force units to this area. Very considerable reinforcements can be reckoned with after the conclusion of the campaign in the east. The Navy, too, is represented by numerous higher commands and units.

If only by reason of this heavy occupation by the Wehrmacht and the attendant demands made on all public institutions such as administration, transportation, communications, and industry, there would of necessity be in the restricted Belgian territory constant areas of friction between the urgent requirements of the Wehrmacht and the justified needs of a *civil* administration. This would be even more true in case of internal unrest or military operations, which are possible at all times.

It should further be taken into account in this connection that the military command authority is in the hands of the Commander in Chief, West, who has his headquarters outside Belgium.

These conditions would create great difficulties in delimiting the rights and responsibilities even in the purely military sphere. However, in order to make it possible to put through the necessary military measures at all times without regard for the political authorities and without delay, the basic Führer decree would have to impose on the Reich commissar and his administrative authorities such restrictions, particularly in case of internal or military tensions, that the civil administration could only function under a great handicap.

A *coastal strip* separated off as the probably most important operational area under a military rump administration would not be viable.

## 2. Political:

I assume that the civil administration would not be extended to the northern French départements now linked with the military administration of Belgium, because France would of necessity consider this a further step toward separation of these provinces from the mother country. If, however, these provinces are joined with the German military administration in France purely for reasons of reorganization in Belgium, the great political effect to be achieved by this move on France at the proper moment is bound to be entirely lost. A "political concession" so far denied, and highly valued by France, would become simply a change in organization.

To the *Flemings*, on the other hand, the cession of French Flanders would necessarily appear as a final renunciation of a large-area Flemish policy and would thereby greatly handicap the Reich commissar when he enters upon his office.

## 3. Economic:

Through the measures of the Four Year Plan, especially with regard to the placement of orders, *Belgium and France have of late become more and more closely intertwined economically*; this is equally true for the fields of nutrition, coal, and exploitation of the other economic capacities. If a civil administration is introduced we must expect, considering the different interests and the lack of unified directives from the high authority common to both at present, that there will be serious dislocations and the same sort of separation that now exists, for example, between the Netherlands and Belgium.

## 4. Personnel:

A transfer to civil administration would have to involve, in addition to the organizational change, a change in personnel all along the line, which would also extend to the military authorities. Aside from the question whether it is possible to find enough suitable persons owing to the constant increase of the areas which have to be administered, it is inappropriate to complicate the present unstable political situation in Belgium by such a disturbance of the uniform administration of the occupation power.

For all these reasons I must urgently advise against a change in the administration in Belgium.

If, however, my dear Reich Minister, reasons should be known to you which would make a politically strictly organized regime seem desirable, I should appreciate information to this effect.<sup>1</sup> It could then be considered whether, as in France, the objective to be sought could be achieved through a political representative of the Reich without eliminating the military administration.<sup>2</sup>

Heil Hitler,

Yours, etc.

KEITEL

<sup>1</sup> In his letter of Oct. 24 (4839/E244979) Lammers informed Keitel that Hitler had decided to set up a civil administration in Belgium. A similar letter was sent to State Secretary Stuckart of the Ministry of Interior (4839/E244980-81). See document No. 416.

<sup>2</sup> Marginal note by Kritzinger, an official in the Reich Chancellery: "First submitted to the Reich Minister. So far I have not known that a civil administration was being considered in Belgium. Kn, Oct. 12."

## No. 402

2109/456462-64

*Minister Kroll to Ministerial Director Wiehl*

Therapia, October 13, 1941.

DEAR HERR WIEHL: I assume it will interest you to know my personal opinion of the economic agreement.<sup>1</sup> As I gathered from incoming telegrams, you, and especially Ambassador Ritter, are somewhat disappointed with the course of the negotiations. I can understand that very well, because I too am disappointed. If you were primarily interested in securing prompt delivery of chromium, there is no denying that the negotiations have not brought the desired result. For the prospect of obtaining chromium from Turkey from 1943 onward is after all merely a somewhat feeble substitute if it is true, as I always have been told, that our stocks will be exhausted about the end of the year and that it is unfortunately not possible to replenish them from other countries to any significant extent.

I also was surprised by the Turkish attitude in this question. In the first conversation at the Foreign Ministry which I had with Numan on the occasion of Clodius' introduction, Numan left the possibility of immediate deliveries of chromium under the contemplated agreement entirely open.<sup>2</sup> Not with a single word did he mention that the Turks had their hands tied to such an extent that deliveries would be impossible for the present. I even recall with certainty that he mentioned specific figures in that conversation, which were 30,000 to 40,000 tons, and neither Clodius nor I got the impression that the last word had been spoken with regard to quantities. Since Numan himself had at the time concluded the agreement in question with the English, he must have certainly been aware in that conversation to what extent Turkey's hands were tied. Accordingly, there is no other explanation for the completely negative attitude later of the Turks than that Numan was then still counting on the possibility of arriving at an amiable understanding with the English concerning the promise of immediate chrome deliveries to Germany. I do not doubt in the least that Turkey made serious efforts to obtain such a concession from the English.

After the treaty has been concluded it is in my opinion futile to ask whether in the circumstances it would not have been better for the German side to suspend negotiations in an amiable manner, so as to enable the delegation to report in Berlin on the situation. At any rate one could imagine that the resumption of the talks after the conclusion of the Eastern Campaign might conceivably have taken place

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 390 and footnote 1.

<sup>2</sup> No report of such a conversation has been found.

under more favorable auspices. For in almost 6 years of working with the Turks I have always found that they are skillful enough to find a loophole in any treaty instrument if this be absolutely necessary because of superior political considerations. This was patently shown by the fact that at the time when Italy entered the war they stayed out of the war, despite plain and explicit treaty commitments.

That the Turks themselves do not have an entirely clear conscience with regard to the treaty concluded is most evident from their efforts to represent the economic agreement as a great success for both parties. The great splash made in the press which is unusual here is explained by the same motivation: One wanted to compensate us in form for what one had to deny us in substance. I also believe, of course, that for propaganda reasons one ought to adhere in public to the view that the new agreement represents a success for our economic policy, as well as for the development of relations between Germany and Turkey as a whole. Internally, however, one ought to realize the true state of affairs. I also think it would be a mistake both in substance and tactics to indicate to the Turks that we are completely satisfied with the outcome. I should rather consider it expedient that the Turks should be confirmed in the feeling, which they undoubtedly harbor, namely, that they have to make amends for something. It might perhaps be a good thing if you would occasionally hint at this to the Turkish Ambassador.

From the *political and propagandistic* point of view I was, of course, glad about the conclusion of the treaty. In view of the further development of our general relations with Turkey we are naturally interested in consistently confirming public opinion and the influential business circles in their belief in the friendly nature of our relations, if only to cut the ground from under the strong Anglophile tendencies which still survive, and also to make it harder for the government circles which tend toward the same direction, to relapse into the English line of policy. From this point of view I welcome, of course, every occasion which compels the Turkish officials to emphasize on their own initiative German-Turkish friendship and the advantages of closer German-Turkish cooperation. The economic result of the agreement is not, however, affected by that.

Herr Clodius took the position here that in his negotiations the Chiefs of Mission concerned have no say in their conduct, or regarding the contents of the telegrams of the delegation. He insisted that the Foreign Ministry was aware of this position. This position was a new one to me and I regretted it for objective reasons, because it might have perhaps been quite useful for Herr Clodius, who naturally cannot know Turkey as well as I do, to make use of my 6 years of experience. I could not, of course, press it on him, especially as I

must in any case take certain sensibilities into account here. But on the basis of my acquaintance with conditions here I believe that I am justified in saying, even after the fact, that the negotiations might well have taken a somewhat different course if I had had a chance of influencing them.<sup>3</sup>

I should be grateful if you would occasionally inform Ambassador Ritter, who became involved in the negotiations because of the military deliveries, of the contents of this letter.<sup>4</sup>

With kind regards and Heil Hitler,  
Yours, etc.

KROLL

<sup>3</sup>In his reply of Nov. 8 (2109/456460-61) Wiehl told Kroll that he had discussed this matter with Clodius who had stated that the Chiefs of Mission were free to make suggestions to the leader of a delegation but not to give him instructions. In this particular case, however, the issue did not arise according to Clodius, because Kroll was absent from Ankara during most of the negotiations.

<sup>4</sup>In a letter of Oct. 18 (1099/318702) Papen thanked Ritter for his great effort in overcoming the resistance of the OKW to the provisions of the German-Turkish commercial agreement. He then added the following comment:

"It is quite obvious that the treaty is unsatisfactory from the substantive point of view and that we must cast in the teeth of the Turkish friends time and again that they took us in with their initial promise of chromium deliveries. But at the moment it seemed politically more expedient to me to conclude even a substantively less satisfactory treaty because I assume that the year 1942 with its inevitable political decisions will also bring about many changes in this field."

No. 403

95/107142-44

*The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 3563 of October 13

MADRID, October 14, 1941—12:30 a. m.

Received October 14—3:00 a. m.

Secret for officer in charge.

With reference to your telegram No. 2367 of October 9.<sup>1</sup>

After a thorough discussion with the Naval Attaché<sup>2</sup> and in agreement with his attitude regarding the shifting of the ships *Corrientes* and *Charlotte Schliemann* into the inner harbor of Las Palmas, the following can be stated:

1. I immediately talked to the Foreign Minister in a friendly but firm manner about the matter, as has already been reported by telegram No. 3250 on September 19.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 391.

<sup>2</sup> Cmdr. C. Meyer-Döhner.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 391, footnote 1.

2. The Spanish Minister of the Navy<sup>4</sup> has expressly favored the measure, with the request that possible incidents resulting from forceful action of the English against German ships in harbors be avoided (as was likewise reported by telegram No. 3250 on September 19); above all, because the Canary Islands are politically a particularly sensitive spot.

3. The complete cancellation of the Spanish measure, that is, the reinstatement of the previous condition, appears impractical:

a. Because removal of the *Corrientes* to the former conspicuous location at the entrance of the harbor would carry with it the danger of its being torpedoed, as has been threatened by the English;

b. Because this might cause resentment of the Minister of the Navy and the cooperative conduct of the Spanish Navy with relation to the remaining extensive supply operation of the Naval Attaché on the Iberian Peninsula might be unfavorably influenced.

As a matter of fact, the Minister of the Navy was already somewhat disgruntled because of the Foreign Minister's reproaches concerning his hasty procedures, but in spite of this fact he declared his willingness to continue to protect remaining supply operations in ports of the Spanish mainland.

4. Removal from the present anchorage will be requested because of English observation and danger of sabotage. An attempt will be made to place the ships on the inner side of the closed outer pier, where, when possible, under later favorable circumstances, new supply bases may be procured. To request Spanish protection against sabotage would not be feasible because it would be dangerous to place Spanish guards on shipboard, and thus make later supply activities impossible, etc.

5. The English note of protest was presented here in the original. A copy was forwarded immediately by the Naval Attaché to the OKM.

6. The Spanish have always stressed their willingness, should the occasion arise, to undertake official supplying of German warships in accordance with international law. As was reported confidentially, they explicitly instructed the English Naval Attaché,<sup>5</sup> on the occasion of the recent call of English warships in Las Palmas, that German naval forces in a similar situation would be granted similar support by them. The Spanish have, however, in their own as well as in the German military interest (preservation of secrecy of the station points!), preferred, when possible, to supply secretly. Besides, official supplying carries the disadvantage that, in accordance with international agreements, the resupplying [of submarines] with fuel and food stored on *German* ships is not permissible and would lead to justified protests by the other party.

STOHRER

<sup>4</sup> Rear Adm. S. Moreno Fernandez.

<sup>5</sup> Cmdr. H. D. Owen.

No. 404

195/139234-35

*Memorandum by the Dirigent of the Political Department*

TOP SECRET

WESTFALEN, October 16, 1941.

To State Secretary Freiherr von Weizsäcker.

The Foreign Minister asks that the following be done:

1. He requests State Secretary Keppler to examine to what extent there is a possibility of using for propaganda purposes Indian prisoners of war who have fallen into our hands, if the need should arise. Ambassador Ritter has already been asked by the Foreign Minister to discuss with the OKW the possibility of such use in the Near East, where Indian troops turn up, and to find out how many Indian prisoners we actually have. The Foreign Minister is thinking of using any suitable people that may have been located for broadcasting purposes in case of a possible advance into the Caucasus, into Iran, etc.

2. In accordance with the proposal of the Political Department, the Foreign Minister agrees that Herr von Hentig should concern himself with the so-called Pan-Turanian movement as a special assignment.<sup>1</sup> The Foreign Minister asks that Herr von Hentig propose how this can be organized, and in this connection he has in mind the formation of a special committee. In case Herr von Hentig is not in Berlin at the present time he is to be brought back at once.<sup>2</sup>

3. The Foreign Minister asks that Consul General Karlowa<sup>3</sup> be asked to submit a memorandum to him on the possibilities which we may have for calling forth a South African countermovement against the Smuts Government, or for aiding the opposition against Smuts (Ossewa Brandag, etc.).<sup>4</sup> He is also thinking here of the possibility that if necessary contact can be made with suitable persons through our Consulate in Lourenço Marques.

In summary, the Foreign Minister remarked with regard to these separate assignments that he requested the corresponding material now as soon as possible, but for the rest he considered it important that in the matter of the Indian activities, the Pan-Turanian movement, and of exerting influence in South Africa we should be fully ready for action in about 2 months. In so far as funds were needed for this he was willing to make them available.

RINTELEN

<sup>1</sup> According to a memorandum by Erdmannsdorff of Oct. 10 (1047/311665) Ribbentrop had asked the Foreign Ministry to designate a liaison official for the Pan-Turanian movement whereupon Counselor Melchers had suggested the name of Hentig and this proposal was submitted to Ribbentrop by Rintelen.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 431.

<sup>3</sup> Of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop.

<sup>4</sup> A South African nationalist organization along military lines. See vol. x of this series, document No. 385 and footnote 2; vol. xi of this series, documents Nos. 163 and 382.

No. 405

2281/482597-98

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, October 17, 1941.

TOP SECRET

Received October 17—7:30 a. m.

No. 2747 of October 17

To be decoded only by officers cleared for Top Secret material. To be submitted to the Chief of Mission in person without delay. Reply by courier or secret code.

Please communicate the following to Count Ciano:

Ambassador Ott was recently approached in the Japanese Foreign Office on the question of extending the Anti-Comintern Pact which expires on November 25 of this year.<sup>1</sup> The Japanese Government did not communicate its final position at that time. We are of the opinion that the idea of an extension of the Pact should be welcomed. Stressing the decision of the states joined together in the Anti-Comintern Pact to continue their solidarity against the Communist International would be of useful political effect particularly in the present situation. Ambassador Ott has therefore been instructed to make a suitable oral communication at the Japanese Foreign Ministry and to propose as the simplest form for the extension a uniform protocol which would be signed by all six member states, Germany, Italy, Japan, Hungary, Manchukuo, and Spain.<sup>2</sup> We proposed Berlin as the place for signing this protocol, this being the place where the Treaty was concluded 5 years ago. At the same time we had suggested that the diplomatic representatives of Germany, Italy, and Japan should jointly approach the Governments of Hungary, Manchukuo, and Spain in order to obtain the agreement of these governments to the extension.

Please get a statement of the Italian Government as soon as possible whether it agrees with the above proposals.<sup>3</sup> If so, we would be grateful if the Italian Embassy in Tokyo were instructed to pursue the matter there further in cooperation with the German Embassy.

RIBBENTROP

<sup>1</sup> Ott's report on this conversation has not been found. In a minute of Oct. 11 (82/60700) Gaus noted that Oshima had asked him whether an extension of the Anti-Comintern Pact had been considered in Berlin.

<sup>2</sup> This instruction has not been found.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram No. 2629 of Oct. 20 (2281/482602) Mackensen reported that Mussolini had given his approval to the procedures suggested by Berlin and that pertinent instructions to the Italian Embassy in Tokyo had been sent.

No. 406

222/150133-35

*The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BUCHAREST, October 17, 1941—9:30 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received October 17—10:30 p. m.

No. 3346 of October 17

Leader of the State Marshal Antonescu summoned me and spoke to me in a very grave manner concerning the economic situation of the country.

We were carrying on a joint war and had an interest in winning it. For this reason all efforts had to be made to eliminate the difficulties and to bring about an even stricter discipline in the economic relations with the Reich. Two points were involved:

1. Establishment of a plan of requests. He had spoken about this repeatedly with Minister Clodius and Minister Neubacher.

2. Elimination of all private purchasing organizations, in particular the middlemen used by them, some of whom were Jews. He had repeatedly stated that the Rumanian State was selling the amounts of goods asked by the Reich at the prices fixed by the Government. He had solemnly pledged to do this, but he could no longer look on while instead of the fixed prices much higher prices were paid by our purchasers, whereby the price structure was upset. In this way a situation arose which was useful only to the enemies of Germany. A twofold objective was being pursued:

- a. to raise the prices and
- b. by creating internal tension to overthrow the Antonescu Government.

He undertook to deliver the goods asked by the Reich at the fixed prices, even if he had to requisition them in return for payment. The Marshal here interjected the question what interest the German Reich had in buying goods at increased prices when they were offered by the Rumanian State at the fixed prices.

A special subject which he unfortunately was also compelled to discuss concerned the purchases by the Wehrmacht. He had only one wish, that the German troops should consider Rumania as *their* country, respecting the laws of Rumania just as they would respect the German laws. If he came with troops to Germany today in order to be useful to Germany he would naturally have to be subjected to the German laws. Under the agreements which he had made at the time with the Führer and Field Marshal Keitel, the Wehrmacht in Rumania had no right to make independent purchases.<sup>1</sup> It was to be supplied with everything which is needed by the Rumanian Commissariat at prices fixed by the State, as was done in the case of the

<sup>1</sup> It is not clear which agreements are referred to here.



Rumanian Army. Instead, the Wehrmacht itself had made large purchases, had itself taken large quantities of goods across the frontiers contrary to the agreements and had itself paid prices that were much higher than those fixed by the State. The Marshal added that he had complied with the demands of the Wehrmacht which constantly increased far in excess of the agreements. His request that the transports of goods across the frontier which had been declared as Wehrmacht transports be supervised had not been granted. He had now felt compelled to institute such controls at the customs offices. The Marshal stated further that he would now insist with Minister Clodius that the amounts of goods requested by the Reich be fixed within the framework of a plan that no German economic organization any longer make purchases independently, but that only the German State should take over the goods to be delivered at the fixed prices. He had taken the sharpest measures against quantity buying and price violations, and he reserved the right of appealing to the Führer directly in the immediate future in case the Germans continued to make difficulties for him—this so that he might restore the economic order in the country which was a basis for the common victory.

I should like to remark here that the economic planning which the Rumanians have requested for some time in the face of the increasingly difficult currency and economic situation of the country—regarding which Reichsbank Direktor Blessing is most accurately informed—(clear text missing) by Minister Neubacher until the arrival of Minister Clodius, who will arrive here today (clear text missing) no doubt about it that I will most emphatically support the intention of the Marshal to restore order in the economic conditions in so far as it involves the German sector. We have every interest in strengthening the position of the Marshal, who is our exponent in Rumania, but we are not anxious, by misunderstanding [our own] interests, to do the work of our enemies, who have recognized the weak point in the structure of the Rumanian State and are zealously helping to undermine the currency and thereby the economy.

KILLINGER

## No. 407

1857/422171

*The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT WASHINGTON, October 17, 1941—12:47 p. m.  
No. 3575 of October 17 Received October 17—11:00 p. m.

The torpedoing of the U.S. destroyer *Kearny* in the waters around Iceland<sup>1</sup> will demonstrate that the American Government, in contrast

<sup>1</sup> This was announced by the Navy Department on Oct. 17.

with Wilson in 1917, does not make the question of war or peace dependent upon incidents on the high seas, but uses these incidents, which by its policies have become unavoidable, to dramatize its propaganda in order to break down public opposition to its present course of action. The opposition, after the experiences in the *Greer* incident,<sup>2</sup> will not forego this opportunity to call for a full report on the circumstances of the torpedoing, and in the meantime will continue its attacks against amendment of the Neutrality Laws.

THOMSEN

<sup>2</sup> See documents Nos. 282, 292, and 299.

## No. 408

2281/482447-48

*The Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Italy*

BERLIN, October 17, 1941.

No. 5032 g Rs.

Subject: Order of the Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht to take vigorous action against Communist machinations.

With reference to our telegram No. 2521 of September 26, 1941,<sup>1</sup> a copy of the letter from the OKW to the Foreign Ministry dated September 24, 1941, is enclosed for your information; it is requested that you report to the Foreign Ministry the comments that may be made from the standpoint of foreign policy with respect to specific decisions by the military courts, so that they may be passed on to the High Command of the Wehrmacht or the Reich Ministry for Air.

By order:  
ALBRECHT

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (2281/482445). This Weizsäcker instruction referred to Foreign Ministry circular of Sept. 20 (document No. 344) and requested Mackensen to support actions by the military authorities in this matter in every respect and not to impede them on political grounds.

## No. 409

F11/0381-404

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat*

RM 49

HEADQUARTERS, October 18, 1941.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND  
AMBASSADOR ALFIERI AT HEADQUARTERS ON OCTOBER 17, 1941

After a word of thanks for the granting of an interview, Alfieri pointed out that his visits to headquarters always coincided with the

receipt of some good news. Thus he had heard this morning in Königsberg of the fall of Odessa and he was glad that in this way a good atmosphere had, as it were, been created for his visit.

The Foreign Minister replied that things had in the main developed as he had predicted in previous conversations with Alfieri.<sup>1</sup> The Russian campaign was practically won and was coming to an end. It was now only a matter of destroying certain scattered units of Russians in the area facing the German military forces. The Russians could no longer form a strongly cohesive front. By and large, the future military operations therefore involved simply a mopping up of the area, which the German troops would also occupy, even if it was to be expected that now and then pockets of Russian troops would still have to be cleaned out.

Germany had proceeded in a thoroughly systematic way in her operations so far. Of the three Russian armies, Voroshilov had been encircled in Leningrad; Budenny was ground to pieces at Kiev and Melitopol, while the central army, under Timoshenko, was now going to its destruction.

At the present moment, when the Russians could neither form a strong front nor possessed cohesive armies, they could no longer offer any effective resistance to the German armies, which were advancing along the entire front. In future battles it would therefore only be a case of local nests of resistance at important points which would still have to be overcome.

One thing was certain, however: Germany would, as he (the Foreign Minister) had predicted to Alfieri previously, fully attain her goal this very year; that is, obtain possession of the centers of industry and raw materials of the European-Russian area in the broadest sense.

To a remark by Alfieri to the effect that he had to note with complete admiration that this result had been achieved within the brief span of 4 months, the Foreign Minister replied that in any case one felt better now than if nothing had been attempted in 1941.

With the liquidation of Russia the last potential ally of the English on the European Continent had been eliminated. Even if the regime of Stalin should stand—nothing final could as yet be said on this, however—it would no longer be possible for Stalin to raise a new army in Siberia; for he would no longer have enough people available, if one considered that in the Siberian area the population was disproportionately smaller than in the European part of Russia. There would be no possibility, moreover, of the re-provisioning and re-equipping of an Army. It was because this state of affairs was clear to

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 308.

the Russians themselves that they were making such efforts to get English and American material help. Not much was to be expected of England because, according to the latest reports on hand, the state of Great Britain's military equipment was so bad that the giving away of material to others was out of the question. The American rearmament hullabaloo was a big bluff, and the United States was not in a position to give much material to Russia. But even if American deliveries were available, the question of shipping space for the transportation of war materials to the vicinity of Russia would still have to be solved, and, even if this problem should, contrary to expectations, be solved, the question would arise whether the material would reach the Soviet Union itself from the areas near her. Germany would surely see to it that the supplies to Russia would be blocked. Practically, then, Stalin could not count on help from abroad. He would therefore have to try to cover his requirements from the remaining industrial area in the Urals. Here, too, Germany would see to it that these industrial installations did not remain intact, so that in this way Russia would, therefore, practically be lost to England as an ally.

That, too, was why they were having such a headache now in London. They realized in England that after the defeat of Russia by the states of the Tripartite Pact, Great Britain would confront in isolation a large part of the world. Her last hope was the United States, whose further conduct would be observed clearly and sharply by Germany. There was no reason, however, to worry about American possibilities. Rearmament would take many years yet. When it was completed the material would surely be old and antiquated. Neither with soldiers nor with the fleet could the United States accomplish anything. The only military help that she could give would be the sending of pilots and planes to England. This was opposed by the potential of the Axis Powers and their friends, as well as by that of the conquered enemies, which was infinitely greater than the potentials of England and America put together. In a renewed air duel between the British Isles and Europe, England would be in a much more unfavorable position than formerly.

England and America were now threatening constantly with control of the seas, but he (the Foreign Minister) thought that the states of the Tripartite Pact and their friends could so organize themselves economically in the huge spaces at their disposal that they would feel the effects of a very long war less than their foes.

Concerning further developments the Foreign Minister remarked that a small portion of the national forces now committed in the East would suffice to head off trouble-making by the Bolsheviks in the future. Upon conclusion of the operations, a large portion of the

German Army would therefore again be withdrawn from the east. The total energies of the huge European area would accordingly be devoted to the final battle against England, that is, to the construction of submarines and the expansion and improvement of the Luftwaffe.

In recapitulation it might be said that the year 1941 has not gone by unprofitably, because the political and diplomatic importance of the Powers of the Tripartite Pact has constantly been increasing particularly as a result of the most recent events. The results were already noticeable. Thus Japan had formed a new Cabinet,<sup>2</sup> at the head of which stood the former Minister of War, Tojo. Although recent news was not available, it seemed quite obvious that the Army had prevailed in Japan, so that now Japan, too, would take a stiffer attitude than the compromise Cabinet of Konoye. Here, too, perhaps, interesting developments were in the offing.

Germany would, in any case, probably face the winter not only in a stronger, but in a completely unassailable position. She could not be beaten, either militarily or economically. That the peoples of the victorious Axis would probably be satisfied with their governments seemed to him (the Foreign Minister) obvious, even if the population and the soldiers had to endure temporary privation. Thus, the last and only hope of England would fade away. This completely false and foolish hope was that the peoples of the victorious Axis, after having conquered all other countries, would be in an unassailable position and would set out to garner the fruits of former and coming victories, yet would stage a revolution at home and capitulate abroad.

Alfieri replied that he had listened to the situation report of the Foreign Minister in its clarity and logic with great admiration and feeling. He felt constrained at this moment to press the hand of the Foreign Minister in order to give expression to these emotions. Alfieri, who had risen at these words, congratulated the Foreign Minister with a handshake and stated further that it must, to be sure, be a very special satisfaction to him if all the predictions made in the previous conversations were completely fulfilled in this way.

The Foreign Minister thanked Alfieri and spoke of the great tranquillity with which further developments were being awaited in Germany, particularly since Germany knew that victory could no longer be taken from her. Her foes, too, surely knew this by now. At any rate, Churchill and Roosevelt should have known it at their Atlantic meeting.<sup>3</sup>

In the further course of the conversation, the Foreign Minister spoke of a matter which he termed delicate and unpleasant and on the absolute clarification of which he had placed decisive value because the Duce had taken a personal interest in it.

It concerned the Recklinghausen matter.<sup>4</sup> On October 11 the Italian Embassy had delivered a note verbale in the matter,<sup>5</sup> to which was attached a copy of an alleged statement by Kreisleiter Goldbeck. The Foreign Minister quoted some passages in the Italian note and pointed out that a similar démarche had been made in Rome with the German Ambassador by Anfuso on September 5,<sup>6</sup> with the comment that the Duce had been most painfully affected by a circular letter of Kreisleiter Goldbeck's (which was probably identical with the statement mentioned in the Italian note).

With regard to this matter, he (the Foreign Minister) had the following to say: He had, of course, had the matter investigated most thoroughly. Reichsleiter Bormann, Chief of the Party Chancellery, had summoned Kreisleiter Goldbeck to Berlin for interrogation. The Foreign Minister handed Alfieri a memorandum concerning the results of this interrogation, with the comment that the text would also be delivered in Rome.<sup>7</sup> After the memorandum had been translated into French for Alfieri, the Foreign Minister stated that he had to say in all frankness that he had the impression that this was a case of deliberate misrepresentation on the part of Palosti, the inspector of the Italian Syndicates. What the reasons were that caused him to take this attitude, was not clear. Perhaps he wanted to disrupt German-Italian relations in some way or other.

The fact was, at any rate, that he himself had composed the notices in question, and, under false pretenses, had induced the Kreisleiter to sign his name twice to the document. Palosti had also had the handwritten notices re-written on a typewriter and subsequently provided with a date and place, so that the impression was thus created that an official document was involved. In copying it, moreover, he had also placed before the name "Goldbeck" the word "signed", in order thereby to create the impression of a signature. The whole thing had then been submitted to the Italian Government as a circular of the NSDAP. Undoubtedly this was a deliberate misrepresentation on the part of Palosti. In these circumstances, he asked that Palosti be recalled immediately and called to account, and that the Duce be fully enlightened as to the true state of affairs. He would surely approve of Palosti's procedure as little as did the Foreign Minister.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 413.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 209.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 281.

<sup>5</sup> See document No. 397.

<sup>6</sup> Document No. 281.

<sup>7</sup> See document No. 410 and footnote 5.

In the event that Alfieri could not accept the German explanation forthwith and wished perhaps to consult with his aides once more, the Foreign Minister suggested having the original document, from which the typewritten copy was produced, sent to Berlin and, if necessary, assuring Palosti's confrontation with the Kreisleiter in the presence of Alfieri and the State Secretary.

Goldbeck was an old party member, holder of the Golden Badge of Honor, and had made his declarations under oath. He (the Foreign Minister) therefore had to put absolute faith in his statement.

One wondered from what motives Palosti had acted. Naturally he was not to be regarded as an enemy agent. But an enemy agent could not have done better to disrupt German-Italian relations than Palosti had done through his behavior.

The Führer had ordered, moreover, that no more Italian laborers be punished in Germany or taken to a training camp. If difficulties arose with Italian workers, they were to be sent back to Italy.<sup>8</sup>

In conclusion the Foreign Minister informed Alfieri of a telegram from Rome, No. 2528 of October 13,<sup>9</sup> concerning measures of the Confederation of Industrial Workers for dealing with the difficulties that arose in connection with the employment of Italian labor in the Reich. It contains, in general, the reproduction of a letter from President Capoferri to the Duce, of which the Social Attaché of the German Embassy<sup>10</sup> was informed in confidence by the Director of the Confederation, Dr. Samotti, acting on instructions of President Capoferri.

After this telegram had been translated into French for Alfieri, the Foreign Minister remarked that it appeared from this report that the attitude that was being taken in Rome on these questions was quite clear and sensible. Capoferri's statements which, according to another report,<sup>11</sup> were shared also by Count Ciano, proved this. He (the Foreign Minister) therefore asked that the Italian Embassy in Berlin not dramatize such incidents in the future and not report everything to Rome at once, but rather have it settled through the office set up by Under State Secretary Luther. He (the Foreign Minister) wanted to ask Alfieri not to burden the two Governments with such things. In view of the presence in Germany of so many Italian workers, dissatisfaction in individual cases was unavoidable. By and large, however, it was absolutely wrong to take such matters up with the Ambassador, the Foreign Minister, and even the Duce and the Führer. In view of the calm attitude that was being taken in Rome, he asked that the Italian Embassy in Berlin also dispose

<sup>8</sup> Hitler's order was contained in a telegram of Oct. 15 (1517/372820-21) from Luther to Rintelen.

<sup>9</sup> Not printed (4865/E249343-46).

<sup>10</sup> Dr. W. Spakler.

<sup>11</sup> Not found.

of such cases within the framework of the organization set up for this purpose.

Alfieri, who was very much impressed by the statements of the Foreign Minister, especially, however, by the memorandum about the results of the interrogation of Goldbeck, declared with some agitation that he found the behavior of Inspector Palosti so unprecedented that he would petition the Duce to have him shot, and even went so far as to say that, if necessary, he would shoot him himself. He regretted, moreover, that the Foreign Minister had gained the impression that he (Alfieri) had wished to dramatize things.

The Foreign Minister mentioned in this connection the attitude that Alfieri had taken at the last conference on this question on the occasion of the Tripartite Pact ceremonies in the Hotel Adlon. He had at the time spoken in a very serious manner about the fact that the Duce had been most disagreeably affected by the report from Berlin.

Alfieri defended himself by saying that the report concerning the matter had been sent to Rome by Cosmelli in his absence with the addendum, to be sure, that nothing be done before the results were received of an investigation which he had at the same time ordered to be made by the competent Consul. Alfieri then stated very heatedly that he had, indeed, as Ambassador, and in obedience to his own instinct, always done everything to improve relations between Germany and Italy in every respect. He was therefore averse to dramatizing things in any way.

The Foreign Minister replied that one had indeed, to view everything in the right proportions. If 100,000 laborers were working in Germany, it was natural that individual complaints concerning treatment or maintenance would always be received. If the workers were told, however, about the hardships the German and Italian soldiers had to endure, they would surely realize that their lot was still an enviable one in every respect. In any case, he asked Alfieri to clarify the matter fully with the Duce, and he would appreciate it if he would, at his convenience, send him (the Foreign Minister) word confirming that this had been done. Alfieri promised to do this and mentioned with regard to Capoferri's letter that the latter had decided somewhat late to take a sensible attitude. At a recent conference of Italian Consuls in Germany, moreover, it had likewise been stated by all the participants that the situation with regard to the Italian laborers was not a good one.

The Foreign Minister mentioned that undoubtedly the procedure proposed by the Führer for the return of dissatisfied workers was the best solution. This too had its surprises, however. Thus, in Pomerania, recently, Italian workers had struck, but had called off the strike at once when it was explained to them that they could go back to Italy.

It was a matter of strict Italian control over the workers. It had to be made clear to them that the Axis was engaged in a life-and-death struggle and therefore all the workers were soldiers at the same time. If they got the impression that they could achieve something by expressing dissatisfaction, the difficulties would become greater and greater.

In the further course of the conversation, Alfieri also pointed out that the difficulties were attributable to the fact that:

1. Germany had expressed so strong a desire for Italian workers that the selection could not be made carefully enough in Italy; and in this way possibly 15,000–20,000 unsuitable Italians had come into Germany and had been dispersed throughout all the Gaue;

2. The camps were unequal to the situation. Of 500 camps, the conditions in 250 were below standards and bad.

3. The sending of Italian workers to so-called training camps, which was done quite freely, had created considerable resentment.

In reply to a question from the Foreign Minister as to whether Alfieri wished to bring up questions aside from the points submitted, the latter referred to the difficulties in connection with the exchange of German potatoes for Italian rice and cheese.<sup>12</sup> It seemed to him that political pressure was called for here in order that the difficulties might be overcome. The Foreign Minister said he was not informed on the question and promised to study it.

Alfieri also mentioned briefly the supply difficulties in Greece, which he attributed in part to the fact that Bulgaria and Hungary had failed to keep their delivery promises.<sup>13</sup>

Finally he also asked, after submitting a letter,<sup>14</sup> that the Italian Senator, Barzini, a well-known journalist and writer, be permitted to be present when the German troops entered Moscow. This request was seconded by Count Ciano.

Afterwards the Foreign Minister had a private talk with Alfieri. The Foreign Minister informed the Italian Ambassador of the contents of telegram No. 2530 of October 14, from Rome,<sup>15</sup> concerning Alfieri's report on the last speech of the Führer. The Foreign Minister remarked that he did not believe, to be sure, that this report about the Führer's speech had originated with Signor Alfieri, but he wished nevertheless to inform him of this matter. According to Ambassador von Mackensen's telegram, there was, at any rate, talk in Rome of such a report, which betrayed a clearly defeatist and critical at-

<sup>12</sup> In telegram No. 2304 of Sept. 23 (4879/E253209–211) Mackensen transmitted a letter from Riccardi to Clodius suggesting an exchange of German potatoes for Italian rice and cheese.

<sup>13</sup> See document No. 323.

<sup>14</sup> Not found.

<sup>15</sup> Not printed (1517/372810–811).

titude toward the contents of the Führer's speech. Even if he, the Ambassador, surely had nothing to do with this, it was nevertheless conceivable that perhaps some member of his Embassy had sent such a report to Rome, which had then given rise to the rumor of a report by Alfieri. Alfieri said that that was conceivable. Perhaps enemy agents had circulated some such thing. The Italian Ambassador was, moreover, obviously impressed by Herr von Mackensen's telegram and continued to appear somewhat dejected.<sup>16</sup>

Alfieri then spoke, for his part, of a communication that had reached him from Ciano, according to which a Gauleiter had said aloud, upon the arrival of the Duce's train, on the occasion of the latter's last visit to Germany,<sup>17</sup> "Here comes the Führer's Italian Gauleiter," which he had then denied in a telegram.<sup>18</sup>

The Foreign Minister replied that this story surely emanated from English agents, for, in the first place, when the Duce's train arrived, no Gauleiter had been present, and, second, no German would say anything so idiotic. Moreover, the two great leaders of Germany and Italy towered above such drivel. Since it could only be a matter of English propaganda, however, which had now, as we knew, made it the first point in its goal to disrupt German-Italian relations, he would consider it proper if Count Ciano would have his informant arrested at once in order to find out who had circulated this lie. Should he be found, he, the Foreign Minister, would recommend that the Italian Government have him shot at once. If, on the other hand, the informant would not divulge his source, then it would just be necessary to have the informant shot at once. If such an example were once established, it would be the best way once and for all of destroying the effectiveness of such propaganda. We could make this propaganda only illusory if, in the first place, the Governments of the two countries themselves were immune to it, which ought really to be taken for granted, and if, in the second place, really brutal examples were set once or twice for the sake of the effect on the people.

Following this, luncheon took place in a small circle. Shortly before luncheon, Alfieri had his secretary submit to the Foreign Minister the text of a telegram to Ciano, in which he (Alfieri) had denied the report communicated to him. The Foreign Minister remarked that he did not quite understand how Count Ciano could have transmitted such a thing at all.

<sup>16</sup> A rather different version of this part of the conversation is given in Alfieri's *Due dittatori di fronte* (Milan, 1948), pp. 233–234.

<sup>17</sup> See document No. 242.

<sup>18</sup> Weizsäcker's memorandum St.S. No. 701 of Oct. 21 (1517/372862) records a subsequent complaint by Alfieri regarding this incident.

See also *The Ciano Diaries*, entry for Oct. 13, 1941.

After luncheon a very brief discussion took place, in the course of which the Foreign Minister pointed out with emphasis to Alfieri that he should urge Ciano to see to it that the one that had circulated the reports of his (Alfieri's) attitude should, in all circumstances, be tracked down.

Alfieri also mentioned in conclusion certain rumors concerning an alleged return of the South Tirol to Germany.<sup>19</sup> Such things, too, were naturally a source of annoyance.

The Foreign Minister replied that the main thing was that the two Governments should not allow themselves to be influenced by such machinations.

England was obviously intent upon sowing discord between Germany and Italy. Her propaganda was concentrated upon Italy, and we had confirmation of this through an instruction which became known to us. With the partial utilization of the Vatican, false reports were being spread by countless agents throughout Italy for the advancement of this propaganda aim.

SCHMIDT

<sup>19</sup> See document No. 362.

No. 410

1517/372840-41

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy*

Telegram

MOST URGENT SPECIAL TRAIN, October 18, 1941—1:37 a. m.  
No. 1126 from the  
Special Train Received Berlin, October 18—3:30 a. m.  
No. 2765 from the Foreign Ministry

For the Ambassador personally. The matter of the alleged circular of the Kreisleiter of Recklinghausen, which was the subject of your report 148/41g. of September 5,<sup>1</sup> was again raised here by Ambassador Alfieri on October 11.<sup>2</sup> Meanwhile we have had this matter thoroughly investigated.<sup>3</sup> I gave Alfieri the report made to me in this matter,<sup>4</sup> concerning the outcome of this investigation, the text of which I am

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 281.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 397.

<sup>3</sup> Under State Secretary Luther's memorandum (1517/372828-31) records the results of his questioning of Kreisleiter Goldbeck.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 409.

sending you separately.<sup>5</sup> It is clear from this that the Italian Government has allowed itself to be misled in this matter as a result of obviously quite dubious machinations of two of its Commissioners in Germany.

Please also give Count Ciano or Anfuso a copy of this report, and at the same time ask that we now be given a photostatic copy of the said document. Since, according to your report of September 5, the matter has also been taken up with the Duce, I ask you at the same time to insist that the Duce now also be informed of our report. Please also have express confirmation sent that the Duce has been informed and send me a report on the matter. Finally, please also comment as follows with regard to the matter: Deputy Kreisleiter Goldbeck is a party official of subordinate rank, who had no authority at all to issue official statements concerning the German stand on the race question. Furthermore, he did not do this, but in a friendly conversation merely presented his views to the two Italians. The report that they had made in the matter by no means indicated the true circumstances. This was comprehensible, since Palozzi's procedure was indeed tantamount to intentional misrepresentation. This would be glaringly apparent if, for instance, Goldbeck were confronted with the two Italians. We would be ready, should Rome consider it important, to arrange such a confrontation, which could then take place in the office of the State Secretary of the Foreign Ministry, in Alfieri's presence. At any rate, however, we were requesting the Italian Government to recall the two Italians from Germany at once, and to let them suffer the logical consequences of their behavior.

Wire report.<sup>6</sup>

RIBBENTROP

<sup>5</sup> Telegram No. 2766 of Oct. 17 (4865/E249346/1-346/4).

The initial paragraph of the summary of this report reads: "In summary the following has been established:

"1. The assertion that it is a circular of a German Kreisleiter to the NSDAP, or that it is in any way an official expression of opinion is pure fabrication. The memorandum is a handwritten memorandum by an Italian, which was written in German. In a very peculiar way the Italian obtained the signature of the Kreisleiter at the bottom and at the top [of the document]. Furthermore, the Italians subsequently put the place and date, 'Recklinghausen, Aug. 15, 1941' on the document."

<sup>6</sup> In telegram No. 2620 of Oct. 19 (1517/372853) Mackensen reported that through Bismarck he had presented the matter to Anfuso in Ciano's absence. Anfuso gave assurances that he would take the matter up with Ciano who would give Mussolini the German report the next day.

In telegram No. 2630 of Oct. 20 (1517/372845) Mackensen reported that the matter had been presented to Mussolini who ordered that the two Italian officials be immediately recalled.

## No. 411

2281/482487-90

*Ambassador Alfieri to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop*<sup>1</sup>

BERLIN, October 19, 1941.

YOUR EXCELLENCY:<sup>2</sup> In expressing to you my cordial thanks for the friendliness that you have always shown me on the visits that I was permitted to make to you at the Führer's headquarters,<sup>3</sup> I should like to tell you how very much I thank you for the evidence of friendship and confidence that you gave me when you communicated to me your confidential information. Although my friendship for Germany and my devotion to the Führer, which go back to an earlier time, are far above all suspicion, and have proved themselves at difficult moments and can therefore easily triumph over all intrigue and gossip, it is a comfort and a consolation to me in my work to know that you did not, with your authority and your personal conviction, believe you had to take confidential information into consideration by giving your attention to things which, even if reported to you in good faith, can have no basis and origin in fact.

For this, I repeat, I am very grateful to you. By invoking now that attentiveness and frankness which you have very sympathetically made the basis of our working relations, permit me to tell you that your reference to the desirability of not dramatizing the situation surprised me a little. You particularly mentioned in this connection some episodes affecting Italian laborers.<sup>4</sup> In accordance with my natural inclination and with my usual method of operation, I try to un-dramatize the matters, which I am reducing to their proper proportions.

In this particular case, I consider it my duty as Ambassador to straighten out and to attenuate facts and situations as much as possible. But this procedure of mine has limits which are readily under-

<sup>1</sup>The document printed here has been translated from the German. The original letter in Italian has been filmed on 2281/482484-86.

<sup>2</sup>Marginal notes:

In Ribbentrop's handwriting: "[For] F[ührer]."

"Shown to the Führer. Hew[el], Oct. 23."

"See special memorandum. Hew[el]."

There is no identification of the memorandum to which Hewel referred.

<sup>3</sup>Alfieri had visited Ribbentrop at Hitler's headquarters on Sept. 12 and Oct. 17. See documents Nos. 308 and 409.

<sup>4</sup>See document No. 409.

standable. My constant optimism and my firm purpose, from which I never waver, to proceed in every case in such a way that the relations between our two countries may be of the best and friendliest kind (I believe that everyone in Italy and Germany is convinced of this) cannot induce me to shut my eyes to situations that were consistently and urgently reported to me. It is an undeniable fact, for example, that—even apart from the episodes that were discussed during those days—the morale of the Italian workers in Germany is depressed and has produced negative reactions in Italy.<sup>5</sup>

I can also no longer conceal it from myself (for a long time I was even very discreet in my reports to Rome in this regard) that, as all Italian Consuls have unanimously told me, the sentiment of the German people in general nowadays has not been favorable to Italy.<sup>6</sup>

I agree with you that all this has no special significance, because in Germany and Italy public opinion is created by the Führer and the Duce, and because the German press and all responsible German political circles have taken an absolutely correct and friendly stand.

I considered it my conscientious duty to call your attention to these things in order that, in view of your political intuition, your viewpoint as Foreign Minister, and with the opportunities at your disposal, you may also, to my satisfaction, review whatever merit there is in my statements. Please also keep in mind always the sincere sentiment that prompted me to make my communications.

I also prefer in a delicate and important matter to have given you a report, for the accuracy of which I cannot absolutely vouch, than that I should some day have to regret not having given you a report that was essential.<sup>7</sup>

Please accept, Your Excellency, the expression of my sincere and devoted friendship.<sup>8</sup>

DINO ALFIERI

<sup>5</sup>There is a question mark in Ribbentrop's handwriting on the margin at this point.

<sup>6</sup>There is an exclamation mark in Ribbentrop's handwriting on the margin at this point.

<sup>7</sup>Question mark in Ribbentrop's handwriting opposite this point.

<sup>8</sup>For Ribbentrop's reply, see document No. 446.

No. 412

4839/E245077

*The Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands to the  
Chief of the Reich Chancellery*

Teletype

No. 3262

THE HAGUE, October 20, 1941.  
Received Berlin, October 21—9:15 a.m.  
Rk. 15326B

With reference to your letter Rk. 14634 Bo of October 14, 1941.<sup>1</sup>

The Dutch hostages will be accommodated in the Netherlands at the urgent request of the Foreign Ministry, because otherwise the Swedish Legation will concern itself with the Netherlanders who are in German Reich Territory, and thus also with the hostages.<sup>2</sup> In the opinion of all the German police authorities in the Netherlands there are no objections from the standpoint of security. The preparations have progressed so far that it will be possible to make the transfer in November. Considering the numerous deaths last winter I wish to point out most emphatically that leaving the hostages in German concentration camps will have serious consequences for the treatment of the German hostages in the Netherlands Indies.<sup>3</sup>

Please bring about an understanding with the Foreign Minister and if need be obtain a decision from the highest authority.<sup>4</sup>

DR. SEYSS-INQUART

<sup>1</sup> In this letter (4839/E245079-80) Lammers informed the Foreign Ministry that Himmler, for security reasons, strongly objected to the transfer of the Dutch hostages from Buchenwald to a camp in the occupied Netherlands.

<sup>2</sup> This was expressed in a letter of Aug. 23, 1941 (4839/E245089-90) from the Foreign Ministry to the Reich Chancellery.

<sup>3</sup> For previous developments regarding German hostages in the Netherlands East Indies, see vol. XII of this series, document No. 445, footnote 1. In a memorandum of Oct. 15 (173/84657-62) Albrecht, Deputy Director of the Legal Department, summarized recent developments with regard to German internees in the Netherlands East Indies.

<sup>4</sup> In a letter of Nov. 3 (4839/245071-72) Lammers informed Seyss-Inquart that Himmler had agreed to the transfer of the Dutch hostages to camps in the Netherlands. In a letter of Dec. 5 (4839/E245070) the Chief of the Security Police informed Lammers that the Dutch hostages had left Buchenwald on Nov. 15 and arrived without incident in a camp in the Netherlands on Nov. 16.

No. 413

82/60768-71

*The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT TOKYO, October 20, 1941—11:30 a. m., summer time.  
No. 2152 of October 20 Received October 21—5:45 a. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 2137 of October 19.<sup>1</sup>

The first statement of the new Prime Minister Tojo says "that it is the unshakable policy of Japan to bring about a successful settlement of the China problems, create a large Asian co-prosperity sphere and thereby contribute toward world peace. In view of the situation of unparalleled difficulty prevailing today the Government intends, externally, to strengthen steadfastly its amicable relations with the friendly powers and, internally, to complete the national defense preparations." From this Government statement and the composition of the Cabinet it is evident that increased tension with the United States is to be expected. Under the impact of the failure of the negotiations with the United States the Army, contrary to all forecasts, has been willing to release the active War Minister in order to form the new Cabinet. The solidarity with the Army is further demonstrated by the fact that the new Prime Minister is not leaving the Army and will at the same time be promoted to full general.

To be sure, placing the burden of responsibility in this way seems to have been also the aim of the outgoing group, which in the communiqué on the reasons for the resignation of the Konoye Cabinet expressed dissatisfaction with the policy of the Army. It is to be expected that this group will not simply resign itself to defeat but will try with the numerous means at its disposal to oppose a more vigorous policy by the new Cabinet, as is already being indicated in the press organs associated with it (*Asahi*, *Japan Times*, etc.). This group will also undoubtedly try to find support in naval circles, whose role in the formation of the new Government has been less prominent. However, the Prime Minister has succeeded in obtaining a vigorous and strong personality from the Navy, Shigetaro Shimada, up until now Commander in Chief of the Japanese Navy in China, for the post of Minister of the Navy.

It is also worth noting that the new Cabinet also includes as Minister without Portfolio the President of the Planning Board, General

<sup>1</sup> This telegram (82/6072) reported the composition of the new Japanese Cabinet of Prime Minister Tojo, formed after the resignation of the Konoye Cabinet on Oct. 16.



Suzuki, who is generally considered one of the ablest leaders of Japanese policy but whose role in foreign policy has not always been entirely clear.

It is to be regarded as a positive factor that the new Cabinet no longer includes the representatives of the pronounced conservative group represented, to begin with, by the Prime Minister, by Baron Hiranuma, still suffering from the effects of the attempt to assassinate him,<sup>2</sup> his friend Minister of Interior Tanabe, and the Minister without Portfolio and Vice President of the Imperial Rule Assistance Society, General Yanagawa. Those no longer in office also include Finance Minister Ogura, Minister of Commerce and Industry Admiral Sakonji, and Foreign Minister Admiral Toyoda, who are closely associated with the large Mitsui, Sumitomo, and Mitsubishi combines.

Of the other ministers only a few department heads have been retained. The newly appointed Foreign Minister and Overseas Minister, Shigenori Togo, is known from his work in Berlin as Secretary, Counselor of Embassy, and Ambassador.<sup>3</sup> Recently he was often mentioned as candidate for the Foreign Ministry both by the Army and by the Navy. Since his recall from Moscow<sup>4</sup> he has kept himself rather in the background but has tried always to maintain friendly relations with the Embassy.

Kishi has been appointed to the post of Minister of Industry and Commerce, and Hoshino to the post of State Secretary of the Cabinet. Both of them were at one time closely associated with the Prime Minister in the Kwantung Army and are regarded as activists.

The new Finance Minister Kaya occupied the same post once before in the first Konoye Cabinet and was most recently president of the North China Development Company. His appointment is welcomed by business circles which hope that he will avoid experiments in the financial field.

A former admiral, Ken Terashima, who was most recently president of the Urgas Shipyards, has been appointed to the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Railways.

The former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tani, whose foreign policy in the past was marked by great vacillation and who can hardly be considered as an asset, has been appointed successor to the Chief of the Information Office, Ito, who was promoted to membership in the Upper House.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 276, footnote 5.

<sup>3</sup> Togo was Counselor of Embassy in Germany, 1929-1932; Ambassador, January-October 1938.

<sup>4</sup> Togo was Ambassador in the Soviet Union November 1938-October 1940.

In summing up it should be stated that in the new Cabinet the forces working for an understanding with America, particularly the business elements, have been weakened. It is to be expected that the new Prime Minister, as guarantor of the Army's interests in China, will be compelled to take an unyielding position regarding America's demands. The policy of the new Government may be expected to add to Japan's value as a creator of tension with respect to the Anglo-Saxons in the Pacific.

As regards any active operation to the south or the north, however, the views of the Army and the Navy, on which I have reported, will probably for the present remain decisive.

OTT

[EDITORS' NOTE. On October 20 President Tiso and Minister President Tuka visited Hitler at his headquarters. The invitation was extended in Ribbentrop's telegram No. 1099 of Oct. 14 from the Special Train which was forwarded to Bratislava as No. 1137 (610/248686-87). The visit was to be kept absolutely secret. No records of conversations held on that occasion have been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry.]

No. 414

222/150150-53

*Ambassador Ritter to the Legation in Rumania*

Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 1135 of October 20 SPECIAL TRAIN, October 20, 1941—5:35 p. m.  
from the Special Train Received Berlin, October 20—6:35 p. m.

No. 2872 of October 21

from the Foreign Ministry

Sent October 21.

With reference to your telegram No. 3346 of October 17.<sup>1</sup>

As is evident from telegraphic instruction No. 2846 of October 18,<sup>2</sup> the entire problem of German purchases and expenses in Rumania is under review at the present time. The Foreign Minister requests you to inform Marshal Antonescu of this and to tell him for the time being that he can depend upon the matter's being clarified and settled very quickly. Field Marshal von Keitel has promised the same thing.

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 406.

<sup>2</sup> This presumably refers to telegram No. 2856 of Oct. 18 (222/150140-41).

You are directed to communicate the following to Marshal Antonescu in the meantime :

I. On the basis of the earlier communications from Marshal Antonescu and [Deputy] Minister President Antonescu and on the basis of the earlier reports from the Legation, the view had been held here in the past that the financial difficulties, in particular the difficulties in obtaining lei, were caused by too extensive purchases of goods and purchases contrary to regulations on the part of the military authorities in Rumania. The oral report by Herr Wenzel<sup>3</sup> had, however, led to a somewhat different view, subject to the further discussions with the experts summoned to Berlin. We were now of the opinion that these purchases of goods play a relatively minor role in the obtaining of the lei. The German purchases of goods were on the whole less extensive than we had so far assumed on the basis of Rumanian claims. Furthermore, certain complaints were not justified. Thus, for example, Herr Wenzel had explained that the shipments mentioned in telegram No. 3252 of October 9,<sup>4</sup> which were held up at the border, and with respect to which Minister President Antonescu had raised objections, could be explained and should not be objected to. Independent of this, however, orders had already been given earlier by the High Command of the Wehrmacht that all purchases of goods contrary to regulations were to be stopped. These orders had been issued anew by Field Marshal Keitel only a few days ago in the strictest form.

II. On the basis of the oral reports thus far, the Foreign Ministry and the OKW were of the opinion that demands for lei, which according to the Rumanian statements were excessive, could not be attributed to such purchases, or only in very small part, but in the main to the fact that the German troops make expenditures for purely military tasks in Rumania which go beyond the military tasks and financial expenditures which could be visualized in the earlier conversations with Marshal Antonescu. Thus, for example, the considerable expenditure for splinter-proof protection in the petroleum region. Furthermore, the impression also existed that the German troops had of their own accord taken over military tasks and financial expenditures which were not the affair of Germany but entirely or primarily of Rumania. Thus, for example, the anti-aircraft defenses in Bessarabia and Bukovina, or bridge building. All of this will be clarified this week with the experts summoned to Berlin.

III. After this clarification we will have reliable data for determining jointly with the Rumanian Government :

1. Which military tasks and financial expenditures will be canceled for the German troops, and are therefore either to be eliminated entirely or are to be taken over by the Rumanian troops.

2. Which military tasks and financial expenditures fall to the German troops in Rumania for the duration of the war, in so

<sup>3</sup> Gerd Wenzel, specialist of the Reich Ministry of Economics for questions of foreign exchange, attached to the Legation in Bucharest.

<sup>4</sup> Not found.

far as that can be predicted today. These expenditures are then to be considered more or less as regular current outlays.

3. Which military tasks and financial expenditures fall to the German troops for one time only, as, for example, splinter-proof bomb shelters in the petroleum region or bridge construction. These expenditures are then to be considered more or less as one-time outlays that cease in the future.

4. Which payments in arrears from the past—whether for military outlays or for purchases of goods—are still to be made.

5. Whether and to what extent and by what procedure goods can be purchased in Rumania for [the use by] German troops outside of Rumania, on the condition of being charged to the commercial policy quotas. Such purchases would be treated like other exports and settled within the framework of the clearing system.

Then a financing plan can be set up on a long-term basis, authoritative and binding for both parties. In this connection it is our intention that the Rumanian Minister of Finance and the Rumanian National Bank must know in advance what amounts of lei they have to count on for each separate month. We know from our own earlier experience that the worst thing for orderly management of finances is the uncertainty as to the amount of the demands made on it and the surprise caused by unexpected demands. We have the same interest in protecting Rumania from the consequence of such disorder. Once a firm basis for precise proposals has been brought about through the present investigations, we shall immediately start conversations on the subject with the Rumanian Government.

RIITER

No. 415

405/213925-26

*The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

PARIS, October 21, 1941—6:35 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received October 21—7:10 p. m.<sup>1</sup>

No. 3255 of October 21

For the Foreign Minister.

Weygand declared before his departure from Vichy that he was not ready to hand in his resignation; he would, however, obey immediately an order of the Marshal to vacate his post in North Africa.

Marshal Pétain made the decision for such an order dependent on establishing whether or not the Reich Government considered the dismissal of Weygand indispensable.

<sup>1</sup> Marginal note: "Transmitted by telephone from the Foreign Minister's Secretariat to the Special Train on Oct. 21 at 8:00 p.m."

Pétain has requested Darlan to make an appropriate démarche with the Embassy. Darlan, in the name of Pétain, will ask me tomorrow morning at 11:00 o'clock whether:

(1) The Reich Government attached a decisive importance to the removal of Weygand from his post in North Africa;

(2) The Reich Government would agree to a solution by which the supreme military command in North Africa would be transferred to General Dentz, and Weygand, on the other hand, would remain in charge of the over-all direction of economic questions between North Africa and the United States;

(3) In my opinion, the opportunity to get rid of Weygand should be seized without compromise, because the United States and Weygand could, through their economic influence, leave the door open for all sorts of intrigues.

I ask for instructions as to what to reply to Darlan tomorrow.<sup>2</sup>

ABETZ

<sup>2</sup> In his reply, telegram No. 1144 of Oct. 21 (405/213927), Ribbentrop instructed Abetz to say only that "you would consider the matter and consult with your Government. Please report about your conversation with Darlan by telegram. Further instructions regarding further handling of this matter will be sent to you in due time." For further developments in this matter see documents Nos. 419 and 463.

### No. 416

4839/E244975

#### *Memorandum by the Chief of the Reich Chancellery*

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, October 21, 1941.  
zu Rk. 739 B g. Rs.<sup>1</sup>

1. The Führer had already informed me weeks ago that he had the intention to set up a civil administration in Belgium. Field Marshal General Keitel had received the same communication. This was the reason for his letter to me on October 13, 1941.<sup>1</sup>

2. I made a report to the Führer today and gave him briefly the reasons which the Chief of the OKW advanced against transforming the present military administration in Belgium to a civil administration. The Führer refused to read the letter of the Chief of the OKW with the remark that he was in any case resolved to set up a civil administration in Belgium. At the same time the Führer instructed me to prepare a corresponding decree. The Führer has Gauleiter Grohé<sup>2</sup> under consideration as Reich commissar or as chief of the civil administration, without, however, having definitely committed himself. The Führer indicated that one should investigate whether

<sup>1</sup> Rk. 739 B g. Rs.: Document No. 401.

<sup>2</sup> Joseph Grohé, Gauleiter of Cologne/Aachen.

it might perhaps be expedient to separate the Flemish and Wallonian areas—to designate a new Reich commissar or chief of civil administration only for the Wallonian areas and on the other hand to allot the Flemish areas to the Reich commissar for the occupied Netherlands.<sup>3</sup>

L[AMMERS]

<sup>3</sup> In a memorandum of Oct. 30 (4839/E244983) Kritzinger recorded a conversation with State Secretary Stuckart of the Ministry of Interior whose informal memorandum (4839/E244984-86) on the civilian administration in Belgium expressed general misgivings. Kritzinger recorded that he informed Lammers of this conversation. "He intended first to wait for the letter of the Minister of Interior and then to present the question in detail to the Führer. A directive concerning the establishment of a civilian administration in Belgium will be drafted on the basis of the result of the new presentation."

Additional documents have been filmed on serial 4839.

### No. 417

405/213935-36

#### *The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

URGENT

PARIS, October 22, 1941—9:00 p. m.

No. 3274 of October 22

Received October 22—10:00 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to my telegram No. 3268 of October 22, 1941,<sup>1</sup> there follows the text of Marshal Pétain's letter to the Führer which was mentioned in the previous telegram under Item II:

Vichy, October 21, 1941.

Führer and Reich Chancellor: The anniversary of the meeting of Montoire<sup>2</sup> is a date the meaning and import of which I would like to stress and not only as a matter of record.

There was so much high-mindedness in your gesture of last year that I feel it my duty to emphasize with words of my own the historical significance of our talk.

Franco-German collaboration has doubtlessly not produced all the results that you expected and for which I hoped. It could still not shed a soothing light upon those dark regions in which the soul of a wounded people rebels against its misfortune. Our people are suffering bitterly, and the prisoners of war have not returned. Furthermore an altogether too extensive enemy propaganda is endeavoring to drive a wedge between the occupying power and the occupied people.

<sup>1</sup> In this telegram (405/213932-34) Abetz related Darlan's expression of regret over attempted assassinations of German soldiers; announced Pétain's letter to Hitler; and explained Darlan's attitude on Weygand's probable retirement.

<sup>2</sup> See vol. XI of this series, document No. 227.

France still remembers, however, your noble gesture. It knows that not all its fruits will be lost.

The victory of your armed forces over Bolshevism supplies the motive, even more than was the case a year ago, to engage now in a peaceful effort for the greatness of a changed Europe.

The German and French people are sure that they will meet each other in these fields of higher culture and unite their endeavors.

In giving voice to this deep and sincere wish I beg you, Führer and Reich Chancellor, to accept the assurances of my highest consideration. Philippe Pétain.

End of text.

Original of the letter will be sent with tomorrow's courier.<sup>3</sup>

ABETZ

<sup>1</sup>The original letter has not been found. For Hitler's reply see document No. 460.

No. 418

205/143049-50

*The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

STOCKHOLM, October 23, 1941—12:15 a. m.

No. 1764 of October 22

Received October 23—3:20 a. m.

The two big unresolved problems concerning the supplying of the German troops in Finland, namely (1) providing 2,000 tents and stoves and (2) leasing 300 trucks *equipped with tires* for transportation on the Arctic Highway, were today successfully settled.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Wied's telegram No. 1497 of Sept. 22 (2116/460540-41) reported that a certain Count Beissel had appeared at the Legation on a mission of the Reichsmarschall and with instructions from Major General Schell. In view of the highly critical need for sending food supplies to the German troops in Northern Finland by the overland route he was to purchase or lease 1800 trucks. If payment through clearing were not possible the Reichsmarschall would make gold currency available. At the same time Hitler had directed that Beissel purchase all the tent material or tents that he could get his hands on.

Telegram No. 1541 of Sept. 25 (205/143018-19) reported the Swedish initial response in regard to all of the requests of both Germany and Finland for trucks. Sweden could make available: 300 personnel carriers of German manufacture; 250 freight trucks of German manufacture; 252 trucks for the Finnish Army; and could lease 300 additional trucks without tires if these would make the return trip on the Arctic Highway loaded with nickel ore from Petsamo for Sweden. All of these 1102 trucks were to be without tires.

Telegram No. 1558 of Sept. 26 (205/143024-28) forwarded in translation a note of the Swedish Government to the Legation explaining Sweden's own needs for trucks, her partial dependence on the importation of truck parts, probable need for greater use of wood and hence for trucks with the restriction in the coal supply from Germany, all of which made it impossible to offer more than the total of 1102 trucks.

(1) Tents: Within 3 days the Swedish army administration will make available in northern Sweden, at the Swedish-Finnish border, 2,000 Swedish army tents, each accommodating 25 men, and the stoves that go with them. The inspection of the tents took place this afternoon in the presence of the Military Attachés and, on the Swedish side, of the Quartermaster General of the Swedish Army and of General Holmquist. It was found that the tents were especially well suited for the far north. If the outside temperature is 30 degrees below zero, the inside temperature can be raised in a short time to 15 or 18 degrees above zero. The price is 600 kronor per tent, or 1.2 million kronor in all, which will be paid from the foreign exchange made available here.<sup>2</sup> In return, Germany will supply flax in accordance with your instruction.<sup>3</sup>

(2) Trucks: This equally difficult problem was also finally solved today after long-drawn-out negotiations. Sweden is willing to lease 300 trucks equipped with tires, which, among other things, will be used for the immediate transportation of finished wooden barracks in Sweden to northern Finland. Part of the return cargo from northern Finland to Sweden will be the 5,000 tons of nickel ore from Petsamo, which we have made available to Sweden.<sup>4</sup> This solution was made possible only by a promise from the German side to deliver 50 tons of buna to Sweden to compensate for the wear on the tires. No agreements have been reached yet on when the buna is to be delivered. In view of the extreme urgency of an immediate settlement, Ministerialrat Ludwig, at my request, took it upon himself to promise this buna without consulting Berlin again, especially since the buna can be delivered in partial shipments. A release order was also obtained from the Swedish Government for 30 more Swedish trucks equipped with tires which had already been leased. These had been detained at Haparanda by the Swedish authorities on account of the unsettled problem of tires. Today's solution of these two difficult problems, of vital importance to the supplying of our troops, is evidence of special cooperativeness on the part of the Swedish Government, since there is a pronounced shortage in both sectors in Sweden. Consequently the Swedish

<sup>2</sup>Eisenlohr's telegram of Oct. 20, zu Ha. Pol. 715 g. Rs. (2116/460554-55) informed the Legation that the sum of 3 million reichsmarks in free exchange had been made available to Colonel General von Falkenhorst, Commander of the Army in Norway, for purchases in Sweden of supplies for the German troops in Finland.

<sup>3</sup>Not found.

<sup>4</sup>Eisenlohr's telegram of Oct. 8, zu Ha. Pol. 6554 g. (3607/E 026756-57), stated that Germany would make 5,000 tons of nickel ore available to Sweden at the same price as the Finns asked of the Swedes, but only on condition that the 300 trucks under discussion be equipped with tires.

Foreign Ministry had to overcome strong opposition from the central Swedish agencies concerned with domestic affairs.<sup>5</sup>

*Addendum for telegram center:* Please forward the foregoing immediately also to Ambassador Ritter by teletype.

SOHNURRE  
DANKWORT

<sup>5</sup> Ritter's telegram No. 2653 of Nov. 1 (205/143075) mentioned that the OKW wished some word of thanks to be expressed toward the Swedes, especially for the tents. Ribbentrop concurred but did not wish the thanks to be much emphasized "because otherwise the Swedish Government in case of some refusal in the future would be able to refer to our earlier appreciation." With General Jodl's assent it was directed that the Military Attaché speak a word of appreciation at the appropriate Swedish office.

### No. 419

405/213942

*The Dirigent of the Political Department to the Embassy in Paris*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL TRAIN, October 24, 1941—12:30 a. m.

No. 1150 of October 24 from the Special Train

Received Berlin, October 24—12:50 a. m.

No. 4838 from the Foreign Ministry

Sent October 24.

RAM 453/R

For the Ambassador personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 3268 of October 22.<sup>1</sup>

Regarding the inquiry of yesterday, the Foreign Minister requests that you confirm orally, in his name, to Admiral Darlan, that General Weygand in no way enjoys our confidence.

RINTELEN

<sup>1</sup> In this telegram (405/213932-34) Abetz reported in detail his conversation with Darlan, the contents of which he had announced in document No. 415.

### No. 420

4697/E226826-28

*Memorandum by Minister Eisenlohr*

Dir. Ha Pol No. 208

BERLIN, October 24, 1941.

*Regarding the Grain Supplies for Greece.*

I. According to a telegram from the Reich Plenipotentiary for Greece dated September 30, 1941,<sup>1</sup> the bread ration had at that time

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (4697/E226801).

to be reduced from 192 grams to 96 grams per day. Even this arrangement applied only to the capital, Athens; in many places in the country no bread had been distributed for weeks. There are no longer any reserves of food and particularly of bread grains available in Greece. A definite famine prevails. Infant mortality has risen fifteen-fold, according to the testimony of Deputy Minister President Logothetopoulos, who is a physician by profession.

II. The reasons for this distress are to be found in the fact that the Greek provinces in which there is a grain surplus have been occupied by us and to a much larger extent by the Bulgarians. The remainder of Greece was always a deficiency area. The small harvest from this area itself has been used up. Moreover, the German and Italian occupation troops (the latter allegedly amounting to 200,000 men) have largely satisfied their requirements from the country.

III. In order to prevent the abuses which are with certainty to be expected from this situation of scarcity, Minister Clodius at the end of August 1941 had reached an agreement with the Italian Government, based on a minimum grain requirement of Greece in the amount of 150,000 tons which comprised the following elements:

Germany and Italy would each deliver 10,000 tons of grain to cover the immediate requirements up to October 1. (The German deliveries were to be diverted from quantities of grain which we obtained from the Banat.) Furthermore, 40,000 tons were to be delivered to Greece by December 31 and another 90,000 tons between January 1 and June 30, 1942 (i.e., until the beginning of the new harvest), and in such a manner that all the amounts delivered to Greece would be charged in equal parts to the German and Italian imports from third countries. It was planned to obtain these deliveries for Greece primarily from Turkey, and in second place from Bulgaria.<sup>2</sup>

This agreement proved to be impossible of execution in so far as the quantities envisaged or even a major part of them could thus far not be obtained either from Turkey or from Bulgaria or from any other third country. Rather, in the course of September and October only the amounts of 10,000 tons of grain apiece promised by Italy and Germany could be delivered. A remainder of this is still being delivered.

IV. Inasmuch as it has proved to be impossible to carry out the idea of supplying Greece from third countries with Germany and Italy acting as intermediaries at least at the present time, and thus the agreement mentioned under point III had in practice become untenable, we pointed out to the Italian Government through the Embassy in Rome at the beginning of October that for the future we would have to leave to the Italian Government the responsibility for

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 323.

supplying Greece, because Greece was in the area where Italy exercised power.<sup>3</sup> This statement was made in order to prevent the Italian Government from possibly demanding of us that Greece must now be supplied from our own German stocks. The Italian Government did not deny its responsibility for supplying Greece, and stated for its part that Count Ciano at the direction of the Duce had instructed the Italian Minister in Sofia to induce the Bulgarian Government to deliver this amount of 100,000 tons of wheat or maize to Italy for the supply of Greece. At the same time our support was requested for this diplomatic step. The Italian step was taken in Sofia in the meantime with our support; the result is not known, but it will hardly be any different from that which our own representations had (cf. point V).

V. We for our part had even previously made the most vigorous efforts in Sofia to obtain Bulgarian deliveries of grain to Greece;<sup>4</sup> and in this connection we had pointed out in particular that there was a German interest in preventing disorders in Greece and that Bulgaria was under an obligation to help since she had taken the Greek grain surplus areas under her administration. The Bulgarian Government recognized this obligation in principle, but, referring to its own supply situation, stated that it was unable to deliver wheat or maize to Greece before all of the grain in eastern Macedonia and western Thrace had been obtained, i.e., before the end of this year. The only thing that Bulgaria has been willing to do up to now is to promise an immediate delivery of 5,000 tons of beans, barley, rice, peas, and lentils as well as 200 tons of eggs. The efforts to increase this promise are being continued, especially with respect to supplying immediately 5,000 tons of grain.

VI. In interpreting the well-known decision by high authorities that certain groups of the Greek population are to receive additional supplies from German Army commissariats in the areas occupied by German troops,<sup>5</sup> an agreement was reached between the Reich Ministry of Food and the Four Year Plan during Minister Altenburg's stay in Berlin stipulating that about 60,000 workers in the mainland areas occupied by us, also the persons on the Island of Crete performing labor for the military, as well as the landlords of our soldiers will receive certain modest supplementary allotments. Over and

<sup>3</sup> In the files is the draft of an instruction of October 17 (2203/474090-91) directing Clodius to take such a position in his economic negotiations with the Italians.

<sup>4</sup> Documents relating to these steps taken in Sofia are filmed on serial 4703.

<sup>5</sup> According to a teletype message of Oct. 4 from Eisenlohr to Ritter (4697/E226807-08) a decision to that effect had been made by Hitler and had been communicated to the Foreign Ministry by a message of Sept. 17 from the OKW.

above this, the Four Year Plan upon the urgent representations of Field Marshal List has in the meantime pleaded with the Reich Ministry of Food that up to the end of this year 10,000 to 15,000 tons of grain per month be delivered to Greece, as an advance on the deliveries which, it is hoped, Bulgaria will make as of the beginning of 1942.

VII. As was to be expected, the Italians have used the presence of Minister Clodius in Rome in order to involve him in the question of the food situation of Greece (presumably with reference to Italy's own supply situation). Herr Clodius has for this purpose summoned the experts from the German civil and military administrations in Athens. There is no news as yet concerning the progress and the result of his Roman conversations.<sup>6</sup>

Submitted herewith through the State Secretary to the Foreign Minister in accordance with instructions.

EISENLOHR

<sup>6</sup> According to a draft telegram of Nov. 17 addressed to Altenburg by Clodius (4697/E226838-48) Germany and Italy had examined the problems relating to the food supply for Greece. As their joint efforts to supply Greece with grain from Bulgaria, Turkey, and Rumania had been unsuccessful, Germany was unable to commit herself to a long-term plan of deliveries to Greece. Germany would, however, supply Greece with 10,000 tons of grain for the rest of the year, in order to alleviate the worst misery especially in Athens and Piraeus.

No. 421

1517/372877-80

*The Legation in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

BUDAPEST,<sup>1</sup> October 25, 1941—12:10 a. m.

Received October 25—2:35 a. m.

No. 1352 of October 25

Del. No. 1

Secret for officer in charge.

For the Foreign Minister.

I. I had a lengthy conversation with the Duce today. The latter first expressed his satisfaction over the course of the visit of Minister Funk.<sup>2</sup> The visit and the splendidly worded communiqué<sup>3</sup> had had

<sup>1</sup> A draft of this telegram (2089/452263-67) was dated Oct. 24 at Budapest. Nevertheless, Clodius' conversation with Mussolini took place in Rome. See document No. 440.

<sup>2</sup> Minister of Economics Funk had been in Rome for discussions with Minister of Trade Riccardi from Oct. 19 to 23.

<sup>3</sup> The text of the press communiqué had been transmitted by Mackensen to Ribbentrop in telegram No. 2666 of Oct. 23 (1517/372864-66). It was approved by Ribbentrop and Mackensen was so notified in telegram No. 1153 of Oct. 24 (1517/372867). The text of Funk's speech to the press in Rome about his talks with Riccardi has been filmed on 4875/E253133-37.

a good effect on the public. The visit was at the present moment primarily of political importance because it tended to refute the rumors which were circulating recently concerning the alleged inclination of Italy to leave Germany in the lurch.<sup>4</sup> The Duce added that he wanted everyone in the world to know that Italy had taken her definitive stand and that it was clear to every Italian that until the end of the war Italy would stand at Germany's side. I replied that none of us had had even the slightest doubt of it.

II. The Duce continued that there was one question of decisive military importance, concerning which he wished above all to speak with me, and that was the guaranteeing of Italy's oil supplies. A critical situation had arisen for the Navy. I knew, indeed, from our constant negotiations in recent years<sup>5</sup> that the supplying of the Navy had always been only partially possible, and that its activities had been considerably curtailed already in the last half year for lack of oil.<sup>6</sup> But now the moment had come when all reserves were used up and a large-scale employment of the fleet had become impossible altogether. In October only a fraction of the stipulated quantity had been delivered from Rumania. If imports were not sharply increased at once, even convoy guard for the transports to Libya would no longer be possible. I reminded the Duce that at our last conversations on this question in January and February, we already found ourselves facing an approximately similar situation.<sup>7</sup> We had nevertheless succeeded in the past 9 months in getting the necessary quantities of oil for an activity, even though perhaps a somewhat restricted one, of the Italian Navy. I was firmly convinced that we would succeed in this again even now.

I had detailed discussions on this question yesterday and this morning both with the Chief of the General Staff, General Cavallero, and with the Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Riccardi. We were working with all the means at our command to further increase production in Rumania and had made all preparations, in the event of a further advance in Russia, to proceed at once with the extraction and the removal of oil.

The Duce then inquired minutely as to the prospects of oil supplies from Russia, and in this connection also obtained a report on the

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Leonardo Simoni, *Berlino, ambasciata d'Italia, 1939-1943* (Rome, 1946), pp. 255-256; Dino Alfieri, *Due dittatori di fronte*, pp. 227-228; *The Ciano Diaries*, entries for June 30, July 6, July 13, July 16, July 20, and Sept. 24, 1941; letter of Ciano to Alfieri, Oct. 6, printed in Galeazzo Ciano, *L'Europa verso la catastrofe*, p. 677.

<sup>5</sup> See vol. XI of this series, documents Nos. 619 and 726, and vol. XII, documents Nos. 19, 27, 91, 641, and 652.

<sup>6</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 65.

<sup>7</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 27.

other prospects for the economic exploitation of Russia. I promised the Duce, upon my return from Berlin, together with all the appropriate authorities to do everything in our power to maintain the activity of the Italian Navy.

III. The next point that the Duce dealt with was the Italian food situation. It had been reported to him that Germany would give decisive aid in connection with the supplying of Italy from the south-east. He expressed his thanks for this and was pleased about it. It was, of course, necessary to assure the Italian people the subsistence minimum, which was already extremely depressed as it was, particularly in regard to bread supplies. But he saw no really serious danger in the food question. The Italian people were tough and easily satisfied and for centuries accustomed to suffering. They could by no means be subdued by reason of a curtailment of the food supply.

I replied to the Duce that it was evident from my conversations with Tassinari, the Minister of Agriculture, and Riccardi, the Minister of Foreign Trade,<sup>8</sup> that the Italian deficit, judged from the standpoint of over-all European consumption, was gratifyingly relatively small. Together with the Italian ministers concerned, we would see to it that this deficit were covered to the extent really necessary. The Duce expressed his thanks for this, but repeated that oil was even more important than bread.

IV. The Duce then asked me to report to him my impressions of my last trips to and negotiations in southeastern Europe. He was particularly interested in the attitude of Turkey and in the situation in Greece. The latter made him very uneasy.<sup>9</sup> Just today he had received the report that Athens again had a supply of bread grains sufficient for only 2 more days. Yesterday he had again released 800 tons of flour for Greece, but that was only like a drop of water on a hot stone. So much, at least, had to be done for Greece as to protect our commercial purchasing interests there and, above all, to safeguard the position of Greece as a starting point for further military operations.

V. In the conversations, prior to my discussion with the Duce, which I held with General Cavallero and Admiral Riccardi on the oil question at their request, Admiral Riccardi in particular, who submitted all the figures, represented the Italian supply situation as an extremely dangerous one. The reserves of fuel oil for the Navy, which at the beginning of the war had amounted to over 1 million tons, had on October 1 shrunk to 50,000 tons. In October, out of the 55,000 tons

<sup>8</sup> Clodius reported a discussion with Riccardi, regarding the precarious food supply situation in Italy, in telegram No. 2636 of Oct. 21 (1517/372846). No record of Clodius' conversation with Tassinari has been found.

<sup>9</sup> See document No. 420.

promised from Rumania, only 17,000 tons had thus far arrived. The minimum consumption of the Navy in October would be 75,000 tons, so that in November only 11,000 tons, that is, practically nothing, would be available. The Navy was no longer in a position to send out large units. A few days ago he, Riccardi, had to pass up a very favorable opportunity for an attack on a large English convoy that was being escorted by several cruisers. The English had in the last several days dispatched two units to Malta; he therefore also had to have the convoy to Africa escorted by cruisers, should it not be possible to disperse the English cruisers in the nightly air attacks on Malta. For the regular transport operations to Africa 35,000 tons of oil were required; in addition to this, 19,000 tons were needed for the protection of the respective harbors. If 54,000 tons were not delivered at once, transports would have to be suspended during November. At the same time he had to stress the fact that the Navy, if it had only 54,000 tons, could only perform transport service, but could not, in addition, undertake any defensive or offensive operations. I replied to General Cavallero and Admiral Riccardi in the same sense as I had to the Duce. Count Ciano did not broach the oil question in his numerous conversations with me.

CLODIUS  
JAGOW

No. 422

405/213950-53

*The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

PARIS, October 25, 1941—8:25 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received October 25—9:35 p. m.

No. 3325 of October 25

For the Foreign Minister.

Subject: Attempts against the lives of members of the Wehrmacht.

Following the instruction received from the Foreign Minister,<sup>1</sup> I have observed complete reserve in the matter of reprisals for the attempts against the lives of members of the Wehrmacht and have taken the position that this is an exclusively military matter. In addition I have personally expressed the view to the military authorities that the reprisals ordered<sup>2</sup> were entirely appropriate if the situation

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 338.

<sup>2</sup> For the text of the orders of Aug. 23 and Sept. 28 of the Military Commander in France, see *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, vol. XXVII, document No. 1588-PS, pp. 364-73.

reports on France sent to Führer Headquarters by almost all the German offices in Paris, in contrast to those of the Embassy for the past year and a half, were true, that is, if the overwhelming majority of the population were actually de Gaullist and anti-German.

Regarding the presumable assassins and the political repercussions of the shootings of hostages already carried out and still to come the following picture appears up to now:

I. Possibly this involves a terrorist group of the association of young Communists which is directed by agents of the Secret Service. The assassination in Bordeaux<sup>3</sup> was carried out in the same way as the one against Marcel Gitton, the former deputy and secretary general of the Communist party in France, who defected to Doriot. Furthermore there are a number of indications that English officers have been dropped by parachute into France; two such Englishmen are supposed to have been arrested by the French police in unoccupied France near the line of demarcation and to have had with them large supplies of explosives and food. It is also not entirely impossible that a French nationalist organization and certain circles in the Government and the Army are behind the assassinations in order to prevent the danger of good relations between the population and the occupation power.

II. The French Government's shock at the execution of the hostages seems to be more for show than real. This can be explained on the score that the major part of the hostages are Communists and with them there disappear elements undesirable to the Government. The secret pleasure of a number of Cabinet members can perhaps also be explained in that an important part of the patriotic Frenchmen in the occupied area possess more confidence in the European and socialist objectives of the occupying power than in the program of their own Government. Through the mass executions of their countrymen these patriotic Frenchmen can become aware of their blood relationship with those who were shot, in spite of the contradiction of political convictions, and thus the creation of a morally united front against the Germans, which is desired by Vichy, can be facilitated.

III. Last night Minister of the Interior Pucheu brought the text of a radio appeal apparently planned by Pétain which follows in translation. It reads:

"Führer and Reich Chancellor. I am appealing to you in the most direct way in order to beg you in the name of the sacred principles of humanity to cease with the bloody reprisals. Because two Ger-

<sup>3</sup> In a memorandum of Oct. 24, 1941 (405/213943-44) Grote recorded the assassination of a German officer from the administrative service in Bordeaux on Oct. 22.



man officers were just murdered in a cowardly way by unknown persons, with no evidence being present that they were Frenchmen, 100 Frenchmen have already been executed within 2 days and others are being threatened.

"Both of us are resolved to find and punish the culprits and to fight with all our might against the foreign influences which put weapons into their hands, but I cannot let the blood of those be spilled who had no part in these murders. I should betray my people if I did not address a solemn protest to you at this hour. If you refuse to hear my voice and if you need further hostages and victims, then take me.

"I shall be at the demarcation line in Moulins today at 2:00 p.m., where I shall consider myself your prisoner while awaiting your decision."

This plan transmitted to me can be a bluff in order to extort cancellation of the 100 executions which are still planned. However, according to reports received at the Embassy<sup>4</sup> it could also be a well conceived intrigue by the chief of the Marshal's civil cabinet, du Moulin de Labarthète,<sup>5</sup> involving the same elements in the Marshal's entourage who already bear the responsibility for December 18.<sup>6</sup> If the Führer had accepted such a proposal by Pétain, then, in the opinion of these circles, the prerequisites for the outbreak of unrest in unoccupied France and in North Africa would have been created, since France would no longer have possessed a Chief of State. If Pétain's proposal had been rejected by the Führer, then the Marshal would have found himself in an impossible situation so that then, too, a crisis in the authority of the state would have been unavoidable. Marshal Pétain himself had not seen through the motives of his intriguing advisers and had already accepted the suggestion which seemed to him chivalrous. Only through the energetic objections of Darlan and Pucheu had he been held back from it.

IV. In reply to the objection that the number of 50 hostages executed for each of the assassinations in Nantes<sup>7</sup> and Bordeaux was too high, it can be stated that the usual small number of executions in the case of previous assassinations has evidently had the result that the population and the French authorities condemned the assassinations, to be sure, but were not willing to cooperate to the extent that they do now, in apprehending the culprits. The French population and police have now been so alarmed by the 600 executions that have already occurred, however, that in the future certainly all that is humanly possible will be done to avoid further assassinations.

<sup>4</sup> These reports have not been found.

<sup>5</sup> On Pétain's plan to give himself up to the German authorities see Robert Aron, *Histoire de Vichy, 1940-44* (Paris, 1956), pp. 458-459.

<sup>6</sup> See vol. xi of this series, documents Nos. 510, 517, 521, 530, and 531.

<sup>7</sup> On Oct. 20, 1941, Lt. Col. Hotz was assassinated in Nantes.

In my opinion it is of decisive importance in the case of assassinations whether they correspond to a hostile attitude on the part of the population or are committed with the provocative intention of calling forth such an attitude. In the present case it can be considered established that the attitude of the French population does not provide any prerequisite for these assassinations of members of the Wehrmacht; indeed, in recent weeks there has been a noticeable improvement among the masses in the attitude toward Germany under the impact of the great German victories in the east and on the eve of the anniversary of Montoire.<sup>8</sup>

The French public is uniform in condemning the murders and the treacherous manner of their execution. If the remaining 100 hostages are executed, however, there exists the danger that the indignation of the people about the assassinations will be transformed into indignation at the reprisals which are disproportionately high according to local opinion. In this situation it would appear to me to be politically useful to inform the population in an impressive proclamation that the Führer had decided, in consideration of the willingness to assist in finding the culprits that has now been demonstrated, to suspend until further notice the execution of the remaining 100 hostages under arrest.<sup>9</sup>

ABETZ

<sup>8</sup> See vol. xi of this series, document No. 227.

<sup>9</sup> A marginal note in Weizsäcker's handwriting on page one of this document refers to this paragraph: "Has instruction re page 4 gone out?" The instruction referred to by Weizsäcker was Hitler's decision to postpone the shooting of 50 additional hostages until Oct. 29 as reported in the memo of Oct. 27 by Kramarz (405/213954) and indefinitely as recorded by Grote's memorandum Pol. IM 7826 g of Oct. 28 (405/213957).

## No. 423

260/170258-59

### *The Legation in Finland to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 1179 of October 25

HELSINKI, October 25, 1941—9:40 p. m.

Received October 25—10:35 p. m.

The main preoccupation of the Finnish Government at the discussions during these past days was concerned with the Finnish food situation in the coming year. State President Ryti as well as individual Ministers were emphatic in explaining to me these difficulties

and their causes.<sup>1</sup> The reasons for Finland's adverse food balance are, for one thing, the poor crops of the last 2 years together with the cessation of the extensive imports from non-European and overseas countries, and, for another, the utmost straining of the Finnish War effort, which requires larger allocations to the army and the auxiliary organizations. The prevailing uncertainty regarding how to cover the deficit in the food situation, is responsible for widespread emergency slaughter, which has already resulted in a critical reduction of livestock. Checking this reaction among the farmers at once is essential if further serious impairment of Finland's food base is to be averted.

The Finnish food balance, according to the figures presented here, shows a deficit of 175,000 tons of bread grains. Only if this deficit is covered will the Finnish Government be able to assure availability of the quantities of fodder grain indispensable to preserve the livestock herds and to maintain the food ration, which has already been cut to the limit. Finland's request to the Reich Government would therefore be for an assurance that these 175,000 tons of grain would be supplied over a period between now and the new crop in 1942, that is, approximately October of next year. The deliveries could be distributed over that period, but the Finnish Government is anxious to receive a small portion immediately. Now that the territories lost under the Moscow peace treaty of March 11, 1940, have been recaptured,<sup>2</sup> the Finnish Government believes that the current shortage will not occur again because the arable land available will henceforth be sufficient to supply the nation with food, although subject to the utmost restrictions.

To judge by the picture which we have gained at the discussions here, the Finnish demands do not appear excessive. If we wish to sustain the combat power and the resistance of the Finnish people, we must come to their aid. And that must be done very soon in order to enable the Finnish Government to do its long-range planning and to counteract the shaky morale of the farmers.

<sup>1</sup> In telegram No. 1134 of Oct. 18 (260/170252-53) Blücher reported a conversation with President Ryti who mentioned that the military situation in all sectors was good but that the chief concern was the problem of foodstuffs and fuels. The economic life of the country could not be maintained, he said, with 16 percent of the population mobilized and Finland consequently would reduce her army to 150,000 men after the capture of Karhumäki.

<sup>2</sup> A translation from the Russian text of the treaty signed at Moscow on Mar. 12, 1940, between the USSR and Finland is printed in Degras, *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, vol. III, pp. 421-424. A translation from the Finnish text is in *Finland Reveals Her Secret Documents on Soviet Policy, March 1940-June 1941* (New York, 1941), pp. 35-38.

In telegram No. 1433 of Dec. 2 (261/170411) Blücher reported that the Finnish Parliament approved a bill for the reincorporation into Finland of the territories lost by the Treaty of Moscow.

I request that a decision on the basis of my telegraphic reporting be reached immediately if possible.<sup>3</sup> The Finnish Government has presented a comprehensive memorandum on the Finnish food situation<sup>4</sup> which will be transmitted by Ministerialrat Ludwig, who is leaving by plane today and will arrive in Berlin on Monday.<sup>4</sup>

SCHNURRE  
BLÜCHER

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

<sup>4</sup> A minute of Oct. 29 (4967/E270777/1) by Weber, an official in the Foreign Minister's secretariat, indicated that Ribbentrop wanted a sympathetic appraisal of the Finnish request.

A memorandum by Scherpenberg, zu Ha Pol. 732 g. Rs. of Nov. 1 (260/170291), stated that the amount of grain in Finland available for 1941-1942 was less than 500,000 tons whereas the consumption in a normal year ran to 750,000 tons, and recorded that the Finnish figures and possibilities of delivery were being examined in the Reich Food Ministry.

See, further, document No. 493.

No. 424

F2/0103-126;  
F12/440-463

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat*

Füh. 50 g. Rs.

SPECIAL GUEST TRAIN, October 26, 1941.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND COUNT  
CIANO AT HEADQUARTERS ON OCTOBER 25, 1941<sup>1</sup>

After a few words of welcome the Führer expressed his satisfaction that the great aim of destroying the enemy forces in the east had now been attained to a great extent and it was merely a question of exploiting the victory in every direction.

He would send the Duce a description of the over-all situation in a letter in the immediate future.<sup>2</sup> He hoped that this letter would be finished in time for General von Rintelen, the German Military Attaché at Rome, who was at Headquarters for the moment, to hand it to the Duce in person.

He (the Führer) was not clear about the intentions of the English. It was certain, however, that Great Britain had lost her strongest ally on the Continent. In the light of the latest events in Russia, severe

<sup>1</sup> Ciano came to Germany at the invitation of Ribbentrop to take part in the annual hunt at Schönhof. For the arrangements and proposed program see telegram No. 1109 of Oct. 16 (1517/372827).

In telegram No. 2622 of Oct. 20 (100/65306) Mackensen indicated his wish to accompany Ciano in order to be able to report orally regarding Minister Mayr and the South Tirol. Cf. document No. 362, footnote 12.

<sup>2</sup> Of Oct. 29, document No. 433.

criticism was being voiced even in England itself regarding the inactivity of British warfare and British policy. The critics believed that in recent weeks the time had been favorable for unleashing a two-front war. The Führer stressed in this connection that Germany was very well prepared for a two-front war, and Lord Halifax had not betrayed anything new at all about England's plan when he hinted at a two-front war. Germany had left strong forces both in Norway and in France, and was therefore armed for everything.

It was not known, however, whether the English were not going to do something somewhere after all. He (the Führer) would explain his opinion on this, too, in the letter to the Duce. He would speak of the danger points where Germany had already made her preparations, and on the basis of certain considerations would suggest that Italy undertake a reinforcement of the Luftwaffe in the Mediterranean in the near future. Furthermore, a new attempt should be made against Malta and in any case the island should be blockaded as thoroughly as possible and cut off from all imports. A long-range night fighter unit would have to watch over the three airports on Malta and in the long run they would be able to inflict considerable losses on the English fighters when they landed there at night. In this regard the best and most favorable possibilities of attack were offered at Malta.

Concerning the general situation the Führer remarked that the decision of the war had really been made by the events of the past 4 months, and that in any case there was no longer any possibility for the enemy to shake this decision. Probably the English could still try a few local operations; but they could not gain a continental victory.

They themselves were not in a position to attempt a landing on the Continent, to say nothing of carrying it through. However, they were also lacking in support from other quarters in executing such an operation. To be sure, Russia now could have given them tremendous help in their aggressive intentions, as one now recognized much more clearly than 5 months ago. By a sudden attack the Russians would have been in a position to give the war a disastrous turn, not only as regards Germany and Italy but in respect to all Europe and civilization.

The Soviet Union had now finally lost this possibility, and not only for geographical reasons, because the front was 1,500 kilometers from the eastern frontier of the Reich, but also for military reasons as regards both personnel and material and likewise for organizational reasons. In regard to personnel the giant state had sacrificed its most valuable units. So much material had been lost that the democracies could not replace it in 5 years, in which connection one should re-

member that they would then keep nothing for themselves. What was decisive, however, was the organizational disruption of the Russian state, regarding the amount and extent of which no one so far possessed any insight.

From the observations of the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow<sup>3</sup> from the time before the battles at Vyazma and Briansk there already emerged a picture of the internal collapse of order and discipline. In a state in which the leadership was so centralized that, to express it crassly, even the distribution of toothbrushes—if such things were used in Russia at all—had to be regulated centrally by Moscow, it was naturally impossible to build up a new governmental center located hundreds of kilometers from the capital city. Even the establishment of the purely technical and communications apparatus was entirely impossible with the Russian colossus, so that after the abandonment of Moscow a central government and administration of the country would be a practical impossibility.

Just as impossible was a removal of industry to the east. Some branches of industry had already lost 75 percent of their raw material supplies. In addition, the remaining 25 percent were mainly distributed in an exceedingly unfavorable manner in relation to the railroads.

At any rate Germany, with her highly flexible economic system, would not be in a position in like circumstances to repair such damage as Russia had suffered. The same was probably true for other European industrial countries. Therefore France had also surrendered at a certain moment in the realization of this impossibility.

Now it was said that Stalin intended to transfer a million workers to Siberia. Certainly only a portion of these would arrive at their destination, and the workers would arrive in the middle of the Siberian winter with its temperatures of 45 to 50 degrees below freezing. They would not find any living quarters, but would have to be accommodated in caves in the earth. Thus this winter the fate of Napoleon would probably overtake Russia rather than Germany and her allies.

Furthermore, the Russian transportation system was not transverse, but radial. All lines radiated from Moscow, and the route between two points in the empire always led through the capital, which, however, would be under siege from all sides within a few weeks.

In southern Russia the further advance of the German and allied troops was above all a matter of supply. It was extremely important to repair the railroad network as quickly as possible and to change it to the European gauge so that the supply of fuel, food, and ammunition was secured as regards transportation. In this respect much

<sup>3</sup> Ali Haydar Aktay.

progress can be noted. Today a large railroad bridge across the Dnieper near Kremenchug will be put into service, so that entire trains will run through to Stalino. What was decisive for the German advance in the south was not the hostile resistance, but the weather and the supply possibilities. As soon as freezing weather arrived and the now almost impassable roads had frozen over, the weather-determined obstacles could be more easily overcome; by crossing the huge barrier of the Dnieper at three bridge points a restoration of the railroad network and therewith an improvement in the possibilities of supplies would be attained which would permit the German army to accomplish the next jump forward. At the present distance of 400 to 500 kilometers of the front lines from the supply bases one had had to call a halt for the time being.

The Führer designated the Caucasus area as the next objective of the German operations, which was to be cut off together with the already interrupted pipeline and the railroad lines to the north. He (the Führer) would be glad if in this manner the German troops would come up against the first divisions of General Wavell and would thereby relieve the situation in the Mediterranean area. Such a relief would best be brought about if the Arab world would witness a really serious threat to the English position, no matter what the point was from which it was launched. The Caucasus area was a favorable basis for this in so far as the main center of oil supplies lay in its immediate vicinity, which could then be put to the service of the German and allied armies even if the Russians should undertake large-scale demolitions. Within 6 to 8 months everything could be repaired again, so that the strongest pressure could then be exerted on England from there.

In the further course of the conversation the Führer called to mind the large-scale strategic and operational plans which he had described to the Duce at his recent visit.<sup>4</sup> At that time he had said his aim was the destruction of Budenny's army, which at that time was still northwest of Kiev, as well as a break-through and an encirclement of Timoshenko's army. He had not wanted to write to the Duce before these plans had been realized. Today he could say that the operational ideas which he had expressed at that time had been carried out in a splendid manner. The armies of Budenny and Timoshenko had been destroyed; far more than 1½ million Russian prisoners had fallen into our hands.

As regards men Russia had lost more than 3 million prisoners since the start of the campaign. If one assumed that one to two dead must be counted for every prisoner, then one arrived at a total loss of 6

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 242.

million in prisoners and dead. For every dead man one could assume two to three wounded, of these 60 percent were serious casualties, that is, soldiers who could not be in service within a short time; 30 to 40 percent could be assumed to be light casualties, but again 50 percent of these were eliminated because of bad sanitary organization.

From his calculations there emerged a total loss of the Russians of a minimum of 10 millions, and this was probably a very cautious estimate. In reality the figures would probably be higher. Furthermore, almost the entire commissioned and noncommissioned officers' corps had been lost in this manner, and when an English newspaper wrote that Stalin intended to set up a new army in the Urals in accordance with the experience gained in the present war, this assertion could only call for a smile from everyone who knew from his own experience the difficulties involved in setting up an army. This was nothing more than a gigantic bluff.

The material losses of the Russians were unimaginable. Only now had it become clear what tremendous danger had threatened from Russia. The industrial damages were just as great and were impossible to repair. The removal of machine tools was a very doubtful undertaking, especially since the railroads were under constant bombardment from the German fliers. As the younger age groups were needed as industrial workers, the Russians were forced to call up mainly older age groups and use them for cannon fodder.

In raw materials Russia had already lost 75 percent of her aluminum supplies, 65-70 percent of her raw steel supplies, and a large part of her coal stocks. Within a short time she would no longer be able to exercise control over more than 90 percent of her oil supplies.

The supply of manganese was completely eliminated, not only for Russia but also for America, which had gotten supplies from Russian sources. Molybdenum had likewise been entirely eliminated. The remaining raw material bases lay so far apart from one another that a concentrated armament production was no longer possible.

Thus if one applied the present Russian situation to German conditions, one would arrive at the following picture: The Ruhr area and the Upper Silesian coal basin were lost, as well as the Central German steel industry; three-fourths of the aluminum industry, 90-95 percent of the armament factories, and 70 percent of the transportation facilities were eliminated. One no longer possessed an army and intended in these circumstances to set up a new army. This comparison showed in all clarity the hopeless situation in which the Soviet Union found itself. The difficulties were still enhanced by the fact that the thickly settled areas of Russia were in German hands, whereas of the 150 million total population only 30 million lived in Siberia.

One could therefore state that the giant empire of the Soviet Union had reached the end of its strength. Not only the Russians and the Germans, together with their allies, knew this, but also England and America. As proof of this the Führer cited the fact that the Americans wanted to route their deliveries to Russia neither through Vladivostok nor through Iran, but like typical Shylocks had chosen the harbor of Archangel because they knew very well that within a few weeks this would be unusable until next May as a result of ice formation. Then they could shift the blame onto Russia for the fact that the deliveries had not come off. For the Anglo-American experts themselves certainly did not assume that one could keep a channel open permanently with icebreakers, as was maintained in the Anglo-Saxon press. There was hardly a better target for air attacks than an icebreaker which, without any possibility of evasion, led the way laboriously through the masses of ice at a speed of three knots. Furthermore German troops would, within a few weeks, also cut the railroad to Archangel.

In these circumstances the war would be transferred to the west in the near future, and thereby the period of grace which England had received because of the Russian events would be ended. What conclusions the English themselves would draw from this could of course not be predicted. However, England's internal situation did not seem to be so firm as it was previously. Within the framework of the fight against England the English harbors would within 1 to 2 months be bombarded in a way that they had so far not yet experienced, and the submarines would proceed with renewed vigor in the dark nights against the English shipping. At the same time an operation against England was under preparation in the Arab world, in which connection the problems in the Mediterranean, too, would be made easier, regarding which he (the Führer) would take a detailed position in his letter to the Duce.\*

Noteworthy in the fighting in the east was the fact that for the first time a feeling of European solidarity had developed. This was of great importance especially for the future. A later generation would have to cope with the problem of Europe-America. It would no longer be a matter of Germany or England, of Fascism, of National Socialism, or antagonistic systems, but of the common interests of Pan-Europe within the European economic area with her African supplements. The feeling of European solidarity, which at the moment was distinctly tangible, even though only faint against the background of the fighting in the east, would gradually have to change generally into a great recognition of the European community.

\* Of Oct. 29; see document No. 433.

After a remark about Japan, whose hour at the side of the Axis would surely come, the Führer spoke of the practical possibilities that existed for America in her fight against the Continent. The United States was arming itself in order to take over as much as possible of the English legacy. It masked this intention behind a holy crusade against Fascism and National Socialism, a typically Anglo-Saxon procedure since the Anglo-Saxons always surround the pursuit of their own interests with an appearance of morality. In this connection it was significant that an American periodical stated a few days ago that England was exhausted to such a degree that America would have to take over the leadership of the world and the succession to the British international position. As counterservices for her deliveries of war material America really seemed to have made demands on England in this direction, which were evidently of such a serious nature that the English had so far not yet replied to them.

Apparently it was a question of the American demand to possess bases everywhere where the English for their part had bases, as well as the demand that England give up the economic protectionism of the British Empire, that is her Ottawa policy.

One often heard the opinion that at the end of the war England would have lost the fight, to be sure, but that America would step into her place. To this the observation was to be made that the United States had so far by no means mastered the problems of internal order and organization of social conditions that had been solved in Germany and Italy, and therefore at the end of the war would find herself confronted by great internal difficulties. If in addition Europe, led and held together by Germany in the north and Italy in the south, achieved a better cooperation between the European nations than in the past, it would then represent such a superior factor that even America could do nothing against a Europe thus unified. Then 500 million Europeans would confront 230 million Americans, whereby one should remember that there were only 60 million Anglo-Saxons in America, whereas the remainder was made up of Italians, Germans, and members of other races.

Central and South America would still provide America with aid during the war under the influence of Jewish propaganda, to be sure. As soon as peace had been established, however, such an economic chaos would arise there that a new orientation would be necessary. Since the South Americans wanted to sell the same products that the North Americans produce in great quantities, no healthy economic relations were possible between the two parts of the Western Hemisphere, particularly since the South Americans were not in a position to raise the means of payment for the finished goods to be obtained from North

America, and one could not after all constantly exchange goods in return for unproductive gold.

In view of these facts of internal and external chaos in America, the war and its armaments were simply a period of grace for the United States, after the passage of which it would experience an economic collapse in comparison to which the crisis of 1929 would appear to be child's play.

Therefore the future did not belong to the ridiculously half-civilized America, but to the newly arisen Europe that would also definitely prevail with her people, her economy, and her intellectual and cultural values, on condition that the East were placed in the service of the European idea and did not work against Europe. Therefore it was also a fallacy to believe that in the last analysis America would be the beneficiary of England's defeat. The older culture and the higher intellectual level of Europe would in the end be victorious.

Count Ciano thanked the Führer for his comprehensive statements, and, following that, came to speak of Italy's domestic situation. As was known, the English and American propaganda, which was connected with other propagandists that were under Jewish influence, had some time ago gone over to representing Italy's domestic situation in the blackest colors. The Duce had commissioned him (Count Ciano) to state to the Führer in no uncertain terms that this prattle was absolutely absurd. Italy's domestic situation had not changed by any means.

At most there was one somewhat delicate and difficult point: This was the food situation, especially in the area of bread grain. Here the scarcity of supply was disagreeably noticeable particularly for the reason that bread and cereals represented the staple of the Italian people. However, the Duce was convinced that he would be able to master the difficulties and by means of skillful distribution of the existing quantities would be able to compensate for the hardships of the poorer people by giving to the more well-to-do population groups, who had alternate possibilities, less bread than to the poor. To be sure, the situation was not exactly splendid. In the Duce's opinion it would, however, be possible to get through to the next harvest. In any case no repercussions on domestic policy of any sort had arisen from these food difficulties. Italy's internal situation was normal and calm; morale was good. The extent to which the Italian people understood the necessity to restrict themselves had been shown when shortly after introduction of the bread rationing the Duce had made a trip to the political center of Italy (Bologna, Parma, and other northern Italian cities) and had been welcomed there with great enthusiasm by the people.

In the further course of the conversation Count Ciano also passed on a personal request of the Duce's to the Führer: Italy felt uncomfortable because she had the impression that she contributed too little to the military efforts in the conduct of the war. Therefore the Duce wanted Italy to participate in the military effort to a larger extent than heretofore.<sup>6</sup>

In this connection Ciano came to speak of the question of Italian workers in Germany and admitted without further ado that certain individual difficulties had been dramatized unnecessarily.<sup>7</sup> One needed only to go through the pages of newspapers of cities like Florence and Bologna, whose laboring population numbered about the same as the Italian workers employed in Germany, in order to find that there are incidents, fights, and the like every day which no one got excited about. The incidents in Germany were therefore something entirely normal and were simply exploited by malevolent people.

In these circumstances the inclination of the Duce could best be summarized in the words: "fewer workers, more soldiers." Since in the choice of the workers mistakes had been made, the Duce intended to undertake a new selection to eliminate unsuitable elements and reduce the number of workers employed in Germany, but to increase the number of fighting soldiers. The Duce asked the Führer to permit him to make a larger contribution to the military effort than in the past if the operations against the Caucasus were to begin in the spring.

The Führer promised this, remarking that for climatic reasons Italian troops could perhaps do particularly good service in the areas situated south of the Caucasus.

Continuing, Ciano pointed out that a greater participation by Italy in the military conduct of the war would exercise a very important countereffect in relation to the Anglo-Saxon propaganda, which liked to characterize Italy's position as entirely subordinate.

The Führer repeated his promise and remarked on the question of the workers that at certain times of scarcity egotistical elements often played a great role. Every category of worker watched to see that no one was allotted more than they themselves. Thus, for example, the German workers, too, had protested when the Italians had been granted a special allowance of wine.

Furthermore, there were naturally still elements among both the German and the Italian workers which were not a hundred percent Fascist or National Socialist. These elements sought to bring about conflicts which they motivated intentionally in another than an ideological way, for reasons of camouflage. There simply existed an inter-

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *The Ciano Diaries*, entry for Oct. 22, 1941.

<sup>7</sup> See document No. 410.

national guild of chatterers and complainers who criticized everything as a matter of principle or because they had too little to do. The decisive thing, however, in relation to this was that the two revolutions, The Fascist and the National Socialist, stood alone in the world united with one another for better or for worse. The real Fascists and National Socialists had grasped this just as had the two leaders, so that every attempt at separating the two movements was condemned to failure from the very start.

Upon Ciano's remark that perhaps the *Alpini* divisions could be employed for the fighting in the Caucasus, the Führer responded with words of appreciation for their fighting ability and remarked that perhaps Italian troops could also participate later in the fighting against India. In any case he (the Führer) would by spring get the English to the point that even if they had not entirely disappeared from the Mediterranean, they still would have to shift their aim elsewhere.

There followed the situation report by General Jodl and Major Christian in the map room in the presence of Count Ciano. This was in regard to the status of the operations on the eastern front, in the west, and in the area of revolt in the Balkans. When Ciano asked about the time of the capture of Petersburg or Moscow, the Führer replied that one could not say anything precise about this, but that both cities would be entirely encircled and cut off from all supplies.

When Ciano asked about the attitude of France, the Führer replied that the French continued their waiting attitude, though they had become considerably more polite in view of the German victories in Russia.

In response to a question of Ciano's about the situation in French North Africa the Führer said that the conditions there would be uncertain as long as Weygand was still at the head of the administration there. There was a prospect, however, that he would soon be recalled.<sup>8</sup>

In reply to a question by Ciano regarding Turkey the Führer pointed out that their attitude would be influenced by an advance in the Caucasus area.

Regarding Spain the Führer again expressed his lively regret that the well-prepared Gibraltar operation could not be carried out at the beginning of the year owing to Spain's attitude.<sup>9</sup> After the cap-

<sup>8</sup> See document No. 415, and footnote 2.

<sup>9</sup> See vol. XI of this series, documents Nos. 323, 707, and 718.

ture of Gibraltar the situation in the Mediterranean would, without a doubt, have changed fundamentally in favor of the Axis, and the difficulties in the Balkans would probably never have arisen.

Following this there was lunch in a small circle, after which Ciano bade the Führer good-bye.<sup>10</sup>

SCHMIDT

<sup>10</sup> Ciano's report on this meeting is printed in *L'Europa verso la catastrofe*, pp. 678-686. It is mentioned in *The Ciano Diaries*, entries for Oct. 25 and 26, 1941.

No. 425

482/231257-61

*Memorandum by an Official of the Department for German Internal Affairs*

BERLIN, October 25, 1941.

zu D III 535g.<sup>1</sup>

Concerning my official trip to Belgrade<sup>2</sup> I herewith submit to Under State Secretary Luther the enclosed memorandum.

I have so far refrained from informing State Secretary von Weizsäcker and Pol IV because I wish to leave it up to your decision whether the last paragraph concerning my over-all impression should also be passed on to these officials.

RADEMACHER

[Enclosure]

SECRET

BERLIN, October 25, 1941.

D III 535 g.

MEMORANDUM ON THE OUTCOME OF MY OFFICIAL TRIP TO BELGRADE

The purpose of the trip was to investigate on the spot whether the problem of the 8,000 Jewish agitators whose deportation was demanded by the Legation could be solved on the spot.

The first discussion with Minister Benzler and State Councilor Turner at the office of the Military Commander of Serbia indicated that more than 2,000 of these Jews had already been shot in reprisal for attacks on German soldiers. By order of the Military Commander, 100 Serbs are to be shot for every German soldier killed. In execution of this order, first of all the active communist leaders of

<sup>1</sup> D III 535g. : Enclosure.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 376, footnote 2.

Serbian nationality—about 50 in number—were shot, and then regularly Jews as communist agitators.

In the course of the conversation it developed that from the very start it was not a matter of 8,000 Jews, but only of about 4,000, of whom, moreover, only 3,500 can be shot. The Gestapo needs the other 500 in order to maintain sanitary and security services in the ghetto to be established.

In the first conversation it could not be clarified how the difference between 8,000 and 4,000 Jews arose. The investigations which I conducted in this matter indicated that State Councilor Turner had cited the figure of 8,000 to Minister Benzler, consisting of 1,500 from Smederevo, 600 from the Banat (a remainder from 2,000), 1,200 from Šabac and 4,700 from Belgrade.

In this compilation a mistake was made in that the Jews from Smederevo and the Banat were counted double, and were contained once more in the Belgrade figure of 4,700; furthermore, a portion of the Belgrade Jews had in the meantime decamped for the area of insurrection.

In the first conversation State Councilor Turner in bitter words expressed his disappointment that the first calls for help had not been immediately answered. The situation had been very precarious, and only as a result of the arrival of the German divisions had it been somewhat improved. I explained the reasons why the Jews could neither be deported to Rumania nor to the General Government nor to the East. State Councilor Turner could not appreciate these reasons. He continues as before to demand the expulsion of the remaining Jews from Serbia.

Detailed negotiations with the specialists on the Jewish question, Sturmbannführer Weimann of Turner's office, the chief of the Gestapo office, Standartenführer Fuchs and the members of his staff concerned with the Jewish question, led to the following:

1. The male Jews will be shot by the end of this week; in this way, the problem brought up in the report by the Legation is settled.
2. The remainder consisting of about 20,000 Jews (women, children, and old people) as well as about 1,500 gypsies, of whom the males will likewise be shot, are to be assembled in the so-called gypsy quarter of the city of Belgrade as a ghetto. The food for the winter could be assured in scanty amounts.

In a final discussion at State Councilor Turner's office the latter was willing to accept such a solution in principle. However, in his opinion the gypsy quarter of the city of Belgrade is an absolute breeding ground of epidemics, and must be burned down for hygienic reasons. It could be considered only as an interim station.

Therefore the Jews and gypsies who are not shot in reprisal at first are to be assembled in the gypsy quarter and then transported at night to the Serbian island of Mitrovica. There two separate camps will be established. In the one the Jews and gypsies are to be kept, and in the other 50,000 Serbian hostages.

Then, as soon as the technical possibility exists within the framework of the total solution of the Jewish question, the Jews will be deported by water to the concentration camps [*Auffanglager*] in the East.

I should like to summarize my over-all impression in this matter by stating that under the impression of the insurrection which increased daily in violence—with the very city of Belgrade being threatened temporarily—the offices in Belgrade saw the whole question too pessimistically at first; furthermore, the Legation and the local Gestapo offices are not working together as closely as the situation requires.

Minister Benzler, with whom I took up this question, confirmed my impression. He said that he no longer negotiated with Standartenführer Fuchs. The reason for this was that Fuchs had acted toward him in a disloyal way in the question of the lists of Freemasons. In the first place he had simply not given him the lists of Freemasons which he had wanted. Upon his insistence he had then supplied a list which had been incomplete and inaccurate. Thus wrong names had been listed, several persons had been listed only by their first names, and further the Prince Regent and former Minister of the Interior Cvetković<sup>3</sup> had been included although the Gestapo knew that the list was supposed to serve as a compilation of the Freemasons who were considered for reprisals.

Since this time he communicated only with State Councilor Turner directly, to whom Fuchs is to a certain extent subordinate.

As for myself, Standartenführer Fuchs and his staff were always helpful to me, permitted me to see their files and cooperated well with me.

The talk with Sturmbannführer Weimann, who is subordinate to Turner, indicated that among those immediately concerned with the matter and in the executive organs a local solution of the whole question is considered optimistically, in contrast to Turner himself.

It is therefore doubtful to me whether the method of dealing only with State Councilor Turner was the most expedient one in the present case.

RADEMACHER

<sup>3</sup> Presumably Dragiša Cvetković, Yugoslav Minister President and Minister of Interior to Mar. 27, 1941.



No. 426

222/150177-80

*The Legation in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

SECRET

No. 3475 of October 27

BUCHAREST, October 27, 1941—2:00 p. m.

Received October 27—2:55 p. m.

The question of how the unstable relationship between the Rumanian Government and the Legion would develop under the impact of the war against Bolshevism could not be clearly evaluated at first, because the Marshal was at headquarters and therefore primarily concerned with settling military matters. During this time one could note, however, that the influence of the clique of generals which is absolutely hostile to the Legion grew more and more, and time and again found expression in measures that were not of a nature to contribute to the internal pacification. I recall the shooting of nine Legionnaires in July 1941 (cf. telegrams Nos. 2276 of July 24<sup>1</sup> and 2365 of July 30<sup>2</sup>), which took place as a result of past facts. Mihai Antonescu, who was of my opinion, and my repeated interventions were unable to change anything regarding the shooting which was justified as such but was politically wrong. Furthermore the generals tried, successfully, to block the path of the Legionnaires who were anxious to get to the front. Volunteers were not taken, but only the age groups called up were considered.

Even before his return the Marshal had left it up to the Deputy Minister President, at the repeated urging of the latter, to negotiate with the allegedly authorized representative of the Legion, Professor Gavanescul, on his own responsibility, in order to find a basis for the cooperation of the Government with the uncompromised elements of the Legion. The Deputy Prime Minister thought of demanding a written statement of Gavanescul that would put a period to the events of January and disavow them and those responsible for them in a clear manner. Then he wanted to induce Gavanescul to designate to him the persons in the Legion with whom cooperation was possible. The conversation with Gavanescul took place without leading to any results. Gavanescul did not go into any concrete questions at all, evidently because at his advanced age he does not feel equal to the situation, and rather believes that the Legionnaires, split up as they are into numerous groups, cannot in any case be brought under one roof. However, he also stated to the Legation that there was an in-

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (222/149830).<sup>2</sup> Not printed (222/149853).

struction from Sima to him authorizing him to approach the Government as the representative of the Legion.

Supposedly there exists a letter along these lines from Horia Sima<sup>3</sup> to Gavanescul, which I have not yet seen in spite of my efforts to do so, so that I do not really believe in it. Thus after the efforts of the Deputy Minister President to build a bridge to the clear-seeing Legionnaires, and especially to the youth of the Legion, had been unsuccessful two incidents happened which led to an increase in the tension between the Marshal and the Legion. Mihai Antonescu informed me that the Marshal had ordered the arrest of 60 young Legionnaires about 16 years of age, who had met in the woods at Baneasa and on whom instructions for propaganda against the Government had been found. This incident was very regrettable, since it had led to a weakening of his own (Mihai's) position with respect to the Marshal. He had always defended the Legion, and in particular had pointed out that the Legionnaire youth had to be won over. The Marshal had told him at the time that if he wanted he could do this on his own responsibility. After the incident mentioned above, all the opponents of the Legion had again been called into the fray. The fact that even under the impact of the war the young people were beginning to make political propaganda against the Government had made the Marshal extremely indignant, so that he had ordered that the book *March into the Abyss*, which had been kept back at the time, should now be published. He had replied to the Marshal that this would perhaps set off new domestic tensions, but had not been listened to. The meeting of the youth in Baneasa shows how foolishly a part of the Legion is acting. All groups of the Legion are permeated with informers, so that reports concerning the activity of the various groups of Legionnaires, which are available to me too, are received daily.

M. Antonescu then mentioned a second fact which he was passing on for our information. The lawyer, Deubal Codreanu, a brother of the murdered C. Z. Codreanu,<sup>4</sup> had complied with an invitation from the former Rumanian Minister in Berlin, Grecianu, to put his signature under a written statement according to which the Legion represented a unified organization. According to the statement by the lawyer Codreanu, M. Grecianu had told the Legionnaires whom he had convened that these signatures were to be sent to Berlin, evidently in order to show the Reich Government that the Legion was still a strong

<sup>3</sup> Leader of the Iron Guard (Legionnaire Movement) and former Deputy Minister President. He fled to Germany following the collapse of the Iron Guard revolt of January 1941.<sup>4</sup> Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, Commander of the Iron Guard, was killed Nov. 30, 1938, by a police escort while being transported from one prison to another. See vol. v of this series, document No. 260, footnote 1.

and unified organization. Antonescu remarked regarding this matter that several Legionnaires who had given their signatures had afterwards been frightened by the political implications of their steps and had the intention of retracting them. However that might be, it was certain in any case that M. Grecianu had not kept his word. He was convinced that when the Marshal heard of this he would carry out his threat of arresting him. This was all the more embarrassing since M. Grecianu had twice been spared from a court martial by the intervention of the Reich Foreign Minister.<sup>5</sup> Even now he personally could no longer receive M. Grecianu, since the Marshal had forbidden him to do this. I, too, am not in a position to intercede once more for Grecianu, who promised me at the time to remain absolutely quiet.

The statements by the Deputy Prime Minister regarding the relationship with the Legion were unequivocal. Whereas he had still tried up to now to take a conciliatory position when talking to me, I believe that after the incidents described he no longer intends to make efforts in favor of the Legion with the Marshal, at least for the time being. On the other hand I consider it to be certain that the Marshal is entirely deaf in this ear, and intends to carry out the building of the new state with well-trying front fighters, but without the Legion.

I may send a report on the activity of the Legion and its various groups.

STELZER  
VON KILLINGER

<sup>5</sup> Although there is no record of such steps by Ribbentrop, several documents in the files indicate Germany's efforts on behalf of Grecianu following the collapse of the Iron Guard revolt in January 1941; such documents are Bucharest telegrams Nos. 202 of Feb. 1 (201/89303) and 230 of Feb. 4 (201/89319), Weizsäcker telegram No. 420 of Feb. 18 (201/89418) and Woermann memorandum of Feb. 21 (201/89401).

No. 427

1857/42242-44

*Minute by Ambassador Dieckhoff*

BERLIN, October 27, 1941.

I received a telephone call yesterday afternoon from the Foreign Minister's Secretariat asking me to give Herr Hewel by telephone my analysis of the situation in the Senate (Neutrality Act). I thereupon gave the Foreign Minister's Secretariat the four points attached hereto, for forwarding to Hewel. As of yesterday I had no knowledge

as yet of Thomsen's telegram No. 3702 of October 25, 1941.<sup>1</sup> My estimate of the situation agrees substantially with his; however, the situation is even more complicated than what Thomsen describes, because of the position of the isolationists who while desiring to maintain the neutrality law would like for tactical reasons to bring about a vote on the entire neutrality legislation.

Herewith submitted to the State Secretary.

DIECKHOFF

[Enclosure]

BERLIN, October 26, 1941.

(1) Roosevelt is striving for the repeal of as much of the Neutrality Act as possible, and chiefly the repeal of the provisions forbidding the arming of merchant ships and prohibiting vessels from entering the combat zones.

However, because public opinion in the United States has so far been overwhelmingly in favor of the ban regarding combat zones, Roosevelt has confined himself to calling only for repeal of the prohibition on arming of merchant ships. A bill to this effect was sent to the Congress two weeks ago<sup>2</sup> and the House of Representatives approved this a week ago<sup>3</sup> by 259 votes to 138. The bill is now before the Senate.

(2) In the meantime there has been a certain shift in public sentiment, partly under the impression of the sinking of American ships, notably the *Lehigh*.<sup>4</sup> Sentiment for repealing the prohibition against entering the combat zones has gained. Willkie has exploited this, and his followers in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have lately been demanding the repeal not only of the prohibition against the arming of merchant ships, but also of the prohibition against entering the combat zones, thus, of the whole Neutrality Act, practically speaking. As Willkie's followers are strongly represented among the Republican members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Committee yesterday approved a proposal to this effect.

<sup>1</sup> In this telegram (1857/422240-41) Thomsen reported that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had voted to send to the Senate a bill providing for changes in the Neutrality Act in addition to the elimination of the ban on the arming of merchant vessels, which had already been voted by the House of Representatives.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 396.

<sup>3</sup> The vote was taken on Oct. 17.

<sup>4</sup> It was announced on Oct. 21 that the American freighter *Lehigh* had been torpedoed and sunk near the western coast of Africa.

(3) The bill now goes before the full Senate. There, a strange situation will develop. The Willkie Republicans and the extremist warmongers among the Democrats will favor repeal of both prohibitions, but very likely the moderate Republicans and the Wheeler Democrats will move for a vote on the *full* question of repealing the Neutrality Act, and not merely the bill on arming merchant ships. The former ones will do so in order to scuttle the entire Neutrality Act, the latter ones because they hope that in a vote there will be a majority *against* repeal of the Neutrality Act, in other words, *against* Roosevelt's policy. The President himself seems to be still waiting for developments. He would like most to have the entire law repealed, but does not want Willkie to get the credit for this; and what he wants even less is a vote against repeal of the Neutrality Act, which would hamper his policy for war in the future. The determining factor for Roosevelt's further tactics will be the development of public opinion in the country, and on this will also depend the attitude of those senators who are as yet undecided.

(4) The debate in the Senate will presumably take two weeks.

No. 428

71/50893

*The Chargé d'Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

SECRET

ROME, October 28, 1941—7:40 p. m.

No. 2723 of October 28

Received October 28—8:30 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 2695 of October 25.<sup>1</sup>

The report announced in the aforementioned telegram regarding the Grand Mufti's arrival in Italy was published in yesterday morning's newspapers. The 1-day delay resulted from the fact that the Duce, being absent from Rome, was not able to receive the Grand Mufti the day before yesterday, but received him yesterday morning in Anfuso's presence.

Anfuso told me that the Grand Mufti's personality had made a very favorable impression on the Duce. He was a man in his middle forties, gave the impression of being intelligent and seemed to know exactly what he wanted. The discussion, which had lasted quite a

<sup>1</sup> In this telegram (71/50892) Bismarck had reported that on Oct. 26 the press would publish the news of the Grand Mufti's arrival at an Italian airport.

while and was held in French, revolved exclusively around the Arab problem. The Grand Mufti had told the Duce that his political aim was the independence of Palestine, Syria, and Iraq. He had further indicated that at the proper time he would ask the Italian and German Governments for a statement in which they would identify themselves with his political endeavors, to which the Duce had given his consent.

Anfuso added that the Grand Mufti first wished to wait for the arrival of Gaylani and would then probably go to Berlin on a visit.

BISMARCK

No. 429

260/170260-61

*The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

TOP SECRET

HELSINKI, October 28, 1941—8:12 p. m.

No. 1202 of October 27

Received October 28—9:45 p. m.

I. I brought up the Petsamo nickel question<sup>1</sup> for discussion in connection with my conferences here, and proposed the following:

1. The Canadian-English concession, in which as is known there is also a major American interest, is to be revoked by the Finnish State. A new concession is to be granted by the Finnish State to a joint Finnish-German corporation, to be organized and which should have its seat in Finland. The capital is to be at the ratio of 80 (eighty) percent German, and 20 (twenty) percent Finnish, the shares in the nickel production to be in the same proportion, with an upper limit set for the Finnish share. Management should also be in approximately the same ratio as capital interest, that is, two representatives of the German group, one representative of the Finnish group.

2. The newly licensed company is to succeed Petsamo Nickeli O.J. in the contracts entered into by the latter with the German syndicate (*I.G. Farben-Industrie, Krupp, Metall-Gesellschaft*).

A memorandum outlining this plan in general terms was presented to the Finnish side. Ministerialrat Ludwig, who arrived in Berlin today, took the text with him.<sup>2</sup>

II. Because strong opposition in the Petsamo question must be anticipated from political and industrial quarters, and because Minister of Commerce Tanner in particular is opposed to such an arrange-

<sup>1</sup> For previous developments see vol. XII, documents Nos. 16, 42, 75, 109, 123, 139, and 305.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

ment,<sup>3</sup> a speedy solution in our favor would depend on a personal decision of State President Ryti. I have therefore taken up the question with Ryti, who gave me his approval in principle without any hesitancy in our very first conversation, and instructed Minister von Fieandt<sup>4</sup> to settle the details with me. Inasmuch as Fieandt, was still reluctant to tackle this difficult complex of questions and advanced various reservations of a legal nature against the annulment of the English concession, I once more today turned for assistance to Ryti who fully reaffirmed his original decision.

III. I have now arranged with the Finnish Government that the negotiations regarding the Petsamo concession are to be continued in Berlin in about 3 weeks, both on the governmental level and between the business groups on both sides, and that the intervening time would be used by both sides to prepare proposals regarding the by-laws of the joint German-Finnish company and regarding the proposed concession agreement. Despite the positive and realistical political attitude of the President, we still must anticipate a great deal of difficulty and opposition during the negotiation of details, which will increase the more time elapses before the matter is brought to a final conclusion.<sup>5</sup>

BLÜCHER

<sup>3</sup> In telegram No. 1285 of Nov. 10 (260/170335) Zechlin reported that Colonel General Falkenhorst had written to Field Marshal Keitel regarding the views of Tanner who urged that Finnish administration of the nickel mines until the war's end was best, and pointed out that broad circles of the Finnish people were displeased to see Germany try during the war emergency to gain such a controlling interest as had been Russia's aim.

<sup>4</sup> Rainer von Fieandt, former chairman of the Finnish delegation to the mixed committee in Moscow to negotiate on the Petsamo nickel mines.

<sup>5</sup> For further developments see document No. 469.

## No. 430

205/143060

*The Chargé d'Affaires in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry*<sup>1</sup>

Telegram

SECRET

STOCKHOLM, October 28, 1941—9:55 p. m.

No. 1810 of October 28

Received October 28, 1941—11:45 p. m.<sup>2</sup>

For the Foreign Minister and State Secretary.

The King of Sweden asked me to see him today and requested me to transmit to the Führer the following views concerning Soviet Russia:

Ever since the end of the last World War, the King had realized what a grave danger Bolshevism had been and still was not only for

<sup>1</sup> Wied's name is penciled at the bottom of the telegram which is the copy decoded in Berlin.

<sup>2</sup> Marginal note: "Forwarded as No. 3594 to Special Train, Oct. 28."

the north, but also for the whole of Europe. Therefore the King wished quite frankly to express his warm thanks to the Führer for having decided to crush this plague. The King asked that his heartiest congratulations be conveyed to the Führer on the great success already achieved.

At the same time the King gave assurances that by far the greater part of his people shared his views in this matter.

His efforts and his activities would always be aimed at converting the doubters to his views. The King also added that he was very anxious for the preservation of good relations between Germany and Sweden.

The King asked me to treat the foregoing communication in special confidence so that it would not become known in public.

At the close of the conversation, the King expressed the hope that his Government would soon dispose favorably on the question of the ban on the Communist party.<sup>3</sup>

DANKWORT<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> In telegram No. 1827 of Oct. 30 (205/143067) Dankwort reported that the ban of the Communist party was considered certain in Swedish parliamentary circles.

<sup>4</sup> In a minute of Nov. 11 (205/143093) Woermann noted that the telegram had been shown to Hitler who had given no further instructions in this matter. The Foreign Minister had therefore decided that no reply should be made.

See, however, document No. 554.

## No. 431

1047/311653-54

*Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

U.St.S.Pol. No. 920

BERLIN, October 28, 1941.

The following action has been taken so far in the Pan-Turanian question:

1. Minister von Hentig, who was on duty as a representative of the Foreign Ministry with Eleventh Army Headquarters, has been called to the Foreign Ministry to attend to Nuri Pasha and to deal with the Pan-Turanian question. He will arrive here presumably on October 29. It is the intention that a committee to deal with these questions will be established soon.

2. The OKW has been asked to prepare for the separation of the ethnically Turkic and Mohammedan prisoners of war.

3. Ambassador von Papen has been asked in accordance with instructions what the position of the Turkish Government would be in

the matter of separating out the prisoners of war. Ambassador von Papen has supplied the following information with regard to this:<sup>1</sup>

"With regard to the role of Nuri Pasha in the Pan-Turanian movement, I recommend the proposal made earlier that Nuri Pasha participate in organizing the screening of the prisoners of war and in their indoctrination. I am sure that the Turkish Government will not have any objection to it because I have already remarked to M. Saracoglu that we intend to place the prisoners of war of Turkic ethnic origin in special camps."

4. Ambassador von Papen has furthermore been asked what, in his opinion, the position of the Turkish Government would be with regard to the establishment of a Pan-Turanian propaganda office in Berlin under direction or with participation of Nuri Pasha. The reply to this is still missing and a reminder has been sent.<sup>2</sup>

5. According to information supplied by Ambassador von Papen, General H. Emir Erkilet, retired, who is participating now in the journey to the front<sup>3</sup> is a leader of the Pan-Turanian movement. At the suggestion of von Papen, Erkilet will call on me after the conclusion of his journey to the front.

6. Further measures will be taken immediately after the arrival of Hentig.

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary.

WOERMANN

<sup>1</sup> Papen's letter of Oct. 17 to Erdmannsdorff (2361/488725-26) includes the paragraph which is here excerpted.

<sup>2</sup> Woermann's letter of Oct. 24 to Papen (1047/311656-57). In a letter of Oct. 31 (1047/311652) Papen sent the requested reply and pointed out that the Turkish Government, which played down Pan-Turanian propaganda in its own country, would certainly consider such propaganda if carried on from Berlin as very awkward. Consequently, he urged, the Pan-Turanian propaganda ought to be limited to the prisoner-of-war camps and to the training of people who might be sent, if necessary, into the German-occupied areas. He stated: "If the matter is handled in this way I have no apprehensions that the Turkish Government will fail to agree to it."

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *Documents secrets du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères d'Allemagne: Turquie*, document No. 12.

No. 432

2163/470307-08

*The Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the Military Commander in Serbia to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

TOP SECRET

No. 841 of October 29

BELGRADE, October 29, 1941—11:25 p. m.

Received October 29—12:00 midnight.

With reference to your instruction R 5032 g. Rs. of October 17<sup>1</sup> and my telegram No. 826 of October 25.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 408.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

In the past week there have been executions without trial of a large number of Serbs, not only in Kraljevo but also in Kragujevac, as reprisals for the killing of members of the Wehrmacht in the proportion of 100 Serbs for one German. In Kraljevo 1,700 male Serbs were executed, in Kragujevac 2,300. Furthermore, in the town of Gornji Milanovac, north of Chakochakok [Čačak?] there have been executions after the burning down of the buildings.

Mistakes have been made in the executions. Thus confidential agents, Croats, and the entire personnel of German armament plants have been shot, and in Milanovac also those who, relying on their innocence, had remained in contrast to the majority of the population that had fled. The executions in Kragujevac occurred although there had been no attacks on members of the Wehrmacht in this city, for the reason that not enough hostages could be found elsewhere.

These indiscriminate executions are causing repercussions among the population which are contrary to our final political objective. They have also made Prime Minister Nedić uncertain in setting his objectives.

The Plenipotentiary Commanding General<sup>3</sup> has thereupon issued new directives concerning the execution of hostages, which do not change anything in the ratio of one hundred Serbs for one German, to be sure, but eliminate as far as possible mistakes such as those mentioned above.

I am passing on the above for your information, so that the Foreign Ministry may be informed about the actual events in case of possible attacks by the enemy radio.

BENZLER

<sup>3</sup> Gen. Franz Böhme. See document No. 326.

No. 433

100/65318-31

*Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini*

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, October 29, 1941.<sup>1</sup>

DUCE: I am writing you this letter at a moment when I believe I can justifiably claim that the campaign in the east is not only won but as such has in the main been brought to a conclusive decision.

When I had the pleasure of welcoming you and your staff members

<sup>1</sup> In telegram No. 2767 of Oct. 31 (1517/372908-09) Rintelen reported that he had handed Hitler's letter to Mussolini that day at 7:45 p.m. In telegram No. 2771 of Nov. 1 (1517/372917-18) Rintelen further reported that he had again seen Mussolini who said he fully agreed with Hitler's statements, particularly regarding the protection of transports. Mussolini mentioned that he had received reports from Madrid and Lisbon that the English planned a landing on Corsica. He intended to answer Hitler's letter on the next day (Nov. 2). See document No. 454.

at my headquarters,<sup>2</sup> I informed you about the operations that were planned or in preparation. Completely misjudging the situation, the command of the Russian Southern Army Group waited until we had created the conditions necessary for closing the big arc around Kiev. This battle led to an outcome that exceeded even my expectations. For I expected 300,000 to 500,000 prisoners; after the conclusion of the last mopping-up operations, however, the number came to more than 700,000.

The ensuing penetration by the Kleist armored group to open the bridgehead around Dnepropetrovsk also gave your divisions, Duce, their first opportunity to carry out an operation of their own, with outstanding success, in the framework of a big new battle of extermination.

As expected, the attack carried forward in the meantime south of the Dnieper against the Crimea drew like a magnet the last remnants of the left wing of Budenny's army between the Dnieper and Melitopol with the objective of plunging our Eleventh Army into a crisis by penetrating our rear communications. We expected that. The Kleist armored group, which had become free again after the opening of the bridgehead of Dnepropetrovsk, had been ordered from the outset, in such an event, to strike the gradually concentrating Russian divisions in the rear to the east and inflict a new defeat on them in cooperation with the German, Rumanian, and Hungarian troops operating from the west. The result of this battle of encirclement was the destruction once again of about 13 Soviet divisions. On the morning of October 11 the operation could be considered completed. My Leibstandarte, another SS division, and two armored divisions thereupon drove forward in the direction of Rostov. They will be the spearhead of other strong forces that become free.

On October 2 came the enveloping breakthrough into the Timoshenko army group, namely at three points along a front more than 500 km. wide. Luftwaffe, armored force, and motorized units, but especially the infantry, not only proved their mettle again but outdid themselves. It was possible to encircle about 75 Russian divisions in three pockets and bring them to inescapable destruction.

Since then, strong units have been advancing against Moscow on a broad front.

Two other operations are envisaged for the destruction of the Russian divisions still stationed on the northern front. I hope that they, too, will lead to great successes. Leningrad itself, Duce, will not be attacked, since I have no intention of sacrificing one man more than is absolutely necessary. Besides, we found in Kiev and only recently in Odessa that the Russians plant mines along whole street

sections and especially in all important buildings, and after a while these mines either ignite automatically or are detonated by wireless action. According to statements by the Russians they have some more, quite special surprises prepared for us precisely in this field both in Leningrad and in Moscow. The important thing, however, is not to occupy cities but to destroy the enemy. Leningrad and Moscow will both fall, possibly without our being forced to put even a single man in the cities themselves and thereby perhaps sacrificing him. The Finns are of the same opinion and this is important because they are maintaining the northern investment front against Leningrad all alone with their own forces.

Bolshevism, moreover, is falling victim to its own treacherous designs. For only the gigantic concentration of all its means of attack on the German, Finnish, and Rumanian frontiers, respectively, forced the Red command to fight where the contest was most favorable to us. The inconceivable massing of its war material for an attack on us prevented it from withdrawing to the rear and fighting there, 1,000 or 2,000 km. away from its frontiers. To be sure, the location of its raw materials area or its large industrial centers made matters more difficult. All in all, we shall soon have either occupied, or be in a position to obtain, 70-90 percent of its industrial and raw materials capacity. In these circumstances, Duce, I do not think I am a rash prophet when I say that, regardless of what decisions Stalin may make, the Bolshevik empire is defeated.

With this, however, Duce, the sole and last great continental hope of the English will collapse.

That they have no illusions about this in London can scarcely be doubted. It therefore seems possible to me that under the pressure of public opinion they may perhaps at the last minute attempt some sort of relief offensive, however stupid this may be.

On this assumption I have already considered all the possibilities still open to England in such an eventuality.

#### 1. *Direct help for Russia.*

As regards material, such help is ridiculous and in any case within a few weeks they will find no way of getting in a sufficient quantity to where it would be needed.

The same is also true of the so-called American help.

#### 2. *Personnel help.*

This is completely excluded. Moreover, we would naturally be gratified if they would somehow bring a few air force wings to Russia. In view of the difficulty of the position, the severity of the Russian winter, but especially the lack of any orderly and sure provision of supplies, they would be eliminated in a short while.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 242.

3. *Relief offensive in some other place.*

a) An attack through Turkey.

In view of the great prudence of the responsible men in Ankara I consider this out of the question, and for that matter also completely hopeless.

b) An attack through the Caucasus.

From the military point of view this would be extremely welcome to me. The forces that England would be able to send into action could only be small because of the supply conditions. But since they would then meet, not poorly equipped Arabs, but the best battle-seasoned troops, their annihilation could only be a question of a few weeks.

c) A landing, that is a landing attempt in Norway.

I have left strong forces in Norway. The country does not, of course, look as it did on April 9, 1939,<sup>s</sup> any more. Hundreds of medium and heavy batteries have been installed. Supplies of food, fodder, and especially ammunition and fuel have been assured for a whole year. If the English should nevertheless get a foothold somewhere, I would consider it advantageous, for they could maintain themselves there only by a constant employment of troop transports and, to cover them, also cruisers, destroyers, etc. That would just be a repetition of the year 1940, with one difference, to be sure. At that time we had a couple of miserable airfields. Now, however, we have over 50 completed, first-class, airports with large runways, more than adequately protected, moreover, from any attempt at a surprise attack from the air. Furthermore, I have built up an armored force for Norway, which is being continually reinforced in order to be capable of lightning-like intervention with other motorized units wherever the need might arise. Oslo, Christiansund, Bergen, Trondheim, Narvik, Trøms up to Kirkenes, etc., are, moreover, protected with medium and heavy batteries, as well as by mine fields, in such a way that I could not wish for anything better than such an operation. Given the poor military leadership of the English, as I said before, nothing, after all, is excluded.

d) A landing in western Europe.

That is, in Denmark, Holland, Belgium, or western France, since even in the eyes of the English the German coasts can hardly come into consideration.

In reality, I could only welcome such an attempt, too. These coasts have been studded at all important points with hundreds and hundreds of batteries, up to 40.6 cm. in caliber. In addition, the whole area has been heavily mined and defense installations have been built which are

<sup>s</sup>The date should read April 9, 1940, the date of Germany's invasion of Denmark and Norway. See vol. ix of this series, documents Nos. 65, 67, and 71.

sufficient to put up an initial, well-nigh insuperable defense immediately against any such attempt. Apart from that, I have left about 45 divisions in all in the west—that is, in France, Holland and Belgium alone—some of which are among the best that we have. In addition, there are two armored formations [equipped] with French material and two armored divisions with German material. Apart from that, however, the first transports are already returning from the east to the west. And this is no additional burden whatever on our transportation system, because with these transports we can bring food supplies and ammunition to the eastern front and take troops back.

So transport trains are already, as stated, uninterruptedly returning with units from the eastern front, some of them to Germany, some of them directly to the west. The Luftwaffe, too, is beginning its transfers to the rear. I believe, therefore, that the English will in only a few weeks have lost all their short-lived gratification at having been able to bomb some German cities without tenfold retaliation. Not to mention the fact that a new bomber type is now being produced in increasingly large series which in carrying capacity, range, and speed undoubtedly surpasses anything that the English have heretofore even thought possible. Moreover, newly formed armored divisions are also now on their way from the Reich itself to France and Norway.

So if the English should try to land anywhere in western Europe, it would lead to a catastrophe corresponding to the scale of the experiment.

For the troops that are now in the west and are actually drilling for such a contingency anyhow, day and night, it would probably even mean a certain relief. For we have many regiments there which as yet have had little such opportunity to distinguish themselves as is now afforded in the east.

I do not then know, Duce, whether the English, in view of their admittedly unpredictable military leadership, will try something like that, but I have in any case carefully made all preparations for it.

e) An attack in the Mediterranean, against the coasts of southern Italy or Sardinia, or against Libya and Cyrenaica.

I do not believe that they would ever attempt anything more than a demonstration against Sardinia or Sicily, for even in case of initial success that, too, would lead to a continual destruction of their shipping tonnage, which in a short time would inevitably result not only in the defeat of such an operation but in the loss of the last margin which they still have in their tonnage.

If we assume, however, that they intend to achieve a certain objective with limited forces, then—like the Channel Islands, where we are prepared for it—Pantelleria in the Mediterranean would be

involved. This is a possibility that must always be kept in mind, just like an attack on Corsica or Sardinia.

In these considerations there remains, Duce, the final but likeliest possibility that they might once more—in order to forestall our attacks—try to advance against Libya, that is, frontally against the forward line at Sollum, supported by a flanking thrust from Tobruk. Although your forces, Duce, and also those of the German Africa Corps have been substantially strengthened recently, I am personally still of the opinion that more must be done in order to make it plain that any increase in this threat would have no prospect of success.

The way to achieve this, in my opinion, is twofold:

- 1) *The maximum safeguarding of our own supply lines.*
- 2) *The possible disruption of our enemy's supply lines.*

With regard to the first point, Duce, I believe it is advisable to re-examine from time to time whether everything has been done and what can still be done to safeguard our own shipments.

On my own initiative I have ordered the X Air Corps to provide increased convoy protection for all sea shipments from Italy and Greece, especially to Bengazi-Derna and possibly Bardia, even if other tasks have to be deferred. The combating of submarines off Bengazi and Derna is now also to be a prime task of the Corps.<sup>4</sup>

Since in addition to these safeguards it is also necessary, however, to protect the Aegean against penetration by the English with its resultant serious disruptions of our vital supply lines in those waters, it is unfortunately not possible to employ elements of the X Air Corps constantly for convoy protection along the sea route between southern Italy and Tripoli via Sicily.

I have, however, ordered that the X Air Corps be made available from time to time as additional convoy protection for particularly valuable shipments by this route as well.

I realize, however, that the main task here can be carried out only by the Italian Air Force itself and that it is especially important to prevent any large-scale revival of the English air unit on Malta. I therefore consider the neutralization of Malta and the safeguarding of air supremacy and of the sea route two equally important tasks warranting the heaviest commitment of the Italian Air Force.

If it should be possible to speed up and intensify still further the work for better utilization of the ports of Bengazi and Derna, that would be very desirable in the interest of shortening the land route and consequently of saving fuel. It would also be very advantageous to use field railways, which can be built easily and quickly, for mov-

<sup>4</sup> OKW directive, WFSt./Abt. L (I Op) No. 441794/41 g. K Chefs of Oct. 29 (8589/603073-75).

ing the supplies from there closer to the front. I have already heard of a wish to that effect. I should be highly gratified if it were carried out, and I will do everything possible, Duce, to make material for that purpose available to you.

If there should be a shortage of labor for this or similar tasks, Duce, I could readily supply you with workers from the large numbers of Russians now held as prisoners.

In this connection I should like to point out in the interest of a smoothly functioning supply line to Greece and also to Crete that it would be especially desirable if the rebuilding of the Bralo bridge near Lamia, which by agreement is to be done by the Italian Armed Forces, could be carried out as quickly as possible.

With regard to point 2, that is, the disruption of the enemy supply lines, I have ordered a quick transfer of submarines and E-boats to support you in the battle against English shipping and also the commitment of a flotilla of minesweepers.<sup>5</sup>

In addition, however, I am willing, if it is agreeable to you, Duce, to transfer additional forces from the Luftwaffe, especially long-range night fighters, to Sicily or Sardinia in order to relieve your southern Italian port cities by eliminating Malta as completely as possible and to help safeguard our convoys. So if it is agreeable to you, Duce, the Reichsmarschall will get in touch with your competent authorities about the matter.<sup>6</sup>

Irrespective of that, however, the German Africa Corps will, as soon as the transportation situation permits, receive extremely effective and long-range antitank guns, some mounted on armored self-propelled carriages but some also for stationary mounting. I hope that it will then be possible to supply the entire front with so many effective 5 cm. antitank guns and even heavier ones that future attacks by the English will fail from the outset, with severe losses of material.

I am also anxious—as soon as transportation permits—to send to the German Africa Corps a larger reserve of tanks III and IV. Finally, special weapons are to be delivered for the attack on Tobruk. But, to repeat what I said before, it seems to me most important of all, by a strong concentration of your own air force, Duce, and the support of the German as well, not only to ensure absolute air supremacy in Sicily and in southern Italy in general but also to guarantee protection for our own transports and to repel attempted enemy attacks or breakthroughs. A systematic collaboration with submarines for starving Malta should also be inaugurated.

<sup>5</sup> OKW directive, WFSt./Abt. L (I Op) No. 441794/41 g. K. Chefs of Oct. 29 (8589/603073/75).

<sup>6</sup> See, further, document No. 535. See also Enno von Rintelen, *Mussolini als Bundesgenosse*, pp. 155-156.



I shall send you, Duce, separate proposals relating thereto for your examination.<sup>7</sup>

In this connection I should like to express to you my most heartfelt congratulations, Duce, on the great success of your fliers and special fighters against the English Navy.<sup>8</sup>

I was really sad because the battleship *Nelson* in particular was not sunk recently. Soldier's bad luck! But in any case the ship will undoubtedly be out of commission for many months and those destroyed will remain so forever!

When in all soberness I consider the recent successes, Duce, and weigh the strength of the two sides, taking into account all economic difficulties, I am only strengthened more than ever in my unshaken conviction that this war is won.

I do not know what the English intend to do, but in keeping with tradition it will in any case be something crazy.

Whatever they may attempt, however, one thing is certain:

They no longer have any continental world power in Europe on which they can lean for support in the future!

With the collapse of their last continental support, Russia, the defense of Europe and North Africa is already ensured in any circumstances by our joint strength.

And if you should ever get into difficulties, Duce, I will help in so far as it is humanly possible.<sup>9</sup>

I know nothing but joint victory.

Regardless of what England or even America may do, our economic position in particular cannot get any worse but must rather get better after a certain time has elapsed. And militarily no one can break us.

Permit me, Duce, in concluding this letter to express to you once more my special thanks for the cordial telegram you sent me after your departure.<sup>10</sup>

With comradely affection and faithfulness,

Ever yours,

ADOLF HITLER

<sup>7</sup> These proposals have not been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry.

<sup>8</sup> This is apparently a reference to the encounter of British and Italian forces in the western Mediterranean, Sept. 27-28, 1941. Cf. Raymond de Belot, *The Struggle for the Mediterranean, 1939-45* (Princeton, 1951), pp. 137-138.

<sup>9</sup> Ciano commented on Hitler's letter in his diary in the entry for Nov. 1, 1941.

<sup>10</sup> Not found.

No. 434

82/60798-800

*The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT TOKYO, October 31, 1941—11:10 a.m., summer time.

SECRET

Received November 1—1:20 p.m.

No. 2301 of October 31

With reference to my telegram No. 2263 of October 28.<sup>1</sup>

In further conversation with Foreign Minister Togo I asked him whether the Japanese Government had in the meantime made up its mind to send an intensified warning to the United States. The Foreign Minister told me that no decision had as yet been taken. The Government was still examining the situation carefully in order to determine what policy should now be followed. In this connection the Japanese Government was particularly interested in knowing how the German Government visualized the further conduct of the war. The question whether Germany would turn to the Middle East after capturing Moscow was of great importance. Was a thrust to be expected there, especially against the Suez, the Arabic stronghold of England, and against Iran, and what, in the opinion of the Germans, would the future attitude of Turkey be?

I replied to the Foreign Minister that these were mainly military questions, concerning which I had no instructions. As I had already told his predecessor in August, the German Government believed that it would crush the main force of the Soviet Union before the end of the year. Any Russian forces that might still turn up would be dealt with definitively in the spring by small units of the German Army that we would leave in the east. After the autumn campaign Germany would release a large part of her army for aircraft and submarine construction, etc., and turn with her total national strength against her last enemy, England (cf. telegraphic report No. — (number garbled) 83 of August 25).<sup>2</sup> The Wehrmacht's successes in the east thus far had only confirmed this view of the German Government. Where and when the attack against the vital points of the British Empire would be made, I could not say. I believed, however, that we would choose the time and place for it with the customary care. To

<sup>1</sup> In this telegram (82/60796-97) Ott had reported about his first conversation with the new Foreign Minister Togo who told him that the new Government had not yet taken a decision regarding the policy to be pursued. Togo was furthermore unable to answer Ott's question whether the statement planned to be addressed to the United States (see document No. 359) had actually been delivered.

<sup>2</sup> This obviously refers to Ribbentrop's telegram No. 1383 printed as document No. 239.

Togo's question whether in our opinion England could be checkmated by an air and sea blockade, I replied that undoubtedly the tonnage problem had already become very difficult for England and would become far worse still as soon as we had our rear free with respect to Russia. The possible effect of military events in other parts of the British Empire had to be taken into account, too, and no doubt it was also of great importance whether England's position in the Far East were shaken. Togo took note of my remark with a gesture of interest but without making any comment. I have the impression that the Japanese Government is still uncertain about what policy to adopt and advocate before the Diet on November 15. The Army, which bears primary responsibility, has not yet been able to make up its mind to sweep aside the groups opposing a firm policy. For the Prime Minister, who has the reputation of being a dynamic soldier, there is the danger that he will lose himself in the petty details of his duties as Prime Minister, War Minister, and Minister of Interior. Ikeda's<sup>3</sup> appointment to the Privy Council (cf. telegraphic report No. 2281 of October 30)<sup>4</sup> and rumors that the Keeper of the Great Seal, Kido, is trying to bring about the appointment of Hiranuma as Elder Statesman [*Genro*] show that the opposing side is active and intends to exploit to the full the silencing of the opposition (group garbled) emanating from the Army. Whether Tojo will overcome the difficulties cannot at present be foreseen. In view of this situation the cancellation of the trip of the *Asama Maru* to England springs from great caution rather than any decision already taken.

OTT

<sup>3</sup> Seihin Ikeda, managing director of the Mitsui Bank, former Minister of Finance.

<sup>4</sup> Not found.

## No. 435

278/178974-75

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

SECRET

St.S. 725

BERLIN, October 31, 1941.

I told the Bulgarian Minister the following during his visit today:

The reports which we had received concerning the conduct of the Bulgarian authorities in suppressing disturbances in Thrace which was under Bulgarian occupation were of such a nature that the Foreign Ministry had considered instructing the Minister in Sofia to speak with the Bulgarian Government. We had refrained from such an instruction, however, in order not to offend Bulgarian sensibilities. Nevertheless I believed that I owed it to M. Draganov as the Bulgarian

Minister here to keep him informed. From Bulgarian reports, too, it was evident that there were thousands of victims among the Greeks. The areas involved were of military and economic importance to us too.

I did not enter more deeply into the discussion, but in conclusion merely told M. Draganov that I left it to him whether and what kind of use he wanted to make of my information.

Submitted herewith to the Foreign Minister.

WEIZSÄCKER

As I see from the *Braune Blätter*,<sup>1</sup> Minister Draganov added to his report on this matter a closing sentence which reads as follows: "He (Weizsäcker) pointed out that in spite of the Greek atrocities toward German soldiers there was still sympathy in German circles for Greece, influenced by the memory of Hellas and the opinion of the Führer."

This paragraph is a pure invention by Draganov.

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>1</sup> The so-called "*Braune Blätter* or "*Der Braune Freund*" were excerpts from intercepted foreign radio messages which had been decoded in the Reich Air Ministry and were then written down on brown paper. They were made available only to a small number of high officials.

## No. 436

280/170284-80

*Memorandum by the Head of Division WIV in the Economic Policy Department*

TOP SECRET

STOCKHOLM, October 31, 1941.

President Ryti received me the day after my arrival for a talk lasting an hour. On the day before my departure, President Ryti had invited me for luncheon, with Mme. Ryti the only other person present, after which we talked for several hours.

Apart from major specific issues, such as the Petsamo nickel concession,<sup>1</sup> grain supply for Finland,<sup>2</sup> the fate of Finnish vessels in overseas countries,<sup>3</sup> the following points of the conversation should be recorded:

*I. Finland's territorial war aims*

Talking first about the Petsamo question, Ryti spoke of the Kola Peninsula and mentioned its still untapped mineral resources as a further opportunity for large-scale German-Finnish collaboration.

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 429.

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 423.

<sup>3</sup> See Document No. 448.

When I remarked that to my knowledge Finland had shown no interest in the Kola Peninsula before (there was no mention of the Kola Peninsula in the materials presented by the Finnish Minister in Berlin last June),<sup>4</sup> Ryti replied that as a result of studies of a military and ethnographical nature since then, the Kola Peninsula should now be added to Karelia and should be included among the Finnish territorial demands.<sup>5</sup> The coast of the Kola Peninsula was settled by Finns, and while Russians have settled in the interior of the country, these Russians are for the most part deportees and prisoners. Ryti then spoke of Finland's other plans of territorial expansion: East Karelia, with an eastern boundary following the coast of the White Sea to Onega Bay; as possibly its easternmost point he indicated on the map of the city of Onega, where the Onega River flows into Onega Bay. From there he indicated a general line to the southern shore of Lake Onega, then following the Svir River to the southern shore of Lake Ladoga, and thence along the Neva River to its mouth in the Gulf of Finland. Finland had no use for Leningrad. He followed this up with the view, often heard also from other Finnish personalities, that Leningrad as an industrial and metropolitan center had to be eliminated and could be allowed to exist only as a German trading and transit point in the future. The territory east of such a Finnish boundary line, i.e., the Government of Arkhangelsk, he recommended to Germany as a forest colonial area. The Government of Arkhangelsk has a population of only about 3 million, composed for the most part of three tribes, the Mordvinians, the Cheremissians, and the Sryenians. These peoples belonged to the Finno-Ugric group, were very primitive, but suited for colonial labor in the vast forest ranges of Arkhangelsk. His advice would be that sometime in the future all members of these tribes should be screened out from the Russian war prisoners and sent home after these territories had been captured. These people were not Slavs, and they were barely touched by Bolshevik ideas.

The fact to be noted about Ryti's remarks was that he spoke about these Finnish war aims with great assurance, although domestic Finnish opinion is still rather undecided in view of the cautious attitude of the Finnish Social Democrats under the leadership of Minister Tanner.

### II. *The Finnish winter campaign*

Ryti spoke of the need to reduce the Finnish combat force from 350,000 to 150,000 for the winter campaign. Additional manpower had to be allocated to the Finnish economy, or Finland would be unable to sustain the burden of a prolonged war. The reduced Finnish Army would be well equipped and mobile, and better adapted to execute the plan of rolling up the Red front from south to north than a larger force less well equipped. It would be a great gain if Soroka, situated on the Murmansk railroad, were to be reached by this northward thrust because it was there that the only other railroad coming from the east, which branched off from the Arkhangelsk-Moscow line, made a junction with the Murmansk railroad; in this way the supply of the

Soviet forces fighting in the north would be impossible. The junction of German and Finnish forces fighting their way from the west eastward would bring the campaign in the north to its conclusion.

### III. *Attitude toward England*

Although Ryti, when he was president of the Bank of Finland, undoubtedly had many personal and business connections with England, his remarks once more conveyed the impression that, in contrast to other Finns, he had broken his inner ties to England. This time, England would be unable to emerge from the war as a world power. England's position within the British Empire rested on belief in her power and wealth. The wealth was gone, and industry and finance would never again be able to regain their former dominant positions. After the war, England would at best lead an existence comparable to that of Spain or of defeated France. The longer the war continued, the more complete would be the destruction of England's world dominating power and position. Only America would in any event be the gainer and the heir of England. Churchill he described as "mad";<sup>6</sup> he had blinded himself to this fatal outcome of the war and had become a prisoner of the war psychosis created by himself. Ryti described the Communist propaganda in England and America as very successful and alarming.

### IV. *Attitude toward the Führer's European plans*

He had only now arrived at a full understanding of the sound logic of the Führer's European plans. Russia had to be destroyed so that Europe could live. Germany would have to bring large territories in the east under her rule in order to prevent any resurgence of a Slavic and Asiatic threat to Europe. Only in that way could Europe, under German predominance, maintain itself against the other continents. England had made the great mistake in opposing Germany in the east. There had always been some influential persons in England who wanted to give Germany a free hand in the east, but they could not prevail against England's old traditional continental policy.

### V. *Attitude toward Sweden*

Ryti gave me a detailed account of the recent visit to Finland by the Swedish labor union leaders and the talk he had with them. At their arrival, the Swedish union leaders—he named Lindberg and Kasparsson—had shown a complete lack of understanding for Finland's situation. They had urged an accommodation with the Soviet Union, suggesting that for Finland too there were other threats besides Soviet Russia. The Swedes had then continued to Soviet Karelia, where they were able to make a firsthand study of Soviet methods. They had returned to Sweden quite converted and, after the object lesson received in Finland, had put aside any thought of a possible accommodation with Soviet Russia. Of Sweden, Ryti spoke in a critical and disparaging tone, especially as regards the determination to fight for the country's defense proclaimed by the Swedes on every occasion. He criticized the Swedish Army and rated its combat effectiveness far below that of the Finnish Army.

According to my other impressions, Ryti's remarks about Sweden do not altogether coincide with Finland's general attitude toward Sweden.

<sup>4</sup> No record of these materials has been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry. See, however, Wuorinen, *Finland and World War II, 1939-1944*, pp. 99-100.

<sup>5</sup> See document No. 301.

<sup>6</sup> In English in the original.

Notwithstanding all disapproval and irritation, Finnish resentment against Sweden does not go so deep as to threaten the basic relationship between the two countries. Personal ties (Field Marshal Mannerheim) and historical tradition still carry too much weight for that.

SCHNURRE

No. 437

205/143073-74

*The Foreign Minister to the Reich Commissar for Occupied Norway*

Telegram

SPECIAL TRAIN, November 1, 1941—12:15 a. m.

No. 1186 of October 31 from the Special Train

Received Berlin, November 1—12:50 a. m.

No. 189 from the Foreign Ministry

Sent November 1.

DEAR PARTY COMRADE TERBOVEN: In reply to your teletype message of October 22 about arrangements for Nordic congresses in Sweden,<sup>1</sup> I wish to say that I agree with your view that the Reich would be opposed on general political grounds to efforts by the Swedes to promote such congresses. I also agree with you that in view of the hostile attitude of the Swedish public toward our administration in Norway,<sup>2</sup> Norwegian participation in such congresses is out of the question. It could be useful only if in such a case there were some prospect of sending a Norwegian personality to Sweden who is prepared to endorse our policy in Norway unequivocally also in Stockholm.

As for Finland's and Denmark's participation in so-called Nordic congresses in Sweden, we cannot in general follow the same line in those countries as that which seems to be called for in Oslo. In particular, a distinction must be made between political congresses and congresses of a purely scientific or cultural nature.<sup>3</sup> In the case of political congresses we have already interposed obstacles, e.g., by refusing exit permits for Denmark. In the case of nonpolitical congresses, on the other hand, consideration should be given to the feeling of independence, especially Finland's, so that only the circum-

<sup>1</sup> In this telegram (205/143044-45) Terboven informed Ribbentrop that in recent times there had been an increase in Swedish efforts to invite Finns, Danes, and Norwegians to congresses in all sorts of fields in order to evoke the impression abroad of Sweden as the leading power of the north. Terboven urged that Germany should oppose such efforts, particularly in view of the insolent attitude of the Swedish press and public opinion toward developments in Norway.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 364 and footnotes 3 and 4.

<sup>3</sup> A memorandum by Grundherr of Oct. 27 (205/143057-59) developed the distinction in Germany's policy toward political and nonpolitical congresses.

Grundherr had at hand the telegram of the Legation at Stockholm, No. 1789 of Oct. 26 (205/143055-56) which indicated no increase in Nordic congresses in Sweden.

stances in each individual case can determine whether or not intervention by Germany appears advisable and necessary.

Heil Hitler!

RIBBENTROP

No. 438

613/249416-17

*The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Slovakia*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL TRAIN, November 1, 1941—2:10 a. m.

No. 1188 of October 31

from the Special Train

Received November 1—2:40 a. m.

No. 1204 of November 1

from the Foreign Ministry

Sent November 1.

For the Minister.

With reference to your telegram No. 1191 of October 27.<sup>1</sup>

In reply to the Slovak Government's inquiry regarding Tuka's invitation to Rumania, please inform M. Tuka personally that you had inquired in Berlin about the thinking there concerning such a trip by the Slovak Minister President. As you had heard, they were of the opinion in Berlin that in judging this question account had to be taken of the circumstance that just recently there had been repeated rumors of Rumanian efforts toward a closer tie between Rumania, Croatia, and Slovakia. As a result of these rumors a certain concern had arisen in Hungary. A Slovak visit to Rumania at the present moment would naturally provide new support to these rumors and possibly impose again an unnecessary burden on Hungarian-Slovak relations. You believed that for similar reasons the Croatian Foreign Minister Lorković had also replied to an invitation to Rumania a short time ago with the request that such a visit be postponed to a later time. In these circumstances you suggested to the Minister President that for his part, too, he find a friendly pretext for postponing the journey and to inform the Rumanians accordingly.

Finally I request you to ask M. Tuka to consider your communication as meant purely for him personally, and not to use it in any way toward the outside.

Wire your report.<sup>2</sup>

RIBBENTROP

<sup>1</sup> This telegram (610/248702) forwarded an inquiry from the Slovak Government as to the attitude of Germany toward acceptance by Slovakia of an invitation suggested by Antonescu.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram No. 1239 of Nov. 5 (613/249422-23) Minister Ludin reported that Tuka had heeded the German objections and would not travel to Rumania.

No. 439

1857/422271-72

*Circular of the Foreign Minister*<sup>1</sup>

Telegram

MOST URGENT

SPECIAL TRAIN, November 1, 1941—1 p. m.

No. 1190 of October 31 from the Special Train

Received Berlin, November 1—1:20 p. m.

Multex No. 887 of November 1

from the Foreign Ministry

Sent November 1.

RAM 457/R

Immediately upon receipt of this telegram please notify the Government there by note verbale of the following communication of the Reich Government:

"The President of the United States, in a speech on October 28 [27]<sup>2</sup> made the following assertions:

(1) The United States Government was in possession of a secret map drawn up in Germany by the Reich Government. This was a map of Central and South America as the Führer wanted to recognize it by forming out of the fourteen countries in this region five subject states and thereby bringing the entire South American continent under his rule. One of these five states allegedly included the Republic of Panama and the Panama Canal.

(2) The United States Government was in possession of a second document prepared by the Reich Government. This document outlined the plan to abolish all religions existing in the world, after Germany had won the war. The Catholic, Protestant, Mohammedan, Hindu, Buddhist and Jewish religions were to be abolished in the same fashion. Church property was to be confiscated, the Cross and all other religious symbols forbidden, and the clergy silenced under penalty of the concentration camps. In the place of the churches an international National Socialist church was to be established, served by speakers sent out by the National Socialist Reich Government. In the place of the Bible, words taken from the Führer's *Mein Kampf* would be imposed and enforced as Holy Writ, the Cross of Christ replaced by the Swastika and the naked sword; finally, the Führer was to take the place of God.

With regard to this the Reich Government states the following:

(1) There does not exist in Germany any map drawn up by the Reich Government regarding a partition of Central and South America, nor any document prepared by the Reich Government concerning abolition of religions in the world. In both instances therefore forgeries of the crudest and most brazen kind must be involved.

<sup>1</sup> Sent to all Missions with the exception of the Embassy in the United States.

<sup>2</sup> The reference is to President Roosevelt's Navy Day address of Oct. 27. For text see Rosenman, *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, vol. x, pp. 438-444.

(2) The allegations as to a German conquest of South America and to an abolition of religions and churches in the world and their replacement by a National Socialist church are so ludicrous and absurd that the Reich Government sees no need for discussing them."<sup>3</sup>  
End of the communication.

Please report by telegram on how your démarche was received and confirm receipt.

RIBBENTROP

<sup>3</sup> An undated memorandum by Weizsäcker (1857/422377-79) sent to the Special Train had reported the result of investigations according to which no official German quarters had published a map such as had been mentioned by President Roosevelt. A memorandum by Luther of Oct. 31 (5109/E295398-400) recorded negative findings on the basis of inquiries with the Institute of Geopolitics and other similar institutions. Luther's memorandum also dealt with the alleged abolition of religions mentioned in the Roosevelt address, stating that "all points in this speech concerning the religious question were taken from the program of the alleged National Reich Church of Germany." Material on this subject which was apparently attached to this memorandum has not been found.

No. 440

1517/372914-16

*Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department*<sup>1</sup>

BERLIN, November 1, 1941.

During my last stay in Rome from October 19 to 24 I had detailed conversations with the Italian Government about the division of the grain surpluses from the southeast between Germany and Italy.<sup>2</sup> The Italians wanted above all a promise from Germany to let them have two-thirds of the Rumanian surplus. Pursuant to instructions given me at the time by the Foreign Ministry,<sup>3</sup> I refused this and on October 24 came to an understanding with Minister Riccardi that on his impending visit to Bucharest he would, to begin with, conclude a firm agreement for 50,000 tons of wheat for Italy. The remaining division between Germany and Italy could be agreed upon only after the definitive figures for the Rumanian exports were known.

Today Minister Riccardi called me from Bucharest and informed me that, in view of the Italian food situation and the fact that the exchanges for the payment of the wheat would also have to be agreed on at once, he would have to conclude an agreement for at least 100,000 tons, for which he requested Germany's consent.

<sup>1</sup> Typed marginal notes: "[To] the Foreign Minister's Secretariat. Please transmit by teletype to the Special Train for the Foreign Minister."

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 420 and footnote 3, and document No. 421, footnote 8.

<sup>3</sup> These instructions have not been found.

These are the reasons against granting the Italian request:

1. The Italian food situation is still being studied here in Berlin with Italian experts;
2. Ambassador Giannini is coming here on Monday, November 3, for further discussions;
3. The waiver of such large deliveries from Rumania in favor of Italy is of such grave significance for the German food situation that Minister Riccardi cannot expect that a decision will be made in a few hours in response to a telephone call.

After reporting to the State Secretary I therefore informed Minister Riccardi that unfortunately we could not at the present time take any other position than that of which I notified him in Rome, namely, that he could conclude an agreement for 50,000 tons. It was absolutely necessary to wait for the definitive figures before dividing the Rumanian surpluses. Minister Riccardi then made the further proposal on the telephone that he would try to get the total Rumanian exports increased from 150,000 tons to 250,000 tons. In the event that he succeeded he requested consent to his contracting for 100,000 tons. Since we had counted on far greater surpluses from Rumania than merely 200,000 tons, I informed him in a third telephone conversation that for the present at least we could not agree to this proposal either.

Signor Riccardi was highly displeased at my message and did not think he would contract for anything at all in these circumstances, because 50,000 tons was too small a quantity for Italy in her present need.

CLODIUS

No. 441

1857/422286

*Circular of the Foreign Minister*<sup>1</sup>

Telegram

**MOST URGENT**

No. 1196 of November 2 SPECIAL TRAIN, November 2, 1941—2 a. m.  
from the Special Train

Received Berlin, November 2—2:30 a. m.

Multex No. 892 from the Foreign Ministry Sent November 2.

Roosevelt's speech<sup>2</sup> induced us to issue two official statements which will appear in the Sunday<sup>3</sup> morning newspapers. The first of these statements, dealing with the two alleged documents, has already been

<sup>1</sup> Sent to all Missions.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 439, footnote 2.

<sup>3</sup> Nov. 2.

communicated to the Missions so that they may notify the respective Governments.<sup>4</sup> There will be no notification or other official steps in connection with the second statement which refutes the charge that Germany was the aggressor and clearly sets forth that the United States was the first to open fire and attack Germany.<sup>5</sup> I request, however, that this statement, too, be used generally as the basis for the guidance of your conversations. Even if we should take no further steps as a result of the actions of the United States, it is of course particularly important that our position in the question of the aggressor be clearly stated.

Addendum for Tokyo only:

Please do not undertake any official step with the Japanese Government either, but make sure in any manner which seems appropriate to you that the Japanese Government pays proper attention to our statement.

Addendum for Washington only:

The foregoing circular instruction which went to all Missions is sent to the Embassy in Washington for information.

RIBBENTROP

<sup>4</sup> Document No. 439.

<sup>5</sup> This statement (1857/422383-84) dealt with the charges made in President Roosevelt's address with regard to the incidents involving the destroyers *Greer* and *Kearny*. See documents Nos. 282 and 407, respectively.

No. 442

2281/482610-611

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy*

Telegram

**MOST URGENT**

No. 2959 of November 2

BERLIN [November 2, 1941.]<sup>1</sup>

Received November 3—2:30 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 2748 of October 30.<sup>2</sup>

Please communicate to Count Ciano on the question of the Anti-Comintern Pact also the following:

In connection with the extension of the Pact among the six Powers which heretofore have been joined in it, the question presents itself in our opinion as to whether on this occasion it would not be well to call upon other Powers, which so far have not been members of it, to join. This would mean primarily Rumania, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Croatia, which have joined the Tripartite Pact but not the Anti-Com-

<sup>1</sup> The document printed here is from the Rome Embassy file and no date or time of dispatch appears on this copy.

<sup>2</sup> In this telegram (2281/482606) Bismarck reported that according to reports in the Italian Foreign Ministry, the Japanese Ambassadors in Rome and Berlin had received instructions, prior to the Japanese cabinet crisis, to propose the extension of the Anti-Comintern Pact. The new Japanese Foreign Minister had not as yet expressed his views on the matter.

intern Pact. We also feel, in view of the present international situation, that it might be appropriate to consider the adherence of Finland and Denmark. In our view it would constitute a political anomaly, in the event the Anti-Comintern Pact were now extended, if countries that are active in the struggle against Bolshevism or at least are politically on our side would not be afforded the opportunity to join. It would fit in with the meaning and purpose of the Anti-Comintern Pact and the present-day situation, and would also have a useful political effect if all Powers concerned would now clearly attest their solidarity in the fight against the Communist International.

In the event that the Italian Government and also the Japanese Government, which we are approaching with this proposal at the same time, concur in our views, the Reich Government would, for its part, undertake to approach the governments concerned to sound them out in a confidential manner at first as to whether they may be ready to join. If these inquiries lead to a positive result, it would be in order to have the diplomatic representatives of Germany, Italy, and Japan make a joint démarche, formally inviting the governments mentioned to join.

The accession of these Powers would have to be executed by a special protocol which would be signed in Berlin simultaneously with the protocol extending the Pact. The protocol of accession should be formulated in the same manner as the protocols on the previous accessions.

We feel that the protocol on the extension of the Pact and also the protocol covering the new accessions should be signed no later than November 25, 1941, the date on which the first 5-year term expires. It is therefore necessary that the diplomatic actions and technical preparations required for this purpose be undertaken with the greatest despatch.

RIBBENTROP

No. 443

2281/482614-16

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN [November 3, 1941.]<sup>1</sup>

No. 2966 of November 3 Received November 3—12:00 midnight.

With reference to our telegram No. 2959.<sup>2</sup>

The German Embassy in Tokyo advises under date of November 1<sup>3</sup> that the Japanese Cabinet has agreed to the proposal for extending

<sup>1</sup> The document printed here is from the Rome Embassy file and no date or time of dispatch appears on this copy.

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 442.

<sup>3</sup> No record of this report has been found.

the Anti-Comintern Pact. Inasmuch as the Italian Government, too, has already given its assent,<sup>4</sup> it would now be in order to undertake the projected joint démarches on the part of the German, Italian, and Japanese representatives in Budapest, Hsinking, and Madrid.

The most suitable form in which to do this, in my opinion, would be as follows:

The three Ambassadors, or Ministers, as the case may be, after consulting together would communicate orally to the Hungarian, Manchukuo, and Spanish Governments the decision of the German, Italian, and Japanese Governments to extend the Anti-Comintern Pact. They would invite the three governments which have adhered to the Pact to join in this document of extension and would ask for speedy information as to acceptance of this invitation. At the same time they would indicate that the date and form of the instruments for extending the Pact would be the subject of a later communication.

In the event the Italian Government and the Japanese Government, which I am contacting about this at the same time, agree to this procedure, they should see to it that their diplomatic representatives in Budapest, Hsinking, and Madrid are issued instructions immediately and have them consult with the diplomatic representatives of Germany and Japan in the respective countries.

As regards the notification of date and form of the instruments of extension, to be left until later at the time of making the joint démarche, I should like to propose for the sake of simplicity and dispatch that this subsequent communication, being chiefly technical in nature, be made exclusively by the diplomatic representatives of Germany. This would be done as soon as Berlin, Rome, and Tokyo were agreed on the wording of the protocol of extension and on the date and place of its signature.

I should like to add that we have already transmitted to the Japanese Government a draft of the protocol on extending the Pact, as requested.<sup>5</sup> As soon as we have learned the views of the Japanese Government on the wording of the protocol, which essentially is formal in content, we shall immediately inform the Italian Government. Please inform the Italian Government of this and point out that in the interest of conserving time, we cleared the text with the Japanese Government first, because in such formal matters this is known to be particularly complicated.<sup>6</sup>

Please wire as soon as possible your reply as regards the above proposals and also as regards the proposal transmitted to you by previous

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 405 and footnote 3.

<sup>5</sup> No record of this exchange has been found.

<sup>6</sup> In telegram No. 2972 of Nov. 4 (2281/482623-26) Ribbentrop transmitted the draft of the extension of the Anti-Comintern Pact, and indicated that it could be handed to the Italian Government.

telegram on the invitation to be extended to other states to join the Pact.<sup>7</sup>

RIBBENTROP

<sup>7</sup> In telegram No. 2813 of Nov. 6 (2281/482630-31) Mackensen reported that the Italian Government agreed to the draft of the Pact and to the procedural details suggested by Berlin.

No. 444

1517/372928

*Memorandum by the Director of the Department for German Internal Affairs*

U. St.S. D. No. 4996

BERLIN, November 3, 1941.

Last Saturday I discussed with Brigadeführer Müller the matter of the Italian workers' not being sent in the future to labor training camps but rather deported to Italy<sup>1</sup> with a pertinent case record, which will be delivered to the Italian police liaison chief at the Italian Embassy in Berlin. By agreement with the Italians, punishment will be imposed in Italy itself and Germany will be notified simultaneously. Brigadeführer Müller has issued the order that all Italians in labor training camps are to be released from them not later than Tuesday, November 4, 1941. He estimates that there are about 120 of them in all and believes that the great majority of those released will voluntarily go back to work in Germany. The rest will be deported.<sup>2</sup>

LUTHER

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 409 and footnote 8.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram No. 2855 of Nov. 10 (1517/372943-44) Mackensen reported from Rome that there was no possibility of recruiting in Italy the 30,000 workers suitable for the German metal industry which were desired. Baron Tucci, Director of the Italian Commission for Internal Migration and Colonization, stated that the unemployed workers still left in Italy were unsuitable for employment in Germany. In the interest of precluding further embarrassing political occurrences, the Commission felt that it should not send to Germany any of the remaining, unsuited workers.

No. 445

405/213982-85

*The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

PARIS, November 4, 1941—1:30 a. m.

TOP SECRET

Received November 4—3:30 a. m.

No. 3431 of November 3

(1) To the Foreign Ministry.

(2) To Armistice Commission, Wiesbaden, for Minister v. Welck.

State Secretary Benoist-Méchin, who returned yesterday from Vichy, and Ambassador de Brinon, who returned this evening, give the following picture of the present situation regarding the Weygand<sup>1</sup> question:

The Ministerial Council of October 24, at the start of which Marshal Pétain announced his decision to apply to the Führer in a radio appeal and subsequently present himself to the German occupying power at the demarcation line as a hostage,<sup>2</sup> had as the main point in its agenda the dismissal of Weygand. It is therefore probable that Pétain's advisers, who were in favor of this radio appeal, were, at the same time, the passionate advocates of Weygand's continued presence in North Africa, wanted to prevent this item from being dealt with in the Ministerial Council, and wanted to create a crisis favorable to their intentions. The opponents of a dismissal of Weygand point out that this involves a selfish attack by the Navy in its power struggle against the Army and an action directed by Darlan's personal hatred of Weygand. Behind Darlan were the Germans, who wanted to gain a military foothold in North Africa and to whom Weygand was an unwelcome obstacle. Against a dismissal of Weygand the argument is also used that such a step would impel the United States to take a firmer stand toward France. They go as far as to assert that Leahy had announced the rupture of diplomatic relations in this case. However, the American Ambassador allegedly only characterized the possible dismissal of Weygand as a severe strain on America's relations with France.<sup>3</sup> Although Darlan threatened to resign, Pétain had adopted the arguments of his opponents, and only at the end of last week was it possible to convince him of the necessity of dismissing Weygand. In a conversation of several hours with Benoist-Méchin on November 1, Pétain had said he was willing to recall Weygand. Since public opinion under the influence of Anglo-Saxon propaganda would interpret this measure as a retreat in the face of German pressure, however, Pétain at the same time asked for opportunities to compensate for the impending loss of prestige. Closest to his heart was the possibility of a trip to the occupied area and the opportunity to meet with a leading German personage such as Reichsmarschall Göring.<sup>4</sup> To the Army he could justify Weygand's dismissal most effectively if the military reinforcements for North and West Africa and the transfer of the Syrian Army requested in Wiesbaden<sup>5</sup> were approved. In

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 415.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 422.

<sup>3</sup> For Leahy's reports on this matter see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. II, pp. 455-456.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 481.

<sup>5</sup> Negotiations concerning these requests were being conducted since June. See document No. 162 and *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. V, pp. 5-12, 53-56.



North Africa itself Weygand's dismissal would be made easier if the native prisoners of war and a contingent of the French prisoners of war of North African domicile who were in German captivity would be freed and he could personally bring the news of their speedy return on the occasion of a trip to North Africa.<sup>6</sup> If he were given an assurance in principle that these three requests would be fulfilled, he was willing to relieve Weygand of his post as early as the coming week.

In a conversation with the de Brinon on November 2 Marshal Pétain repeated the same ideas, but spoke of the trip to the occupied area, mentioned the day before in the form of a hope, as if it were already a definite fact, and went into the details of the travel schedule. De Brinon reported to Pétain about his reception by the Reich Foreign Minister and his visit to the camp of the French Legion.<sup>7</sup> Marshal Pétain commissioned de Brinon to deliver to the Foreign Minister his most cordial thanks for this reception and at the same time to express how very grateful he would be if he himself could be given the opportunity of meeting the Foreign Minister. In his conversations with de Brinon, Pétain expressed himself in a deprecating manner concerning the United States and Weygand. Weygand had asked him not to contest his right to hate, and from an intercepted communication to the United States it could be concluded that the latter considered Weygand to be the representative of its interests in North Africa.<sup>8</sup> Regarding the three requests whose fulfillment Pétain is asking in connection with the dismissal of Weygand it can be noted that during the past weeks they have already been frequently advanced by Darlan, Benoist-Méchin and other members of the Government in the name of Pétain. It is therefore possible that they were only suggested to Pétain anew at this time in order to make the decision to dismiss Weygand more palatable.<sup>9</sup>

ABÉTZ

<sup>6</sup> In telegram No. 279 of Nov. 8 (898/292246-49) Boehland reported the views of the Armistice Commission regarding Pétain's desires for German concessions. It advocated the granting, in principle, of reinforcements for West Africa but not for North Africa; a partial transfer of the forces from Syria and some concessions regarding the prisoners of war.

<sup>7</sup> For de Brinon's account of his meeting with Ribbentrop see Fernand de Brinon, *Mémoires* (Paris, n.d.), pp. 82 ff.

<sup>8</sup> In the film of the files of the Reich Foreign Minister's Secretariat is a memorandum of Aug. 12 by Weizsäcker (F1/0574) submitting to Ribbentrop German translations of two intercepts. The first (F1/0568-0571) is Murphy's telegram No. 338 of July 21, printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. II, pp. 396-398. This intercept is almost complete. The second (F1/0575) is a telegram numbered 378, dated Aug. 5, and signed by Cole, the United States Consul General at Algiers. The correct date is Aug. 2. The message tallies exactly with the third paragraph of telegram No. 378 as printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. II, p. 406.

<sup>9</sup> For Ribbentrop's reply, see document No. 463.

## No. 446

2281/482491-503

*Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to Ambassador Alfieri*

IN THE EAST, November 4, 1941.

DEAR SIGNOR AMBASSADOR: You were so kind as to write me on October 19<sup>1</sup> and touch on several questions which had already been the subject of a conversation between us during your recent presence here at Führer Headquarters.<sup>2</sup>

Now after my return from Schönhof, where Count Ciano's stay in Germany<sup>3</sup> was concluded by a couple of very successful days of hunting, I do not wish to fail to revert to your letter. While thanking Your Excellency sincerely for your frank statements in the letter, I should like to say in the first place that it was a matter of course for me to inform you confidentially about a matter which, even though one should not accord it any too great importance, if continued could have had repercussions on the cooperation between your Embassy and the Foreign Ministry, which so far has been exceedingly harmonious. However, I believe I can be sure that this is a temporary phenomenon which for lack of inner justification will have no duration.

As regards the question of the Italian workers, which Your Excellency again brought up, I gather from your letter that my request expressed during your presence at Headquarters, that the Italian Embassy not dramatize such matters in so far as possible, occasioned a certain amount of surprise on your part. In this regard I should like to ask Your Excellency in the most friendly way to recall that of late you have repeatedly spoken to me about the great importance of this question and have thereby repeatedly pointed out how very much these complaints of the Italian workers needed to be remedied in the interest of German-Italian friendship.<sup>4</sup> From this then I drew the natural conclusion that I should work in every way for a settlement of these matters, and Your Excellency will agree with me that in the treatment of this question it was always my aim and that of my co-workers to promote in every way the well-being of the Italian workers in Germany. But if over and above this I did not accord any greater significance to the small disagreements which occurred than was due to them within the framework of the great common struggle being carried on by our two countries and of the close friendship existing between them, this corresponded with my inner conviction.

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 411.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 409.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 424.

<sup>4</sup> For Alfieri's complaints to Ribbentrop see documents No. 308 and No. 409. For his complaints on the same subject to Weizsäcker see documents No. 281 and footnote 2, No. 375, and No. 397.

tion. It is therefore with particular satisfaction, Signor Ambassador, that I now believe I can gather from your letter that you, too, share the opinion that these questions should only be treated in accordance with their true importance.

Now if Your Excellency nevertheless considers it proper in the further course of your letter to point out that this way of looking at things had to have its limits, and that you were not in a position to close your eyes to situations which you had to regard as undeniable facts, namely: that the morale of the Italian workers in Germany was depressed and that this had called forth negative reactions in Italy, then I had to assume that important reasons and facts have brought you to this. I have therefore made a point of occupying myself once more with this problem in detail in order to find out the reasons for this situation of the Italian workers in Germany which you have observed and feel to be an encumbrance. As a result of this investigation permit me to transmit to you the attached compilation of reports<sup>5</sup> on incidents involving Italian workers that have taken place at various places of work in Germany, which have arrived at the central Berlin offices from the various local agencies in Germany. On the basis of these reports and also of other additional inquiries which I have instituted, I cannot avoid reaching the clear conclusion that there is no German responsibility for the fact that, as has been reported to you, the morale of the Italian workers in Germany may not have been good. It seems to me from these reports and examples that it is incontestably evident on the one hand that the performance of the Italian workers has deteriorated here and there, but on the other hand their demands have increased in almost every case, and often beyond the point of what Germany is able to fulfill even with the best will in the world. Thus, for example, the demands of the Italian workers often exceeded the standard of the German worker, so that the German agencies were time and again simply not in a position to comply with such demands. Your Excellency can convince yourself of the true state of affairs with the aid of these examples. I should like to add that the care with which the investigations have been made in all of these cases is illuminated by nothing so much as by the fact that, for example, in the case of Flözberg near Linz, indicated under figure 6, not only Dr. Ley and I but the Führer himself, whose native city is Linz, as is well known, intervened and had the true facts of the case as described here reported to him. In summary I should like to say that considering the available evidence the Foreign Ministry would rather have had occasion to turn to Your Excellency for redress because of certain abuses among the Italian workers. The fact that the German agencies did not do this, but consistently tried to settle and correct matters on the spot is

based on the realization that on the one hand such occurrences can happen in the course of employing several hundred thousand Italian workers who were recruited in great haste, but that on the other hand they were never of such significance as to justify the Governments of the two friendly nations concerning themselves about them at all. For the future I therefore believe and hope that such friction can be settled without further ado through the institution for such questions of a mediation agency agreed upon by the Foreign Ministry and the Embassy,<sup>6</sup> without bothering the highest authorities.

In the further course of your letter Your Excellency also stated that aside from the question of the workers the feeling among the German people in relation to Italy was in general not good. You preferred to make this communication to me in order not to have to regret at some time not having told me this. At the same time you inform me that your view is based on the unanimous reports of the Italian Consuls in Germany. Although I cannot judge on what experiences the Italian Consuls in Germany believe they can base their views, and as I am furthermore, according to the words of Your Excellency, not very clear about what significance you attach to this matter, I should like for my part in any case, on the basis of exact knowledge of the feeling among the German people, to express the following opinion on this question quite clearly.

*The feeling of the German people toward Italy is not bad but good.* Naturally in Germany, too, there are still incorrigible elements who do not want to follow the policy of the Führer. The same, however, is probably true in reverse for Italy, too, where there will still be circles who do not want to go along with the Duce's policy. These elements are incorrigible grumblers, critics, and weaklings who, the less of a positive nature they do for the state, the more they talk and criticize, pass on every rumor and every bit of gossip, and even try to transform what is most positive into the negative. I am certain that you are aware, Your Excellency, that precisely these circles in the two countries also often have contact with one another and toss the ball back and forth. It is a regrettable fact that precisely these circles maintain in almost all countries an especially lively contact with the diplomatic and consular representations. Hoping to find people of like mind here, they often—perhaps even against their will—become tools of Anglo-American agents who, as you doubtless know, have chosen precisely the neutral Missions as a rewarding field for their propaganda activity. If, as I naturally do not know, the Italian Consuls have perhaps also let themselves be influenced in their reporting to the Embassy by information from such circles and from this atmosphere, then this would be bound to result in an entirely erroneous picture of Germany's attitude toward Italy. *The German*

<sup>5</sup> Not printed (2281/482512-25).

<sup>6</sup> See document No. 375, footnote 2.

*people think quite differently.* They have no time for such prattle; they fight and work and have contempt for this world of do-nothings and intriguers. They have the warmest sympathies for Fascist Italy—I doubtless do not need to give Your Excellency any special assurance of this—and I am convinced that the reverse is no different. If the German people were perhaps now and then somewhat sorry if this or that Italian measure was not immediately crowned with success as they had perhaps hoped, this seems to me to be precisely a sign of how warmly the German people feel in everything that affects Italy. As in the past, the German people will rejoice most sincerely and cordially in the future, too, about every Italian success, and I am certain that you, Signor Ambassador, have yourself been able to note this repeatedly. I should like to mention only in passing that this has incidentally also always found public expression in all fields of journalism. The German people are very well aware that they are allied with the Italian people in a life and death struggle, and they are just as ready to march to the end with their Italian friends as, to use the Duce's historical words, the Italian people are ready to do this with the Germans. And this end—you know my conviction, Your Excellency—will be the greatest common victory in the history of our peoples!

This, Signor Ambassador, is my opinion of the feeling of the German people toward Italy. I am therefore convinced that no real German or Italian patriot will let himself be influenced in the long run by any sort of obstruction by a few obscure elements in his trust in the Axis and in his will to victory; and I believe that we, the co-workers of our two great leaders, are called on in first place to show the way in this respect.

With the assurance of my particular esteem and cordial affection, I remain, Your Excellency, etc.

RIBBENTROP

P.S. I should be grateful if Your Excellency would also inform Count Ciano of my above opinion and the attached report on the question of the Italian workers.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> In Weizsäcker's letter of Nov. 7 (2281/482483), in telegram No. 1289 of Nov. 18 (1517/372966-67), and again in telegram No. 3115 of Nov. 18 (2281/482547-48) Mackensen was instructed to make sure that Ciano was fully informed regarding Ribbentrop's letter to Alfieri, particularly regarding those points concerning the Italian workers in Germany and the attitude of the German people toward Italy.

Weizsäcker's memorandum, St.S. No. 767 of Nov. 18 (1517/372971), and his instruction of Nov. 20 to Mackensen, telegram No. 3127 (2281/482549-50), record that Alfieri had forwarded the full text of the letter to Ciano.

In telegram No. 3012 of Nov. 20 (2281/482551-52) Mackensen reported that Ciano expressed his gratification over the friendship of Germany for Italy and insisted that the Italian people reciprocated the feeling toward the Germans. Ciano added that Mussolini was informed about the letter.

Cf. Dino Alfieri, *Due dittatori di fronte*, pp. 237-239; *The Ciano Diaries*, entry for Nov. 14, 1941.

No. 447

945/300034-37

*Memorandum by the Head of Political Division VI*

BERLIN, November 4, 1941.

Pol. VI 7788 g.

Subject: Denmark's attitude toward Germany.

For the Foreign Minister.

I. Any appraisal of the attitude of the Danish Government and the Danish people toward Germany based on the maxim "By their fruits ye shall know them" must stress the fact that none of the countries occupied by us is as peaceful and offers such close and virtually trouble-free cooperation as Denmark. Cooperation with the Danish Government which, to be sure, is separated from us by a wide gap ideologically has been carried out successfully during the past 1¾ years since Denmark's occupation by German troops, thanks to close adherence to the guiding principles given by the Foreign Ministry to the Plenipotentiary of the Reich, Minister von Renthe-Fink: "To work with 'diplomatic means', a friendly attitude, patience, calm, tact, and perseverance, while fully protecting the interests of the Wehrmacht; the maintenance of law and order."

In the field of *internal politics*, the Danish Government has enacted all laws deemed necessary and demanded by us to promote our interests as regards foreign policy, the Wehrmacht, and the economy. In the field of *foreign policy* the Danish Government has severed its diplomatic relations with England, France, and the Soviet Union, and lodged its protest against the so-called Greenland agreement<sup>1</sup> and the occupation of Iceland by the English and the Americans.<sup>2</sup> Denmark has moreover furnished a sizable contingent for the Waffen SS to fight against the Soviet Union.<sup>3</sup> In the *economic* field, the readjustment of Denmark's economic life following the cessation of the large imports from England and the overseas countries was carried out more successfully than we could have expected, so that delivery of critical food products to Germany is possible on the largest scale. Denmark's industry has likewise to a large degree been put to work for our armaments program. This was and still is possible only through the voluntary and constructive cooperation of all Danish governmental authorities and the good will of the Danish population.

<sup>1</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 308, footnote 1.

<sup>2</sup> Documents Nos. 102 and 118.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram No. 830 of June 27 (62/42321-22) Renthe-Fink reported about the recruitment of Danish volunteers into the Waffen SS. They were to form a separate battalion of 800 to 1000 men within the SS-Division Viking.

II. In appraising the sentiments of the *Danish people* in regard to Germany, the following must be borne in mind: The Dane is materialistic, loves the comforts of life, and is a pronounced individualist. The destruction of the Danish fleet by the English in 1807 has been forgotten, 1864<sup>4</sup> has not. Versailles is being condemned today as a folly. However, it did give north Schleswig to Denmark, although the Danes are eager to stress that they exercised moderation in the acquisition of territory, contrary to the wish of the Allies. Noteworthy in the political development of recent years are the facts that Danish Foreign Minister Munch abstained from voting in the League of Nations in the spring of 1935, when Germany was denounced for asserting her sovereign right to rearm, and that Denmark was the only Scandinavian State to conclude a non-aggression treaty with Germany in the spring of 1939.<sup>5</sup>

Until 1940 England provided the principal market for Danish exports. The shipping and ship-owning interests were inclined toward England, whose democratic-liberalistic form of government corresponds to that of Denmark. There is little understanding in Denmark for the political and strategic necessity for the occupation of Denmark by German troops on April 9, 1940; but all the more emphasis is put on Germany's promise to preserve Denmark's sovereignty and integrity, and notwithstanding all the admiration for the achievements and the conduct of the German armed forces, everyone is looking forward to the day when the German troops will leave Denmark.

On the *attitude of the Royal House* I reported yesterday under Pol. VI 7768 g.<sup>6</sup>

Information on the attitude of Stauning, still the most influential and powerful single individual in Denmark, and the various leaders of the political parties, is presented in the dispatch of the German Legation in Copenhagen, of October 31, received today, which is attached.<sup>7</sup> Of particular interest in this report is the following statement made by State Minister *Stauning*: "I regard the *occupation* as an element in the gigantic conflict in which Germany is engaged today in order to establish a new order in Europe. In considering the situation, the background must not be overlooked. The Danish Government, as is known, is taking a constructive attitude toward the problems of our time and has endeavored to solve them in the measure in which they arose." Regarding the question of Danish participation in *building the new Europe* Stauning stated as follows:

<sup>4</sup>This is a reference to the Danish defeat in the war against Austria and Prussia over Schleswig-Holstein in 1864.

<sup>5</sup>See vol. VI of this series, document No. 461.

<sup>6</sup>Not found.

<sup>7</sup>Not printed (5109/E295395-396/1).

"The changes required will meet with no opposition here. If the Danish people are allowed to carry them out the Danish way, there is no doubt in my mind about the attitude of the people and there will be no cause for conflicts."

*Foreign Minister Scavenius*, an experienced, realistic statesman, has repeatedly given proof of his positive attitude toward Germany, as has also the former Danish State Secretary Mohr, now Minister to Berlin,<sup>8</sup> as well as other members of the Danish Government, for example the young Minister of Transportation, Gunar Larssen, the general manager of the Danish state railroads, Knutzen (construction of the railroad line and super-highway Fehmarn-Rödby), and Minister of Justice Thune Jacobsen. The Navy cooperates smoothly with our Navy, while the Army is keeping somewhat more aloof. The agricultural circles are aware that they are dependent on the German market. Many industrial and business circles clearly recognize that Denmark's interests are and always will be intimately linked with those of her greater German neighbor. Only recently a Danish committee was formed with a view to associating Danish business groups with the German development program in Eastern Europe.<sup>9</sup> Groups interested in Germany have joined together in a number of German-Danish associations, whose activities always attract sizable audiences. The contacts of *Danish scholars* with Germany are closer than those with England.

By contrast, the Danish Royal House, the Danish Government, and nearly the entire Danish people reject the DNSAP and Clausen, whose leadership qualifications are not acknowledged.<sup>10</sup> Large segments of the Danish people are prepared, while not loving us, to accept the practical consequences of the situation, i.e., to take their place in the new Europe under the leadership of Germany; the Danes do so, how-

<sup>8</sup>Otto Carl Mohr presented his credentials on Sept. 11, 1941.

<sup>9</sup>In telegram No. 1389 of Oct. 27 (62/42393) Renthe-Fink reported the formation of a committee of Danish businessmen for the participation of Danish business interests in the development of the eastern areas. Renthe-Fink mentioned in this context that statements made by Hitler, when Minister Mohr presented his letter of credence, with regard to "the Greater European area, its development and European cooperation, especially in the east, in connection with it" had made a deep impression in Denmark. Mohr confirmed this in a conversation with Weizsäcker which the latter recorded in a memorandum of Nov. 6 (62-/42401-02). Mohr stated that he had reported Hitler's statements to his Government and that Scavenius had thereupon instructed him to inform Germany of the Danish Government's positive reaction to Hitler's ideas. He was told "to point out Denmark's willingness to make deliveries to Germany, to the dispatch of a very great number of workers to Germany, and to the new plan of the Danish business community to engage in activities in Russia in accordance with the Führer's ideas."

<sup>10</sup>On Clausen and the Danish National Socialist party see vol. XII of this series, document No. 101.

ever, in the hope that this can be accomplished while preserving the Danish Royal House as well as Denmark's sovereignty and integrity, and with the stipulation that any organic modification of their form of government, which they are partly prepared to accept, must not be imposed upon them from the outside. It has to be admitted that a certainly not inconsiderable segment of the Danish public would better than anything like the war to end in a draw between Germany and England in the hope that in that case Denmark would again be able, together with the other Nordic States, to play a certain role in the so-called "neutral" Scandinavian group. The more experienced and thoughtful politicians like Scavenius, and perhaps also Stauning, are probably aware that this is wishful thinking. But a genuine change of sentiment in the Danish people must not be expected until Germany has won the final victory.

GRUNDHERR

No. 448

260/170298-300

*Memorandum by Minister Leitner*

BERLIN, November 4, 1941.  
zu Ha. Pol. 7142 g.<sup>1</sup>

I. Statements of the Finnish Minister of Supply Ramsay regarding Finnish tonnage overseas.

1. Before the breach of relations between Finland and England there were 55 Finnish ships overseas. Of these more than half were able to get to places under German control and save themselves; some were sunk or captured by the English; the remaining 24 ships fled to American waters where they were to be laid up.<sup>2</sup> Ten of these ships (including 4 Thorden ships) placed themselves under the Panamanian flag in order to remain in service. Since England did not recognize this change of flag, and since the United States began to seize the laid-up ships, these ships, with American consent, were moved out in order to escape English or American seizure. For this purpose a Finnish shipping office was set up in New York which in cooperation with the USA Maritime Commission chartered the ships for voyages in the Western Hemisphere and guaranteed their remaining in American waters whereupon the ships received the necessary quantities of fuel for coastal voyages.

<sup>1</sup> Ha. Pol. 7142 g: Not found.

<sup>2</sup> Helsinki telegram No. 722 of Aug. 2 (260/170110-113) gives a listing of Finland's Atlantic ships as of July 28.

2. Finland declined to run the blockade with two ships already loaded from Rio de Janeiro as we intended, because this would have led to the immediate seizure of all the rest of the ships.

3. If Finland is in principle ready to run the blockade she is willing to do this only with ships which are suitable for it; and because she fears jeopardizing her relations with the United States in doing it, she wishes to undertake it only shortly before a break in Finnish-American relations.

4. These are in any case to be excluded from running the blockade: a) the ships *Aurora* and *Olivia* which are laid up in the U.S.A. because they will be ready for traveling only after 2 to 3 months of repairs; and, further, b) 10 small, old, slow ships which offer no prospect for a successful run of the blockade; and also c) the 4 Thorden ships, because their owner is a Swedish citizen with whom the necessary secrecy could not be arranged.

As much as possible Finland will direct the remaining ships toward South America whence at the appropriate time they should break out for Casablanca without regard for loading. The Finns do not consider the chances for running the blockade as very favorable in view of the strict North American watch.

5. Since a break-out will have as a consequence the seizure of all the rest of the Finnish ships in America, Finland wishes to sell to Sweden beforehand the two ships which need repairs (*Aurora* and *Olivia*) as well as the ten small and slow ships which cannot be considered for running the blockade. At the same time Finland hopes through the sale to receive the Swedish kronor necessary to make up the strong passive balance of trade with Sweden. (Ramsay termed the interest of the shipowners in the sale a secondary matter.)

II. I explained to M. Ramsay that the sale of Finnish ships to Sweden would have to be refused because it would amount to an indirect or a direct employment for England of the tonnage sold. I have nevertheless reserved a final answer to his proposal to the time of agreed concluding discussions on November 7.

III. According to the directive of the Reich Foreign Minister of November 1 apropos of the memorandum No. 709 of the State Secretary,<sup>3</sup> the Finnish wishes regarding sale to Sweden of the ships which are overseas are to be refused. Inasmuch as the present Finnish proposal does not concern the sale of all,<sup>4</sup> but only of individual ships to

<sup>3</sup> In this memorandum (260/170271) Weizsäcker recorded a discussion with Kivimäki regarding the Finnish proposal for sale to Sweden of 25 ships with a total tonnage of 130,000.

<sup>4</sup> Zechlin's telegram No. 785 of Aug. 15 (260/170134) reported that there had been attempts to sell Finland's Atlantic merchant fleet to Switzerland. In telegram No. 930 of Sept. 11 (260/170181) Blücher reported that Finland intended to sell the fleet to Sweden.

Sweden, this proposal is hereby submitted to Ambassador Ritter with the request for a directive if possible by Friday noon, November 7.<sup>5</sup>

LEITNER

<sup>5</sup> No record of this decision has been found.

In telegram No. 1299 of Nov. 13 (260/170353) Blücher reported that the Finns would begin negotiations with Sweden immediately, and that the Finnish ships in South America had been ordered to remain there as long as possible.

Telegram No. 1462 of Dec. 5 (261/170425) reported that the Finnish Government was weighing the problem of running the blockade or of issuing an order for the ships to be scuttled.

In telegram No. 1479 of Dec. 8 (261/170429) Blücher reported the status of Finland's Atlantic merchant fleet of that date, and that he had repeated his urging that the ships be given an order to run the blockade or to be scuttled. The difficulty in such an order was the lack of a secure code. The Finnish Legation had been instructed to cooperate with Germany's representatives in regard to the ships.

### No. 449

71/50900-01

*The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, November 5, 1941—10:30 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received November 5—11:00 p. m.

No. 2802 of November 5

With reference to my telegram No. 2789 of November 4.<sup>1</sup>

Today Anfuso handed Bismarck the text provisionally agreed upon here between the Duce and Count Ciano, on the one hand, and the Grand Mufti, on the other, for the declaration which the Grand Mufti wishes to issue after having obtained Germany's consent.

In the German translation the text reads as follows:

"Amin al-Husayni, the Grand Mufti of Palestine and one of the leading representatives of the independence movement of the Arab peoples, has had a frank and cordial exchange of views with the Duce and the Führer.

"In this conversation he was told the following:

"(1) That the two Axis Powers will give every possible support to the Arab countries, which are now suffering under British domination and oppression, in the fight for their freedom.

"(2) That the Axis Powers, supporting the aspirations of the Arabs, are prepared to recognize the full sovereignty and complete independence of the Arab countries of the Near East which are now occupied or controlled by the English. Pursuant thereto, the Axis Powers are prepared to give their consent to the elimination of the

<sup>1</sup> This telegram (71/50898-99) reported that Bismarck had called on the Grand Mufti who, after having expressed his wish to be received by the Reich Foreign Minister "and if possible, by the Führer," mentioned that he had discussed with Mussolini and Ciano a declaration which he would issue, "but only after his Berlin conversations."

Jewish national home [*jüdisch-nationalen Lebensraumes*] in Palestine.<sup>2</sup>

"Their readiness to do this will be set down in the near future in a formal agreement that will seal the sincere friendship and close cooperation between the Axis Powers and the Arabs in the future. The negotiations for the conclusion of such an agreement will be started as soon as possible.

"In the course of the discussions the intention of Italy and Germany, to respect, as before, to the full extent, the sovereignty and the independence of all Arab countries that are now sovereign and independent was again confirmed."

End of the declaration.

MACKENSEN

<sup>2</sup> In telegram No. 2810 of Nov. 6 (2281/482671) Mackensen sent the Italian text of this passage according to which this expression read "Focolare Nazionale Ebraico". A minute by Counselor Plessen on the Embassy copy of this telegram explains that Woermann had requested the Italian text over the telephone, saying that the Foreign Ministry did not like the expression "Lebensraum" in the German version.

### No. 450

235/157294-95

*The Embassy in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

RIO DE JANEIRO, November 6, 1941—2:36 p. m.

No. 2186 of November 6

Received November 6—11:25 p. m.

For OKH, Attaché Department; for RLM, Attaché Group.

With reference to my telegram No. 1902, Military Attaché 669 g. of September 29.<sup>1</sup>

General Lehmann W. Miller<sup>2</sup> returned on October 24; he presented to the War Minister<sup>3</sup> and Chief of the General Staff<sup>4</sup> the increased demands of his Government, particularly regarding the utilization of harbors in northern Brazil as U.S. naval bases, along with the establishment of considerable stockpiles of foodstuffs, fuel, ammunition, etc., as well as docks for repairs with the necessary military personnel of the U.S.A.<sup>5</sup> When the Minister of War rejected this very sharply, at once Miller threatened with military occupation in order to be able to execute and ensure the measures considered necessary by the U.S.A.

<sup>1</sup> Not found.

<sup>2</sup> Chief of the U.S. military mission in Brazil.

<sup>3</sup> Gen. Eurico G. Dutra.

<sup>4</sup> Gen. Pedro de Góes Monteiro.

<sup>5</sup> For the details on U.S.-Brazilian negotiations see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. VI, p. 490-514 ff. The military developments have been dealt with in Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, *The Framework of Hemisphere Defense* in the series *United States Army in World War II: The Western Hemisphere*, pp. 265-330.

The Minister of War replied, exceedingly aroused, that the Brazilians would rather live under the most primitive conditions than give up their independence through the establishment of U.S.A. bases. In any case he would give the order to fire if the U.S.A. should land troops without Brazil's requesting it to do so. Miller added that certain "pro-Nazi" advisers of the President (this meant War Minister Dutra, Chief of the General Staff Góes Monteiro, Police Prefect Felinto Müller) were opposing the demands of the U.S.A., and that in certain circumstances his Government would demand the removal of the persons concerned. Moreover, if the U.S.A. demands were rejected the sharpest economic reprisals would be undertaken within 24 hours; among other things the deliveries of gasoline would be cut off, etc.

The conference was extraordinarily dramatic. The President, apprised at once by the Minister of War, told the latter in the presence of the Police Prefect, that he (Vargas) was the one to govern and make decisions in Brazil and not the North Americans. Thereupon the President asked the American Ambassador Caffery to call on him, who told him that General Miller had no authority at all to make such demands in the name of the American Government. The Military Attaché<sup>6</sup> received the above information from the Police Prefect as well as from two high-ranking officers, each independent of the other.

In the meantime very rapid progress has been made in the expansion of the eight airfields reported in Annex 3 of report No. 11/41 of July 29,<sup>7</sup> so that the completion of some can still be counted on this year.

Military Attaché 781g.  
PRÜFER

<sup>6</sup> General Niefenführ.  
<sup>7</sup> Not found.

No. 451

82/60819-21

*The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT  
SECRET

TOKYO, November 6, 1941—10:50 p. m.  
Received November 7—2:50 p. m.

No. 2354 of November 6

Foreign Minister Togo, to whom I spoke about the sudden dispatch of Ambassador Kurusu to Washington,<sup>1</sup> told me that the Ambassador,

<sup>1</sup> It was announced in Tokyo on Nov. 5 that Saburo Kurusu, former Japanese Ambassador in Belgium and Germany, would be sent to Washington to assist Ambassador Nomura in the negotiations. Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. iv, pp. 566-567.

Admiral Nomura, had asked that an experienced career diplomat be sent to aid him in the present difficult situation. The press and public opinion throughout the world had made optimistic comments in connection with it. He did not share this optimism, because the disagreements between Japan and the United States were very great. He could not, unfortunately, tell me anything at present about the details of Kurusu's instructions. He would, however, sum up his personal assumptions about the future by saying that it might soon become necessary to strengthen the cooperation with Germany and Italy.

I replied to the Japanese Foreign Minister that Ambassador Kurusu had undoubtedly also received instructions to give a warning, as promised by the Japanese Government, against any continuation by Roosevelt on the path of aggression.<sup>2</sup> Togo answered that he had in the meantime studied the matter and found that his predecessor had failed to issue the statement in question. (Seven groups garbled or missing, correction requested) he had taken note of the German wish but had to take into account the total situation at the moment. A firm attitude on the part of Japan would be more important than a mere warning to the Americans, the effect of which appeared to him to be doubtful, and such an attitude was reflected in the instructions to Kurusu. This much could be said: for his negotiations with the United States definite limits had been imposed on him which he could not exceed.

The dispatch of Kurusu was decided upon only recently, as I have learned confidentially and as is proved by his precipitate departure. In the long Cabinet discussions about which I have reported<sup>3</sup> the opinion which prevailed in the end was that an attempt, described as final, should be made to come to a peaceful agreement with the United States. In that connection the advocates of an understanding no doubt aimed to gain time, however short, and to obtain an element of reassurance for the coming session of the Diet.

The fact that Kurusu accepted the mission indicates that he did not consider the undertaking altogether hopeless from the outset, although the instructions contained substantive limitations (especially in the China question) and presumably also time limits for the leader of the negotiations. The fact that before he was sent, the Privy Council met for a 20-(twenty-) minute session under the chairmanship of the Emperor shows further that the government felt that need to assure itself of support. The fact that the press emphasizes that Kurusu is supposed to have played an important role in the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact also points in that direction. Since

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 359.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram No. 2331 of Nov. 5 (82/60813-14). In this telegram Ott also forwarded "with reservations" various kinds of information from Japanese Navy circles regarding certain steps included by the Japanese.

the Army and the Navy, as in the past, can hardly accept the demands of the United States with regard to China, I would view the chances of this importunate gesture, too, with skepticism.<sup>4</sup>

Ott

<sup>4</sup>This telegram crossed with Ribbentrop's telegram No. 2029 of Nov. 7 (82/60815) directing Ott to inquire at the Japanese Foreign Ministry about the Kurusu mission and to remind the Japanese Foreign Minister of Germany's view "that a strong attitude taken by Japan with respect to the United States was the only correct policy which would certainly not fail to have a sobering effect on Washington."

Ott replied in telegram No. 2373 of Nov. 8 (82/60823) referring to his report which is printed here and stating that he had carried out the instruction with Deputy Foreign Minister Nishi who assured him that Kurusu had been instructed "to adopt a firm attitude and not to allow himself to be intimidated by any threats."

## No. 452

71/50902-05

### *Memorandum by Minister Grobba*

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, November 6, 1941.

Subject: Arrival of the Grand Mufti; German-Italian statement on the independence of the Arab peoples.

The Grand Mufti arrived at 12:00 noon today. He was accompanied by the Italian Counselor, Alberto Mellini Ponce de Leon, and the latter's wife. The Grand Mufti's secretary, Dr. Abu Ganime, will arrive tomorrow and another secretary, Safwat, will probably arrive the day after tomorrow.

The Grand Mufti was greeted at the station by Counselor Melchers, Consul Falkenstein, Secretary of Legation Kutscher (Protocol), Secretary of Legation Dr. Kaspar (Radio Department), and Herr Steffen (Press), besides me.

The Grand Mufti, Signor Mellini and his wife, and Herr Falkenstein are lodged in the Bellevue Castle. Minister Hinrichs waited there for the Grand Mufti and greeted him on behalf of Minister of State Meissner, who himself called on him at 1:15 p.m.

At the welcoming ceremony I informed the Grand Mufti that the Foreign Minister would be happy to receive him. The Grand Mufti expressed his sincere thanks for this message.

The Grand Mufti talked to me about his rather adventurous flight from Iran and his discussions with Count Ciano and the Duce on the German-Italian declaration regarding the independence of the Arab peoples, the German translation of which was transmitted to us by the Embassy in Rome.<sup>1</sup>

Regarding his flight from Iran the Grand Mufti said more than once that he had at first attempted to leave Iran with German help

and a German passport, and that Minister Ettel had gone to much trouble in connection with his flight. Unfortunately, however, the Germans in Iran were at that time subject to such strict surveillance that his flight with a German passport had been impossible. During the last period Minister Ettel had been very occupied with the care for his colony. He [the Grand Mufti] had thus felt compelled to accept help from the Italians. In Italy it had been suggested to him that the center of his activity be set up there. He had told Count Ciano, however, that he wanted to have two centers, Rome and Berlin. He added that he was fully aware that Germany was of greater military and political importance than Italy and that the misgivings of the entire Arab world regarding Italian intentions also stood in the way of close cooperation of Arab circles with Italy.

He made the following points as regards the draft of a German-Italian declaration transmitted from Rome with the enclosed telegram:

Regarding point 1: He had expressed the wish that, besides "for their freedom," the statement should also say "and their complete independence." Count Ciano, however, had objected to that wording.

Regarding point 2: He had requested that the readiness of the Axis Powers to bring about the unity of the Arab countries also be expressed, but Count Ciano had stated that he was not in favor of that either. However, the last point in particular was extremely important for propaganda reasons, because the achievement of unity was precisely the main point of the Arab program.

Signor Mellini then spoke with me regarding the wording of the declaration and said that he was instructed to report to Rome if Germany concurred in this declaration or desired any changes. As soon as agreement about the declaration was reached, the Italian Government would propose that it be published simultaneously in Rome and Berlin.

With regard to the changes desired by the Grand Mufti, which he knew about, he stated the following:

Regarding (1): The Italian Government would prefer that the present wording be retained, since the Egyptians would interpret the reference to "complete independence" as including them; the Italian Government did not want this. Nevertheless, should the Grand Mufti insist on the mention of complete independence, the Italian Government would not allow the declaration to fail on that account.

Regarding (2): The Italian Government had nothing against a unified Arab state consisting of the countries of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Transjordan. The expression "countries of the Near East" was understood by it to refer to these five countries only and not to Egypt and the Sudan. On the assumption that the German Government concurred with this view, the Italian Government would

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 449.



agree to having the "unity of the Arab countries" mentioned in some form or other. It would, however, prefer a somewhat vague wording, because differences of opinion still existed between the individual Arab leaders with regard to the way this unity is to be worked out. In reply to my question whether the Italian Government would be prepared to recognize the "right of the Arab countries of the Near East to obtain a unity in accordance with their wishes," Signor Mellini said that it would.

The Grand Mufti also agrees to such a wording and proposes that in the French text<sup>2</sup> under (2) "*les Anglais*" be followed by "*et leur droit d'avoir une unité d'après leurs désirs.*" Thus, agreement seems to be possible on this point.<sup>3</sup>

The Grand Mufti attaches great importance to being received by the Führer. Since the statement is based on an exchange of views between the Duce and the Führer, he would be especially grateful if the Führer would express his approval of the proposed statement to him personally, as the Duce had done. Moreover, he hopes that his reception by the Führer will have a great propaganda effect on the entire Arab world and, beyond that, the Islamic world. Signor Mellini strongly recommends that the Grand Mufti be received by the Führer and points out in that connection that, after the reception of the Grand Mufti by the Duce, his reception by the Führer would silence all rumors of differences of opinion between Germany and Italy on the Arab question.

Submitted herewith through the Dirigent to the Under State Secretary, Political Department, and the State Secretary.

GROBBA

<sup>2</sup> A complete French text of the declaration (71/50907) as well as a partial Italian text (71/50906) are attached to this memorandum.

<sup>3</sup> Further changes in the text of this declaration were discussed by the Foreign Ministry in Berlin with the Grand Mufti and the Italian Counselor of Legation Mellini. They are dealt with in the following communications between the Foreign Ministry and the Embassy in Italy: Woermann telegram No. 3021 of Nov. 8 (2281/482672); Rome telegram No. 2864 of Nov. 10 (2281/482673); Rome telegram No. 2903 of Nov. 13 (2281/482674-79); Woermann telegram No. 3131 of Nov. 19 (2281/482683-84); Rome telegram No. 3142 of Nov. 20 (2281/482688-89); Rome T 3039 of Nov. 22 (2281/482690); Woermann T 3167 of Nov. 22 (2281/482691). See, further, document No. 494, footnote 4.

## No. 453

481/231238

*Memorandum by an Official of the Embassy in Spain*

MADRID, November 6, 1941.

The recruiting of Spanish workers for Germany has come to a complete standstill, because:

1. The Spanish authority, which under the German-Spanish agreement is to cosign the separate work contracts, has thus far not been appointed;

2. So far no funds of any sort have been provided by Spanish quarters for financing the trip to Germany,<sup>1</sup> which under the agreement concluded is to be paid, along with clothing, by the Spanish side.<sup>2</sup>

The German commission for recruiting the workers has now been in Spain for 10 weeks, without a single worker having left for Germany. From various credible sources it has become known that English propaganda has already made appropriate capital out of this delay.<sup>3</sup>

The technical preparations for the recruitment and departure of the workers have been concluded for several weeks; in particular, the transportation questions have been regulated up to and including the determination of the travel timetables, which have already been printed.

Spanish quarters justify the delay on the grounds that a formal resolution by the Ministerial Council sanctioning the preparations made is still lacking.

I propose that on the occasion of the press luncheon taking place this noon Serrano Suñer be asked once more about the above matter.

STILLE

<sup>1</sup> Marginal note in Stohrer's handwriting: "See my memorandum of yesterday."

In this memorandum (481/231237), actually dated Nov. 4, Stohrer records that he had emphasized to Serrano Suñer the need of funds for recruiting and clothing workers for Germany and for the payment of the families who remained in Spain.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 231 and footnote 2.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 380 and footnote 2.

## No. 454

100/65444-54

*Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler*<sup>1</sup>

ROME, November 6, 1941/XIX.

FÜHRER: I thank you, Führer, sincerely for the very interesting letter which you have sent me,<sup>2</sup> and hasten to reply. I, too, believe that Bolshevism is crushed and incapable of any recovery even if it should succeed in establishing a "front" on the Ural Mountains or

<sup>1</sup> The document printed here is a translation from an Italian copy which has an unsigned marginal note "Text of final draft." The German translation, which is not fully legible, has been filmed on F10/175-189.

In telegram No. 2784 of Nov. 4 (1517/372929) Mackensen reported that he saw Ciano who had just come from a visit with Mussolini who showed him the draft of the letter. Mussolini had written the political part of the letter in his own hand. The military-technical part was based on staff work. A clean copy of the letter was to be prepared in Ciano's office.

<sup>2</sup> Of Oct. 29, document No. 433.

beyond. American and English aid will fail to alter the fact already accomplished, by which I mean the annihilation of their Bolshevik ally.

Before proceeding to a review of the military situation in the Mediterranean in particular, I should like to set forth to you some of my thoughts.

a) It is my conviction that America will intervene in the war and, this time again with an expeditionary corps, to be based in Egypt. This is logical. I am in possession of a cable intercepted by my service, announcing the arrival at Cairo of a mission headed by General Maxwell.<sup>3</sup> An American news agency, the Associated Press, states that one of the purposes of the mission is "to study the climatic, sanitary, and logistical conditions in connection with the possible dispatch of an American expeditionary corps to Africa. The mission will be comprised of several hundred officers and technicians." It is becoming increasingly evident that the British Empire will either defend itself or be destroyed in Egypt, the backbone of the British Empire and the link between three continents.

b) Given this situation, the trump card that we must seek to play has been and still is Turkey. The latest speech of the President of the Republic<sup>4</sup> could not have been pleasing to the English. It is obvious that with the control of the Black Sea and with the annihilation of the Bolshevik fleet, Turkey must finally make a decision. It is only with Turkey as an ally or an associate, I believe, that it would be possible in 1942 to bring off the pincer movement that would eliminate England's political and military position in the Middle East. This too would have far-reaching effects in the Far East.

c) With Russia beaten and thus once and for all ejected from Europe, the war will shift to the eastern Mediterranean and will absorb tremendous resources. Let me say at this point, Führer, that Italy's manpower and industrial plant are not as yet sufficiently utilized. For lack of raw materials we work only at 40 to 60 percent of our capacity. That is a negative element in the struggle of the Axis.

d) Full utilization of our industrial potential would enable us to participate in the military operations with larger forces. We have millions of men and it is not just that Italy should wage war on a scale not proportionate to its demographic resources. I must tell you, Führer, that this is distressing to the Italian people. The Italian people are aware of the objective difficulties due to the enormous distances of the fronts, but it is equally true that they desire to make a larger contribution to the war effort. That would be the best means

<sup>3</sup> See *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. III, pp. 314-315.

<sup>4</sup> Papen reported on the speech in telegram No. 1364 of Nov. 1 (265/173370-72).

of cutting short all enemy speculations about a separate peace, etc., etc. The nations fighting today at our side cannot sustain a prolonged effort. Germany should not have to bear almost completely the major sacrifice, that is the sacrifice of blood. The time is past for partial, semisymbolical participation. In the operations envisaged in 1942, Italy has the duty and, I should add, the right to bring a greater effort to bear. I do believe, Führer, that you will make it possible for us to do this.

I fully agree with you that the English may attempt some strikes for the purpose of gaining some local successes, especially with a view to home propaganda. I have on my part taken all the necessary precautions in this regard with respect to Pantelleria and also Lampedusa, which might be attractive objectives for the English because of the fact that we are now constructing a runway there. I have also taken appropriate measures for Sicily and for Sardinia. In Sicily, forces and material have been increased; in Sardinia the disposition of troops and material have been made more efficient, while the air units have also been reinforced on both islands.

The possibility of a landing at the Tunisian-Libyan border has also been envisaged and adequate measures have been taken. As regards the Bizerte-Tunis area, I believe that any landing in that area would be possible only with the full consent of the French command, because the approaches are strongly defended and the greater part of the Tunisian garrison is concentrated there. If such a landing should occur, we would have to expect an attack on Tunisia by the combined English and French North African forces; this would seriously imperil our hold on Tripolitania, where our garrisons are sparse because of the need of concentrating the maximum of material and forces at the Cyrenaica front. Adequate reinforcement of Tripolitania is planned and can be carried out next spring. This depends, of course, on the availability of transport. I shall presently revert to this problem which you, Führer, have yourself alluded to in your letter.

Mindful of the persistent rumors of the possible attempt by de Gaulle to make a landing in Corsica, we have strengthened the countermeasures already taken some time ago.<sup>5</sup> This possibility must be given close attention, if only by way of precaution, particularly because in addition to the previously reported presence of special landing equipment at Gibraltar, intelligence has been received that General de Gaulle would shortly transfer his headquarters to Gibraltar. The various reports also mention a possible landing in Morocco; in any case, as regards Corsica, I have directed that we will have to proceed against possible convoys with quickly operating naval forces and with

<sup>5</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 65, footnote 4. See further, document No. 433, footnote 1 in this volume.

powerful air attacks from Sardinia, whereby the air forces in Sardinia could also be reinforced from Sicily. In addition, landing forces with the necessary equipment are also held in readiness. I believe, however, that a landing should not be resorted to except as an extreme necessity, if only in consideration of the possible repercussion such action might have on French North Africa.

This complex of precautionary measures was also necessary to permit us to concentrate all our attention on Libya, which is the main problem. That problem, as you have so astutely observed, Führer, is essentially one of transport. It is first of all necessary to have the required means available for these transports, and in this connection I can inform you that early next year we shall have available a certain number of fast ships which will afford us more freedom of movement and maneuver while en route. At this time we are still obliged to rely largely on ships with a speed of eight knots, and this restricts our movements to the course west of Malta, which is most vulnerable to enemy naval and aerial attacks. Once the steamers with an average speed of 16 knots are available, it will be possible to use for the most part the eastern route, which is farther removed from the range of enemy attacks by sea and by air and which is better adapted to evasive movements.

At the present stage of the war it is certain that the English command has intensified and will continue to intensify the attacks against our convoys, employing at sea surface vessels in addition to the submarines, which are in constantly increasing numbers. Four British naval units are based at Malta at present and we are making efforts to hit them by aerial attacks. An attack on our shipping made by surface vessels last April succeeded in sinking an entire convoy. This makes it necessary from now on to protect convoys by increasing significantly the naval escorts with cruisers, and even by the employment of battleships. Shipping operations across the Mediterranean become in this way a military operation in the fullest sense. Such protection afforded by substantial naval units can be coordinated on a large scale with, but not replaced by, aerial protection. This, therefore, brings into focus with utmost urgency the problem of naphtha.

With respect to this I have taken the liberty, Führer, of forwarding to you through the intermediary of General von Rintelen, a report on our situation<sup>6</sup> and to request your assistance, without which we would be unable even before the end of November to continue these shipping operations to Libya. Without your assistance, Führer, we should within a month have been defenseless against an enemy whose

<sup>6</sup> This report has not been found.

aggressiveness and resources are constantly mounting. And so I express to you my sincere thanks for what you consented to do.

General von Rintelen has informed me that we shall receive 66,000 tons of naphtha during November, 30,000 coming from the reserves of the German Navy, and 36,000 from Rumania, and that the delivery will be made during the month of December. General von Rintelen has also offered the dispatch of some of your chemists for the purpose of investigating the possibility of reclaiming the oil residues at the bottoms of storage tanks. I am exceedingly grateful to you also for this arrangement by which we would be enabled to recover a substantial quantity of combustible oil and which could speed the efforts which we are ourselves undertaking in that field. As you have so well observed, Führer, the problem of the war in the Mediterranean is the problem of naphtha. If we are successful in overcoming this difficulty, which will certainly continue into the late part of next spring, that is, when we shall be able to obtain larger supplies of this valuable material, I maintain that there can be no doubt as to the final outcome of the battles in the Mediterranean.

It is needless to assure you, Führer, that the expenditure of that naphtha, to be narrowly restricted to the needs of the armed forces, will be made with the exercise of the greatest economy and vigilance under the watchful control of the Supreme Command, which concerns itself directly with this matter.

As regards antiaircraft protection, I appreciate, Führer, what you have proposed to me. The German X Air Corps, reinforced and employed for the particular mission which you assign to it, will render decisive services in the eastern Mediterranean and in Cyrenaica. As to the operations sector of southern Italy, Sicily, and Tripolitania, the Italian Air Force is carrying out that mission in an ever more satisfactory manner, and I am convinced that the dispatch of an additional German Air Corps to southern Italy and the islands will give us an overwhelming superiority over the enemy, and will also result in the neutralization of Malta. I am grateful to you for sending to Italy the brave Marshal Kesselring; I had the pleasure of making his acquaintance at the eastern front and many of our fliers know him not only by renown but also in person, by having seen him operating on the western front.

With respect to the Italian Air Force, I appreciate, Führer, your commendation by underscoring the success which it has recently won against the naval and air forces of the enemy.

In compliance with your request I have immediately directed the Air Force General Staff to get in touch with the Reichsmarschall.

In the matter of transport vessels we shall soon, as I have told you, have a certain number of fast ships at our disposal. They are, however, still of the order of 9,000 to 10,000 tons, while it is advisable to have ships of a lighter class. I have therefore directed that a program be initiated for the construction of ships of lesser capacity, canceling a portion of the program for larger ships, which have not yet been laid down. Construction of the ships in question can be started in January or February; they will be built on lines applying the most rigorous economy and with a minimum use of special materials. The construction period will be about 6 months. The material available for this purpose, however, is exceedingly short; we shall not be able to commission more than 50,000 tons of shipping space. A temporary increase of raw materials destined exclusively for this construction program would be more than desirable, and in fact absolutely indispensable.

The utilization of the ports and landing places in Libya is a matter of continuous and careful study by the appropriate agencies. The German Admiral attached to the Italian Naval Operations Staff<sup>7</sup> is following these studies and efforts, and participates directly in them. The construction of narrow-gauge field railroads has been under study for some time, also in response to the suggestion of your Command in Cyrenaica, and we are now ready to get it started provided it is possible to make shipment of the necessary material which you are making available to us, as you have so kindly informed me, Führer, and for which I thank you.

I am also very grateful to you, Führer, for having decided to provide the German Africa Corps with new antitank weapons and a substantial reserve of III and IV tanks. I have been informed that the antitank weapons will be transported directly from Germany by air. As regards the tanks, we shall make every effort to speed their shipment by sea.

Also as regards coal we are in a tight situation because the few reserves at our disposal are exhausted and the insufficient arrival of naphtha necessitates an increase in the consumption of solid fuel. But with the fuel oil problem about to be solved thanks to your intervention, we still remain under the necessity of receiving every month at least the total requirement of coal, set at 1,050,000 tons per month, plus a minimum of an additional 150,000 tons, according to a

<sup>7</sup> Eberhard Weichold.

standing request which your competent agencies have not been able to approve before now.<sup>8</sup>

Before closing this letter, I should like to give you a sketch of Italy's internal situation. I know that, especially after my visit to your General Headquarters—a visit which has left an indelible impression on my mind—currency has been given, also in Germany, to many rumors which are not only without foundation but simply ridiculous. The enemy propaganda has once more furnished proof of its stupidity. The "facts" have an irrefutable eloquence of their own and the actuality demonstrates that the measure taken by my Government in recent times have left the entire Italian people in perfect tranquility. And the measures are very stringent if you recall that the *basic* ration of bread is 200 grams a day, that of fats is at a monthly rate of 400 grams, and that of meat at a monthly rate of 400 grams, but practically nil in thousands of communities; 500 grams of sugar a month, and 1,000 grams of potatoes a month. But this austere food rationing system does not cause me undue concern. The *material* living standard of the Italian people has always been more than modest; it cannot be otherwise if you recall, Führer, that for every square kilometer of Italian territory there is a population of 142. In regard to the question of consumption I feel so reassured that I have announced that the food ration system will also be continued after the war and become permanent so as to establish a balance between consumption and production.

In the political area the party has complete control of the situation. That in a country of nearly 46 million inhabitants there should be a few tens of thousands of adversaries is more than understandable, but these splinters are of practically no account and are of no interest to political affairs but only to the police.

The thinking majority of the Italian people follows with admiration the feats of your armed forces, is determined to march at the side of Germany during the war and after, and, as I have told you above, wishes more than anything else to make a larger contribution to what will be the common victory.

Accept, Führer, the hearty expression of my comradely friendship and fidelity, in the hope to meet you as soon as possible on Italian soil.

MUSSOLINI

<sup>8</sup> In telegram Del. No. 1 of Aug. 31 (4877/E253172-73) the Embassy in Italy transmitted and supported a request of the Italian Government for an additional 50,000 tons of coal. See also vol. XII of this series, documents Nos. 641 and 652.

In a memorandum of Nov. 18 (1517/372977-80) Clodius reported a conversation with Alfieri who stressed the requests of the Duce regarding fuel oil and coal.

In a memorandum of Nov. 29 (1517/373004-06) Clodius lists production and transport difficulties as reasons why an increase of coal deliveries could not be accomplished.

## No. 455

77/58298-301

*The Ambassador in Spain to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 3890 of November 6

MADRID, November 7, 1941—1:00 a. m.

Received November 7—2:50 a. m.

With reference to our telegram No. 3792 of October 30.<sup>1</sup>

The presence of General Orgaz, the Spanish High Commissioner in Morocco, provided an opportunity for a detailed discussion of the propaganda situation in Morocco. First there was an exchange of views between the Foreign Minister, General Orgaz, Counselor of Embassy Lazar, and me, at a dinner at my house; then I called on both General Orgaz and the Foreign Minister, in order to discuss once more the whole complex of questions in detail.

The result of this discussion: Orgaz at first took the stand that all foreign propaganda in the Moroccan area of Spain was undesirable and had to be prevented. Vigorous objections were expressed against this tendency of equating German with English propaganda, and these objections were successful.

Orgaz accordingly agreed to the following proposal:

1. Encouragement of German propaganda activity if it does not involve propaganda among the natives that is harmful to Spanish interests;
2. The combating of English propaganda by official and practical means so far as possible.

*Re 1.* The Foreign Minister and Orgaz declared themselves in agreement with the establishment of an agency of the Press Division of the Embassy at the Consulate in Tangier, and the publication of a news bulletin in Arabic.

*Re 2.* General Orgaz, as well as the Foreign Minister, were well informed about English propaganda methods in the Spanish Zone and Tangier. The Spanish Government is protesting to the British Embassy against the inadmissible channeling and dissemination of abusive English propaganda material through English Consulates in Morocco. Orgaz is trying to fight the distribution of English propaganda material with police methods. He also wants to introduce a preliminary censorship of the sensational English *Tangier Gazette*.

I received considerable support from the Foreign Minister in achieving the triumph of our point of view.

<sup>1</sup> In this telegram (77/58295-97) Stohrer reported about extensive American and British propaganda efforts in Tangier and Spanish Morocco, his protests to the Spanish High Commissioner, and the lack of official German propaganda in this area.

In reply to the complaint of General Orgaz concerning German meddling in indigenous policy, and concerning unsupervised German propaganda activity altogether (see previous telegram), I stated:

I shall completely reject all German propaganda activity that is not directed or ordered by the representative of the Reich. The Embassy itself will take all measures to prevent all unauthorized German propaganda. The elimination of any initiative taken from an unauthorized direction will promote harmonious collaboration between the representation of the Reich and the Spanish authorities with a view to the development of the propaganda in Morocco directed or ordered by the former.

Even assuming the best will of the Spanish authorities and a systematic German propaganda, possibilities for exerting German influence in Morocco must not be overestimated. Englishmen, with the support of Americans, are working with a tremendous outlay of money. They have rich Jewish elements entirely on their side and through bribes and food deliveries exert extensive influence in international and indigenous circles.

To supplement our propaganda in Spanish Morocco, it seems to me—as I have repeatedly reported—<sup>2</sup> that a considerable expansion of our missions in the Spanish Zone and Tangier is absolutely necessary. As I reported, Orgaz has at various times pointed out to me (clear text missing) to which of our Consulates, particularly Tangier, compared to the Missions of other powers, hardly make themselves felt. In order to remedy this condition, I repeat my request for an increase in personnel, the assignment of at least one Military Attaché or military observer to the Consulate in Tangier. The elevation of the Consulate in Tangier to the rank of a Consulate General is likewise desirable, because all other countries represented there, even small ones, maintain Consulates General, whose chiefs moreover have the title of Minister (the U. S. Mission even calls itself a Legation). I also consider it absolutely necessary to provide the Consul at Tangier especially with considerable financial resources in order that he may be enabled to perform the necessary functions of representation, etc., on a par with those of the other Consuls General. Consul General Noehring at Tangier is in an especially difficult situation, because, although the former Legation property was returned, the house is uninhabitable (dilapidated and unfurnished). Noehring would, therefore, have to receive funds to rent another representative building and live in the proper style. For the representative of Greater Germany in Tangier to continue in this Cinderella-like existence is, in my opinion, impossible in this oriental milieu, in which outward appearances count for so much.

<sup>2</sup> Stohrer had asked for such an expansion in telegram No. 2571 of July 30 (77/58279) and telegram No. 3187 of Sept. 15 (77/58292).

General Orgaz has asked Counselor of Embassy Lazar to come to Morocco for his personal orientation. He will accept this invitation as soon as possible.

I should be grateful if, upon submission of the report of Counselor of Embassy Lazar<sup>3</sup> concerning press conditions in Morocco, Consul General Noehring were summoned to Berlin for discussion of further details.

STOHRER

<sup>3</sup> This report has not been found.

No. 456

1517/372932-33

*The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

SECRET

No. 2828 of November 7

ROME, November 7, 1941—9:05 p. m.  
Received November 7—12:00 midnight.

On my visit today in connection with some other business (cf. my telegram No. 2824 of today's date<sup>1</sup>), Count Ciano received me with the remark that he had had the intention of summoning me for the purpose of bringing to the attention of my Government a matter that was somewhat disturbing to the Duce. It concerned the Mitrovica territory which because of its mineral resources had at the time of the discussions between him and the Reich Foreign Minister in Vienna<sup>2</sup> been in fact assigned to the future rump Serbia, despite its purely Albanian character. It was not his intention by any means to reopen the basic question of that award, the less so because he remembered that the Reich Foreign Minister had on that occasion in Vienna been very firm on the subject. But Ciano could not help saying, however, that a gesture of the Führer, giving Mitrovica to its original country, Albania, would make a very profound impression both over there and here in Italy. I reacted to this remark merely by saying that it had been my impression in Vienna that the arrangements made at that time were to have definitive character. Count Ciano then read to me a very long report from the Governor General of Albania, Jacomini, giving an account to the Government here of certain developments in the Mitrovica territory, which, if correct, would fill the Duce's mind with uneasiness.<sup>3</sup> They referred essentially to the fact that the local German military authorities, endeavoring to organize an effective administrative machinery and having no

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (2281/482633).

<sup>2</sup> See vol. XII of this series, documents Nos. 378 and 385.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *The Ciano Diaries*, entry for Nov. 7, 1941.

Serbs available in view of the purely Albanian character of the territory, were relying on Albanians and, on top of that, anti-Italian Albanian emigrants for the most part. They [the emigrants], as the report related, were supposed to establish some sort of autonomous political entity under German sovereignty, which was envisioned to form a rallying point for all of Albania. The government of this state-like territory would subsequently be turned over to the son of the ex-Prince of Albania, Prinz Wied. The report further asserted that the militia, which is composed of Albanians, was to take its oath to the Führer in the near future, and also related that an official of the Foreign Ministry, whose name is given as Feninger, had recently arrived there to put the measures described into appropriate form.

Ciano added to his statement that he was not unduly worried by these reports and that he had therefore suggested to the Duce that he discuss them with the Reich Foreign Minister orally at their next meeting. The Duce had nevertheless instructed him to bring the matter to my immediate attention.

May I request that I be furnished with instructions.<sup>4</sup>

MACKENSEN

<sup>4</sup> Document No. 497.

No. 457

1517/372934

*The State Secretary to the Embassy in Italy*

Telegram

No. [3018]<sup>1</sup>

BERLIN, November 7, 1941.  
[Sent November 8.]  
e.o. Pol IV . . .

The Foreign Ministry is being deluged with mutual accusations from both Rumanian and Hungarian quarters. The Hungarian Minister has stated here that Rumanian-Hungarian relations have reached a critical stage.<sup>2</sup> There are statements of the same sort from Bucharest, too. We do not believe, to be sure, that any military action by Rumania against Hungary, for which there are no indications of any sort is imminent. Still, the development of Rumanian-Hungarian relations causes concern. We would be interested in knowing here whether the Italian Government is also constantly being confronted

<sup>1</sup> The file copy of this document is a draft; the telegram number and the date of dispatch are supplied from Rome telegram No. 2863 of Nov. 10 (1517/372946-47) which was the reply to this instruction.

<sup>2</sup> Weizsäcker's memorandum, St.S No. 734, of Nov. 6 (93/104353-54) records a discussion on this topic with Sztójay, the Hungarian Minister.

with mutual Hungarian and Rumanian complaints, and whether it has any ideas of how a settlement might be brought about. We here have, of course, adhered firmly to the Vienna Award and have given both parties clearly to understand that we consider intolerable any disturbing of the accord between the allies fighting against Bolshevism.

Wire your report.<sup>3</sup>

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>3</sup> In his reply (see footnote 1) Mackensen stated that, according to Anfuso, the Italians were indeed receiving constantly Rumanian and Hungarian complaints; Ciano had now intimated to Bismarck that he would welcome German proposals on how to cope with these difficulties.

No. 458

32/25031-35

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan*<sup>1</sup>

No. 2047 of November 9      BERLIN, November 9, 1941—11:30 p.m.<sup>2</sup>  
Pol. VIII 1630.

Drafting Officer: Counselor Schumburg.

From the reports of the German Embassy in Washington, particularly of the Military Attaché during the last 2 months, the following appraisal of American-Japanese relations emerges:

1. American propaganda is operating with respect to Japan with the crude weapons of intimidation or threats, obviously not without success. For example, the Japanese Embassy in Washington and its Armed Forces Attachés have reported to Tokyo that in the event Japanese policy in the Far East is activated, armed intervention by the United States can unquestionably be expected.<sup>3</sup> American propaganda emphasizes Japanese anxieties about raw materials and stresses American military superiority in the Pacific. Pointing to the armament capacity of the United States the press there warns the Japanese against intervening in the conflict on the side of the Axis. The American press studiously avoids carrying reports of Japanese activity

<sup>1</sup> It appears from a Woermann minute of Nov. 4 (82/60809) that Ribbentrop himself had requested that this instruction be drafted, suggesting the use of reports from Washington, especially from the Military Attaché, which made the point "that the present situation was especially favorable for the realization of Japan's political aspirations in the Far East."

<sup>2</sup> The typed date on the document is Nov. 6. The telegram number and the time of dispatch are entered on this copy by hand.

<sup>3</sup> In a memorandum of Nov. 7 (82/60825-26) Counselor Braun recorded that Ushiba, Secretary of the Japanese Embassy, after communicating the contents of a recent telegram from Ambassador Nomura in Washington had commented that "this report from Washington indicated for the first time a change in Ambassador Nomura's appraisal of the American conditions; heretofore Ambassador Nomura had always considered America's entry into the war as imminent."

against Thailand or Indochina, for example, but on the other hand regularly disseminates reports on the strengthening of the American or the British position in the Far East.

2. In reality, this big talk merely masks the fear that Japan may perceive the weak side of the American position and, dropping the restrained and compromising attitude of the Konoye Cabinet, proceed to activate her policy in the Far East. The American Government is anxiously observing the increasingly plain signs of a Russian collapse, which a Japanese intervention could accelerate to such an extent that any hope of delaying a direct German attack on the British position in the Middle East, possibly in connection with a simultaneous Japanese attack on Singapore, would become illusory. If the Russian front should collapse, however, the American-British war potential would not be able at present to cope with such a concentrated German-Japanese operation.

3. It is already evident from statistically verified information from the Embassy that the American armaments industry is totally unable to furnish the British ally anywhere near the promised quantity of war material, in addition to supplying the Russian front, and at the same time to bring the nation's own armaments up to a level that would in the foreseeable future make a two-front war in the Atlantic and the Pacific possible. From reliable information it is obvious, for example, that in the period from March to August America exported only one-tenth of the war material planned for.

4. The difficulty of transporting by sea these fragmented war deliveries to the British and Russian fronts forces the American Government to avoid a conflict with Japan in the Pacific at all costs, especially because the Japanese fleet could also in the event of conflict prevent the entry of raw materials from India (manganese) vital to the American war industry. As long as Russian resistance had not been broken, the American Government took an unyielding attitude toward the Konoye Cabinet. In view of its inability to supply the Russian front adequately it will now, to be sure, be inclined to make greater concessions to Japan, but these could never meet Japan's needs for living space.

5. Japan should therefore not fail to act when the moment is favorable. Perhaps never in history has a state been so favored by fate as Japan is at this hour. Japan can now, without the risk of armed American intervention, hazard any thrust in the area of the East, as long as American territories (the Philippines) or ~~American basis for raw materials (Netherlands Indies)~~<sup>4</sup> are not affected by such an action. The American armaments industry is in the process of development and is not in a position to satisfy the requirements of the

<sup>4</sup> The words scored through were deleted before the telegram was sent.

British, Russian, and Chinese, in addition to the nation's own needs, on any thing like the necessary scale. The American Navy is already tied down in the Atlantic to such an extent that no Japanese action need reckon any longer with the intervention of superior American naval units. The American naval bases in Hawaii and in the Philippines are not yet built up sufficiently to make a major American naval operation safe.

I request that you use the above account of the state of American-Japanese relations in speaking with influential Japanese and transmit the same instruction also to Ambassador Stahmer upon his arrival.<sup>5</sup>

RIBBENTROP

<sup>5</sup>In the telegram forwarded to Tokyo as No. 1856 of Oct. 17 (191/138887) Ribbentrop had notified Ott that Stahmer was about to depart for Nanking to assume his post there as Ambassador to the Japanese-sponsored Chinese Government and that he had been instructed to call on Ott and jointly with him get in touch with the Japanese politicians with whom he was acquainted.

No. 459

62/42403-4

*The Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Foreign Minister*

Teletype

URGENT

BERLIN, November 10, 1941.

Dir. Ha. Pol. 216.

Ha. Pol. VI 3267<sup>1</sup> Ang. II.

To the Special Train

Subject: Revaluation of the Danish crown.

The Danish Government has renewed its pressing demand for our approval of a revaluation of the Danish crown. The same proposal has several times been unanimously rejected by all interested Ministries, most recently half a year ago. The Danes were told in this connection that revaluation of the crown could be discussed in the framework of the plan for a German-Danish customs and currency union, which we promoted after the occupation of Denmark, but which the latter rejected.<sup>2</sup>

The strain on the Danish economy has meanwhile been so aggravated by the outlays for the occupation forces and our debt in the clearing with Denmark that inflationary tendencies, similar to those in the

<sup>1</sup>Ha. Pol. VI 3267: This was a circular letter of Oct. 28 (3182/695876-80) from the Chairman of the German Governmental Committee for German-Danish Trade to the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Economics, and the Reichsbank regarding past Danish requests for a revaluation of the Danish currency and subsequent German refusals.

<sup>2</sup>See vol. x of this series, document No. 268 and footnote 5, and document No. 382.

Balkan countries, can now be discerned. To be sure, despite the sharp rise in prices it has been possible to keep wages on a fairly stable level, but unless drastic steps are taken to prevent a further decline in the living standard of the workers, it will be impossible any longer to prevent also a rise in wages. The proposed revaluation of the crown is regarded as necessary within the framework of such measures. If the incipient inflation cannot be checked by such measures, we must expect social unrest in Denmark and a development similar to that in Rumania, for example, which would also gravely affect German interests (deliveries of essential food products, war contracts placed in Denmark).

For these reasons the Ministry of Economics, the Reichsbank, and also the Ministry of Food, contrary to their earlier position, stated at the deliberations of the Commercial Policy Committee that they would approve revaluation of the crown up to 15 percent.<sup>3</sup> The Office of the Four Year Plan and the Ministry of Finance on the other hand raised certain objections and I have reserved stating the position of the Foreign Ministry until later. Decision of the matter will be held over until the next conference, which will be held next Wednesday.<sup>4</sup>

In consideration of the arguments in favor of revaluation of the crown advanced in Germany's interest, and taking into account Denmark's internal political development, the Department for German Internal Affairs of the Foreign Ministry will raise no objection to the proposal. The Legation in Copenhagen likewise recommends approval.<sup>5</sup>

In the event that the domestic Ministries at the next conference should unanimously approve revaluation of the crown at a rate that would have to be negotiated with the Danes, I request authorization for approving revaluation also on behalf of the Foreign Ministry.

To be submitted herewith through the State Secretary to the Foreign Minister with the request for approval.<sup>6</sup>

WIEHL

<sup>3</sup>A record of the meeting of the Commercial Policy Committee of Nov. 6 has been filmed on 3182/695898-901.

<sup>4</sup>This was Nov. 12. No record of this meeting has been found.

<sup>5</sup>In Copenhagen telegram No. 1453 of Nov. 10 (62/42405-08).

<sup>6</sup>A reply to this request has not been found. On Jan. 5, 1942 (3182/695963) the Minister of Finance informed the Foreign Ministry that in a meeting of the same day an upward revaluation of the Danish crown to the extent of 8 percent had been approved. Cf. *Beretning til Folketinget afgivet af den af Folketinget under 8. Januar 1948 nedsatte kommission i henhold til Grundlovens § 45* (Copenhagen, 1948), vol. v, *Bilag*, pp. 515-556.



## No. 460

FI/0557-66

*Chancellor Hitler to Marshal Pétain*

At present at FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS,  
November 10, 1941.

DEAR MARSHAL: Let me first thank you sincerely for the letter,<sup>1</sup> on the occasion of the anniversary of Montoire, in which you transmitted to me your sentiments which have remained the same. I, too, recall the moving hour in which I was able to make the acquaintance of Your Excellency, the one-time Marshal of the French soldiers of the World War and respected Chief of the present French State and its Government.

From your letter, M. Marshal, I believe I may deduce a painful regret that the cooperation instituted a year ago has not led to the results that one could have expected. I must point out, however, that in this case there is no fault which lies on my side or in any way on the German side. The unexpected change of government in France which occurred only a few weeks later and the motivation for this step which hurt me personally very much have led to disappointments which are unfortunately not yet entirely overcome even to this day. In your letter, M. Marshal, you complain of the fact that there are still French prisoners of war in Germany. However, you will certainly recall that even more than a year and a half after the end of the World War German prisoners of war were retained in France. Incidentally, almost 40 percent of the French soldiers which we took prisoner—including those which we had already released during the operations—have been restored to their families. Above all, however, M. Marshal, may I point out one fact: It was not Germany which had declared war on France, but France on Germany! And this without any sort of reason or motive! Even after the failure of my numberless offers I personally applied to the French Ambassador in Berlin a few days before the outbreak of the war and asked him to try to get the French Government not to threaten Germany with military measures but to use its great influence to counsel Poland to reach an understanding with Germany.<sup>2</sup> It was a shock to me and to every German to have to look on while the strongest military power on the Continent not only had to let itself be provoked in the most unseemly manner by something which, militarily speaking, can only be considered a small country, but over and above that to see also the countries with which we have no serious quarrels whatsoever, and to which I had always offered German

friendship, pushed into war in a truly incomprehensible manner, having rejected every attempt at an understanding. For without the guilt of the French Government of that time England, too, could not have dared, without any reason, simply to seize the first opportunity for her criminal undertaking of a new world war. Thus through the complicity of the French Government of that time over a million Frenchmen are, to be sure, still in German captivity, but over nine million German soldiers are in a bloody war!

I have learned, M. Marshal, that you have been indignant over the execution of hostages on the occasion of the murder of German officers.<sup>3</sup> I believe, M. Marshal, that the only one who has a right to be indignant about these matters is I, unless it is the victims and the families of the innocent German officers murdered from ambush.

For: 1. These officers are not in France for pleasure, but the French declaration of war of September 3, 1939, brought them into that country. They would all rather live in Germany among their families than fulfill their occupation duties in a foreign country.

2. They did not perform in unworthy fashion, let alone abuse, the mission which regardless of their wishes their duty as soldiers required of them.

We ourselves have adequate comparisons with the conduct of the French authorities during the time of the occupation of the Rhineland, when they drove German citizens from the sidewalks with whips, and not only men but also women and girls; when more than 16,000 German women and girls were violated, some of them by blacks, without the French military authorities in most cases having found it worth the trouble to take steps against this; when, however, on the other hand, offenses against the occupation authorities themselves were met with the most severe punishments, yes, with deportation, and in many cases with death. In contrast I should like, M. Marshal, to point out to you that the German occupation authorities, officers and men, have not acted similarly—not even in one single case, I believe—with what at that time was so often the order of the day for the French occupation troops. If however some unworthy person should anywhere have laid violent hands on French property, not to speak of a French woman or girl—I do not know one single case of the latter—then the person concerned would have been punished, and very severely punished. You must be aware, M. Marshal, that there is the death penalty for plundering and robbery, not to mention rape, and that wherever we have occupation authorities we accord the French people at least the same legal protection as our own German people.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 422.

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 417.

<sup>2</sup> See vol. VII of this series, Editors' Note, p. 284.

This, in a country whose leadership once left no doubt of their intention of dismembering Germany in case of victory, depriving us forever of the Rhineland, evacuating millions of Germans, etc. I am writing you this, M. Marshal, because I know that you yourself personally never belonged to these provocateurs against the European peace, and that you can therefore also evaluate how boundless my indignation is when as the Führer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht I must now see that German officers who are doing nothing but their duty, and a duty that was imposed on them by France herself against their own wills, are now shot from behind by cowards. I have now ordered that hostages are to be executed. And they will continue to be executed until either the culprits have been found or these crimes have stopped. In the case of these hostages they are, however, not just innocent and harmless citizens, but elements all of whom had themselves already committed offenses against the occupation authorities. Some acted out of hatred with a Communist inspiration and some for hatred based on de Gaullist reasons both of which are incomprehensible to us, but their elimination is also in the highest interest of the French people. Furthermore, it is only to be ascribed to the German good nature that these partly criminal elements were not already sentenced to death by a court martial because of their past conduct. For no occupation authority in the world can tolerate having a violent uprising prepared against it, often with the most abominable methods.

You, M. Marshal, as an old officer must and will understand this; for immediately after the collapse of France I was willing, in spite of knowledge of the French war aims, in contrast to the conduct of France in 1918, to institute an epoch of reasonable reconciliation and understanding. This also for the reason that I naturally realize that all Frenchmen cannot be made responsible for the crime of September 3, 1939. However, when this effort of mine is answered with attempts against the lives of officers of my occupation power, then I shall coldly and resolutely apply those methods which, according to all past experience, are certain to restore absolute calm and order within a short time through the destruction of those directly and indirectly responsible. You must believe me, M. Marshal, that such a decision is difficult for me, and that I would rather take the other course which I had proposed to you a year ago in Montoire.<sup>4</sup> For in the long run the Germans and the Frenchmen on this continent will be forced to live with and beside one another, and they will live in whatever way they manage their lives, either well or badly. The only ones who can be interested in a bad coexistence are not the people whose existence is rooted in the Continent, but rather

those powers which have always seen and always will see their past and their future in the division of this continent. However, if the Jewish-Anglo-Saxon world threat continues as heretofore, then their rapacity will seek and find the objects to satisfy it less in Europe itself than in the European colonies. Then, M. Marshal, France will be considerably more threatened and in particular have more to lose than Germany. I therefore continue to believe that—from the larger point of view—it would accord with the interests of our two nations to find the way to a sincere cooperation and to exclude those who believe for some reasons or other that they cannot cooperate in this way. In addition I should like to point out, M. Marshal, that through the outbreak of this war, which was not caused by Germany, the Wehrmacht and therewith the German people have now had to assume a further fight which imposes heavy blood sacrifices upon us once more, and which we are today fighting not only for Germany but really for all of Europe. For if I had not decided at the last minute on June 22 to move against the Bolshevist menace, then it could have happened only too easily that with the collapse of Germany the French Jews would have triumphed, but the French people would likewise have been plunged into a horrible catastrophe. For only the Wehrmacht alone, and this I may state without any presumption, was capable of mastering this terrible force massing against Europe. A failure on our part would have meant the end of this continental culture for the next centuries, indeed perhaps forever. The Anglo-Saxon warmongers, however, in their bottomless foolishness would certainly have grasped too late what consequences the Bolshevization of this continent would have involved not only for our unhappy peoples but also for their own. I may therefore, M. Marshal, express the expectation that the French Government for its part, too, will do everything to counter, and to counter with effective methods, those elements which are trying just at this moment to poison the relationship of the occupation authorities with the French people. This is one of the prerequisites of being able at all to continue a policy which I tried to introduce a year ago and which you, M. Marshal, approved at that time.

Let me conclude this letter, M. Marshal, with the assurance of my personal respect for you, and with the wish that for the advantage of our two peoples and therewith for that of all of Europe the way of cooperation will be found after all which will help in ending successfully a war in whose continuation only the eternal enemies of Europe can have an interest. Germany at any rate is resolved this time to reject compromises once and for all. Our will to secure

<sup>4</sup> See vol. XI of this series, document No. 227.

Europe for the future against the repetition of such a danger is unalterable.

With the sincerest wishes,

Yours,

ADOLF HITLER<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> The letter was handed to Pétain by Abetz on Nov. 16 at 11:00 a.m. (see document No. 478).

No. 461

260/170331

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

St.S. No. 738

BERLIN, November 10, 1941.

The Finnish Minister mentioned to me today the new American memorandum<sup>1</sup> regarding the continuation of the Finnish campaign against Russia. Mr. Kivimäki said that the answer would be given within the next few days.<sup>2</sup> It would of course be negative and would sound quite similar to the reply given to England a month ago.<sup>3</sup> They had drawn on the Foreign Affairs Committee of Parliament for advice, not because they thought of watering down the reply but rather in order to deprive the Americans of the chance to say that the reply was not supported by the entire Finnish people.<sup>4</sup>

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>1</sup> The text of an initial American memorandum of Oct. 27 was forwarded to Berlin in Helsinki telegram No. 1204 of Oct. 28 (260/170267-69). In this memorandum the United States Secretary of State urged that Finland make peace with the Soviet Union on a line corresponding to the border of 1939 between Finland and the Soviet Union. Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. I, pp. 81-84.

In telegram No. 1211 of Oct. 29 (260/170274) Blücher reported regarding his discussion of this initial American memorandum with Witting and the probable form of the Finnish reply.

In telegram No. 1227 of Oct. 31 (260/170280) Blücher reported that the American Minister, Schoenfeld, had delivered a new memorandum, longer and somewhat sharper in tone than the first. Witting felt restrained from giving Blücher the text of this memorandum.

In telegram No. 1246 of Nov. 4 (260/170294-95) Zechlin was able to report the text which at his request was given him by Witting. The memorandum stated that Finnish military operations gave assistance to the cause of Nazi world aggression and had become a direct threat to the security of the United States and it urged that Finland immediately discontinue such military operations.

Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. I, pp. 84-85.

<sup>2</sup> On Nov. 8 in telegram No. 1274 (260/170317-319) Zechlin was able to report from Helsinki that he had been able through a confidential agent to get an outline of the Finnish answer to the American memorandum. In telegram No. 1291 of Nov. 11 (260/170337-47) Zechlin forwarded a German translation of the text of the Finnish reply which had come to him in a confidential manner. Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. I, pp. 91-98.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 353.

<sup>4</sup> In telegram No. 1305 of Nov. 13 (260/170354) Blücher reported that Witting was making great effort to give the Finnish memorandum the broadest publicity in the United States.

No. 462

265/173383-84

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Turkey*

Telegram

PRIORITY

MOST URGENT SPECIAL TRAIN, November 11, 1941—11:50 p. m.  
No. 1246 of November 11 from the Special Train

Received Berlin, November 12—12:15 a. m.

No. 1627 of November 12

from the Foreign Ministry

Sent November 12.

RAM 491/R

Secret for officer in charge.

The pact against the Communist International that was concluded between Germany, Japan and Italy in 1936 and 1937,<sup>1</sup> and acceded to by Hungary, Manchukuo, and Spain in 1939,<sup>2</sup> will expire on November 25, 1941. The German, Italian, and Japanese Governments have agreed to extend the Pact. Furthermore, during the preliminary negotiations on the extension, the three Governments have decided to approach a number of additional European countries calling on them to use this opportunity to accede to the pact.<sup>3</sup> For this purpose we will now first sound out the Rumanian, Bulgarian, Croatian, Slovak, and Finnish Governments confidentially on whether they would accept an official invitation to join if such were addressed to them.

I now wonder whether the time may not have arrived to take a further step with the Turks also toward closer cooperation in the spirit of Europe going beyond the trade agreement. The Anti-Comintern Pact, which does not contain any political conditions of any sort but merely represents an agreement on joint defense against internal communist subversive activity, could perhaps provide such a platform. I personally have the feeling, however, that a certain political element which, after all, is inherent in such an agreement of this sort could still be too much for the Turks even today, but I would like to have your personal opinion as Ambassador, who observes matters at close quarters. I therefore request you to telegraph me your opinion without reservation. I must, however, exact from you the commitment not in any circumstances to talk about this inquiry and this telegram to anyone at all in your Embassy, not to mention it to any person on the outside, not even in the most confidential way. You know how easily very disagreeable repercussions can otherwise occur

<sup>1</sup> See vol. I of this series, document No. 463, footnote 2a, and document No. 17.

<sup>2</sup> See vol. V of this series, document No. 269, footnote 2 and vol. III of this series, document No. 768.

<sup>3</sup> See documents Nos. 405, 442, and 443.

in case of an indiscretion. I should therefore like to ask you to send me your opinion as soon as possible in a telegram directed exclusively to me.<sup>4</sup>

RIBBENTROP

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 464.

No. 463

405/214027

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Paris*

Telegram

SPECIAL TRAIN, NOVEMBER 11, 1941.

No. 1249 of November 11 from the Special Train

Received Berlin, November 12—2:45 a. m.

No. 5060 of November 12

from the Foreign Ministry

Sent November 12.

RAM 494

For the Ambassador personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 3431 of November 3.<sup>1</sup>

I refer to the communications which, according to your telegram, were made to you by Benoist-Méchin and de Brinon regarding the recall of General Weygand. Please inform the French Government through an appropriate oral communication to Benoist-Méchin or Ambassador de Brinon that the Reich Government has already informed the French Government, upon its inquiry, that General Weygand does not in any way enjoy the confidence of the Reich Government.<sup>2</sup> Whether France wishes to draw the appropriate conclusions from this the Reich Government has to leave up to the French Government. The Reich Government is of the opinion that it is erroneous to connect with this question any sort of French wishes such as were communicated to you.<sup>3</sup>

Wire report on execution of this instruction.<sup>4</sup>

RIBBENTROP

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 445.

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 419.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram No. 282 of Nov. 13 from Wiesbaden (405/214040-42) Welck reported that the German Armistice Commission, while rejecting an unconditional acceptance of all French military requests, was ready to adopt an accommodating attitude once Weygand's dismissal had been accomplished.

<sup>4</sup> Such a report by Abetz has not been found. See, however, document No. 478.

No. 464

265/173385-86

*The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

TOP SECRET

ANKARA, November 12, 1941.

No. 1432 of November 12

Received November 12—11:05 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 1627 of November 12.<sup>1</sup>

Your feeling that this question is absolutely a political issue here is very justified. Since the Bolshevik question never was nor will be of importance in purely agrarian Turkey, accession by Turkey would be interpreted everywhere as a pronounced option in favor of the Axis. However, the moment for such an option is still too early. This is so in the first place because of the attempt to make the English ready for a compromise as you can see from my last dispatch.<sup>2</sup> In regard to this Numan also recently proposed close cooperation with Spain.<sup>3</sup> In the second place because in case of an option in favor of us Turkey would have to fear that a part of the ethnically Turkish minorities in Russia would be liquidated.

The evolution of Turkey will proceed with the progress of the operations. When the situation has become ripe for decision the Turkish Government, in my opinion, would then opt quite openly and not choose a detour via the Anti-Comintern Pact. It would then only be necessary for it to find an explanation for detaching itself from its English commitments, which would be plausible and defensible before world opinion. To this extent I consider it valuable that the peace feelers which the Turkish Government has put out be sharply rejected in England and America.

The foregoing matter will, of course, not be discussed with anyone.

PAPEN

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 462.

<sup>2</sup> Presumably a reference to Papen's dispatch of Nov. 6 (2361/488747-52). It reported an account given by Menemencioğlu of his conversation with the Ambassador of Great Britain and of the United States who had inquired about a passage in President İnönü's address on Oct. 29 referring to the possibility of Turkish mediation for peace.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 501, footnote 24.

No. 465

1857/422347-48

*The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 13, 1941—5:55 p.m.

No. 3938 of November 12

Received November 14—6:20 a.m.

With reference to my telegrams Nos. 3646 of October 20<sup>1</sup> and 3373 of September 27.<sup>2</sup>

Roosevelt is ruthlessly continuing to press the drive against the opposition and its leaders with all available means. Roosevelt's chief antagonist and obstruction to his foreign policy of intervening is the America First Committee, now numbering over 15 million members. Secretary of the Interior Ickes declared open war on it in his speech of October 20, by calling for an investigation of the methods of financing the organization, allegedly supplied by subversive Nazi funds. Following Lindbergh's attack on the Jews,<sup>3</sup> Baruch<sup>4</sup> was given the job of undermining the America First Committee from within by the use of Jewish money. At the same time the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the propaganda squads of the Justice Department are proceeding against the publishers of the well-known magazines *Scribner's Commentator* and *Herald* as the two principal publicity media of the America First Committee.<sup>5</sup>

The danger exists that many leading members of the Committee will be so intimidated by these methods that they will resign. In order that this useful organization not disintegrate, the press officer,

<sup>1</sup> This telegram (1857/422217-19) reported on the arrest and prosecution of an American lawyer who had confessed having accepted money from a German agent for propaganda against the Lend-Lease bill.

<sup>2</sup> This telegram (1543/375867-68) dealt with the activities of the Federal Government in fighting the opposition.

<sup>3</sup> Apparently a reference to Lindbergh's speech at Des Moines on Sept. 11 in which he stated that "the three most important groups who have been pressing this country toward the war are the British, the Jewish, and the Roosevelt Administration."

<sup>4</sup> Bernard M. Baruch, American financier, Chairman, War Industries Board, 1918-1919.

<sup>5</sup> These two publications, the former a monthly, the latter a weekly were published in Lake Geneva, Wisconsin. It appears from Thomsen's telegram No. 3395 of Sept. 30 (1543/375874-75) that the *Herald* had received financial support from the Embassy. Regarding German support for *Scribner's Commentator*, see the record of the testimony by Counselor of Legation Heribert Stempel printed in *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1947), Supplement A. (document 3800-PS), pp. 571-573. For the relationship of these magazines to the America First Committee, cf. Wayne S. Cole, *America First* (Madison, 1953), pp. 133, 140.

through his confidential agents, is endeavoring to ensure that should General Wood, who is the present chairman, resign, Lindbergh would take over the leadership. Despite all attacks and calumnies on the part of the interventionists, Lindbergh's prestige and popularity are on the increase. The negotiations are conducted in such a way that the Embassy's part in them cannot be discerned.

Part of this campaign of defamation of the opposition is the action of the Attorney General's office against the leading isolationist Republican Representative Hamilton Fish and against Viereck<sup>6</sup> for spreading "Nazi propaganda", in other words, accusing leading isolationists of [abusing] the Congressional franking privilege.<sup>7</sup>

THOMSEN

<sup>6</sup> George Sylvester Viereck, an American citizen who was public relations counselor for the German Library of Information in New York and correspondent of the *Münchener Neuesten Nachrichten*.

<sup>7</sup> This seems to refer to Viereck's arrest on Oct. 8 which was dealt with in Thomsen's telegram No. 3502 of Oct. 10 (1857/422138-39) reporting that the Justice Department had instituted proceedings against Viereck on grounds of violation of the law concerning registration of agents of a foreign government. With regard to Representative Hamilton Fish the reference seems to be to newspaper reports published on Nov. 10 according to which Representative Fish had received a summons to appear before the federal grand jury investigating Nazi propaganda.

No. 466

239/154388

*The Minister in Rumania to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

BUCHAREST, November 13, 1941—9:35 p. m.

No. 3726 of November 13

Received November 13—11:30 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 3128 of November 10.<sup>1</sup>

M. Antonescu, whom I informed of the contents of the instruction referred to above, stated to me that the Rumanian Government would leave it to the Reich Government to deport the Jews with Rumanian citizenship to the ghettos in the east, together with the German Jews. The Rumanian Government had no interest in the return of the Rumanian Jews to Rumania.

VON KILLINGER

<sup>1</sup> A marginal note identifies this as D III 536: Not found.

No. 467

498/233930

*The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Spain*

Cipher Letter

TOP SECRET

No. 2654 g Rs.

BERLIN, November 13, 1941.

Received November 13.

Pol. III 826 g. Rs.

Top Secret. To be deciphered only by someone cleared for Top Secret materials. To be presented immediately to the Chief of Mission. Answer by courier or secret cipher letter.

With reference to your report No. 2425 g Rs. of September 2.<sup>1</sup>

The conditions for a further broadening of our military relations with Spain do not exist at the present time. The three branches of the Wehrmacht have been instructed anew by the Chief of the OKW that they are not authorized to conduct reconnaissances in Spain or to carry on military discussions with the Spaniards.

Please refrain, as in the past, from discussing with members of the Spanish Government the preparation of any sort of joint military actions or the entry of Spain into the war.

WOERMANN

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 273.

No. 468

41/28229-39

*Memorandum by the Foreign Minister<sup>1</sup>*

WESTFALEN, November 13, 1941.

BRIEF FOR THE FÜHRER<sup>2</sup>

After this year's events in Iraq, Syria, and Iran, England now controls an unbroken stretch of land connecting its position at the Suez Canal in the west with the Indian realm which forms the keystone of the Empire in the east. A solid area of English control extends

<sup>1</sup> This document is based on a more detailed memorandum in two parts which Woermann submitted on Nov. 6 (41/28200; 41/28202-14). The first part bore the title "Questions of the Near East", the second part "Special Assignments for Matters of the Near East". The memorandum was drawn up in compliance with a request of the Foreign Minister, transmitted by Bruns on Oct. 27 (41/28201), for an interim report by Woermann on what had been done so far in Pan-Arab, Pan-Turanian, and Indian matters.

<sup>2</sup> Marginal notes:

"Shown to the Führer".

"See separate memorandum. Hew[e], Nov. 15."

The last marginal note apparently refers to document No. 475.

from the boundaries of Cyrenaica all the way to Singapore. It goes without saying that as regards this region our policy must first and foremost be guided by military needs and therefore must serve the purpose of defeating England. Political propaganda measures must pave the way for permanently eliminating England from these areas. To this must be added the problems connected with a future organization of the territories lying to the north of this belt of countries, which now are part of the Soviet Union, for example, the Caucasus and that part of Central Asia heretofore in Russian hands, where because of the dominant Turkic ethnic element in the population conditions are ripe for a Pan-Turanian movement. The important thing, after a collapse of Soviet Russia, is to prevent these regions from possibly serving England as a *cordon sanitaire* for her Indian realm, and to organize them in such a manner as would take into account the objectives of German policy in the east. Thus, policy and propaganda are faced with comprehensive tasks in southwest Asia, and the following steps should be taken for their accomplishment:

#### I. *The Arab Question.*

All utterances made by Arab leaders indicate that the alpha and omega for the Arab world is a new political declaration of the Axis Powers on independence for the Arab countries. The German declaration broadcast by radio on October 21, 1940,<sup>3</sup> is judged by the Arab world in general as being inadequate. It confined itself to expressing the complete sympathy of Germany and Italy with the efforts of the Arab countries to attain their independence. A new statement of policy by Germany and Italy in favor of the Arab world appears absolutely indispensable because its absence is an obstacle to loyal cooperation with the Arabs. It seems all the more necessary to issue such a statement soon, as according to available information, England, too has begun to make new promises to the Arab states with a view toward the formation of a Greater Arab federation.

As a basis of such a declaration there is already available the text proposed by the Grand Mufti and approved by the Duce, which is attached,<sup>4</sup> and which would be acceptable to us with minor changes. The text does not go into details about the organization of the Arab region, notably it makes no mention of a federal union of Arab states, but promises them independence. Since this formula also includes Syria, the statement presumably will not be well received in France, but this can be disregarded. Ambassador von Papen has been asked for an opinion as to whether such a declaration might be expected to

<sup>3</sup> See vol. XI of this series, documents Nos. 190 and footnote 4, 496, and 596.

<sup>4</sup> Attachment not printed (41/28240-41). This is the text transmitted in document No. 449.

have unfavorable repercussions on Turkish policy.<sup>5</sup> Presumably this is not the case, since the declaration requested by the Mufti would not rule out the possibility of meeting Turkish wishes for minor frontier rectifications, as in the region of Aleppo. Before a permanent settlement of the Arab question is undertaken, it will be necessary to get in touch with the Turkish Government. The moment for such a discussion, however, has not yet come.

From the standpoint of German policy there would be no objections if after the war Iraq, Syria, Palestine, and Transjordan were united into a Greater Arab federation which would then enter into a relationship of friendship and alliance with Germany and Italy. Given their military and financial weakness, these countries would in all circumstance be dependent upon such support by the Axis Powers.

At present the Grand Mufti is in Berlin and has asked to be received by me and, if at all possible, also by the Führer. As he was received by the Duce promptly after he arrived in Rome, I should like to propose to the Führer to have him come to Headquarters here, on a date to be set by the Führer, at which time he could get the Führer's promise in principle that the declaration intended for the Arab world, which he had requested, would be issued. It would still be best if we held back regarding the date for the publication of such a declaration, with respect to which, in any case, agreement would have to be reached also with the Italian Government.

The next step then would be the establishment of a council of Arab leaders in Berlin.<sup>6</sup> Besides the Grand Mufti and the Syrian pioneer of Arab independence, Fawzi al-Qawuqchi,<sup>7</sup> we can draw upon suitable Arab personalities here and in Turkey, who might join such a council of leaders. There is hope that it will be possible to employ former Iraqi Minister President Gaylani in this capacity. For the moment the Turkish Government refuses to issue to him an exit permit, but attempts are underway to get him out of the country by underground means.

For propaganda into the Near East, radio broadcasting is by far the most effective weapon. Broadcasts in Arabic are made daily from Berlin. The Athens radio station has now also been made available

<sup>5</sup> The relevant instruction was sent to Ankara as telegram No. 1638 of Nov. 12 (2361/488761-62). Papen's reply in Ankara telegram No. 1446 of Nov. 13 (71/50940) stated that such a declaration "undoubtedly would cause a certain amount of annoyance on the part of the Turkish Government unless it were discussed in advance." Papen thought that it would be sufficient if he were instructed to inform Turkey that Germany would issue a declaration in general terms about the sovereignty and independence of Arab states but that "this would not prejudice the settlement of certain territorial questions."

<sup>6</sup> Marginal note in Ribbentrop's handwriting: "In Rome."

<sup>7</sup> See document No. 165.

for this propaganda work. Action will also be stepped up regarding other ways of exerting influence by the press, especially periodicals.

Side by side with this go the special military preparations with which Special Staff Felmy<sup>8</sup> is charged. The Foreign Ministry maintains close contact with this Special Staff, in order to ensure coordination of joint programs.

## II. *British India.*

Preparations for stepping up our propaganda with a view to encouraging India's independence movement are in the hands of State Secretary Keppler, who is working closely with the Indian, Bose, in this matter. At the moment the chief element of this preparatory work concerns the establishment of an Indian Legion recruited from Indian prisoners of war in our hands, and the organization of a "free India" central office under Bose's direction. The point of departure for our policy with regard to India, similarly to that toward the Arab question, must be the publication of a declaration by the Axis Powers concerning a free India. We know that Bose has been insistently urging since the spring that such a declaration be issued by the Axis Powers as early as possible.<sup>9</sup> The moment for such a declaration, however, will come only when it is clearly discernible that England does not manifest any willingness to make peace even after the final collapse of Russia. There is no need for the declaration on a free India to coincide in time with the one regarding the independence of the Arab countries; rather, it would seem preferable to issue the declaration regarding the Arab countries first and to issue the one relating to India on a separate occasion, so that each measure would carry its own full effect.

Large-scale propaganda directed at India will become possible only when the declaration regarding a free India has been published. Such propaganda effort will have to operate chiefly with radio broadcasts for which at present the Berlin transmitter has already been made available. The use of the Zemun transmitter for broadcasts of the free India central office is being planned. Further intensification of this propaganda will become possible when, as a result of our troops advancing into Caucasia, stations located nearer to India, such as perhaps the transmitter at Tiflis, can be utilized for this, or provision is made for mobile transmitters.

As may be seen from the enclosed copy of State Secretary Keppler's memorandum of November 13,<sup>10</sup> an English counterpropaganda action has recently begun which is intended to discredit Bose with the Indian population as having gone over to the Axis Powers and to promote his antagonist, Pandit Nehru, as in accordance with England's intent.

<sup>8</sup> See vol. XII of this series, documents Nos. 543 and 606, footnote 4.

<sup>9</sup> See vol. XII of this series, documents Nos. 300, 323, and 553.

<sup>10</sup> Not printed (41/28242-44).

In other ways, too, Bose's activities in Germany have already been made known, as shown by the telegram mentioned in the memorandum which was sent to Bose by the Indian Independence League in Japan. I intend to act in accordance with State Secretary Keppler's proposal that I discuss personally with Bose the resulting new developments in the situation.<sup>11</sup> Our decision to defer for the time being a declaration of the Axis Powers concerning a free India will not have to be altered by us despite the reports circulated by the English. On the contrary, they confirm that the English camp is already beginning to show anxiety as a consequence of Bose's presence in Germany.

### III. *Pan-Turanian Movement.*

The Pan-Turanian question is being handled in the Foreign Ministry by Minister von Hentig who is particularly familiar with the Mohammedan countries.<sup>12</sup> For the purpose of forming a special committee, he is currently gathering together the East-Turkic expellees who are living in Turkey, France, or Germany and who are particularly suitable for promoting the Pan-Turanian movement. The difficulty in the development of any Pan-Turanian movement has been that such a movement heretofore has been largely limited to small groups of Turks educated in literature and history, whereas the great mass of the ethnically Turkic population in the present Soviet Union really do not have any feeling of Pan-Turanian solidarity. These people, split up in various tribes such as the Uzbeks, Turkmen, Kirghiz, Kazaks, Kalmucks, Tartars, etc., fill the entire region from the northern border of Afghanistan to the middle Volga and also a considerable portion of Caucasia (including Baku). They are solidly Mohammedan and are antagonistic to the Russians. However, these tribes know very little about one another. Therefore, the first and foremost task in any attempt to set in motion a Pan-Turanian movement is to arouse a Pan-Turanian feeling of solidarity directed against the Russians. A federation of Turkic states could be taken as the objective for the future, and it is reasonable to expect that Turkey would lend sympathetic support to such a movement, even if official Turkish policy maintains its present attitude of being completely disinterested in any territorial aspirations.

At present, means for activating a Pan-Turanian movement are as yet limited. Radio may afford some means, but its influence should not be estimated very high, because only commissars and Jews have receiving sets. A campaign with leaflets, to be scattered by aircraft, offers more prospects. Of special importance are ethnically Turkic prisoners of war of Turcoman race. The OKW has issued orders that

<sup>11</sup> See document No. 521.

<sup>12</sup> See document No. 404.

such prisoners be accommodated in separate camps. It remains to be examined whether persons may be found among them who could be used as emissaries to stir up partisan movements, etc.

It will not be possible to consider issuing a special declaration in favor of the Turkic peoples until it has been shown that these can be roused from their present lethargy and that they are striving to break away from the Soviet regime.<sup>13</sup>

In conclusion may I have instructions as to whether the Führer, as a first step toward realization of the program outlined, is willing to receive Amin al-Husayni, Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, at Führer's headquarters, and if so, when the Grand Mufti should arrive for such a meeting.<sup>14</sup>

R[IBBENTROP]

<sup>13</sup> On Nov. 19 Ribbentrop submitted to Hitler a supplementary memorandum on the Pan-Turanian question (41/28253-58) with data regarding the numerical strength and geographic distribution of the eastern Turkic peoples in the Soviet Union.

<sup>14</sup> Marginal note in Hewel's handwriting: "In principle, yes. See special memorandum."

See document No. 475.

[EDITORS' NOTE. In a conference at Hitler's headquarters on November 13, Admiral Raeder, Commander in Chief, Navy, received Hitler's approval for a set of new "directives for conduct of surface forces on encountering American forces." The first paragraph of these directives which are found in annex 2 of the minutes of this conference defines the general tenor of the directives as follows:

"Engagements with American naval or air forces are not to be sought deliberately; they are to be avoided as far as possible. Efforts to avoid incidents are to be abandoned, however, as soon as the American forces endanger our naval forces or other ships under our control, as supply ships or prizes, by shadowing them, for instance. In such a case the commander has the right to resort to arms in self-defense, and it is then his duty to be sure he is not too late in using his weapons. He is to try to destroy the enemy."

In presenting these directives to Hitler the Commander in Chief, Navy pointed out that their aim was "on the one hand to lessen the possibility of incidents with American forces, and on the other to give the commanders clear guidance for their conduct when meeting U.S. naval forces; guidance which is in keeping with strategic necessity and which upholds the prestige and honor of the German flag." See U.S. Navy Department, ONI "Führer Conferences on Matters Dealing With the German Navy, 1941," vol. II, pp. 54-67.]



No. 469

260/170357-58

*The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

TOP SECRET HELSINKI, November 14, 1941—11:48 p. m.  
No. 1316 of November 14 Received November 14—12:00 midnight.

1. The Foreign Minister today brought up the subject of the memorandum on the nickle question,<sup>1</sup> which Minister Schnurre had presented to M. Fieandt. The Foreign Minister expressed himself very cautiously, avoiding even mention of the word concession. His remarks, in substance, were as follows:

The Finns had taken over the mines as trustees and assured Germany of approximately 90 percent of the production. The Finns are scrupulous about fulfilling such obligations. Any attempt on the part of Germany to find another solution now would create difficulties in Parliament and among the public. One representative has already sought to raise the issue in committee. The question of the nickel mines must be pursued in a manner that would preclude unfriendly critics from saying that in the nickel question the Germans were making the same demands of the Finns as formerly did the Russians.

Moreover, English propaganda, which apparently had a secret transmitter in the country, must not be handed material lending itself to exploitation, and the same held for the United States.

2. The Foreign Minister made a point of saying that this was a friendly communication, designed to avoid difficulties and not a means of creating delays.

3. The Foreign Minister apparently is under the impression that I. G. Farben is satisfied with the present arrangement. He gave me to understand that progress would be aided by negotiations between officers of the Finnish Ministry of Economics and representatives of I. G. Farben.<sup>2</sup>

BLÜCHER

<sup>1</sup> Not found. See document No. 429.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram No. 1504 of Dec. 11 (261/170434) Blücher reported that he had learned from a confidential source that Kivimäki had received instructions to give a negative answer in the question of the nickel concession. Kivimäki had discussed the question with Schnurre who was very dissatisfied and indicated that President Ryti had expressed different views.

No. 470

1857/422337-38

*Memorandum by Ambassador Dieckhoff*

By teletype to the Foreign Minister  
through the State Secretary

BERLIN, November 14, 1941.

REGARDING YESTERDAY'S VOTE IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
ON THE NEUTRALITY AMENDMENT

The House of Representatives voted 212 to 194, thus by a majority of 18, to repeal the prohibition for United States merchant ships to enter or pass through combat zones. The bill, which had previously passed the Senate by 49 to 37 votes<sup>1</sup> now goes to the President and after his signature will take effect shortly.<sup>2</sup> The same applies to the bill repealing the prohibition on arming of merchant ships which was adopted by the Senate by 50 to 37 votes and which the House of Representatives had already passed by 259 to 138 votes on October 17.<sup>3</sup>

As a result of these Congressional enactments, hardly anything substantial remains of the Neutrality Act after the cash clause already rescinded by the Lend-Lease Act<sup>4</sup> and now that the carry clause and the prohibition against arming merchant ships are likewise eliminated.<sup>5</sup> It will require some time to arm United States merchant vessels with guns and to muster the required crews for operating them. On the other hand, American ships may now begin at once to call at English ports.<sup>6</sup>

The interesting thing is that only 212 Representatives voted yesterday for amending the Neutrality Act. The House of Representatives has 435 members, which means that not even one-half of the Representatives voted for the measure.

Thus, despite the greatest pressure from the President it was not possible to mobilize the quorum of the House of Representatives for

<sup>1</sup> On Nov. 7.

<sup>2</sup> Approved Nov. 17, 1941; U.S. Statutes at Large, 1941-1942, vol. 55, p. 764.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 427.

<sup>4</sup> Approved Mar. 11, 1941; U.S. Statutes at Large, 1941-1942, vol. 55, p. 31.

<sup>5</sup> The following is recorded in the minutes of Hitler's conference with the Commander in Chief, Navy on Nov. 13 (see Editors' Note, p. 779): "In reply to a question from the Commander in Chief, Navy regarding the Führer's intention in case Congress repeals the Neutrality Law, the Führer stated that he would let the order stand that all merchant ships, including American ones, may be torpedoed without warning in the old blockade area. Further orders will depend on how the situation develops."

<sup>6</sup> In telegram No. 3960 of Nov. 15 (1857/422355-57) Thomsen commented on the expected practical effects of the dangers in the Neutrality Law on the "battle for the supplies in the Atlantic."

the measure. The President owes his victory solely to the fact that 29 Representatives were absent at the time of the vote. This point is to be used for propaganda purposes.<sup>7</sup>

DIECKHOFF

<sup>7</sup> In Multex telegram No. 972 of Nov. 21 (6506/HO70815), sent to all Missions except Washington, Woermann pointed out the increased danger of incidents as a result of the new legislation emphasizing at the same time, however, that the vote in Congress showed "that there is no united public opinion in these foreign policy questions" and that the President had suffered "a rather embarrassing set-back." The Missions were directed to point out these facts in conversations.

## No. 471

95/107185

*The Embassy in Spain to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MADRID, November 15, 1941—4: 45 p. m., s[ummer] time.  
No. 4039 of November 15 Received November 15—6: 40 p. m.

Also for Dienststelle Ribbentrop.

According to a well-founded report Franco in a written letter informed the Pretender to the Throne, Don Juan, in Rome 2 or 3 weeks ago that he considered the restoration of the monarchy in Spain to be the coronation of the national revolution.<sup>1</sup>

GARDEMANN

HEYDEN-RYNSCH

<sup>1</sup> Typed marginal note:

"This rumor has been making the rounds in Madrid recently. People who might *perhaps* know whether it is true have denied it to me.

"The rumor might be the result of the actually existing 'flirt' by Spanish governmental authorities with Spanish monarchists. Particularly Foreign Minister S. Suñer has recently shown a strong accommodating spirit toward the monarchists, for whom he—for example—facilitates trips to Rome to see Prince Juan. I interpret this as an understandable effort by S. Suñer to ease his position, because his sharpest opponents—the military—are almost all monarchists.

"I pointed out this rapprochement of the Spanish Foreign Minister with the monarchists which is furthermore only tactical in my last cipher letter (which must have arrived here about November 11). The matter will be kept under observation.

"I still retain the opinion of 4 years ago that the restoration of the *monarchy* in Spain is the most probable *final solution* if we do not give the course of events a different direction.

Berlin, November 16, 1941. Stohrer."

The cipher letter referred to above has not been found.

## No. 472

5085/E293019-20

*The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Finland*

Telegram

No. 1469 of November 15

BERLIN [November 15, 1941.]<sup>1</sup>

Received November 15—6: 40 p. m.

In reply to your telegram 1315.<sup>2</sup>

As already advised by telegram,<sup>3</sup> the accession of additional countries to the Anti-Comintern Pact, planned on the occasion of the extension of the Pact and in connection with its extension, shall be embodied in a single instrument of ratification. This will eloquently attest to the solidarity of the states in their joint resolve to resist the danger of Communism for the future. If this ratification will now be accomplished by the six present member governments of the Pact, Germany, Italy, Japan, Hungary, Manchukuo, and Spain, and by a number of additional governments which have since agreed to join, the absence of Finland especially, would be very conspicuous. It would be really anomalous if Finland, which is menaced by Communism as no other country is, and which is conspicuously taking part in the military campaign against Soviet Russia, were to hold aloof from agreements concerning the ideological defense against the subversive efforts of the Communist International.

If Finland were to join at a later date, this would not make up for the anomalous situation. In the relations between Finland and the United States, too, now that Finland in her note to the United States of America<sup>4</sup> has outlined so eloquently the communistic threat to which it is exposed, she could only act as a self-explanatory and natural step if Finland now would grasp this opportunity which offers itself to join with the other states in the defense against communist machinations. There can be no way in which this would lead to a deterioration of relations between Finland and the United States. On the contrary, world public opinion and even public sentiment in the United States of America would sense the ambiguity of Finland's attitude toward communism if Finland were now to hold aloof from the intended wider cooperation against the Comintern. We believe that it is just such an attitude which would cause American policy toward Finland to turn more aggressive. The United States might be moved, as in the recent American notes,<sup>5</sup> to make new and impos-

<sup>1</sup> The document printed here is from the Helsinki Legation file and no date or time of dispatch appears on this copy.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 474, footnote 1.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram No. 1433 of Nov. 11 (5085/293024-25).

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 461, footnote 2.

<sup>5</sup> See document No. 461, footnote 1.

sible demands upon Finland which are incompatible with Finland's future security, as the entire civilized world uniformly acknowledges, and which have now been so eloquently refuted by the Finnish note. The reaction in the United States to the Finnish note has also demonstrated that in view of the general aversion against communism in the American public this policy toward Finland is causing concern in the White House.

Will you please bring these points emphatically to the attention of the Finnish Foreign Minister in my behalf and ensure that Finland will in all circumstances join in the ratification on November 25.

Following your call on the Foreign Minister please seek immediately an appointment with President Ryti so as to set forth these considerations in all friendliness but with the greatest of emphasis.

Please wire reply as soon as possible.<sup>6</sup>

RIBBENTROP

<sup>6</sup> In telegram No. 1328 of Nov. 16 (261/170368) Blücher reported his conversation with Witting. The Foreign Minister seemed to take a positive attitude toward Finland's accession to the Pact but said that Parliament and the President would have to be consulted. For Blücher's report on his conversation with the President, see document No. 477.

### No. 473

1857/422366/67

*The Embassy in the United States to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT WASHINGTON, November 15, 1941—10:47 p. m.  
No. 3971 of November 15 Received November 16—1:20 p. m.

For OKW Ausland, OKH Attaché Department, and RLM Attaché Group Military: Information of November 15.

1. With the arrival of the Japanese negotiator Kurusu<sup>1</sup> the assertion is made that failure of Kurusu's mission would surely mean war. The question of war or peace is said to be posed.

In fact the question is how America should block Japanese activity in the Far East, extricate herself from the dilemma frequently discussed between megalomania and the actual situation there, and how she should secure the front in the Pacific by arriving at an understanding with Japan or by intimidating the Island Empire.

It is highly amusing to watch the American tactics of bluff, intimidation and deception which, as we have known for years, are not backed up by the determination to risk or to force a military decision in the Pacific. One particular item of bluffing was the solemn declaration of Roosevelt's, which coincided with the arrival of the Japanese

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 451.

negotiator, that he would now withdraw the marine garrison from the Far East.<sup>2</sup> Does any Japanese really believe that by removing this obsolete garrison which under present conditions could no longer be maintained, the United States wishes to clear the ground for the coming war which it considers probable? I refer to my reports of last year on relations between the United States and Japan and the possibility of war, most recently to telegram No. 3941 of November 13,<sup>3</sup> and to the opinion, expressed for a long time that America's policy with respect to war is dictated by worry and uncertainty and that she wishes to gain time and to defer decisions.

2. There is extensive propaganda intended for Japan to the effect that Russia is in many instances successful. Individual incidents are played up, and the public is skillfully indoctrinated. Since this must be counteracted by me and my associates, and other propaganda originating in Germany is largely pushed in the background or treated with doubt, I ask again that I be provided with the most comprehensive information that is possible.

BÖTTCHER  
THOMSEN

<sup>2</sup> In his press conference on Nov. 7 President Roosevelt had stated that consideration was being given to the question of withdrawing 970 U.S. Marines from China.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed (1857/422349-51).

### No. 474

260/170361

*The State Secretary to the Foreign Minister*

Teletype Message

BERLIN, November 15, 1941.

Minister von Grundherr submits the following communication:

"Memorandum.

The Minister of Finland called to see me today. Among other things he made the following remarks:

On the 12th Minister Zechlin had sounded out the Finnish Foreign Ministry as to the prospects for a possible accession of Finland to the Anti-Comintern Pact at an early date.<sup>1</sup> He said that on this matter he would like to tell me in confidence his strictly personal opinion. He said that he had consistently advocated to his Government in Helsinki the basic position that Finland should join the Pact. However, he personally felt that the present moment was quite unsuited. For one thing he felt that one would have first to wait for the American

<sup>1</sup> Zechlin's report has not been found.

In telegram No. 1315 of Nov. 14 (260/170360) Blücher reported a conversation with the Finnish Foreign Minister who suggested that Finnish adherence might not have much significance in the United States.

reply to the Finnish memorandum.<sup>2</sup> He said that he was certain that the practical concern of the Americans was, first of all, to keep the Murmansk railroad open, and that they would therefore again request the Finnish Government to refrain from any operations against the Murmansk railroad. Once such a demand were received from the Americans, he felt that the psychological conditions, both in their foreign and domestic implications, for Finland's joining the Anti-Comintern Pact would be substantially more favorable. Grundherr."  
End of report.

If I receive no other instruction, I shall ask Minister Kivimäki to see me soon, in order to urge him that Finland adhere to the Anti-Comintern Pact.<sup>3</sup>

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 461.

<sup>3</sup> In a memorandum of Nov. 15 (260/170362), which was sent to Ribbentrop, Weizsäcker recorded that he had seen Kivimäki and impressed upon him the necessity for Finland's adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact.

#### No. 475

41/28246-47

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff*

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, November 15, 1941.

#### BRIEF FOR THE FOREIGN MINISTER

The Führer, after having read over the brief for him from the Foreign Minister regarding the Arab, British-Indian, and Pan-Turanian questions,<sup>1</sup> said that he wanted to talk personally with the Foreign Minister in the next few days about this set of problems. No final decisions can be made before that.

He said that he was in principle willing to receive the Grand Mufti but first it would have to be settled whether the future headquarters of a council of Arab leaders would be in Berlin or in Rome. In principle, he is of the opinion that the Mediterranean region and with this also the Pan-Arab question must be assigned to the Italian sphere of influence. When I objected that a council of leaders established at Berlin would command greater authority in the Arab world than if it operated out of Rome, the Führer thought that he would have to think about this question further and then discuss it with the Foreign Minister.

As regards the statements about the Pan-Turanian movement the Führer remarked that it would be necessary to work in this matter very closely with the Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories,

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 468.

Rosenberg, first, for the reason that Rosenberg had people who were fully conversant with the pertinent questions and secondly, that it was Rosenberg, who, directly after our troops had occupied these territories, would have to assume responsibility for them and for their administration. The Führer considers that to arouse a Pan-Turanian feeling of solidarity directed against the Russians would be contrary to our interests. Our objective was first to get control there and to organize the country for our purposes. The last thing we would therefore want there was a sentiment of national solidarity.

HEWEL

#### No. 476

129/121199-200

*Memorandum by the Minister to Portugal*

BERLIN, November 15, 1941.<sup>1</sup>

Ever since the inception of the Anti-Comintern Pact, the problem of Portugal's possible accession to it has figured in the considerations of the Portuguese politicians. The problem has been in the air especially since accession by her friendly neighbor Spain.<sup>2</sup>

Portugal's resolute opposition to Bolshevism is well known. Portugal was almost the only country at the time that voted against Soviet Russia's admission to the League of Nations;<sup>3</sup> she has never accepted a Bolshevik diplomatic mission in her country, nor entered into any agreement with Soviet Russia, and no Soviet Russian has received permission to enter the country. Thousands of Portuguese volunteers gave their lives fighting Bolshevism during the Spanish Civil War.

Portugal's accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact would accordingly not signify that country's act of profession against Bolshevism, but merely the documentation by means of a treaty of a position widely known for a long time.

In this connection the question would be raised for Portugal whether such an action would outweigh the political risk involved. Portugal is today a country still dependent on England economically: the coal she needs comes from England, and no hundredweight of cargo can come from the colonies to the mother country without the English navicert. The fact, on the other hand, that despite her old alliance with England, Portugal strictly adheres to neutrality and, especially, that she maintains friendly trade relations with Germany and sup-

<sup>1</sup> Marginal note: "Original submitted to the Foreign Minister. Nov. 15."

<sup>2</sup> Spain joined the Anti-Comintern Pact on Mar. 27, 1939. See vol. III of this series, document No. 768.

<sup>3</sup> On Sept. 17, 1934.

plies her with critical raw materials, is annoying to the English in the highest degree, so that they are looking for any pretext to express their displeasure to the Portuguese Government and tighten the thumbscrews. England would immediately brand Portugal's accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact as a demonstration directed against herself, and Portugal would then be confronted with economic consequences difficult to calculate.

Several years ago, when the plan was under consideration to organize in Lisbon an Anti-Comintern Congress under predominantly German influence, I was instructed to make unofficial soundings as to whether the Portuguese Government would give its consent for it. Salazar let me know at the time that he would urgently request that such an idea be dropped because things might easily be said from the platform of such a congress, that went beyond the subject at hand, and would put a little country like Portugal under severe political strain.

With the war on, Portugal's situation now is much more delicate. While the Government, ideologically, would have no hesitation to place itself by a visible act on the side of the other opponents of Bolshevism, it has to consider the consequences which such a step might have. In light of the political considerations outlined above, it must therefore be assumed that Portugal would decline any formal invitation to join the Anti-Comintern Pact at the present moment.

Submitted herewith to the State Secretary, as instructed.

HUENE

No. 477

261/170370-72

*The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

HELSINKI, November 17, 1941—7: 53 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received November 17—9: 15 p. m.

No. 1332 of November 17

With reference to your telegram No. 1469.<sup>1</sup>

(1) The President, who had spent the week-end in the country, received me this afternoon in an interview lasting more than one and a half hours.

(2) After I had carried out my instructions the President, having particularly requested me to treat his remarks confidentially, drew

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 472.

a picture of the situation and morale in terms that were gloomier than my other information would indicate.

The Army was tired out. At the front there had been cases of insubordination and of men going back home without official leave.

The transportation problem was very unsatisfactory due to heavy demands on rolling stock for Finnish and Germany military movements.<sup>2</sup>

The food situation was much worse than had been expected, due to early frost, a poor harvest, and a shortage of labor.<sup>3</sup>

English radio broadcasts in the Finnish language were exploiting this and were drumming into the heads of the Finns that they were fighting and starving for Germany.

In view of the mood prevalent in the country this did not seem to him to be the right moment for joining the Anti-Comintern Pact.

I replied that I had not come to request Finnish troops for military operations or Finnish railway cars for German use or Finnish foodstuffs for the German market, but merely to propose to him accession to a Pact which had the same content as the Finnish reply to the United States.<sup>4</sup>

The date for joining was fixed by circumstances which we could not alter.

(4) In discussing the nature of the present Pact and its repercussions on Finland's relations with foreign countries I stressed that this would not involve Finland in the German-English war, and that Finland would retain her special status, and that the similar anti-Communist attitudes of Germany and Finland would now be put in a definite contractual framework.

(5) When the President returned to the subject of public sentiment and intimated that the English radio would depict Finland's accession as a sign that Finland was completely harnessed to Germany's chariot, I disputed the existence of any causal relations between accession and popular feeling. If the latter had to be considered at all, then it should rather be assumed that the numerically weak Finnish people would gain relief in the realization that the Pact lessens or removes the Bolshevik menace.

(6) The President asked which countries had been invited to join the Pact. I said that I was uninformed on this. The President then

<sup>2</sup> In telegram No. 1239 of Nov. 1 (260/170281-83) Blücher reported a Finnish memorandum stating the need for 100-150 locomotives, for 4000-8000 railway cars, and for a great number of automobiles with tires and gasoline if the crisis in transportation were to be overcome.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 423.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 461, footnote 2.

remarked that it would create an especially favorable impression in Finland if Norway and Denmark were also invited.

(7) The President then cautiously stated his misgivings that too much publicity was planned for the signing. I answered that I had no information about such details, but that I would be glad to pass on his comment.

(8) In the last phase of the conversation I felt it appropriate to point out to the President the situation in which Finland would find herself if, among the countries militarily engaged against the Soviet Union, she alone declined to sign the Pact. With the ink not yet dry on the reply sent to the United States this would mean a departure from the clear-cut anti-Communist policy pursued heretofore, would cause a major sensation in Russia, England, and America and would supply the English with radio propaganda material which would dwarf anything so far.

The President seemed impressed by this argument.

(9) In conclusion the President said to me that as far as he personally was concerned he was in principle in favor of joining, but did not wish to act against the Cabinet. The Cabinet would meet this very day. The Foreign Minister would sponsor the matter, and he, the President, planned to attend the meeting. The Foreign Minister is supposed to let me know the outcome after the meeting.<sup>5</sup>

I refrained from (one group missing) that he alone had the constitutional power to make the decision.

(10) May I add for the sake of completeness that as the conversation progressed the President managed to find a few brighter sides to the gloomy picture of the situation which he had sketched at the beginning. He believed, of course, that Finland could overcome these difficulties. After that, and especially after the older classes of soldiers were discharged, morale would improve of its own accord. For that matter, the German Army Command had always viewed with sympathy the necessity of reducing the Finnish army. Opposition to this had come from naval officers.

BLÜCHER

<sup>5</sup> In telegram No. 1336 of Nov. 18 (4963/E276595-96) Blücher reported that Witting told him that the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee brought out views similar to those of the President and the Foreign Minister but that the general attitude had been positive. A decision would be reached the following day. In telegram No. 1340 of Nov. 19 (4963/E276593) Blücher reported that the Foreign Affairs Committee had unanimously approved Finland's accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact.

No. 478

405/214059-64

*The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT  
No. 3631

PARIS, November 17, 1941—10:20 p. m.  
Received November 17—12:00 midnight.<sup>1</sup>

For the Foreign Minister.

Report on the trip to Vichy November 15-16, 1941.

1. Funeral of General Huntziger.<sup>2</sup>

The German and Italian delegations were treated with the greatest attentiveness under protocol, and their participation was very much stressed in Admiral Darlan's address as well as in the press and radio. Marshal Pétain, too, asked me several times to transmit to the Führer his thanks for the honor done to General Huntziger, which had deeply moved him.

The funeral mass was celebrated by a mission priest in the presence of the Primate of Gaul, Cardinal Archbishop Gerlier. It was indicative of the inner connection between the French Army and the Church that themes of French military marches with fanfares and drums were inserted into the religious music of this mass.

In contrast to the religious portion of the funeral, which was carried out in grand style in the Church of St. Louis, solidarity was lacking in the subsequent military parade. The march-past of the infantry, of the artillery, as well as of the motorized formations was carried out in deficient style. In the case of the cavalry the undernourishment and poor care of the horses was noticeable.

Whereas the facial expressions of the officers betrayed a controlled fanaticism, the majority of the men exhibited total lack of interest and obvious opposition.

Marshal Pétain and Admiral Darlan are said to have had such an unfavorable impression of the parade that they intend to relieve the Commanding General of Vichy responsible for it from his post.

2. Political atmosphere in Vichy.

I used the time between the funeral and the arrival of the Führer's letter to Marshal Pétain<sup>3</sup> for conversations with political personages of the French Government, of the opposition and of other countries.

These conversations confirmed that de Gaullism has greatly receded in unoccupied France, too, and the animosity against England has increased. The anti-German circles are today taking shelter all the more decidedly behind the United States.

<sup>1</sup> Marginal note: "Forwarded as No. 3835 to Special Train, Nov. 18."

<sup>2</sup> General Huntziger, French Minister of War, was killed on Nov. 12 when his plane crashed in fog at La Vigan, near Nîmes.

<sup>3</sup> Document No. 460.

Marshal Pétain, too, is said to have been won over to the idea of a possible mediating role for America at the conclusion of the peace and therefore to the policy of maintaining good relations with the United States. America's siding with Soviet Russia, however, and the great German victories in the eastern campaign had made him somewhat uncertain in this attitude.

Primarily the experts in the economic and nutritional agencies seem to be speaking against measures and statements which could annoy America. Inadequate nutrition is much more prevalent in unoccupied France than in occupied France and is said to have reached the lowest point of the German nutritional situation in 1917 and 1918 in several départements. If the ship cargoes that are still arriving with Anglo-Saxon consent should be stopped, then according to the Ministries of Food and Economy the nutrition in the unoccupied area would be reduced by another 15 per cent.

In domestic policy Vichy still offers the picture of small groups that fight one another less because of conflicting ideology than in the interest of private power positions. The personal entourage of the Marshal, which is composed of entirely insignificant but very ambitious intriguers, has still not been changed in spite of a number of announcements by members of the Government in opposition to it.

In the Veterans' Legion, which should form the basis for a unified party, a lively fight for the decisive influence has broken out between Church, Army, and big industry. The circles which are feuding with one another in the Government, in the entourage of the Marshal, and in the Legion are, however, united in their hostility against the political groups, the veterans' associations, and the professional classes in the occupied area; they are so stubborn in this enmity that we do not have to fear any reconciliation of the existing antagonisms within the foreseeable future.

According to a reliable source Cardinal Gerlier, Archbishop of Lyon, together with the lower clergy, is working for a unification of the anti-German leftist circles, and for this purpose had taken up secret connection not only with the head of the Protestant Church, Pastor Boegner, but also with the Masonic lodges, which were dissolved, and the Grand Rabbi of France.

### 3. The delivery of the Führer's letter to Marshal Pétain.

The delivery occurred on Sunday, November 16, at 11:00 a. m.

Marshal Pétain, who read the letter in my presence, showed himself to be very much impressed by the Führer's position on the assassinations of members of the Wehrmacht in occupied France. He stated that the French Government had spared no attempt and would try everything to combat these cowardly crimes, which were condemned unanimously and most strongly by the French population, and to

punish the culprits with the death sentence which they deserved. In full appreciation of the measures necessary and taken for the security of the occupation power, however, he feared very sincerely that the reprisals ordered could endanger the psychological prerequisites among the French people for the policy of collaboration with Germany which the French Government was striving for.

Marshal Pétain then went over to the question of collaboration with Germany and said regretfully that the assassinations, which should perhaps not even be put to the account of the French people, and the de Gaullist talk of irresponsible circles had received greater attention in Germany than the services of the French people and the French Government which demonstrated their good will. Since the armistice there was not one single act of the French Government, from Oran,<sup>4</sup> Dakar,<sup>5</sup> and Syria<sup>6</sup> up to the admission of Japanese forces into Indochina<sup>7</sup> and the heroically executed hunger fight in Djibouti,<sup>8</sup> that had not been directed against England.

In the interior of France, too, in both the occupied and the unoccupied area, the French Government had done everything to support the German war effort, the interests of the German occupation authority, and the German armaments beyond the obligations incurred in the Armistice Treaty. He was willing, with the authority which he possessed among the French people, to support fully the propaganda for German-French collaboration and as the Chief of State of France to declare before the world that he voluntarily recognized Adolf Hitler as the leader of Europe. He asked that it be understood, however, that he could only justify such far-reaching willingness before public opinion if he had in his hands at least the broad outlines of a plan of how Germany as the victor power intended to organize German-French relations.

With the request for such a *plan* Marshal Pétain evidently wanted to come back to the proposal in the French note of July 14<sup>9</sup> which was rejected by the Reich Government, and I therefore replied that in my opinion there existed an entirely clear plan for all of Europe and thus also for France, namely to conquer as quickly and as completely as possible the enemies of Europe, Russia, and the Anglo-Saxon powers. The extent to which the European nations participated in the realization of this plan would certainly also determine their later position and their weight in the new Europe. The ques-

<sup>4</sup> See vol. x of this series, document No. 93.

<sup>5</sup> See vol. xi of this series, document No. 112.

<sup>6</sup> See document No. 165.

<sup>7</sup> See document No. 126.

<sup>8</sup> In July 1941 the French forces in Djibouti had declared their allegiance to the Vichy Government and in spite of a British blockade, refused to surrender; they held out until December 1942.

<sup>9</sup> Document No. 113, enclosure.

tion of a collaboration of Germany with France was a question of Germany's confidence in France. The Führer's letter permitted no doubt that the removal of Laval from the Government on December 13, 1940,<sup>10</sup> had very severely endangered this confidence; a removal of Weygand, on the other hand, could contribute to a lessening in the justified mistrust.

Marshal Pétain replied that he well knew the importance of the Weygand problem for German-French collaboration and had prepared his recall. Owing to the possible repercussions on public opinion in North Africa, however, he wanted to undertake it in two stages. He wanted first to deprive Weygand of the supreme military command in North Africa and then, at a later time, relieve him of the mandate for the economic and political coordination of the North African areas.

I explained to Marshal Pétain that the mistrust on the part of the German authorities was directed primarily against Weygand's political and economic arrangements with representatives of the United States, and consequently the proposed solution was entirely unsatisfactory even though it was only a temporary one.

At this moment of the conversation Admiral Darlan and State Secretary Benoist-Méchin, who were present, took a greater part in the conversation, saying that they would find a solution for the Weygand problem in agreement with Marshal Pétain which would be satisfactory to us.<sup>11</sup> Simultaneously with the recall of Weygand they want to ask the Reich Government for the institution of military conversations concerning the defense of North and West Africa. West Africa in particular could be held in case of an Anglo-Saxon attack only through offensive measures against the contiguous English possessions, and, from a certain time on, such operations could not be carried out successfully without German assistance.

In conclusion Marshal Pétain said that he assumed that the Führer probably did not expect an answer to the letter delivered, since this was an answer to his, Pétain's letter.<sup>12</sup> He therefore asked me to convey his thanks for this letter and to inform the Reich Government how moved he was by the respectful terms with which the Führer had referred to him in the letter.

During the conversation with Marshal Pétain and in subsequent conversations with Admiral Darlan and Benoist-Méchin I gained the impression that the Führer's letter is a wholesome lesson for the

<sup>10</sup> See vol. XI of this series, document No. 510.

<sup>11</sup> The recall of General Weygand was officially announced by Vichy on Nov. 20, 1941.

<sup>12</sup> Transmitted in telegram No. 3274 of October 22 (document No. 417).

French Government, which in the narrow outlook of Vichy inclines to overlook the significance of the revolutionary events in Europe and to lose its sense of reality, in particular when this is disagreeable for France.

4. The probable reassignment of the military command positions in the War Ministry and in North Africa.

I found the conjectures expressed in my telegram No. 3556 of November 13<sup>13</sup> concerning the reassignment of the military command positions after the death of Huntziger to be confirmed in their essentials in Vichy. The transfer of the War Ministry to General Juin is said to be already definite, and General Dentz is designated as his successor in the military command of Morocco in spite of the resistance of the Army. Darlan intends to take over personally for the time being the military command of all of the African territories in his capacity as Minister for the National Defense, and he believes that Weygand, disgruntled over the loss of his military position, will also give up his mandate, left to him temporarily, for the economic and political coordination of North Africa.<sup>14</sup>

ABETZ

<sup>13</sup> Not printed (405/214035).

<sup>14</sup> In telegram No. 3682 of Nov. 21 (405/214082-83) Abetz reported that General Olbry, who was near retirement, would take over as Minister of War and General Juin would become his successor. For the time being Juin assumed the supreme military command in French North Africa.

No. 479

62/42428-34

*Memorandum by the Dirigent of the Political Department*

TOP SECRET

WESTFALEN, November 17, 1941.

Pol. VI 1212g. Rs.

For State Secretary Freiherr von Weizsäcker.

The Foreign Minister has shown to the Führer the attached memorandum on the development of the relationship between Germany and Denmark. The Führer, after studying the memorandum, expressed his satisfaction with the policy pursued and said he believed that we should continue along the present course.

The Foreign Minister requests that you inform the interested gentlemen of the Political Department and the Department for German Internal Affairs as well as Minister von Renthe-Fink in Copenhagen of the memorandum and the Führer's comment.

V. RINTELEN



[Enclosure]

WESTFALEN, November 11, 1941.

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE FÜHRER

The political debate held in the Danish Parliament at the end of October has prompted a review of the development of the German-Danish relationship since the country was occupied last year in April. Its result is as follows:

1. Results of cooperation with the Danish Government, utterly alien though it may be to us from an ideological point of view, by and large, has been satisfactory. None of the countries occupied by us is as peaceful and is offering so close and virtually trouble-free cooperation by its authorities as is Denmark. Maintenance of peace in the country requires only small German military forces. The Danish Government has to date always complied with our military demands and even approved the transfer of a number of Danish torpedo boats to the German Navy.<sup>1</sup>

The results of cooperation with the Danish Government are especially good in the economic field. The readjustment of the economic life of Denmark after cessation of the substantial imports from England and the overseas countries was effected more satisfactorily than could have been anticipated and Denmark is supplying Germany with food products in the largest possible amounts. Denmark's industry has been put to work extensively for our armament program, thanks to the positive cooperation of the Danish Government departments and the good will of the Danish population.

Regarding the sentiments of the Danish people toward Germany at this time, their foremost wish today is no doubt that the day would come when the German troops will leave Denmark again. The great majority of the Danes entertain the hope that Denmark's integration in the new Europe headed by Germany will be possible with the retention of the Danish Royal House, and Denmark's sovereignty and integrity, and they would like not to have the adjustment of their form of government to the new situation imposed from the outside.

2. The Danish National Socialist Workers party, headed by Clausen, has not succeeded so far in gaining much ground among the Danish people. It has been able to maintain its membership of 30,000, but has not shown any growth worth mentioning beyond that point. The Foreign Ministry has done everything in cooperation with the various party organs and party organizations in Germany to strengthen Clausen's DNSAP in every respect.<sup>2</sup> Dr. Benemann, a leader of the Hitler Youth, was attached to the German Legation in Copenhagen, and he has brought the youth leaders of the DNSAP together with the Hitler Youth and gave them an opportunity to study its installations and organization as well as its leadership schools. The Reich Labor Service sent Labor Service leader Scheifarth as adviser to Copenhagen; he has organized a Labor Service

camp where the followers of the Clausen Movement are trained as leaders of the Danish Labor Service, which is to be organized later. Young Danish Labor Service leaders are continually sent to the Labor Service schools in Germany. Attached to the Copenhagen Legation as adviser on women's questions is Frau Hein of the Reichs-frauenführung, who is giving the DNSAP advice and practical guidance for work among women. Sturmbannführer von Loew of the SS-Reichsführung assures continuing liaison between the DNSAP and the SS. The young activists of the DNSAP are now serving in the Waffen SS and the Danish Legion. The German Legation in Copenhagen has moreover given considerable assistance in building up the newspaper of the Clausen Movement, *Fædrelandet*, and provided for central control of the DNSAP from Copenhagen by setting up the necessary departmental offices in the city. The subsidies supplied up to now to the DNSAP by the Legation total 3.3 million crowns (about 1.6 million reichsmarks). Financial assistance during the current quarter year has been over half a million crowns (about 260,000 reichsmarks).

Politically, the Clausen Movement has received very effective assistance from the Reich Plenipotentiary in Copenhagen as a result of which the Danish Government had to rescind the ban on meetings issued against the Clausen Movement, release the National Socialists arrested in connection with various incidents, and remove the chief enemies of the Clausen Movement from their position. In this way, changes in the posts of the Minister of Justice and the Police President of Copenhagen were effected, and the conservative, anti-German member of Parliament Møller had to lay down his mandate,<sup>3</sup> while the Social Democrat Hansen had to resign from the leadership of the labor unions.

A coup d'état by Clausen is precluded by the opposition of the great majority of the Danish people to his aims. A legal transfer of power could not be accomplished owing to the old King's dislike of Clausen himself. We have hopes, however, that within the foreseeable future conditions enabling the Danish National Socialists to gain further ground will greatly improve also in Denmark under the impact of the tremendous successes of National Socialism in Germany.

3. The line of policy pursued to date by the Reich Plenipotentiary in Copenhagen, Minister von Renthe-Fink, in accordance with my instructions, aims at achieving a synthesis of our present-day need for exploiting all economic resources to the fullest extent possible in Denmark, which will be the more effective the better we succeed in maintaining tranquillity in the country, and the necessity for providing for the future political evolution of Denmark through effectively assisting the Clausen Movement. This synthesis has been realized so far by proceeding with caution and avoiding any hasty action in supporting the Clausen Movement. The drawback inherent in this is a development at such a slow rate that a genuine change of sentiment in the great mass of the Danish people must await Germany's final victory.

<sup>1</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 101, footnote 2.

<sup>2</sup> In a memorandum of Nov. 7 (945/300030-33) Rademacher recorded in detail the assistance given by the Foreign Ministry to the DNSAP.

<sup>3</sup> On the Møller case see vol. XI of this series, document No. 537 and footnotes 1 and 2.

I request a directive by the Führer whether he agrees that the policy pursued in the past and set forth above should be continued or whether he wishes that the pace be stepped up by more active support for the National Socialist movement in the country even at this time; in that case, however, internal political difficulties which are to be expected and certain repercussions in the economic field and on matters concerning the occupation forces would have to be accepted.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> See, further, document No. 518, footnote 6.

### No. 480

82/60875-78

#### *The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry*

##### Telegram

MOST URGENT TOKYO, November 18, 1941—11:50 a. m., summer time.  
No. 2472 of November 18 Received November 19—6:10 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

As was to be expected, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister speaking before the Diet<sup>1</sup> indicated a desire not to exclude the possibility of an agreement with the United States of America. On the other hand the demands set forth by the Prime Minister show that unless there is a complete reversal of American policy a change of direction can hardly be brought about. It is to be expected that the conflict between the activists and the advocates of peace at any price will enter a decisive stage.

In my reports I have repeatedly pointed out that after the experiences at Nomonhan<sup>2</sup> and in view of the Russian resistance to an army such as the German Army, the activists consider participation in the war against the Soviet Union too risky and also too unprofitable. I refer to the statements made at the time by the present Prime Minister (cf. my telegram No. 1974 of October 4).<sup>3</sup> On the other hand the plans for a push to the south have now been tackled in earnest by the armed forces, according to reliable reports. Following a recently reported discreet feeler from the Navy concerning a German promise not to conclude a separate peace or an armistice in the event of a Japanese-American war (cf. my telegram No. 2331 of November 5),<sup>4</sup> the Chief of the Department's Foreign Armies, General (here

<sup>1</sup> The main sections of an English text of Prime Minister Tojo's address in the Diet on Nov. 17 were reported by Ott in telegram No. 2462 of Nov. 17 (82/60862-66), the essential points of Foreign Minister Togo's speech in telegram No. 2459 of Nov. 17 (82/60859-61).

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 276, footnote 3.

<sup>3</sup> Document No. 378.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 451, footnote 3.

the name, apparently "Okamoto", is left out), obviously on orders from above, made the following statement to the Military Attaché,<sup>5</sup> with the request that it be transmitted.

The dispatch of Kurusu is a last attempt to settle Japanese-American relations. The Japanese General Staff is not reckoning with the possibility of a peaceful settlement. The necessity to help herself that would then arise for Japan will probably lead to entry into the war by the United States. This fact which is perhaps incomprehensible to Germany at the moment is however actually advantageous when everything is considered. The Japanese thrust to the south—there cannot be any question of anything else—will come well before the Germans shift the main point of their efforts to the eastern Mediterranean and the Near East. In view of the geographical separation of the two theaters of war, the Near and the Far East, direct operational cooperation is in any case not possible. In the opinion of the Japanese General Staff the best mutual support for the two states, Germany and Japan, would be to obligate themselves not to conclude any armistice or peace separately but only jointly. As yet he could give no details even to him [the Military Attaché] of the planned Japanese operations in the south.

In my opinion, which coincides with that of the Armed Forces Attachés, General Okamoto's statement, paralleled by a similar approach involving the Navy, is to be understood in the sense that an officially conceived approach has now been made [by the Japanese Armed Forces—in other words, by the governing factor in Japan.

I have heretofore avoided getting into any discussion of this line of thinking and, in accordance with the instructions for the guidance of my conversations which I have received (cf. your telegram No. 2047),<sup>6</sup> have in effect stated in conversations, as have the Armed Forces Attachés, that Japan can risk any thrust in the East without any danger of American-English intervention, provided that no American sovereign territory (the Philippines) is affected by such an action. The Japanese to whom I have spoken have always indicated, however, that in the event of an action in the south it seemed to them impossible for military reasons to leave the Philippines out.

Since an attack against the United States by the Japanese falls outside the cases envisaged in the Tripartite Pact and, contrary to the line heretofore adhered to by the German Government, is apparently supposed to entail an open break by Germany with the United States, I request basic instructions.<sup>7</sup> If the Japanese suggestion is accepted, I should like to propose as a precaution that, among others, the question

<sup>5</sup> Colonel Kretschmer.

<sup>6</sup> Document No. 458.

<sup>7</sup> See document No. 487.

of future imports of raw materials from the Far East, as well as the question of imports of war material via Vladivostok, be taken up.

The Military Attaché will report in a corresponding telegram about the Japanese forces available for an operation in the south.<sup>8</sup>

OTT

<sup>8</sup> Document No. 486.

## No. 481

405/214071-72

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Paris*

Telegram

SPECIAL TRAIN, November 18, 1941—10:45 p. m.

No. 1293 of November 18 from Special Train

Received Berlin, November 18—11:30 p. m.

No. 5136 of November 18

from the Foreign Ministry

Sent November 18.

RAM 513/R

For the Ambassador personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 3431 of November 3.<sup>1</sup>

Please inform the French Chief of State through Ambassador de Brinon that we suggest that he meet with Reichsmarschall Göring in the course of the coming week at a place in the occupied area. The exact time and place are being left open.

For your information:

It is intended to arrange the meeting between Reichsmarschall Göring and Marshal Pétain in a way similar to the meeting at Montoire.<sup>2</sup> Accordingly the meeting should take place in a small French railroad station suitably situated, where the Reichsmarschall will receive the French Chief of State in his train. The meeting point will be located in such a way that it is not too far distant from the line of demarcation, so as to facilitate the trip for Marshal Pétain.

Please point out to Ambassador de Brinon particularly that the meeting should be kept secret.<sup>3</sup>

RIBBENTROP

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 445.

<sup>2</sup> See vol. XI of this series, document No. 227.

<sup>3</sup> For an account of the Göring-Pétain meeting see document No. 529.

## No. 482

2361/488768-70

*The Ambassador in Turkey to the Foreign Ministry*

No. A 5881

ANKARA, November 18, 1941.

POLITICAL REPORT

Subject: Turkish imports under the "Lend-Lease Law."

As indicated in the appended memorandum,<sup>1</sup> M. Saracoglu informed me yesterday in the presence of Minister Dr. Schmidt concerning the fact that for a year Turkey has been receiving goods and war material contracted for by England out of American deliveries under the Lend-Lease Law. However, the Americans have now insisted on delivering these goods directly to Turkey in the future in accordance with the agreements with England, according to which such goods may not be re-exported.<sup>2</sup> They intend to release a statement on this in the near future.<sup>3</sup>

I naturally told MM. Saracoglu and Numan that this was a political matter of the first order. It was to be anticipated that the Anglo-American bloc would exploit it propagandistically in the biggest possible way, pointing out that Turkey, too, had now joined the ranks of countries receiving help and assistance under the Lend-Lease Law for the defense of the democracies against the aggressor states.

On the occasion of the reception which I gave in the evening in honor of Minister Dr. Schmidt, Herr Kroll continued the conversations with M. Numan<sup>4</sup> and I with M. Saracoglu concerning these matters. I pointed to the very bad impression which such propaganda would necessarily and justifiably make on us, as well as to the difficult situation in which Turkey was involving herself.

Both men admitted this. However, they stressed repeatedly that there was no other possibility for Turkey to obtain vital materials. This fact cannot be contested, especially since according to yesterday's communication from the Naval War Staff, the transports up to now routed from Trieste through the Aegean are being discontinued because of the danger in the Aegean, and thus until completion of the railroad connection there is really no possibility of sending Turkey the goods which we promised her by treaty.

<sup>1</sup> Papen memorandum of Nov. 17 (2361/488771-75).

<sup>2</sup> For United States policy regarding Lend-Lease aid to Turkey, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. III, pp. 833-936.

<sup>3</sup> According to a White House release of Dec. 3 the President had found the defense of Turkey vital to the defense of the United States and had directed Lend-Lease Administrator E. R. Stettinius, Jr. to see that the Turkish defense needs were filled as fast as possible. See Rosenman, *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, vol. X, p. 511.

<sup>4</sup> Kroll recorded these talks in a memorandum of Nov. 18 (2361/488765-67).

The Turkish Government takes the position that it is its national duty to utilize every possibility of strengthening its military position. It makes no difference to the Turkish Government whether it receives these goods as in the past through England, or now directly from the United States. The repeal of the Neutrality Law<sup>5</sup> would incidentally make it possible for American steamers to bring these goods to Istanbul without our being legally able to intervene.

M. Saracoglu emphasized to me several times yesterday evening that if the United States would try to exploit the fact of the delivery propagandistically by stating that Turkey had thereby practically moved to the side of the democracies, it would receive an appropriate reply.

I see no practical possibility of changing in any way the fact that Turkey is consenting to these deliveries, and I believe that I should propose the following position for the propagandistic treatment on our part:

Any military strengthening of Turkey can only be welcomed by us. The fact that we ourselves desire this is underlined by the treaty under which we ourselves deliver war material to Turkey.<sup>6</sup> We know exactly that even though such deliveries come from America they will not move Turkey one inch away from the policy which is dictated by Turkey's own well-understood interest.

For the United States to exploit for propagandistic purposes the fact of such deliveries, which come about only because England herself is unable to make deliveries, only demonstrates once more Roosevelt's bellicose intention of extending the war also to countries that have so far been peaceful.

By such an interpretation we would give the Turkish press a good cue and would then be in a position to exploit Turkish press comments in our favor.

I shall report on the further development of the matter.<sup>7</sup>

PAPEN

<sup>5</sup> See document No. 470 and footnote 2.

<sup>6</sup> See document No. 390 and footnote 7.

<sup>7</sup> In telegram No. 1814 of Dec. 5 (2361/488801-02) Weizsäcker pointed out that an official statement by President Roosevelt had meanwhile been issued (see footnote 3) regarding the extension of Lend-Lease to Turkey and that great significance was attributed to the matter in the British and American press. Papen was therefore instructed to request a Turkish statement confirming the fact that Turkey did not commit herself to making any political or economic concessions in return for Lend-Lease deliveries.

In telegram No. 1617 of Dec. 8 (265/173438-39) Kroll reported having carried out this démarche with Saracoglu who denied that political considerations had any part in the extension of Lend-Lease to Turkey. Saracoglu stated that he had done his part by insisting on a change in President Roosevelt's statement and emphasized that Turkey's unequivocal foreign policy position was known to Germany.

No. 483

71/50952-53

*The Director of the Political Department to the Embassy in Italy*<sup>1</sup>

Telegram

BERLIN, November 19, 1941.

[No. 3132]<sup>2</sup>

[Received November 20—8:45 a. m.]

Subject: Declaration Regarding Arabia.

For Ambassador von Mackensen.

In order to give manifest expression to the Arab policy of the Axis Powers, the idea has been considered here, in accordance with the suggestions from various sides, to set up a council of Arab leaders. There would be available for this purpose, for example, the Grand Mufti and, after his arrival in Europe, the former Iraq Prime Minister, Gay-lani, and the well-known Arab freedom fighter, Fawzi al-Qawuqchi, and others.

The Foreign Minister, however, is of the opinion that Rome rather than Berlin should be considered for the headquarters of such a council of leaders, while perhaps some sort of a Berlin office of this agency could be visualized.

The Foreign Minister requests that you inform the Italian Government confidentially of this view of ours and inquire if it already has any plans in this regard, and what they are.

Report by wire.<sup>3</sup>

WOERMANN

<sup>1</sup> Marginal note: "On the basis of the instruction of the Foreign Minister, forwarded by Minister von Rintelen."

<sup>2</sup> The number and the date of receipt of this telegram are supplied from the copy in the files of the Rome Embassy (2281/482685).

<sup>3</sup> In telegram No. 3013 of Nov. 20 (71/50957) Mackensen reported that he had carried out the instruction. Ciano stated that the Italians had similar ideas and that he was in full agreement with Ribbentrop, "i.e., a council of leaders with headquarters in Rome and an office in Berlin under the former."

No. 484

205/143102-03

*The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

STOCKHOLM, November 20, 1941—1:25 p. m.

No. 1956 of November 20

Received November 20—1:25 p. m.

On the 19th of this month I took occasion to discuss again with the Swedish Foreign Minister the question of assistance for our troops fighting in Finland. I pointed out in this connection the unfavorable

impression that the complete refusal to supply articles of winter equipment had made, since it was precisely on this point that we had expected a speedy contribution from Sweden in the fight against Bolshevism. Günther replied that the Swedish Government had had to refuse to give over wool and leather goods because the British Government, to judge from experience, would immediately cut off imports of the necessary raw materials via Göteborg.<sup>1</sup> In this respect it was immaterial whether the Swedish Government had made available out of its supplies one piece or 200,000 pieces of the desired woolen goods. To my objection that the British Government would think it over twice before stopping the Göteborg traffic, as indicated by the circumstances, M. Günther stated that our assumption was incorrect, for the Göteborg trade was authorized by the British for a short period, and the Swedish Government was faced with the necessity of negotiating repeatedly in London for the continuance of these very vital imports.<sup>2</sup> Since the Anglo-American threat of war against Finland,<sup>3</sup> the English attitude on this point had stiffened considerably. It had to be pointed out that Sweden had deviated from her neutral attitude during this war only in favor of Germany, and these facts would naturally be carefully noted in London. The fuel, for instance, that was coming in via Göteborg was eking out the supplies of the Swedish Navy, which, since the outbreak of the German-Soviet war, was rendering continual convoy service for German troops and goods.

WIED

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 357.<sup>2</sup> See document No. 91.<sup>3</sup> See documents Nos. 461 and 533.

## No. 485

4963/E276591

*The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

[HELSINKI, November 20, 1941]<sup>1</sup>

TOP SECRET

No. 1352 of November 20

With reference to my telegram No. 1351.<sup>2</sup>

(1) The President has decided to empower the Foreign Minister to take steps necessary for Finland's participation in the international anti-Comintern program.

<sup>1</sup> The document printed here is from the files of the Legation in Helsinki. No dates or times of dispatch or arrival appear on this copy.<sup>2</sup> In this telegram of November 20 (4963/E276592) Blücher reported that he had carried out the joint démarche with the Japanese and Italian Ministers, inviting Finland formally to join the Anti-Comintern Pact.

This signifies acceptance of the invitation to accede.

(2) The Rumanian Government inquired of the Finnish Government as to how it wished to stand on the question of adhering to the Anti-Comintern Pact. The Rumanian Government added that in its opinion the proposition came after the event.

(3) The Swedish Minister here<sup>3</sup> learned from Berlin about the extension of the Anti-Comintern Pact to include Finland. He asked an official of the Foreign Ministry here about it, but received an evasive reply.

BLÜCHER

<sup>3</sup> S. E. G. Sahlén.

## No. 486

82/60885-86

*The Embassy in Japan to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOKYO, November 21, 1941.

No. 2491 of November 20

Received November 21—12:52 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to telegram No. 2472 of November 18,<sup>1</sup> last paragraph, there follows below a report from the Military Attaché, in which the Naval Attaché<sup>2</sup> and the Air Attaché<sup>3</sup>, concur:

(1) The purpose of any Japanese operations in the south, the objectives of which are still kept secret as far as the Embassy is concerned, are probably

(a) Occupation of important areas for raw materials, especially for (group missing) and rubber,

(b) Securing their exploitation, including protection against English and American seizure.

(2) The following three operations, carried out successively or simultaneously, may therefore be expected:

(a) Occupation of Thailand, including the northern approach to the Malay Peninsula. This will probably not involve any fighting to speak of, except for clashes with British forces that might likewise move in. Finally, one may expect steps to guard against British Burma and the Chinese forces in Yunnan and at least to the cutting off of the British part of the Malay Peninsula, perhaps even to a land attack in the direction of Singapore.

(b) Occupation of important oil fields, at least those of British and Dutch Borneo, against only weak enemy resistance.

(c) In the event of a threatening American attitude, about which there can hardly be any doubt, a surprise attack on the Philippines,

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 480.<sup>2</sup> Rear Adm. Paul Wenneker.<sup>3</sup> Col. W. von Gronau.

particularly the Manila base, possession of which is generally termed vital in order to secure the gains.

(3) For an estimate of Japan's total forces see telegram No. 2430 of November 15.<sup>4</sup> Of these, there are available immediately for an operation in the south approximately: 15 divisions; 1,500 airplanes; the bulk of the fleet.

According to rumors the following Japanese land forces are grouped under the Supreme Command of Terauchi with Tsukada as Chief of Staff: South Indochina under Homma, North Indochina under Iida, Canton under Imamura, Formosa and Hainan under Yamashita.

(4) Possible enemy forces are estimated by the Japanese General Staff, at a maximum, as follows:

- (a) Malay Peninsula—48,000 men, 24 airplanes;
- (b) Burma—35,000 men, 60 airplanes;
- (c) North Borneo—3500 men;
- (d) Hongkong—13,000 men, 30 airplanes;
- (e) Netherlands Indies—70,000 men, 400 airplanes, both concentrated mainly in Java;

(f) Philippines—40,000 men, including only 8,000 Americans, 200 airplanes.

(5) Despite the Japanese Navy's superior strength and greater operational possibility, the relative strength of the land forces of the two sides is such that a quick and decisive Japanese victory can be expected only if there is complete surprise and a sharp concentration of forces on the primary targets.

KRETSCHMER  
OTT

<sup>4</sup> Not printed (82/60841-42).

No. 487

82/60879

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan*

Telegram

WESTFALEN, November 21, 1941.

TOP SECRET  
RAM 230  
No. 2136

With reference to your telegram No. 2472 of November 18.<sup>1</sup>

Please have the head of the Department of Foreign Armies informed orally of the following with respect to his statements, either by you yourself, or, if you consider it more appropriate, by the Military Attaché:

You had reported to Berlin regarding this statement and you understood that the idea that armistice or peace was to be concluded only jointly, in case Japan or Germany should become involved in a

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 480.

war with the USA, no matter for what reason, was considered a matter of course in Berlin; and that in Berlin they would be entirely inclined to lay down the necessary stipulations in an agreement providing for such a contingency.

Report by telegraph concerning execution.<sup>2</sup>

RIBBENTROP

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 492.

No. 488

82/60894-95

*The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT  
No. 2518 of November 22

TOKYO, November 22, 1941—10:40 p. m.  
Received November 23—3:30 a. m.

I was received by the Foreign Minister today after the end of the session of the Diet and the meeting of the Privy Council and I asked him for information about the status of the negotiations in Washington.

The Foreign Minister said he had promised at the beginning of November that the Japanese Government would take a very firm attitude,<sup>1</sup> and the negotiations were being conducted in accordance with that attitude. He had also stated this publicly in his speech before the Diet. He had not been able to give any information in the Diet about the content of the negotiations, since they were still in progress. He would give me the following explanatory information, with the request that it be treated confidentially:

In the negotiations the American Government had since April taken its stand on certain basic principles which it applied to developments in the Far East, and in accordance with which it wanted to deal with Japan. It still adhered to those principles. This made the negotiations difficult and it was impossible to predict future developments. In reply to my question whether those basic principles meant the Stimson doctrine, preservation of the territorial status quo, and the demand for an open door in China, Togo said that the question could not be answered in such clear-cut terms. However, it was primarily a question of the Stimson doctrine and principles of the Churchill-Roosevelt declaration.<sup>2</sup> The American Government had not, since he had been conducting the negotiations, expressly called the Japanese action in China aggression. But it obviously took this view. The American Government apparently had many wishes with regard to the Tri-

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 451.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 209, footnote 2.

partite Pact. The Japanese Government had stated, however, that the Tripartite Pact was an unalterable fact. Although this caused a certain dissatisfaction on the part of the American Government, no concrete demands had thus far been brought up with regard to the Tripartite Pact. At the moment he could not make any further statements. I shall continue trying to get continuous information, making use of your telegram No. 2135 of November 20.<sup>3</sup>

OTT

<sup>3</sup>This instruction by Weizsäcker (82/60887) referred to a report that the United States was keeping Great Britain informed about the Hull-Kurusu negotiations and pointed out that "this report will make it easier for you to obtain continuous information from the Japanese Foreign Ministry regarding the purpose and contents of these conversations."

No. 489

516/236144;  
516/236148-50

*The Head of Division W II in the Economic Policy Department  
to the Legation in Portugal*

BERLIN, November 22, 1941.

Ha. Pol. 7566 g.

Subject: The procurement of tungsten from Portugal.

A thorough discussion, regarding the measures to be taken by us, took place in the Foreign Ministry on November 18<sup>1</sup>; present were the Minister [to Portugal], Herr Eltze,<sup>2</sup> and representatives of the Ministry of Economics and of the High Command of the Wehrmacht (special staff HWK). The Ministry of Economics has been asked to carry out the resolutions and it has approached the Commissioner of the Four Year Plan with a copy of the letter of November 20, which is enclosed,<sup>3</sup> so as to receive authorization for the export of goods needed by Portugal, which will have to be given as compensation for the procurement of tungsten. I am transmitting this letter together with two enclosures,<sup>4</sup> for your information.<sup>5</sup>

By order:

SABATH

<sup>1</sup>The records of these meetings have not been found in the files of the Foreign Ministry. A memorandum by Sabath of Nov. 13 (516/236156-158) records a discussion on that day held in the Ministry of Economics.

<sup>2</sup>Chief of the *Ausfuhrgemeinschaft für Kriegsgerät*.

<sup>3</sup>Not printed (516/236145-47).

<sup>4</sup>One of the enclosures is printed below. The other, a memorandum by the Ministry of Economics of Nov. 20 (516/236151-53), dealt with the regulations to implement the private compensation transaction of tungsten against iron and nitrogen.

<sup>5</sup>In telegram No. 2912 of Dec. 22 (516/236155) Huene reported that because of political developments delays in the negotiations had occurred and that further discussions had been scheduled for between Christmas and the New Year.

Additional material on these negotiations has been filmed on serial 516.

[Enclosure]

NOVEMBER 20, 1941.

zu Ha. Pol. 7566 g.

Subject: Assuring an adequate supply of tungsten from Portugal.  
Exchange of Portuguese tungsten concentrate for German exports.

The heretofore free supply of tungsten from Portugal has been gravely jeopardized by the decree of the Portuguese Government establishing a control organ for tungsten mining and trade in Portugal.<sup>6</sup>

Herr Eltze (chief of the AGK) has gained the impression in personal talks with the Portuguese Minister President, Oliveira Salazar, that Portugal would be prepared to ensure Germany a certain monthly supply of tungsten concentrate if, in return, certain German articles urgently needed by Portugal were supplied.<sup>7</sup>

The internal political reason for the establishment of the control organ for tungsten production and trade in Portugal lay in the realization that the enormous increase in the price of tungsten might lead to heavy damage to Portugal's economic structure and to derangement of the heretofore stable wage and price level of the population. For that reason the Portuguese Minister President also emphasized in his talk with Herr Eltze that he attaches special importance to forcing down the price of tungsten to a reasonable level, about 15 RM per kg. of 65 percent ore (the present price is about 50 RM per kg. of 65 percent ore). He (the Portuguese Minister President) could, however, justify such a reduction in the price before his people only if he obtained, in return, important goods needed by all of the Portuguese people at "special prices."

In extensive talks held in the Ministry of Economics and in the Foreign Ministry on November 14 and 18, 1941, the situation was thoroughly discussed in the presence of all the participating departments. For the time being the following program was set up, subject to a binding commitment to make available the corresponding deliveries of German goods:

(1) The exchange of tungsten ore for German goods will be settled as a closed compensation transaction outside of the German-Portuguese clearing.

(2) The German side will be represented by a group formed by the Otto Wolff, Ferrostaal, Stahlunion, and Krupp firms with the coopera-

<sup>6</sup>The Legation in Lisbon reported the details of the controls in telegrams Nos. 2477 of Nov. 10 (516/236119-120) and 2505 of Nov. 12 (516/236122). The text of the government decree was sent with report No. 12907 of Nov. 20 (516/236128).

<sup>7</sup>No record of Eltze's conversation with Salazar has been found in the files of the Foreign Ministry. A memorandum of the Legation in Portugal of Nov. 12 (516/236113-118) records the changes in the structure of Portugal's foreign trade since August, and the difficulties arising from the competition of German firms.

tion of the nitrogen syndicate. The Gesellschaft für Elektrometallurgie in Berlin will act as the receiver and purchaser of the tungsten concentrate. On the Portuguese side the responsible body is still to be designated by the Portuguese Government. It probably will be the Minerio Silvicola Ltda., Lisbon, which today is already delivering by far the greatest share of tungsten to Germany.

(3) The agreements will be countersigned by the German Legation in Lisbon and by the Portuguese Ministry of Economic Affairs, under the obligation of seeing to it that the specific delivery commitments are fulfilled.

(4) Herr Eltze (chief of the AGK), who enjoys the special confidence of the Portuguese Minister President, will be appointed as authorized representative for the German suppliers and will, in close cooperation with the German Legation in Lisbon, conduct the negotiations in Portugal.

(5) Germany will undertake to deliver 60,000 tons of iron material (railway material, shipbuilding material, structural iron) at monthly rates of at least 5,000 tons; up to 15,000 tons of ammonium sulphate; 300 railway cars; mining machinery, compressed air drills [*Bohrhämmer*], and other mining installations valued at the equivalent of about 24 million RM. The basis for the price structure will be the normal price which was in effect for exports to Portugal before the outbreak of this war.

(6) The office designated by the Portuguese Government will deliver 250 tons of tungsten concentrate monthly to Germany at the price of 150 escudos per kg., that is, about 15 RM per kg. of 65 percent ore, valued at the equivalent of about 3,750,000 RM monthly—45,000,000 RM yearly.

(7) Herr Eltze will set up a head office in Portugal which will be charged with supervising the execution of this compensation transaction. The representatives of the German firms designated to make the deliveries under the agreement are to go exclusively by the guidelines and directions of the head office in Lisbon in submitting their offers.

(8) A compensation account will be set up in Germany in favor of the Portuguese party and in Portugal in favor of the German party. The difference between the monthly deliveries of Germany and those of Portugal will be compensated for by Germany through payment in cash.

(9) The Portuguese Government, through its control organ or other competent organizations in Portugal, will undertake to make available in due course all the quantities of tungsten concentrate scheduled for export to Germany at the fixed price of 14 RM per kg. of 65 percent ore.

BETHKE<sup>6</sup>

<sup>6</sup>Head of Division V So (Special assignments) in the Reich Ministry of Economics.

## No. 490

F5/0309

*German-Bulgarian Secret Additional Protocol to the Tripartite Pact Regarding the Press, News, and Propaganda*

[SOFIA, November 22, 1941.]

### I

In support of the Tripartite Pact of September 27, 1940,<sup>1</sup> concluded between Germany, Italy and Japan the Foreign Ministers of Germany and Bulgaria will take the necessary measures as speedily as possible to assure a cooperation which is in accordance with the spirit and the aims of the Pact in the sphere of press, news, and propaganda.

### II

For this purpose, each of the two Foreign Ministers will attach to the Legation of his country in the capital of the other country one or several particularly experienced specialists who will be in continuous consultation, in cooperation with the Foreign Ministry concerned, regarding the appropriate steps in the sphere of press, news and propaganda in order to promote the policy laid down in the Tripartite Pact concluded among Germany, Italy and Japan and to counteract the policy of the enemy powers.

### III

The Foreign Ministers will support the organizations of journalists of their respective countries in their professional cooperation in accordance with a view of the journalistic profession which is conscious of its responsibilities.

Signed in duplicate in the German language at Sofia, November 22, 1941.

For the Reich Foreign Minister:

Iv[AN] POPOV

*Royal Bulgarian Foreign Minister*

ADOLF HEINZ BECKERLE

*German Minister*

<sup>1</sup>For text of the Tripartite Pact, see vol. XI of this series, document No. 118. For Bulgaria's accession to the Pact, see vol. XII of this series, document No. 114.



No. 491

482/231268

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

BERLIN, November 22, 1941.

To: Department D.<sup>1</sup>

With reference to Memorandum D III 535 g of November 7 [October 25].<sup>2</sup>

The Führer decree of April 28 last<sup>3</sup> designates the Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry as the competent authority for dealing with all questions of a foreign policy nature arising in Serbia. Specifically (hence, as a matter within the scope of the Plenipotentiary's activity with regard to foreign policy) it is his task to forestall any activity by Serbian political elements that might be detrimental to the interests of the Reich.

Consequently, Minister Benzler, and with him the Foreign Ministry, will have to deal with the matter of the deportation of Jews from Serbia to other countries. However, it lies outside the responsibility of Benzler and the Foreign Ministry to do anything actively about the way the Jewish problem inside Serbia is being handled by the military and administrative authorities concerned. They receive their instructions in this matter, as we know, through channels other than the Foreign Ministry.

I have talked to Minister Benzler about this today. It will be advisable also to give him the appropriate instructions in writing.<sup>4</sup>

WEIZSÄCKER

<sup>1</sup> Marginal note: "D III. Please consult. Lu[ther,] Nov. 27."

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 425.

<sup>3</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 365, footnote 1.

<sup>4</sup> In a note of Dec. 12 (482/231254-55) Luther commented on Weizsäcker's memorandum by referring to the instructions received from Ribbentrop (see document No. 376, footnote 2) and stated the following:

"I must therefore assume that it was in accord with the Foreign Minister that the Foreign Ministry intervened in this certainly rather delicate matter. For this reason, and also because the matter is to be considered as settled any way, I consider it not advisable to give Minister Benzler appropriate instructions also in writing." The text of this note by Luther is printed in full in Poliakov and Wulf, *Das Dritte Reich und seine Diener*, pp. 32-33.

No. 492

82/60897-98

*The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 2526 of November 23

Tokyo, November 23, 1941—10:00 a. m.

Received November 24—3:00 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to your telegram No. 2136 of November 21.<sup>1</sup>

I first had the Military Attaché call on General Okamoto to carry out the foregoing telegraphic instruction orally, adding that I myself was available at any time for a discussion.

General Okamoto thereupon asked that I receive him and in an ensuing discussion stated the following:

The Japanese Minister of War extended his most sincere thanks to me for the statements made by the Military Attaché. He, Okamoto, was highly gratified to be reassured that in any conflict with the United States Germany would not leave Japan in the lurch. He asked to be informed whether in my opinion Germany would also consider herself at war with the United States if Japan should open hostilities against the latter. I referred to the wording of the foregoing telegraphic instruction and to our willingness to conclude a mutual agreement about the matter.

Okamoto stated that the Armed Forces assumed that a decision would soon be taken concerning an operation in the south. However, the outcome of the Kurusu talks would first have to be awaited. Although no absolute time limit had been fixed for these talks, the Armed Forces were pressing for speed, because the most favorable time of the year for an operation in the south was approaching.

Regarding the operational plans, I received the following impression from the conversation. Apparently a surprise occupation of Thailand extending about to the Isthmus of Kra is planned. Simultaneously, possession is to be taken of the oil fields of northern and eastern Borneo. It seems that no decision has been taken as yet on what is to be done about the Philippines. On the basis of previous instructions I said that if adequate armed forces were in readiness an attitude of waiting might be possible and advisable considering the weakness of the Americans, so that the United States may be saddled with the decision on entering the war which is a difficult one on grounds of domestic policy. I also called attention to the necessity of blockading American supply shipments to Vladivostok, which Okamoto seemed to understand.

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 487.

Okamoto thanked me for my statements and said he hoped that he would soon be able to inform me about the outcome of further deliberations by the Armed Forces. He requested that the conversation be treated confidentially and be restricted for the time being to Armed Forces channels.

I received the impression from the talk that the deliberations within the Armed Forces have become much more concrete, but that no decision has as yet been taken on the question of an operation in the south.

OTT

## No. 493

261/170878

*The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

TOP SECRET

HELSINKI, November 23, 1941—7:47 p. m.

No. 1371 of November 23

Received November 23—8:20 p. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 1504 of November 21.<sup>1</sup>

The promise has occasioned great joy here. The food supply situation here looked very critical. Despite the harvest the cities had bread for a few days only because of the supply difficulties. The Berlin promise arrived simultaneously with the favorable communication from Ramsay regarding Swedish help with butter and it appeared to be sufficient, because, according to a Finnish report, in addition to the promise of 75,000 tons it was promised in Berlin that in January Germany would again examine Finland's requirements and would not leave Finland in the lurch.

On the other hand according to the views of the agricultural experts the harvest is again judged in the last few days to be poorer. The former Minister of Agriculture Jännes told me that on the basis of the threshing results available to him the Finnish deficit would have to be estimated at 300,000 tons instead of 175,000.<sup>2</sup>

BLÜCHER

<sup>1</sup> In this telegram (5085H/E293014-15) Schnurre informed Blücher that after discussion with the Reich Food Ministry he had on Nov. 19 informed Kivimäki that Germany would supply Finland with 75,000 tons of grain during the current season.

Schnurre's memorandum of Nov. 18 (261/170876) indicates that he gave the assurances to Kivimäki on the day before, i.e., on Nov. 18.

<sup>2</sup> See also document No. 507 and footnote 1.

## No. 494

71/50959-61

*The Embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

PARIS, November 23, 1941—9:30 p. m.

No. 3715 of November 23

Received November 24—1:10 a. m.

Delayed by Interference!

Subject: German-Italian declaration on the independence of the Arab states in the Near East.<sup>1</sup>

With reference to your telegram No. 5171, of November 22, 1941.<sup>2</sup>

(1) The impression on France made by the brave fight of the Army of the Levant in Syria, which has been hailed and celebrated as proof of the will to preserve the empire, is still fresh. The projected declaration would give the impression that France's loyal attitude in this question is not being appreciated by the Axis Powers and that French blood was indeed shed in vain.

(2) This would also seriously weaken the will of people and army to defend North and West Africa, because the suspicion would at once arise that France would suffer a similar fate in these areas, too.

(3) It is impossible to judge from Paris whether a vigorous French defense of North and West Africa and of the coastal waters of these areas is less important for German strategy than the possible military repercussions of the planned declaration in the Arab world. In so far as Ibn Saud's emissary to Vichy, Fuad Hamza, is supposed to be promoting the project for this declaration, it seems to me important to note in judging him that he is said to have been sent to France originally upon English instigation and that in several cases he engaged in a whispering campaign in unoccupied France along cues supplied by the English.

(4) Before issuing the projected German-Italian declaration I feel that it is absolutely necessary to inform the French Government about it and to let the Government know that its economic and financial interests and even the opportunity to protect these by military measures, if necessary, would not be affected by granting sovereignty to Syria and Lebanon.

To be sure, information which is furnished the French Government solely on a confidential basis would not enable it to justify in a propagandistically effective manner before public opinion the position it has

<sup>1</sup> See documents Nos. 449 and 452.

<sup>2</sup> This telegram which, according to a notation on the margin, had the file number Pol. VII 7966 g. has not been found.

heretofore taken in the Syrian question, or the continuance of such a policy in other overseas areas.

The French Government itself surely realizes that due to the revolutionary events of this war radical changes are taking place also in the Levant and that France must limit herself in Syria and Lebanon to looking after her economic and financial interests.

The projected German-Italian declaration, however, would place those members of the Government who favor a policy of Franco-German collaboration in a difficult position, especially after having recently forced the resignation of Weygand a few days ago<sup>3</sup> which increases the danger of English attacks on North and West Africa, and would strengthen their opponents in their argument that Weygand had become the victim of a policy running counter to the true interests of France.

Our interests with respect to France would therefore be better served if, at the least, some later date were chosen for the issuing of the projected German-Italian declaration.<sup>4</sup>

ABETZ

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 478, footnote 11.

<sup>4</sup> In memorandum U. St.S. Pol. 1003 of Nov. 26 (71/50962-65) drawn up for the forthcoming talks with the Grand Mufti, attached to which was a revised text of the German-Italian declaration on Arab freedom, Woermann made the following comment regarding the points raised by Abetz in the document printed:

"With regard to the objections in consideration of France, expressed by Ambassador Abetz in telegram No. 3715 of Nov. 23 which is again enclosed, it will be possible to reply that in the treaty of Sept. 9, 1936, which was already signed but was subsequently not ratified out of consideration for England and for reasons of domestic policy, the French had already promised to Syria complete freedom, sovereignty, and independence; to be sure, this was linked to a commitment that foreign policy would be coordinated with that of France, and to certain French military rights which were couched in the form of assistance.

"On the other hand it will be possible to comply with the suggestion of Ambassador Abetz that the French be told before the declaration is issued that the French economic and financial interests in Syria will be taken into account.

"The promise 'to uphold' these interests should not be made as this would prejudice a settlement of the petroleum question."

With this Woermann memorandum there is in the files a note in Ribbentrop's handwriting (41/28285) which reads as follows:

"[For] F[ührer].

Grand Mufti reception

To promise in principle declaration of this kind

Time—to be decided later

Exact content—ditto

} to be discussed with the Italians."

No. 495

230/153452-53

*The Director of the Political Department to the Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the Military Commander in Serbia*

Telegram

No. 1631

BERLIN, November 24, 1941.

zu Pol. IV 6218g.<sup>1</sup> III.

[Pol. IV 1176 g. Rs.]<sup>2</sup>

For the Minister personally.

With reference to your report Kult. 3 No. 2 Albania of November 8<sup>3</sup> and your telegram No. 981 [891] of November 11.<sup>4</sup>

It is evident from the first-named report as well as from the report ethnic expert Dr. Feninger submitted with this that even today there is an inclination on the part of our military administration in the Mitrovica area to sympathize with anti-Italian Albanian elements.

It can be seen from the report of Governor General Jacomini to his Government, which you are familiar with, as well as from the interest which, as you know, Count Ciano has personally shown in the matter, that there is a suspicion in Italian quarters that certain German agencies wanted to bring about an "Irredentist Little Albania" in the Mitrovica area. We know from a report from our Consulate General in Tirana that arrived in the last few days<sup>5</sup> that the Italian High Command in Albania recently by means of a special secret order warned the Army and police command posts to be on their guard against certain Albanian leaders of bands because it is suspected that they were planning a meeting with other leaders of bands from the Mitrovica area supported by German quarters. In this order it is supposed to be expressly stated that Germany is interested in encouraging unrest in Albania. Similar instructions are supposed to have been sent to all Italian functionaries in Albania. The demands of the Albanians for the "flag of Mitrovica" is supposed to play a special role in the Italian anger.

It must in all circumstances be prevented that the Mitrovica area become a source of German-Italian misunderstandings and friction.

<sup>1</sup> Pol. IV 6218 g.: Not found.

<sup>2</sup> This number is taken from the reply, Belgrade telegram No. 976 of Nov. 28 (230/153456). See footnote 7.

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

<sup>4</sup> In this telegram (230/153448-50) Benzler admitted that some members of the local Arnaut population would be used in the administration and that the Arnaut element had a greater Albanian point of view and were anti-Italian and pro-German. But he denied the assertion that Albanians of Mitrovica were conspiring with Albanians beyond the border with the agreement of German agencies. He admitted that some members of the Wehrmacht had perhaps been indiscreet in their remarks about Italians.

<sup>5</sup> This is apparently a report of Nov. 18 (1517/372975-76) forwarded through the Embassy in Rome as No. 2978 on Nov. 19.

I request you therefore to discuss the entire affair once more with the military commander<sup>6</sup> and ask him to see that by means of clear instructions to the local military authorities in the Mitrovica area nothing more happens in the future that could arouse in the Italians the justified suspicion of German support for an Albanian Irredentist movement in the Mitrovica area. In particular it will be advisable in this sense if possible for the military administration not to use any political refugees from Old Albania.<sup>7</sup>

WOERMANN

<sup>6</sup>General Franz Böhme, Plenipotentiary Commanding General, Serbia. See document No. 326.

In a telegram of the same date, Nov. 24 (No. 22 of Tirana: 1517/372992), Woermann directed the Consul General to withdraw from any connection with such Albanian groups as were working for annexation of the Mitrovica area to Albania.

<sup>7</sup>In telegram No. 976 of Nov. 28 (230/153456) Feine reported that he had taken up the problem with General Böhme who assured him that he would issue an appropriate order to the German troops. The General suggested that the Italians could cooperate by restricting the visits from Albania proper into the Mitrovica area.

## No. 496

F9/0303

### *Memorandum by the Director of the Legal Department<sup>1</sup>*

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, November 24, 1941.

Before handing over the note of the Foreign Minister to Ambassador Oshima concerning the Secret Additional Agreement to the Anti-Comintern Pact<sup>2</sup> I asked Mr. Kase about the question of the continued secrecy of these documents. He said, in agreement with Secretary of Legation Ushiba who accompanied him, that it was a matter of course that this exchange of notes did not affect the mutual obligation to continue the secrecy of all pertinent documents, even though the exchange of notes did not mention this expressly. He asked, however, not to make any alterations in the exchange of notes itself, as this had already been placed before the Privy Council in Tokyo. He declared himself very willing, however, to let me have immediately a confirmation of his interpretation in form of a letter. After he had obtained the consent of Ambassador Oshima by telephone to this we exchanged the attached letters<sup>3</sup> which clarify the matter. Following this we also exchanged the notes of the Foreign Minister and Ambassador Oshima.

GAUS

<sup>1</sup> Marginal note: "Presented to the Foreign Minister. G[aus], Nov. 24."

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 502 and footnote 2.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed (F9/0309-10).

## No. 497

1517/372993-84

*The State Secretary to the Embassy in Italy*

Telegram

No. 3170

BERLIN, November 24, 1941.

Sent November 25—1:35 a. m.

zu Pol. IV 1126 g. Rs.<sup>1</sup>

1171 g. Rs.<sup>2</sup>

1176 g. Rs.<sup>3</sup>

Subject: Mitrovica area.

With reference to telegram 2828 of November 7.<sup>4</sup>

Please inform Count Ciano that we had made the alleged incidents in the territory of Mitrovica, reported by Governor General Jacomini, the subject of a detailed investigation by our local authorities.

As was to be expected from the beginning, it developed that there can be no question of an enlistment of anti-Italian Albanian emigrants or of support for any sort of Albanian Irredentist movement in another form on the part of the local German military administration. The German interest in the Mitrovica area is limited to maintaining peace and order and preventing the old antagonisms between the Albanian and Serbian population from leading to bloody conflicts in view of the present rebellious psychosis. For this purpose members of the indigenous Arnaut population are also being employed for administrative purposes.

If the German military administration permitted the Serbian Government to allow the Albanians of the area a certain local cultural autonomy by approving the "Albanian People's Association" [*Albanischer Volksbund*], this occurred in the interest of the Albanians, which was surely understood and approved by Italy as the protective power of Albania and in no way to organize them against Italy.

Upon Count Ciano's intervention we went out of our way and instructed the local German military authorities once more in no case to tolerate anti-Italian Albanian machinations. We for our part believed all the more that we could count on the local Italian officials on their part refraining from any promotion of a Greater Albanian Irredentist movement directed toward the Mitrovica area.

<sup>1</sup> Telegram No. 891 of Nov. 11 from Belgrade (230/153448-50) indicates that Pol. IV 1126 is telegram No. 1544 of Nov. 9 which was not filmed. See document No. 495, footnote 4.

<sup>2</sup> 1171 g. Rs.: Not found.

<sup>3</sup> 1176 g. Rs.: Document No. 495.

<sup>4</sup> Document No. 456.

At the same time we were aware, as the Italians must be too, that considering the present situation of rebellion and the type of terrain, connections between the Albanians on the two sides of the border could never be entirely prevented.

In the meantime Count Pietromarchi<sup>5</sup> proposed on the occasion of his Berlin visit,<sup>6</sup> that an Italian consul as well as Italian soldiers be sent to Mitrovica. We do not consider either to be necessary in the circumstances described above. The Italians already have a special Albanian expert with the rank of minister at the Italian Legation in Belgrade which should be sufficient for looking after their interests in the Albanian border area. An Italian military action is unnecessary if only for the reason that there is a German military area headquarters in Mitrovica.

Please react to Count Ciano's remark about incorporating Mitrovica into Albania by means of a gesture of the Führer's only if Count Ciano should revert to it; then, however, in the sense you have already expressed, that according to the intentions on both sides, something definitive was to be accomplished at Vienna.

The situation in the Balkans is already fluid enough so that we and the Italians have no interest in making it still more uncertain by opening up new border problems.<sup>7</sup>

WEIZSÄCKER<sup>7</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Luca Pietromarchi, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, assigned to the office of the Italian Foreign Minister with the rank of Director General.

<sup>6</sup> Woerman's memorandum, U.St.S.Pol. No. 953 of Nov. 3 (1517/372927), records a discussion with Pietromarchi who said his Government wished to clear out the nest of agitators (Unruheherd) in Mitrovica.

<sup>7</sup> In telegram No. 3160 of Dec. 3 (1206/331847) Mackensen reported that he had talked to Ciano along the lines of Weizsäcker's directive. Ciano had said that he would inform Mussolini; he had neither mentioned the proposal of Pietromarchi, nor the idea of giving Mitrovica to Albania. Additional material on Mitrovica has been filmed on 4865/E249748-309.

## No. 498

2871/D564745-47

### *Protocol on the Extension of the Period of Validity of the Agreement Against the Communist International*

The Government of the German Reich, the Royal Italian Government, and the Imperial Japanese Government, as well as the Royal Hungarian Government, the Imperial Government of Manchukuo, and the Spanish Government,

Recognizing that the arrangements which they have made for counteracting the activities of the Communist International have proven highly successful, and

Convinced that the coinciding interests of their countries require their continued close cooperation against the common enemy,

Have decided to extend the period of validity of the above-cited arrangements, and for this purpose have agreed to the following provisions:

#### Article 1

The Pact Against the Communist International, comprising the Agreement and Supplementary Protocol of November 25, 1936,<sup>1</sup> and the Protocol of November 6, 1937,<sup>2</sup> and which Hungary joined by Protocol of February 24, 1939, Manchukuo by Protocol of February 24, 1939,<sup>3</sup> and Spain by Protocol of March 27, 1939,<sup>4</sup> will be extended by a period of five years, beginning with November 25, 1941.

#### Article 2

The States which upon the invitation of the Government of the German Reich, the Royal Italian Government, and the Imperial Japanese Government, as the original signatories of the Pact Against the Communist International, propose to accede to this Pact will communicate their declarations of accession in writing to the Government of the German Reich which in turn will notify the other signatory States of the receipt of these declarations.<sup>5</sup> Accession shall become effective on the date on which the declaration of accession is received by the Government of the German Reich.

#### Article 3

The present Protocol is drawn up in the German, Italian, and Japanese languages, each deemed to be an original text.<sup>6</sup> The Protocol shall enter into effect on the date of its signature.

The High Contracting Parties shall communicate with each other in proper time prior to the expiration of the five-year term provided in Article 1 with regard to any further modus of cooperation.

In Witness Whereof the Undersigned, being duly and properly authorized hereto by their respective Governments, have affixed their hands and seals to this Protocol.

<sup>1</sup> See vol. I of this series, document No. 463, footnote 2a.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, document No. 17.

<sup>3</sup> See vol. V of this series, documents Nos. 268 and 269 and footnote 1.

<sup>4</sup> See vol. III of this series, document No. 768.

<sup>5</sup> Written declarations of accession, dated Nov. 25, were made in Berlin by the following states: Bulgaria (2871/D564636); Denmark (2871/D564637); Finland (2871/D564638); Croatia (2871/D564639); Rumania (2871/D564643); Slovakia (2871/D564644).

<sup>6</sup> The Nanking Government made its declaration of accession in somewhat different fashion. Dr. Tsumin-Yee, the Foreign Minister, on Nov. 23 handed the German Minister a note of accession dated Nanking, Nov. 25 (2871/D564645).

<sup>7</sup> The Italian text has been filmed on 2871/564748-50. The Japanese text on 2871/564751-54.

Done in Berlin, in sextuplicate, on November 25, 1941, in the 20th year of the Fascist Era, corresponding to the 25th day of the 11th month of the 16th year of Showa.

V. RIBBENTROP  
 CIANO  
 OSHIMA  
 BÁRDOSSY, LÁSZLÓ  
 LÜ YI WEN  
 RAMÓN SERRANO SUÑER

No. 499

137/127904-05

*Memorandum by the Director of the Information Department*

BERLIN, November 25, 1941.

The following gentlemen participated in the conference on propaganda in Spanish Morocco that took place in the Cultural Attaché's office of the German Embassy, Madrid, on November 14, 1941:

- 1) Consul General Wüster
- 2) Minister von Zechlin (Press Officer of the Embassy)
- 3) Consul General Nöhring (Tangier)
- 4) Consul Dr. Richter (Tetuán)
- 5) Counselor of Legation Gardemann
- 6) Herr Schooff (Radio Specialist of the German Embassy, Madrid)
- 7) W[issenschaftlicher] H[ilfs] A[rbeiter] Richter.

It was agreed that enemy propaganda in Spanish Morocco was still very active and that the ban placed on propaganda activity by the High Commissioner is therefore working out in Germany's disfavor, because the English through the English Post Office and many other channels were still conducting propaganda on a sizeable scale.<sup>1</sup> It was decided that Germany should abstain from political polemical propaganda and work only through factual reports and pamphlets, which show particularly Germany's strength, and which are, moreover, to be of a positive and constructive tendency.

At the suggestion of Herren von Zechlin and Nöhring, in agreement with the Madrid branch of the *Reichsbahn* Central Tourist Office, a branch is to be established in Tangier. In cooperation with the Consulate General, it is to publish three times a week an illustrated bulletin in several languages (primarily Arabic). The material for this will be made available by the Press Division of the German Embassy. It will be printed in Tangier. The colored supplements are,

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 455.

for lack of technical facilities in Spain, to be printed in Berlin. The Arabic, or other text, would be printed for this in Tangier, and these pictures would then be enclosed or incorporated in the bulletin. The above-mentioned periodical is also to be circulated through the Consulate at Tetuán. The material for the pamphlet will be made available by the Information Officer of the Madrid Embassy.

Consul General Nöhring suggested entrusting Herr Wiedemann, who is working for the Abwehr at the Consulate at Tangier, with these special propaganda duties. A suitable arrangement would have to be made with the Abwehr. In the event that such an agreement with Abwehr is not possible, the following additional gentlemen were proposed:

- 1) Dr. Viczyhl, Paris;
- 2) Dr. Seidel, Vice Consul in Tetuán;
- 3) Dr. Kajadan (Kaitan?), Tripoli.

Herr Nöhring considers Herr Wiedemann the proper person however, because of his many years of experience in the country and his linguistic qualifications.

Regarding radio broadcasting, Herr Schooff is already negotiating through Kult R (Kurt Meier) for the purchase of the Tangier radio station which belongs to a French Jew. (Consideration should be given to possible payment in French francs.)

Consul General Nöhring requests that a special fund of 20,000 reichsmarks annually (in Moroccan francs or pesetas) be placed at his disposal for these tasks.

Consul Dr. Richter, Tetuán, asked that he be given for this purpose a press and information fund in the amount of 10,000 reichsmarks. Herewith to Counselor Völkers, for further action.

WÜSTER

No. 500

F9/0139-45

*Memorandum by the Dirigent of the Political Department*

RAM 54 g. Rs.

BERLIN, November 26, 1941.

RECORD OF THE RECEPTION OF THE SLOVAK MINISTER PRESIDENT TUKA  
 BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER IN BERLIN ON NOVEMBER 25, 1941

At first the Slovak Minister President presented the Foreign Minister with the highest Slovak decoration, together with a chain, and stated in an address that the Slovak Government actually gave this rank of decoration only to Heads of State. However, in consideration of the especially great services of the Foreign Minister it had

felt impelled to make an exception and had awarded him this decoration. Furthermore, M. Tuka stated in his address that being a teacher of international law he had to note that the German policy in recent years had brought about a new epoch in international law, and was striving finally to establish a true legal order, whereas formerly a policy devoted to interests and exploitation had dominated the life of nations and had to be presented by the professors to their listeners as international law. The name of the Foreign Minister was inseparably connected with this new epoch of international law.

The Foreign Minister thanked M. Tuka warmly and in his reply pointed out that for every German the name of Tuka had become the very embodiment of the sincere and militant Slovak element.

In the following discussion M. Tuka first pointed out that the Slovak people had immediately understood the meaning and the necessity of the National Socialist movement. To be sure, the intelligentsia still held back and was often uncertain, as he had been able to observe also among the student youth in the lectures which he was now giving once more. Thus it was asserted, for example, that National Socialism was not entirely Christian, and more of the like, a critical attitude that was naturally also promoted by church influences.

To the Foreign Minister's question whether M. Sidor<sup>1</sup> was still at the Vatican as Slovak Minister, M. Tuka replied that he had to leave him there, in the first place in consideration of M. Tiso, and then also for the reason that he would be compelled to have him imprisoned at once if he brought him back to Slovakia.

The Foreign Minister then dealt with the participation of the Slovak troops in the struggle in the east, and emphasized how happy we were about the attitude which Slovakia displayed in this struggle. M. Tuka had been right when in his address in the morning he had termed the accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact as being of only formal significance for Slovakia. For the rest, the situation in the east was such that Soviet Russia was as good as finished today. To be sure, bad luck with the weather in recent weeks had prevented us from advancing more rapidly, but practically speaking we would have attained our objective in Soviet Russia by the end of this year. The Russians could not recover from these blows, and would be entirely finished off next year. In summary, one could therefore be only exceedingly satisfied with the balance sheet of this year. The battle in Africa now in progress, regarding which our latest reports were favorable, was in no way decisive for the outcome of the war. Once the Führer had time to occupy himself more intensively with Africa, a way would be found there, too, to master the situation in accordance with our wishes. In fact, the war had already been won, and today it

<sup>1</sup> Karel Sidor, Slovak Minister at the Vatican, 1939-1945.

was primarily a question of bringing it to a close with as few losses as possible.

With regard to a question by the Foreign Minister concerning Slovak-Hungarian relations, M. Tuka stated that the Hungarians were somewhat nervous and there was constant friction with them. The people in Slovakia were prejudiced against the Hungarians, and this fact could not simply be set aside with logical reasons.

The Foreign Minister replied to this that it was at any rate desirable that a settlement be reached if possible between Slovakia and Hungary. In any case there were always rumblings between Hungary and Rumania. We, of course, had an interest that these things not be stirred up during the present great struggle and that the awards that had been made be maintained. In Hungary they were already asserting that the former Little Entente was already being revived. Germany, however, had an interest in stable conditions. After the war had been brought to a victorious conclusion, there would be such great tasks of reconstruction that at that time, too, no questions should be brought up that could interfere with reconstruction. Rather, one should let things be consolidated.

M. Tuka stated that he for his part would do everything to bring about a détente in the relationship with Hungary. Subsequently he spoke briefly of M. Durčanský,<sup>2</sup> remarking that the latter wished to take over a top position as general manager of a Slovak farmers' bank, in which he wanted to participate purely financially. Since at the time he had promised the Foreign Minister to keep an eye on Durčanský,<sup>3</sup> he wanted to ask whether the Foreign Minister had any objections to this.

The Foreign Minister replied that he had no objections if it was purely a matter of private business activities. However, Durčanský must not play again any kind of political note.

To a final question from the Foreign Minister regarding Tuka's relations with Tiso, M. Tuka replied that he and the State President simply lived in two different worlds, but avoided a conflict with one another and in any case did not want to fight it out now.

In conclusion the Foreign Minister asked M. Tuka to transmit to State President Tiso his best thanks for the decoration as well as his best regards.<sup>4</sup>

RINTELEN

<sup>2</sup> Ferdinand Durčanský, Slovak Foreign Minister and Minister of Interior to July 1940.

<sup>3</sup> This promise may have been made in the Salzburg conversations July 1940 of which there is no record in the archives of the Foreign Ministry. See vol. x of this series, document No. 263 and footnote 3.

<sup>4</sup> According to a memorandum of Nov. 30 by Schmidt (67/46942) Hitler had a conversation with Tuka on Nov. 29 which lasted only a few minutes and had a purely personal character. "The Führer merely promised Tuka that Germany would act extremely generously in the matter of equipping the Slovak Army."

## No. 501

67/46875-93

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat*

RAM 52

BERLIN, November 28, 1941.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION IN BERLIN ON NOVEMBER 25, 1941, BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER IN WHICH THE SPANISH FOREIGN MINISTER WAS LATER ASKED TO JOIN<sup>1</sup>

At the beginning of the conversation, Count Ciano recalled the request of the Duce that Italian troops be employed in Russia in larger numbers than heretofore, and he mentioned that he was authorized in his conversation with the Führer to refer once more to this desire of the Duce's.<sup>2</sup>

Politically nothing much that was new had occurred since the last conversation with the Reich Foreign Minister.<sup>3</sup> Some time ago Serrano Suñer had addressed a letter to him, since there had been no contact between Ciano and the Spanish Foreign Minister since the last meeting some time back.<sup>4</sup> In this connection, a meeting with Ciano in Genoa on December 11 and 12 had also been proposed by Serrano Suñer. As a result of the present meeting in Berlin, this meeting of the two Foreign Ministers might, however, be unnecessary.

Ciano further mentioned that Darlan was obviously seeking contact with Italy. The Duce had, to be sure, declined to receive him, but had instructed Count Ciano to meet with Darlan if there was no objection to this on the German side.

In reply to Ciano's question whether the Reich Foreign Minister considered such a meeting advantageous, the latter replied that this might perhaps be the case; at any rate, he had no objection to it. Moreover, Ambassador de Brinon had also tried, for his part, to bring about a meeting of the Foreign Minister with Pétain.<sup>5</sup> He (the Reich

<sup>1</sup> Ciano had come to Berlin on Nov. 23 for the signing of a 5-year extension of and admission of new members to the Anti-Comintern Pact (see document No. 498).

For Ciano's account of this discussion, see Galeazzo Ciano, *L'Europa verso la catastrofe*, pp. 686-693, and *The Ciano Diaries*, entries for Nov. 24-26, 1941. A separate record of the discussion after Serrano Suñer's entrance was made by Hans Brandau of the Protocol Department, which is filmed on F15/122-132.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 454.

<sup>3</sup> Ciano had been invited by Ribbentrop for the annual hunt at the end of October and had talked to Hitler at his headquarters on Oct. 25 (see document No. 424). No record of the Ciano-Ribbentrop conversation has been found. See also *The Ciano Diaries*, entry for Oct. 25-28, 1941.

<sup>4</sup> Ciano met Serrano Suñer at the Obersalzberg on Nov. 18, 1940, at the occasion of a meeting with Hitler and Ribbentrop. See *The Ciano Diaries*, entry for Nov. 18, 1940.

<sup>5</sup> See document No. 445.

Foreign Minister) had, however, handled the matter in a dilatory manner. At the same time, however, Benoist-Méchin had made contact with Marshal Göring. It had, to be sure, led to no definite result thus far, but it was possible that the Marshal would one day meet with Pétain.<sup>6</sup> If, on the other hand, he (the Reich Foreign Minister) should speak with the French, it might become necessary to go into things quite deeply. For this, however, the moment had not yet come.

The Reich Foreign Minister continued with the remark that the French would logically inquire what was to become of them once peace were restored; that, of course, this could not be answered now, but that it would be necessary to take a purely noncommittal attitude toward them.

Ciano stated, and he repeated the remark several times in the course of the conversation, that he would refrain from meeting with Darlan if Germany, for her part, had even the slightest objections.

Count Ciano emphasized in this connection that he had nothing at all to say to France and wished to retain the present armistice regime. He would, therefore, confine himself to listening to Darlan and possibly talk to him about economic matters.

In the further course of the conversation, the dismissal of Weygand was also mentioned.<sup>7</sup> The Reich Foreign Minister then remarked that the French had the tendency to push things too much. Thus he, the Reich Foreign Minister, had refused their wish to send an ambassador to Germany and had merely agreed that M. Scapini<sup>8</sup> should deal with questions of laborers and prisoners.<sup>9</sup>

In itself, the desire of France to learn something about her future was understandable, but it was not yet possible to discuss it. First the campaign in the east and some other matters had to be terminated. Ciano interjected that if anyone was interested in not seeing an improvement in relations with France, it was Italy. This was a clear-cut definition of the Italian attitude.

The Reich Foreign Minister summed up the German stand on the question of relations with France by saying that all questions of the future could only be discussed later on, while at present concessions could be made to France in so far as she assisted the Axis in the fight against England. In this connection Ciano also mentioned a plan, emanating from the initiative of Riccardi, for a visit of the French Minister of Production<sup>10</sup> to Rome. Riccardi had the habit of carrying out such plans on his own initiative at times. Ciano had,

<sup>6</sup> For a record of the Pétain-Göring meeting, see document No. 529.

<sup>7</sup> See document No. 478.

<sup>8</sup> Georges Scapini, delegate of the French Government for prisoners of war.

<sup>9</sup> In telegram No. 1145 of Oct. 22 (405/213928-29) from the Special Train, Rintelen transmitted Ribbentrop's views on this to Weizsäcker.

<sup>10</sup> François Lehideux.



however, forbidden the visit of the French Minister of Production. The Reich Foreign Minister again emphasized the French tendency to push things too much, and he mentioned the fact that, after Montoire,<sup>11</sup> the French had acted as if there had been no war at all. Brinon had told him, the Reich Foreign Minister, that France had really not been conquered at all; that the French troops had merely not had the necessary fighting spirit, and so forth.<sup>12</sup>

The Führer had been deeply affected by the dismissal of Laval.<sup>13</sup> Particularly because in the same letter in which he thanked the Führer for the transfer of the remains of the Duke of Reichstadt, Pétain informed him of the dismissal of the very man who had, in the last analysis, brought about the policy of Montoire. The Führer had learned, moreover, that Pétain, who was supposed originally to take part in the interment of the remains in the Dôme des Invalides, had not gone to Paris because he had heeded the suggestions that the Germans only wanted to lure Pétain into the occupied territory in order to get their hands on him there. The fact that Pétain had apparently believed such a thing of the Führer had grieved the Führer exceedingly.

When Ciano again declared that he would not meet with Darlan if the Reich Foreign Minister had even the slightest objection, the latter replied that he would give further consideration to the question. He also mentioned in this connection the Führer's letter to Pétain, which again reduced things to the correct denominator.<sup>14</sup>

To a question from Count Ciano as to the German attitude toward Croatia, the Reich Foreign Minister replied that, in his opinion, conditions were becoming more and more stable there, as Minister Kasche also reports.<sup>15</sup> This caused Count Ciano to remark that the Duce was not satisfied with developments in Croatia. A certain anti-Italian trend had developed in Croatia. The internal situation was not clarified. Nevertheless he, Ciano, would accept an invitation from Pavelić and would go to Zagreb in January in order to study matters on the spot.

When Count Ciano once more inquired as to Germany's views concerning Croatia, the Foreign Minister replied, with reference to the declaration already made in Vienna, that Germany regarded Croatia as belonging to Italy's sphere of interest.<sup>16</sup>

Count Ciano was evidently pleased with this statement and he thanked the Reich Foreign Minister for the clear-cut answer that he

<sup>11</sup> See vol. XI of this series, documents Nos. 212 and 227.

<sup>12</sup> No record of this statement has been found.

<sup>13</sup> See vol. XI of this series, document No. 564.

<sup>14</sup> This is probably a reference to document No. 460.

<sup>15</sup> Not found.

<sup>16</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 385.

had given him to his reply [sic]. He then hinted that Croatian opposition elements were trying to create misunderstandings between Germany and Italy. He would therefore consider it appropriate if the Reich Foreign Minister would also express to the Croats the view just set forth, in order in this way to counteract all intrigue. The Reich Foreign Minister promised that he would speak with the Croats accordingly, and he mentioned that he had also given the German Minister in Zagreb very clear instructions in this direction.<sup>17</sup> He knew that Croatian elements who had formerly lived in Germany, among others, also Minister Benzon,<sup>18</sup> who was now leaving Berlin, were not averse to intrigues in which Germany and Italy were played off against each other. He, the Reich Foreign Minister, would observe the situation very carefully and suppress any such tendency at once. Ciano remarked that the situation had to be clarified in such a way that the Croats would be given to understand that Croatia would never be the cause of a misunderstanding between Italy and Germany. The Reich Foreign Minister replied that this had already been done and that the Croats knew that they could not hitch Germany to their wagon.

With regard to Greece, Ciano remarked that the country was suffering hunger. He criticized the loose local organization of the Italian and German agencies and advocated a clearer delimitation of the jurisdictions. Such a double rule led to difficulties. He intended, moreover, to take a trip to Greece in order to study matters on the spot and then make suggestions for their settlement.

The food situation in Athens was especially bad. There they were really at the end of their rope. It would be regrettable if the Italians were obliged to resort to force in dealing with a possible hunger revolt. They therefore wanted to try to help out with food, although they themselves had no surplus. But it was important to avoid disorders in Athens, which would surely be echoed around the world.

In the further course of the conversation, the Spanish Foreign Minister, Serrano Suñer, was drawn into the discussion. After a few words of greeting, the Reich Foreign Minister expressed his satisfaction over the extension of the Anti-Comintern Pact.<sup>19</sup> The year 1941 was of decisive importance in the battle against Bolshevism, since the Führer had this year decided to proceed against the stronghold in Moscow itself.

<sup>17</sup> Document No. 219.

<sup>18</sup> Branko Benzon, Croatian Minister in Germany, May–November 1941.

<sup>19</sup> In telegram No. 2773 of Nov. 21 (462/225725) Ribbentrop informed the Embassy in Spain that the signing of the protocol for the extension of the Anti-Comintern Pact would take place in Berlin on Nov. 28 and directed that Serrano Suñer be invited to the ceremony.

The battle had been so successful that the view was entertained in Germany that through it Bolshevism had today already been dealt a decisive blow. He, the Reich Foreign Minister, would, in his talk at the Kaiserhof tomorrow,<sup>20</sup> take a stand on this and other current questions of foreign policy. Today he only wished to stress the fact that, in the opinion of Germany, the predictions made at an earlier date had been fulfilled. By and large, the war was won for the Axis, and victory could never again be taken from the Axis Powers.

The situation could be summed up as follows: In Russia, Germany would, by the end of the year, have achieved all the goals that she wanted to attain this year. By the end of the year she would have occupied more or less the entire European and Russian area which was important from the standpoint of human resources, of supplies of food, and of raw materials. Germany was, moreover, in possession of almost the entire Russian war industry. Upon conclusion of some operations that were still in progress in the east, Stalin would have at his disposal only a small percentage of his industry. In the German opinion Russia could then put forth no further effort of any importance. She was faced, moreover, with a terrible winter, in which probably millions of Russians would starve to death.

If the Stalin regime should remain in power, which was possible because thus far there was no tangible evidence of a countermovement, Russia would, in the spring, enter the battle in a considerably weakened condition. Anglo-American aid was pure bluff and would be of practically no avail to Russia. Next spring Germany would march further to the east and would crush the remnants of the Russian Army. These operations could, however, be performed with a fraction of the present troops. From now on Germany was in a position to release large numbers of troops and to employ them for other purposes.

With Russia, however, the last ally of England would be eliminated. The Axis could be assailed neither by England alone nor by England and America in Europe. The war was practically won. What England could do in Africa was an open question. In any case, Africa was geographically closer to the European Continent than England, whose communications therewith were difficult. At the moment a big battle was in progress in Libya,<sup>21</sup> the outcome of which could not yet be foreseen, although in itself the situation was extremely favorable for the German-Italian troops.

In any case, in these circumstances, Europe was unassailable, and that was true also in the economic field. She could wage a perpetual war.

<sup>20</sup> For text of this speech delivered on Nov. 26 at a reception on the occasion of the signing of the protocol extending the Anti-Comintern Pact, see *Dokumente der Deutschen Politik* (1944), vol. IX, pt. 1, pp. 473-495.

<sup>21</sup> Battles near Tobruk and Sidi-Rezagh.

With regard to the possibility of an air duel between England and the Axis, the Reich Foreign Minister remarked that here, too, England was at a disadvantage strategically because the Axis could employ all its power concentrically against the British Isles, while the English themselves would have to attack excentrically in all directions. Furthermore air defense was becoming stronger and stronger. England was suffering increasingly heavy losses as a result, so that the attacks were becoming more and more difficult. Actually the English had not been to Berlin for many weeks.

Strategically, therefore, the Axis was in a commanding position with respect to England. Politically, the question arose as to the intentions of America. They were unknown. But even if America entered the war it would make little change in the situation described above. Europe's rearmament potential was considerably greater than that of America and England. In any case, the Führer would beat the English everywhere he met them and would sweep them out of our hemisphere. Germany was calmly watching the attitude of America. If this country wanted war, she could have it. Germany would not allow herself to be disturbed by anything. After Russia, as stated above, had suffered her decisive defeat in the course of the year and received her death-blow the following year and thus no longer presented a threat any more than did France, the fight against England would be continued until England realized that she had nothing more to say in Europe, came to her senses herself and asked for peace; or until, through employment of the concentrated power resources of the Axis, the Island of Britain was forced to capitulate in the foreseeable future.

The Reich Government noted with great satisfaction that, beside the Italian ally, a Spanish division was also fighting against Bolshevism.<sup>22</sup> The Spanish nationalists, whose bravery was proverbial, had conducted themselves splendidly and contributed their best to final victory. Many of them still had old accounts to settle from the days of the struggle in Spain.

Serrano Suñer expressed his thanks for the words of greeting of the Reich Foreign Minister and the appreciation of the deeds of the Spanish volunteer division. He had listened with complete interest to the statements of the Reich Foreign Minister concerning the general situation.

Serrano Suñer inquired in this connection as to the military operations undertaken against Moscow, the protraction of which exploited by enemy propaganda had caused a decline in morale among the friends of the Axis. In all discretion, he wished, therefore, to ask when Moscow would be taken, so that he might discourage further propaganda efforts.

<sup>22</sup> Document No. 70.

The Reich Foreign Minister replied that it was necessary to realize that winter was approaching. Germany prepared her military ventures methodically or "scientifically," as Oshima had expressed it. In the pockets of Briansk and Vyazma, practically the entire army of Timoshenko had been destroyed. Before these pockets could finally be cleaned up, however, bad weather had set in and for several weeks transformed the roads and the country into a morass, which caused tremendous difficulties for the motorized forces. Therefore the exploitation of the victory over Timoshenko had, unfortunately, not been possible to the extent that this would have been possible in dry weather. Thus it was possible to advance only slowly. For a week, however, the country had been frozen, and the German Army was methodically getting in motion again. It hoped to be able to advance considerably further in the region of Moscow. In general, it could be said that the war in the east was no longer a question of soldiers and armaments, for the Red Army practically no longer existed—it was either dead or captured. At the present stage, it was exclusively a case of supplies and channels of communication.

English propaganda, which was geared to this fact and which was well known in Germany, was poor. The strange thing about it was only that there were always people who fell for it. The same propaganda mills were at work that the English had been using, first in Norway, then in Holland, Belgium, France (Dunkirk), Greece, Serbia, and Crete. All these defeats had been played up as the greatest victories for England. The same procedure was now being used in Russia. The German troops would advance slowly and systematically in the Soviet Union and occupy the areas that were of any importance at all to the Russians. Even if he, the Reich Foreign Minister, did not know how far we would get this year, because this was dependent on the weather, he did know that the entire area, which was important from the standpoint of population, industry, or agriculture, would be occupied, so that it would thus become impossible for the Russians to regenerate themselves.

So far no English or American war material had turned up in Russia. Probably it would never come. If it did, however, then only in very small quantities. Germany would cut off these imports, however, and then dispatch the remnants of the Russian Army.

The word "Blitzkrieg," of which the Führer spoke in his last address,<sup>23</sup> had been coined by the Jews and had never been used by Germany. Germany would continue to proceed methodically.

In these circumstances, everyone was well-advised to pay as little attention as possible to the English propaganda mill. Germany,

<sup>23</sup> On Nov. 8 Hitler spoke in Munich on the anniversary of the 1923 Putsch. For text see *Frankfurter Zeitung*, Nov. 10, 1941.

moreover, was not taking any risk and not striving to score a prestige victory. She could long since have conquered Leningrad. Since no blood was to be spilt unnecessarily, however, we would proceed here, as in other cases, slowly and methodically, according to a systematic plan.

One thing was absolutely certain: by and large, Russia had been eliminated as an ally of England and would never again become a European power by which Europe could be threatened.

Serrano Suñer then briefly alluded to the sounding-out of the Spanish Government by Turkey. The Turks, with whom Spain had never entertained any special relations, had, as Ambassadors von Papen and Stohrer have also surely reported,<sup>24</sup> approached Spain with the suggestion that the moment was "interesting" for the restoration of peace. Both countries, which were allegedly in a similar situation, therefore had to work actively for European peace. Serrano Suñer had replied that Spain was not neutral and only considered desirable a peace that would bring victory to the Axis. He asked in this connection whether the attitude of Turkey had now become more friendly and loyal toward the Axis than formerly and whether the German Government had confidence in the Turks. The Reich Foreign Minister replied that Turkey was essentially neutral and wanted to keep out of the war. The Turks had told him that they had no ambitions of any kind and were very well satisfied with their present territory. They had an alliance with England that was, however, like a torso since France had been eliminated.<sup>25</sup> Germany had concluded a political and a commercial pact with Turkey<sup>26</sup> and had always cherished friendly feelings toward that country, even if this had been on a rather one-sided basis. For some time, however, relations with Turkey had been much better. Turkey was glad to be rid of her worst opponent, Russia. The Reich Foreign Minister recalled the fact that in the same room Molotov had postulated his demand for the Dardanelles,<sup>27</sup> which had, however, been rejected by Germany.

Relations with Turkey were becoming more and more close and friendly. The Duce, too, was favorably disposed, and Turkey was responding to these sentiments to an ever-increasing extent.

The above-mentioned peace effort was, indeed, traceable to a pet idea of Turkey's, particularly of State Secretary Numan's, who now

<sup>24</sup> In telegram No. 3863 of Nov. 5 (95/107173) Stohrer reported that the Turkish Government had suggested to the Spanish Minister that Spain and Turkey should cooperate to bring about a peace. Serrano Suñer told Stohrer that he would reply that Spain was interested only in a peace on the basis of victory of the Axis.

<sup>25</sup> This treaty was signed at Ankara, Oct. 19, 1939. The text in English and French is published in the League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cc, pp. 167-175.

<sup>26</sup> See vol. xii of this series, document No. 648 and footnote 2.

<sup>27</sup> See vol xi of this series, document No. 328.

and then came forward with this idea. Mostly then, this was interpreted by English propaganda as a German peace feeler. Since the last public peace offer of the Führer in his speech of last year,<sup>2a</sup> no peace feelers of any kind had, however, been put out by Germany. The Foreign Minister would also speak about this in the talk this afternoon.

SCHMIDT

<sup>2a</sup> See vol. x of this series, Editors' Note, p. 249.

### No. 502

F9/0320-19

#### *The Japanese Ambassador in Germany to the Foreign Minister*<sup>1</sup>

BERLIN, November 25, 1941.

HERR REICHMINISTER: On the occasion of the signing today of the Protocol concerning the extension of the period of validity of the Pact against the Communist International I have the honor to inform Your Excellency upon instruction of my Government that the Japanese Government and the German Government are in full agreement on the following points:

The Secret Additional Agreement to the Agreement Against the Communist International, the Annexes thereof and the Protocol concluded on November 25, 1936,<sup>2</sup> between the Japanese Government and the German Government shall be considered as no longer in force as of November 25, 1941, notwithstanding the provisions of Article III of the Secret Additional Agreement.<sup>3</sup>

I would request Your Excellency to be good enough to confirm the agreement of the German Government to the above interpretation.<sup>4</sup>

I take this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

HIROSHI OSHIMA

*Imperial Japanese Ambassador Extraordinary  
and Plenipotentiary*

<sup>1</sup> The document here printed is translated from the German translation which was provided by the Japanese Embassy.

<sup>2</sup> See Series C, vol. vi, documents Nos. 57 and 58.

<sup>3</sup> Article III included the provision: "The Agreement comes into force simultaneously with the Agreement against the Communist International signed today and will remain in force for the same period."

<sup>4</sup> By letter of Nov. 25 (F9/0316-15) Ribbentrop replied, acknowledging the receipt of Oshima's letter.

A minute by Gaus of Dec. 5 (F9/0324) records that on Nov. 29 Kase stated that Ribbentrop's letter was not textually identical with that which had been sent by the Japanese Embassy to Tokyo and he asked, therefore, that it be withdrawn and that a new document replace it. Accordingly on Dec. 4, Gaus records, a new letter signed by Ribbentrop was delivered to the Japanese.

No copy of this later text has been found.

### No. 503

F9/0146-58

#### *Memorandum by the Dirigent of the Political Department*

RAM 55 g. Rs.

BERLIN, November 27, 1941.

RECORD OF THE RECEPTION OF HUNGARIAN MINISTER PRESIDENT DE BÁRDOSY BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER IN BERLIN ON NOVEMBER 26, 1941, FROM 7:45 TO 8:25 P.M.

The Foreign Minister thanked M. de Bárdossy once more for the painting by Makart given him as a gift from the Hungarian Government, whereupon M. de Bárdossy for his part expressed his thanks for the historic days which he had been privileged to experience here.

The Foreign Minister then stated the following:

He considered the Berlin meeting to be very useful, for Europe had to draw closer together now. Perhaps one could see in this Berlin meeting the early dawn of a new Europe which was drawing together in unity in the face of the common dangers. This was important particularly with respect to England who did not hesitate to form an alliance with Bolshevism against Europe. For one thing was clear: Churchill was willing even today to hand all of Europe over to Bolshevism with cold indifference [*eiskalt*]. It was time now that Europe freed herself entirely from the English tutelage. One had experienced it earlier that in all the European capitals the given English Minister played the main role, as it were; things could not remain like that, however, because the European peoples did not want it any longer. A new status for Europe had to come about which the peoples of the Continent would have to determine for themselves. It was certain that Germany and Italy would assume the leading position in this new Europe as a natural consequence of the fact that the Axis was also bearing the greatest responsibility for the security of Europe and had made—and had to make—the greatest sacrifices for this. In the new Europe even the former foes of Germany would find a place, although on condition that they would not be able to start new wars in Europe; that applied to France as well as to Russia. The speech which he (the Foreign Minister) had given<sup>1</sup> was supposed to show how we evaluated the present situation. This had had to be said, although as such we did not want to imitate the constant speechifying of the other side.

In the coming year Soviet Russia would receive the death blow, for the Führer had made the unalterable decision not to tolerate any longer anything in Europe that was Communist. Whether somewhere in

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 501, footnote 20.

Siberia some insignificant Soviet state could still maintain itself was of no importance.

As far as England was concerned, Churchill would have to consider whether he still had prospects of any sort. His latest attempt to deal the Axis a blow by the attack in Cirenaica did not seem to proceed very successfully, according to the reports received. These reports were entirely favorable for us; naturally one had to wait and see how the fight developed. On the whole, however, England would have to realize that she could no longer win the war. Nor could she any longer achieve any great effect with air attacks, either, since the effectiveness of the anti-aircraft weapons was constantly growing and the percentage of losses in air attacks would soon be so large that these could no longer be carried out. The losses that would then occur could not be replaced by the U.S.A. either; in general the United States was constantly being used with respect to us as a kind of boogeyman where the English resources themselves failed. And yet, the American propaganda was nothing more than a continuous offensive by mouth. In contrast to this, what (the Foreign Minister) had stated in his speech was not empty propaganda, but really expressed our most sincere conviction.

The Foreign Minister then referred to the importance of the Führer's decision to proceed against Soviet Russia in June of this year, and remarked in this connection that he would have been compelled in the end to negotiate with Stalin regarding every bit of oil that we could obtain from Russia if this decision had not been taken. In that case, however, Soviet Russia would have been more or less in a position to enable Germany to carry on the war or to prevent her from doing so. This thought, incidentally gave him an opportunity to appeal to M. de Bárdossy that Hungary also should release as much petroleum as possible for export to Germany. The situation was such that relatively small quantities, such as an additional delivery of 40,000 tons were of particular importance. In making this request for increased deliveries, which referred likewise to grain, he wished in advance to express his thanks to M. de Bárdossy for the support which the Hungarian Minister President had so often given Minister Clodius in his negotiations on the Hungarian deliveries.<sup>2</sup> With other officials of the Hungarian Government, however, Herr Clodius often encountered difficulties. One should regard these deliveries under a larger aspect. Europe was today engaged in a common struggle in which the German nation had to assume the main burden and the largest sacrifices. Germany could surely expect of her friends every possible help and support in this struggle.

M. de Bárdossy answered first that he was very happy with what the Foreign Minister had said regarding the support which he had given to

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 208.

the efforts of Herr Clodius. He could give assurance that Hungary would be ready in the future, too, to make all deliveries to Germany, provided there was a material possibility for doing so. After all, it was often not a case of the Hungarians having this and that and not wanting to deliver it, but often a case of their really not having anything to deliver.

The Foreign Minister thereupon cited with the aid of a memorandum from Minister Clodius a number of [figures] concerning the amount of the deliveries desired by us,<sup>3</sup> adding that he did not intend to go into the particulars, but to express very generally the request that the deliveries be increased in so far as this was possible.

M. de Bárdossy stated in this connection that the Hungarian Government was encountering a number of difficulties in its deliveries; in the first place, heavy floods had been very detrimental to the harvest and its gathering, and furthermore organization was not so good in Hungary as it was in Germany. These difficulties also had to be taken into account. He would do everything, however, to see that the German wishes for an increase in the deliveries of grain and oil were complied with in so far as possible.

In conclusion the Foreign Minister remarked with regard to this subject that we wanted today to rescue old Europe and were bound to do so; and for that we simply needed every possible support.

After inquiring about the health of Regent Horthy, which, M. de Bárdossy said, was again good, the Foreign Minister mentioned the talk which the Hungarian Minister President had had the day before with the Slovak Minister President<sup>4</sup> regarding the Hungarian-Slovak frictions which were best avoided.

M. de Bárdossy replied to this that he did not want such quarrels at all. To be sure the Slovaks and the Rumanians often made matters quite difficult for the Hungarians. The Rumanians simply refused to recognize the Vienna Award regarding Transylvania. Marshal Antonescu had not hesitated to state that he wished to march back to Bucharest by way of Cluj. The Rumanians had even sent word to Washington that they would denounce the Award although this could not be done as the Award was not subject to denunciation. Even though they had retracted these communications afterwards it was

<sup>3</sup> This might possibly refer to a memorandum of Nov. 24 by Clodius (2293/-483591-97) with the title "Brief for the Führer's conversation with the other Foreign Ministers regarding economic questions." This document which summarized Germany's economic relations with Italy, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Finland, Denmark, Croatia, Slovakia, and Spain, emphasized that Hungary was still able to export to Germany 40,000 additional tons of grain. No other memorandum of the kind described has been found.

<sup>4</sup> In a memorandum of Nov. 29 (93/104403) Woermann recorded having been informed by Sztójay of the substance of two personal conversations between Bárdossy and Tuka during their stay in Berlin regarding a recent Hungarian-Slovak controversy.

nevertheless clear that one could not take part in building the new Europe unless one was prepared to accept matters which had been put so clearly.

The Foreign Minister on the other hand referred to the difficult situation in which the Rumanians had found themselves in Vienna with the Award. When M. de Bárdossy interjected here that it would have been even much worse for the Rumanians if Hungary at the time had taken up the challenge, the Foreign Minister vigorously contradicted him by remarking that it was his firm conviction that Hungary in that case would have been forced very soon to fight against the Soviet Russian Army. The Soviets at that time had been ready for intervention as he indeed had told the Rumanians with great insistence.<sup>5</sup> Only today when we knew how strong the Soviets had been at that time was it possible to realize fully how significant it had been that the danger of a conflict at that time was settled through the Vienna Award. Of course the Award had been difficult. The Rumanians had reproached him and the then Court Minister, Urdareanu, had made the assertion that Rumania had been duped. Likewise he had had an unpleasant controversy with Count Teleki because the latter did not want to understand fully the situation. Count Csáky, however, had understood it better.<sup>6</sup> However, the Award had then struck the Rumanians like a clap of thunder although it had been intimated to them previously that they had to count with the loss of the Szekler region.

M. de Bárdossy replied to this that the Rumanians really did not have any kind of genuine claim to Transylvania. That territory had fallen into their laps in 1918 without their deserving it.

The Foreign Minister countered this by saying that we must not forget that today we were living in the age of the national idea, and from this point of view it had been very difficult for the Rumanians to abandon a part of Transylvania. In the Award Germany had not emphasized the national idea but had chosen a way which took into account to a much greater extent historical viewpoints; in so doing she did not forget either her former comradeship in arms with Hungary. It was clear, however, that the result was bound to affect Rumania like a cold shower. As far as the present situation was concerned one must in any event treat matters with the greatest calm.

M. de Bárdossy interposed here the remark that he was in agreement with that but that this presupposed that the Rumanians would

<sup>5</sup> Apparently a reference to Ribbentrop's conversation with Manoflescu, the Rumanian Foreign Minister, on Aug. 29, 1940, in Vienna; see vol. x of this series, document No. 408.

<sup>6</sup> Apparently a reference to Ribbentrop's conversation with Hungarian Minister President Teleki and with Foreign Minister Csáky on Aug. 29 in Vienna; see vol. x of this series, document No. 410.

now accept the settlement which had been made. In that case they must not engage in open propaganda against the Award. Obviously, they believed that the time had already come for opening up the entire question anew.

The Foreign Minister said with regard to this that he would tell Deputy Minister President Antonescu too that what mattered now was to win the war and that quarrels within the family had to be settled. He could merely repeat that dealing with all these matters required great calm.

M. de Bárdossy interjected at this point that there was danger that the Rumanians would conclude from the admonition that the war had to be won first, that after the war the moment would come for engaging in strife on account of Transylvania.

The Foreign Minister countered this by saying that the Rumanians would have much work to do after the war, above all the rebuilding of Bessarabia which was completely destroyed and of her other territories in the east. [One must] not forget that Marshal Antonescu was an intelligent man; the Rumanian troops had acquitted themselves well in the fight against Soviet Russia.

M. de Bárdossy on the other hand was sure that the Rumanians would certainly not build anything; even if beyond Bessarabia they should receive Transnistria they would in spite of it continue to talk only about Transylvania. They would not do anything in the eastern territories either just as they had not done anything in Bessarabia for 20 years.

The Foreign Minister then broke off discussion of this subject asking M. de Bárdossy about the role of the American Legation in Budapest and pointing out to him that the Americans had simply taken over the English espionage activities in Hungary just as they had in Finland.

With regard to this M. de Bárdossy said that it was possible. Actually the American Minister in Budapest, Pell, had nothing important to do. At the end the Foreign Minister inquired of M. de Bárdossy whether he had thought about the question of prohibiting in Hungary the listening to foreign broadcasting stations.

M. de Bárdossy said in this connection that public listening was prohibited but that there were considerable objections to a complete ban on listening; nor did it seem to him to be so necessary as the enemy propaganda was always refuted by the events.

After the Foreign Minister had drawn the attention of the Hungarian Minister President also to the injurious effect which the many Jews in Hungary could have on public opinion as a result of listening to enemy broadcasting stations, M. de Bárdossy took leave expressing thanks for the reception which had been granted him.

## No. 504

FR/0163-67;  
FI/0002-06

*Memorandum by the Dirigent of the Political Department*

RAM 56 g. Rs.

BERLIN, November 27, 1941.

RECORD OF THE RECEPTION OF THE BULGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTER POPOV BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER IN BERLIN ON NOVEMBER 26, 1941, FROM 8:40 TO 9:15 P.M.

By way of introduction M. Popov transmitted to the Reich Foreign Minister the greetings of the Bulgarian King as well as of the Bulgarian Minister President, and remarked concerning Bulgaria's general policy that it was of course, as in the past, a policy on Germany's side; and in all the more important questions which arose Bulgarian policy in the future, too, would always request German advice. He hardly needed to talk about that. Rather he was interested in bringing up at this opportunity a few minor questions regarding which the Bulgarian Government wanted to express special wishes.

At the first of these questions M. Popov cited the resumption of operations of the railroad line Pythion-Dede Agach.<sup>1</sup> The French Military Attaché in Sofia<sup>2</sup> had recently brought up this question and had stated that the French-Greek company which owned this line would open it again in the near future. This did not appear expedient to the Bulgarian Government. Rather, it requested that this line either be turned over to the Bulgarian railroad administration or, if it should be put into operation by the German military, that Bulgarian personnel be used. It did not appear expedient to the Bulgarian Government for Greek personnel to be employed again in operating this line. This matter was of no great importance; nevertheless, the way in which it was settled did have a certain psychological significance for Bulgarian public opinion.

The Foreign Minister promised M. Popov to examine this question.<sup>3</sup> He then for his part broached the question whether Bulgaria was in

<sup>1</sup> A Bulgarian request that this railroad line which ran through the German-occupied part of Greek Thrace be put into operation under German administration and with Bulgarian personnel was first reported in Sofia telegram No. 1334 of Oct. 29 (2233/476023-24). The same matter was officially raised by Minister Draganov with Weizsäcker who recorded this conversation in a memorandum of Oct. 31 (278/178973).

<sup>2</sup> C. de Robien.

<sup>3</sup> Memoranda of Nov. 27 by Weizsäcker (278/179025) and Woermann (278/178997-99) indicate that the Bulgarian Foreign Minister brought up the question of the Pythion-Dede Agach railroad in separate conversations which he had with them on Nov. 27. In the course of his visit with Weizsäcker, Popov presented a memorandum explaining the background of the Bulgarian wishes in this matter (278/179026-28).

a position to deliver grain to Germany.<sup>4</sup> One could not simply treat this question from the standpoint of a transaction involving deliveries, but as a matter of principle one had to proceed from the fact that Germany was today carrying on a struggle for freedom for all of Europe, in which the German people were indeed making the greatest sacrifices. In this struggle it was surely of a certain significance that the countries friendly to Germany, each to the extent of its abilities, contributed to Germany's receiving the necessary deliveries.

M. Popov replied that he knew this and was aware of these necessities. Unfortunately, however, the situation for Bulgaria herself was rather difficult. Owing to the excess of rain the harvest had been very bad, and the Bulgarian estimates indicated that there would hardly be enough of a surplus to satisfy fully the needs of the Bulgarian Army and the larger Bulgarian cities.

The Foreign Minister replied to this that he did not want to ask anything that went beyond the Bulgarian capabilities. However, he had believed that it would be possible to put through the delivery of some 10,000 tons of grain.

With regard to this M. Popov said that he hardly believed that the delivery of grain would be possible; perhaps maize deliveries could be made. He furthermore stated that the Bulgarian Minister of Trade, too, would discuss these matters with the German Government and that one could then see what might be done.

In conclusion the Foreign Minister remarked on this subject that he asked only that as much as possible be done, and no more. However, every Bulgarian delivery would be very welcome to us. Whatever Bulgaria did for us in this connection she would actually be doing for herself. One should not forget what fate the Bolsheviks had intended for Bulgaria. Here in Berlin M. Molotov had stated only a year ago that the Russians wanted a pact of assistance with Bulgaria under which they would be provided with bases in that country;<sup>5</sup> in which connection he had added condescendingly that one could easily let the Bulgarian King remain in the country. One knew indeed the significance of these wishes from the experience with the pacts of assistance between Russia and the Baltic countries. Now this danger was past. However, Germany had to continue her efforts in order to secure the victory for the whole future. She was pleased with all her friends that would help her in this.

<sup>4</sup> In a memorandum of Nov. 23 (4703/E227414-15) which was to serve as a basis for Ribbentrop's discussion of this matter with Popov, Clodius expressed the opinion that Bulgaria was capable of supplying Germany with at least 20,000 tons of bread grain and a considerably larger amount of maize. Clodius recommended that the German Government insist on Bulgaria's supplying Germany with grain and maize "to the limit of her possibilities and accompanied by a drastic curtailment of her domestic consumption."

<sup>5</sup> See vol. XI of this series, document No. 328.

Foreign Minister Popov repeated again that Bulgaria would do everything possible, for she had not forgotten what Germany had done for Bulgaria. Bulgaria felt allied with Germany to the bitter end.

As a further point of the conversation the Bulgarian Foreign Minister then turned to the uprising in Thrace that occurred some time ago in the vicinity of Drama, in which 32 Bulgarian officials and soldiers had been killed or badly wounded. Of course the Bulgarian authorities had been compelled to take vigorous action against this uprising, which had been caused by Communist agitation. Now the Greeks were starting to complain about it and to address written complaints to the German Government.<sup>6</sup> The Bulgarian Government would be grateful if it could have this material. It wanted to settle this matter at once conclusively and not defer it for the future. M. Popov asked us to believe that nothing had been done by the Bulgarians that was not necessary for quelling the uprising. If mistakes had nevertheless been made in individual cases, then they could best be remedied on the basis of the Greek complaints.

Regarding this the Foreign Minister remarked that such material had not been submitted to him.<sup>7</sup> He would have the matter investigated.

M. Popov then brought up the matter of the area of Florina in western Macedonia as another point. The Greek administrative authorities there were indulging in anti-Bulgarian agitation. The area was under German military administration, but there was only a limited number of German commanders in the cities there and they could not control everything that occurred in their area. He requested that the Bulgarians in this area be granted somewhat greater protection. The German command posts in Salonika seemed to be too skeptical in regard to the complaints of the Bulgarians from this area, probably because the complaints that had reached them had been exaggerated and had not been fully confirmed upon investigation. However, that did not change the fact that there were too few German supervisory organs on the spot and the Bulgarian population did not enjoy adequate protection. The Greeks simply wanted to oppress the Bul-

<sup>6</sup> See document No. 435.

<sup>7</sup> In a memorandum of Nov. 27 (278/179022-24) Weizsäcker recorded having told the Bulgarian Foreign Minister that day that he would be glad to show Minister Draganov the material relating to accusations against Bulgaria on account of extremely severe Bulgarian measures taken against Greek insurgents. The Bulgarian Foreign Minister was anxious to refute these accusations and for his part left a memorandum, which is appended to Weizsäcker's record of the conversation.

garians there, as they had always wanted to do in the course of history. One should not forget that Bulgaria had been forced to assert her intellectual freedom from Greece in the same way as she had been forced to fight for her political freedom against the Turks.

The Foreign Minister promised M. Popov that he would have this question investigated, too, and would see what could be done in this regard.

M. Popov finally brought up the difficulties which the Bulgarian Government encountered in carrying out the laws directed against the Jews. Quite a number of the Jews living in Bulgaria were not citizens of Bulgaria but of Hungary, Rumania, Spain, and other countries. These countries, however, claimed the same rights for their Jewish citizens as for their other citizens, and did not tolerate their receiving the special treatment provided for in the Jewish legislation. This was after all a question that had to be settled jointly among the European countries.

The Reich Foreign Minister replied that he found this question which M. Popov had brought up to be not without interest. Even at this time, he could tell him one thing: at the end of the war all Jews would have to leave Europe. This was an irrevocable decision of the Führer's, and was also the only way to master this question, because it could only be solved on a global basis and because individual measures were of little use. Incidentally, one should not attach too much importance to the protests regarding Jews who were alien nationals. At any rate we no longer paid attention to such protests from American quarters. He—the Reich Foreign Minister—would have the problem brought up by M. Popov examined in the Foreign Ministry.

M. Popov then turned to the Bulgarian wish that, as part of the great program of opening up new transportation routes which the Todt Organization was carrying out, provision be also made for a bridge across the Danube between Bulgaria and Rumania. The lack of such a bridge had been felt for some time. That it should be built was of the greatest significance to Bulgaria.

The Foreign Minister termed this wish interesting and worth looking into, too, and in conclusion asked M. Popov to transmit his respects and regards to the King and also to Minister President Filov.<sup>8</sup>

RINTELEN

<sup>8</sup> In a minute of Nov. 28 (278/179035) Rintelen forwarded to Weizsäcker the Foreign Minister's request that action be taken with regard to examining the individual questions raised by Popov. Weizsäcker routed this request to the officials concerned on Nov. 30.



## No. 505

67/46936-41

*Unsigned Memorandum*<sup>1</sup>

NOVEMBER 30, 1941.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN REICHSMARSCHALL GÖRING  
AND DEPUTY MINISTER PRESIDENT MIHAI ANTONESCU<sup>2</sup>

Following the reception of the representatives of the Anti-Comintern powers,<sup>3</sup> the Reichsmarschall had a conversation with the Rumanian Deputy Prime Minister which was also attended by State Secretaries Körner and Neumann and Ministerialrat Görnert.

After a few words of personal welcome the Reichsmarschall explained to Antonescu that he had invited him to this personal conversation because the petroleum problem had assumed unexpected importance. He was certain, to be sure, that the German and allied troops would reach the petroleum area of Maikop in the course of December or January, but he was equally certain that everything would be destroyed there. Even though all preparations had been made for an accelerated resumption of the petroleum production, it still had to be expected that production would get under way again only after a year. With this, however, the petroleum situation would be greatly relieved; but in the year until then the German and allied armies would use a very great deal of gasoline, for obvious reasons. Rumania was practically the only source that came into consideration for this. Germany and Rumania would either win together or lose the war together; therefore it was also in Rumania's own interest to do everything to secure the petroleum supplies necessary for victory. Next to the blood of her soldiers, the most valuable contribution which Rumania could make to the common cause was therefore her petroleum. Now in recent years Rumania's petroleum production had decreased to a frightening extent, not only on account of the gradually decreasing productivity of the wells—a fact that could not be changed—but also for other reasons that could be removed. He (the Reichsmarschall) therefore asked Antonescu in the common interest of the prosecution of the war to increase the Rumanian petroleum production to the greatest possible extent with all conceivable means. In so doing he pledged his word as Reichsmarschall to him (An-

<sup>1</sup> It appears that the text of this memorandum which is from Schmidt's file is not complete.

<sup>2</sup> This memorandum does not indicate when the conversation was held. There is in the files a memorandum of Nov. 28 by State Secretary Neumann of the Four Year Plan (2193/473055-60) which was sent to the Foreign Ministry with the explanation that "it served the Reichsmarschall as a basis for his conversation with Minister President Antonescu on Nov. 26 of this year." See footnote 3.

<sup>3</sup> According to the DNB report this reception took place Nov. 26.

tonescu) that with respect to this wish the idea of a commercial or shareholding exploitation did not predominate for one second on the German side. The distribution of shares, the conditions of ownership and the financial interests were a matter of complete indifference to Germany; it was merely a question of increasing the production.

The Reichsmarschall repeated the assurance already given Marshal Antonescu at the meeting in Vienna,<sup>4</sup> that Germany by no means intended an open or covert seizure of Rumania's oil wells, but simply desired that German and Rumanian experts would remove all legal and constitutional obstacles that could stand in the way of greater production. He was aware that the Finance Ministry or other offices perhaps had departmental viewpoints to advance, which however had to be ignored. Only the common interest of Rumania and Germany as allies should be allowed to count. He did not need to describe in more detail how urgently the oil was needed at the eastern front, particularly in the tank battles around Moscow.

All personal financial interests which hampered production had to be pushed ruthlessly aside. In Germany, too, certain big industrialists had been given very clearly to understand that the general interest had to take precedence. He wanted to inform Antonescu very candidly that production had to be increased even at the risk of pumping the Rumanian oil wells entirely dry. Rumania would in this case receive compensation in the future big oil interests in the Middle East. Any exhaustion of the wells would be compensated by Rumanian participation in Russian and Iranian petroleum interests.

He (the Reichsmarschall) had already expressed similar thoughts during his Vienna meeting with Marshal Antonescu. Marshal Antonescu, too, had agreed entirely with this opinion, but it seemed as if subordinate organs were not following the directives of the Marshal. Therefore he was turning to the Deputy Minister President as the present leader of the Cabinet with the request that he proceed in an absolutely dictatorial manner in these matters and force all interested parties to adapt themselves to the necessities of the hour.

It would perhaps be good if on the Rumanian as on the German side only one man were responsible for the further pursuit of this question. Then the results would have to become satisfactory.

The Reichsmarschall cited in this connection a number of examples in Germany in order to show how he himself had taken vigorous action in similar situations.

In particular it was a question of establishing a working community of the petroleum industry in order to concentrate all energies decisively in one organization that would be directed by one man. Further-

<sup>4</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 126.

more the obstacles in the mining legislation had to be eliminated and finally fuel oil had to be largely replaced by coal. Then the allied armies would be able to continue to advance in Russia up to the Urals, and, if necessary, to Sverdlovsk, Omsk or Irkutsk.

Deputy Minister President Antonescu, referring to the statements already made by Marshal Antonescu in Vienna, replied that Rumania and Germany would hold out together as allies in this war until the final victory. He repeated Marshal Antonescu's promise that the petroleum production would be very greatly increased. He himself was entirely aware of the importance of this question for the continuation of the war, and was willing even to consider a kind of exhaustion of the wells, while all administrative, financial, or other obstacles would be removed.

In the further course of the conversation Antonescu then turned to the financing of the German troops in Rumania and complained that the burdens resulting therefrom for the Rumanian State were much too great and were bound to lead to inflation. In the last 8 months 20 billion lei had been spent for this, and another 30 billion had been requested. Considerable sums would also have to be raised by Rumania for capital investments in the chemical industry. While he (Antonescu) was personally entirely in favor of German-Rumanian cooperation in the economic field, and for example had himself signed a contract with the Hermann-Göring-Werke, these participations in the chemical [industry] seemed to him to represent too great a burden.

In this connection Antonescu described the Rumanian plans for industrialization. He stated that considering her raw material sources and her cheap labor Rumania could become an auxiliary industrial center for supplying the Balkan countries, the Near East, and the areas east of the Balkans. In this respect there emerged for Rumania from economic cooperation with Germany a new orientation in the economic field. For this reason he had also gladly signed certain industrial contracts. However, in the case of the 6 billions which I. G. Farben was asking in order to make capital investments in the Rumanian chemical industry other things were involved that were not absolutely necessary for the victory, and therefore had to be postponed until later.

In the further course of the conversation Antonescu summarized his wishes as follows:

1. There had to be a significant reduction in the German troops in Rumania in order to avoid the danger of inflation;
2. Marshal Antonescu would like in this connection to pose the question that he had already touched on in his conversations with Field

Marshal Keitel,<sup>5</sup> whether Rumania could not take over the air defense alone; at the same time she would merely ask for the provision of technical aids and anti-aircraft equipment for the protection of the petroleum refineries. The 65,000 German troops, plus the 20,000 prisoners, were gradually becoming a burden for the Rumanian State Bank, far in excess of its possibilities;

3. He requested that the German economic negotiators be instructed to waive the demands for capital investment, which also involved a heavy burden on the Rumanian currency.

In this connection Antonescu also mentioned reproaches that had allegedly been made by the German side against Marshal Antonescu on account of the too low petroleum production, and emphasized that the Marshal was really doing everything that he had promised. After all, out of a total production of 5,500,000 tons Italy and Germany had received 3,300,000. In the period from July 1 to the present moment, i.e., in 4 months, 1,500,000 tons had been delivered. Furthermore, Marshal Antonescu had made available to the Luftwaffe all the reserve stocks of the Rumanian Air Force in high-grade aviation gasoline.

Unfortunately it had been learned in Rumania that the Hungarians had stockpiled considerable reserves of aviation gasoline, and it was suspected that part of this was Rumanian gasoline. This was all the more serious, stated Antonescu with increasing fervor, as it was only recently stated in an official newspaper in Budapest that the experience of 1918 would not be repeated in Hungary, but that Hungary would remain strong and await the auspicious moment! Antonescu called this an extreme lack of tact on the part of the Hungarians, and asked for Germany's help in regard to such statements which were insulting to the dignity of the Rumanian people. In this connection he also complained vigorously about the bad treatment of the Rumanian minority in Hungary, and cited thereby in particular the incidents with the Rumanian students in Cluj<sup>6</sup> and the halting of the Rumanian courier communications through Hungary. Stressing his firm belief in the Führer's sense of justice, he asked for Germany's support against the Hungarians. The new Rumania had made sacrifices most willingly and believed that she had thereby won the right to be protected against the Hungarian excesses.

In his reply the Reichsmarschall took up each of the points brought up by Antonescu:

He promised that Germany would seriously consider the question of reducing the occupation troops, since she realized the dangers of an inflation in Rumania.

<sup>5</sup> Keitel went to Bucharest Nov. 8 to represent Hitler at a military victory parade in Bucharest (Ribbentrop telegram No. 3072 of Nov. 6: 239/154353). According to Killinger's telegram No. 3653 of Nov. 9 (239/154366-68) Keitel on that occasion discussed with Marshal Antonescu German-Rumanian economic relations, especially the reduction of the number of German troops in that country.

<sup>6</sup> Erdmannsdorff recorded on Nov. 4 (239/154360-61) that the Rumanian Minister had handed in a list of complaints regarding Hungarian excesses against the Rumanian minority in Transylvania. One of these complaints referred to an attack on Rumanian-speaking students at the University of Cluj by their Hungarian fellow students.

Likewise he confirmed a statement by State Secretary Neumann according to which the Reichsbank would come to the aid of the Rumanian State Bank with gold and foreign exchange in order to prevent the danger of inflation in this fashion.

Regarding the question of the participations in Rumanian enterprises on the part of industrial firms, particularly I. G. Farben, State Secretary Neumann remarked that these things did not involve official negotiations but agreements made by private industry. With regard to this the Reichsmarschall remarked that all transactions undertaken for purely private financial interests would be halted.

Regarding the plans for industrialization the Reichsmarschall warned the Rumanian Deputy Prime Minister against carrying out such plans rashly. For the time being Rumania had great developmental tasks to perform in the reconquered or newly acquired territories. In the future she would become a country with tremendous grain surpluses as well as exportable quantities of maize, oats, and wheat, and would have to think about selling these export surpluses. If she industrialized to a large degree, then difficulties would develop similar to those of the South American countries in their relations with North America. Having her own industrial production she would not be in a position to accept the payment in industrial goods for her agricultural production made by the purchasing countries, as she herself would also produce industrial articles within the country. Great difficulties in marketing would result from this. Everything that stood in the way of such an exchange between industrial products and agricultural products was unfavorable for Rumania's further development.

Regarding the reduction of the German troops in Rumania the Reichsmarschall asked the question whether the presence of a strong German division ready for action in Rumania was not really quite agreeable to Marshal Antonescu or whether he believed that the internal situation of Rumania was so consolidated in relation to the Iron Guard or the generals, . . .

### No. 506

64/44675-76

*The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT WASHINGTON, November 27, 1941—3:28 p. m.  
No. 4145 of November 27 Received November 28—1:55 a. m.

American-Japanese relations, as reported by DNB No. 427 from Washington, have suddenly entered a very critical stage. The presentation yesterday of a note<sup>1</sup> to Nomura and Kurusu demanding the evacuation of Indochina, acceptance of the principles laid down by Hull on July 16, 1937,<sup>2</sup> and Japan's withdrawal from the Axis,

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941*, vol. II, pp. 764-770.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 325-326.

amounts to an ultimatum and might result in the immediate termination of negotiations. In order to underline the seriousness of the situation, Hull canceled his regular press conference and called in the American reporters for a confidential briefing this morning, during which he once more stressed the reliability of the information regarding a reportedly planned Japanese invasion of Thailand. This corroborates what I reported about press developments on November 26,<sup>3</sup> namely, that Roosevelt called the Chinese Ambassador Shih and the Financial Advisor Soong for the purpose of dispelling their anxieties and not at all, as asserted by the American press, to induce China to make concessions to Japan.

The question whether the Americans really intend to make good this new threat and take military countermeasures in the event of a Japanese advance into Thailand, or whether this is just the continuation of the past incendiary campaigns, cannot be answered at this time. It is worth noting, however, that the English apparently were not consulted although Roosevelt is said to have been asked by the English as well as the Soviet Russians to avoid if possible a (clear text apparently missing) in the Pacific at this time. The extreme limits of what can be called bluffing would seem to have been reached, in any event, by the sharp tone and arrogance of the American demands.

THOMSEN

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

### No. 507

F9/0120-38

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff*

Füh 53

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, November 28, 1941.

RECORD OF THE RECEPTION OF FINNISH FOREIGN MINISTER WITTING BY THE FÜHRER IN THE PRESENCE OF THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER ON NOVEMBER 27, 1941, FROM 12:00 TO 1:00 P. M.

After Foreign Minister Witting thanked the Führer for the great honor of being received by him, the Führer began with his remarks: He wanted to describe the situation to him briefly as it is:

1. The present situation was not the result of his desire, but the fault of Russia.

2. The German position toward Bolshevism had always been clear and unequivocal. He himself had shortly after the World War founded the party which had taken as its most sacred task the fight against Bolshevism.

3. The attacks by the western powers had occurred through no fault of Germany's and contrary to our desire.

For Germany there existed one law: That was to avoid, in all circumstances, having to fight two sides at the same time. Many dogs are the death of the hare; and the World War had shown how difficult it was to fight against strong enemies in the west and the east at the same time. If he, the Führer, had promised Finland his help at the time during her first fight against Bolshevism, this promise would have been highly problematical. It would have meant merely a gesture, but not support capable of fulfillment. He had certainly not been willing to permit Bolshevism to penetrate further into Europe. But he had had to wait until he had gained freedom in the rear in 1939-40. Only when France had been thrown to the ground in 1940 had the moment arrived when he had been able for the first time to say no to Bolshevism.

He was a soldier and also judged his political possibilities as a soldier. He had therefore been clear about the fact that at a time when a two-front war threatened him it would have been very dangerous to proceed against Russia. Furthermore, he had needed one more year in order to set up the 240 divisions that were needed in order to be able to begin the great fight. During these preparations he had been aware that this was a matter not only of a fight for Germany but above all a fight for all of Europe; for if Germany had not been in a position to stand up against Bolshevism, then no other country in Europe could have done it in her place. The wave of Bolshevism would have swept across the Continent without hindrance. After he had gained the conviction, however, that Russia intended to attack Germany in any case, probably this very summer, he had decided to act and on June 22 his armies had marched.

One should be clear about the fact that the entire world Jewry stood on the side of Bolshevism. An objective political point of view was not possible in any country in which public opinion was controlled and formed by these forces which in the last analysis had brought about Bolshevism. He knew these forces from Germany. They were exactly the same that did their mischief in those states which today stood on the side of Bolshevism.

He saw how the U.S.A. was drifting very fast toward a terrible social crisis. In England, too, such contests were in the offing. Those who once employed these forces for their political purposes could no longer control them. He recalled a report stating that a year ago Halifax had received numerous letters from all parts of England demanding peace negotiations. This report had stated further that Halifax had been "strong enough" not to follow these wishes. This proved that a great number of Englishmen sought the reasonable course of a settlement with Germany, but that the forces which worked for destruction were still predominant. The entire national intelligentsia of England should be *against* the war, for even a victory could

not gain anything for England. It was the Bolshevist and Jewish forces which kept the English from pursuing a reasonable policy.

Europe had already recovered from the worst social crises. She was better consolidated and, owing to her lengthy historical past, more stable than America. She had, for example, quickly surmounted the abuses of the French Revolution, and also in the fight against Bolshevism the healthy and strong forces in Europe, as such, had prevailed. We could not have any conception as yet as to how these contests would develop in the superficial, unconsolidated America.

Thus one had to realize that in the last analysis Europe was entirely dependent upon herself. The most important task was to utilize *for* Europe from now on the richest and most fertile portion of Europe, which had been organized *against* Europe up to now. It was impossible, for example, that in Belgium there were 240 persons to the square kilometer, that there and in many other countries was great distress in taking care of the unemployed, whereas in the most fertile areas of Europe, in the Ukraine, there were only 80 persons to the square kilometer in areas where one could provide living conditions and food for countless people. It would be madness to permit such a situation. Europe had to mobilize her own resources and this would be done. Europe could become self-sufficient and he would make herself-sufficient.

It was an insane situation that those forces which today worked against Europe in the world did not build up but destroyed, and that they cut off thriving commerce. It was insane, for example, what the U.S.A. did with South America. To be sure South America, which had bought large numbers of machines from us in the past, could buy these from North America, but North America could not take the products which South America had so far delivered to Europe in exchange for the European products. How should South America pay if the U.S.A. could not use its goods! Gold was only a fiction; no one could live from it.

It was a tremendous task to develop Europe into a self-sufficient structure, a task which could be accomplished with relatively minor corrections. Up to now the most valuable part of Europe had been organized against Europe. The entire wealth of broad European Russia had not been utilized for the Europeans, not even for the Russians, but it had been used exclusively for developing a gigantic armament against Europe.

If we Germans took over the leadership in this new development of Europe, it was only for the reason that someone finally had to do it and because owing to her position, her people, and her capacities Germany was predestined for this. Through the fighting in the past, Germany had developed into a strong power and had borne a tremendous blood-burden—in the final analysis also for Europe.

It was easy for some countries that stood outside the battle today to say that they remained neutral and regarded the developments from a higher point of view. The Swedes could regard the development from a higher point of view as long as Finnish soldiers risked their lives at the front and opposed the enemy in dirt and mud. If there had been no Finnish soldiers then Sweden and Norway would soon have been overrun by Bolsheviks, and if the Rumanians had been beaten, then Bulgaria would have been next in line. It was right for everyone to fight for himself against Bolshevism, for then they would all be fighting for Europe. In this respect he could not understand England, for the English were insane if they believed that once Russia got to the Channel they could keep out of the conflict and would be safe from being destroyed by Bolshevism.

It was Germany's task not only to end the war but also to build up a new Europe. Perhaps in our past we would have fared better had we been somewhat more egoistical. Since the year 1454 the German Reich had lost 24 million lives in war and had not won much thereby. In the same time the English had sacrificed 2.3 million men and with these had conquered a world empire. In this comparison one could not reproach Germany with having been especially egoistical. It was unfortunately the German fate that she always had to fight for Europe and stand firm against the penetration of alien peoples from the east. Just as in the past she had preserved Europe from the onslaughts of the Huns, Turks, and Mongols, today she was again battling against the onslaught of Bolshevism. And this time Bolshevism had mobilized all of Asia against Europe.

There were certain problems that could *only* be solved in Europe. As a soldier, he was in a position to evaluate what a tremendous contribution the Finnish people had made in this battle, and he wanted to assure him, the Finnish Foreign Minister, of one thing: *We did not have much to give away in Germany, but we would, under no circumstances, leave Finland in the lurch, also not economically.<sup>1</sup> Where 90 million people could live, it was also possible to let another 3 million live with them, too. He would take care that this was made possible; this he promised him, even at the risk that certain restrictions had to be made in Germany.*

He was resolved to find a solution for the Russian question once and for all [*grundsätzlich*]. He did not exaggerate when he said that Europe had been saved through his person. How would Europe have

<sup>1</sup> Schnurre's memorandum Ha. Pol. 7709/41g of Nov. 27 (261/170384-85) records a discussion on the evening before with Witting who had discussed the problem of Finland's food supply with Göring. The Reichsmarschall, said Witting, showed great understanding for Finland's needs and assured him that Germany would make up Finland's deficit not only in grain but also in fats. In January experts of Finland and of Germany would study Finland's additional needs.

withstood the Russian onslaught if he had not at one time founded his party, and if the victory of his party had not made it possible for him to rearm for eight years. This onslaught would have swept across Europe like a hurricane.

He considered it necessary that the Russian problem be solved radically, and once and for all. As a historic personality he wanted to give him the advice also to seek a solution from the Finnish point of view that was not only meant for 1941-42 but was also of truly historical dimensions. Finland had to define her borders in a manner which precluded a repetition of the Russian attack; otherwise she would have to mobilize and bleed again after a few years. The borders which she had to strive for should be determined from the point of view of security. He, the Führer, had only the desire in this that Finland would permit us to participate economically in her reconstruction, particularly as regards to products that were scarce with us. These were primarily nickel and lumber. Once we had organized the Ukraine, we could make available to Finland unlimited quantities of food. Finland should secure a border that stretched from the White Sea to the Svir and the Neva. It was his irrevocable decision to break the power of Russia once and for all. Within this framework there was also his resolve to blot out the significance of Leningrad, so that new fights would not break out and new blood not have to be shed every 25 years. For after all, the German people had another mission than to carry on war.

He himself had been torn away from his peaceful work. This work had been of great creative value for humanity and its culture. The Führer then spoke of the reconstruction and cultural work lying within the framework of his plans. He spoke of social reforms, of buildings, roads, worker colonies, factories and more of the like.

Turning to the present war situation, the Führer said that it was not because of the Russians but because of the snow, mud, and cold that we had not yet attained our objectives. In one area our successes were not so large, namely in the Finnish theater of war.<sup>2</sup> The Finns were admittedly better than we on their terrain, for our equipment and our training had only been meant for the European Continent.

The achievements of the German soldiers were written in the stars. We had conquered Poland, the west, Yugoslavia and Greece; in the east we had pushed our front 1500 kilometers forward. In North Africa an annihilating defeat was awaiting the English. To be sure, he was not a man to let off a fanfare too early, like the English, but he was convinced that there, too, a great victory was on the way for us. Leningrad had to be destroyed, and Moscow, too;<sup>3</sup> he did not want to

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 349 and No. 395.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 388.

conquer any cities. In the meantime preparations were being made in the southern part of the front for the further advance into the Caucasus. No matter what happened, there was no longer any combination of forces conceivable in the world that could force us out of Europe.

It gradually became clear that the nations of Europe belonged together like a great family of nations. France, too, would come to realize this, and he hoped that England, too, would recognize this; it was to be hoped that it would not be too late. England had to realize that the only group of powers which had an interest in maintaining the English Empire was Europe and never America.

In the meantime Germany would keep on arming. He followed American production; in comparison to what we accomplished it was ridiculous, and one should not think that what we had at the front today represented our last possibilities. He always gave out only what was just needed. Actually, owing to the unprecedented development of the anti-tank defenses the tank had passed its high point. The same thing had happened as with the knights' armor in the Middle Ages, which had lost its value owing to the invention of fire-arms. He regarded the future with perfect composure. If the U.S.A. entered the war, then Japan would also be in the war within the shortest time. This would be regrettable, however, because the world would thereby suffer a tremendous upheaval. For Germany, however, this would no longer signify any danger.

All of us, the Finns, too, had only the one wish at the moment, and that was for peace. But not a peace in which we knew that we would have to fight again within a few years.

Germany was very happy to have Finland as her ally, and every German soldier respected the Finnish soldier. The fact that both are brave was the best prerequisite for mutual respect. He, the Führer, hoped that this common war would be the last war, and that at the same time it would signify the start of a long friendship between Germany and Finland.

Foreign Minister Witting expressed to the Führer his gratitude for what he had said and mentioned that Finnish history was similar to that of Germany inasmuch as Finland had fought against the east for centuries. Finland realized that for securing her position she had to go beyond her old borders. The Führer confirmed this and assured him that in these questions, too, Germany stood 100 percent behind Finland's aspirations.

Witting then stated that Finland employed her troops according to the seasons. In the winter it was again predominantly the struggle of individuals, and thus many soldiers were now being withdrawn from the front, some to be put in industry and agriculture and some into

winter quarters. Finland had tried to become self-sufficient, especially in the matter of grain supplies, and these efforts had been almost successful. But owing to the attack of the Bolsheviks she had again lost a large portion of territory and the war had done its part in blocking this development. Now they had too little grain, but the Reichsmarschall whom he visited yesterday, had told him that the Führer had promised to help Finland. They hoped to conclude next spring what had not been possible this winter and to conclude the fight against Bolshevism.

The Führer confirmed that he would support Finland further in this fight and that he would send up another division to Finland.<sup>4</sup> *He also considers it right for Finland to strive for possession of the Kola Peninsula and to secure this area for herself.*<sup>5</sup> He had only the one wish, namely that Germany be allowed to participate economically in the nickel exploitation. Regarded from the political point of view, Germany would be happy if every state would take its place in the defense of Europe. For Germany does not wish to scatter her forces all over Europe, but to concentrate them in her country. Furthermore, Germany had a reconstruction program, for which she needed every German. This was what annoyed him most about the numbskull Churchill, that he had frustrated him in his great creative work of reconstruction and culture. But we humans had to believe here in a higher dispensation of fate. Perhaps it was just as well that everything happened as it did. He did not belong to those who were ready to leave to posterity a very difficult task with which they had been confronted. The task of bringing together the European family had to be performed now. With modern military technology small nations could no longer exist independently. In a time when 600 km could be covered by an airplane in an hour, a great territorial integration of nations was necessary. In this sense the construction of a tremendous protective wall toward the east was the first requirement for the security of Europe. Since time eternal Russia had pushed toward the west. Not only under Bolshevism, but as long as history had existed the east had threatened the west, no matter what regime had ruled in Russia. This the Finns knew too. Today Bolshevism had mobilized all of Asia against Europe.

In conclusion the Führer asked the Foreign Minister to convey greetings to his President and Field Marshal Mannerheim and to assure them:

1. That the victorious military development could no longer be diverted by any power. Germany and the German soldiers had not only the courage to attack but also the toughness to hold out until the objective has been attained.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 395.

<sup>5</sup> See document No. 331.

2. That he, the Führer, did not shrink from the rest of the world; he was arming to a degree that no one outside could imagine. Just at the present time new armored divisions were being set up and equipped with the most modern tanks ever seen as yet. In the west there were stationed a total of 45 divisions today. He did not need to have any concern there; on the contrary, he could only wish that the English would land; he would toss them into the sea so that Dunkirk, by comparison, could be considered child's play.

From a certain moment on, the war was nothing more than a problem in transportation, and this, too, would be solved. German submarines would now get into the Mediterranean,<sup>6</sup> too, and within a few weeks or months the English would learn that this puddle would be very difficult to negotiate. After having related somewhat more about the successes of the German submarines in the Mediterranean, the Führer took leave of the Finnish Foreign Minister in a very cordial manner.

HEWEL

<sup>6</sup> See U.S. Navy Department, ONI, "Führer Conferences on Matters Dealing With the German Navy, 1941," vol. II, pp. 59, 68, 80.

No. 508

F9/0159-62

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff*

Füh 55a g.Rs      FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, November 28, 1941.

RECEPTION OF THE HUNGARIAN MINISTER PRESIDENT AND FOREIGN MINISTER DE BÁRDOSY BY THE FÜHRER ON THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 27, 1941, FROM 1:00 TO 1:30 P.M. IN THE PRESENCE OF THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER

Bárdossy transmitted to the Führer the most cordial greetings from the Regent. The Führer thanked him for this and told him that he had told the Finn,<sup>1</sup> who had just been with him, that nine-tenths of the work had actually been done. The advance had bogged down in dirt and mud, but this meant only a certain loss of time. He still wanted to finish up a few things this year, but in so doing was following the principle of attaining these objectives with as few sacrifices as possible. Sevastopol was now first in line. The artillery had almost all been brought up, and moreover, he already had reports that the Russians were apparently evacuating Sevastopol. He then told the Hungarian of details of the fighting for the Crimea, which he termed an outstanding heroic feat of the German soldier and an

<sup>1</sup> For Hitler's conversation with Finnish Foreign Minister Witting, see document No. 507.

example of brilliant leadership by General von Manstein.<sup>2</sup> These were accomplishments which in the history of war were simply to be termed fantastic. He then reported further concerning the war in the east and the concentration in the direction of the Caucasus which was under way at the moment and which had been hampered for a while by the mud period. He also hoped in the immediate future to eliminate the last remnants of the Russian fleet from the Black Sea.

The Gulf of Finland was not freezing shut, and the Russian ships frozen in there would soon become victims of the Stukas. Leningrad would be starved out. The German troops were now moving up toward Moscow; everything was proceeding according to plan. The main task at the moment was bringing up supplies, and this too was functioning. In first place the winter equipment for the troops was now being brought up to this tremendous front. In North Africa the English would suffer a great defeat; he did not want to anticipate matters, but he could say even at this time, that the English operation in North Africa, which had been conceived by Churchill, had simply been stupid. It would go down in the history of wars as the Churchill operation. Churchill had evidently wanted to be very daring for once as he believed the Germans to be. But the difference was simply that Mr. Churchill had acted very daringly and stupidly, whereas we German prepared and carried out our operations down to the smallest detail with a tremendous sense of responsibility. This time the Italians in Africa, particularly the Ariete Division, had fought splendidly. Fortunately they had now recovered from the first shock which they had received at the time from the offensive of the English for the reason that they had had no tank defenses available.

The Hungarian unit had fought really splendidly on the eastern front, and deserved to have first of all a period for rest and recovery.

He would now continue to observe developments calmly. He had hoped very much that the English would attempt a landing. He now had eight additional new divisions in the west, and in Germany a tremendous, entirely new tank weapon was being developed. In the spring Germany would stand ready for the final struggle with numerous weapons of a new kind. He had kept back the entire production of the last months and had sent almost nothing to the eastern front.

The war could no longer be lost, but it was not only a question of finishing the European war, but also of organizing the new Europe. There would not be quiet in the world for a long time, because America in particular, and England, too, were confronted with the most terrible

<sup>2</sup> Gen. Erich Manstein, on Sept. 18 succeeded General von Schobert as Commanding General of the Eleventh Army. Schobert was killed in an airplane landing on Sept. 12.

social crises. It was all the more important to put Europe on her own feet, and that could and would happen.

After having spoken to the Hungarian with the greatest admiration of the heroic fight of the Finns, he [Hitler] asked him to convey his greetings to the Regent and to thank him for the excellent help which he had given the German people. He should tell the Regent that what he [Hitler] had indicated to him at the time as a military project had in the meantime become reality.

HEWEL

No. 509

F1/0007-14

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff*

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, November 29, 1941.  
Füh. 56a g.Rs.

RECEPTION OF THE BULGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTER POPOV BY THE  
FÜHRER ON NOVEMBER 27, 1941, FROM 7:30-8:00 P.M., IN THE  
PRESENCE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER

The Bulgarian Foreign Minister thanked the Führer for receiving him and after a few introductory sentences asked him how satisfied he was with the Bulgarian policy. The Führer replied that Bulgaria's attitude was very good, especially with respect to Turkey. It was good that Turkey had kept out of everything, for it was better for us if Turkey was indifferent than if she pursued a wavering policy. We simply could not offer Turkey as much as the English, for the simple reason that we would only offer a government what we were really able to deliver. The English made things much easier for themselves, for they would promise the countries which they wanted to win over for their purposes everything conceivable without thinking of ever keeping their promise. That was a very simple policy, at least temporarily, but it was alien to him, the Führer. To cite an example, the Führer mentioned his promise to Antonescu that the latter would get Bessarabia back for Rumania. The Führer had kept this promise, and he had backed it up with everything, with the German Army and even with German blood. England was always looking just for people who would pull the chestnuts out of the fire for the sake of her ends. The entire system of the offers of guarantees had had no other purpose than to find fools who would run their heads against the wall for England. Once she had given her word Germany backed it not only politically but also militarily. In his opinion it would not do in the long run to let other nations fight one's

own battles. What one wished to secure permanently one had to fight for with one's own blood. Germany had given the best example of this, for in this fight Germany, indeed, had again carried the main blood burden. The English themselves were not worth much; one saw this again in North Africa. Big England had put only one single division into the fight down there; everything else that was fighting down there for England consisted of Empire troops, New Zealanders, South Africans and even Indians.

It was good for Germany if Turkey did nothing at all. If the word were spread throughout the world that Germany had the intention of attacking Turkey, these were stupid lies. However, if Turkey had turned against us then he, the Führer, would not have remained on the defensive.

The main objective which he envisaged was the reconstruction of Europe. With the development of technology and also war technology the world was shrinking more and more and it had already become a foolish idea that the many countries in Europe should make war upon one another. Today one could fly over the largest European country in an airplane in one and a half hours. The Russians had been saved temporarily only because they simply had not built any roads. Every war against any other country in Europe which had a good road network could be ended by the power having superiority within a few days. He therefore believed that Europe was moving toward a great period of peace. After all everyone desired peace, Bulgaria too, and likewise Germany, because with respect to all countries a tremendous development program was waiting to be started.

He also believed that the end of this struggle would not be fought between any of the European countries, but that finally England would have to fight against America. The English would find out one day that Europe alone could have an interest in preserving England and the Empire. America, on the other hand, could only desire to dissolve the English Empire and inherit it.

The Führer then spoke at some length about the horrible conditions in Russia, the devilish system of Bolshevism, the gigantic Bolshevik armament industry and the unscrupulous methods which the Bolshevik and Jewish rulers had used to deprive the Russian worker of his rights, rob him of his freedom, and impress him into the armament industry like cattle. Gigantic factories had been built and next to them the administrative buildings of the GPU which had monumental facades in front and from the rear were nothing but great prisons. The workers had simply been caught and put into the factories, and then they had been left to their fate and had had to find shelter in holes in the ground. It had been the same in the construction of the super highways. In vain did one look for the workers'



accommodations; but nothing had been found along the highway but a concentration camp every 30 kilometers. Here the workers that had arrived too late or had not fulfilled the demands of the work had been beaten and tortured or finally shot. The entire wages had consisted of one pound of bread for the people and some oats for the horses. In this way one could naturally achieve tremendous things. He himself had seen areas in the Ukraine flowing with milk and honey, where the soil was so rich that there was nothing like it anywhere else in Europe, and still the population had been so miserable and impoverished that one could hardly believe it. He had seen thousands of women, but not a single one had worn even the cheapest jewelry. In the miserable huts there had been neither dishes nor any other household objects. And this misery existed in an area whose soil could produce the biggest harvest that one could imagine. Today a fearful and intimidated mass lived there which trembled in fear of their commissars. Only after these pitiable creatures saw with their own eyes that their commissars had been shot did they slowly turn into human beings again. Popov said that the same observations had been made from Bulgaria. The Führer continued that the poor people had no fear of death, but only of torture and the horrible torments that they were exposed to by their rulers. He had read countless letters from Russian prisoners which constantly told of hunger. The notion of hunger ran like a red thread through all the manifestations of life of the Russian people. They were simply not human beings any more, but animals, and one was shocked to compare the present population with the Russians whom one knew from the World War. At that time one had encountered the good-natured blond Russians as the predominant element of the population. Today they had disappeared. With a devilish methodicalness the Bolshevik regime had increasingly destroyed these Russians or sent them to Siberia and had systematically transplanted Mongols from Asia to European Russia in order to destroy the Russian people racially, too, in this way and saturate them with Asiatic blood.

He now believed, however, that the danger factors had been overcome. The fall of Sevastopol was a matter of a few days. He also had reports that the Russians evidently intended to evacuate Hangö. How badly the Russians were faring could also be seen from Molotov's statement in which he sketched for the world, but especially for the Russian soldiers, a horrible picture of the tortures which the Russian prisoners of war had to undergo at the hands of the German soldiers.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This presumably refers to a note of Nov. 25 by the Soviet People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs addressed to all diplomatic missions which protested the mistreatment of Soviet prisoners of war by the Germans. The text of the note was published in the Soviet press. For a summary, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. 1, pp. 1016-1017.

The main reason for this statement was probably the fact that especially around Moscow numerous Russian soldiers had again gone over to the Germans. They had an insane fear of their commissars; once these had been exterminated the Russians were in general quiet, usable and willing.

The Führer concluded the conversation by asking Popov to convey to the King his very best regards and to tell him one thing: No longer would anybody be able to change anything in the outcome of the war, neither England nor America nor any other coalition.

HEWEL

### No. 510

F20/505-14

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff*

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, November 27, 1941  
Füh 63a g.Rs.

RECORD OF THE RECEPTION OF DANISH FOREIGN MINISTER SCAVENIUS  
BY THE FÜHRER IN THE PRESENCE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER ON  
NOVEMBER 27, 1941, FROM 8:00 TO 8:30 P.M.

The Führer mentioned to the Danish Foreign Minister, the events of the last few days, such as the renewal of the Anti-Comintern Pact, the adherence of new states, and the meeting of Foreign Ministers in Berlin,<sup>1</sup> as indications of the new Europe that was slowly emerging. The European states were gradually getting together in the realization that Europe had to find the foundations of its existence on the European continent itself. It was madness to say that Europe depended on the rest of the world. If for once the rich territories of eastern Europe which hitherto had always been mobilized *against* Europe would be organized *for* Europe, Europe could be made self-sufficient. Only top quality products could continue to be exchanged with other economic areas. The policy, especially the trade policy, of North America was insane and bound to collapse sooner or later, because it was based only on thoughtless and imperialistic aims and not on actual realities. North America's fight against German trade in South America was complete nonsense. True, South America could obtain from North America all the goods it had so far ordered from Europe, such as machines, industrial products, chemicals; but with what did it want to pay for these goods? All the things it could supply to America, America herself had in abundance. Europe, however, needed South America's meat and fruit, so that a healthy exchange

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 498.

of goods could flourish between Europe and South America. Nor could Europe develop any substantial trade with North America for long because in the end one could always buy only as much as one could sell. One could not build an economy on credit or on reserves which one possessed, but only on mutual performance. America, that big industrial country, had 13 million unemployed herself. She had sold the product of the labor of her people not in exchange for commodities, but for dead gold. And although she had piled up a great amount of gold, she was nonetheless at the threshold of inflation. We could carry on a flourishing trade with South America, but the United States never could. Nor could England, since she had her empire, in which she had to develop her own trade. The present policy of the North American union would lead to the destruction of South America.

The economic areas in the world were growing and would become too big to carry on, in addition, a large volume of trade among themselves. Here was North America, which was a closed economic entity in itself, next to it the British Empire, then Japan, which was in the process of conquering a closely knit economic sphere in the Far East, and finally there was the European bloc, which was likewise in a position of becoming self-sufficient. He, the Führer, saw in front of him the aim of creating this self-sufficient Europe, which was entirely possible. Countries such as Belgium and Holland with their dense population could not exist at all. They were living on their colonies; but how long would they possess them? They were not in a position to defend these colonies. What one could not defend with the sword, one must not expect to keep for long. The agglomeration of masses of people in these small countries was a problem that needed a solution. The situation would become entirely different once the east was opened up for the benefit of Europe. If the Ukraine were administered with European methods, three times as much could be gotten out of her. We could supply Europe on an unlimited scale with the things that could be produced there. The east had everything in unlimited quantities: iron, coal, oil, and a soil in which anything Europe needs could be grown: grain, oil seed, rubber, cotton, and much more.

Europe, however, could produce for 200 years before saturating the east with the most necessary consumers' goods. Today Europe was straining to the utmost to sell some trifle somewhere in China or in distant overseas areas. And here at our borders stretched an immense area that had nothing, beginning with the simplest household goods, and which was only waiting to be given the possibility of absorbing European goods.

To solve these problems was a stupendous task and if no one undertook this task he himself was going to solve it. He was no dilettante

in this field; after all he had solved the German problems too. He had caused the production of Germany to flourish anew. If he was told that he had eliminated the unemployed by engaging in large-scale rearmament, this was only partially true because in the end he had enabled the German worker to buy any conceivable goods with what he earned. In this way he had indeed made the armament industry productive, but had also accelerated the entire German production, and thereby solved the problems of the general increase in production.

We had better get slowly accustomed to the concept of Europe, because after all we were all living in one European family. It was true that there was often bitter quarreling in a family, but that did not prevent people from getting together nevertheless at a moment of great danger or at moments when it was a matter of solving vital problems. In Europe only two races had accomplished something, the Romanic and the Germanic. All others were only profiteers and parasites of the values and cultures which the other races had created.

Germany was fighting on the eastern front because she stood there. If she did not stand there another power would have to fight there. We had been fighting this tremendous battle against the constantly onrushing east for one thousand and a half years. Earlier there were the Huns, the Tartars, and the Mongolians; today it was Bolshevism that had mobilized the whole of Asia against Europe. The Finns, too, were standing on the eastern front of Europe. The Swedes were making things easy for themselves, which they could do as long as there were Finns who staked their lives at the front. It was the same with the Rumanians who were fighting against the Bolsheviks. If they did not fight, or if they did not exist, it would be the Bulgarians who would have to undertake this battle.

Germany having borne the greatest blood burden in this struggle and again bearing it this time was fighting for herself, but at the same time she was fighting for the whole of Europe. If Germany had not recovered and prepared herself for this great struggle, these Bolshevik-Asiatic hordes would have rolled across Europe like a wave and would not have halted in front of democratic Switzerland either. That was why he was glad that Denmark was participating. The war would pass, but the European problems would remain and had to be solved. For that it was necessary that the European family of nations stood together and lent a hand. Trading was possible only where one could protect trade with the sword. Denmark, too, ought to realize this. England would also one day find the way back to Europe; he hoped, not too late. The policy which she pursued today was insane. Europe ought now to stand together, the more so as she had to realize that the states upon which most of the countries had

relied up to now, England and America, were standing on the threshold of vast social revolutions. No nation on earth was more ripe for social explosions than the USA and England.

The Führer then made a few comments regarding the American armaments. He knew precisely what America could accomplish. He was not a man to underestimate the enemy, but he could calmly say that the one who had underestimated his enemy in this contest was not he, but the Anglo-Saxon politicians.

Reverting to American policy, the Führer remarked that some states might embark on a course where, from imperialistic motives, they would rob territory merely for the sake of robbing, such as England had done in the last few centuries, that is without necessity and without relation to social needs. In these matters he was a businessman, particularly in the colonial question. What use was a colony to him that supplied him annually with 60 million marks worth of spices and tropical products, but cost him 200 million marks in expenses for troops and defense. Germany would always export that much to be able to buy such things.

No state in Europe could blame him for having approached it on his own initiative to lure it into this war, or to induce it to fight for Germany. The states that today stood side by side with us had on their own part voiced a desire that they be permitted to join in the fight. Even the Czechs had wanted to set up a legion, but he was convinced that the Czechs did not like the European new order and therefore he did not want them to fight for it. Nor did he want to make the Czechs into Germans. He had a principle that the task which fate imposed on him should be solved through [Germany's] own blood sacrifice and at his own commitment. If the German people should in the future be no longer sufficiently strong and ready to give their own blood for their existence, they ought to perish and be destroyed by another, stronger power. They would then no longer deserve the place that they had conquered today. Europe had passed through a long history of ups and downs, but today she was well on the way of growing together into a family. In accordance with this development, she had to conduct a common economic policy and jointly take in hand the economic opening-up of Europe. The main task was first to make Europe self-sufficient. Big deals with overseas countries could be handled by anybody the way he wanted. In a hundred years all of Europe would thank him that he had initiated this development.

Scavenius took his leave from the Führer stating that Denmark would participate in this development to the best of her capacity.

HEWEL

## No. 511

F20/487-94

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff*

Füh. 62a g.Rs.

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, November 28, 1941.

RECEPTION OF THE CROATIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, LORKOVIĆ, BY THE FÜHRER IN THE PRESENCE OF THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER ON NOVEMBER 27, 1941, FROM 8:30 TO 9:00 P.M.

The Croatian Foreign Minister spoke about the establishment and development of the young Croatian state and expressed the hope that this state would develop to the benefit of the new Europe. General Kvaternik had asked him to express his loyalty and his thanks for Germany's assistance in building up the Croatian armed forces. The latter had to make up for 25 years in order to become again what they once were. But Croatia was happy to have an army of her own.

The Führer confirmed that the war, more than any other event, would stimulate the development of Croatia's armed forces. The fact that a unit of the Croatian armed forces was fighting alongside the German troops and thus was participating in a maneuver of tremendous dimensions was certainly a blessing for the young armed forces. This unit would doubtless at some time provide the nucleus for the later Croatian army. There was a classic example for this, namely the 27th Rifle Battalion of the World War, which consisted of Finns. The whole of the present armed forces of Finland had grown out of this battalion. The Finnish Army was excellent; yes, he even had to admit that they were our teachers in the fighting in the terrain there. The knowledge of war could not be learned in peacetime. We Germans had also tried to develop new operational ideas in peacetime with the aid of the new weapons, but war was a different school. It was through the practice which we had had, starting with the occupation of the Rhineland and through the entry into Austria to the great battles of this war, that we had really developed our great military ability. The Rumanians, too, had learned a great deal in the war, and their present army was something quite different from what it was two years ago.

Lorković continued: He could report that the reorganization of the Croatian state was progressing, that Croatia was today a united nation in which religious denominations played no role. There was good progress in the areas of foreign and domestic policy. The development of the economy was also progressing satisfactorily; they even hoped that next year Croatia's harvest would be sufficient to cover her own needs. They were establishing a kind of Reich Food Estate

[*Reichsnährstand*] at the present time. The Führer expressed his pleasure at this development.

As an Austrian by birth, who in his youth had so often associated with the people from the close-by southeast, he was particularly interested in the Croatian state. He had also gotten to know the Mohammedan Croats as excellent soldiers, and for this reason he was particularly happy to learn that the Croats were able to shift their development away from denominations and toward the racial idea, for after all the Christian and Mohammedan Croats were one race. Lorković replied to a question by the Führer that there were somewhat fewer than one million Mohammedans in Croatia, which was one-seventh of the population. All Croatian soldiers, especially the Bosnians, remembered the Austrian period with affection.

The Führer mentioned the unsatisfactory conditions in Serbia, where guerrilla bands consisting mainly of communists were still causing trouble. These uprisings would be crushed, and today things had already progressed so far that the majority of the Serbs themselves opposed them. One could indeed see from this how everything had been prepared from Moscow long in advance. He, the Führer, had never intended to have quarrels with so many states of Europe; he had always wanted peace only. But one had to recognize from the development of the war that we humans were subject to the decrees of fate. To be sure, he was not the man to wait until all problems came to him, but he seized the initiative as soon as he felt the need to act.

He spoke briefly about the insane act of the perpetrators of the Yugoslav Putsch, mentioning that the German national groups had felt quite happy in this country and thus had not caused the Yugoslav state the slightest difficulties. He pointed out to the Croatian Foreign Minister that Croatia could make of the Germans living there the most faithful and loyal supporters of the state if she treated them well; citizens who would remain true in the hour of danger, as well. He had tried in vain to make this clear to the Hungarians. Prince Paul of Yugoslavia<sup>1</sup> had recognized this wisdom. The Slovaks, too, were pursuing this policy with success. The Germans in Slovakia likewise belonged to the elements which supported the state. He praised the Slovaks highly and said that Germany was a close friend of Slovakia and had particularly cordial relations with them. Regarding our military bases in Slovakia the Führer said that they were a logical consequence of the request of the Slovaks for a guarantee, for one could not assume a guarantee unless one could put it on a military basis.<sup>2</sup> However, there was no military security down there as long as

<sup>1</sup> Regent of Yugoslavia, Oct. 9, 1934–Mar. 27, 1941.

<sup>2</sup> This is a reference to the German-Slovak Treaty of Protection signed Mar. 18, 1939. For text see vol. vi of this series, document No. 40.

one stood west of the Carpathians. In the meantime these military zones had become so well co-ordinated that the Slovaks were very content with them.<sup>3</sup> They profited from them economically, in the first place, but then they also learned from them militarily. Today a Slovak unit stood alongside the German troops on the most advanced front.

In the case of the Czechs, however, he had not been able to pursue this policy. To be sure, not all Czechs were enemies, but the majority of them had a kind of megalomania, and considered Czechia to be a country that had to engage in world politics with the great powers of the world, especially with the U.S.A. Furthermore, he did not want to convert the Czechs into Germans. They were of a race entirely alien to us, a mixture of Slavs and Mongolians. Their whole history had been made by Jews and Freemasons, among whom Beneš<sup>4</sup> was still today pursuing his Utopian ambitions, to the misfortune of his people.

The Führer then spoke of Europe's fight against the Bolshevik danger, and contrasted Germany's struggle in which Germany herself was making the greatest blood sacrifice, to the English lack of character in always letting other nations fight for her whenever possible. Germany had an entirely different view in this respect and it was his, the Führer's, whole ambition that in every attack Germans should be present, or, even better, be in the lead. We did not let other nations pull our chestnuts out of the fire for us.

Germany, by being willing to make the greatest blood sacrifices in this struggle, also acquired certain privileges with respect to leadership and organization. If we were leaders in the fighting we had also the right to a leading role in the new organization of Europe. Should the Germans ever become so base as not to want to carry on their fight with their own blood any longer, but with alien blood according to the English method, then it would serve the German people right if they were destroyed by a stronger power. Then he would not shed any tears for the German people.

The Führer closed the conversation with the remark that Germany was very content with her allies. He asked the Foreign Minister to give his regards to the Poglavnik and Marshal Kvaternik after his return.

HEWEL

<sup>3</sup> Article 2 of the German-Slovak Treaty of Mar. 18, 1939 (see footnote 2) had provided for the establishment of a zone of protection consisting of military installations set up by the Wehrmacht in Slovakia. A special treaty regarding this zone of protection was signed by Germany and Slovakia on Aug. 12, 1939. See vol. vii of this series, Editors' Note, p. 50.

<sup>4</sup> Eduard Beneš, President of Czechoslovakia December 1935–October 1938.

## No. 512

F1/0025-080

*Unsigned Memorandum*

RAM 58

## RECORD OF THE RECEPTION OF JAPANESE AMBASSADOR OSHIMA BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER IN THE EVENING OF NOVEMBER 28, 1941

Ambassador Oshima remarked by way of a preliminary that he had telegraphed to Tokyo several days ago and requested full information in view of the fact that he was going to see the Führer<sup>1</sup> and the Foreign Minister in the next few days. Foreign Minister Togo now had telegraphed him that Japan would continue in her determined, unyielding attitude at the conversations in Washington, and would enter no commitment inconsistent in any way with the Tripartite Pact. His Foreign Minister's telegram had contained no further details. According to a Domei report which he had read, Roosevelt and Hull took their stand on the Nine-Power pact,<sup>2</sup> and that of course was unacceptable for Japan. On top of that, the Americans were reported to have demanded withdrawal of the Japanese forces from China and Indochina.

The Foreign Minister commented that he did not believe that Japan could avoid a showdown with the United States, and that the situation could hardly ever turn more favorable to Japan than it was now. It was his view that when one was strong, one should take advantage of it. One should not hesitate tackling the Americans right now. It seemed better at any rate to bring a problem to a head at the right moment than to keep on putting it off. Besides, he believed that no great country like Japan could forever remain dependent on American supplies with respect to such vital raw materials as oil; as the situation stood today, every great power needed to have oil within its own sphere of control.

To the Foreign Minister's question why in effect Ambassador Kurusu had been sent to Washington, Ambassador Oshima replied that Kurusu surely must have felt confident that he could accomplish something. The fact was that many people in Japan believed that it was possible to reach some agreement with America, just because America

was really striving to avoid a war with Japan, as was also the case with England. After the World War, Japan had adopted a fundamentally wrong policy in adjusting her entire economy to England and America, a policy that needed to be changed now. But this was precisely the reason why all businessmen in Japan found themselves in a difficult position as a result of present political developments.

Answering the Minister's question whether Japan would be in a position to deprive the Americans of their rubber and oil imports from Indochina, Ambassador Oshima replied that as a first step it would be necessary to seize Dutch Borneo, after which it would be the turn for Java and Sumatra. Once these had been seized, the shipments of rubber and oil to America could be cut off.

To the Foreign Minister's next question as to what substance there was to the report that Japan was preparing to move into Thailand, Ambassador Oshima replied that he also had no specific information on that matter. When the Thai Ambassador here had asked him a similar question, he had answered him that Japan would march into Thailand if the country were to work for England or the United States. Occupation of Thailand would of course be of great importance in threatening Singapore and Burma. For the rest, he thought it would not be long before this matter was settled.

The Foreign Minister remarked that all the bowstrings of the Tripartite Pact community would have to be stretched taut if the full potential of its power were to be realized. He had known from the beginning that Germany would accomplish the task she had set for herself. We would crush Russia for good and all and also drive England out of her positions in the Mediterranean. If Japan in turn were to carry a strong policy into effect, we would be impregnable.

Asked by the Foreign Minister whether Prime Minister Tojo was a strong man, the Ambassador replied that that was the case; however, his was not the sole decisive voice. Policy changes could be effectuated in Japan only step by step. Again, it was not possible, either, to remain simply on one spot.

The conversation then turned to the question of whether Japan would or would not be able to bypass the Philippines in executing her southward thrust. Ambassador Oshima replied that in his opinion all preparations had been made to wage war also against the United States and England if the case should arise, but that would not be absolutely necessary. In his personal opinion, the first step should be to occupy Thailand and Dutch Borneo, in order to secure oil, for one thing, and good strategic bases, in addition, for the next forward moves. If this resulted in war with England, Singapore should be seized, if possible. He did not think that the United States would intervene in the event of a move against Thailand and

<sup>1</sup> Oshima was received by Hitler on Nov. 27 together with other representatives of countries which were signatories to the Anti-Comintern Pact.

<sup>2</sup> This refers to the Nine-Power Treaty signed in Washington on Feb. 6, 1922, between the United States, Belgium, the British Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and Portugal. According to the preamble, this Treaty was designed "to stabilize conditions in the Far East, to safeguard the rights and interests of China, and to promote intercourse between China and the other Powers upon the basis of equality of opportunity." For text, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1922*, vol. I, pp. 276-281.

Borneo, but if that were to happen, Japan was determined to go to war against America at once.

The Foreign Minister commented regarding this that he wondered whether it would not be for the best if the showdown with the United States were to come soon. There could not be a moment more favorable than the present. If the American Navy then came to the Far East, that would be fine, and if it stayed away, Japan would be in a superlatively favorable position for conducting . . .<sup>3</sup> naval warfare against America.

The Foreign Minister then raised the further question whether Japan could not proclaim a security zone covering all Far Eastern waters, which then would also make it impossible for the Americans to use the Vladivostok route. To this Ambassador Oshima remarked that the Americans were no longer using this route as being too hazardous for them on account of the large number of Russian floating mines off Vladivostok, and because they did not want to run the risk of having their ships seized by Japan in case war broke out.

In conclusion, the Ambassador inquired how Germany assessed the situation in the Atlantic and whether America's formal entry into the war in the Atlantic was to be expected.

The Minister replied that he did not know; moreover, it did not matter for our policy. What really mattered was that the coalition of the Axis Powers . . .<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> One word illegible in the original.

<sup>4</sup> The German Foreign Ministry record of this conversation is incomplete.

Cf. Oshima's full account of this conversation with Ribbentrop in an intercepted telegram of Nov. 29 to Tokyo, the text of which is printed in *Pearl Harbor Attack: Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*, 79th Cong., 1st sess., pt. 12, Joint Committee Exhibits Nos. 1 through 6, pp. 200-202. According to this account Ribbentrop made the following statement toward the end of the conversation:

"Should Japan become engaged in a war against the United States, Germany of course would join the war immediately. There is absolutely no possibility of Germany's entering into a separate peace with the United States under such circumstances. The Führer is determined on that point."

### No. 513

67/46960-67

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat*

RAM 16 g. Rs.

[NOVEMBER 28, 1941.]

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND RUMANIAN DEPUTY MINISTER PRESIDENT ANTONESCU IN BERLIN ON NOVEMBER 28, 1941

After a few personal words of greeting the Foreign Minister expressed his pleasure because Antonescu's visit occurred on such an

important occasion. The extension and expansion of the Anti-Comintern Pact meant in the final analysis a confirmation of the view of the Führer and Marshal Antonescu, that communism had to be destroyed once and for all. Even though in time of war when the armed forces did the talking the value of a diplomatic act ought not to be overestimated, nevertheless the association of 12 nations in the Anti-Comintern Pact was of importance and represented a considerable step along the path of reconstruction in Europe and the new order of the world.

In the further course of the conversation the Foreign Minister gave a description of the present situation. The view of the Reich Government on this culminated in the conviction that the war was already won and that it was simply a question of securing the final victory of Germany, Italy, and their allies over England and Russia in as short a time as possible and with as few losses as possible.

In this connection the Foreign Minister also spoke in a very appreciative way about the conduct of the Rumanian troops. The reports from the front confirmed that the Rumanian soldiers had fought very bravely and had shown themselves to be good and loyal brothers in arms. The Foreign Minister asked Antonescu to pass this on to the Marshal, and pointed out that in the meeting with Marshal Antonescu the Führer had already spoken in a similar manner.<sup>1</sup>

As far as the situation between Rumania and Germany in its particulars was concerned, it was characterized by the fact that the two countries had no divergent interests, but complemented one another in an outstanding way, particularly economically. Just as Germany had tremendous tasks of reconstruction to perform in the east, Rumania was occupied with the restoration of Bessarabia and the development of the areas in the direction of the Black Sea and Odessa. Both countries would perform these tasks, too, in closest harmony and friendship with one another.

The Foreign Minister recalled how difficult the situation had been when the Vienna Award had been rendered. If at that time a war between Hungary and Rumania had broken out, Russia would have overrun both countries. Germany had precise information that the Bolsheviks intended to exploit the situation at once in order to intervene.<sup>2</sup> The danger would have been tremendous for all concerned if the Russians had gained a foothold in the Balkans in this manner.

Russia was now defeated. It was not believed in Germany that Russia would offer much resistance in the coming year. In any case Russia had been definitely eliminated as an ally of England. To be sure, the Russian war still had to be brought to an end in order to

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 188.

<sup>2</sup> See vol. x of this series, document No. 389 and document No. 396, footnote 5.

break the last resistance. He (the Foreign Minister) hoped that it would still be possible before the winter set in to advance into the area of the Caucasus and to encircle Moscow. He was also convinced that Leningrad could not hold out much longer.

After that, however, there would be a pause until May. Only then could the Führer deal the Russians the death blow. In this way they would be removed from Europe for good. It was a matter of relative indifference whether Soviet Russian peasant republics would then still exist in Siberia.

Taking up the situation in Africa, the Foreign Minister remarked that there were favorable reports concerning the fighting in Libya, and he pointed out that North Africa and the Near East were considerably closer to continental Europe than to the British Isles. Thus Germany had the more advantageous position.

On the whole one could summarize the situation to the effect that the enemies of Germany and of her allies could no longer do much to them. If the Axis Powers and their allies were resolved to bring the war to a speedy close, then they all would have to work together in order to contribute toward attaining this objective. Although in Germany they greatly appreciated the blood sacrifices of the allies, it was nevertheless a fact that the main burden of the struggle was borne by the German people. Therefore the struggle ought to be made easier for the German people in every way. They imposed upon themselves considerable restrictions: Not a drop of oil or a bit of grain was wasted. In this respect the German people followed the Führer in absolute obedience.

Ever since he took over the government, Marshal Antonescu had preached war against Russia with unprecedented consistency. Reichsmarschall Göring, in close cooperation with the Foreign Minister, concerned himself with the economic development of Germany and the European countries. Since the shaping of the relations of the Reich with foreign countries was the task of the Foreign Minister, he wanted to express his views also with regard to the economic relations with Rumania.

It was a matter of fuel oil (Pakura) and of the deliveries of grain. The allies would need a great deal of oil in the future. Large countries and large mechanized armies could not get along without oil. For the time being, one was dependent in the greatest possible degree upon the Rumanian deliveries. Therefore he (the Foreign Minister) requested Antonescu to do everything to increase the Rumanian oil deliveries. Furthermore, the deliveries of maize and wheat had to be increased very considerably. In the final analysis all of these efforts were for the benefit of Rumania, too, because she was, after all, in the same boat with her allies and shared their fate. Without failing to

recognize the difficulties in Rumania's position, he (the Foreign Minister) was directing the personal request both to the Deputy Minister President and to the Marshal to make the greatest efforts in this field. He knew that Marshal Antonescu was not petty, but had always cooperated in the most generous manner. However, there were difficulties of an administrative nature in Rumania which had to be eliminated at all events. The Foreign Minister pointed in this connection to the particular importance of oil for the Italian fleet and the protection of the convoys in the Mediterranean.

Antonescu thanked the Foreign Minister for the words which he had found in appreciation of the services of the Marshal and the Rumanian Army, as well as for the great help which Rumania had received from Germany in her fight against Russia. Rumania alone would never have been able to win back the lost territories. He recalled the words of Marshal Antonescu that Rumania would always go along with Germany, that the Rumanian people could not be made responsible for the mistakes of a past generation and would do everything at all times to help Germany. Rumania had kept her word and already was able to present a long list of services in assistance of Germany. The alliance which Marshal Antonescu had brought about with Germany was political and, above all, also ideological. Rumania considered Germany the leading power in the Europe of the future.

Antonescu then gave the Foreign Minister the assurance that Rumania would do everything that was humanly possible to increase her deliveries to Germany. This would be achieved through reducing consumption and increasing production. Moreover, he pointed out that Rumania had already placed all of her petroleum supplies at the disposal of Germany.

In this connection he complained about the inflationary effects of the costs of the German troops in Rumania, which were enhanced by the fact that the German military supply services had very gravely disrupted the internal price structure of Rumania by direct purchases at very considerably increased prices of supplies stored in Rumania. Within 2 months the prices had risen more than 100 percent.

In this connection, Antonescu cited figures of the encumbrances resulting for the Rumanian State from its relations with Germany amounting to 20 billion lei of unsecured commodity credits, 20 billions in military costs, and 20 billions in export advances. Since the Rumanian Central Bank possessed only insufficient gold coverage, the situation was rather critical for the Rumanian currency.

In order to remedy these difficulties Antonescu advanced the following wishes:

Reduction of the number of German troops in Rumania. He mentioned in this connection that at the moment there were 56,000 Ger-

man troops and 20,000 prisoners in Rumania. Furthermore he requested three carloads of gold for the Rumanian Central Bank.

The Foreign Minister, referring to a memorandum by Minister Clodius in which the Rumanian wishes were appended in a particularly detailed form,<sup>3</sup> replied that the present difficulties had naturally only been called forth by the war. In the long run Rumania would doubtless be able not only to overcome her economic difficulties on the basis of her economic cooperation with Germany, but also to attain great prosperity. For the rest, Germany would do her best in order to comply with Rumania's economic wishes. The question of the deliveries of tractors for Rumanian agriculture was being speedily examined. However, the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern territories also had considerable demands on German industry in this regard. As far as supplying the Rumanian Central Bank with gold was concerned, Germany would be able to do something, although perhaps not on the scale of the Rumanian wish. The Foreign Minister would speak with the military authorities about the reduction in the German troops.

Antonescu then turned to the tension with Hungary. When the Foreign Minister countered that the Hungarian Minister President had complained very much about the Rumanian propaganda,<sup>4</sup> Antonescu replied that the Transylvanian border represented too great a burden on Rumania in consideration of her right to demand the unity of the Rumanian people.

The Foreign Minister interrupted him at once with the remark that he could not speak about the Vienna Award and that at all events peace had to be maintained between Rumania and Hungary. He was well aware of the difficult situation. Rumania was accused of carrying on a great deal of revisionist propaganda, and Hungary made mistakes, too. However, peace and order had to reign in Europe so that the great tasks of reconstruction could be fulfilled. It would be a crime to want to concern oneself with matters that were of lesser importance in comparison to the tremendous tasks in the east. Nor should one forget that the Russians still had to be definitively defeated, that one perhaps would have to pursue them up to the Urals, and that one would still have an open border toward the east. Therefore one had to be on guard against everything that might come out of the "sinister space" in the east. The conquered eastern territories had to be completely reorganized. Here, too, Rumania had a great deal to do. As against this, one ought to leave no room for European family quarrels. One had to look at them coolly and soberly.

Although Germany understood very well that every country stood up for the members of its own national group, he (the Foreign Minister) nevertheless wanted to admonish Antonescu to be exceedingly restrained. Hungary had undertaken commitments in regard to the treatment of the minorities. Admittedly, the Hungarians unfortunately had a somewhat peculiar view concerning the keeping of this commitment. Germany too had constantly received complaints from her own Volksdeutsche in Hungary. However, Germany never forgot with respect to these matters that every fellow German in Hungary was at the same time also a Hungarian citizen. One could not knock one's head against the wall in the desire to help members of one's own national group in other countries, but ought to remember always the great political line of the European development. He (the Foreign Minister) knew full well that the Hungarians treated their citizens of alien ethnic groups badly. One had to see that this improved, particularly in the case of the Rumanians. On the other hand, as he had already said, the Hungarians complained about the Rumanian revisionist propaganda in the press and in public speeches. In view of this situation he could only urge the greatest calmness and request that Rumania concentrate upon the problems of development which awaited her in the east.

At this moment Antonescu handed over a document which contained details of the Hungarian excesses against members of the Rumanian minority.<sup>5</sup> The Foreign Minister promised to assign to State Secretary von Weizsäcker the task of examining and evaluating the dossier. He added that the weight of blame was possibly on the side of Hungary, but that one should nevertheless not start up any polemics, for mastery lay in restraint.

Deputy Minister President Antonescu replied that Rumania relied on the sense of justice of the Führer, who well knew how to evaluate biological realities. However, Marshal Antonescu's position with the Rumanian people was being greatly impaired by the excesses of the Hungarians against the Rumanian minority, especially since these excesses were not decreasing but increasing. Furthermore Antonescu also complained about the speech which Bárdossy had given on the occasion of the extension of the Anti-Comintern Pact, and which he termed a piece of brazen impudence.<sup>6</sup> Bárdossy had stated that Hungary had already fought against the Communists in the year 1919. In reality this fight had taken place only with the support of the Rumanians.

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

<sup>4</sup> For the text of this speech given on Nov. 25 see *Dokumente der Deutschen Politik* (1944), vol. ix, pt. 1, pp. 356-358.

<sup>5</sup> Clodius memorandum of Nov. 23 (2293/483586-90).

<sup>6</sup> See document No. 503.



Minister Clodius was asked to participate in the last part of the conversation on account of the economic questions. He characterized the Rumanian request for gold as too high; for the rest he expressed willingness to study the question of the tractors and the reduction in troops.

In conclusion the Foreign Minister expressed his pleasure at the personal acquaintance with Antonescu, and called Germany and Rumania the corner stones in the perpetually open struggle against the influence of Soviet Russia.

SCHMIDT

No. 514

F2/0098-100; 102  
F15/0092-102

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat*

NOVEMBER 28, 1941.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE GRAND MUFTI WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER IN BERLIN ON NOVEMBER 28, 1941.

After introductory words of thanks for being received by the Foreign Minister and for the sympathies tendered by the German Government to the Arab peoples in general and Palestine in particular, the Grand Mufti stressed the fact that the Arabs were naturally friends of Germany because both were fighting three common foes: the English, the Jews, and Bolshevism. It had been a great deed on the part of Germany to have proceeded against these three enemies. The Arabs hoped that Germany would also help them in their own fight on these three fronts. They thought that victory in this battle was important not only for the Axis, but also for their own people.

They were prepared to do everything, and it had, indeed, been understood in Germany that the cooperation of the Arabs in Palestine, in Iraq, and in Syria had been contributions to the common cause. The insurrection in Iraq had not gone off very felicitously, but the Arab world took the stand that this was not an end but only a beginning. At least the Iraqis had now understood that England was their foe.

It was their desire, however, not only to render negative assistance, through insurrection and sabotage, but also to mobilize positive forces. Consideration was being given to an Arab Legion that might consist of Arabs from Er Rif and captured Algerians, Tunisians, and Moroccans. Also the Arab community of Palestine was on the best of terms with the centers of the Moslem faith and it was hoped that this would influence the Indians. It was also hoped that there would be opportunity to obtain recruits among the Indian prisoners and to care for them.

As is well known . . .<sup>1</sup>

. . . history, so often had to suffer from disunity.

It was natural that the Arabs should attach great importance to collaboration with Germany, both now and later, and in this connection cultural and economic ties were also being considered. They would like to conclude an agreement with the Axis Powers and desired, first of all, to have a declaration in order that the people might understand the attitude of the Axis Powers; for, as it was, the English were, unfortunately, planting doubts, while they themselves had already issued various, though rather unimportant, declarations. Unfortunately, as a result of the activity of the English there had already been some defections among the Arab followers. A declaration would strengthen the movement, without however causing the people to rise prematurely.

Nor did he, the Mufti, think that such a declaration would antagonize the Turks, for the Turks preferred to see weak neighbors on Palestine's borders rather than a strong power; under the mandate system, this meant France. The French, for their part, had as early as 1933 contemplated a union of Syria and Iraq [*eine Einheit Syrien-Irak vorgesehen*] and later on in 1936 even the independence of Syria.<sup>2</sup>

In summary, the Mufti once more referred to the importance of the declaration and particularly to the fact that it must be issued without delay. He then expressed his thanks for the support that had been given by the Axis powers to Rashid Ali's venture.

The Foreign Minister observed that this venture had been premature and that in German political life something important had been learned from the English, namely, "timing."<sup>3</sup>

After the Mufti had again asked that the declaration be not too long delayed, the Foreign Minister said that he was very glad to see the Mufti. Even when he was a child, his imagination had often been engaged by the concept and person of the Mufti, and in past years, it was his activities that he had closely observed, because he had now become a sort of mystic figure. As a nationalist he felt much sympathy for such an undaunted champion of his people, who had also never abandoned the struggle.

He wished to emphasize what the Mufti had said about the three common foes of the Arabs and the German people. Russia was now as good as beaten and the political power of Bolshevism was almost

<sup>1</sup> Page 3 of the original is missing.

<sup>2</sup> Apparently a reference to the Franco-Syrian treaty, signed Dec. 22, 1936, which was never ratified by the French Chamber of Deputies. For the text, see Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, *Rapport à la Société des Nations sur la situation de la Syrie et du Liban, 1936* (Paris, 1937), pp. 201-223.

<sup>3</sup> In English in the original.

broken. The Führer was determined never to let this danger spot become active again. As a sworn enemy of the Jews, Germany understood the troubles of the Arabs in this field, and finally the war against England was another bond uniting the Axis and the Arabs.

As far as Iraq was concerned, the Foreign Minister was afraid that they had begun too early there. Nor had Germany been in a position to contribute anything there. The sea was controlled by the English fleet. Air operations were impossible because they were beyond the range of the fighter planes, and with regard to land, everything had, to be sure, been attempted with Turkey; but these attempts had failed because of Turkey's refusal. Herr von Papen had, to be sure, been promised that the transit of material would be permitted but, apparently under English pressure, the Turks finally refused permission.<sup>4</sup>

At this point the Mufti stressed the fact that the English had a secret treaty with the Turks which had especially as its subject certain postwar plans.

The Foreign Minister then asked whether the declaration addressed by the Axis Powers to Iraq in the early summer<sup>5</sup> had caused Gaylani to strike. This was denied by the Mufti, who added that the Iraqis had no obligation but that of defense. The Foreign Minister's question as to whether the defense had been directed against the dangerously numerous landings of English troops was answered in the affirmative by the Mufti, who added that the plan to use Iraq as a base originated with Wavell<sup>6</sup> and was formulated in 1940, when Weygand was still chief of the Army of the Levant.

The Foreign Minister then stated that upon the outbreak of the war, when Minister Grobba was sent to the Near East, the Führer had been very much occupied with the problem, but it had been impossible for him to do anything. He himself, the Foreign Minister, has asked the Führer in Berchtesgaden, after the occupation of Crete, whether it would be possible to make a greater effort there, and the Führer had that very same day consulted the Reichsmarschall as leader of the Crete operation about it. The reply had been negative because a Syrian operation was impossible due to the insufficient range of fighter planes for this long distance. If it had been possible at the time to send a dozen trains through Turkey; if the necessary material as well as a mixed battalion with the necessary tanks had been placed

<sup>4</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 556.

<sup>5</sup> "Frühsummer" in the original is apparently an error. The reference seems to be to the German-Italian declaration addressed to the Iraq Government in April 1941, the text of which is printed in vol. XII of this series, document No. 322.

<sup>6</sup> Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell, British Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, February 1940-June 1941.

in readiness; it would certainly have been possible to chase the English out of Iraq. In the case of the Syrian operation, Germany had, to be sure, gotten the French to shoot, but, for lack of gasoline and, above all, of facilities for transportation, exactly the same difficulties had arisen with regard to supplies.

It was clear that it was now necessary to proceed very cautiously and prudently. One thing, though, he, the Foreign Minister, could say to the Mufti: his cause would receive support. How this was to be done, however, was still a matter for careful consideration. There was one thing he wanted to point out: the Germans were not Englishmen and the Führer didn't care for humbug. Thus, if an announcement were made, it had to be backed up by the power to carry it out.

A declaration naturally had to be made at the proper time, but the Foreign Minister wondered whether the time for this had already come, or whether it would not be better to wait until the guns did the talking there. The Führer thought that the latter moment would be better. To make empty promises was the English way: The Führer did not wish a declaration to be followed by inaction. He feared that the Arabs would in that case only lose confidence, and he thought that the declaration had better be made at a time when we were ready to strike and expel the English from the Suez Canal.

After the Foreign Minister had once more summed up the arguments with regard to the timing of the declaration, he pointed out that events in the south of Russia would proceed much more rapidly, particularly, once the Black Sea had become a German base of operations, which was to be expected in the near future. When we had advanced to the areas of the Near East, that would be the right moment for the declaration.

The Mufti stated that the Iraq venture was not regretted, and it was very well known that Germany would have liked to help. It seemed to him that the statement was necessary at the present time and especially important, for the reason that the English were recruiting volunteers with their promises, and that there was danger that many of the supporters of the Arab idea would defect.

Here the Foreign Minister interrupted to ask whether the Arabs, after all the trouble they had had with the Jews and after all that the English had done to them, still put faith in what the English said.

The Mufti stated that this was, to be sure, no longer the case in Palestine, but that in other Arab areas, people still thought differently. He considered it important for the declaration to be issued immediately in order that popular support might be retained and confidence bolstered. He wished to prepare the Arabs by such a declara-

tion for a later operation, so that they would not again be taken by surprise, as was the case with the Iraq venture.

The Foreign Minister raised the question of the consequences that the immediate issuance of a declaration would have. For the time being nothing positive could really be done, and there was danger, therefore, that the friends of the Mufti might get the impression that it was again merely a case of an idle promise. Also, and this was very important, the elements that were now engaged in secret activities might possibly become careless and thereby appear suspect to the English.

The Mufti contradicted this view and stated that the declaration would only bolster the hope of the adherents. He personally would hold them together and he could assure us that nothing would happen except by his command. In reply to a question from the Foreign Minister as to what Turkey's position would be in this matter, the Mufti said that the Turks would be glad to see an Arabic Greater Syria as such. They were only afraid to have a European great power as a neighbor, while they could not be unsympathetic to the idea of a rather small Arab state. He himself had been an officer in the Turkish Army during the entire World War and had always gotten along well with the Turks. It was, after all, not a case of the unification of all Arab countries, but only the union of Syria and Iraq. When the Foreign Minister indicated that, with respect to Syria, it was necessary to think also of France, the Grand Mufti remarked that the French had in theory already agreed to such a union in the past, under Briand.<sup>7</sup>

The Foreign Minister expressed the fear that only harm could come from premature revelation of the matter, particularly since it was not a question of years, but could only be a matter of months before intervention in the Near East was possible. Experience had shown that once a movement suffered reverses, it could be paralyzed for a long time to come. This was doubly dangerous because presumably the people who would have been most important upon the arrival of the German forces would then be at the mercy of the English.

The Mufti stated that he had no misgivings on this score. His organization was absolutely steadfast and he would speak on the radio, commenting on the declaration. He could assume responsibility for his followers. The leaders of his movement were, to be sure, entirely steadfast, but the people needed a psychological boost.

In conclusion, the Foreign Minister asked the Mufti to present these ideas in detail also in his forthcoming conversation with the Führer,<sup>8</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Aristide Briand (1862-1932), served frequently as French Minister of Foreign Affairs and as President of the Council of Ministers.

<sup>8</sup> See document No. 515.

and he assured the Mufti, who asked the Foreign Minister to intercede with the Führer in the matter of the declaration, of his warmest sympathies for the Arab people.

VON LOESCH

## No. 515

F1/0018-24

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat*

Füh. 57a. g Rs.

BERLIN, November 30, 1941.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND THE GRAND MUFTI OF JERUSALEM ON NOVEMBER 28, 1941, IN THE PRESENCE OF REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND MINISTER GROBBA IN BERLIN

The Grand Mufti began by thanking the Führer for the great honor he had bestowed by receiving him. He wished to seize the opportunity to convey to the Führer of the Greater German Reich, admired by the entire Arab world, his thanks for the sympathy which he had always shown for the Arab and especially the Palestinian cause, and to which he had given clear expression in his public speeches. The Arab countries were firmly convinced that Germany would win the war and that the Arab cause would then prosper. The Arabs were Germany's natural friends because they had the same enemies as had Germany, namely the English, the Jews, and the Communists. They were therefore prepared to cooperate with Germany with all their hearts and stood ready to participate in the war, not only negatively by the commission of acts of sabotage and the instigation of revolutions, but also positively by the formation of an Arab Legion. The Arabs could be more useful to Germany as allies than might be apparent at first glance, both for geographical reasons and because of the suffering inflicted upon them by the English and the Jews. Furthermore, they had close relations with all Moslem nations, of which they could make use in behalf of the common cause. The Arab Legion would be quite easy to raise. An appeal by the Mufti to the Arab countries and the prisoners of Arab, Algerian, Tunisian, and Moroccan nationality in Germany would produce a great number of volunteers eager to fight. Of Germany's victory the Arab world was firmly convinced, not only because the Reich possessed a large army, brave soldiers, and military leaders of genius, but also because the Almighty could never award the victory to an unjust cause.

In this struggle, the Arabs were striving for the independence and unity of Palestine, Syria, and Iraq. They had the fullest confidence

in the Führer and looked to his hand for the balm on their wounds which had been inflicted upon them by the enemies of Germany.

The Mufti then mentioned the letter he had received from Germany, which stated that Germany was holding no Arab territories and understood and recognized the aspirations to independence and freedom of the Arabs, just as she supported the elimination of the Jewish national home.<sup>1</sup>

A public declaration in this sense would be very useful for its propagandistic effect on the Arab peoples at this moment. It would rouse the Arabs from their momentary lethargy and give them new courage. It would also ease the Mufti's work of secretly organizing the Arabs against the moment when they could strike. At the same time, he could give the assurance that the Arabs would in strict discipline patiently wait for the right moment and only strike upon an order from Berlin.

With regard to the events in Iraq, the Mufti observed that the Arabs in that country certainly had by no means been incited by Germany to attack England, but solely had acted in reaction to a direct English assault upon their honor.

The Turks, he believed, would welcome the establishment of an Arab government in the neighboring territories because they would prefer weaker Arab to strong European governments in the neighboring countries, and, being themselves a nation of 7 millions,<sup>2</sup> they had moreover nothing to fear from the 1,700,000 Arabs inhabiting Syria, Transjordan, Iraq, and Palestine.

France likewise would have no objections to the unification plan because she had conceded independence to Syria as early as 1936 and had given her approval to the unification of Iraq and Syria under King Faisal as early as 1933.

In these circumstances he was renewing his request that the Führer make a public declaration so that the Arabs would not lose hope, which is so powerful a force in the life of nations. With such hope in their hearts the Arabs, as he had said, were willing to wait. They were not pressing for immediate realization of their aspirations; they could easily wait half a year or a whole year. But if they were not inspired with such a hope by a declaration of this sort, it could be expected that the English would be the gainers from it.

The Führer replied that Germany's fundamental attitude on these questions, as the Mufti himself had already stated, was clear. Germany stood for uncompromising war against the Jews. That naturally included active opposition to the Jewish national home in Palestine,

<sup>1</sup> Apparently a reference to the letter of Apr. 8, 1941, printed in vol. XII of this series, document No. 293.

<sup>2</sup> Thus in the original. It should read 17 millions.

which was nothing other than a center, in the form of a state, for the exercise of destructive influence by Jewish interests. Germany was also aware that the assertion that the Jews were carrying out the function of economic pioneers in Palestine was a lie. The work there was done only by the Arabs, not by the Jews. Germany was resolved, step by step, to ask one European nation after the other to solve its Jewish problem, and at the proper time direct a similar appeal to non-European nations as well.

Germany was at the present time engaged in a life and death struggle with two citadels of Jewish power: Great Britain and Soviet Russia. Theoretically there was a difference between England's capitalism and Soviet Russia's communism; actually, however, the Jews in both countries were pursuing a common goal. This was the decisive struggle; on the political plane, it presented itself in the main as a conflict between Germany and England, but ideologically it was a battle between National Socialism and the Jews. It went without saying that Germany would furnish positive and practical aid to the Arabs involved in the same struggle, because platonic promises were useless in a war for survival or destruction in which the Jews were able to mobilize all of England's power for their ends.

The aid to the Arabs would have to be material aid. Of how little help sympathies alone were in such a battle had been demonstrated plainly by the operation in Iraq, where circumstances had not permitted the rendering of really effective, practical aid. In spite of all the sympathies, German aid had not been sufficient and Iraq was overcome by the power of Britain, that is, the guardian of the Jews.

The Mufti could not but be aware, however, that the outcome of the struggle going on at present would also decide the fate of the Arab world. The Führer therefore had to think and speak coolly and deliberately, as a rational man and primarily as a soldier, as the leader of the German and allied armies. Everything of a nature to help in this titanic battle for the common cause, and thus also for the Arabs, would have to be done. Anything, however, that might contribute to weakening the military situation must be put aside, no matter how unpopular this move might be.

Germany was now engaged in very severe battles to force the gateway to the northern Caucasus region. The difficulties were mainly with regard to maintaining the supply; which was most difficult as a result of the destruction of railroads and highways as well as of the oncoming winter. If at such a moment, the Führer were to raise the problem of Syria in a declaration, those elements in France which were under de Gaulle's influence would receive new strength. They would interpret the Führer's declaration as an intention to break up France's colonial empire and appeal to their fellow countrymen that

they should rather make common cause with the English to try to save what still could be saved. A German declaration regarding Syria would in France be understood to refer to the French colonies in general, and that would at the present time create new troubles in western Europe, which means that a portion of the German armed forces would be immobilized in the west and no longer be available for the campaign in the east.

The Führer then made the following statement to the Mufti, enjoining him to lock it in the uttermost depths of his heart:

1. He (the Führer) would carry on the battle to the total destruction of the Judeo-Communist empire in Europe.
2. At some moment which was impossible to set exactly today but which in any event was not distant, the German armies would in the course of this struggle reach the southern exit from Caucasia.
3. As soon as this had happened, the Führer would on his own give the Arab world the assurance that its hour of liberation had arrived. Germany's objective would then be solely the destruction of the Jewish element residing in the Arab sphere under the protection of British power. In that hour the Mufti would be the most authoritative spokesman for the Arab world. It would then be his task to set off the Arab operations which he had secretly prepared. When that time had come, Germany could also be indifferent to French reaction to such a declaration.

Once Germany had forced open the road to Iran and Iraq through Rostov, it would be also the beginning of the end of the British world empire. He (the Führer) hoped that the coming year would make it possible for Germany to thrust open the Caucasian gate to the Middle East. For the good of their common cause, it would be better if the Arab proclamation were put off for a few more months than if Germany were to create difficulties for herself without being able thereby to help the Arabs.

He (the Führer) fully appreciated the eagerness of the Arabs for a public declaration of the sort requested by the Grand Mufti. But he would beg him to consider that he (the Führer) himself was the Chief of State of the German Reich for 5 long years during which he was unable to make to his own homeland the announcement of its liberation. He had to wait with that until the announcement could be made on the basis of a situation brought about by the force of arms that the Anschluss had been carried out.

The moment that Germany's tank divisions and air squadrons had made their appearance south of the Caucasus, the public appeal requested by the Grand Mufti could go out to the Arab world.

The Grand Mufti replied that it was his view that everything would come to pass just as the Führer had indicated. He was fully reassured and satisfied by the words which he had heard from the Chief of the German State. He asked, however, whether it would not be

possible, secretly at least, to enter into an agreement with Germany of the kind he had just outlined for the Führer.

The Führer replied that he had just now given the Grand Mufti precisely that confidential declaration.

The Grand Mufti thanked him for it and stated in conclusion that he was taking his leave from the Führer in full confidence and with reiterated thanks for the interest shown in the Arab cause.

SCHMIDT

## No. 516

71/50970

### *Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

BERLIN, November 28, 1941.

Minister von Rintelen informed me by telephone that after the reception of the Grand Mufti by the Führer,<sup>1</sup> the following decision was reached:

- 1) The issuance of a declaration concerning a free Arabia is to be postponed;
- 2) Minister Grobba is to inquire of the Grand Mufti whether he agrees to a press announcement which would approximately say that the Führer had received the Grand Mufti and had had a conversation with him that was significant for the future of the Arab people;
- 3) After the Grand Mufti gives his consent, before such a statement is issued, however, an inquiry should first be made in Rome. Since, so far as is known here, nothing has been published concerning the reception of the Grand Mufti by the Duce,<sup>2</sup> the suggestion should be made to the Italians that first of all a communiqué be issued stating that the Duce had some time ago had a conversation with him; this is to be followed after a while by a corresponding announcement regarding the conversation of the Führer with the Grand Mufti;<sup>3</sup>
- 4) After Rome has been contacted, the Foreign Minister desires that first of all the matter be again submitted to him.

WOERMANN

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 515.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 428.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram No. 3244 of Nov. 29 (2281/482692-93) Woermann instructed the Embassy in Rome along these lines.

In telegram No. 3154 of Dec. 3 (2281/482694-95) Mackensen reported the agreement of the Italian Government to the proposal and forwarded an Italian draft communiqué regarding Mussolini's reception of the Grand Mufti.

Woermann's telegram No. 3293 of Dec. 4 (2281/482697) informed Mackensen of the Grand Mufti's approval of the proposed German and Italian communiqués.

On Dec. 6 in telegram No. 3184 (2281/482698), Mackensen notified the Foreign Ministry that the Italian communiqué would be published the next day.

## No. 517

F20/485-86

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat*

RAM 62 g. Rs.

BERLIN, November 30, 1941.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE CROATIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, LORKOVIĆ, IN BERLIN ON NOVEMBER 28, 1941

After a few words of greeting the Croatian Foreign Minister stated that the situation in Croatia had become considerably stabilized. After temporary difficulties with Italy a rather extensive settlement had now taken place.<sup>1</sup> The Reich Foreign Minister remarked in this connection that he would consider it a good idea if the Poglavnik settled all difficulties on a friendly basis with the Duce, who had proved to be a good friend in a difficult time. For the rest, Croatia always had to remember that the Führer and the Duce were friends and that Italy and Germany were allies. Therefore the tendency among certain people in Croatia to wish at times to put a little sand in the mechanism of the Axis was entirely misdirected. It was known in Germany that this was not in accordance with Croatia's official policy, but was merely the work of some hotheads. He (the Reich Foreign Minister) asked the Croatian Foreign Minister, however, to carry on a clever and wise policy with respect to Italy and also to pass on this advice to the Poglavnik himself.

The Croatian Foreign Minister replied that it was his impression that the difficulties with Italy were to be attributed to the willful policy of certain members of the Italian military in Croatia. However, the situation had improved considerably. Count Ciano would come to Zagreb in the near future, so that there would be an opportunity for a candid discussion. Croatia was suffering under the presence of 200,000 Italian soldiers on her national territory. She was not in a position to feed such a large number of troops, and for this reason had considerable economic difficulties to overcome.

She had made settlements of her frontiers with all neighboring countries except Hungary. On the occasion of the present Berlin sojourn he had tried to clarify the frontier question with Bárdossy, but had gained the impression from the conversation that the time had not yet come for settling the frontier problems with Hungary.

<sup>1</sup> Possibly a reference to an Italian-Croatian agreement of Oct. 27 regarding the determination of the frontier between Croatia and Montenegro; the text of the agreement was reported by Kasche in Zagreb telegram No. 1329 of Oct. 27 (116/87059-61).

The internal development in Croatia was making good progress. Maček<sup>2</sup> had been assigned a compulsory residence and was keeping quiet. Aside from communist uprisings in the eastern part of the country Croatia's cohesion was perfect. The Croatian Foreign Minister concluded his remarks by saying that the Axis would in no case have any sort of trouble in Croatia.

SCHMIDT

<sup>2</sup> Vladko Maček, President of the Croatian Peasant party and former Yugoslav Deputy Minister President.

## No. 518

F20/496-504

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat*

RAM No. 63 g. Rs.

BERLIN, November 30, 1941.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND DANISH FOREIGN MINISTER SCAVENIUS IN BERLIN ON NOVEMBER 28, 1941

After a word of personal welcome, the Reich Foreign Minister expressed his satisfaction that Denmark's representative was able to take part in the act of renewal and extension of the Anti-Comintern Pact,<sup>1</sup> which beyond its strictly formal purpose was also helping the struggle against the Communist International from the point of view of all of Europe.

He (the Reich Foreign Minister) knew that Scavenius was taking a positive attitude toward Germany and toward cooperation between Germany and Denmark.

In a statement of some length the Reich Foreign Minister described the situation, with special reference to the struggle against Russia. Bolshevism was finished; that did not mean, however, that the battle against it did not have to be continued this year or the next. Warfare against Russia would go on until her final destruction. Next year, to be sure, a mere fraction of the troops now employed would suffice. The war against England would be continued until the English themselves realized that the continuation of the war made no sense and sued for peace, or until everything was laid waste on that island and the British were thus forced to yield. It was England's bad luck to have challenged such a man as the Führer. He (the Reich Foreign Minister) had warned Henderson<sup>2</sup> and François-Poncet<sup>3</sup> repeatedly before the war not to mistake the Germany of today for the Germany

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 498.

<sup>2</sup> Sir Neville Henderson, British Ambassador in Germany, 1937-1939.

<sup>3</sup> André François-Poncet, French Ambassador in Germany, 1931-1938.

of the World War. But these gentlemen had merely smiled uncomprehendingly and not grasped that the Germany of today was a united people with the most up to date army and weapons, which was led by a great military genius. In terms of power Germany would therefore have to be appraised quite differently from in the past. Germany was three or four times as strong as before. The English and French had however not seen this, but had regarded National Socialism simply as an evil invention. Scavenius injected here that such was the fate of anything new. Continuing, the Reich Foreign Minister stated that Germany already was an empire when, a thousand years ago, the English were still living far behind the times. National Socialism was not an evil invention but the expression of a nation's will to live. Blindness toward these facts had ruined France and Poland and would ruin England, too.

Germany's will to live was making use of new methods, but was not necessarily directed against the old traditions.

Turning to America, the Reich Foreign Minister emphasized the presumptuousness inherent in the interference of the United States in European affairs. The way the Finns had been threatened was outrageous. Materially, however, America could not do much. Here was the biggest bluff in history.

Today Germany was fighting for Denmark, too, by keeping Bolshevism out of Europe. England, too, was deceiving herself in believing that she was safe from communism. The fact of the alliance with Soviet Russia involved the hazard of great revolutions in America and England. Although the English were just barely keeping afloat militarily, the war would inflict further defeats on them and after a while Churchill would no longer be tolerated by his own compatriots. The domination of the old ruling class in England was definitely a thing of the past. The peoples were seeking for new expressions of their national will. The Reich Foreign Minister declared that no one could say how long the war would last, but that he was convinced that Germany and her allies would win it. The Reich was proceeding systematically in its military operations. It did not assume risks or go after Napoleonic adventures, but advanced to new attacks only after all preparations had been made and especially after the supplies had been secured. The English would be assailed wherever they got too near to the Germans or their allies, or where they touched vital interests. That was why they had to be eliminated from the Mediterranean area.

The English had for years incomprehendingly confronted Germany like blind men, and even now did not want to recognize the economic and military strength of the Reich.

Anyone who, like the Reich Foreign Minister, knew England and had many friends there, and to whom London had become a second home, as it were, was filled with regret over the news about the destruction of all the well-known places. It was sad that the English had not pursued a wiser policy. He, the Reich Foreign Minister, had done what was humanly possible to deal with the insular pigheadedness of the English, but it had been in vain. Now a clear decision had to be brought about in a struggle against England.

In the further course of the conversation the Reich Foreign Minister talked about the demonstrations against Denmark's adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact which had taken place in Copenhagen in front of the Foreign Minister's house. From the reports it seemed clear that these demonstrations had been supported, among others, by rightist elements in Denmark.<sup>4</sup> Scavenius interjected here that Denmark naturally had its chauvinists too.

The Reich Foreign Minister replied that he did not take these events too seriously but that it would be well, nevertheless, if these chauvinistic tendencies in Denmark would not attain the upper hand because this would lead to considerable difficulties.

Scavenius remarked that this was only a small insignificant opposition group. In view of the character of the Danish people one could not expect that the slow-thinking Danes should all at once understand the new policy of cooperation with Germany. But time would change that.

The Reich Foreign Minister further mentioned a certain latent hostility toward Germany which was noticeable in parliamentary speeches.

Scavenius replied that these speeches were rather expressions of fear of their powerful neighbor on the part of the small Danish people.

The Reich Foreign Minister thereupon stated that Germany was trying to avoid any difficulties with Denmark. The Führer viewed the development of the situation with calm; so far at any rate everything had gone well, except for a few blemishes, such as for instance the conduct of the Danish Minister in Washington.<sup>5</sup> Envoy von Renthe-Fink had in any case received instructions to maintain the present line of policy toward Denmark.<sup>6</sup> The inquiries by the Danish Government on the occasion of Denmark's adherence to the Anti-

<sup>4</sup>Details of these demonstrations were reported in Copenhagen telegram No. 1543 of Nov. 26 (62/42417-18).

<sup>5</sup>This is a reference to Minister Kauffmann's negotiation of the Greenland agreement in Washington in April 1941. See vol. xii of this series, document No. 308 and footnote 1.

<sup>6</sup>See document No. 479. In a minute of Nov. 27 Renthe-Fink noted: "The Reich Foreign Minister who remarked that Danish Foreign Minister Scavenius had made a good impression on him, gave me today at noon the instruction that the policy conducted in Copenhagen so far should be continued, though care should be taken that we did not 'slip.'"

Comintern Pact had, however, perhaps mistakenly produced a feeling in Germany as if the Danes were afraid Churchill could take offense at their adherence to this Pact.<sup>7</sup> But one must not forget that in her fight against Russia Germany was sacrificing her blood for the whole of Europe, in order to safeguard it against the influx of the Mongolian hordes. The low level of the Soviet Russians was strikingly illustrated among other things by the fact that in the prison camps they were devouring each other. To a question by Scavenius, whether they were doing that from hunger, the Foreign Minister retorted that Russian prisoners, to be sure, often fell into captivity in a half-starved condition, because of the disorganization on the Russian side—especially when they had been surrounded by the Germans for any length of time—they had often for weeks been receiving short rations or none at all.

In explanation of the Danish attitude Scavenius mentioned that for generations Denmark had pursued a policy of the strictest neutrality and therefore had to accustom herself slowly to taking sides. Besides, this would be much easier if no German troops were in Denmark. But everything in the practical field that had been undertaken with Germany was going well; only with the imponderables were there some difficulties. Germany had to consider this fundamental attitude of Denmark. A dangerous mood would be created if Denmark were expected to move toward the new alignment too suddenly; under certain conditions something like a "suicidal mentality" could develop from that. He (Scavenius) was advising against pushing matters too far, because in that case things might develop as they did in Norway.<sup>8</sup> Denmark had to be given time.

The Reich Foreign Minister then spoke about Sweden. He believed that fate would never forgive Sweden that in the struggle against Moscow, in which two great Swedish historic figures had in the past acted as standardbearers, she had taken her position outside of Europe. In private exchanges many Swedes, including very highly placed people, let it be understood that they were fully on Germany's side, but they did not want to say so openly. Sweden did not even let volunteers go to Russia for this fight.<sup>9</sup> She had thereby totally forfeited the sympathies of Europe; but the ties of the Swedish labor unions with the English Labour party, with Attlee and Greenwood<sup>10</sup> were probably too strong.

The Foreign Minister remarked in concluding that he was glad that Denmark by her adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact, had taken

<sup>7</sup> Nothing found.

<sup>8</sup> See document No. 312.

<sup>9</sup> See document No. 270.

<sup>10</sup> Arthur Greenwood, Secretary of the Labour party's research and information department, member of the British War Cabinet since 1940.

the first step in joining the European family of nations. For the rest he hoped that manifestations against Germany would remain isolated incidents, for otherwise developments might take a very dangerous turn. He hoped that the war would soon come to an end (Scavenius remarked here that that would indeed be highly desirable); in any case Europe would feel the war less and less. The enemies could no longer land on the Continent. Futile aerial bombings were the sole means left to the English in their fight against the Continent, but they would, of course, accomplish nothing with it.<sup>11</sup>

SCHMIDT

<sup>11</sup> Some passages in the original of the document printed are barely legible. They were checked against another copy of the document (67/46851-59).

### No. 519

67/46851-59

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat*

Füh. 61a. g. Rs.

BERLIN, December 3, 1941.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND THE RUMANIAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER [sic] MIHAI ANTONESCU IN BERLIN ON NOVEMBER 28, 1941

In the first place Antonescu transmitted to the Führer the sincere regards of the Rumanian Marshal, who was very sorry not to be able to take part in the solemn act of extending and broadening the Anti-Comintern Pact in Berlin and to speak with the Führer on this occasion. The absence of the King from Rumania, however,<sup>1</sup> required his (the Marshal's) presence in the country. It was the first time after the beginning of the Russian campaign that the Rumanian Government could express through him (Antonescu) its sincere gratitude for the genial direction of the Russian campaign. The entire Rumanian people stood behind Germany in this fight, not only because they had to defend their rights and their interests, but also because since time immemorial they had taken an anti-Slav and anti-Semitic stand and had not forgotten the many injuries that had been inflicted on them by their enemies.

After Carol's reign the Marshal had again consolidated the morale of the Rumanian nation and the organization of its army. Without the German Army, however, the Rumanian nation would never have

<sup>1</sup> According to Bucharest telegrams Nos. 3802 of Nov. 22 (239/154406) and 3908 of Nov. 24 (239/154407-08) King Mihai and Queen Mother Elena were to leave Bucharest on Nov. 26 for a private visit to Florence, Italy. It was also arranged that Hitler would receive them on their passage through Berlin on Nov. 28.



been able to regain its lost territories. It recognized this fully and completely and would never forget Germany's role.

He (Antonescu) had already assured the Reichsmarschall and the Foreign Minister of Rumania's first determination to increase her oil production and reduce her consumption so that Rumania's would be in a position to deliver a maximum amount of this important raw material to Germany.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore in his conversations with those mentioned above he had also assured them that the Rumanian agricultural surplus would be exported to Germany and that it would be increased.

Antonescu then cited detailed figures in regard to the Rumanian petroleum deliveries to Germany thus far and complained, as he had in the conversations with the Reichsmarschall and the Foreign Minister, about the financing difficulties which arose for the Rumanian State as a result of the presence of German troops on Rumanian territory. He again requested this time, without going into details, that the number of German troops be reduced. Furthermore he also mentioned briefly the financial difficulties arising for Rumania as a result of advancements with regard to exports.

Then he turned to the relations with Hungary and he asked the Führer to help in bringing about a pacification in the relationship with Hungary. Pointing to the calm attitude of Rumanian public opinion and to the file on the Hungarian excesses which he had given to the Foreign Minister,<sup>3</sup> Antonescu stressed that the continuous incidents brought about by the Hungarians undermined the position of Marshal Antonescu and were detrimental to an atmosphere of peace and order in Rumania. Marshal Antonescu had telegraphed him about the latest incidents only recently, with the instruction to remonstrate to the Führer. Antonescu stated that a definitive solution had to be found in the relations with Hungary on a just basis, which would make it possible for Rumania to continue her peaceful work. If the incidents with Hungary continued in this manner, then this would exceed the power of the Rumanian nation to resist and would impose an intolerable burden upon its sense of honor.

As a proof of Rumania's peaceful attitude Antonescu cited the fact that a good understanding had been brought about with Bulgaria and Croatia, although, after all, areas had been ceded to the Bulgarians, too. He then referred to the possibility of a closer relationship between Rumania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Croatia and asked the Führer to advise Rumania whether or not she should enter such an association.

<sup>2</sup> See documents Nos. 505 and 513.

<sup>3</sup> Not found. Cf. document No. 513.

Then he asked the Führer about the status of the Ukrainian question and in this connection expressed his fear that the Slav-Russian danger in Rumania would take on new shape under influences from the Ukraine [*dass von der Ukraine aus die slavisch-russische Gefahr in Rumänien neue Krystallisationspunkte finden würde*]. He hoped that the Führer would find a solution that would prevent a new Slav nucleus from developing there which could provide the point of departure for expansionist aspirations.

The Führer replied that he saw from Antonescu's statements that Rumania had consciously placed herself at the side of Germany, Italy, and her other allies in the fight for the fate of Europe. If Germany and her allies were defeated, this would signify the end of European culture. The result would be [like] the Mongolian invasion in Europe or the destruction of the Byzantine Empire by the onrushing Turks. European culture had been created by the Germans and Romans, but not by the Slavs. In such a tremendous conflict which would decide the future of Europe for centuries, the need of the hour required the greatest possible concentration on the most pressing problems.

Speaking at length the Führer then gave a survey of the momentary situation. World Jewry in combination with the Slavs and unfortunately also the Anglo-Saxons was carrying on the fight with embitterment. Germany and her allies confronted real colossi in terms of space, which possessed all raw materials and fertile land in copious measure. In addition there was a certain destructive tendency of the Jews, which found expression in the fight of Bolshevism and Pan-Slavism.

The Führer then gave a description of the situation of the Balkans at the time of the Vienna Award. At that time Germany had tried by this award to prevent the worst for Rumania and for the Balkans. The Führer called it tragic that ethnographic and historical claims were often incompatible, so that no delimitation of frontiers could do justice to all claims. In the east, however, both Rumania and Germany had tremendous areas to colonize. Rumanian and German interests met here and forced one to biological decisions; i.e., Rumania, too, would have to give as much of her own ethnic group as possible in the interest of preserving these newly-acquired territories, and this to the furthestmost frontier of these new areas. The Führer would understand it entirely if Rumania in addition to restoration of her old frontier should demand an appropriate glacis, necessary for security, and Odessa.

Regarding the Ukraine the Führer mentioned that he was, of course, of the opinion that no points of departure for a reaction must develop here (*dass hier keine Ansatzpunkte für eine Reaktion entstehen dürften*). However, it was not only a question of preventing some-

thing, but one also ought to make these territories serviceable to Europe in a positive way. Here, too, the biological structure was of the greatest importance.

The Führer then explained how with the aid of the Ukrainian territories the food basis for all of Europe could be secured. Particularly the Western European industrial countries that were overpopulated, such as Belgium, for example, would now be able to obtain the necessary food from the Ukraine instead of from overseas, as in the past. Thereby Europe would be safe from blockades and at the most she could still be molested from the air, although in this respect, too, the attacks would become more and more difficult.

For the rest, countries such as Germany and Rumania did not need any commitments under international law in order to cooperate with other countries; rather it was sufficient for them to be of one opinion by virtue of reason and ideology. On this basis, for example, the cooperation between Finland, Rumania, and Germany was complete without any special treaties having been formally concluded.

Regarding Rumania's economic difficulties the Führer remarked that of course the greatly inflated German organizations in Rumania would be dismantled although certain elements, as for example the coastal defense system, would still have to remain. He likewise intended to reduce the staffs. Furthermore Germany would do everything to help in keeping the Rumanian currency stable, whether by guaranteeing its purchasing power or by the cooperation of the Reichsbank. Finally the Rumanian Army should receive everything which Germany could possibly supply to it.

On the other hand the Führer asked Antonescu to see that Rumania made the greatest efforts to assure the necessary deliveries of raw materials and foods. He (the Führer) expected that the war would last at most another 2 years. Leningrad and Moscow would fall in the winter. Sevastopol would be in German hands within a few days. In no case would Rumania be entirely exhausted within the 2 years. On the other hand she also had to help with grain as much as she could, for after all, the struggle was a joint one.

Regarding the person of Marshal Antonescu the Führer remarked that he had decided in favor of him at one certain moment. He had felt confidence in him when he had seen him for the first time and had recognized him as a fanatical national leader of the people. He had grown to like him personally very much.

In summary the Führer remarked that Rumania could regard him as a sincere friend who desired a strong Rumania that could keep watch effectively against the east in order to protect Europe, whose culture had been created jointly by the Rumanians and the Germans, against her enemies.

SCHMIDT

## No. 520

235/157330-31

*The Ambassador in Brazil to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

SECRET

RIO DE JANEIRO, November 29, 1941—1:24 a. m.

No. 2362 of November 28

Received November 29—11:10 a. m.

Following the dinner to which, at the suggestion of President Vargas, I invited his brother, Colonel Benjamin Vargas, and some gentlemen of the Presidential Chancery, as well as close friends of the President, Colonel Vargas gave me—as he stressed—at the express direction of his brother, a general confidential statement on the policy of the President. He had the urgent desire to continue on good terms with Germany. If he were now forced to make concessions to the United States of America in many fields, this did not mean any fundamental change in his policy. He was trying to keep this as elastic as possible in order to give Americans no cause for unlawful interference with Brazilian sovereignty. This too explained Brazil's attitude toward American procedure in Dutch Guiana.<sup>1</sup> The Americans had requested military participation. A compromise had been found through an empty gesture of border occupation and the dispatching of a civilian commission to Paramaribo.

The speeches and interviews of Foreign Minister Aranha during his last trip were also to be interpreted in the sense of the elasticity of Brazilian policy.<sup>2</sup> There was a wide gap between words and deeds. The President once more gave this assurance: He was not thinking of breaking off relations with Germany, even if America should press him to it. He was, moreover, not at all convinced that Roosevelt would risk a war with Germany.

Benjamin Vargas then went on to a discussion of his brother's domestic policy, stressing the fact that the latter had become more and more convinced that he had to look to youth, particularly the students and workers, for support. It was precisely the war that had shown that the spirit of sacrifice and energy of German youth were triumphing over the senility and indolence that prevailed among the enemy powers. Also the tough resistance of the Bolsheviks was only to be

<sup>1</sup> In telegram No. 1642 of Aug. 26 (235/157273-74) the Embassy reported that the United States had requested that Brazil occupy Dutch Guiana and the Azores. See Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, *The Framework of Hemisphere Defense* in the series *United States Army in World War II: The Western Hemisphere*, p. 289.

<sup>2</sup> In telegrams No. 2270 of Nov. 15 (235/157313) and No. 2317 of Nov. 21 (235/157321) Prüfer reported that Aranha in speeches and interviews in Porto Alegre and Buenos Aires had declared that Brazil would not be neutral if an American country were involved in war, but that the President had given assurances that he would reprimand the Foreign Minister on his return.

explained by the fanaticism of the soldiers who had come out of the Comsomol.<sup>3</sup>

The conversation closed when Benjamin Vargas, in the name of his brother, and reiterating his sympathy for Germany, thanked me for the understanding attitude of German policy with respect to Brazil.

PRÜFER

<sup>3</sup> Comsomol, the Communist Union of Youth, a branch of the Communist Party.

## No. 521

F12/138-129

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat*<sup>1</sup>

RAM 59 g. Rs.

BERLIN, November 29, 1941.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION OF M. BOSE WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER ON NOVEMBER 29, 1941, IN BERLIN<sup>2</sup>

M. Bose began the conversation with words of thanks for the hospitality he had enjoyed in Germany and the request that his mission be supported. He congratulated the Foreign Minister on his speech<sup>3</sup> and stated that the tone adopted in it had been very precisely attuned to England and America. In general he termed the situation hopeful, and believed that he could reckon Germany's prospects of winning the war at about 80 percent. He did not attribute any particular importance for the development of the war to America's entry, but said that Germany now had to take up the Oriental question, particularly as [action in] the European theater of war would be finished within the foreseeable future.

The English had prepared a broader base in India. Whereas in the last war they had in the main procured manpower from India, the country had now been much more industrialized and especially adapted to the production of war material, so that all the fronts in the Orient could be supplied from there. England was so easy to attack in her Empire, and had enemies everywhere (Iraq, Iran, etc.). He, M. Bose, watched the English propaganda very closely; as an example he cited Colonel Britten [Colonel Britton], who was carrying

<sup>1</sup> A draft of this memorandum with handwritten corrections (F1/0037-46) which were incorporated in the finished copy printed here is also in the files.

<sup>2</sup> According to a memorandum by Woermann of Nov. 22 (195/139258) the Foreign Minister had promised that he would receive Bose the next time he would be in Berlin. "The reception appears to be the more necessary as the Grand Mufti is to be received by the Führer in the presence of the Foreign Minister and as Bose and the Grand Mufti are in continuous contact with one another."

<sup>3</sup> Delivered on Nov. 26 at a banquet celebrating the prolongation of the Anti-Comintern Pact. For text, see *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, December 1944, pp. 1053-1068.

on particularly realistic propaganda of subversion. Here the German propaganda ought to start its effort in a similar way; he expected this to have great success all over the Orient, which would greatly facilitate the work of the Wehrmacht.

It was a very important point that Germany should decide in time which party she wanted to cooperate with in each country. A prompt decision would then make it possible for the organization concerned to cooperate effectively.

M. Bose then showed several clippings from the *Times*, the *Daily Mail*, and the *Daily Express*, which branded him a traitor. He indicated that it was rather necessary to make a reply to this so that his followers would not defect.

In his reply the Foreign Minister pointed out that the war, as he had already told him in Vienna,<sup>4</sup> would result in the destruction of the English possessions everywhere in the world. Churchill knew, to be sure, that the war was lost, but could not and would not admit it; furthermore, there was no leader of stature to replace him. Thus he continued to make war. True, he could not be termed a great statesman; his sole strength lay in the fact that he was willing to take over the responsibility for continuing the war and that he succeeded in bringing about a certain agreement between the Labour Party and the Conservatives which others did not feel capable of achieving. It was improbable that Churchill would be overthrown; it was conceivable, however, in case the current operation in North Africa should lead to an English defeat.

As far as Russia was concerned, this would still require some effort, to be sure, but she would fall in the course of the coming year at the latest. The Russians had arrived at the point where they could not themselves replace their armaments adequately, while Anglo-American support was too scanty. In the meantime the English would lose one position after the other; this time the Führer wanted to have a clear decision and would no longer consider any compromise. It seemed that relations between Japan and America would reach a state of tension in the next few days which would at least result in a serious situation and perhaps also war.

In England Bevin<sup>5</sup> was important in domestic policy; actually a half-Bolshevik, he was something of an English Kerensky. One could assume it to be certain that the Conservatives would no longer be in power at the end of the war. The more England lost, the more the course turned toward the left. America would be the heir to the English possessions in the Western Hemisphere, whereas the Axis would predominate in Europe. Once Germany had the Russian space before

<sup>4</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 425.

<sup>5</sup> Ernest Bevin, British Minister of Labour and National Service.

her as an area for colonization, she would hardly need colonies. Certainly the Russian area would be successfully colonized. In Africa, where the Duce would have a great influence, the English would be driven out and the peoples there would be given greater freedom. He, the Foreign Minister, had just seen the Mufti,<sup>6</sup> who wanted to create a new Arab world, whereas Japan also had certain justified claims in the Far East.

In the question of India it was important to realize that the collapse of the Empire could no longer be prevented. One important point had to be taken into account, however: German policy did not think much of declarations with no force behind them, because it was possible that the opposite effect from the one desired could occur. As an example the Foreign Minister pointed to Iraq, where Germany was unable to help. The result was that the Grand Mufti and Gaylani were in Germany, the Government was forced into exile, and its friends were dead or in prison. After that the Syrian venture had occurred, with a similar outcome. Germany wanted to avoid taking a step which could again induce certain circles to ill-considered actions. Thus no open action should be taken that could endanger the situation. When we would be in a position to put pressure behind a declaration, and this time was no longer very far off, then we would take action. For the moment we intended to carry on all sorts of propaganda for the Arabs, for instance, but not to issue any declaration.

In the case of India matters were not entirely analogous. There, too, however, one should proceed cautiously and only say something concrete when a success was in view, for example when German troops had crossed the Caucasus. Then one might consider setting up an all-India committee under M. Bose in Tiflis, for example, which would make propaganda efforts with a large expenditure and with radio transmitters.

One thing was certain, that propaganda alone would never bring about a free India or Arabia; this could only be achieved through the destruction of the English positions of power by the Wehrmacht. At the moment England held all of these countries through her prestige; once this had been destroyed the Empire would fall.

Here M. Bose interjected that he hoped that this view of the Foreign Minister's also reflected the Führer's view.

The Foreign Minister said that the Führer believed in the final defeat of England; it was simply his view, however, that no action should take place until Germany had the power to support it properly. One should not risk the possibility of our propaganda's being torn to shreds by English counterpropaganda.

<sup>6</sup> See document No. 514.

M. Bose pointed out that the Indian question differed from the Arab question in two points:

1. India was much further away. Therefore the English propaganda was much more effective there, for the Indians had no contact of any sort with Germany and no conception of Germany.

2. In *Mein Kampf* there were passages in regard to India which had been exploited in an unfavorable sense by English propaganda. It was by far the most important thing to let the Indian people know what the Führer thought about India, because the Indian people did not know either Germany or the views held there. Technically such influence could probably be exerted through the radio.

The Foreign Minister stated that he had been thinking about an audience with the Führer for M. Bose; but at the moment he still hesitated to suggest this to the Führer because such a visit might become known. At the moment it was probably also too soon to undertake such decisive steps. At the proper time propaganda would be started against all the positions of the British Empire, possibly also including South Africa, so as to proceed with the strongest possible means against the Empire. However, he wanted to intensify the broadcasts to India and for this reason asked M. Bose for ideas which he might suggest.

M. Bose pointed out that there were millions of persons living in India who were anti-English, to be sure, but not for that reason pro-German. The great problem lay in the possibility of winning over these forces.

The Foreign Minister repeated his request for suggestions, and added that the moment would then have arrived when German troops were beyond the Caucasus and at Suez. The Axis could speak only when the military had a firm basis in the Near East, for otherwise any propaganda effect would come to nought. It was a guiding principle of German policy not to promise anything that could not be carried out later. As far as the English method was concerned, the Foreign Minister pointed to the concept of "Blitzkrieg", which had been formulated in England so that one could say in the case of every German campaign, no matter how short, that it had failed as a Blitzkrieg. He imagined propaganda for India from this standpoint: The English oppress all nations, and Germany will help all those oppressed.

M. Bose asked to consider whether a secret radio transmitter for India should not be established.<sup>7</sup> He would then direct the propaganda of this transmitter without himself making an appearance.

<sup>7</sup> An unsigned and undated summary of various points made by Bose in this conversation (F1/0047-49) indicates that Bose proposed to have the transmitter set up in Zenum near Belgrade.

Following this he asked the Foreign Minister to arrange an audience with the Führer, nevertheless, so that he would have the opportunity of personally presenting his views to him.

The Foreign Minister closed the conversation with the promise to consider this question.<sup>2</sup>

VON LOESCH

<sup>2</sup> Bosc was not received by Hitler until May 27, 1942 (Schmidt memorandum of May 30: F16/0232-47).

### No. 522

F16/0174-82  
F8/0130-38

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat*

Füh 60a g. Rs.

BERLIN, November 30, 1941.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER COUNT CIANO IN BERLIN ON NOVEMBER 29, 1941<sup>1</sup>

At the start of the conversation the Führer developed his ideas concerning the general situation and came to the conclusion that on the whole the war was already won. During his last meeting with the Duce<sup>2</sup> he had given the latter a picture of the projected operations on the eastern front. At that time the German objectives had consisted of breaking the resistance of the Russians on the central and southern part of the front and then launching a thrust against the center. These operations had proceeded according to plan. The resistance that was still being offered in Russia did not come from man but from nature, that is, the weather and the character of the terrain. With 6 weeks of good weather Russia would have been liquidated by Germany.

Now Sevastopol was to be taken. The artillery for the offensive would be at the spot within the next few days. Then the attack would begin at once. The speed with which this next task would be executed was naturally conditioned by the weather. Moscow was to be encircled. No assault would be opened on the city, but gradually all of its communications with the outside world would be cut off. An additional task was the destruction of Leningrad.

The recent offensive against the Russians had suffered from the atmospheric conditions to the extent that bad weather had set in immediately after completion of the first big rush.

As a whole, however, all of the operations were dependent upon the supply lines and the rail and road connections. Therefore it was also

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 501, footnote 1.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 242.

intended to continue to advance toward the southeast in the direction of the Caucasus and to destroy the Russian Black Sea fleet, because easier routes of communication across the Black Sea would simplify the supply question.

Snow had now fallen along a large part of the front, and the troops were going into winter quarters. This did not mean, however, that absolute calm would now reign there throughout the winter.

Moreover, the Wehrmacht would use the time for a reorganization of its units and for constituting new armored divisions.

Furthermore, we had never lost sight of the precaution of likewise securing the west in case the English should attempt a landing. Enough troops had been left not only in the west but also in Norway in order to frustrate any such attempt from the start.

In summary, then the future tasks were as follows:

1. liquidation of the east,
2. securing of the west,
3. activation of the submarine war, and
4. independent of this, the conquest of the Caucasus.

The Führer illustrated Russia's desperate situation with some figures. She had lost 65-75 percent of her total industry, 65-70 percent of her iron resources, 75 percent of her coal resources, 100 percent of her molybdenum, 75 percent of her manganese, and 75 percent of her aluminum. Because America obtained some of these resources from Russia, that country, too, would be affected by the losses. Furthermore, Russia had lost 3.8 million prisoners, 4 million dead, 22,800 tanks, 16,000 airplanes, and 28,000 guns. A recovery from these blows was impossible. Not only was the material lacking, but also trained troops. Industries could not be relocated without further ado, especially not in winter, when owing to the freezing of mortar and cement the erection of factory buildings and storehouses was impossible. Furthermore, the Luftwaffe was inflicting destruction precisely on industrial construction. Trains with valuable machine tools that were on the way to the east from a factory to be relocated were destroyed and the factories themselves bombarded.

In the Mediterranean the heaviest attack was, at the moment, under way in North Africa. Churchill could not wait any longer. Actually he should have attacked only at the moment when Germany and Italy proceeded against Tobruk.

To begin with, Count Ciano expressed his pleasure that he was able to meet the Führer again so soon after his visit to headquarters.<sup>3</sup> He had informed the Duce in detail about everything he had learned from the Führer at his last visit to headquarters. Before his departure for

<sup>3</sup> Ciano had been at Hitler's headquarters on Oct. 25. See document No. 424.

Germany he had talked to the Duce once more and had ascertained that at the moment there were really no urgent problems to deal with between Germany and Italy.<sup>4</sup> Concerning Croatia and Greece he had already talked with the Foreign Minister;<sup>5</sup> as a result, the only item to discuss with the Führer was the renewed request of the Duce to have the numbers of the Italian divisions fighting at the eastern front increased. Inasmuch as the Duce would like to prepare thoroughly the troops that might be sent and as a certain length of time would be necessary to do this, he would naturally like to know, as soon as possible how his request could be met. Compared to the enormous exertions of Germany this could naturally mean only a relatively small contribution by Italy to the common fighting force. The Duce would like to see, however, that Italy's participation in the eastern campaign be more in line with its potential than heretofore. He therefore asked the Führer to let him know how many additional Italian divisions he was counting on and what type these divisions should be.

In his reply, the Führer explained that in this question, as was true in general for the military operations in the east, it was essentially a transportation problem and in this connection he explained in detail the few railroad lines that were available, the road conditions, as well as the work that had been accomplished on the part of Germany in reactivating the Russian transportation system, especially with the construction of bridges across the Dnieper. It was characteristic for the conditions of roads, for instance, that during bad weather in the east the hourly speed of motorized vehicles was, on the average 2-3 kilometers.

The Führer then came to speak of the further German operation plans, and indicated as one of the aims of the German Army the Caucasus, from which Iran and Iraq were to be conquered. During this advance which would lead through desert areas with a hot climate, Italy could perhaps make a useful contribution. Mountain troops would be necessary for the Caucasus. Actually, of course, the conquest of the Caucasus was not decisive for the war, but one could probably ascribe such a character to the capture of Iran and Iraq, Syria and Palestine.

Furthermore, Italy could play a useful role if she made every effort to hold Africa. It was absolutely necessary for Germany and Italy not to be pushed out from there. In French North Africa the pressure had somewhat eased through the departure of Weygand<sup>6</sup> but the sit-

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *The Ciano Diaries*, entry for Nov. 22, 1941.

<sup>5</sup> Document No. 501.

<sup>6</sup> Document No. 478, footnote 11.

uation could be considered as finally secure only after Germany and Italy would prevail over the enemy throughout the rest of North Africa.

None of these problems would have arisen, however, if a year ago Spain had agreed to the German proposals concerning the capture of Gibraltar and had cooperated in this.<sup>7</sup> Two German divisions in Spanish Morocco would have stabilized the entire situation in French North Africa.

Count Ciano pointed in this connection to the internal difficulties which actually existed in Spain. The army, the monarchists, and not least of all the Reds, of which Spain was still full, hampered every decision.

The Spanish royal family in Italy was a real nest of Anglophile intrigue. Don Juan, the Pretender to the Throne, was also on the English side, and the Queen of Spain<sup>8</sup> in a lively exchange of letters with Sir Samuel Hoare not only developed an activity of an espionage character, but had also suggested all sorts of political adventures to the English. In conclusion the Führer spoke about the favorable situation of the German-Italian troops in North Africa and the considerable success which they had achieved in repulsing the English offensive. The Führer analyzed for Count Ciano in more detail the various phases of this fight as they were known up to now.

Finally, the conversation turned to the domestic situation in Germany and in Italy. The Führer stated that the German people were acting admirably and that merely a small malicious unteachable minority in Germany stood apart. Wherever he showed himself in Germany, he received enthusiastic ovations as never before. This was, after all, a remarkable fact after 2 years of war.

Count Ciano replied that things were similar in Italy. At his visits to places like Parma and Bologna, which were considered especially difficult, the Duce had been received enthusiastically. Every intelligent Italian realized today that it was a matter of existence and the future of the country.

Moreover, the situation in Japan was similar. There, too, the great mass of the population was full of enthusiasm for the progressive course.

SCHMIDT

<sup>7</sup> See vol. XI of this series, documents Nos. 682, 695, 702, and 707.

<sup>8</sup> Victoria Eugenie Christina, born Ena of Battenberg, widow of Alfonso XIII.

## No. 523

F1/0031-36

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat*

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, November 30, 1941.

Füh 58a/1941 g Rs.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FÜHRER AND ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER COUNT CIANO, AS WELL AS SPANISH FOREIGN MINISTER SERRANO SUÑER, IN THE PRESENCE OF THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER AND AMBASSADOR VON STOHRER IN BERLIN ON NOVEMBER 29, 1941

The Führer first gave a survey of the general situation from the military and political point of view whereby he particularly went into the American policy. Roosevelt hated both the Duce and the Führer, because in his country he had failed in tasks which the two above-named persons have solved brilliantly in their own countries. Furthermore, he intended to exploit the war in order to take over the inheritance of England and France, establish himself firmly in South America, take possession of or gain control over the islands in the Atlantic, Greenland, the Azores, the Canary and Cape Verde Islands, and finally to gain a foothold in Africa. To confront this, sooner or later a European front would develop quite of its own accord. Furthermore he (the Führer) was convinced that if America should enter the war Japan for her part would also proceed against America, for her situation was not dissimilar to that of Germany.

In the light of the latest events, Turkey would in no circumstances go over to the Anglo-Saxon side. Furthermore, the visible signs of internal difficulties were increasing both in England and in America. America in particular did not possess the inner power of resistance which characterized some European countries.

The eastern part of Europe had to be intensively organized so that Europe would not only be secure against blockades but also against crises.

Serrano Suñer thanked the Führer for the interesting statements on the general situation. Spanish attention was particularly directed to the events in North Africa, which had caused some concern among the Spaniards. Ambassador von Stohrer knew how he (Serrano Suñer) felt about these events. Since he was used to the English propaganda he was not influenced by it, but there were other people in Spain who were influenced by England. Therefore if a favorable outcome could be achieved in North Africa as soon as possible, the psychological effect would be exceedingly great, especially considering that the English had evidently great hopes for their advance because after all Sir

Samuel Hoare had announced repeatedly in Spain a great offensive in North Africa, of which the English Government and the English people expected great things.

Regarding the morale in Spain, Serrano Suñer remarked that there was still a large number of Anglophiles in this country.

The Führer was absolutely right when he said that there was no power and no instrument of power in the world that could conquer the European Continent militarily. This was so clear that even the English knew it and even spoke of it, as had Eden recently in London, who had admitted that England possessed no adequate means of military power to be able to conquer. The English hopes were therefore focused upon economic warfare and internal revolution in the enemy countries.

In regard to Spain he could state, with particular reference to the language used by the Spanish press, that the Spaniards were fully conscious of their obligation of loyalty toward the Führer of a great country and therefore built up their foreign policy on the basis of sincere friendship for Germany. Spain also performed every possible service for the Reich to the modest extent possible to her, whereby he (Serrano Suñer) did not want to conceal that this was not done without internal difficulties, for Spain was not only in a very bad situation economically, but the Spaniards also believed that the war would be very long and difficult. Furthermore, Spain's economic dependence upon foreign countries was a great obstacle in the way of a bold foreign policy. Thus, for example, America's reaction to his (Serrano Suñer's) trip to Berlin<sup>1</sup> had been immediately to detain two petroleum tankers that were to have left the United States for Spain.<sup>2</sup> The Führer remarked regarding this that precisely such an action had to lead to a unified front in Europe, and that no country would be able to avoid the fight in the long run.

Regarding Spain's domestic situation, Serrano Suñer also remarked that only the Falange was pro-German. There were in the country numerous enemies of the Government, among them a tremendous number of Reds who were directed by agents of foreign powers. The lack of grain and gasoline, moreover, made every thought of participation in the war unpopular in Spain. Furthermore, Spain did not have enough anti-aircraft artillery and coastal batteries to defend herself against a possible foe, so that a war would mean great losses.

The Führer put the question what Spain would then do if the Azores were attacked. Serrano Suñer replied that Spain would defend the Azores, whereupon the Führer countered that offense was the

<sup>1</sup> Serrano Suñer had come to Berlin in connection with the ceremonies attending extension of the validity of the Anti-Comintern Pact. See document No. 498.

<sup>2</sup> See *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. II, pp. 932-934.

best defense, and added his regret that the Gibraltar action had not been carried out owing to the attitude of the Spaniards.<sup>2</sup> The status of the preparations at that time was such that 6 days would have been enough to capture Gibraltar. Then one could also have exerted pressure on France, and the threat to the Mediterranean posed by the English Malta would have been eliminated.

In conclusion Serrano Suñer proposed that certain Falange members, important for the political work at home, who were now at the eastern front, should be sent back to Spain, because they had more important services to render at home than at the front, particularly in regard to promoting friendship for Germany and strengthening the Government.

The Führer agreed with this idea, and it was arranged that a certain exchange of Spanish soldiers of the Blue Division should be made for other volunteers to be sent from Spain.

SCHMIDT

<sup>2</sup> For details of the plan for Gibraltar, see vol. XI of this series, document No. 323. For Franco's refusal to undertake this operation, see *ibid.*, documents Nos. 420 and 476.

## No. 524

82/60917-19

### *The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry*

#### Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 2597 of November 30

Tokyo, November 30, 1941—10:10 p. m.

Received December 2—2:40 p. m.

When I called on the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs today, I took the opportunity in the first instance to present to him the Japanese translation of the Reich Foreign Minister's speech<sup>1</sup> prepared by the Embassy, inviting his special attention to the political remarks. The Foreign Minister expressed his thanks for furnishing him with the text of the speech and stated that the Reich Foreign Minister's remarks had been of great interest to him. He then inquired about the military situation in Russia and North Africa, which I explained to him with the help of some maps which I had brought with me. The Foreign Minister expressed his deep gratification over the progress of our defensive operations in North Africa. He also congratulated Germany on the continued favorable development of the eastern campaign, but stressed in that connection the very high importance which Japan attached to restoration of the trans-Siberian route;

<sup>1</sup> Presumably a reference to Ribbentrop's address of Nov. 26. See document No. 501, footnote 20 or document No. 521, footnote 3.

Japan was closely watching the political developments inside Russia, and hoped that after the fall of Moscow and the disappearance of the Stalin regime, it would be possible to come to some political arrangement leading to restoration of the land connection with the Axis Powers. As instructed,<sup>2</sup> I replied by referring to the Reich Foreign Minister's explicit remarks.

I then observed that according to press reports the note delivered by the American Government on November 26<sup>3</sup> marked a decisive phase in the negotiations. I needed not especially to emphasize that official information from Japan regarding it would be of value to my Government and would be deemed as being in accordance with our alliance. The American Government, according to newspaper reports, had likewise informed a number of states. The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs replied that the American note was of great importance indeed. In strict confidence, he would tell me the following about it:

The course of the conversation to date had confirmed his view that the differences of opinion between Japan and the United States were very deep. Since sending Ambassador Kurusu on his mission, the Japanese Government, as he had told me before, had adopted a firm attitude. He was convinced that this attitude was in line with our point of view and that it contributed to making the United States hesitate about joining the European war. The new American proposal of November 26 indicated a wide divergence of the respective positions. These differences concerned, for instance, the further handling of the China question. The largest (one group missing), however, stemmed from the American efforts to render the Tripartite Pact inoperative. America was proposing that Japan conclude a non-aggression pact with the United States, the British Empire, the Soviet Union and other states, designed to prevent Japan's entry in the war at the side of the Axis Powers. Japan insisted, however, upon keeping her treaty obligations, and the American demand was for that reason the principal impediment to normalization of American-Japanese relations. He avoided going into the concessions held in prospect by the Americans, and merely stressed that a grave decision was involved. America was preparing in earnest for a conflict and was about to arrange for a not unsubstantial portion of her navy to operate from the southern Pacific. The Japanese Government was now engaged in preparing a reply calculated to clarify its position. He was not yet able to give me particulars at this moment. He considered (group garbled) the American proposal as a whole unacceptable.

<sup>2</sup> Instructions not found.

<sup>3</sup> For text, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941*, vol. II, pp. 768-770.



Japan did not fear rupture of the negotiations and trusted that if the occasion arose, Germany and Italy would stand by Japan in accordance with the Tripartite Pact. I replied that there could not be any doubt concerning Germany's future attitude. Upon this the Japanese Foreign Minister observed that he gathered from what I had said that Germany would in such a case regard her relationship to Japan as a bond of common destiny. I replied that in my belief Germany would assuredly be prepared to enter a mutual agreement on that matter. To this the Foreign Minister replied that he might possibly come back to that point before long. The conversation with the Foreign Minister confirmed my impression that the American note was indeed very unsatisfactory even for the statesmen of this country who are seeking to reach an understanding. America's attitude, especially in the China question, is extremely disappointing for these circles. The fact that he had emphasized the Tripartite Pact as the main obstacle to success in the negotiations seems to me to indicate that the Japanese Government has now again become strongly conscious of the need for close cooperation with the Axis Powers.

OTT

No. 525

1306/346472-473

*Memorandum by the Director of the News Service and Press  
Department*

BERLIN, November 30, 1941.

For the Foreign Minister.

I would like to state the following with respect to the confidential report by L[ikus] regarding the testament of Peter the Great.<sup>1</sup>

The testament of Peter the Great was taken up in the Belgian newspaper *Pays Réel*. Subsequently the Führer ordered that the most extensive propaganda use be made of it. A lecture by Professor Schüssler discussed the subject. The lecture was reported in the entire German press. This report of the lecture of Professor Schüssler was not enough for the Führer. He ordered the widest possible discussion in the German press with the theme: the imperialist policy of Tsar

<sup>1</sup> According to this Likus report of Nov. 28 (1306/346474) stories published in the German press in connection with a lecture by Professor Schüssler of the University of Berlin dealing with the testament of Tsar Peter the Great had aroused great interest in the United States Embassy in Berlin. After it had been discovered that in authoritative German reference works these documents were characterized as "crude forgeries" the American correspondents in Berlin received from their Embassy instructions "to wire the full text of the judgments in the books of German historians and in German reference works regarding the forgery of these documents."

Peter the Great has been the guideline of Russian pre-war policy and of the policy of Stalin. Bolshevik world hegemony and Slav imperialism have joined hands in the policy of Stalin. The Führer rejected the objection which the Reich Press Chief<sup>2</sup> had raised with him that the testament of Peter the Great had been characterized by German scholars as a forgery already in the last World War, and he stated in this connection that it didn't matter what some professor or other had discovered with regard to this testament of Peter the Great. What mattered rather was that history had demonstrated that Russian policy was conducted according to these principles as they were laid down in the testament of Peter the Great. Knowing of this instruction of the Führer, I together with Herr Fritzsche<sup>3</sup> gave the press a number of arguments and guidelines for treating this matter. The press thereupon took up the subject in a big way and treated it to the satisfaction of the Führer.<sup>4</sup>

DR. SCHMIDT

<sup>2</sup> Otto Dietrich.<sup>3</sup> Hans Fritzsche, Director of the German Press Department in the Reich Ministry for Propaganda.<sup>4</sup> There is in the files a memorandum of Dec. 1 of the Press Department (3933/EO52165-80), apparently drawn up for the use of the German press, which gave the history and the text of this alleged testament of Peter the Great.

No. 526

195/139265

*The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

TOP SECRET

ROME, December 1, 1941—8:10 p. m.

No. 3135 of December 1

Received December 1—8:50 p. m.

With reference to my report No. 61/41 g of November 26.<sup>1</sup>

The Indian, Schedai, has stated that the Japanese Counselor of Embassy<sup>2</sup> here told him, after receiving the corresponding instruction from Tokyo that the Japanese Government intended to engage in fruitful cooperation with the Indian liberation movement and was willing to issue a declaration concerning Indian independence immediately after the outbreak of war between Japan and Great Britain. Schedai also stated that his cooperation with the Japanese Embassy here would in particular concern active efforts of the Indian colonies in East Asia, in which regard he always wanted, of course, to defer

<sup>1</sup> This report (41/28612) dealt with an offer of support which the Japanese Counselor of Embassy had made to Schedai, who directed Indian activities in Rome (see document No. 379).

<sup>2</sup> Yoshiro Ando.

to any wishes Germany might have. Schedai added that the Japanese Counselor of Embassy had told him several times very clearly that Japan's entry into the war was imminent.<sup>3</sup>

MACKENSEN

<sup>3</sup> In the files there is the draft of a telegram of Dec. 8 (195/139271-72) by Woermann informing the Embassy in Japan of the substance of this document with the instruction to inform the Japanese Government that it seemed most desirable to Germany "that a Japanese declaration regarding Indian independence should be coordinated with us and Italy with respect to content as well as time."

No. 527

2281/482390-93

*Circular of the Foreign Ministry*<sup>1</sup>

BERLIN, December 1, 1941.

Pol. V 6265 g.

With reference to instruction Pol. V 4552 g. of August 26, 1941.<sup>2</sup>

The information communicated in the instruction indicated above concerning the question of the émigrés from former Russia and the obstacles in the way of utilizing them for practical cooperation in the newly-occupied eastern territories remain valid in the future. The announcement of the appointment of Minister Rosenberg and the establishment of civil administrations in the occupied eastern area<sup>3</sup> have changed nothing in this.

In explanation of this fact reference may be made to the following. Although the individual émigré may be well disposed, in general the appearance and activity of émigrés would not make the situation in the eastern areas easier, but would only complicate it. It would have to be feared that the familiar antagonisms and controversies which split the emigration would be carried into the areas which had just been liberated from Bolshevism. This would produce new difficulties there, particularly since the distrust toward the émigrés and the fear of "White Guardist" acts of reprisal have by no means disappeared as yet among the population of the liberated territory.

Because in the inquiries and petitions originating in émigré circles the question of Germany's political objectives in the east also often plays a role, we refer in this matter to the enclosed memorandum.

WOERMANN

<sup>1</sup> Addressed to the Embassies in Turkey, Spain, Italy, and Paris, to the Legations in Croatia, Switzerland, Hungary, Rumania, Finland, Denmark, Portugal, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Sweden, to the Offices of the Foreign Ministry in Athens, Belgrade, Brussels, The Hague, Prague, and Krakow, and to the Consulate at Tangier.

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 247.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 119.

[Enclosure]

BERLIN, November 20, 1941.

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Germany and the occupied eastern territories.

The attempt is being made in various interested quarters to induce German authorities to make statements concerning the war aims and the constructive political intentions which Germany is planning to realize in the eastern area liberated or still to be liberated from Bolshevism. The establishment of civil administrations in the occupied eastern area and the announcement of the appointment of Minister Rosenberg will probably give a new impetus in this direction. Questions of this sort often derive from motives for which Germany has understanding, particularly when members of the nations oppressed by the Soviet regime up to now wish to learn in what manner their homeland is to participate in the new order which is developing. However, these elements which sympathize with the German struggle for liberation must be told that we also have to reckon with other undesirable and hostile trends which are often behind the wide-spread curiosity about the German plans for the eastern area. We have no interest in facilitating the work of enemy propaganda, which so far has been groping in the dark. Concrete statements about the German political aims would only serve the enemy in his attempt to discredit and disrupt precisely the form of the work of reconstruction which is planned in the east by a corresponding campaign operating with insinuations and distortions. As for the émigré groups of those eastern nations, who are unfortunately so often quarreling and to whom the German campaign brings liberation from Bolshevism, a premature announcement of more specific German objectives would only have the result that a new, fruitless, quarrel about questions of the future would arise. Their practical settlement can only be brought about by a final military decision, a decision which is still being fought over on the battlefields.

In view of the reasons set forth, statements about the objectives pursued by Germany in the eastern area can only be of a general nature. Nevertheless, a reply can be given to inquiries. With reference to the announcement which appeared in the German press on November 18 concerning the Reich Commissariats Ostland and Ukraine placed under Minister Rosenberg, as well as to the DNB report which appeared in the papers on November 19 concerning the reception for the press held by Minister Rosenberg, one can constantly state with special emphasis that the basic fact of liberation from Bolshevism has not by any means been grasped and appreciated everywhere in its whole significance. The profound significance of this

action can be fully recognized only if one clearly visualizes all of the consequences that have resulted for the internal life of the national group concerned. These consequences concern in the first place the personal security of the inhabitants of the country, who were abandoned without protection to the arbitrary acts of the Soviet regime and the persecutions by the GPU. They [the consequences] have to do with the order in public life by the introduction of an administration operating according to European principles in place of the partisan, inefficient Soviet administrative organs which exploited the population. They concern the restoration and revival of a healthy economy in place of the Soviet "planned economy" built on unrealistic doctrines, which led only to a lowering of the living standard and to pauperization in city and country. They finally concern also the encouragement of a national cultural life rooted in the native soil in place of the past antinational Communist pseudo-culture.

The work of a reawakening of the healthy national forces in the liberated territory carried out in accordance with these principles must be in the foreground today. Within the framework of an activity for these objectives, those elements of the indigenous population who are qualified to serve their people in responsible posts in the future can work their way up by efficiency and sustained performance. For this selection of persons the prerequisites are being created at the present time, because even at this time representatives of the local population are participating to a large extent in local self-government by teaching in the educational institutions, by working in the press, the arts, theater, etc., and in particular by starting the economic life. In this manner the indigenous national elements in the territories liberated from Bolshevism can first find themselves and work for their own benefit. They are trying out their powers and by practical work are creating the foundations upon which their national and cultural life can develop.

BAUM

No. 528

233/156836-38

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Argentina*TOP SECRET  
No. 1434BERLIN, December 1, 1941.  
RAM 236 g. Rs.

For the Ambassador personally.

I have carefully studied the question whether it would be advisable for the purpose of clearing up relations between Germany and Argentina to make a change in the post of ambassador there. I am still

of the opinion that there is no justification for any Argentine proposal to that effect.<sup>1</sup> Any retreat in the face of the public agitation that was going on in Argentina some weeks ago was ruled out from the beginning.<sup>2</sup> Not until now, when this agitation has subsided somewhat after a certain lapse of time, has the necessary condition existed for discussing this question at all; the only feasible way out that we can conceive of would be a simultaneous change of ambassadors both in Buenos Aires and in Berlin.

I therefore request that in connection with the conversation between Counselor of Embassy Meynen and the Under State Secretary in the Foreign Ministry there (your telegram No. 1795 of October 22)<sup>3</sup> you call on the Foreign Minister and make an oral statement to him of approximately the following content:

(1) The German Government is still of the opinion that the present deterioration in German-Argentine relations is due to the unjustified, systematic agitation publicly carried on in Argentina against the activity of the German Embassy in Buenos Aires in general and against your person in particular. The German Government has learned to its regret that the Argentine Government has not been able to provide proper protection from unwarranted public attacks for the Chief of a foreign Mission and his staff, in accordance with general and accepted usages between friendly states.

(2) If the Argentine Government now wishes to improve German-Argentine relations again, a necessary condition for it is now present in so far as the wholly unjustified agitation against the German Embassy has died down in the last few weeks and calm has set in.

(3) The German Government has had no reason basically for taking up the question of a change in the ambassadorial post in Buenos Aires. However, once the systematic and unjustified agitation against the person of the Ambassador had set in, it was confronted with the fact that your activity as Ambassador had thereby been subjected to undesirable handicaps. On the other hand the Argentine Government has indicated to us through the Under State Secretary of the Argentine Foreign Ministry in his conversation with Counselor of Embassy Meynen that the Argentine Government would, if necessary, be prepared for the sake of normalizing mutual relations to recall its Ambassador from Berlin. In view of this situation the German Government has no objection to replacing you there by some other person, if there is at the same time a change in Argentina's ambassadorial post in Berlin.

(4) The German Government requests a clear and binding statement by the Argentine Government on this solution, which would consist of a replacement of the German Ambassador in Buenos Aires and of the Argentine Ambassador in Berlin, to be announced simultaneously by the two Governments without any comments of their own. The appointment of the new Ambassadors would also have to be announced at the same time.

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 274 and footnote 2, and document No. 293 and footnote 3.  
<sup>2</sup> See document No. 293.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed (253/165226-27).

(5) In case of agreement the German Government reserves the right to make a proposal regarding the date of the change of Ambassadors at the two posts.<sup>4</sup>

RIBBENTROP

<sup>4</sup>In telegram 2039 of Dec. 2 (253/165222) Thermann reported that he had taken up the problem with the Argentine Foreign Minister who appeared visibly relieved. He seemed to anticipate no difficulty in the recall of the Argentine Ambassador from Berlin but felt that there might be difficulty in naming a successor because this required approval of the Senate which was adjourned until May 1942. The Argentine Government was expected to make a counter-proposal.

No. 529

67/46902-35

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat*

No. 60

PARIS, December 3, 1941.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN REICHSMARSCHALL GÖRING AND MARSHAL PÉTAİN IN FLORENTIN-VERGIGNY ON DECEMBER 1, 1941

Marshal Pétain by way of introduction explained that he had cherished the wish for a long time to meet with the Reichsmarschall, and he had also, as the latter doubtless knew, tried several times to bring about a conversation with him—not only for reasons of the personal sympathy which he felt toward the Reichsmarschall, but also because he was interested in describing his own situation to a soldier. When someone stood at the head of a country then the fate of the people was in his hands and took a certain direction according to the course followed by the state leadership. He (Pétain) wanted to come to an agreement with Germany in so far as possible concerning this course.

Pétain then pointed out that he had prepared a note<sup>1</sup> and wanted to discuss the content of this note with the Reichsmarschall and in consultation with Admiral Darlan.

The Reichsmarschall replied that he, too, was happy to meet with Marshal Pétain, even though heretofore this conversation had had to be postponed time and again owing to his (the Reichsmarschall's) other military and governmental tasks.

It was known both to the Führer and to other circles in Germany that already after his first meeting with Marshal Pétain he (the Reichsmarschall) had spoken of him everywhere with great respect. He even went so far as to say that if Marshal Pétain had exerted more influence on the destinies of his country at a certain critical hour the war would not have broken out between Germany and France.

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 531.

For himself Reichsmarschall Göring emphasized the sincere sympathy which he had always had for France even before the present war. He had belonged to those circles which had tried to prevent another passage at arms between the two countries. His (the Reichsmarschall's) talks with Laval in Kraków<sup>2</sup> and with Daladier in Munich<sup>3</sup> demonstrated that he had always been in favor of a settlement with France.

In a brief exchange of views between Reichsmarschall Göring and Marshal Pétain concerning the question of further procedure they finally agreed that Darlan should be immediately included in the conversations and that if necessary the Reichsmarschall and Marshal Pétain would have another private conversation thereafter.

During the reading of the German text of the memorandum by Pétain's interpreter, M. Freund, Darlan was brought into the conversation. After the end of the reading Pétain once more briefly summarized the most important points of this memorandum: the French Government was entirely prepared for collaboration with Germany. This collaboration so far, however, did not find the approval of the entire French people, who were suffering exceedingly and found it very difficult to come to terms with the present difficulties. Thus for the Chief of State of the French people it was a question of getting their approval of this policy. For this the methods described at length, perhaps even at too great length, in the memorandum were necessary. It had to be made clear to France what privileges she could obtain from Germany within the framework of the collaboration. He asked that the French wishes listed in detail in the memorandum be reviewed by a mixed commission in order to determine in what points Germany could comply with these wishes of France.<sup>4</sup>

The Reichsmarschall first stated that the document just read did not come from the Chief of State but from the French Government, and he therefore turned to Admiral Darlan, whom he told that for the moment it was totally incomprehensible to him how Darlan could have even submitted such a document in this form. If it were submitted to the Führer as it was now drawn up this would be rendering a bad service to France and the French Government.

According to the content this note verbally stood things entirely on their heads and aroused the impression that it was not France but Germany that had been conquered: for in this document it was demanded of Germany that she give up all of the advantages which

<sup>2</sup> Laval and Göring had met in Kraków on May 19, 1935, on the occasion of the funeral of Marshal Pilsudski. See Series C, vol. IV, document No. 98 and footnote 2.

<sup>3</sup> Daladier and Göring met on Sept. 29, 1938, at the Munich Conference.

<sup>4</sup> For further developments see document No. 573.

she had won in hard and bloody fighting, brought about by a war which Germany had not desired but which had been declared on her by France. Through a single stroke of the pen all of this was supposed to be more or less wiped out again. Things were asked of Germany which would considerably weaken her position, whereas the French Government offered as a counterservice only the hope that the French people would agree to collaborate; nothing was said, however, as to how far this collaboration with Germany was supposed to go or what positive advantages would result from it for the Reich.

Germany was involved in the most difficult fight for the new order of Europe and was at the point of destroying the most tremendous military power of all time. In the midst of this struggle France now demanded that Germany give up these advantages that were of the most extreme importance to her in her fight against England, whereby the Reichsmarschall stressed that almost all of the wishes advanced by the French side involved positions that primarily had to be held not at all on account of France but on account of the fight against England.

If now the French Government did not even offer any positive counterservices but only spoke vaguely of the agreement of the French people, then one could just as well have demanded that Germany leave France entirely and calmly look on while the French Government was then forced by its people once more to employ its means of power thus regained in a new war against the Reich under conditions unfavorable to Germany.

If he (the Reichsmarschall) was willing in spite of this first unfavorable impression to discuss the note with the French gentlemen, he did this because he knew that they, like himself, were moved by the desire for collaboration. He asked the French gentlemen, however, to keep both feet on the ground. If Admiral Darlan would think the matter over coolly and soberly, then he would doubtless realize himself that it would be insane of Germany to comply with the French demands.

It was true, to be sure, as the French Chief of State had just stated, that the agreement of the French people to the policy of collaboration was necessary. Even in a state under authoritarian leadership it was impossible in the long run to pursue a policy without the consent of the people. As a soldier who was speaking to a soldier, however, he had to ask the question in all frankness what had really been done thus far by the French Government in order to bring about a more favorable feeling for this policy among the French people who rejected collaboration. Germany could already come up with a long list of French wishes that had been fulfilled and thus with an influencing of public opinion in favor of collaboration. He (the Reichs-

marschall) would go into the particulars later on. At the moment he wanted only to point to the fact that Germany had so far already released 800,000 French prisoners. In order to make the French people ready for collaboration, the French Government should have considered its very first task, on the basis of the defeat of France, which was a fact that did not need to be discussed further, to point out to the French people the much more favorable and dignified treatment which France had received from the victorious Germany at the armistice in comparison to what had been imposed on the latter herself at the armistice of 1918 and in the Treaty of Versailles. The French Government should have stressed to its own people that Germany had respected the standpoint of honor of the French people, had taken account of the history, the value, and the prestige of the French nation and had spared it every painful or degrading demand in order to show that Germany had entered this fight only against her will owing to the declaration of war from other quarters and now wanted to close this phase as soon as possible. Germany did not have the intention to torture France or to degrade or dishonor her. If this had been made clear to the French people by the French Government, then the understanding of the French nation for the new period would thereby have been awakened, when the victors were not proceeding against the honor of conquered France but merely had to make certain demands out of the necessity of continuing the fight against England. This would have been the pivot from which one could have guided the mentality of the French people along new paths. For after all, two nations such as France and Germany could not always carry on war against one another.

Furthermore, the French Government should have exploited quite differently both technically and propagandistically the alleviations which Germany had granted and the cooperation which she had shown toward France and which had found its expression in the meetings of the Führer with Marshal Pétain and Admiral Darlan.<sup>5</sup>

For the rest the French people in the occupied area were more for collaboration than those in the unoccupied area. This was connected with the fact that the atmosphere in Vichy was generally anti-German. Of course he did not mean Marshal Pétain or Admiral Darlan, but many of their co-workers and particularly the French ministerial bureaucracy, which frustrated the orders passed down from above and hindered their implementation. The German state leaders knew from experience in their own country how much a ministerial bureaucracy that disagreed could interfere with the execution of the governmental decisions, and had needed several years to clean up the situa-

<sup>5</sup> For Hitler's meeting with Pétain see vol. XI of this series, document No. 227; for that with Darlan see vol. XII of this series, document No. 491.

tion entirely. Germany was not blind, and Vichy was not so far removed from the world that the leadership of the German state did not know exactly that the lower strata in France were not disinclined to collaborate with Germany, to be sure, but that the intellectual circles continued to be opposed to collaboration. Of course the Reich Government also knew how much Marshal Pétain and Admiral Darlan had worked personally for the policy of collaboration. The disposal of the Weygand Affair,<sup>6</sup> too, had strengthened this impression; but the people had to be won over to collaboration by means of proper propaganda, in that it was made clear to them that it was a question of creating a new Europe without future wars, the tendency of which was characterized by the manner in which Germany had treated France in the armistice, as well as by the fact that Germany was closing in on Europe's deadly enemy, Bolshevist Russia. The intellectual group in France had no understanding for this new Europe. Even if the Reichsmarschall had the power to sign the document just submitted in its present form, this would change nothing in this attitude of the intellectuals.

In the further course of the conversation the Reichsmarschall recognized the difficult situation in which Darlan had often found himself in regard to England, and stressed how glad he had been about Darlan's order to the French fleet now also to torpedo English ships in the light of the latest English encroachments. He (the Reichsmarschall) had seen, in case of good results of this order to shoot, the possibility for the German side to make a gesture toward France, but had unfortunately waited in vain for reports of sinkings. Thus it seemed that the order given by Darlan had simply not been carried out. Darlan denied this and said that two French submarines in the vicinity of the Cape of Good Hope had destroyed an English ship. The French Naval Command had intercepted the SOS signal of an English freighter and on the basis of the location of this ship had immediately determined that only a French submarine could be involved in the torpedoing. Naturally, however, they had had to wait with the official announcement of the report until the submarine commander himself, who was en route to Madagascar, submitted an official report from his port of destination. This had arrived in France a day and a half ago and confirmed what had just been said.

In the further course of the conversation Göring asked the Frenchmen repeatedly to tell him specifically what particularly they were willing to do on their own initiative within the framework of the collaboration and what thereby would be of a positive advantage for Germany.

Moreover, the Reichsmarschall pointed out to the French gentlemen that a stipulation of the armistice, according to which the German strategic position toward England must not deteriorate in any circumstances, did not permit anyone who did not want to betray the German nation to make certain concessions. Here France had to understand the difficulties that were based on the fact that the fighting position toward England must not be impaired.

In his reply Marshal Pétain pointed out that he was of the same opinion as Reichsmarschall Göring concerning the negative attitude of the intellectuals in France toward the policy of collaboration with Germany. However, the French Government could gain influence over intellectual circles only if it had its seat in Paris itself. From the little provincial town of Vichy it was not possible to influence the class of scholars and other intellectuals who were concentrated in Paris. Besides this, France, by the line of demarcation, was torn into two parts whereby a uniform position of the French Government was rendered more difficult.

In this connection Pétain also complained about the Paris press, which often criticized the Vichy Government and over which he did not have the least influence.

Furthermore Pétain pointed to the threat to the French colonies by England, which had already once led to an open attack on Dakar.<sup>7</sup> Since neither France nor Germany had an interest in England's or America's taking over the French colonial possessions, particularly in North and West Africa, France was willing to defend her colonies to the utmost. For this, however, she had to have permission from Germany to reinforce her North and West African troops in both men and material.

In his reply Reichsmarschall Göring agreed with Pétain that neither France nor Germany had an interest in letting the English or the Americans or de Gaulle into Dakar. In order to permit the alleviations of the type mentioned by Pétain, however, the leadership of the German State first had to be told clearly and concisely how the French visualized the military defense of Dakar.

Grand Admiral Raeder, like the Reichsmarschall, had, at a certain time, greatly supported the defensive intentions of France. Later on, however, the French themselves had explained that they could bring only two battalions to Dakar because of bad transportation conditions. In these circumstances, before permitting further alleviations, Germany had to know precisely just what military plans France had, for even though Marshal Pétain and Admiral Darlan enjoyed absolute confidence, as already stated, Germany knew on the other hand that

<sup>6</sup> Document No. 478 and footnote 11.

<sup>7</sup> See vol. xi of this series, document No. 112.

some of their ministerial colleagues held other views. Germany had proof at hand, for example, that General Weygand wanted to get concession of the reinforcement of the North African troops only so that he could establish there a relatively strong force and make it available to the English at the proper moment. Indeed, he had now withdrawn; still, from the conditions described above, there nevertheless developed the necessity for Germany to approach the question of reinforcements very cautiously. The leadership of the State had the responsibility toward the German people that if Pétain and Darlan should be overthrown by some sort of camarilla the concessions regarding number of troops, stockpiled equipment, pilots, artillery, and ammunition that had been granted would not be utilized against the German people by the successors of Pétain and Darlan.

Pétain replied that he himself, as was known, was a very strong advocate of the idea of collaboration, but that he did have to say that so far France had not been informed how she would fit into the new order of Europe. France was, so to speak, proceeding with closed eyes into the future. She wanted to know something more about the future organization of Europe and about the place to be occupied by her. If, to speak in military terms, one attacked a position, one first had to define it well and then be clear about the means of attack. Just as for military procedure, a plan was also necessary for a work of peace such as the development of the new Europe.

The Reichsmarschall repeated that the French for their part first had to state exactly just how in detail they envisaged collaboration. He then gave a short outline of the history of the war, the advanced position of Poland on the east, the liquidation of the western continental European position through the elimination of France from the struggle and the continuation of this fight against England. Perhaps Germany had spared England too long because she believed the English would possibly still join up. If we had crossed over to England after Dunkirk, which would have been entirely possible militarily, since the English did not have any weapons, things would probably have gone differently. It was certain in any case that England could not hold her European position against Germany.

The Germans had often racked their brains about what hope England could really have in continuing the war. American deliveries had been left out of this because probably England too recognized what a monstrous bluff these involved. Marshall Pétain knew from his own experience, after all, how unpunctual the Americans were with their deliveries.

Seeking after motives for the continued English resistance it was discovered in Germany that it was Russia, with which as such there existed an agreement. The Soviet Union had, however, rearmed to a

really unimaginable extent, which did not remain concealed from Germany. The extent of this rearmament, which was now exhibited in full clarity, was such that if Germany had not marched into Russia when she did, the Soviet Union would probably have fallen upon Europe a year later and flattened everything in its path. But Germany had not only learned of the Russian rearmament but had also obtained knowledge of the Russo-English agreements, according to which Russia was to be left the eastern part of Europe whereas Great Britain kept the west as her own domain. From this Germany had recognized that the Soviet Union represented the greatest danger of all for the entire European Continent. No military power in the world, not even the English and French armies of 1939 together with the American Army would have been in a position to push Russia back as Germany had done, but they would have been simply run over by the Russian armored divisions. Only an armed force like the German one could dare to take up the fight against the giant, which proceeded without general staff finesses, to be sure, but was in a position to put up for every fallen soldier 5 or 10 others at once and for every lost tank to have 10 new ones on the spot; and which furthermore had on his side as a main ally the mud and the swamps of the Russian soil. Germany was now involved in this hard fight, in which America also supported the Russian side with material; she would fight until she had gained a complete victory. In this situation she was now supposed to accept certain disadvantages in order to help France defend her colonies. Where was France's collaboration now? Had the last man and the last woman in France been brought into production in order to support Germany at least with material? The French fleet, most of which was intact, was playing dead. It did not consider action against England because the French people would not understand this. He (the Reichsmarschall) believed, however, that if their Government explained to the French people how decently Germany had acted as an enemy and how indecently England had acted as an ally in sinking [French] ships and in seizing [French] colonies, they would be able to understand. The real reason for this lack of support of Germany by France within the framework of the collaboration was to be found in the already mentioned fact that the French intelligentsia were hoping for an English victory, still believed in this and furthermore clung to the fantastic idea that America exercised a decisive influence. Thus it happened that French ships were sunk and colonies were seized by the English, but even after this France still maintained the same relations as before with these countries. In former times France would certainly have replied in quite a different way to such attacks.

The absurdity to which unilateral collaboration can lead in some circumstances was demonstrated by the Reichsmarschall with an example in connection with the German advance against the Suez Canal. Germany would reach the Suez Canal in one way or another. If this were done via the Caucasus and Syria, then according to the French conception of the collaboration, Syria, which had been conquered by the German troops, would be returned without France herself having made even the slightest contribution toward regaining it.

When Marshal Pétain asked what position France was supposed to take in the new Europe, then he (the Reichsmarschall) replied that in the final analysis this would depend on how close the two people came to one another. He (the Reichsmarschall) had recently spoken, during a reception in Berlin, to the delegates of the Anti-Comintern Powers about a political master book in which Germany would set down the debits and credits for every country and that he would open it at the end of the war in order to draw the balance, whereby each country could see according to the positive treatment of each how they would be evaluated by Germany. For the rest, Reichsmarschall Göring concluded his remarks, it was certain that Germany would not in any circumstances pay for the war. It was in France's interest to hope that England would be forced to pay. Some country, however, would certainly have to pay for the war. France, therefore, had a great interest in the defeat of the Britons and should cooperate accordingly.

Darlan stated thereupon that he together with Marshal Pétain belonged to those who recognized that France had lost the war and that a defeat had to be paid by the defeated. He also recognized that the armistice conditions had been honorable; otherwise neither he nor the Marshal would have stayed in office. He understood too that the war against England involved certain necessities in the treatment of France. For a year now collaboration had been established as a program by Germany and France. Much of what the Reichsmarschall had said had already been pointed out in earlier conversations. France for her part was striving to bring about collaboration with Germany in the interest of the fight against England.

When, within the framework of these efforts, the note verbale with the French wishes has been drawn up, this was not so much as to say that all wishes had to be filled at once and without services in return. These were rather maximum wishes.

Darlan recalled the conversation at Berchtesgaden<sup>8</sup> after which the agreement with Warlimont and Abetz had been concluded.<sup>9</sup> He then spoke at somewhat greater length about the details of the three so-

called Paris Protocols and directed his particular attention to the final protocol which contains the well-known reservation about making the harbor of Bizerte available as well as the providing of escort protection.<sup>10</sup> He stressed thereby that these negotiations laid down in the above-mentioned protocols were to occur within the framework of political discussions. The first of these political discussions had begun only today, however. Nevertheless, France had, on her own initiative, placed at the disposal of Germany airfields in Syria for the further flight of the German planes to Iraq,<sup>11</sup> and through this gesture had clearly oriented French policy toward the side of collaboration. The result for France had been the loss of Syria. The French fleet had not been able to leave for Syria because the secret of the trip had been aired in Wiesbaden, because not enough fuel could be provided in Greece and because the necessary protection by the Luftwaffe was lacking, which was too much occupied in the Russian war.<sup>12</sup> At the moment they were negotiating in Wiesbaden about the providing of harbors in Tunis and the supplying of the Africa Corps as well as about the chartering of French merchant ships to Germany.<sup>13</sup> At the same time France knew, however, that if the harbor of Bizerte were made available to the Germany Army, the English and Americans would derive from this the right to attack Dakar, Martinique and Guadeloupe. If reinforcements were to be permitted for Dakar, then this concession had to be made at least before the harbor of Bizerte was finally made available to the Wehrmacht, because otherwise the English would not let any more transports through to Dakar.

As far as the possibilities of the French fleet were concerned, he had already explained to General Warlimont that it would rule the sea for about 8 days, but would then have to yield to the English who, even though they were much damaged by the Luftwaffe, still had considerable strength at sea. For the Navy the difficulties derived from the lack of freedom of movement (in ship transfers the prior consent of the Armistice Commission had to be obtained), as well as from the scarcity of fuel, which was gradually making itself felt after a year of constant readiness.

In the further course of the conversation Darlan pointed to a trip through the occupied and unoccupied area of France during which

<sup>10</sup> See vol XII of this series, document No. 559.

<sup>11</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 475.

<sup>12</sup> See documents Nos. 31, footnote 3, and 82, footnote 2.

<sup>13</sup> In a memorandum of Nov. 29 Pol. I M 3400 g. Rs., Ang. II (898/292160-61) Grote recorded a message from Wiesbaden according to which military negotiations between Germany and France, on the turning over of French shipping space for the Axis operations in North Africa, were getting under way. See *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. V, pp. 305-306, 329-335, 398-402.

<sup>8</sup> See vol XII of this series, document No. 491.

<sup>9</sup> See vol XII of this series, document No. 559.



he had explained to the French population that the only possible policy for France today consisted in a rapprochement with Germany and incorporation into the new Europe. He had added that Germany as the most dynamic and numerically strongest nation on the Continent would naturally lead this new Europe. This idea had doubtless made progress among the French. When the Reichsmarschall complained that the unoccupied area was less favorably inclined toward collaboration than the occupied area, this was in part owing to the fact that Germany had deported a lot of Jews into the unoccupied area who could not be sent on from there.

Reichsmarschall Göring replied that when Germany had set down the armistice conditions of 1940 on a basis honorable for France, this had not been done so that she could strike a false pose, but because she wanted to show that hatred and destruction were alien to her and that she was thinking of a rapprochement with France for the future, even of a friendship between the two countries. If Germany had not desired collaboration, then she would have set quite different conditions. This had to be explained to the French people through propaganda again and again.

Further, the Reichsmarschall contested Darlan's statement that in the operation for Syria there had not been any protection provided for the French fleet by the Luftwaffe. He himself stressed that he had been in telephone contact with General Dentz for 5 days in order to declare time and time again his readiness to attack the English fleet at once wherever it appeared.<sup>14</sup> He had asked only for airfields or at least landing fields in Syria so that any German airplanes that had been shot up would not need to go down on the territory of the English; inexplicably these airfields had been refused him by Dentz, and this had naturally and irrefutably resulted in the impossibility of an intervention by the Luftwaffe.

If Darlan had explained earlier that France, as a result of her collaboration with Germany in making airfields available to her, had lost Syria, he could reply to this that England would have attacked Syria in any case, and only made use of the lie of the apparent presence of Germans in Syria in order to carry out an attack which had long been planned.

In Iraq the collapse had come so precipitantly that there was no longer any time for an effective intervention. Furthermore, in the land of oil there had surprisingly not been any airplane gasoline at hand.

<sup>14</sup> No record of the Göring-Dentz conversation has been found. In telegram No. 3413 of June 25 from Berlin (386/211121) Abetz informed Schleier that in a conversation with Göring, the latter had informed him that he was ready to grant to the French fleet in its operation off Syria all possible protection of the Luftwaffe.

As regards Martinique and Guadeloupe the Reichsmarschall advised Darlan to pull out the French ships lying there secretly if at all possible and have them proceed to Europe or to Dakar; for, independently of what France did or did not do there, the Americans would in any case occupy the two colonies, whose final fate could only be decided after the war.<sup>15</sup>

The Reichsmarschall returned once more to the question of the reinforcement of the troops in Dakar, and repeated the remark that both he and Grand Admiral Raeder had strongly advocated sending the troops, but learned afterwards that no more than two battalions could be transported either by ship or overland. Germany had an interest in the defense of Dakar, and he (the Reichsmarschall) was willing to help with the Luftwaffe if he was sure that really well-seasoned troops were fighting in Dakar and not de Gaulle units. As far as the French fleet was concerned, if employed as a unit it was a strong element for the security of the African colonial empire, even against the English fleet, since the latter, which was spread over large areas, was not so strong as the French evidently assumed.

Regarding Bizerte the Reichsmarschall remarked that he could understand the French reserve to the extent that he believed that France could only make a decision in the question of making this harbor available when it was entirely clear to her that she would, after all, sooner or later come into warlike entanglements with England.

Regarding the question of releasing prisoners the Reichsmarschall remarked that looked at from the propaganda point of view, Germany could as such do nothing better than to release the French prisoners; for they were all of them in favor of the collaboration with Germany, as he had learned in numerous conversations which he had had with French prisoners. The prisoner question was not to be solved with sympathies or antipathies, however, but like everything else it had to be subordinated to the purposes of the war. Only after there existed a program of industrial deliveries from France could one speak of the release of prisoners.

After the Reichsmarschall had once more asked the French gentlemen how they conceived of the details of the defense of Dakar, of West Africa, and of North Africa, he remarked regarding the last point that with a failure of the English offensive in Libya the situation would thereby be considerably alleviated. He remarked that he would now once more consider at his leisure the document presented by Darlan in order "to pull the worst teeth," i.e., to strike out the demands by France which had given him a certain shock. One

<sup>15</sup> On American concern about French ships at Martinique and Guadeloupe, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. II, pp. 182, 197-198, 199-202, 543.

simply had to proceed a good deal more slowly than the French had evidently intended.

What was decisive was that the Führer had not sent the Reichsmarschall to this meeting with Marshal Pétain in order to negate collaboration. Marshal Pétain could see from the fact of this meeting that Germany was trying to reach a good understanding with France and was moved by the desire to accord France a worthy place in the new Europe. The French people, who had created so much that was great and beautiful, did not need to be concerned that they would not be accorded the proper place in Europe. Naturally Germany would take over the leading role in this new Europe; not so much because she would win the present war, but rather because of the basic power that emitted from a mass of over 100 million Germans who excelled in organizational talent, courage, and intelligence and were entirely unified as a nation through National Socialism. Europe was to get a new appearance, a master's countenance, for it was clear that Europe with her ancient culture deserved a master's role in the world. In this new Europe there would be no oppressed, enslaved or partitioned France.

In conclusion the Reichsmarschall repeated that he for himself wanted to go through the memorandum once more point for point, but he asked the French gentlemen to commit themselves to clear, concrete matters of collaboration, a collaboration in which Germany could not onesidedly be the only giving party, but in which each must make his contribution in the same manner. Above all France also had to give the assurance that her policy of collaboration was really a continuing one. For even though Germany had absolute confidence in Marshal Pétain and Admiral Darlan, she still did not know what attitude possible successors would take.

He (the Reichsmarschall) would now report to the Führer on the conversation, and he thought it best if the French side would in the military sector first say exactly how France visualized the particulars of the defense of her colonial empire. This could be done within the framework of a military commission.<sup>16</sup> After that they could take up other problems.

After the Reichsmarschall had asked about the present whereabouts of Weygand, and Pétain had answered that Weygand was in France and had been forbidden to return to Africa, the discussion was concluded.

<sup>16</sup> In a memorandum of Dec. 4 (898/292127) for Minister Schmidt, Abetz reported a conversation with Darlan in which the latter informed him that materials relating to the defense of French Africa were being assembled and he repeated his proposals of German-French military conversations to work out a joint plan for the common defense of North and West Africa.

Following this the Reichsmarschall invited Marshal Pétain, Admiral Darlan, and several gentlemen of his entourage to a luncheon.  
SCHMIDT

### No. 530

2116/460565-69

*Memorandum by the Head of Division WIV of the Economic Policy Department*

BERLIN, December 1, 1941.  
zu Ha. Pol. 7695g.<sup>1</sup>

The Swedish Foreign Ministry, in order to strengthen its negotiating position toward Germany, recently delivered the enclosed memorandum on the services Sweden has rendered so far during the present war. The compilation shows to what considerable services, particularly in the field of transportation and supplies by water and by land, it has been possible to press Sweden as a result of the persistent and difficult negotiations of recent months. Details are given in the enclosure.

To be submitted to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary.

SCHNURRE

[Enclosure]<sup>2</sup>

STOCKHOLM, November 18, 1941.

1) Transportation to and from Norway through Sweden on behalf of the Wehrmacht applies, as we know, partly to men on leave, partly and to a lesser extent, to small German troop units for the exchange of troops between central and northern Norway ("horse-shoe traffic") and partly to goods of all kinds (war material and other military equipment). Since the furlough transports started in July 1940 until November 1, 1941, a total of about 670,000 members of the Wehrmacht, that is, an average of about 1,400 men a day, have been transported through Sweden either to or from Norway or between Trondheim and Narvik.

At the moment about 30,000 to 40,000 members of the Wehrmacht (per month) are being transported to Norway and just as many from Norway. About 1000 to 1500 freight carloads on behalf of the

<sup>1</sup> Not found.

<sup>2</sup> The original was a Swedish document translated into German. The text printed here is based on the German translation.

Wehrmacht are being transported to Norway. A considerable portion of these railroad cars is loaded with military equipment.

2) Transit through Sweden to Finland and back on behalf of the Wehrmacht applies partly to passengers, partly to goods of all kinds. For travelers on Wehrmacht missions, special direct cars are being made available between Storlien and Haparanda via Gällivare twice a week in either direction. In this way since the outbreak of the German-Russian war until November 1, 1941, 3,500 German passengers have been transported from Norway through Sweden to Haparanda and 1,600 passengers from Haparanda to Norway.

In the same period 5,000 railroad cars of military material with a weight of about 75,000 tons, have been routed on behalf of the Wehrmacht on Swedish railway lines from Germany or Norway to Haparanda. Of these cars, 2,500 were loaded with war material, amounting to about 37,000 tons of military equipment shipped through Sweden to Haparanda. The shipments of military equipment through Sweden were curtailed only in so far as the capacity of the Finnish railroads to receive the goods at Tornea made this necessary.

3) Couriers who travel through Sweden between Norway, Denmark, Finland, and Germany on behalf of the Wehrmacht were accorded extensive privileges in passport and visa matters.

4) Since the outbreak of the German-Russian war up to November 10, 1941, 26 German transports with troops and war material, altogether over 70 German vessels, with a total tonnage of about 420,000 gross tons, have been routed through Swedish territorial waters from Germany to Finland, under special convoy by Swedish warships and Swedish planes. The ships were loaded with troops and war material and, so far as their safety required it, were conducted through Swedish inland territorial waters.

5) By special agreement, German military courier planes are flying across Sweden, both between Norway and Finland and also between Germany and Finland. In accordance with a special agreement concluded recently,<sup>3</sup> not fewer than 60 German courier planes per week may fly over Swedish territory during the winter months. Moreover, German hospital planes fly over Sweden between Finland and Norway.

6) Since the outbreak of the German-Russian war, approximately 11,000 wounded German soldiers from Northern Finland have been transported from Haparanda to Oslo on Swedish railroads and partly on hospital trains made available by Sweden.

7) Sweden has permitted the installation of large transit depots at Luleå and the vicinity on behalf of the Wehrmacht. The depots

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 319 and footnote 4.

consist, among other things, of 6,000 tons of food, as well as fuel, oils, forage, etc. The German authorities transported goods from these depots to the German troops in Finland with about 40 trucks.

8) The Swedish Army from its mobilization stocks has placed at the disposal of the Army of General Dietl 2,000 tents for 25 men each, with appropriate stoves.<sup>4</sup>

9) At the request of the Luftwaffe and the German Army, approval has been granted for the exportation of 700 trucks and passenger cars and for the hiring of 330 trucks.<sup>4</sup>

10) The German-Swedish trade has, as is well known, expanded considerably since the war. Total sales in German-Swedish clearing amounted in 1938, for example, to 799.7 million kronor; in 1940 to 1,368.1 million kronor, and in 1941 will probably lie between 1,800 and 1,900 million kronor. Since difficulties have arisen in the making of certain German deliveries in connection with the German-Russian war, and certain stoppages have occurred in the clearing, the Swedish Government has approved a clearing credit of 100 million kronor.<sup>5</sup> Another consequence of the German-Russian war was the withdrawal of German tonnage, which normally took care of the major part of German-Swedish sea shipments, and its utilization elsewhere. In its place, Swedish tonnage has transported most of the German-Swedish shipments.

11) During the war in Norway, the harbor of Narvik had been destroyed quite thoroughly. At the request of Germany, the Swedish Grängesberg concern repaired in a short time some important sections of the harbor facilities.

Since it is still difficult to maintain shipping traffic to Narvik on a sizable scale, the facilitation of ore shipments via Luleå, the second largest port for the shipment for Lapland ores, was of great importance. This was made possible on an unexpectedly large scale. Thus in the current year up to 45,000 tons per day were shipped at times via Luleå, which was formerly considered impossible.

12) During the year 1941 Sweden delivered the following food items to Finland: 23,000 tons of grain, 8,400 tons of flour, 3,400 tons of bread, 6,288 tons of potatoes, 5,264 tons of meat, 1,844 tons of butter, 460 tons of margarine, 229 tons of sugar, and 500 tons of molasses.

Finland has also been granted credits, totaling approximately 300 million kronor so far.

13) Since the outbreak of the Finnish-Russian war, Sweden has delivered the following items of war material to Finland: 8,142,000

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 418.

<sup>5</sup> See document No. 347.

kronor of ammunition; 2,740,000 kronor of powder; 1,197,000 kronor of signal equipment, 350,000 kronor of material for the services of supply and 1,200,000 kronor of other material.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup> See document No. 41 and footnote 5.

## No. 531

852/284539-46

### *Note Verbale From the French Government*<sup>1</sup>

[DECEMBER 1, 1941.]

1. The French Government has at various times demonstrated its desire to collaborate with the German Government.

It has taken an unequivocal position:

*a.* By political actions: Montoire,<sup>2</sup> Berchtesgaden,<sup>3</sup> and diplomatic break with Soviet Russia;<sup>4</sup>

*b.* By military actions: Mers-el-Kébir,<sup>5</sup> Dakar,<sup>6</sup> Nemours,<sup>7</sup> Syria,<sup>8</sup> Djibouti;<sup>9</sup>

*c.* By economic and industrial actions.

2. This policy of Franco-German collaboration has not up to now met with the unreserved approval of the French people:

*a.* Because France is suffering from her present lot and is anxious about her future;

*b.* Because up to the present time the French people do not clearly see the objective toward which they are being led.<sup>10</sup> They have not been told clearly what they can expect in the future.

<sup>1</sup> The note was handed to Göring by Pétain when they met at Florentin-Vergigny on Dec. 1 (document No. 529). Appended to it were ten additional notes and annexes (852/284547-603) on: Occupation Costs; The Demarcation Line; the Ostland Organization; French Coal Requirements; French Petroleum Requirements; Food Deliveries for the Army of Occupation; Previous Deductions of Vehicles; Transfer of French Railway Rolling Stock to Germany; Prisoners of War; and Reinforcement of French North Africa and of French West Africa.

The translation of the note verbale is from the French text. A German translation has been filmed on 852/284444-50.

<sup>2</sup> See vol. XI of this series, document No. 227.

<sup>3</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 491.

<sup>4</sup> Document No. 20 and footnote 3.

<sup>5</sup> See vol. X of this series, document No. 93.

<sup>6</sup> See vol. XI of this series, document No. 112.

<sup>7</sup> A minor naval engagement between French and British forces near Oran on Mar. 30, 1941. See *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. IV, p. 294, footnote 1.

<sup>8</sup> See document No. 165.

<sup>9</sup> In July 1941 the French forces in Djibouti had declared their allegiance to the Vichy Government and in spite of a British blockade, refused to surrender; they held out until December 1942.

<sup>10</sup> In the German translation (852/284444) there is at this point the extra sentence: "They have felt no significant improvement in their situation."

To adhere unhesitatingly to the course of collaboration, to stop "marching in the dark," they have to learn to appreciate through a number of significant facts that this collaboration will open up new horizons to them.

The Führer has told Admiral Darlan that the more he was certain of the loyal attitude of France toward him, the more he would be inclined to consent to advantages to our country.

"Give and take," he added, "it isn't haggling but a political necessity."

Finally, the Führer said, "I have decided to give France an honorable place in the European Federation."<sup>11</sup>

3. The Führer on the one hand and the French Government on the other hand have accordingly agreed to pursue a policy of collaboration.

To implement it in a meaningful way it is necessary to normalize the present relations between the two countries and to lay the foundations for the future relations.

This implies a far-reaching program, the necessity of which is all the more imperious in that the risks assumed by France increase day by day, and after having brought about the loss of Syria the storm now threatens to engulf Africa.

France wants to defend her empire. But it is necessary for her to be able to defend it effectively. She will defend it better to the extent that she is better armed and that she will have the possibility of providing men, arms, ammunition, fuel, and food for the forces which will be engaged.

This implies that Germany and Italy will continue to facilitate the technical reinforcement of our African defenses with our own means, and then that they will give us the material aid which is indispensable in order to replace what we have lost in defeat and what the armistice prevents us from producing.

French Africa, through its geographical position, constitutes either the rear or the flank of the zones of operation of the German Army, according to the objectives which Germany pursues in Asia or in Europe.

The maintenance of strategic equilibrium demands that it should not fall into the hands of the Anglo-Saxons.

The French African Army, reinforced in men and material as will be specified, will thus find itself in a satisfactory numerical and technical situation to safeguard French Africa. But it will be necessary that its action, of prime importance for the destiny of the new Europe, be sustained by the unanimous spirit of the nation.

In this respect, it would be important that Germany agree to release the shackles that bind the French Army and that she permit the

<sup>11</sup> References to these statements by Hitler have not been found.

return from captivity of numerous prisoners, in particular the cadres and troops indigenous to North Africa.

It would likewise be necessary that she consent to a public recognition of the integrity of the territories of our empire, in accordance with the declaration made last May 11 by Chancellor Hitler to Admiral Darlan, in the terms of which the Führer declared "that he did not have any designs on the French colonial empire."<sup>12</sup>

4. The necessity of a joint plan appears at least equally important in order to establish the bases of confidential and stable relations between Germany and France in the Europe of tomorrow.

France is bold enough to believe that her role in the world will continue. She feels that in a new Europe she ought to hold the place which is due to her past, to her influence on certain peoples, and to her future possibilities.

Germany is about to win the war alone. But she will have to establish the peace.

The peace can be lost—France herself has had this cruel experience—if the victor, even though forcing the respect of the other peoples for his might, and their admiration for the daring nature of his ideas, does not succeed in obtaining the agreement of their minds and, in a certain degree, of their ideals.

In approaching Germany and participating willingly in the work of European reconstruction—in accordance with the spirit of Chancellor Hitler's last letter to the Marshal<sup>13</sup>—France will through her decision and her example draw along certain reluctant nations of Europe and America, and at the same time a large part of Africa and Asia Minor.

This magnificent task, higher and nobler than the simple juxtaposition of technology and brains, could arouse in our country initiative, sacrifice, and creative hope.

The prospects which it holds, from the present time, are in any case such as to counterbalance effectively the opposition which, on the intellectual, sentimental, or material plane would risk keeping the spirit of collaboration in check for too long.

5. The difficulties of an internal order weigh, however, as heavily on our immediate future as the external dangers.

And this is why any joint plan must contain for the immediate future an introduction that is tangible and sensible to all.

The situation would not be well understood if France did not declare expressly:

<sup>12</sup> See vol. XII of this series, document No. 491.

<sup>13</sup> Document No. 460.

a. That she has the duty to affirm and to confirm the sovereignty of her Government over the entire extent of her territory,<sup>14</sup> which means: that the line of demarcation is merely the limit of the military occupation; that the prohibited area must return to the general regulation of the occupied zone; that the organization of the Ostland<sup>15</sup> must be done away with; that the administrative independence of the French authorities must be expanded in the occupied zone; that the organizations not recognized by the Government must no longer be supported by the occupation authorities.

b. That the liberation of new and important contingents of prisoners of war is today indispensable to her; in particular the farmers, in whose absence the richest land in western Europe, today cultivated only by women and children, will not regain its full yield for a long time.

c. That without irreparable damage to her economy and to her currency she cannot continue to pay such high occupation costs.<sup>16</sup>

d. That she has the most pressing need of coal and fuel.

e. That she desires a significant reduction in the German advance claims on her agricultural products in order to permit the minimum maintenance of her population.

f. That she must obtain the termination of requisitions of motor vehicles and rolling stock.

6. These requests may appear inconvenient. They are based, however, upon necessities of the policy which justifies them, and that is the policy of collaboration.

This policy will not penetrate into the spirit of a population which has not as yet perceived its results except under the impression of a splendid revelation of the advantages which it brings.

Solidly applied, the various political, economic, and military measures which the French Government has the honor to propose to the German Government will bring about this necessary awakening of opinion without which everything is rendered difficult, and nothing useful or decisive can be undertaken.

The grandeur of the decisions at this time must correspond to the imminence of the dangers which threaten us, as well as to the amplitude of the task which awaits us.

The French Government strongly underlines this necessity.

In requesting a joint plan, both comprehensive and precise, it takes the liberty of suggesting that this plan be put into effect as rapidly and in as practical a manner as possible.

<sup>14</sup> A separate note on this point was submitted by the French Government; it has been filmed on 852/284547-49.

<sup>15</sup> The Ostland Gesellschaft was a state organization which, under German direction, expropriated and exploited rural properties in the départements of Aisne, Nord, Meurthe, Moselle, and Ardennes. The former owners of these properties were dispossessed and turned into agricultural laborers. See *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. IV, pp. 188-193, 332, 342, 345, 361, 386-387.

<sup>16</sup> On the question of occupation costs see documents Nos. 24 and 222.

It is entirely ready to study the modalities of it with the least possible delay.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>17</sup> In Paris telegram No. 3835 of Dec. 4 (898/292126) Schmidt reported to Ribbentrop that according to Göring, de Brinon had stated that the French Government was withdrawing the note which Pétain had handed to Göring at their meeting on Dec. 1. See *La Délégation française auprès de la Commission allemande d'Armistice*, vol. v, p. 379.

### No. 532

M341/M015341-43

*The Military Attaché in Italy to the General Staff of the Army, Attaché Department*<sup>1</sup>

Telegram

CHEFSACHE

ROME, December 2, 1941—2:50 a. m.

No. 150113/41 g. Kdos.

By Officer only

The same to Chef OKW; to OKW/L; OKW/Ausland.

The Duce declared to me in a conversation on the evening of December 1, held in the presence of Colonel General Cavallero, that he trusted that the battle in the Marmarica would find a favorable outcome. But no matter how this battle turned out, he had the greatest fears regarding the further campaign in Libya. The situation had steadily deteriorated during the last few months so that the sending in of the requisite supplies was scarcely possible. In this situation he did not know how the losses in personnel and material which occurred in the battle could be made good, or how new troops could be transferred. Even the employment of German U-boats, which in itself was so welcome, and the arrival of the II Air Corps in Sicily<sup>2</sup> could not so transform the transport situation that it would be possible in the long run to keep up the race with the English. He sees the sole possibility of radically improving the transportation situa-

<sup>1</sup> By cover letter (Abt. L-ZbV No. 442077/41 g. K Chefs. of Dec. 5: 898/292111) General Warlimont sent a copy of this message (898/292112-13) to Ambassador Ritter in the Foreign Ministry together with Keitel's reply of Dec. 3 to Rintelen (No. 442051/41 g. Kdos: 898/292114-15) which is summarized in footnote 5.

A copy was also sent of the message (No. 442076/g.K Chefs. of Dec. 5: 898/292116-17) of the German Armistice Commission with France to OKW/WFSt., Abt. L which is summarized in footnote 4.

Warlimont also forwarded to Ritter a copy of a note of OKW/WFSt., Abt. L, No. 442079/41 g.K Chefs. dated Dec. 5 (898/292118), recording the receipt of a message of that date from the German liaison officer in Turin who reported that a meeting of Ciano with Darlan was scheduled for the next week in Turin. Ciano intended at that meeting to ask that the Tunisian base be made immediately available.

<sup>2</sup> See documents Nos. 433 and 535.

tion only in the free use of the harbor of Bizerte. This question is so important that one should make significant concessions to the French for it,<sup>3</sup> such as, for example, the liberation of war prisoners. This question should be clarified as quickly as possible<sup>4</sup> because Bizerte would have to be used even in December. If the French would not voluntarily concede the use of the harbor of Bizerte, one would have to take the harbor by force. This is necessary because the other possibility of decisively influencing the transportation situation—the seizure of Malta—is not given. The Duce charged me expressly to report his view to the Chief of OKW, because he sees no other possibility to supply Libya and to hold it in the long run unless as quickly as possible the transport through Tunisia is conceded—at least for trucks with supplies.

After the conversation with the Duce, Colonel General Cavallero asked me to portray forcibly the necessity of the free transit traffic over Tunisia as the only solution of the difficult transportation problem. He added that in his own view the Duce's notion of seizing Bizerte by force in a given case could not be carried out.<sup>5</sup>

The German General with the Headquarters  
of the Italian Armed Forces

<sup>3</sup> In a supplementary message of Dec. 2, No. 150114/41 g. Kdos. (M341/M015346-47) Rintelen reported on Mussolini's political comments which followed his remarks on the military situation. He suggested it would be appropriate soon to reach an agreement with France for the future peace. Mussolini stated that Italy would demand of France only Nice and Corsica, areas which were clearly inhabited by Italian populations. Tunis and Djibouti were not mentioned in this connection, Rintelen reported, but it was not clear whether or not Mussolini's remarks were restricted to the European possessions of France.

<sup>4</sup> By a message of Dec. 5, No. 442076/41 g.K Chefs. (898/292116-17) the German Armistice Commission with France notified OKW/WFSt., Abt. L of the receipt that day of a communication from Colonel Mancinelli of the Italian Armistice Commission with France. Mancinelli explained the urgency of gaining from France the use of the Tunisian base. He stated that the question was to be taken up in the next few days in a discussion between Ciano and Admiral Darlan as had been agreed between Ribbentrop and Ciano.

In response the German Armistice Commission informed Colonel Mancinelli of Keitel's reply to Rintelen, No. 442051/41 g.K Chefs., which is summarized in footnote 5.

<sup>5</sup> In a telegram of Dec. 4, No. 442051/41 g.K Chefs. (M341/M015344-45), Keitel informed Rintelen that the matter had been presented to Hitler. On the basis of that presentation Rintelen was directed to inform the Comando Supremo that the OKW had taken all the measures available to it for securing the supply traffic between Italy and North Africa. The commitment of the Second Air Force and increased employment of light ships, it was explained, was expected gradually to improve the supply situation. Only after the command of the sea and of the air in the Central Mediterranean had been restored to the Axis, Rintelen was told, could the French be approached regarding the use of Bizerte. A premature demand for the harbor, Keitel said, might lead to English intervention against North Africa without there being adequate French defensive forces on hand or possibilities of their support by the Axis. See, further, document No. 557.

## No. 533

261/170408

*The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

HELSINKI, December 2, 1941—5:25 p. m.

TOP SECRET

Received December 2—7:00 p. m.

No. 1430 of December 2

With reference to my telegram No. 1420.<sup>1</sup>

1) The discussions regarding the English ultimatum<sup>2</sup> have been continued in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Cabinet. Tanner represented the standpoint that the counterquestions in regard to Hangö, the Rybachi Peninsula, and the further conduct of the Soviets would have to be brought out in the reply. The majority, however, were opposed to this. The present draft refers to the last Finnish answers to England and America<sup>3</sup> and declares at the end that England has no political or moral right to declare war on Finland.

2) The Foreign Minister told me that there was no doubt that the answer to England would be negative but that in view of the feeling among the Finnish people it would be as mild in its formulation as possible.<sup>4</sup>

3) Up to now the American Minister has undertaken no démarche in support of the English ultimatum.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup>In this telegram of Dec. 1 (261/170403) Blücher reported that some of the nervous members of the Cabinet were worried over the prospect of an English declaration of war, arguing that the Finnish army for the next few months would not be in condition for a great offensive. A draft reply had been composed in the Finnish Foreign Ministry but had been rejected by the Foreign Minister who feared it would be interpreted in the world press as if Finland sued for a separate peace.

<sup>2</sup>In telegram No. 1409 of Nov. 29 (261/170387) Blücher reported that on Witting's return to Helsinki he was met with the news of a communication from the English Government in the form of an ultimatum.

<sup>3</sup>In telegram No. 1414 of the same day (261/170388-89) Blücher forwarded the text in English of the note presented by the American Legation to the Finnish Government containing the communication from the British Government which concluded:

"His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in these circumstances finds it necessary to inform the Finnish Government that unless by December 5th the Finnish Government ceases military operations and further withdraws from all active participation in hostilities, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will have no choice but to declare the existence of a state of war between the two countries."

<sup>4</sup>*Cf. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, vol. I, pp. 108-109.*

<sup>5</sup>See document No. 461 and footnotes 1 and 2.

<sup>6</sup>See document No. 540 and footnote 5.

<sup>7</sup>On Dec. 8 in telegram No. 1476 (205/143124) Blücher reported having learned that the American Under Secretary of State had on the previous afternoon told Procopé that Finland's fate would be decided if she were to make further agreements with Germany which was Germany's intention. Yet Welles stated that Finland could still save herself if she would quickly conclude operations and make peace with Russia. In that case, he said, England would be ready to change her attitude completely.

In telegram 1478 of Dec. 8 (261/170428) Blücher reported that Washington had brought very strong pressure on Finland in the days preceding the English declaration of war.

4) Finland has information that according to the views of the American State Department the leading Finnish circles are divided on the question of further conduct of the war.<sup>6</sup>

5) The Hungarians have told the Finns that Hungary will leave the English ultimatum unanswered. The Rumanians have explained that Rumania will reply that there is nothing further to be done in the matter.<sup>7</sup>

BLÜCHER

<sup>6</sup>*Cf. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, vol. I, pp. 110-111.*

<sup>7</sup>In telegram No. 3815 of Nov. 4 (260/170296-97) Thomsen had reported from Washington that it was officially announced in London that the English Government was actively discussing with the dominions and with the United States the Russian demand for an English declaration of war on Finland, Hungary, and Rumania.

*Cf. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, vol. I, p. 108.*

## No. 534

261/170409-10

*The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 1432 of December 2

HELSINKI, December 2, 1941—7:45 p. m.

Received December 2—8:30 p. m.

On the basis of information from Regierungsrat Riekki, the Foreign Minister took up with me the matter of Finnish volunteers:<sup>1</sup>

1. The volunteers had been told a month and a half ago that their training was completed and they would now go to the front. Their departure, however, had been continually postponed. They want to get out now.

2. At the time a considerable number of Finnish officers and non-commissioned officers had volunteered, because the impression had existed that volunteer formations were to have Finnish officers and non-commissioned officers in part. Now, however, a large number of the officers were SS officers. The volunteers wanted more Finnish officers and non-commissioned officers.

3. Four hundred of the volunteers had been ordered to the Viking Division<sup>2</sup> with the justification that they should obtain war experience there and then return to the Volunteer Battalion to disseminate it. Forty of them had been killed in action, 100 wounded. The remainder now wished to return to the Battalion.

<sup>1</sup>In telegrams No. 219 of Apr. 4 (260/169932-33) and No. 240 of Apr. 16 (260/169946-47) Blücher reported about the organization of Finnish volunteer units in the German Army.

<sup>2</sup>The *Wiking* Division was the 5th S.S. Panzer Division, organized in January 1940 as a Motorized Division comprising the Germanla Regiment of the SS *Verfügungsddivision* and two regiments of Scandinavian, Dutch, and Flemish volunteers.

The Foreign Minister added that it was desirable that the employment of the volunteers should not cause dissatisfaction among their ranks but create a favorable effect like the sharpshooter movement during the World War.<sup>3</sup>

I should like to note that everything that happens in the volunteer unit influences the morale in the country accordingly. There exists a political interest in sealing off in time the source of dissatisfaction, if it is justified.

Please wire instruction.<sup>4</sup>

BLÜCHER

<sup>3</sup> Finnish volunteers served on the German side during the war in so-called Jaeger battalions.

<sup>4</sup> No reply to this telegram has been found.

### No. 535

8589/E603087-88

#### *Führer's Directive*

CHEFSACHE

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, December 2, 1941.

TOP SECRET MILITARY

The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht  
OKW/WFSt/Abt. L (I Op.) No. 441980/41 g.Kdos.

By officer only

#### DIRECTIVE No. 38

1. To provide a basis for securing and extending our position in the Mediterranean and with a view to establishing a *center of strength of the Axis Powers in the central Mediterranean*, I herewith, after consulting with the Duce, order the transfer to southern Italy and North Africa of contingents of the Luftwaffe units released in the east, in the strength of one air corps, together with the requisite air defense elements.

Apart from its immediate effect upon the conduct of operations in the Mediterranean and in North Africa, the object sought by this movement is to exert a potent influence on the entire course of future developments in the Mediterranean theater.

2. I confer command over all the forces to be committed in execution of this mission to Field Marshal Kesselring, whom I designate at the same time as Commander in Chief, South [*Oberbefehlshaber Süd*].

His *missions* are:

To gain air and sea supremacy in the area between southern Italy and North Africa with a view to establishing secure communications

with Libya and Cyrenaica, and including specifically the neutralization of Malta.

To cooperate with the German and allied forces committed in North Africa.

To interdict enemy traffic through the Mediterranean and British supply movements to Tobruk and Malta, in close cooperation with the German and Italian naval forces available for that purpose.

3. The *Commander in Chief, South* is subordinate to the Duce and receives through the Comando Supremo the Duce's general directives on the over-all missions. In all matters immediately pertaining to the Luftwaffe, the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe will communicate with the Commander in Chief, South directly, keeping the High Command of the Wehrmacht informed when questions of basic importance are involved.

4. The *Commander in Chief, South* will have under command:

All Luftwaffe forces committed in the Mediterranean and in North Africa;

The Italian air force and antiaircraft units made available by the Italian Armed Forces for the execution of his missions.

5. The German *naval forces* employed in the central Mediterranean remain under control of the Commander in Chief of the Navy.

The Commander in Chief, South is authorized, *in execution of the missions assigned to him*, to issue directives for the German Admiral with the High Command of the Italian Navy<sup>1</sup> and also, if the need arises, to the Navy Group, South (for the eastern Mediterranean). Orders for action are to be issued by the Navy Headquarters in agreement with the Commander in Chief, South.

The wishes of the Commander in Chief, South for coordination of joint action with the *allied* naval forces are to be addressed exclusively to the German Admiral with the High Command of the Italian Navy.

6. The missions of the Wehrmacht Commander, Southeast<sup>2</sup> and of the German General with the Headquarters of the Italian Armed Forces<sup>3</sup> remain unchanged.

ADOLF HITLER

<sup>1</sup> Eberhard Weichold.

<sup>2</sup> Field Marshal List. See vol. XII of this series, document No. 609 and document No. 326 in this volume.

<sup>3</sup> General Eano von Rintelen.



## No. 536

83/61453-54

*Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

U. St.S. Pol. No. 1013

BERLIN, December 2, 1941.

BRIEF FOR TODAY'S VISIT OF GAYLANI WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER<sup>1</sup>

The former Iraq Minister President Rashid Ali al Gaylani called on me today. It appeared that he has the following principal wishes:

1. He would like to be recognized by us as Minister President and Foreign Minister of Iraq at once. He does not attach any importance to having this recognition made public at this time.

It may well be possible to comply with this wish. The only objection would be that we thereby imitate the English system of the governments in exile. This objection, however, could perhaps be put aside in view of the great importance which Gaylani attaches precisely to this point. A definite promise ought to be given to Gaylani certainly only after accord with Italy has been established.<sup>2</sup>

2. Gaylani would like to conclude a treaty with us providing for armed assistance, economic support, participation in the conclusion of peace, accession to the Tripartite Pact, and a series of similar items which partly can be fulfilled and partly are incapable of fulfillment. It is his wish that this treaty be concluded not only with regard to Iraq but also with regard to Syria and Lebanon as well as Palestine and Transjordan.<sup>3</sup> He is also prepared, however, to limit himself to a German-Iraq treaty. The negotiations concerning such a treaty would continue the negotiations begun by Minister Grobba in Bagh-

<sup>1</sup>Therapia telegram No. 126 of Oct. 7 (794/273202) had reported that the Turkish Government refused to issue an exit visa for Gaylani.

Ankara's telegram No. 1472 of Nov. 17 (83/61953) reported that arrangements were secretly being worked out by the Reich Foreign Ministry and the Reich Main Security Office to get Gaylani out of Turkey by plane.

Telegram No. 330 of Nov. 21 from Istanbul (83/61955) stated that Gaylani would arrive that afternoon in Berlin but that his arrival was to be kept secret until Nov. 25 after which "the story is to be circulated that he succeeded by himself in escaping to Bulgaria via the Black Sea."

According to Grobba's memorandum of Dec. 17 (F7/0291-82) the reception of Gaylani by Ribbentrop was not until Dec. 16.

<sup>2</sup>In a letter of Dec. 19 (83/61455) which he handed to Gaylani on Dec. 22, Ribbentrop expressed the hope that Gaylani would soon be the Minister President and Head of Government of a liberated Iraq. Ribbentrop also stated on this occasion that the German Government was prepared to discuss with Gaylani conditions of future cooperation between Germany and Iraq even at this time.

A memorandum by Woermann of Dec. 22 (83/61975) records that the agreement of the Italian Government had been obtained to the text of the letter.

<sup>3</sup>Gaylani's preliminary draft of such a treaty (71/50972-76) comprised 13 numbered paragraphs.

A memorandum of Dec. 2 by Grobba (71/50971) records that he submitted the draft to Weizsäcker although he found it "technically very clumsy" and in need of complete revision.

dad in the past. The Foreign Minister has approved earlier that such negotiations be held and be conducted by Minister Grobba.

3. In the question of an announcement in the press about Gaylani's presence in Germany, Gaylani wishes to be guided entirely by Germany's wishes. The moment for this presumably has now arrived.

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister through the State Secretary.<sup>4</sup>

WOERMANN

<sup>4</sup>Marginal note in Weizsäcker's handwriting: "Gaylani made quite similar statements to me today."

## No. 537

2281/482751-57

*The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

ROME, December 3, 1941—2:25 p. m.

TOP SECRET

MOST URGENT

No. 3151 of December 3

For the Foreign Minister personally.

Count Ciano just received me at 12:30 p. m. and informed me as follows:

At 11:30 a. m., the Duce, in his presence, had received the Japanese Ambassador<sup>1</sup> who had made the following communication to him:

"At the instruction of my Government<sup>2</sup> I have the honor to inform you of the progress of the Japanese-American conversations which have been under way since the middle of last April. The conversations have been in progress for about 6 months, during which time the Japanese Government has always carefully observed the Tripartite Pact, which has become the basis for our unchangeable national policy, and has made it its task to approach the question of settling Japanese-American relations in the spirit and according to the stipulations of the Tripartite Pact, making a resolute effort to prevent the entry of America into the European war.

"Accordingly the present Government has continued the conversations on the basis of justice, thereby preserving the dignity and the existence of our Empire. Besides certain difficulties, in the course of which there was also an acute difference of opinion regarding the question of the withdrawal of the Japanese troops from China and

<sup>1</sup>Zenbei Horikiri.

<sup>2</sup>Cf. *Pearl Harbor Attack*: Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 79th Cong., 1st sess., pt. 12, pp. 204-206.

from French Indochina, a basic obstacle—if one considers the experience of the past—is the fundamental and traditional position of the United States in dealing with international questions. This view emerged clearly from the Anglo-American conversations in the Atlantic.<sup>3</sup> In other words: America's true intention is to frustrate the establishment of the new order in Asia and in Europe—which is being promoted by Japan, Italy and Germany and which is the purpose of the Tripartite Pact—and to place obstacles in its way; and they dare to say that friendly relations between Japan and America are impossible as long as Japan maintains the alliance with Italy and Germany. With this in view it was proposed to ask Japan to abandon the Tripartite Pact. Since this became clear in the last phase these last few days the Japanese Government is compelled to realize that further conversations are of no use.

"The proposal which the American Government advanced on November 26<sup>4</sup> revealed its attitude still more clearly, and in particular it advanced the provision that it should be agreed that the basic purpose of this agreement was not contradictory to any existing agreement between one of the two Governments and a third state for maintaining the peace in the entire sphere of the Pacific.<sup>5</sup>

"This had the purpose, in accordance with their intention, of committing us in regard to the interpretation of the obligations imposed on us by the Tripartite Pact and to force Japan to refrain from accepting the support of Italy and Germany if America should enter the European war.

"This provision alone, without speaking of other questions, indicates to the Japanese Government that the American proposal cannot be taken as the basis for conversations.

"Moreover, it is clear that in the course of the conversations the American Government frequently negotiated with Great Britain, Australia, Holland and China. From this one can be certain that the American Government, like the countries mentioned above, regards Japan with the same hostility with which it regards Italy and Germany."

The Ambassador added to these statements that the outbreak of a conflict of Japan with the United States and thus also with Great Britain was now to be regarded as possible and imminent. On the basis of the foregoing statements the Japanese Government, referring to the relevant clause of the Tripartite Pact, requests that the Italian declaration of war follow immediately. It requests further that an agreement be signed on the basis of which the two Governments obligate themselves not to conclude either an armistice or a separate peace with the United States and likewise, not with the Brit-

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 209, footnote 2.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 524, footnote 3.

<sup>5</sup> For the actual text of that part of the American proposal which is apparently referred to, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941*, vol. II, p. 770.

ish Empire. The Ambassador added that a similar request was simultaneously being addressed the Reich Government.<sup>6</sup>

The Duce replied to the Ambassador that the Japanese communication did not surprise him in any way, as he had carefully followed the progress of the Japanese-American conversations conducted through Admiral Nomura and Ambassador Kurusu. The Italian Ambassador in Washington,<sup>7</sup> who had followed the conversations on the spot, had confirmed him in his conviction that as a result of the intransigent attitude of the United States and Roosevelt's determination to unleash the war, the negotiations could not come to a good conclusion. Roosevelt could not recognize Japan's political principles in so far as that country made it its task to establish a new order in Asia and had already laid the foundations for this new order, whereas the American plutocracy was striving to regard Asia as its own area of exploitation.

The Duce, who knew the pride of the Japanese people, had always been convinced that all of the attempts of the United States to separate Japan from the powers of the Tripartite Pact would remain fruitless. Having said this beforehand the Duce had stated: Italy will do everything to contribute militarily to the success of that struggle which Japan is preparing to begin against the United States and the British Empire, and she will do this particularly by tying down the largest possible number of British naval units in the Medi-

<sup>6</sup> No documents concerning this parallel Japanese démarche in Berlin have been found in German Foreign Ministry files. This gap in the documentation can partly be filled, however, from testimony and evidence submitted to the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and from intercepted Japanese telegrams printed in the record of the hearings before the Joint Congressional Committee investigating the attack on Pearl Harbor.

In his testimony given at the proceedings (International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Proceedings, pp. 34033-35) Oshima declared that he made his démarche with Ribbentrop on Dec. 2, thus correcting the date of his démarche given as Dec. 1 in his telegram to Tokyo (International Military Tribunal for the Far East, exhibit 605, transcript pp. 6654-56).

In his testimony at the proceedings Oshima stated that Ribbentrop asked him whether there would be a war with the United States. The telegram to Tokyo does not report such an inquiry by Ribbentrop while mentioning that Gaus, who was also present, asked whether the obligation regarding participation in the war against the United States was to be mutual, a question which Oshima answered in the affirmative. The telegram to Tokyo also reports that Oshima expressed the view that a joint declaration by Japan, Germany, and Italy would be more effective politically than a Japanese-German and a Japanese-Italian declaration issued separately.

The two accounts of Oshima agree in that Ribbentrop stated that, before giving a reply, he would have to consult Hitler who was at the front and with whom he could not get in touch at the moment.

In a subsequent meeting in the afternoon of Dec. 3 Ribbentrop again told Oshima that he had been unable to get in touch with Hitler but that he would try to reach him at headquarters the next day. While he himself was in agreement with the Japanese proposal and believed that Hitler would be, too, no official reply could be made until Hitler had given his approval (*Pearl Harbor Attack*, pt. 2, p. 4200). See further, document No. 548.

<sup>7</sup> *Ascanio del principi Colonna*.

terreanean. At present about one third of the English naval forces were being tied down in the Mediterranean by the Italian naval units, and the organization of a bloc of Italian-German air and naval forces was in progress which would force the English to increase their naval forces in this sector even more.

The Duce also says that he is willing to sign the agreement precluding the conclusion of an armistice or a separate peace. But regarding this point as well as regarding the declaration of war he intended to consult with the Reich Government and bring his own actions into harmony with those of the latter. Nevertheless, he had added that, as far as Italy was concerned, he had no objection to a declaration of war on the United States, particularly as that country was actually in conflict with Italy even at this time; indeed, in the present battle in the Marmarica a number of American officers who were with the British troops had been taken prisoner.

Count Ciano asked me to pass on at once to Berlin the foregoing communications, which I am sending in translation on the basis of an Italian memorandum given me,<sup>8</sup> and to request your position both on the question of the declaration of war and of the pact requested by Japan.

I shall transmit with the next telegram<sup>9</sup> the text of the proposal for such an agreement handed the Duce by the Japanese Ambassador here.<sup>10</sup>

MACKENSEN

<sup>8</sup> Not found in German Foreign Ministry files. Apparently this is the memorandum printed in Galeazzo Ciano, *L'Europa verso la catastrofe*, pp. 694-697; see also *The Ciano Diaries*, entry for Dec. 3, 1941.

<sup>9</sup> No. 3152 of Dec. 3 (2281/482758). The substance of the Japanese proposal which is in French in the original reads as follows:

"The two Governments agree not to conclude any armistice or peace either with the United States of America or with the British Empire, their common enemies, without complete agreement between themselves."

For a complete text of the Japanese draft proposed, see Galeazzo Ciano, *L'Europa verso la catastrofe*, p. 696, footnote 1.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. the Japanese Ambassador's account of this démarche printed in *Pearl Harbor Attack*, pt. 12, pp. 228-229.

No. 538

4927/E258372-79

*The Office of the Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry With the Military Commander in Serbia to the Foreign Ministry*

CONFIDENTIAL

Pol. S No. 2

Subject: The situation in Serbia.

- I. Military
- II. Administrative
- III. Prospects

BELGRADE, December 3, 1941.

Pol. IV 6459 g.

## I

The successful conclusion of the operations against the communist bands operating in the areas of Čačak and Užice, which had their main bases in these cities, represents an important stage in the suppression of the insurrection in Serbia. After the Plenipotentiary Commanding General,<sup>1</sup> as his first action after assuming command, had deprived the rebels of an important supply base by mopping up the area around Šabac in the Sava-Drina bend and had further driven them out of the Čer mountains, the capture of Užice is a new heavy blow that has fallen on the actual base of the communist resistance. The victory, which cost the enemy more than 1,500 dead, was bought with very few casualties of our own. The operations are being continued successfully toward the south. Today our troops have already reached Raška and are advancing on Novi Pazar, so that this area of unrest, too, is approaching pacification. The impression made by these successes is strong all over the country. It would be greater still if a considerable portion of the communist bands had not slipped out of the threatened encirclement and escaped to Croatia. The open border toward Croatia is one of the greatest difficulties with which the fight against the rebellion in the Serbian area has to cope. Full pacification is possible here only if quiet is restored everywhere in Croatia, too, and the border between the two countries is closed off.

While the Plenipotentiary Commanding General was carrying out the operations in the west, Minister President Nedić, in full accord with him, contributed very essentially with the Serbian gendarmerie and the volunteers in numerous small engagements and mopping-up actions to putting down the uprising in central Serbia and in the northeastern part of the country. A rough mopping-up operation was carried out in these areas, too. The Serbian auxiliary forces have shown themselves to be exceedingly useful and skillful in this respect and have proved their reliability. What they achieved is to be appreciated all the more since in numbers and in their armament they cannot, of course, be compared with German troops, and they were often inferior in this respect even to the rebels. The bloody losses which they have so far inflicted upon the rebels are probably about as large as those the German troops have inflicted upon them. On the other hand the losses of the Serbian gendarmerie and volunteers are considerably larger than the German losses.

Although according to the foregoing the military situation in Serbia can be termed satisfactory at the present time, the country is still far from any real pacification. Up till now only the large com-

<sup>1</sup> General Franz Böhme; see document No. 326.

In November 1941 General Paul Bader succeeded Böhme.

munist bands have been defeated and the main communist bases taken. However, one cannot speak of an annihilation of the enemy. In many places there are still small bands roving about, attacking villages and isolated police units and interfering with the traffic on the roads and railroads. Furthermore there exists in the person of Colonel Draža Mihailović a rallying point for all insurgents with nationalist leanings. This person, who is said to have his headquarters in the mountains between Čačak and Valjevo in the village of Ravna Gora, has not many followers any longer, but should nevertheless not be underestimated, since many nationalistically minded Serbs sympathize with him. Whereas the communist bands get their instructions from Moscow, with which they are in connection not only by radio but also by courier via Bulgaria—probably through the Soviet Legation in Sofia—Colonel Mihailović is the exponent of King Peter and the Simović Government in London and is being supported particularly by the radio there and in the one of Boston. True, at the present moment he does not present any acute danger, particularly as he has become an enemy of the communists, with whom he at first cooperated, and is indeed fighting them. In the long run, however, he might become dangerous.

## II

It is evident from what has been said that thorough measures are still needed in order really to pacify Serbia. These measures, to be sure, will have to be more in the sphere of the police than in the military field. In particular it is necessary to establish again a disciplined administration all over the country and to comb through systematically, thoroughly, and continuously the areas which had been roughly cleaned up in order to remove all undesirable elements and force the surrender of arms. What is necessary is demonstrated by the example of the city of Belgrade, where an energetic police chief has seen to it that so far tranquillity has never been seriously disturbed, although at any other time Belgrade has been the focus of the unrest in the country, and although the population is freezing and starving. Here, however, it has been possible to maintain tranquillity and order through disarmament of the inhabitants, constantly repeated searches for communists, severe actions against Jews, Freemasons and anti-German elements from the old political parties of Yugoslavia and through the arrest of numerous hostages. Similar measures are necessary for the whole country so as to put through a real pacification and to prevent the insurrection from breaking out anew in the spring. Certainly much has already been done in this respect, as is indicated alone by the number of executions which have probably exceeded 20,000 at the present time. But there is still much to be done.

The question is who is to do it, Germans or Serbs. It would be in the interest of the Reich to leave the carrying out of the necessary operations largely to the Serbs, in order to save her own forces. A prerequisite for this is that one trust them sufficiently. In this respect it can be said today after General Nedić has been Minister President for three months that so far he has justified the trust placed in him. Called upon at the most difficult time, he has proved to be resolute and of firm character in carrying out the thankless task once he undertook it. Unperturbed by all the hostility, unshaken by the abuse that comes from London, this old soldier goes his difficult way. Today he is so much identified with Germany in the eyes of the Serbian people that it is hardly possible for him any more to abandon this line. He has shed Serbian blood in fratricidal struggle, and with this his position is fixed once and for all. In his government there are men such as Minister of the Interior Ačimović, who is an experienced police expert and for many years has taken entirely the German line; also Minister of Economics Olčan, a follower of Dr. Ljotić, who as minister has himself often fought successfully at the head of volunteer units against the communist bands; and Minister of Education Professor Jonić, who through the new university law has made an important contribution to the clean-up of academic life in Serbia which had been infected for a long time. Furthermore the Nedić Government can rely upon the support of the Chetnik leader Pećanac, who has led a large number of these volunteers to the cause of tranquillity and order. Also to be mentioned, and not in the last place either, is Dr. Ljotić, leader of the "Zbor" movement, who has not joined the government himself, to be sure, because he is evidently keeping himself in reserve for a later time, but who has made available a number of his followers for important ministerial posts and has placed his authority in the scales in favor of General Nedić. Dr. Ljotić, the old enemy of the communists, Freemasons and Jews in Serbia, represents a moral force which must not be underestimated. He is therefore particularly valuable to the Nedić Government, to which he has also made available numerous volunteers from his movement.

## III

If one surveys all of these forces one can say without exaggeration that they doubtless represent the best that this country possesses in the way of men in public life. They are the nucleus for the establishment of a new Serbian nation that has learned from the mistakes of the past and seeks its course in the direction which the German Reich has indicated. To be sure, the good elements are still weak in this country, and it would be desirable to reinforce them from the ranks of those who are at present sitting idle in German prisoner of war camps. There are still numerous men there who are indispen-

sable for the work of reconstruction here. The problem is simply to choose the right ones.

Although it is hardly possible today to predict how things will develop here in Serbia, one can nevertheless determine that a beginning has been made in the right direction. The credit for this belongs to a large extent to Minister President Nedić, and one can therefore justify giving him the trust which he needs in order to continue his work successfully. It is self-evident that such trust must not be blind and that under the existing war conditions a German force capable of putting down at once any new major attempt at insurrection must remain in such a restless country as is Serbia.<sup>2</sup>

FEINE

<sup>2</sup> Copies of this dispatch were sent on Jan. 12, 1942, for purposes of information to the Embassy in Italy, to the Legations in Hungary, Rumania, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Croatia and to the Reich Plenipotentiary in Athens.

### No. 539

64/44716-17

*The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

No. 4242 of December 3 WASHINGTON, December 4, 1941—2:00 a. m.  
Received December 4—2:45 p. m.

At a time when practically the entire American press points out in alarmist articles every day that the issue of war or peace between America and Japan is on the knife's edge, it is worth while by contrast to recapitulate briefly once more the considerations arguing against an American-Japanese war. These considerations have received recognition in important quarters; similarly, it is known that Japan has no intention of attacking the United States. The continuing press campaign is nevertheless being directed from above with the two familiar considerations in view, to gain time for one's own preparations and to intimidate Japan.

1. The outbreak of a war between America and Japan would in all probability also mean war between America and Germany. The country is unprepared for such a two-front war, Mr. Knox's claim to the contrary notwithstanding.

2. An American-Japanese war at the present time would be hard to take for England and Russia from the standpoint of their material situation. It would mean a drastic cut in lend-lease aid to both nations as a result of the American requirements for carrying on the war in the widest sense; the closure of the port of Vladivostok to American supplies; and likewise as a result of disruption of the ship-

ping route to the Persian Gulf. Over against these facts, which are of vital importance especially to English war operations, the psychological value of America's entry into the war must take second place.

3. A war with Japan, contrary to the views of frivolous American "experts", is no walk-over. It might drag on indecisively for years, especially if America has to fight simultaneously in the Atlantic. The supply of raw materials essential for armaments, without which America's industry and economy cannot live and for which ersatz could not be developed for several years, would be materially handicapped or perhaps even endangered.

4. The attitude of the Latin American countries, in the event of the outbreak of an American-Japanese war, is viewed here as being uncertain.

It is not believed that in order to please America these countries would be readily inclined to break off their relations with Japan.

THOMSEN

### No. 540

261/170416

*The Minister in Finland to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 1450 of December 4

HELSINKI, December 4, 1941—2:05 p. m.

Received December 4—2:45 p. m.

1) Day before yesterday and yesterday the Foreign Minister took up the English ultimatum<sup>1</sup> with the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Cabinet<sup>2</sup> and with the Foreign Affairs Committee of Parliament. With both bodies he took as his point of departure a report on his trip to Berlin<sup>3</sup> which quickly created a good atmosphere. Following this he discussed the Finnish reply to England. The reply was approved unanimously.

The Foreign Minister told me that he had never had so good a hearing and that he had never seen the Parliament so unanimous.

2) According to the information of the Foreign Minister the reply is very polite in order to take account of feeling in the country and in order later to be able to place the blame for a declaration of war on England alone.<sup>4</sup> It takes over a passage from Mannerheim's order

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 533 and footnote 2.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 533.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 507.

<sup>4</sup> In telegram No. 1480 of Dec. 5 (261/170424) Blücher reported that Witting, in giving him the text of the Finnish reply, let it appear that he would prefer it if England refrained from a declaration of war.

of the day of November 30 that the Finnish Army does not have much remaining in order to achieve its strategic aim.

The Foreign Minister was rather undecided toward us whether the passage in the order of the day, which was composed during his absence, was very happily phrased. He felt, however, that after it had found acceptance in the order of the day it could scarcely fail in the reply.

The reply will possibly be handed to the American Minister this evening<sup>5</sup> and then given to me tomorrow morning.<sup>6</sup> Please do not urge that it be given to us earlier because the Foreign Minister wishes to protect himself against renewal of the assertion that the reply was not composed in Helsinki but in Berlin.<sup>7</sup>

BLÜCHER

<sup>5</sup> The American Legation received a note comprising the Finnish reply to the British Government at 6:00 p. m., Dec. 4. See *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. 1, pp. 113-114.

<sup>6</sup> In telegram No. 1459 of Dec. 5 (261/170422-23) Blücher reported the text of the note.

<sup>7</sup> In telegram No. 1467 of Dec. 6 (261/170426) Blücher reported that the English declaration of war on Finland had been received with the state of war beginning at 12:01, Dec. 7.

Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. 1, pp. 114-115.

In telegram No. 1475 of Dec. 8 (261/170427) Blücher reported that the Finnish people accepted the English declaration of war with a feeling of regret, yet with equanimity and determination. For several days they had been prepared by the English radio for the declaration but this had now been overshadowed by developments in the Far East.

## No. 541

64/44723-24

*The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT WASHINGTON, December 4, 1941—4:05 p. m.  
No. 4250 of December 4 Received December 5—2:45 a. m.

The publication on December 4 in the *Chicago Tribune* and the leading isolationist Washington newspaper, the *Times Herald*, of the secret report of the American High Command to the President about the preparations and prospects for the defeat of Germany and her allies, is causing a sensation here.

This secret report is doubtlessly an authentic war plan drawn up at Roosevelt's request.<sup>1</sup> It probably served as the reason for the special Cabinet meeting about which I reported in my No. 3545, of October 14.<sup>2</sup>

The report confirms in its essentials the known fact that a full commitment of American combat power is not to be expected before July 1943.

The view constantly put forth by Lindbergh, Hoover,<sup>3</sup> and the other leaders of the opposition is now also corroborated by the American High Command; namely that Germany can be conquered neither by dollars, American bombers, nor by American subversive propaganda, but at the most only by an American expeditionary force of several million men; and that activating it, arming and transporting it, would require enormous sums of money and would be attended by a serious shock to the American economy.

The Anglo-American thesis that a war of starvation against Germany would suffice, is refuted, and the propaganda theme that Roosevelt merely wanted to do away with the "Nazi regime" in order to bestow upon the German people the blessings of the Four Freedoms is demolished.

Military measures against Japan, in the presentation of the High Command, would be of a defensive character. Japanese policy is thus justified in concluding that America will, in the event of a two-ocean war, make its main offensive effort in the direction of Europe and Africa.

The elimination of the Soviet Union as a fighting power by the summer of 1942 at the latest and the collapse of the British Empire are soberly included in the calculations of the American General Staff so that the publication of the document will hardly cause any special rejoicing among the allies. To be sure, the High Command characterizes the continued preservation of the British Empire as one of America's most important war aims, an admission which the non-interventionist opposition will not fail to note.<sup>4</sup>

THOMSEN

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Mark Skinner Watson, *Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations in the series United States Army in World War II: The War Department* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. 358-360.

<sup>2</sup> This telegram (1857/422151-52) reported about a Cabinet meeting on Oct. 10 allegedly convoked by Roosevelt to deal with an inquiry from Churchill on "whether the U.S.A. would be prepared to support militarily an invasion of the continent especially by relieving the English fleet operating in the Atlantic."

<sup>3</sup> Herbert Clark Hoover, President of the United States, 1929-1933.

<sup>4</sup> A somewhat more detailed account of this matter was given by the Military Attaché in telegram No. 4260 of Dec. 4 (64/44725-27).

## No. 542

535/240107-08

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Ministry*

BERLIN, December 4, 1941.  
zu Pol. III 2415.<sup>1</sup>

With reference to St.S. No. 755 of November 11<sup>2</sup> and memorandum Pol. III 2368 of November 28.<sup>3</sup>

The competent official in the Eastern Ministry,<sup>4</sup> Herr Dudzus, who has no deputy, has been absent for several days. However, the following could be ascertained from Herr Schütte (Eastern Ministry) and Herr Frank (Dienststelle Rosenberg), who works together with Herr Dudzus in church matters:

1. The actual reason for the denial to Catholic priests of permission to enter into the formerly Russian area is the circumstance that the Catholics in working in the formerly Russian area should not consider it as new territory.

2. According to a general directive the entry into the formerly Russian area is prohibited. If nevertheless a few Orthodox priests have returned or will still return to this area, these are exceptional cases that cannot provide any claim as precedents.

3. In the formerly Russian area there is a very great scarcity of Orthodox priests. On the other hand there are relatively a great many Catholic priests, especially in Lithuania, available for taking care of the Roman Catholic population. If therefore a few Orthodox priests are permitted to enter into formerly Russian areas this was objectively quite justified. Furthermore there were no longer any Catholics in the old Soviet areas.

4. Herr Frank pointed out that Orthodox and Catholic priests had been able for a time to enter the occupied Russian area with the permission of Wehrmacht authorities who had, however, not been competent in this matter. At the instruction of the Eastern Ministry these priests had been again expelled from these areas.

<sup>1</sup> Pol. III 2415: Not found.

<sup>2</sup> In this memorandum (535/240099) Weizsäcker recorded a visit of the Nuncio who stated that he had learned that some 20 Orthodox priests had been admitted into occupied eastern territory but that about that same number of Catholic priests of Latvia and Lithuania had been refused permission to return to the Russian area.

<sup>3</sup> In this memorandum (535/240104-105) Haidlen recorded that according to the competent official in the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, there existed a different policy for the return of Catholic and Orthodox priests. This was necessary, it was recorded, "in the interest of the general peace."

<sup>4</sup> Eastern Ministry (Ostministerium) a shortened form for the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories. See document No. 119.

5. Herr Frank stated that he would see that the question of admission of Orthodox priests into the eastern area would be reviewed by the Eastern Ministry.

The question of the reunification of the Eastern Church with Rome or rather the regaining of the Orthodox Catholics for the Roman Church has for centuries been one of the most important questions the solution of which has occupied Vatican policy. The Nuncio will for this reason probably give the present matter his special attention. It is therefore advisable not to let the Nuncio see the real reason mentioned under (1), but to inform him in the sense of the statements made under (2) to (4). Furthermore it would probably be well to tell the Nuncio that the inquiries about the matter have not yet been concluded.

Submitted herewith to the State Secretary through the Dirigent of the Political Department and the Under State Secretary.

FISCHER

## No. 543

2281/482759-60

*Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Italy*

ROME, December 4, 1941.

During my visit today with Marchese d'Ajeta<sup>1</sup> he brought up the Japanese Ambassador's démarche with the Duce yesterday,<sup>2</sup> and informed me that according to his information they intended in Berlin first to review very carefully the reply to be made to Japan. As Anfuso, whom I met later, told me, a telegram from Alfieri was received here according to which the German Government was of the opinion that a very grave reply was involved which one first had thoroughly to consider.<sup>3</sup> Marchese d'Ajeta said further that the Japanese Government, which had so far not yet been handed an ultimatum by the American side, first intended to obtain the firm promise of Germany and Italy in order thereby to get carte blanche, so to speak, for its actions without having precisely defined how it visualized them. The suddenness of the Japanese step was all the more remarkable in that the Japanese Government had so far cautiously avoided informing the two Axis Powers about the course of the Japanese-American negotiations. In his opinion it was necessary to point out to Japan that she should not assume the war guilt

<sup>1</sup> Chef de Cabinet to Count Ciano.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 537.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 537, footnote 6. Cf. *The Ciano Diaries*, entry for Dec. 4, 1941.

by a declaration of war on America on her own initiative; rather, by a delaying policy on the part of Japan the American Government, for its part, should be forced to reveal its true colors. It seemed very doubtful to him whether America would take the initiative in declaring war on Japan if the Japanese reply to the American inquiry were delayed. He therefore understood very well that Germany wanted to examine her answer to Japan very carefully.

When I said, somewhat surprised, that the Italian Government after all, had given its full agreement with the Japanese procedure without further ado, Marchese d'Ajeta remarked smilingly that this had been Count Ciano's idea.

Marchese d'Ajeta added that opinions in the Palazzo Chigi were very divided as to whether it would be more advantageous for us if a Japanese-American conflict should now develop or whether the present latent situation should continue. There were many who believed that the outbreak of the conflict would force America to concentrate so much on the Pacific that it would slow down the supply of the European theaters of war with American war material. He personally was not of this opinion, however, but believed that America's entry into the war with Japan and subsequently with Germany and Italy would represent a substantial worsening of conditions in comparison with the present situation.

BISMARCK

No. 544

4865/E249680-82

*The High Commissioner of the Reich Government for the South  
Tirolese Resettlement to the Ambassador in Italy*

BOLZANO, December 4, 1941.

DEAR HERR AMBASSADOR: As you foresaw, Count Ciano, during his recent visit in Berlin, did not mention anything to the Reich Foreign Minister about an Italian wish regarding the accelerated resettlement of the optants from six specified communities of the Alto Adige.<sup>1</sup> M. Podestà, however, took up the matter again. At his suggestion it was made the subject of a conversation to which I also invited Dr. Luig<sup>2</sup> and Dr. Helm.<sup>3</sup> It developed that for technical reasons the emigra-

<sup>1</sup> For Ciano's visit to Germany see document No. 522.

<sup>2</sup> Dr. Wilhelm Luig, Leader of ADEuRSt (Amtliche Deutsche Ein- und Rückwandererestelle: Official German Agency for Immigrants and Repatriates) with its main office in Bolzano.

<sup>3</sup> Dr. Robert Helm, President of the German-Italian Commission for Evaluations, with its main commission in Bolzano.

tion of the optants can be carried out in the course of a few weeks in only two of the communities concerned. Signor Podestà finally obstinately insisted on the emigration of the optants from Vadena. He pointed out that only seven property owners there come into question for resettlement, and that the appraisal and emigration could proceed without further ado since the village 5 km. south of Bolzano lies on the snowless plain. Dr. Luig pointed out that the seven property owners in Vadena also have a contractual right to be placed as a group in the resettlement area. He offered, since the resettlement area is not yet known, to ask the seven property owners whether they will allow themselves to be settled voluntarily somewhere in Germany.

After the meeting Signor Podestà asked me for a private conversation. He told me that, as the Vadena case made particularly clear, the resettlement had arrived at a stalemate.<sup>4</sup> He emphasized that matters could not continue in this way; he asked me to bring to the attention of the Reich Foreign Minister at once, if possible, the necessity of now finally designating a settlement area in the Reich, where there was really room enough. The radical ethnic solution had to be carried out and taken in hand energetically in the entire treaty area, he continued, also with regard to the peasants.

I replied to Signor Podestà that his desire for the implementation of the radical ethnic solution fully coincided with my instructions and with my efforts; he was doubtless aware, however, I told him, that now when the war—e.g., also in North Africa—was still in full swing, the Reich Government could not designate the settlement area from one day to the next.

Herr Ambassador, I have been waiting for such language from Signor Podestà; what surprised me was that he let the cat out of the bag this soon. Whether the Italians really desire the radical ethnic solution as regards the peasants, too, need not be investigated in this context. What is significant is that Signor Podestà wants to push the German side to apply for a moratorium in regard to implementing the resettlement for the duration of the war. What he is doubtless interested in is in obtaining a temporary solution of the problem with favorable conditions for the Italians, which the Italians have already been on the point of proposing on their own initiative a number of times.

<sup>4</sup> In telegram No. 2641 of Oct. 21 (4865/E249617-19) Mackensen reported a discussion with Buffarini on the resettlement of the South Tirolese. He remarked that Mussolini had stated that the resettlement was 2 months behind the schedule suggested by Greiffelt.



It is not known whether the impulse to drive matters to a head originates with Signor Podestà alone. In any case I thought I should inform you about this outpost engagement.

I have informed Under State Secretary Woermann by means of an appropriate letter.<sup>5</sup>

With the best regards, etc.

MAYR-FALKENBERG

<sup>5</sup> In his reply of Dec. 8 (4865/E249682) Mackensen wondered how Woermann would respond. He felt that Mayr-Falkenberg and he should merely push the problem to the top authorities.

No. 545

32/25043-44

*The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT TOKYO, December 5, 1941—1:00 a. m., summer time.  
No. 2657 of December 5 Received December 6—12:55 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

I have learned from the Foreign Ministry strictly confidentially that the Japanese reply to the American note of November 26<sup>1</sup> is not supposed to have been sent yet. The reply is expected to be calm but firm in tone and to state that American principles are not applicable to the Far East. It is anticipated that the United States will then break off the negotiations. In reply to Secretary of State Hull's oral question to the two Japanese Ambassadors about the purpose of the Japanese preparations in Indochina they have been instructed to say that the Japanese Government is making preparations necessitated by Chinese troop concentrations in Yunnan. The preparations, moreover, do not go beyond the framework of the treaty arrangements with France,<sup>2</sup> as Vichy, too, has in the meantime stated. My informant remarks with reference to this that a limitation of the number of troops, namely to 25,000, applies only to northern Indochina, whereas no upper limit was fixed by treaty with regard to the south.

In the Foreign Ministry they are now trying to impress on us Japan's determination to take countermeasures against the encirclement. Thus the Italian Embassy, which apparently has not been

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 524, footnote 3.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 126, footnote 2 and document No. 146, footnote 2.

informed about the Imperial Conference at the end of last week,<sup>3</sup> concerning which Oshima has probably reported in Berlin,<sup>4</sup> has been given to understand that Italy must prepare to decide what other Power she wishes to take over the protection of her interests in the future.

A leading official of the Foreign Ministry said in a talk that Japan had always been of the opinion, as Matsuoka had stated earlier, that article 3 of the Tripartite Pact should be considered applicable to any conflict between one of the three Powers and the United States, unless one of those states should, for example, attack the American continent without cause. I took due note of this.

Shiratori<sup>5</sup> told me that in the leading circles of Japan they had come to the conclusion that Roosevelt now wants to enter the war by way of conflict in the Far East. At times the view is also expressed here that the United States is now certain of a coalition of the ABCD [American-British-Chinese-Dutch] States with Russia, which has been aimed at for over 10 years. Roosevelt therefore believes that the time has come for a showdown, as the adherence of these states in the future is uncertain.

In the Foreign Ministry thought is being given to the manner in which Japan should open a conflict which is inevitable. The inclination is to take the view that for domestic political reasons a declaration of a state of war or a declaration of war against the United States simultaneously with or after the beginning of hostilities is inevitable. In accordance with the directives for the guidance of my conversations received thus far I have taken the position that if a direct attack is avoided, the United States can be saddled with the (clear text missing) for this difficult decision about entering the war. In view of the important role which this point may play in the gradual deterioration of the situation and in the conflict between the groups I have often referred to, I should be grateful for early instructions.<sup>6</sup>

OTT

<sup>3</sup> Presumably a reference to the Imperial Conference of Dec. 1 which adopted the following resolution:

"Our negotiations with the United States regarding the execution of our national policy adopted on Nov. 5 have finally failed. Japan will declare war on the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands."

See International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Exhibit 588. For Prime Minister Tojo's and Foreign Minister Togo's statements at the Imperial Conference of Dec. 1 see *ibid.*, Exhibits Nos. 2954 and 2955. No record of any statement regarding this Imperial Conference made by Oshima has been found in German Foreign Ministry files.

<sup>4</sup> No record found.

<sup>5</sup> Toshio Shiratori, former Japanese Ambassador in Italy, adviser to the Japanese Foreign Ministry.

<sup>6</sup> See document No. 551.

## No. 546

2281/482769-71

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, December 5, 1941.

TOP SECRET

Received December 5—1:50 a. m.

No. 3295 of December 5

For the Ambassador personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 3151 of December 3.<sup>1</sup>

Please call on Count Ciano and the Duce at once and communicate to them the following draft text which we intend to hand the Japanese Ambassador here in reply to his *démarche*<sup>2</sup> as soon as the Duce's consent has been received here.

The text of the draft follows:

"In view of the increasingly obvious intention of the United States of America and England with all of the powers [*Machtmittel*] at their command to frustrate a just new order and to cut off the means of existence of the German, Italian, and Japanese people, the German Government, the Italian Government, and the Japanese Government have agreed on the following provisions for the defense against the dangers threatening the existence of their peoples:

## "Article 1.

"In case a state of war should arise between Japan and the United States of America, Germany and Italy for their part will also immediately consider themselves to be in a state of war with the United States and will carry on this war with all of the powers at their command.

"In case a state of war should develop between Germany and Italy on the one hand and the United States of America on the other, Japan for her part, too, will immediately consider herself to be in a state of war with the United States and will carry on this war with all of the powers at her command.

## "Article 2.

"Germany, Italy and Japan, in case of a war waged jointly by the three powers in accordance with article 1 of this Agreement against the United States of America undertake not to conclude any armistice or peace with the United States except in full mutual agreement.

"They assume the same obligation also in regard to an armistice or peace with England in case a state of war should arise between Japan and England.

## "Article 3.

"The three Governments are agreed that this agreement shall be kept most strictly secret. However, they will, in a form yet to be agreed upon, announce the obligation undertaken by them in article 2 as soon as Germany, Italy, and Japan find themselves jointly in a

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 537.<sup>2</sup> See document No. 537, footnote 6.

state of war with the United States of America or England or with both of these powers.

## "Article 4.

"This agreement shall enter into force immediately upon its signature and shall remain valid as long as the Tripartite Pact concluded on September 27, 1940."

End of the draft.

It is to be added in explanation that importance is being attached here to setting down in writing not only the promise concerning the conclusion of an armistice and peace, but also concerning the joint entry into the war. Please inform us at once of the Duce's position, since we wish to avoid any delay in issuing the reply to Tokyo. In case the Government at your post agrees with our draft it will, I suppose, make an identical proposal to the Japanese Ambassador there in reply to his *démarche*.

RIBBENTROP

## No. 547

535/240131-32

*Memorandum by the State Secretary*

St.S. No. 800

BERLIN, December 5, 1941.

As expected, the Nuncio reverted again today to his two notes in regard to ecclesiastical conditions in the Warthegau.<sup>1</sup> He has the instruction from Rome to apply to a higher authority, if need be to the Führer, if he does not make progress at the Foreign Ministry. His main points of complaint remain as follows:

1. That doubt was cast on his competence for the Warthegau;
2. That he did not come into contact with the ethnic Polish Catholics in the Warthegau and therefore could not provide for orderly church administration in this area.

The Nuncio realized that any appeal to the Führer would come back again to the Foreign Ministry and thus would not advance his cause. The Nuncio knows from other quarters that the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs has been eliminated from the Warthegau.<sup>2</sup> He therefore hopes that the Foreign Ministry may achieve something in this matter with the Reich Chancellor.

I did not inform the Nuncio about the details of our negotiation with Reichsstatthalter Greiser, etc., and also did not give him any hope that any direct contact could be brought about between him and the ethnic Polish Catholics in the Warthegau.

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 368, and document No. 272, footnote 1.<sup>2</sup> See document No. 368, footnote 5.

The Nuncio then dropped the subject rather soon.

Since Herr Greiser has protested against the Nuncio's competence for the Warthegau on legal grounds with which the Ministry cannot agree, and since he is evidently also supported in this by the Party Chancellery, it will not be possible to achieve much more in practice. I should therefore like to disillusion the Nuncio gradually in his belief that he will still receive any substantive reply to his notes. On the other hand it will be necessary, once more, legally to justify and state the Foreign Ministry's point of view to Statthalter Greiser and to do the same with the Reich Chancellery, and through the latter to try after all to get a step further.

I remain of the opinion that it makes a bad impression toward the outside if by denying the competence of the Nuncio in the Warthegau we create doubt that this area is an integral part of the Greater German Reich. Today I used the argument with the Nuncio that one reason we did not particularly welcome his efforts to dispose over ecclesiastical affairs in the Warthegau was that after all the Holy See still recognized a diplomatic representative of the former Polish state.

WEIZSÄCKER

No. 548

2281/482761-64

*Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy*

ROME, December 5, 1941.

Yesterday evening at 9:30 p.m. Minister von Rintelen telephoned me on the instruction of the Reich Foreign Minister and informed me that in the course of the next hours I would receive telegraphic instructions which the Foreign Minister wished to have carried out with Count Ciano and possibly with the Duce during the night. Herr von Rintelen asked me to make sure even at this time that Count Ciano would be available for me at the proper hour, but he was unable to inform me—even approximately—when the telegraphic instructions would arrive here.

I thereupon telephoned *Chef de Cabinet* Marchese Lanza d'Ajeta and asked him to inform Count Ciano accordingly.

Marchese d'Ajeta informed me shortly afterwards that this had been done and that he, d'Ajeta, would be expecting my call as soon as it was determined at what hour I wished to see Count Ciano.

At 1:30 a.m. Herr Sieber reported to me that the telegraphic instruction was coming uncoded over the closed circuit teletype.<sup>1</sup> I thereupon asked Marchese d'Ajeta to tell Count Ciano that I requested

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 546.

to be received by him at 2:20 a.m. At 2:20 a.m. I informed Count Ciano at his home of the draft text which had been sent to me by wire, reading to him the German text orally in Italian because in that short time it had not been possible to make a written Italian translation. At the same time I pointed out to him that the Reich Foreign Minister attached great importance to avoiding any delay in issuing the reply to Tokyo.

When I remarked that I was supposed to pass on the statement of the Italian position to Berlin during that very night and that therefore we would probably have to call on the Duce, too, Count Ciano stated that he could express full agreement with the draft on behalf of the Italian Government, as it kept entirely within the limits of what the Duce thought in regard to the further treatment of the matter. Paragraph 2 of article 1 even seemed to him a gratifying extension in our favor. We thereupon agreed that in these circumstances we would refrain from disturbing the Duce during the night and I made sure once more that I was authorized through Count Ciano's statement to inform Berlin of the unqualified assent of the Italian Government. Count Ciano confirmed this and added that he would inform the Duce at once in the morning, which would be at about 9 o'clock.<sup>2</sup>

In discussing the question when Count Ciano would hand the analogous statement to the Japanese Ambassador, we agreed that it would be expedient to do this if possible at the same hour in Berlin and in Rome. I said I was prepared to inquire once more in Berlin in that matter in order to set the hour precisely.

Count Ciano added further that in handing the draft to the Japanese Ambassador he would state that as this was a draft from Berlin the German text was authoritative in all circumstances. He added that this appeared necessary to him so as to avoid quibbling over words by the Japanese in case of possible, even innocuous, differences between the German and Italian texts.

I finally handed Count Ciano the draft text in the form of a carbon copy of the telegram addressed to me, from which I had cut off the first and last paragraphs.

I then informed Minister Rintelen from the Embassy at 2:45 a.m. of the outcome of my discussion with Count Ciano; he thanked me for the speed with which the instructions had been carried out and stated that the matter was thus in order for the time being. When I asked when the Reich Foreign Minister intended to hand the draft to the Japanese Ambassador, Herr von Rintelen replied that it would probably be done right away, that is, still in the course of that very night. I pointed out to him that the wish had been expressed here that the

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *The Ciano Diaries*, entry for Dec. 5, 1941.

delivery should take place, if possible, at the same hour, and that I asked him to let me know when the delivery had taken place in Berlin so that in case it had occurred during the night the Italians could join in the action in the morning as quickly as possible.

This morning at 9:30 a.m. Marchese d'Ajeta telephoned me to inform me by instruction of Count Ciano that the latter had informed the Duce and had met with his full agreement. He would receive the Japanese Ambassador immediately to hand him the statement and he asked me to find out when the delivery had taken place in Berlin. Count Ciano also was anxious that the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin be told that an analogous step would be taken here at the same time with regard to Mr. Horikiri.

I thereupon telephoned Herr von Rintelen and learned from him that the statement had already been handed to the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin at 4:00 a.m. this morning<sup>3</sup> and that the Reich Foreign Minister had expressly pointed out on that occasion that the same step would be taken here in Rome.

I passed on this information to Marchese d'Ajeta by telephone and pointed out that it appeared good to me now to receive the Japanese Ambassador in Rome very soon. D'Ajeta agreed, and stated that the Japanese Ambassador had been asked to see Count Ciano at 10:00 a.m.

I thereupon passed on this last communication to Minister von Rintelen by telephone.

At 10:25 a.m. Marchese d'Ajeta again telephoned and asked whether and if so what instructions had been sent in this matter to our Ambassador in Tokyo. I promised him that I would find out and reply at once.

MACKENSEN

ROME, December 5, 1941.

At 10:40 a. m. I asked Minister von Rintelen by telephone the question of Marchese d'Ajeta's concerning the instructions for Tokyo. Herr von Rintelen replied that so far no instructions or information of any sort had been sent to Ambassador Ott and that they would in any case only be very summary if they were sent at all. I told him that it was my impression that the Italians considered it best in the interest of secrecy if the two Ambassadors in Tokyo did not receive any information from their Governments in this matter. Herr von Rintelen indicated understanding for this view, but did not seem to be quite certain of being able to make it prevail. We arranged in the end that in case any communication is sent directly to Ambassador Ott in

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Oshima's account in intercepted telegrams of Dec. 5 to Tokyo the texts of which are printed in *Pearl Harbor Attack*, pt. 35, pp. 684-685.

this matter I will be immediately informed so that I may let the Italians know.

Immediately following the telephone conversation I telephoned the foregoing to Marchese d'Ajeta, who thanked me for this information.<sup>4</sup>

MACKENSEN

<sup>4</sup> In a subsequent memorandum of Dec. 5 (2281/482765) Mackensen recorded having received Ribbentrop's instructions, transmitted through Rintelen by telephone at 3:00 p. m., directing him to inform Ciano that no instructions or information in the matter of the agreement would be sent to Ambassador Ott in Tokyo and that Ciano therefore should likewise abandon such an idea. Mackensen also recorded that d'Ajeta, whom he informed at 6:50 p. m., expressed the view that Ciano would be very satisfied with this communication.

No. 549

4858/E247807-09

*Marshal Antonescu to Adolf Hitler*

Telegram

BUCHAREST, December 5, 1941.

Referring to the request transmitted through M. Mihai Antonescu concerning an increase in the export of Rumanian fuel oil,<sup>1</sup> I have the honor to inform your Excellency of the following:

1. By cutting our internal consumption to the maximum extent, we can export a total of 25,000 tons of fuel oil to Germany and Italy.

2. If monthly 60,000 tons of coal of at least 7,000 thermal units are shipped to us, we can make available another amount of 20,000 tons fuel oil for export, by withdrawing this fuel from the railroads.

But this step cannot be taken without accumulating beforehand a reserve of 6,000 tons of coal; at the same time there should be a guarantee that in addition to this quantity we shall daily receive five trainloads of coal.

3. If we should be furnished facilities for piping natural gas to Bucharest, as I asked of Marshal Göring in Vienna,<sup>2</sup> we could make another amount of 25,000 tons of fuel oil monthly available for export.

4. In the last 5 months we exported to Germany and Italy amounts greater than the monthly output of 125,000 tons fuel oil, which exhausted our available reserves.

5. I feel once more obligated to stress what I said in the meetings of Munich<sup>3</sup> and Vienna: Our annual oil production has shrunk from 8,704,000 tons in 1936 to 5,500,000 tons in 1941, although after the Vienna meeting of March 1941 I made every effort to increase production. The result was an increase of 2,500 tons per day.

6. Despite the drop in oil production, exports to Germany and Italy have nevertheless risen from 25 percent of total exports in 1936 to 83 percent of total exports in 1941.

<sup>1</sup> See documents Nos. 505, 513, and 519.

<sup>2</sup> See vol. xii of this series, document No 126.

<sup>3</sup> See vol. xii of this series, document No. 614.

I mention this only to prove to Your Excellency that as in the past, Rumania is today also making effort to aid Germany and Italy in carrying on with the war.

7. A new mining law which will further exploitation and development of Rumanian mining resources is just about to be enacted.

8. A short time ago, upon requests of the southern front, I have authorized the delivery of 4,000 tons of gasoline over and above the monthly quota. This contribution represents our war reserve.

9. I take the liberty to emphasize that the substitution of coal for fuel oil imposes on the Rumanian State Railways an annual additional expenditure of about 700,000,000 lei and imperils domestic coal production, since hitherto inferior coal was mixed with fuel oil.

I merely mention the foregoing facts to enable Your Excellency to realize the exact state of affairs.

For the same purpose I beg you to order the dispatch of an expert on this subject to Bucharest, to examine the situation here on the spot, since the figures received in Berlin regarding Rumanian fuel oil production and domestic consumption are not in accord with the facts in the case.<sup>4</sup>

Only in this way can it become evident that we are doing our very best, even imperiling our economy, to assure the winning of the war.<sup>5</sup>

MARSHAL ANTONESCU

<sup>4</sup> There is in the files the draft of a reply telegram from Hitler to Antonescu dated Dec. 7 (2193/473063-64) acknowledging Antonescu's telegram and promising that Clodius and the necessary experts would be sent to Bucharest in compliance with Antonescu's request for an examination of the situation on the spot. The draft telegram was submitted to Hitler on Dec. 7 but there is no record of the telegram's having been sent.

<sup>5</sup> Clodius commented on the various points raised in Antonescu's telegram in a memorandum of Dec. 6 (239/154422-26) as did Neubacher in telegram No. 4186 from Bucharest (239/154440-41).

## No. 550

32/25052-53

### *The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

No. 2666 of December 6

TOKYO, December 6, 1941—10:00 p. m.

Received December 7—4:10 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

With reference to my telegram No. 2657 of December 5.<sup>1</sup>

The Minister of Foreign Affairs confirmed to me today that the reply to the American note would be sent in the near future. He could not yet give me any particulars. On December 2, the American Government had inquired about the purpose of the concentration of

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 545.

large Japanese forces in southern Indochina.<sup>2</sup> The American Government saw this as a threat to Thailand, Malaya, and Burma. The American Government now was told today that the Japanese measures were within the terms of the agreement concluded with the Government at Vichy.<sup>3</sup> The troops in northern China, the Minister added, had for that matter been reinforced in view of Chinese troop concentrations against that area. The Foreign Minister gave me to understand that troops from southern Indochina had been committed for that purpose and were in turn reinforced from the outside.

Upon my question whether the Japanese reply would also take a stand on the allegation of a threat to Thailand, Malaya, and Burma, the Foreign Minister replied that the answer was implied in the position indicated to me. The United States of America, after all, had no control rights over these territories.

With respect to the American attitude, the Minister explained that it was difficult to perceive the motives behind it. He doubted that the United States of America was really desirous of reaching an understanding with Japan. The reported movements of American naval and land forces in the Far East intensified the danger of a clash. Togo sought to minimize Hull's attack on Japan's policy at the press conference of December 3.<sup>4</sup> Ambassador Oshima had meanwhile been instructed by the Japanese Government to approach the Führer and the Reich Foreign Minister with a view to the development of closer German-Japanese relations. A reply had not yet been received. I expressed to the Minister my best wishes for a successful outcome of this approach.

In conclusion, the Minister added that the American and English side was trying to capitalize to the utmost on the evacuation of Rostov. The Japanese Government, relying on Oshima's detailed reports, viewed this measure as a temporary episode without any bearing on the over-all situation, especially if the German offensive against Moscow, which the Japanese Government was following with great interest, continued to develop favorably. I made reference to the very satisfactory reports on hand about the military situation on all fronts.

The line taken by the Minister in conducting the conversation suggested to me the resistance that has to be overcome while the Japanese Government is struggling to reach a decision. As has been con-

<sup>2</sup> See *Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941*, vol. II, pp. 778-781.

<sup>3</sup> Actually such a statement was presented by Ambassador Nomura, accompanied by Kurusu, in a meeting with Secretary of State Hull on Dec. 5. See *Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941*, vol. II, pp. 781-784. Cf. document No. 545 and footnote 2.

<sup>4</sup> For an account of this news conference, see the *New York Times* of Dec. 4, 1941, p. 1, col. 3.

firmed to me by friends, attempts by every means are still being made to halt the development. For that reason I would repeat my most respectful request for continuing information and instructions.

OTT

No. 551

111/115601

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan*

Telegram

BERLIN, December 6, 1941—11:10 p. m.

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

RAM 246 g. Rs.

[No. 2282]<sup>1</sup>

For the Ambassador personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 2657 of December 5.<sup>2</sup>

With respect to the concluding remarks of your telegram, I want to say that it would seem inappropriate to me in the present situation to suggest to the Japanese Government this or that course of action in the event that a showdown should come about with the United States. Instead, I want to ask you that if such matters are discussed at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, you state our view in these terms, that the Axis Powers and Japan find themselves faced with a struggle upon which hangs their fate, which they must fight through together, regardless of the form of the tactical moves taken by one or the other partner in the individual case. If you feel that the remark which you quote in your telegram might have created at your post a different impression about our attitude, please correct it in accordance with the foregoing.

For your strictly confidential and exclusively personal information I want to add that I am at present engaged in talks with Ambassador Oshima aiming at a more precise definition of the attitude of the signatories of the Tripartite Pact with a view to ever closer cooperation.<sup>3</sup>

RIBBENTROP

<sup>1</sup> The number is supplied from Tokyo telegram 2690 of Dec. 9 (document No. 567) which refers to this document.

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 545.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 546 and document No. 548 and footnote 3. Nothing further on these discussions prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor has been found in the German Foreign Ministry files. See, however, the intercepted telegrams of Dec. 6 and Dec. 7 sent from the Japanese Foreign Ministry to Berlin the texts of which are printed in *Pearl Harbor Attack*, pt. 12, Joint Committee Exhibits Nos. 1 through 6, pp. 245-246 and pt. 35, Proceedings of Clausen Investigation, p. 686.

No. 552

2281/480956-57

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy*

Telegram

BERLIN, December 7, 1941—1:10 a. m.

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 3317 of December 6

To be presented immediately to Chief of Mission.

I. Through General von Rintelen the Duce informed the High Command of the Wehrmacht on December 2 of his intentions with regard to the port of Bizerte.<sup>1</sup> The OKW thereupon transmitted to General von Rintelen a directive of the Führer's on December 3.<sup>2</sup> I assume that you are informed about this through General von Rintelen. If not, then please have the two teletypes shown you for your information. The Italian Armistice Commission has likewise informed the German Armistice Commission about these Italian intentions and thereby stated that Count Ciano intends to speak to Admiral Darlan concerning the Bizerte question at the pending meeting.<sup>3</sup>

II. Please make sure that before his departure Count Ciano is informed about the Führer's view on this question;<sup>4</sup> in particular, that the French Government can be approached again about Bizerte only after the mastery of the sea and air in the Central Mediterranean by the Axis Powers has been established once more through deployment of the Second Air Force and the German submarines.

III. Colonel Mancinelli, the Italian representative with the German Armistice Commission, has stated moreover that the discussion of the supply question would be handled between Count Ciano and Darlan in a concrete form in the way in which it was arranged in Berlin between Ciano and me.<sup>5</sup> Regarding this it is to be noted that I did not discuss this question here with Count Ciano<sup>6</sup> and accordingly also did not arrange anything concerning it.

Wire your report.<sup>7</sup>

RIBBENTROP

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 532.

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 532, footnote 5. The copy sent to the Foreign Ministry by Warlimont (898/292114-15) bears the date Dec. 3. The OKH copy (M341/M015344-45) gives the time of dispatch as Dec. 4, 12:55 a. m.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 532, footnote 4.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 557 and footnote 5.

<sup>5</sup> See document No. 501.

<sup>6</sup> Document No. 557.

## No. 553

64/44740-41

*The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

WASHINGTON, December 7, 1941—8:36 p. m.

No. 4293 of December 7

Received December 9—8:55 [a. m.]

The Japanese attack on Hawaii and the Philippines struck the American Government and the American people like a bolt of lightning. The first reports came from the White House and were soon supplemented by the broadcasting companies' own news reports which immediately interrupted all programs. As we see from the statement of Hull, which follows verbatim in No. 4292,<sup>1</sup> in which he in an excess of fury and anger virtually calls Ambassador Nomura a (1 group apparently missing) and swindler, the Japanese attack came as a complete surprise and caused the greatest consternation among leading American statesmen. The reaction in London seems to be similar, according to reports received so far. The measures, reported in detail by the DNB in New York, which have in the meantime been taken also reflect a state of extreme nervousness. They include, for example, police protection for Japanese Consulates, out of fear of riots, mobilizing the Federal Bureau of Investigation [*Bundes-Geheimpolizei*] for surveillance of Japanese nationals, orders to guard all vital war plants, apprehension of all Japanese in the Panama Canal Zone, enforcement of the Espionage Law of 1917, which is tantamount to instituting censorship, especially of the isolationist press. These all reflect extreme nervousness. All the American war plans which, as was demonstrated by the recent article in the *Chicago Tribune*,<sup>2</sup> were oriented toward Europe and calculated to gain time for at least another year or two, have suddenly been scuttled. A war in the Pacific 2 to 3 years before the completion of the two-ocean navies, at a time when one's own army has not been equipped and the great armament industry has only just been started up, must come at an extremely inopportune time for the American Government.

They [the Americans] had thought that they themselves could choose their enemy and the time to begin the war and in the meantime let other peoples fight for American imperialism. They now see that they have been terribly deceived in this calculation which had been based on Japan's willingness to yield, and her fear of America. The last thing that had been expected was a Japanese surprise attack which, as the first reports of heavy losses and great material damage in

<sup>1</sup> Not filmed. For text of the several statements by Secretary Hull, released on Dec. 7 see Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1941, vol. v, pp. 461-470.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 541.

Hawaii indicate, deprived the Americans of military initiative. It is significant that the bombastic prophesies that a war against Japan would be a "promenade" have now been silenced. Senator George,<sup>3</sup> in one of the first statements which we have here from Congress, speaks of the possibility of a war against Japan lasting 2 to 3 years.

THOMSEN

<sup>3</sup> Walter F. George, Democrat from Georgia.

## No. 554

F3/0517-20

*Adolf Hitler to King Gustav V of Sweden*

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS.

December 7, 1941.

MAJESTY: It is with sincere pleasure that I learned through the German Legation in Stockholm of the understanding that Your Majesty shows for the battle that in the truest sense of the word is being fought today by the German Reich and its allies for the whole of Europe.<sup>1</sup> It gives me great satisfaction to be able to learn from the remarks of Your Majesty that as early as 1918, at the end of the last World War, you realized the great danger that had arisen through Bolshevism, not only for Germany, but for all European and particularly for the northern countries. At the same time, however, I may take the liberty of pointing out that the situation is quite a different one today.

When the German Reich went down in 1918, vanquished less by the force of arms of its enemies than by the lack of a superior leadership, Russia herself was militarily completely crushed. Bolshevism was at that time the same foe of Europe, nay, of the entire civilized world that it is today. But its hostility had to be confined more to the *internal* work of disintegration in the case of the surrounding nations, because it did not have at its disposal sufficient resources of military power. Today, Majesty, the situation is very different. If Germany had succumbed in this war, Europe would be confronted with the mightiest military power that had ever threatened this Continent in its entire history. All nations and states that are today participating in this fight in the east are therefore protecting with the blood of their soldiers, not only their own countries, but the entire Continent of Europe as well. If Finland had collapsed, the Bolshevik tide would have spread to Norway and finally also have engulfed Sweden. If

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 430.

Germany had failed, not only Central Europe, but the whole of Western Europe, would have become a defenseless target of Bolshevist world destruction. Had Slovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and Italy not recognized the hour of danger and undertaken the bloody sacrifices of such a war, the Muscovite-Bolshevist tide would have rolled over the countries of the Lower Danube and the Balkans all the way to Constantinople. For this is the difference between today and the year 1918: At that time Bolshevism had, indeed, the same impulse of destruction, but it lacked the power. Today the same destructive intent is united with the greatest military machinery of all times. In a heroic battle of all the allies, which has now lasted over 5 months, it has been demolished and crushed to such an extent, however, that it will never rise again. If the operations are for the moment reaching a sort of standstill, it is not because of Russian resistance as such, but only because of mud, snow, and frost. Even in the twentieth century it is impossible to wage war successfully in winter. We have, however, created the bases for launching the continuation of the attack at the moment that weather conditions become more favorable for warfare. This time will come, and it will bring with it the final destruction of the Bolshevist monster.

I am most sincerely glad that Your Majesty appreciates this unique historic action that is decisive for the future of the whole of Europe in the positive sense that has become known to me. I regret, however, that precisely in Sweden the echo of public opinion is not such as might have been expected.<sup>2</sup> I acknowledge with thanks all that the Swedish Government has done in the way of positive contributions in the course of this struggle. Yet I cannot avoid the feeling that large circles in Sweden not only do not acknowledge the secular importance of this historic battle in its bearing also on Sweden, but even try to preserve their distance from the events. I find this the more incomprehensible because in the event of a collapse of the German-Finnish battle front precisely in the north—whether now or in a few years is not of decisive historical importance—Sweden would be fighting the same life-and-death battle on her own soil. I must therefore accompany my thanks for the very comforting personal attitude of Your Majesty with the sincere wish for success in guiding the interests not only of the Swedish Government but also of the Swedish public even more strongly to the realization that this war will decide the fate of Europe, that is, of all European countries, and that if certain of its peoples undertake the burden, so heavy in itself, of shedding their blood, the other countries are obligated to make their contribution at least in other ways.

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 364 and footnotes 3 and 4.

Minister Schnurre, who has the honor of handing this letter to Your Majesty, will try on the occasion of his visit to Stockholm to strengthen the interest of the Swedish Government accordingly.<sup>3</sup>

Yours, etc.

ADOLF HITLER

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 574.

## No. 555

498/233941-43

*Memorandum by an Official of the Protocol Department*

TOP SECRET

BERLIN, December 9, 1941.

zu 2647 g.<sup>1</sup>

Subject: Visit of the Spanish General Moscardo with the Führer at the Führer's Headquarters on December 7, 1941, at 1:00 p.m.

While exchanging greetings General Moscardo said that he conveyed the most cordial greetings and congratulations from Generalissimo Franco. General Franco had urged him in particular to tell the Führer that he believed in the absolute final victory of Germany; not because he desired this most strongly, but because he knew that this victory could not fail, for he was following the victorious campaigns of the Wehrmacht step by step. General Moscardo took part in the situation conference in the map room of the OKW bunker. The Führer explained the situation to him personally. He described, however, exclusively the position of the Spanish Division and its probable activity in the immediate future. The Führer did not reveal any important military information or figures of any sort to the General. In the discussion of the campaigns in Africa the General came to speak of Gibraltar. He told the Führer that Spain was very much interested in the elimination of this English base, for aside from the loss of prestige which that would mean for the English, Gibraltar in English hands would always be like a dagger in the heart for the Spaniards. The Führer said that he was sorry not to be able to undertake anything in this respect at the moment,<sup>2</sup> and he regretted that General Franco had not seized the opportunity for his part in the spring of 1941.<sup>3</sup>

During the dinner attended by a small group in the Führer's bunker, general matters were discussed without any political importance. The

<sup>1</sup> 2647 g.: Madrid telegram No. 3936 of Nov. 9 (498/233923) in which Stohrer announced General Moscardo's trip to the Blue Division and his arrival in Berlin.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. document No. 467.

<sup>3</sup> See vol. XI of this series, documents Nos. 323, 420, and 476.



Führer merely asked the General about Spain's relations with Portugal. General Moscardo said that the Portuguese had a childish fear that Spain might have territorial aspirations against Portugal. The relations between the two countries were very difficult. Little things such as a soccer match between Spanish and Portuguese teams often degenerated into large-scale quarreling and brawling. That had gone so far that the Spanish Foreign Ministry had advised him in his capacity as Spanish sport leader to discontinue sporting events between Spanish and Portuguese athletes. The Führer expressed his astonishment that these two countries, which were closely connected territorially on the Iberian Peninsula, could not get along together. The General repeated that the Portuguese simply always attributed hostile intentions to the Spanish. At any rate they acted in a very reserved way toward Spain and always stressed that they would sell their independence dearly, no matter to whom. And it was indeed the case, said the General, that Portugal seemed to be firmly determined to ward off any aggressive intentions of the U.S.A. by force of arms. This was shown by the continual shifting of troops to the Azores and the Cape Verde Islands.

The Führer asked the General a few things about the economic situation in Spain. The General stressed the tremendous difficulties Spain was having at the moment in obtaining grain and gasoline. The Führer asked whether Spain did not have enough lignite and other types of coal available in order perhaps to convert some of the gasoline engines to gas generators. The General replied that the necessary factories for carrying out the conversion were lacking in Spain and that they could only be obtained from Germany with great difficulty, because Germany's industry was greatly burdened in every respect. The Führer then treated this question generally without making special reference to Spain. Following this the cinema "Alcazar" and other topics of minor interest were discussed.

In taking leave the Führer asked the General to convey his warmest wishes to the Caudillo.

Submitted herewith to Minister Schmidt (Foreign Minister's Secretariat).

BRANDAU

No. 556

93/104431-32

*Memorandum by the Director of the Political Department*

U.St.S.Pol. 1022

BERLIN, December 7, 1941.

The Hungarian Minister, who on instruction of Minister President de Bárdossy had broken off his visit in Vienna yesterday to return to Berlin, called upon me today and stated the following with the request that it be transmitted to the Reich Foreign Minister:

The Regent and the Minister President fully understood the reasons which necessitated postponement of the visit by the Reich Foreign Minister to Hungary, thanks to the letters brought by Minister Freiherr von Dörnberg.<sup>1</sup> News of a forthcoming visit by the Reich Foreign Minister to Budapest had spread, however, probably owing to the hunting preparations by the Regent and the room reservations made at hotels. Postponement of the visit now might easily be given a political interpretation by ill-disposed elements. Minister President de Bárdossy had accordingly instructed him [the Hungarian Minister] to inquire about the possibility of putting out an officially inspired press report indicating that a visit of the Reich Foreign Minister was planned but had to be postponed for official reasons.

I told M. Sztójay that I would not want to do anything in this matter in anticipation of the Reich Foreign Minister who, as I had heard, had already inquired about him as early as yesterday.

The Minister then added that he happened to run into Freiherr von Dörnberg at the railroad station in Vienna yesterday, and that Freiherr von Dörnberg gave him briefly the reasons for the postponement of the visit.

Herewith submitted to the Reich Foreign Minister.

WOERMANN

<sup>1</sup> A memorandum of Dec. 6 by the acting Chief of Protocol (93/104419) recorded that Minister Dörnberg, the Chief of Protocol, had left Berlin in order to deliver to Horthy a personal letter from Ribbentrop. According to Dörnberg "the Reich Foreign Minister, because of the Far Eastern crisis, has canceled his acceptance of the hunting visit with his Highness, the Regent of Hungary." According to an account based on Hungarian documents, the invitation to Ribbentrop had been conveyed by Bárdossy during his Berlin visit; see C. A. Macartney, *A History of Hungary, 1929-1945*, vol. II p. 65. No copy of Ribbentrop's letter has been found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry.

In Budapest telegram No. 1648 of Dec. 5 (93/104417-18) Minister Jagow reported that in accordance with instructions transmitted through Dörnberg he had asked Minister President Bárdossy to convey to the Regent Ribbentrop's communication regarding cancelation of the visit. Bárdossy expressed profound shock at the news and emphasized its unfavorable effects on Hungary's position.

No. 557

2281/480958-61

*The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

ROME, December 7, 1941.

TOP SECRET

No. 3194 of December 7

For the Foreign Minister personally.

With reference to your telegram No. 3317 of December 6.<sup>1</sup>

I have just spoken with Count Ciano regarding the Bizerte question, told him of the communications which we have from the Italian Armistice Commission to the German Armistice Commission and the statements by Colonel Mancinelli,<sup>2</sup> and asked him whether he had knowledge of the Duce's inquiry transmitted through General von Rintelen<sup>3</sup> and the Führer's directive passed on by him to the Comando Supremo here,<sup>4</sup> and above all whether he knew that in the Führer's opinion the French Government could be approached only under the conditions mentioned in figure II of telegraphic instruction No. 3317.

Count Ciano replied that he could not say what was the basis of the inaccurate communications of the Italian Armistice Commission and the statements of Colonel M[ancinelli]. So far the Duce had still not issued him the instruction for Turin;<sup>5</sup> that would only be done tomorrow morning. Thus far the Duce had only instructed him quite generally to "listen" during the conversation and had also mentioned Bizerte among the subjects that came into question for the conversation, in the form that he could point out to the French the great significance which this question had for Italy. However, he had not indicated in any way that this theme might be made the subject of negotiations. He—Ciano—had also not included this theme among the few points which he intended to propose to the Duce tomorrow as suitable for discussion in Turin. These points involved a few matters of an administrative nature such as the establishment of consulates, etc., such as were inherent in the nature of the relations between two neighboring states. In the main, however, the meeting had the purpose of resuming the direct contact between the two governments which had been broken off for the past year and a half.

Count Ciano added that he would never enter into any sort of concrete discussion in a matter such as Bizerte without having first

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 552.<sup>2</sup> See document No. 532, footnote 4.<sup>3</sup> Document No. 532.<sup>4</sup> Document No. 532, footnote 5.<sup>5</sup> This is a reference to the Ciano-Darlan meeting of Dec. 10. See Galeazzo Ciano, *L'Europa verso la catastrofe*, pp. 698-703.

reached full agreement with us. That was not only a "question of discipline" for him, but he was also personally of the opinion that the attempt to push the matter ahead at the present moment could call up incalculable risks which one should incur all the less since in his opinion even a successful attempt which would make the port of Bizerte available to us would not really solve the supply problem, if only in view of the tremendous distance between Bizerte and the Libyan front. He had the impression that the Duce was being strongly pushed by the military in this question, in particular by Cavallero. I replied to him that the Führer was of exactly the same opinion as regards the risk that was connected with an action at the present time.

Since I had the impression from a remark of Count Ciano's that he had heard something by way of General von Rintelen about the exchange of ideas between the Duce and the Führer to be sure, but is not acquainted—at least so far—with the text of the Führer's opinion, I offered to make available to him a copy of the letter from General von Rintelen to the High Command here which General von Rintelen had previously promised to give me for this purpose. Count Ciano thanked me very much for this offer, since he would then be fully in the picture for tomorrow's audience with the Duce.

He added that he would of course inform the Duce of my démarche. I thanked him for this intention, with the remark that the word *démarche* seemed to me somewhat too solemn for our conversation, which was meant only for his full orientation, whereupon he replied that he would then only speak of a conversation. For the rest he believed he was sure that the Duce, knowing the Führer's opinion, would not give him instructions that were not in full harmony with this opinion. Should tomorrow's conversation with the Duce result in something else, contrary to all expectation, then he would notify me.<sup>6</sup>

MACKENSEN

<sup>6</sup> In telegram No. 3201 of Dec. 8 (2281/480962) Mackensen reported that he had seen Ciano who reverted to the question of Bizerte. Having discussed the matter with Mussolini, Ciano assured Mackensen that the matter would not be brought up on the part of the Italians.

Cf. *The Ciano Diaries*, entry for Dec. 7, 1941.

No. 558

124/123235-37

*Minister Wied to State Secretary Weizsäcker*

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

STOCKHOLM, December 7, 1941.

Dear Herr State Secretary: Early in November the Swedish Government rejected the most important points in our latest requests,

presented in Stockholm by Herr Schnurre, and referred them to the Government Committee for German-Swedish economic relations for further study.<sup>1</sup> The Swedish Government had refused in particular to transport fresh troops through Sweden by leave trains<sup>2</sup> or to agree to the export of goods for which raw materials are still imported with English navicerts via Göteborg with our consent.

Beginning today a state of war exists between Finland and England.<sup>3</sup> Although it is as yet impossible to foresee the consequences of this fact, the Swedish public is naturally talking about the possibility of intervention by the English as soon as weather conditions in the far north permit. Under the heading, "Finland's involvement in the War of the Big Powers," the large Stockholm daily, *Stockholms Tidningen*, says on December 7: "The future will reveal what this declaration of war means and what it will entail. It may be only a gesture, but it can also result in military actions and even lead to a serious threat to the freedom and existence of Finland . . . . For Sweden, which considers it her duty, as far as circumstances permit, to maintain contact with kindred nations and cultivate Nordic ties in general, what has now happened cannot in any way alter the general attitude. We have proclaimed neutrality with the reservation concerning the aid which in our opinion we can give to Finland. As Prime Minister Rangell said in his latest speech on Finland's independence day, the Finnish supply situation is gloomy. Sweden would neglect her duty

<sup>1</sup> Neither Schnurre's instructions nor a precise list of Germany's wishes has been found in the files.

In telegram No. 1829 of Oct. 30 (205/143068) Schnurre referred to telegram No. 2604 (Pol. I M 3156 g. Rs.) and reported that he had taken up the questions in urgent manner, but that Günther was rather negative toward the new German wishes in the field of transportation.

Stockholm telegram No. 1865 of Nov. 4 (205/143076-79) forwards the text of a Swedish memorandum which constitutes a reply. It included the following items:

Chartering of tankers—a matter for the Swedish-German Government Committee;

Delivery of yarn, leather, or furs—not possible in view of the Swedish supply situation;

Tents—Sweden had delivered 2,000 a short time back; hospital beds and surgical equipment could be provided to some extent—the problem should be referred to the Committees;

Icebreakers—Sweden would examine the problem;

Transportation—extension of the courier air traffic had recently been negotiated. Sweden suggested rapid trains rather than the use of planes for express freight. Further expansion of the military railway traffic could not be conceded; as to the desired sea transport from Finnish ports to Germany, Sweden would assist in the same manner as hitherto.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram No. 1966 of Nov. 21 (205/143106-07) reported to a Swedish disinclination to grant Germany the privilege of running furlough trains from Haparanda to Trelleborg. They suggested that Germany should try to schedule the furlough traffic over Finland's railways to Åbo (Turku) and thence by water in which case Sweden would assist in the water transport.

Telegram No. 2118 of Dec. 13 (205/143127) reported Sweden's definitive refusal to grant Germany the privilege of a furlough traffic by rail between Haparanda and Trelleborg.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 540 and footnote 7.

and her own interests with respect to Finland if she did not try to do what she could, as far as her present admittedly limited potentialities permit, to help her ancestrally related brother country."

Given this situation, it is almost inevitable that we shall have to present new requests to the Swedish Government, and I should therefore like to point out here that this should be done, if at all possible, through Finland and through the conventional and always available channel of the government commissions and the Legation. From statements made by Swedes I know that the recent practice of dispatching a special representative has such an alarming effect on the party concerned that we might again have to expect unsatisfactory, negative results. By this I do not mean to say that the negative responses based on the fundamental attitude of the Swedish Government can be avoided entirely; however, the method of abandoning the existing channels will not in any circumstances help our case. It is quite obvious and natural that the alarm button will be pressed as soon as Herr Schnurre applies at the Swedish Legation in Berlin for a renewed visa and that the "Swedish hedgehog"—to use the expression which the leader of the Conservative party and the Minister of Education and Church affairs, Professor Bagge, once employed in a public speech—will then immediately roll itself up and present all its spines . . . .

From Stockholm it is impossible for me to judge what steps, if any, are needed and contemplated in the near future in relation to the Swedish Government. But in such an event I can only give the advice that all basic requests should first be brought up here through the Finns and, for the rest, be left as far as possible in the trusty hands of the chairman of the German Government Committee.<sup>4</sup> Since, moreover, the Legation has to perform the auxiliary tasks in the normal way, it would seem that the maximum influence on the Swedish Government obtainable by peaceful means can be achieved in this way.

My wife and I extend to you and the baroness the most cordial greetings, and I remain, my dear Herr State Secretary, with

Heil Hitler!

Yours, etc.

V. WIED

P.S. I have just learned that Herr Schnurre will arrive here in the next few days.

<sup>4</sup> Ministerialdirektor Walter of the Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture. For the Committee negotiations, see documents Nos. 347 and 565.

[EDITORS' NOTE. Nothing has been found in German Foreign Ministry files regarding conversations between Ribbentrop and Oshima immediately following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. That

such conversations were held is indicated, however, by the following intercepted telegram dispatched to Tokyo by Oshima on December 8, the text of which is printed in the record of the hearings of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack:

"At 11 p. m. today, the 7th, I received a radio report that hostilities had broken out between Japan and America, and at once called on Ribbentrop. He said that from reports which he too had received he thought this was true, and that therefore, although he had not yet secured Hitler's sanction, the immediate participation in the war by Germany and Italy was a matter of course. The secret agreement had in consequence already become —? —, and [? they had decided] to drop it . . . [a portion is lost here] . . . form of German and Italian participation. Ribbentrop said he would discuss with me to-morrow, the 8th, about the time of publication of this declaration and so on.

"Ribbentrop rang up Ciano then and there and notified him of the foregoing."

(*Pearl Harbor Attack*, pt. 35, Proceedings of Clausen Investigation, p. 687). See also International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Proceedings, pp. 34035-34036, and Exhibit No. 3512.]

### No. 559

64/44758-59

*The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry*

#### Telegram

MOST URGENT WASHINGTON, December 8, 1941—10:32 a. m.  
No. 4301 of December 8 Received December 8, 1941—6:40 p. m.

As had been expected Congress, by near-unanimous vote, declared a state of war to exist with Japan.<sup>1</sup> The only (group missing) was Congresswoman Rankin,<sup>2</sup> who also voted against war in 1917. Roosevelt's speech<sup>3</sup> was remarkably short. The fact that he made no mention whatever of Germany or Italy indicates that for the present he wants to avoid any worsening of the situation in the *Atlantic*. Add to this that the initial staggering American losses have focused all attention on the Pacific and have impressed upon the people already on the first day of war that the struggle with Japan will

<sup>1</sup> For text of the Joint Resolution by the Senate and House of Representatives, see Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1941, vol. v, p. 475.

<sup>2</sup> Jeannette Rankin, Republican Representative from Montana.

<sup>3</sup> Message to Congress of Dec. 8; for text see Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1941, vol. v, p. 474.

not be child's play. It is significant that there are reports that reinforcements must be immediately obtained for the severely crippled air forces in Hawaii and that American pilots in London are besieging the embassy there demanding to be sent back because they want to "fight for *their own country*." Neither the *Government* nor the press are able to conceal behind the mounting wave of patriotism their disappointment that the cleverly conceived political gamble had miscarried and that it could have been possible to catch the proud American military forces in Hawaii napping in such a way. To soften the initial shock and loss of prestige, attempts are being made to portray the Japanese attack as an act of desperation. At the same time the people are being prepared to expect initial reverses and bad news.

In all other respects the feeling in the country is characterized by the enthusiastic ovations which the President received in Congress. There is no such thing as an opposition any more, although some newspapers are reserving their right to make constructive criticism. For the first time all segments of political life are joined in eagerness for war, hatred of Japan, and desire for unity.

The American Government apparently expects Soviet Russia to enter the war against Japan and start military operations from Siberia. Hints to this effect have already appeared in newspapers. However, Litvinov, asked about this on his arrival yesterday,<sup>4</sup> answered very cautiously and evasively. The surprisingly high losses suffered by the American Pacific Fleet in Hawaii pose most difficult problems for the American conduct of military operations, especially with regard to whether units of the Atlantic fleet should be ordered to the Pacific, which would entail substantial reduction of American cooperation with England in the Atlantic.<sup>5</sup>

THOMSEN

<sup>4</sup> Maxim M. Litvinov, newly appointed Soviet Ambassador to the United States, arrived on Dec. 7 and presented his credentials the following day.

<sup>5</sup> In telegram No. 4315 of Dec. 9 (64/44773-75) Thomsen stated that there were increasing reports that American losses at Hawaii were "very much larger than heretofore admitted officially"; as a result there was much concern and nervousness about the naval situation in the Pacific.

## No. 560

64/44744-45

*The Chargé d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT WASHINGTON, December 8, 1941—9:19 p. m.  
 No. 4294 of December 7 Received December 9—3:10 p. m.

With reference to my telegram No. 4293 of December 7.<sup>1</sup>

In the message to Congress which Roosevelt has just drafted the President will ask Congress to declare the existence of a state of war with Japan and Congress will immediately comply. While the American people were not as yet ripe for war on European soil, Roosevelt can count on the solid backing of the nation in a war against Japan. This is also confirmed by statements from the isolationist camp by such Senators as Wheeler,<sup>2</sup> Taft,<sup>3</sup> and Vandenberg.<sup>4</sup> The nature of Japan's surprise action which is of course termed here a "brutal act of aggression against a peace-loving country", will undoubtedly produce a tremendous upsurge of patriotism and thus render unnecessary any further propaganda on the part of Roosevelt to rally the nation behind him. Roosevelt will utilize this opportunity to obtain from Congress the full grant of authority he needs for carrying on a total war and effecting a total mobilization of industry. It may be expected that all war powers legislation of 1917 and 1918 will again become effective inasmuch as the conditions for enacting such legislation originally, that is "immediate danger of war" and "state of war" are present.

Whether Roosevelt will at the same time ask that a state of war be declared with Germany and Italy is uncertain. From the standpoint of the American conduct of war against Japan it would seem logical to avoid a war on two fronts with all the consequences so often described. However, Roosevelt may attempt at least in this regard to anticipate the decisions of Germany and Italy, if only to make up for some of the loss of prestige throughout the whole world and particularly in South America resulting from the inadequate preparations against the Japanese operation.

War with Japan means re-direction of all efforts to the country's own rearmament, a corresponding reduction in lend-lease assistance, shift of all activity to the Pacific, so far as the garrisoning of Iceland permits this, organization of convoys in the Pacific, closing of Vladivostok as far as shipments to the Soviets are concerned, jeopardizing the supply of raw materials, especially rubber.

THOMSEN

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 553.<sup>2</sup> Burton K. Wheeler, Democratic Senator from Montana.<sup>3</sup> Robert A. Taft, Republican Senator from Ohio.<sup>4</sup> Arthur H. Vandenberg, Republican Senator from Michigan.

## No. 561

205/148122-23

*The Minister in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT STOCKHOLM, December 8, 1941—9:20 p. m.  
 SECRET Received December 9—12:10 p. m.

No. 2071 of December 8

For the State Secretary.

Although the consequences of the English declaration of war against Finland<sup>1</sup> cannot yet be fully perceived as far as the Swedish sector is concerned, there are many indications it will not change Sweden's attitude toward Finland.

I called on the Foreign Minister today and he confirmed to me that the English declaration of war against Finland had created a generally unfavorable impression here. Pro-English circles were disturbed. Günther also told me he had said to the new American Minister<sup>2</sup> on his opening visit that Sweden was highly displeased with England's action. He would also say this to the British Minister,<sup>3</sup> whom he had not seen since the declaration of war. The Foreign Minister furthermore stressed that England had not, to be sure, made any demand as yet that Swedish deliveries to Finland be halted, but if such a demand should be made, it would be flatly rejected by Sweden. Quite contrary to his custom, Günther also attended the reception at the Legation on December 6 on the occasion of the national holiday. This step, he told me, was intended as a demonstrative act. The new situation no doubt entails possibilities of an aggravation of Anglo-Swedish relations. Such a favorable development for us might possibly be hampered, however, if we were now to make special demands on Sweden. For the present, therefore, I believe that as far as possible only the usual economic negotiations, which are difficult enough as it is, and such others as are of a more or less routine nature, should be conducted. But if it becomes necessary to make special demands, the opinion here is that it would be best if they were presented by Finland. Apart from the fact that the development indicated above would thereby not be prevented from running its full course, such a procedure would probably be most likely to succeed, since, as I have been able to gather from previous statements made occasionally by the Foreign Minister, there is special sympathy here for everything which is in the interest of Finland.

WIED

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 540 and footnote 7.<sup>2</sup> Mr. Herschel V. Johnson, named Minister to Sweden, Oct. 21, 1941.<sup>3</sup> Victor Alexander Louis Mallet.

## No. 562

111/115615-18

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

TOP SECRET

No. 2294

RAM 249

BERLIN, December 8, 1941.

Sent December 9—12:15 a. m.

Exclusively for the Ambassador personally.

In the course of the discussions here with Ambassador Oshima<sup>1</sup> I have handed him today the enclosed draft of an agreement between Germany, Italy, and Japan which in essence corresponds to a draft presented by Oshima.<sup>2</sup> Oshima will for his part transmit this draft to Tokyo. In order to make sure that it is transmitted, I request that you, too, give the text to the Japanese Government at once. Furthermore please do everything at your end to see that the assent of the Japanese Government is communicated to Ambassador Oshima in time so that the signature can take place here in Berlin on Wednesday<sup>3</sup> morning, our time, at the latest. You may remark casually in this connection that the Japanese Government itself has an interest in speeding this up, since the agreement may be announced here in a special form.

I request an immediate reply if possible.<sup>4</sup>

The text of the draft follows:

RIBBENTROP

<sup>1</sup> See Editors' Note, p. 977. For additional information regarding these discussions which took place on Dec. 8, see the texts of intercepted telegrams sent to Tokyo by Oshima on Dec. 8, printed in *Pearl Harbor Attack*, pt. 35, Proceedings of the Clausen Investigation, pp. 687-688.

<sup>2</sup> Not found. Oshima's account in one of the intercepted telegrams (see footnote 1) has the following comment regarding the differences between the Japanese draft and the draft printed here:

"From 5 p.m. to-day myself, Ribbentrop, Kase, Ushida, and Gaus put our heads together on this matter on the declaration on the nonconclusion of a separate peace with a view to imparting to this declaration the loftiest possible significance, and produced the text of the agreement contained in my telegram under reference. This goes beyond the adoption of our proposal in regard to a promise of nonconclusion of a separate peace (Clause II) to the following extent:

"a) The Three Powers' firm intention to fight together against Anglo-American aggression until final victory is expressed in Clause II.

"b) Cooperation with a view to the establishment of a new order after the war is promised in Clause III.

"Thereby, the significance of the war is elucidated, while at the same time Clause III has an advantage from the point of view of obtaining German and Italian cooperation when the Great East Asia co-prosperity sphere is established after the war, this, I believe, being in accord with the views of the Japanese Government . . ."

See also International Military Tribunal for the Far East, exhibit No. 3512.

<sup>3</sup> Dec. 10.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 568.

[Enclosure]

In their unshakable determination not to lay down arms until the joint war against the United States of America and England has been brought to a successful conclusion, the German Government, the Italian Government, and the Japanese Government have agreed upon the following provisions:

## Article 1

Germany, Italy, and Japan will jointly wage the war forced upon them by the United States of America and England until its victorious conclusion with all the powers at their command.

## Article 2

Germany, Italy, and Japan undertake not to conclude an armistice or peace either with the United States of America or with England except in full mutual agreement.

## Article 3

Germany, Italy, and Japan will cooperate very closely after a victorious conclusion of the war for the purpose of bringing about a just new order.

## Article 4

This agreement shall enter into force immediately upon its signature.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized by their Governments, have signed this agreement and set their seals to it.

Done in triplicate in the German, Italian, and Japanese languages, each language being equally authentic, in Berlin on December . . . 1941—in the XXth year of the Fascist Era—corresponding to the day of the 12th month of the 16th year of the Syowa Era.

## No. 563

2281/482772

*Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy*

ROME, December 8, 1941.

After having gotten in touch once more with Under State Secretary Gaus and Minister von Rintelen, I called on Count Ciano at 8:00 p. m. and gave him the text sent me by telegram.<sup>1</sup> Count Ciano expressed immediately his agreement with the contents, called up the Duce in my presence, who for his part had likewise no objections to

<sup>1</sup> This refers to the text of the draft for the German-Italian-Japanese agreement (document No. 562, enclosure) which was sent to Rome by Rintelen in telegram No. 3325 of Dec. 8 (2281/482773-74).

make, and then telephoned the Reich Foreign Minister, as arranged, in order to inform him of Italy's concurrence. In the conversation it was pointed out that the text, which is to precede the agreement when it is published by way of a kind of retrospect of the whole development, would naturally have to be worded differently on the part of each of the three participating states according to its different situation. Our version would be forwarded to the Italians as soon as possible in order to give them an indication of what our introductory text would look like.

Because of the direct telephone conversation, Ciano-Ribbentrop, I have refrained from reporting by telegraph or telephone on the execution of the instructions and I arranged with Count Ciano that in case the communication, which was still to come, should arrive after his departure for Turin<sup>2</sup> at 11:00 p. m., I should approach the Duce directly during the two days of his absence.<sup>3</sup>

M[ACKENSEN]

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 557 and footnote 5.

<sup>3</sup> The German version of the retrospect which was to precede the published text of the agreement was forwarded to Rome in Rintelen's telegram No. 3340 of Dec. 9 (2281/482777-78). According to Mackensen's telegram No. 3210 of Dec. 9 (2281/482779) he handed an Italian translation of this text (2281/482780-81) to d'Ajeta who had been authorized by Ciano to deal with the matter and who was to draw up at once a similar Italian statement.

## No. 564

8589/E603090-97

### *Führer's Directive*

CHEFSACHE

FÜHRER'S HEADQUARTERS, December 8, 1941.

TOP SECRET MILITARY

The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht  
OKW/WFSt/Abt. L (I Op) No. 442090/41 g. K. Chefs.

### DIRECTIVE No. 39

The surprisingly early arrival of severe winter weather in the east and the supply difficulties resulting therefrom call for the immediate cessation of all major offensive operations and a shift to the defensive.

The conduct of this defensive will be determined by the *objective* to which it is directed, namely:

- (a) To retain such areas as are of great importance to the enemy with respect to his operations and armament production.
- (b) To make possible for the Wehrmacht forces committed in the east the greatest possible measure of recuperation and rehabilitation.

(c) To bring about by the foregoing the prerequisites for resuming major offensive operations in 1942.

Specifically, I order the following:

#### I. *Army:*

1. The bulk of the Army in the east will as soon as possible shift to the defensive in positions sparing of manpower to be designated by the Commander in Chief of the Army, and thereupon initiate rehabilitation of the units, with the armored and motorized divisions in particular to be withdrawn from the front line.

2. Wherever the front is moved back in the absence of enemy pressure, provision must first be made for a rear position affording better living conditions and better defense facilities to the troops than the positions previously held.

Abandonment of important lateral communications to the enemy may put in jeopardy other front sectors not as yet consolidated. Where this occurs, timing of the withdrawal from particular sectors must take account of the over-all situation.

3. The course of the front must be calculated to facilitate billeting of the troops as well as defense and permit organization of a simplified supply system that would function also during the thaw season.

Switch and rear positions must be laid out and constructed as speedily as possible as field fortifications, drawing upon manpower wherever it can be found.

4. Within the framework of the essentially defensive pattern of operations, the following *special missions* must be accomplished:

(a) *Sevastopol* is to be seized as soon as possible; employment of the bulk of Eleventh Army (less the contingents required for coastal defense) will be decided after conclusion of fighting in that area.

(b) *Army Group, South* notwithstanding all difficulties must endeavor to achieve the conditions which, given favorable weather conditions, would permit it to launch an offensive to seize the lower Don-Donets line still during the winter. That would provide favorable conditions for the spring offensive aimed against the Caucasus.

(c) *Army Group, North* is to shorten its eastern and southeastern front north of Lake Ilmen without relinquishing the road and railroad line from Tikhvin to Volkhov and Kolchenavo [*Koltschanawo*] to the enemy, so as to provide the essential conditions for resolving the situation south of Lake Ladoga as soon as reinforcements arrive. Only thus can the final isolation of Leningrad and establishment of contact with the Finnish Karelian Army be assured.

(d) Should it be found that the enemy has withdrawn the bulk of his forces from the *coastal strip south of Kronstadt Bay* and no longer intends to put up any serious defense there, the shore in that area must be seized to economize forces.

## II. *Luftwaffe*:

1. *The mission of the Luftwaffe* shall be to disrupt rehabilitation of the Russian armed forces as much as possible by raids against the armament and training centers, especially Leningrad, Moscow, Shcherbakov, Gorki, Voronezh, Rostov, Stalingrad, Krasnodar, etc. Of particular importance is the continuing disruption of the lines of communication by which the enemy lives, and the utilization of which imperils our own front sectors. In addition to combating the enemy air force, all-out support must be given to the Army in the defense against enemy attacks on the ground and from the air.

2. The organization plan conforming with the Army Group boundaries submitted to me, and the strength of the *Luftwaffe* contingents scheduled to remain in the east have my approval. Where the situation may permit upon conclusion of the Army operations, individual units may be withdrawn for rehabilitation and training.

3. In order to provide for effective repulse of any winter offensives and allow for our planned winter operations (see I, 4), a ground organization shall be maintained to permit prompt shifting of forces and bringing up reinforcements from units withdrawn. To this end, the rehabilitation areas shall be organized as close as possible to the eastern front.

4. Continuous, complete and far-sweeping air reconnaissance is especially important for early detection and watching of regrouping movements of the enemy. The Army and the *Luftwaffe* shall supplement each other in this task through allocation of resources and missions.

5. I shall continue to reserve the right to authorize withdrawal from the front near Moscow of contingents still earmarked for commitment in the area of the Commander in Chief, South.<sup>1</sup>

6. Local forces must provide for the air defense of their own billeting and supply areas, and also for securing their important rear communications. In order to take effective countermeasures when concentrations of the enemy's attacking air arm have been identified, arrangements shall be made which will permit prompt formation of concentrations of our own fighter forces for interceptive action.

III. The *Navy* shall take steps to ensure that the sea route to Helsinki, which will be less hazardous after the seizure of Hangö and Osmussar [Ostrov], shall be available on a large scale for commercial navigation and supply movements for our forces in Finland.

The number of small vessels to be constructed at home and in the allied or occupied countries for supply operations (especially across the Black Sea and in the Aegean Sea) must still be substantially in-

<sup>1</sup> Field Marshal Kesselring. See document No. 535.

creased, setting aside all not absolutely vital demands and security considerations.

IV. *Personnel replacements* for the Wehrmacht in 1942 must be assured even in the event that casualties should run high. Since the 1922 age class alone will be insufficient, drastic measures are called for. I therefore order:

1. All personnel now on Wehrmacht assignments at home or on special missions (e.g., Wehrmacht mission in Rumania) that can be released must be made available for the fighting front through a sweeping retrenchment program.

Soldiers of younger age classes now in the Zone of the Interior or in rear services shall in that connection be exchanged for older frontline soldiers.

2. Regarding the exchanges between the eastern and western theaters of war, the following rules shall apply:

Fully employable divisions of the second and third wave stationed in the west shall be exchanged for exceptionally combat-worn divisions in the east. A temporary weakening in France, during the winter only, could be afforded in that conjunction.

Combat-experienced officers, non-commissioned officers and men from eastern divisions slated for disbanding may be assigned to such western divisions.

Whether additional western divisions which cannot be employed as units in the east shall be disbanded and used for replenishing tried eastern divisions shall be decided by me when I have before me the complete plan of the Army for its reorganization and disposition.

The combat efficiency of the Army in the west must in any event be kept up to the level of assuring protection of the coasts and execution of Operation *Attila*.<sup>2</sup>

3. Young workers with service exemptions must to the greatest possible extent be gradually replaced by prisoners and Russian civilian workers to be put to work in groups. Special directives to that end will be issued by the High Command of the Wehrmacht.<sup>3</sup>

ADOLF HITLER

<sup>2</sup> See vol. XI of this series, document No. 488.

<sup>3</sup> In Ritter's files on the USSR there is an interesting memorandum (1386/358843-46) dated Dec. 8, 1941, and entitled: "How can and will the Soviet Union continue the war in the Year 1942." The memorandum excluded either (a) collapse of the government through rebellion of the population and overthrow, or (b) capitulation and separate peace as long as such a man as Stalin was at the head of affairs and it forecast a continuation of delaying warfare in 1942. There is no signature to the document but Hilger's name is written at the top indicating that he was possibly the author. There is no indication of any circulation or distribution of the memorandum.



## No. 565

4475/E087960/61

*German-Swedish Agreement Regarding the Delivery of War Materials*

STOCKHOLM, December 8, 1941.

## SECRET PROTOCOL

[Ha. Pol. 8278 g.]<sup>1</sup>

Agreement was reached on the following:

## I

Subject to the conclusion of transactions between the German supply firms and the Swedish import authorities, the delivery of the following war material to Sweden is promised by Germany:<sup>2</sup>

1) Some 15,000 binoculars, 6 x 30, deliverable in 6-8 months after conclusion of the transaction, in about equal monthly installments;

2) Some 11,000 field telescopes from the firms of Zeiss, Busch, etc., deliverable as under 1);

3) Two thousand light machine guns with accessories and ammunition (quantity still to be determined) from the Brno [*Brünn*] Munitions Works; deliverable in some 6 equal monthly installments after transaction is concluded;

4) One hundred and ten light field howitzers 10.5 cm. with 300,000 rounds, deliverable at the rate of at least 8 pieces a month, beginning 1 month after the conclusion of the transaction, likewise 30,000 rounds a month; (Sweden's desire for an increase in the delivery to 140 pieces and 400,000 rounds is being considered by Germany);

5) Three batteries of 3 pieces each of 21-cm. long-barreled Skoda cannons (with 1350 half-armor shells and 1350 high-explosive shells).

Delivery beginning some 18 months after conclusion of the transaction at the rate of two guns a month; corresponding ammunition. (Sweden's desire to purchase a license for the manufacture of high-explosive shells instead of the delivery of 1350 units is being considered by Germany.)

6) Twenty-five million rounds of Pistol Ammunition Parabellum 08, deliverable in monthly installments of about 3 million rounds, beginning one month after conclusion of the transaction. (Sweden's desire for an increase to 50 million rounds is being studied by Germany.)

7) Up to 340 20-watt ultra shortwave transmitters and up to 940 receivers, as well as up to 50 Telefunken 15-watt instruments, deliveries to start in the second half of 1942;

8) Up to 1,300 Telefunken portable receivers, deliverable in 1943. (On figures 7 and 8, consideration is being given as to whether, in view of the long delivery periods, the manufacturing license may not be acquired instead.)

Ten percent of the purchase price of each German delivery will be paid by Sweden outside of the German-Swedish Clearing Agreement,<sup>3</sup> in Swedish kronor, converted at the official Berlin medium rate of exchange. These Swedish kronor may be freely used by Germany for payment within Sweden. The payment of the remaining 90 percent of the purchase price is to be made through the medium of the German-Swedish Clearing Agreement.

Sweden will see to it that the quantities of alloys and other non-ferrous metals, as well as other raw materials, of which there are limited stocks in Germany, such as rubber, which are needed for the manufacture of the equipment purchased, are supplied. Those raw materials which are supplied will be paid for by Germany through the medium of the German-Swedish Clearing Agreement.

## II

Germany will agree to the sale of the license to manufacture steel cartridge cases.

Germany will promise to expedite consideration of the possibility of supplying up to 600 field cars without tires, Type A 330, from the Klöckner-Humboldt-Deutz A.G., the Ulm factory.

## III

The war material purchased from Germany and the equipment, etc., manufactured as a result of the licensing will be used exclusively by the Swedish Army. The licenses will likewise be exploited only in Sweden.<sup>4</sup>

W. WALTER  
G. HÄGGLÖF

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 347 and footnote 2.

<sup>2</sup> The German-Swedish general economic agreement signed by Walter and Hägglöf (2116/460572-633) for the two governmental committees was not concluded until Dec. 19, beyond the scope of this volume.

<sup>3</sup> A general sketch of the agreement was submitted by the Legation in telegram No. 2125 of Dec. 14 (205/143123-30).

<sup>1</sup> The file number is supplied from a copy of the agreement in the files of Ministerialdirektor Wiehl (2116/460563-64).

<sup>2</sup> Cf. document No. 59.

## No. 566

482/231253

*Minute by an Official of the Department for German Internal Affairs*

BERLIN, December 8, 1941.

D III 664 g.

Minister Benzler, who is currently in Berlin, communicated the following by telephone:

In the plan for the further treatment of the matter of the Serbian Jews, a change had occurred since the conference in Belgrade,<sup>1</sup> in that the Jews now would not be sent to a Serbian island, but rather to the Zemun camp. The island previously under consideration is under water. The Croats had agreed to the Jews' being sent to Zemun as a temporary camp.

Minister Benzler requested on that account that the Jews should be taken away to the east at the earliest. I replied that this was completely out of the question before next spring because the deportation of the Jews from Germany had priority. Even next spring such a transfer would still be doubtful.

Herewith submitted to Under State Secretary Luther with the request that the contents be noted.

RADEMACHER

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 425.

## No. 567

32/25088-90

*The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

Tokyo, December 9, 1941—2:30 a. m.

No. 2690 of December 8

Received December 10—1:40 p. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

The Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs received me this afternoon and told me that he also wanted to inform me personally of the great decision taken by the Japanese Government to enter the war, after the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs<sup>1</sup> had already given me this morning a summary of the development of the Japanese-American conversations and the memorandum delivered to the American Government.<sup>2</sup> He would ask me to take note of the facts

<sup>1</sup> Haruhiko Nishi.<sup>2</sup> Reported by Ott in telegram No. 2676 of Dec. 8 (32/25054). For a published text of the Japanese memorandum handed to Secretary Hull on Dec. 7, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941*, vol. II, pp. 787-792.

represented in these papers. Japan had by Imperial Rescript declared war on America and the British Empire this morning. The Japanese Government had issued a statement relating thereto, of which I probably had knowledge also.<sup>3</sup>

I told the Japanese Foreign Minister that I felt certain that Japan's great and momentous decision was attended by the best wishes of the entire German people. The first reports received about the military actions indicated that the first Japanese operation had been a great success.

Togo replied, thanking me from his heart for my wishes in this fateful hour. This war, as the documents made clear, was a war forced upon Japan. The Japanese people would carry it through with the most resolute determination. The Japanese Government now expected Germany on her part to declare war on America very soon, and he would ask me to convey this wish of the Japanese Government to Berlin. Ambassador Oshima had received a similar instruction.<sup>4</sup> The Minister further stated that Oshima had also been given the necessary instructions relating to an agreement to act only jointly in concluding peace or an armistice.

In accordance with telegram No. 2282 of December 6<sup>5</sup> I replied that the Axis Powers and Japan find themselves faced with a struggle upon which hangs their fate, which they must fight through together and regardless of the form of the tactical moves taken by one or the other partner in the individual case. I would not fail to convey immediately to my Government Japan's wish for a speedy declaration of war.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram No. 2684 of Dec. 8 (32/25064-66) Ott had forwarded the English text of the Imperial Rescript concerning the Japanese declaration of war on the United States and Great Britain. According to a memorandum of Dec. 8 by Siegfried (32/25059), the Japanese Embassy informed Weizsäcker by telephone on Dec. 8 that the Imperial Rescript regarding the declaration of war had been issued.<sup>4</sup> No record of such a démarche carried out by Oshima has been found in the German Foreign Ministry files. What appears to be Oshima's account of the matter is found in the following intercepted telegram sent by him to Tokyo on Dec. 8 the text of which is printed in *Pearl Harbor Attack*, pt. 12, Joint Committee Exhibits Nos. 1-6, p. 253:<sup>5</sup> "At 1:00 p.m. today (8th) I called on Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and told him our wish was to have Germany and Italy issue formal declarations of war on America at once. Ribbentrop replied that Hitler was then in the midst of a conference at general headquarters discussing how the formalities of declaring war could be carried out so as to make a good impression on the German people and that he would transmit your wish to him at once and do whatever he was able to have it carried out promptly. At that time Ribbentrop told me that on the morning of the 8th Hitler issued orders to the entire German Navy to attack American ships whenever and wherever they may meet them.<sup>6</sup> "It goes without saying that this is only for your secret information."<sup>7</sup> Cf. Ribbentrop's statement after the war regarding Hitler's attitude toward the question of a German declaration of war on the United States in *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, vol. x, pp. 297-298; *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, Supplement B, pp. 1199-1200.<sup>8</sup> Document No. 551.

The Foreign Minister also told me that no declaration of war had as yet been received from the Dutch Government.

With British troops having been the first to cross the southern border into Thailand, Japanese forces had also been landed in the south of Thailand. No detailed reports were available as yet about the attitude of the Thai Government. But Japan had been able to reach a peaceful agreement with Thailand today.

No change had occurred in the relations between Japan and the Soviet Union. In reply to my question what the Japanese Government intended to do about possible American arms shipments in Russian ships to Vladivostok, Togo replied that according to the information of the Japanese Government, only very minor quantities of arms had been shipped by this route to date. This issue, which I had raised with him on several occasions, was rather complex. He would like to ask me not to require him to go further into it at this time, as he was still studying it.

The Foreign Minister, who had displayed a very serious manner throughout the conversation, then stated that the Japanese Government was viewing the over-all situation with calm. It was hoped that the attack on Hawaii would deter the Americans from a thrust into the western Pacific Ocean. For that reason the Japanese Government intended to order no blackout and carry on without declaring a state of siege. The Japanese Government was well aware that the war might be very long and hard.

In conclusion I expressed to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs my wish for closest cooperation and sincerest friendship, and my hope for an early successful conclusion of the armed conflict in which we were standing side by side. The Minister assured me that he, too, was hoping for very close and sincere cooperation.

OTT

No. 568

111/115667-68

*The Ambassador in Japan to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

MOST URGENT TOKYO, December 9, 1941—8:20 a. m., summer time.  
No. 2699 Received December 9—10:10 p. m.

For the Reich Foreign Minister.

With reference to your telegram No. 2294 of December 8.<sup>1</sup>

Immediately after the decoding of the clear text had been finished, I gave the Foreign Minister the draft agreement and asked for speedy concurrence in accordance with instructions. The Foreign Minister

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 562.

stressed that the Japanese Government attached the greatest importance to having it signed and published as quickly as possible.

He hoped to be able to wire Ambassador Oshima the final text and full powers in the early afternoon of Wednesday,<sup>2</sup> Japanese time. In order to secure the prompt assent of the Privy Council and Emperor he requested our acceptance, by tonight at the latest, of the following two proposals which he considers indispensable for the Privy Council:

I. In article 3:

a. More precise definition of the term "just new order" possibly by adding "in accordance with the Tripartite Pact."

b. Obligation of *immediate* cooperation possibly by inserting "also" after the words "Japan will."

2. In article 4:

Timing of the agreement in accordance with the Tripartite Pact, as is said to have been provided for in a supposedly earlier draft.

In order to guarantee the long-range cooperation envisaged in article 3, one could possibly include a supplement to the effect that the contracting parties are to arrange for the continuation of the cooperation before expiration of the agreement.

The Foreign Minister insisted on the necessity of such additions, in spite of the fact that I had urgently requested, for the sake of gaining time, that the German draft be agreed to.

Since the draft and any explanations of the text had not yet been received from Ambassador Oshima, I agreed to request a speedy statement of the position of the Reich Foreign Minister. The Foreign Minister asked finally when the German declaration of war on the U.S.A. was to be expected. I said that I was not informed, but that I considered it possible that Germany and Italy intended to announce the actual existence of a state of war with the U.S.A. through the publication of the agreement now under consideration. The Foreign Minister stressed in this connection that Japan particularly desired a formal declaration of war with a subsequent publication of the agreement.<sup>3</sup>

OTT

<sup>2</sup> Dec. 10.<sup>3</sup> Cf. Foreign Minister Togo's account of this conversation in his intercepted telegrams of Dec. 9 to Oshima, the texts of which are printed in *Pearl Harbor Attack*, pt. 35, Proceedings of Clausen Investigation, pp. 691-692.

## No. 569

F6/0122-29

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat*

RAM 64 g. Rs.

BERLIN, December 10, 1941.

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND  
AMBASSADOR ALFIERI IN BERLIN ON DECEMBER 9, 1941

Ambassador Alfieri explained that he had requested an appointment with the Foreign Minister pursuant to the telegraphic instruction received from Count Ciano to ascertain the position taken by Germany on Japan's acts against America and England and to inquire about the meeting between Reichsmarschall Göring and Pétain.<sup>1</sup>

The Foreign Minister replied that he himself had received a detailed report on the Göring-Pétain meeting only today, after the Reichsmarschall's return. He had already sent an informatory telegram to Herr von Mackensen so that he could acquaint the Duce and Count Ciano with the facts.<sup>2</sup> It would also be possible for him to make that informatory telegram available to Ambassador Alfieri.

Concerning Japan's acts against America and England he had already talked directly with Count Ciano by telephone, telling him that these developments were of momentous significance and cause for congratulations on the part of the Axis.<sup>3</sup> He hoped that the Japanese would be able to deliver a decisive blow, and he had learned with deep satisfaction from Oshima<sup>4</sup> that two battleships, among them the *West Virginia* had already been sunk by the Japanese.

Japan had launched large-scale operations, attacked Pearl Harbor in the Hawaiian Islands and Manila in the Philippines, and in addition had made a landing on the Malay Peninsula as a preliminary to the assault on Singapore. This was of the highest importance. Also, Hong Kong had been attacked, and Guam had been seized.

The essential thing was that Japan now was in the fighting on the side of the Axis. This was a heavy blow for America and worse even for England. It represented the most important event to develop since the beginning of the war.

<sup>1</sup> See document No. 529.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram No. 3318 of Dec. 8 (2281/480963-66) in which Ribbentrop directed Mackensen orally to inform Ciano about the Göring-Pétain meeting before Ciano's departure for his meeting at Turin with Darlan.

In telegram No. 3200 of Dec. 8 (1206/331854) Mackensen reported that he had informed Ciano and in telegram No. 3211 of Dec. 9 (1206/331857-59) that he had informed Mussolini.

<sup>3</sup> The telephone conversation is referred to in document No. 563. Cf. *The Ciano Diaries*, entry for Dec. 8, 1941.

<sup>4</sup> This subject came up in the Ribbentrop-Oshima discussions of Dec. 8, referred to in document No. 562 and footnote 1.

Concluding, the Foreign Minister noted that certain questions were still being studied on the German side and that he might possibly see Alfieri once more later in the day in order to let him have the picture of things. It concerned an arrangement to be executed, for which Alfieri would need full powers.

Following this, Alfieri brought up a personal matter. He related, with some agitation, that on the occasion of the luncheon given by the Führer for the signers of the Anti-Comintern Pact, the Reichsmarschall had made a complaint to Count Ciano about the Italian Embassy. The Reichsmarschall stated that one of his officers had been told in Italy by a prominent Italian that rumors were being spread by the Italian Embassy in Berlin that the Reichsmarschall no longer had the confidence of the Führer. The Reichsmarschall had shown great indignation to Count Ciano over those rumors. Ciano immediately told him that to his knowledge nothing of such a nature had ever been mentioned in any report received from Berlin, but promised that he would institute a thorough investigation of the matter.

Apparently the Reichsmarschall had also complained to the Führer about these rumors for he (Alfieri) attributed to this the exceedingly warm words which the Führer used when he referred to the Reichsmarschall in his talk with Ciano.

Ciano had now written a letter to the Reichsmarschall regarding the incident and instructed Alfieri to deliver the letter in person. Because of the Reichsmarschall's absence this had not been possible so that he (Alfieri) had arranged for transmission of Ciano's letter together with a letter of his own to the Reichsmarschall by other means. Alfieri added to this report the remark that he felt personally involved by the action of the Reichsmarschall because as chief of the Italian Embassy he naturally bore the responsibility for everything that happened within his jurisdiction. After the earlier episodes<sup>5</sup> he would thus once more become the object of a complaint from the German side. It appeared most serious to him that the Reichsmarschall had said nothing directly to him about the case. He could state categorically that none of the official reports dispatched from the Embassy in Berlin had contained anything whatever about a disturbance of the confidential relationship between the Führer and the Reichsmarschall. He felt himself to be unjustly suspected and, considering the other complaints voiced against him on a previous occasion, found himself so compromised in his position as Ambassador that confronted with these developments he appealed to the Reich Minister for protection.

The Reich Minister then raised the question as to what could be the explanation that rumors of such a nature about the Italian Embassy kept coming from Rome; whether he (Alfieri) could indeed fully rely on the staff at his Embassy; and whether he knew for a certainty that

<sup>5</sup> See documents Nos. 409, 411, and 446.

none of the outgoing reports or other written materials had included anything of that kind.

Alferi first asserted with great assurance that it was utterly impossible for Embassy reports to have contained anything of that nature about the Reichsmarschall, because all outgoing reports were examined by him.

When the Reich Minister reverted to his earlier suggestion and specifically recalled an instance in the past which also seemed to have involved a member of the Italian Embassy staff, who must have possessed accurate information on everything that went on, Alferi became a little less sure. He observed that the Italian Embassy comprised a staff of 100 persons, of whom only 13 or 14, however, were actually members of the diplomatic corps, and he seemed to concede the possibility that someone was sending reports or writing letters behind his back of which he was ignorant.

Upon the Foreign Minister's repeatedly reiterated suggestion that it was strange indeed that such rumors about the Italian Embassy should keep cropping up in Rome and that there might be someone there who was ill-disposed toward him, Alferi finally did admit that being a former cabinet minister, he naturally had political enemies and those might be spreading things of that kind.

Finally he presented a carbon copy of the letter to the Reichsmarschall and of his own covering letter, asking that they be treated in strict confidence, and in a state of considerable agitation he continued to complain about the injustice done to him.

In closing the Reich Minister promised that he would straighten out the matter with the Reichsmarschall.

SCHMIDT

No. 570

252/164786-88

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassies in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, and to the Legation in Peru*

Telegram

MOST URGENT

BERLIN, December 10, 1941—11:50 p. m.

TOP SECRET

RAM 259

To Buenos Aires No. 1469

To Lima No. 370

To Rio de Janeiro No. 2334

To Santiago No. 599

Please call on the Foreign Minister at your post on December 11, toward noon, and inform him that the policy of the President of the

United States of America has now led to an open state of war between the United States of America on one side and Japan, the German Reich, and Italy on the other, after the United States has for some time already engaged in actual warlike acts against Germany and Italy, as has been known to the Government there. I request that you explain once more to the Foreign Minister at your post the political developments which have led to this situation, stressing the exclusive responsibility of President Roosevelt and that you refer to the official German statements which will be made tomorrow in the course of the day.<sup>1</sup>

Following that, please tell the Foreign Minister that we are fully convinced that the Government will not let itself be dislodged from its policy of neutrality, which it has followed so far, by the machinations of the policy of the United States which, in many respects, is contrary to the vital interests and the independence of the Latin American countries. It would be superfluous to stress that there was not the slightest cause to institute a change in the hitherto existing relationship between the Government and ourselves. The Government at your post was, of course, well enough informed to what extent all allegations of supposedly hostile intentions by Germany against Central and South American states were invented and belonged to the realm of fantasy in order to hide the selfish designs of the United States for the subjugation of the South American continent.<sup>2</sup>

Please report on the reception of your démarche.<sup>3</sup>

This instruction goes to Buenos Aires, Lima, Rio de Janeiro, and Santiago.

RIBBENTROP

<sup>1</sup> See documents Nos. 572, 577, and 578 and footnote 9.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. document No. 158.

<sup>3</sup> For the reply from Buenos Aires, see document No. 575.

In his reply from Lima, telegram No. 703 of Dec. 11 (229/154290) Noebel, the German Minister, reported that the question of Peruvian neutrality would be decided by the Government and that it would most likely consult with other Latin American countries in this matter.

The reply from Santiago, telegram No. 744 of Dec. 11 (197/88423-24) stressed the pessimistic mood of the Chilean Foreign Minister and the dependence of Chile on the United States.

As to Brazil, Prüfer, in telegram No. 248 of Dec. 11 (235/157342) mentioned the Pan-American commitments of the country which, by necessity, had an adverse influence on German-Brazilian relations in the current crisis. Brazil would certainly proclaim its solidarity with the United States.

No. 571

64/44747

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Japan*

Telegram

PRIORITY  
 MOST URGENT  
 No. 2307  
 RAM 253

BERLIN, December 10, 1941.

With reference to your telegram 2699 of December 9.<sup>1</sup>

Please inform the Foreign Minister at once that the Reich Government agrees to all of the changes in the draft agreement which he has proposed.<sup>2</sup> Thus the amended articles 3 and 4 would receive the following wording:

"Article 3.

"Germany, Italy, and Japan will also cooperate very closely after a victorious conclusion of the war for the purpose of bringing about a just new order in accordance with the Tripartite Pact concluded by them on September 27, 1940.

"Article 4.

"This agreement shall enter into force immediately upon its signature and shall remain valid as long as the Tripartite Pact of September 27, 1940. The High Contracting Parties shall consult with one another in due time prior to the expiration of this term of validity concerning the further form of their cooperation provided for in article 3 of this agreement."

Please insist once more with the utmost vigor that Ambassador Oshima be issued full powers to sign the agreement in this version without any further delay and that they arrive here in any case by Wednesday noon at the latest.<sup>3</sup>

RIBBENTROP

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 568.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram No. 3212 of Dec. 10 (1206/331860) Mackensen informed the Foreign Ministry of Italy's assent to the charges proposed by Japan.

In telegram No. 2308 of Dec. 10 (64/44748) Ribbentrop directed Ott to inform Togo of the Italian concurrence with the proposed changes.

<sup>3</sup> In his reply telegram No. 2712 of Dec. 10 (111/115682) Ott reported that Togo would make every effort to have the proposed text accepted by the Cabinet, the Privy Council, and the Emperor by 7:00 p. m., Japanese time, of the same day and to send Oshima full powers by telegraph right away. Copies of Oshima's full powers in German translation as sent from Tokyo on Dec. 10 are in the files (2871/564947-48). See *Pearl Harbor Attack*, pt. 35, Proceedings of the Clausen Investigation, pp. 690-691.

No. 572

64/44825-29

*The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in the United States*<sup>1</sup>

Telegram

MOST URGENT  
 TOP SECRET  
 Priority Handling  
 No. 2391

BERLIN, December 10, 1941.  
 RAM 257.

For the Chargé d'Affaires personally.

On December 11, at 3:30 p.m., German summer time, please deliver to Mr. Hull or, in case he cannot be reached, to his representative, a copy of the following note which I shall deliver an hour earlier to the American Chargé d'Affaires<sup>2</sup> here:

"Mr. Chargé d'Affaires: The Government of the United States of America having violated in the most flagrant manner and in ever increasing measure all rules of neutrality in favor of the adversaries of Germany and having continually been guilty of the most severe provocations toward Germany ever since the outbreak of the European War, provoked by the British declaration of war against Germany on September 3, 1939, has finally resorted to open military acts of aggression.

"On September 11, 1941,<sup>3</sup> the President of the United States of America publicly declared that he had ordered the American Navy and Air Force to shoot on sight at any German war vessel. In his speech of October 27, 1941,<sup>4</sup> he once more expressly affirmed that this order was in force.

"Acting under this order, vessels of the American Navy, since early September 1941, have systematically attacked German naval forces. Thus, American destroyers, as for instance the *Greer*, the *Kearney* and the *Reuben James*, have opened fire on German submarines according to plan. The Secretary of the American Navy, Mr. Knox, himself confirmed that American destroyers attacked German submarines.

"Furthermore, the naval forces of the United States of America under order of their Government and contrary to international law have treated and seized German merchant vessels on the high seas as enemy ships.

"The German Government therefore establishes the following facts:

"Although Germany on her part has strictly adhered to the rules of international law in her relations with the United States of Amer-

<sup>1</sup> The text of this instruction was sent by Rintelen to the Embassy in Italy in telegram No. 3358 of Dec. 10 (64/44819-24).

<sup>2</sup> Leland B. Morris. See document No. 577.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 304, footnote 1.

<sup>4</sup> See document No. 439, footnote 2.

ica during every period of the present war, the Government of the United States of America from initial violations of neutrality has finally proceeded to open acts of war against Germany. It has thereby virtually created a state of war.

"The Government of the Reich consequently discontinues diplomatic relations with the United States of America and declares that in these circumstances brought about by President Roosevelt Germany too, as from today, considers herself as being in a state of war with the United States of America.

"Accept Mr. Chargé d'Affaires, the expression of my high consideration. RIBBENTROP."

Following this, please ask for your passports and request proper repatriation to Europe for Embassy personnel and include as many press and other representatives as possible. Please entrust the protection of German interests to the Swiss Minister in Washington<sup>5</sup> who will receive appropriate instruction from his Government.

Please ensure that, before carrying out the foregoing instruction there is no contact whatsoever between the Embassy and the State Department. ~~We want to avoid absolutely the American Government's stealing a march upon us by taking a step of that kind.~~<sup>6</sup> For that reason no official communication from the State Department must be accepted before your démarche is made.

Immediate acknowledgment of receipt of this order is requested.<sup>7</sup> The secret transmitter is to be destroyed beyond recognition, the entire cipher material at your post is to be destroyed and its destruction is to be reported to us.

RIBBENTROP

<sup>5</sup> Charles Bruggmann.

<sup>6</sup> The passage scored through was deleted before the telegram was dispatched.

<sup>7</sup> Sent by Thomsen in telegram No. 4337 of Dec. 10 (64/44814). The note was handed by Thomsen to Ray Atherton, Chief of the European Division of the Department of State on Dec. 11 at 9:30 a. m. See Department of State, *Bulletin*, 1941, vol. v, p. 480.

## No. 573

898/292102

*Memorandum by an Official of Political Division IM*

TOP SECRET

DECEMBER 10, 1941.

Pol. IM 3514 g. Rs.

Counselor of Legation von Welck reports as follows:

The Führer has decided that the conversation begun by the Reichsmarschall with Pétain<sup>1</sup> is to be continued and that the Wehrmacht Operations Staff is available to the Reichsmarschall for this purpose.

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 529.

The French Armistice Commission is to be informed<sup>2</sup> that the Reichsmarschall would be willing to receive the Colonial Minister, Admiral Platon, as the representative of the French Government, and the Commander in Chief in North Africa, General Juin, to discuss the plan for the defense of Africa. The French are to be asked to submit plans, particularly how they visualize a military collaboration in the defense of the African colonial possessions.<sup>3</sup>

KRAMARZ

<sup>2</sup> Marginal notes: "Through whom? Wako Wiesbaden? R[itter]."

"Yes. Notification was delivered today (Dec. 10). Text is on the way.

G[rote]."

The text of this note has been filmed on 898/292097.

<sup>3</sup> Marginal notes: "H. Kramarz. Has Abetz been notified (only for his own information!) R[itter], Dec. 10."

"Yes, this has been done with Ang. II [Grote]."

The draft of the telegram to Paris has been filmed on 898/292103.

## No. 574

205/143125-26

*The Legation in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

STOCKHOLM, December 11, 1941—1:20 p. m.

No. 2099 of December 11

Received December 12—1:45 a. m.

For the Foreign Minister.

Following a long conversation yesterday with Foreign Minister von Günther regarding our wishes in the military field<sup>1</sup> this afternoon I gave the King, who had come to the city for this reason, the Führer's letter.<sup>2</sup> Foreign Minister von Günther and Minister Prinz zu Wied were present. The King, who at once opened and read the letter, did not of his own accord, except for comments of general assent, go into its contents.

The ensuing conversation, which lasted about half an hour, provided an opportunity, however, for speaking with the King in greater detail about the role of Sweden in the fight against Bolshevism, and to interest him in this connection in our wishes in the military field. The most important open question, the transportation of men on leave and exchange troops from northern Finland through Sweden to Germany and back was gone into further. The King related how it had been owing only to his personal intervention that the question of the transportation in the summer of troops through Sweden had been settled in accordance with our wishes,<sup>3</sup> and how also in September the 2d divi-

<sup>1</sup> No record of this conversation has been found.

<sup>2</sup> Document No. 554.

<sup>3</sup> See document No. 16.

sion, under convoy by the Swedish Navy, had been transported through Swedish territorial waters.<sup>4</sup> With respect to our present wishes, his response, with Günther's support, was rather negative.<sup>5</sup> The King referred to the English declaration of war on Finland<sup>6</sup> and the state of the war between Germany and the United States,<sup>7</sup> in order to point up the everincreasing dangers that were threatening Sweden's neutrality. Günther objected that England and America would see in the permission to transport troops from and to northern Finland a breach of neutrality and a participation in the military operations. In conclusion the King referred to the difficult internal political situation. Even if the Swedish Government withdrew its objections, it would be repudiated by the Riksdag. To my objection that the Swedish people would certainly understand a fulfillment of the German request, just as had been the case in the summer, the King replied that unfortunately the Riksdag was not the Swedish people.

The King will consider the matter tomorrow in council with the Cabinet. There is probably not much prospect of a positive decision, particularly since the Swedish Government a few days ago again took a negative stand with regard to the Finnish Government, and the objection is repeatedly made by Sweden that there is no urgent necessity of routing these transports through Sweden since, with an appropriate shifting, they could be routed through Finland as well.

Further telegraphic report will follow.

SCHNURRE  
WIED

### No. 575

233/156848-49

*The Ambassador in Argentina to the Foreign Ministry*

Telegram

SECRET BUENOS AIRES, December 11, 1941—5:52 p. m.  
No. 2092 of December 11 Received December 12—3:10 a. m.

With reference to your telegram No. 1469 of December 10.<sup>1</sup>

I called on the Foreign Minister this morning as instructed and made the oral statements called for by the above telegraphic instruction. The Foreign Minister noted with great seriousness the news of the state of war existing between Germany and the U.S.A. but de-

<sup>1</sup> Document No. 570.

clined to take any stand on the German judgment of the policy of the U.S.A. and of President Roosevelt.

With regard to the future development of German-Argentine relations the Foreign Minister stated that those principles of solidarity, mutual assistance, and joint defense which had steadily been developed in the course of the various Pan-American conferences and had been adopted by the Argentine Government were decisive for Argentine foreign policy in the present war. For this reason Argentina was continuing the consultations with the other American Governments and would participate in the Pan-American conference which would be held in Rio de Janeiro perhaps before the end of December.

From these statements by the Foreign Minister and other reports which I have received, I believe I may conclude that the present Argentine Government will for the time being strive as far as possible to continue the policy of neutrality within the framework of the Pan-American agreements, as is also indicated among other things by the assumption of the protection of British interests in Japan. The actual course of the American consultations and the impending decision of the conference in Rio de Janeiro, where Argentina can hardly isolate herself, cannot yet be foreseen, however.

Same text to Berlin, Lima, Santiago de Chile, Rio de Janeiro.

THERMANN

### No. 576

1551/377199-200

*The Foreign Minister to the Legations in Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Slovakia*<sup>1</sup>

Telegram

1. To Budapest No. 2360
2. To Bucharest No. 3520
3. To Sofia No. 1992
4. To Zagreb No. 1484
5. To Bratislava No. 1397

BERLIN, December 11, 1941.

Please approach the Government at your post after consultation with your Italian colleague, who is receiving corresponding instructions from Rome, and state the following:

In consequence of the generally known aggressive acts of the United States the Axis Powers have declared themselves to be in a state of war with that country. Thus the prerequisites exist for the application of article 3 of the Tripartite Pact. In the opinion of the German and

<sup>1</sup> The text of this instruction was forwarded by Sonnleithner to the Embassy in Italy in telegram No. 3380 of Dec. 11 (1551/377201).



Italian Governments this establishes the obligation of the Government concerned for its part, to declare war on the United States at once. In this connection we do not consider entry into a state of war to be merely a break in diplomatic relations but the formal declaration that a state of war exists. Although no military consequences would result from this for the Government at your post, it is nevertheless of the greatest importance politically that all of the Powers associated with the Tripartite Pact should without hesitation give expression to their solidarity in an unmistakable manner.

*Supplement only for Zagreb, Sofia, Bratislava:*

At the same time I request you to suggest to the Government at your post to declare itself to be in a state of war with England, too, since considering the development of the situation as a whole, a separation between war against England and war against the United States no longer appears possible.

*For 1 to 5:*

Please wire your report at once.

*Supplement only for Budapest, Bucharest, Sofia:*

We have informed the Japanese Government of our intention to make this démarche with the Government at your post and have suggested that it instruct its Legation concerned to make the same démarche. However, please do not delay the execution of your démarche for this reason.

RIBBENTROP

No. 577

F7/0308-06

*Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat*

RAM 65 g. Rs.

BERLIN, December 11, 1941.

RECORD OF THE DELIVERY BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER TO THE AMERICAN CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES MORRIS OF THE GERMAN DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST THE UNITED STATES

On December 11, 1941, at 2:18 p. m., the Foreign Minister received the American Chargé d'Affaires Morris in his office at Wilhelmstrasse 74 and, standing, read the following statement:

[Here follows the text of the note printed in document No. 572, p. 999.]

The Foreign Minister added that President Roosevelt had consistently followed a policy aimed at war. Now he had got the war he desired.

Morris, who had quietly listened to the reading of the statement and the additional remark by the Foreign Minister, then requested per-

mission to notify his Government immediately by telegraph. He was granted this permission by the Foreign Minister and this ended the visit at 2:21 p. m.<sup>1</sup>

SCHMIDT

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. I, pp. 588-589.

No. 578

2281/482787-91

*Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy*

ROME, December 11, 1941.

At 4:30 p. m. yesterday the Reich Foreign Minister telephoned me personally and asked me to go to the Duce at once and inform him by order of the Führer that the latter intended to convene the Reichstag tomorrow at 3:00 p. m. and at this occasion to make public the Italo-German treaty<sup>1</sup> with Japan and the statements which are to precede it and which were arranged between us and the Italians.<sup>2</sup> The Foreign Minister added that the Führer wished thereby to suggest to the Duce to take similar action here if necessary.

The Reich Foreign Minister stated further that he personally would summon the American Chargé d'Affaires at 2:30 p. m., that is, half an hour before the meeting of the Reichstag and would make him the statement that on account of the developments brought about by President Roosevelt and the resulting situation the Reich considered itself to be in a state of war with the United States as of December 11.

The Reich Foreign Minister asked me to telephone him again personally as soon as the instruction had been carried out.

He added further that it would probably also interest the Duce if I informed him that according to reports received in Berlin not only the two big English battleships had been sunk,<sup>3</sup> but that in addition the Japanese fleet had already inflicted large losses on the American fleet in battle. Two battleships had been sunk and 4 damaged; 3 Class A cruisers had been destroyed and also a number of destroyers and torpedo boats.

<sup>1</sup> The signed copies in German, Italian, and Japanese of the "Agreement between Germany, Italy and Japan regarding joint conduct of the war against the United States and England until the victorious conclusion, signed in Berlin on Dec. 11, 1941", together with copies of Oshima's and Alfieri's full powers are filed on serial (2871/564945-59).

<sup>2</sup> See document No. 563 and footnote 3. The Italian version of this statement in the form approved by Mussolini had been forwarded by Mackensen in telegram No. 3215 of Dec. 10 (1206/331868-70).

<sup>3</sup> The British battleship *Prince of Wales* and the battle cruiser *Repulse* were sunk by Japanese air and naval forces on Dec. 10 east of the Malay coast.

The Reich Foreign Minister then went into considerable detail concerning the change in the situation brought about by Japan's action, which he termed extremely fortunate.

I called on the Duce at 5:30 p. m.; he received me at once, interrupting a council of ministers. He received my communication with the greatest interest and asked me to thank the Führer and the Foreign Minister sincerely for their special kindness in providing him with this information, the content of which interested him exceedingly. He did not plan to have a similar function here on December 11, but would limit himself to following the Führer's speech on the radio, as he always did. Here the matter would develop as follows: At 2:30 p. m. Count Ciano would receive the American Chargé d'Affaires<sup>4</sup> and deliver to him orally the statement (given me by Lanza d'Ajeta)<sup>5</sup> without any further explanation which, after all, was adequately supplied in the introduction to the German-Italian-Japanese treaty agreed between us. When I asked what arrangements the Duce expected to make as regards the time of publication by Italy, he discussed the various possibilities with me and came to the conclusion that from the Italian standpoint it was best to time the announcement for 3:00 o'clock, because the [news of the] reception of the American by Count Ciano would certainly spread through the city like wildfire. I pointed out to him that that might possibly anticipate the announcement by the Führer, a situation which Berlin surely wanted to avoid in any case. Consequently it appeared better to me at most to let the press go into action at 3:00 o'clock but the radio only at 3:30. Perhaps it would be even more practical considering the Führer's speech to consider 4:00 o'clock as the time. The Duce asked me to find out what Berlin's wishes were in this regard, but stressed once more than 3:00 and 3:30 seemed best to him. I promised to let him know at once as soon as I had an answer from Berlin.

As the Duce explained, the Italian announcement is to occur in this order:

1. The communiqué concerning the reception of the American Chargé d'Affaires by Count Ciano.
2. The introductory statements,
- and 3. (after a short connecting sentence) the text of the German-Italian-Japanese treaty.

In concluding the conversation the Duce stressed that he found our draft for the introductory statements quite excellent.

He received with great interest my communications concerning the reports about Japanese successes also with respect to the American fleet and then spoke at considerable length about the different moral

<sup>4</sup> George Wadsworth.

<sup>5</sup> Forwarded in Rome telegram No. 3228 of Dec. 10 (64/44807). For the text of Ciano's statement as delivered to the American Chargé d'Affaires, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. I, pp. 589-590.

fighting value of the Japanese and the American nations, as well as about the person of President Roosevelt, who at the age of 40 years—a case that occurred only once in 10 million people, as the doctors had assured him—had contracted infantile paralysis, a fact which had a decisive effect on his mental condition.

In a short conversation with Lanza d'Ajeta that followed, the latter asked me the question what time of day we would put in the statement as determining the start of the state of war. I replied to him that I would inquire about this in Berlin and inform him at once regarding this and likewise concerning the question of the exact hour of the announcement (whether 3:00 or 4:00 o'clock).

In reply to my telephone call to Berlin immediately thereafter, I was told that the Foreign Minister was resting at the moment and did not want to be disturbed. He was said to persist in the idea of talking with me personally about the conversation with the Duce, but to request for the moment that I report the outcome even at this time. I briefly sketched the contents of the conversation for Counselor of Legation Weber,<sup>6</sup> who was at the telephone, so that it could be reported to the Foreign Minister, and stated in this connection that I could not be reached by telephone during the next hour because I had to go to a large reception given by the Japanese Ambassador which had been arranged some time ago independent of the present events. Counselor of Legation Weber asked me for the telephone number of the Japanese Embassy in any case, which I gave him, and he promised to inform me very soon regarding Lanza d'Ajeta's two questions.

Since no telephone call had come from Berlin even by the evening, I again called from here at 8:30 p.m. and received the information from Herr Weber that the Foreign Minister had been with the Führer again for some time and therefore could not be reached at the moment. As far as the question about the time of the start of the state of war was concerned, the German statement which was to be handed to the American Chargé d'Affaires contained only the phrase: "as from today."<sup>7</sup> They asked me to insist in all circumstances on the hour of 4:00 p.m. at the earliest as the time for the announcement. I pointed out that in the meantime the Duce, of his own accord, would certainly have set 3:00 o'clock for the press and 3:30 for the radio, as several hours had passed since my inquiry, but I would still try to get a change in accordance with the Berlin wishes.

Immediately after this telephone conversation, Minister Schmidt (Press) called and insisted for his part, too, on the time of 4:00 p.m. I thereupon got in contact with Count Ciano's secretariat, but reached only Signor de Ferrariis there, who, however, told me that Marchese

<sup>6</sup> Of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat.

<sup>7</sup> See documents Nos. 572 and 577.

d'Ajeta had received unlimited authorization from the Duce to come to an agreement with me regarding the time in accordance with our wishes. We thereupon arranged definitely that the Italian press and radio would be informed at 4:00 p.m. at the earliest. I further informed him that our statement to the American did not contain any time of day but only the phrase "as from today." That meant that we considered the state of war as having begun as of December 11, 1941, at 0:00 hours. Signor de Ferrariis confirmed that the Italians would conform with our statement in theirs.

I then informed Counselor of Legation Weber accordingly.

This morning at 9:10 a.m. at the Termini Station prior to the arrival of Count Ciano, I gave Marchese d'Ajeta, the draft of our instructions to the Chargé d'Affaires in Washington,<sup>8</sup> concerning the delivery of a copy of the Foreign Minister's statement to the Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin, which I had received at 3:15 a.m.; and I made sure with him once more that now everything had been arranged between us regarding the course of today's events,<sup>9</sup> and I also told Count Ciano this after his arrival.

Marchese d'Ajeta informed me at 10:50 a. m. that Count Ciano had given the Italian Ambassador in Washington in a very urgent priority telegram the same instructions<sup>10</sup> that had been sent to our Chargé by the Foreign Ministry.

MACKENSEN

<sup>8</sup> See document No. 572 and footnote 1.

<sup>9</sup> In a subsequent memorandum of Dec. 11 (2281/482786) Mackensen recorded that having been informed at 12:30 p.m. that Mussolini would address a crowd from the balcony of the Palazzo Venezia at 2:45 p.m., he took up this matter with d'Ajeta. D'Ajeta assured Mackensen that Mussolini had already informed Hitler through Alfieri that he had decided on such an action "in the interest of a common approach in this matter" but that he would only speak a few words to the crowd. D'Ajeta confirmed to Mackensen that Mussolini's speech would be brief and would not conflict with Hitler's address to the Reichstag set for 3:00 p.m.

For the text of Hitler's speech of Dec. 11 see *Dokumente der Deutschen Politik* (1944), vol. ix, pt. 2, pp. 499-536; for the text of Mussolini's speech see the *New York Times* of Dec. 12, 1941, p. 4, col. 3.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941*, vol. I, p. 590, footnote 9.

## APPENDICES

**Appendix I**  
**ORGANIZATION OF THE GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTRY<sup>1</sup>**  
**DECEMBER 1941**

THE REICH FOREIGN MINISTER  
von Ribbentrop

(a) *Secretariat:* Minister Dr. Schmidt (Paul Otto)  
Senior Counselor Dr. Lohmann  
Senior Counselor Dr. von Sonneleithner  
Counselor Dr. Weber  
Counselor Dr. Bruns

*For special assignments:* Minister Bergmann  
Counselor of Embassy Dr. Hilger

(b) *Personal Staff:* Head: Senior Counselor Hewel  
Counselor Dr. Baron Steengracht von Moyland

*Staff of the Foreign Minister:*  
Head: Counselor Braun  
Secretary of Legation Gottfriedsen  
Secretary of Legation Schwelmer

*For special assignments:*  
Counselor Likus  
Consul General Stahmer

THE STATE SECRETARY OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY  
Freiherr von Weizsäcker

*Secretariat:* Counselor Dr. Siegfried

THE HEAD OF THE AUSLANDSORGANISATION  
IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY

State Secretary E. W. Bohle

*Attached:* Secretary of Legation Dr. Gossmann

STATE SECRETARY FOR SPECIAL DUTIES  
W. Keppler

*Attached:* Minister Dr. Grobba

<sup>1</sup> This table of organization is based on the German Foreign Ministry plan of August 1940 (293/183945, 183948-84) as modified by a series of circulars of December 1941 (1780/406543-64) which showed the reorganizations effected in Büro RAM, Abt. Deutschland, Pers., Pol., Ha. Pol., Recht, Kult., P, and Ru.

For most of the period of this volume, however, the older organization was in effect, the plan which appears as Appendix I of vol. XII of this series (pp. 1087-1091) which is also to be consulted.

## AMBASSADOR FOR SPECIAL DUTIES

[Activities of the Foreign Ministry relating to economic warfare: general trade policy, economic warfare against the enemy and defense against economic warfare, blockades, contraband, blacklists, economic relations with neutrals, German property abroad and foreign property in territories controlled by Germany (1780/406615).]

Dr. Ritter\*

Attached: Minister Eisenlohr  
Minister Leitner  
Counselor Mackeben

## PROTOCOL DEPARTMENT

Diplomatic Corps in Berlin, foreign consuls in the German Reich, audiences with the Führer and Reich Chancellor, ceremonial, state visits, decorations:  
Chief of Protocol: Minister Dr. Freiherr von Dörnberg  
Deputy: Counselor Dr. von Halem

## DEPARTMENT FOR GERMAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS (D)

Director of Department: Under State Secretary Luther  
Deputy: Counselor Büttner  
Personal Assistant: Secretary of Legation Dr. Neuwirth  
Party Section: Business between the Foreign Ministry and the departments of the NSDAP. Under State Secretary Luther.  
The Party Rally: Senior Counselor Likus

D II Matters affecting the Reichsführer SS, the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, international police cooperation: Senior Counselor Likus

D III Information for Foreign Missions about important internal political events. The Jewish question. Racial policy. Flags and insignia. National hymn. Freemasons: Counselor Rademacher

D IV Production and distribution of literature in and to foreign countries. Publishers, distributors, and advertising agencies abroad: Wissenschaftlicher Hilfsarbeiter Klatten

D V Approval of all official and private travel arrangements of officials of Party and State to foreign countries with the exception of members of the Foreign Ministry. Approval of travel arrangements into the occupied countries with the exception of Holland and Norway. National Holidays: Counselor Dr. Garben

D VI Special constructions: Under State Secretary Luther

\*By a directive of Oct. 7, 1940, Ribbentrop further assigned to Ambassador Ritter the handling in the Foreign Ministry of all military questions affecting foreign policy, including those previously handled by Pol. I M. At the same time he was made immediately subordinate to the Foreign Minister or respectively to the State Secretary and personally responsible for keeping the Foreign Minister currently informed on questions of that nature (293/183950).

D VII Geographical Service of the Foreign Ministry: Wissenschaftlicher Hilfsarbeiter Dr. von Muehlen

D VIII Questions concerning the German community; German and foreign national communities: Referent Triska

D IX Economic questions concerning the national community: Minister Grosskopf

D IX (spec) Resettlement of Volksdeutsche: Minister Grosskopf

D X Care of foreign laborers: Counselor Dr. Kleser

Special Section: Organizational matters of the Foreign Service: Under State Secretary Luther

## PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENT (PERS.)

Director of Department: Ministerialdirektor Schroeder  
Deputy Director: Minister Bergmann  
Dirigent for Administration: Minister Dr. Schwager  
Special duties (disciplinary matters, etc.): Minister Erythropel  
Special duties (Party matters): Counselor Dr. Spelsberg

## POLITICAL DEPARTMENT (POL.)

Director of Department: Under State Secretary Dr. Woermann  
Deputy Director: Minister von Rintelen  
Acting Deputy Director: Minister Dr. von Erdmannsdorff  
Pol. I M (under Ambassador Ritter): Military questions, armaments, national defense: Counselor Kramarz

Pol. I Luft Aviation questions: Counselor Schultz-Sponholz

Pol. II Western Europe (Great Britain, Ireland, British possessions—unless dealt with elsewhere—France, Algeria, French Morocco, Tunisia, Occupied Belgian territories, Occupied Netherlands territories, Switzerland): Counselor Dr. Strack

Pol. III Spain, Spanish Morocco, Portugal, Vatican: Counselor Dr. Haidlen

Pol. IV Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy (Ethiopia, Libya), Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Rumania, Slovakia, Hungary: Minister Dr. Heinburg

Pol. V Eastern Europe (Soviet Union, Government General): Senior Counselor Dr. Schliep\*

Pol. VI Scandinavia (Denmark, Greenland, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, Finland): Minister Dr. von Grundherr

Pol. VII Near and Middle East (Egypt, Afghanistan, Arabia, Ceylon, Cyprus, Palestine, Syria, Turkey, India, Iraq, Iran, Sudan): Counselor Dr. Melchers

\* Until transferred to Tirana as Consul General in December 1941.

Pol. VIII	East Asia and Australia (Japan, Japanese mandated territories, China, Manchukuo, Mongolia, French Indochina, Thailand, Straits Settlement, Malay States, Netherlands East Indies, Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, South Sea territories):	Secretary of Legation Braun (acting)
Pol. IX	America (North, Central, and South America):	Senior Counselor Freytag
Pol. X	Africa (except Algeria, French Morocco, Tunisia, Italian possessions, Egypt, Sudan), mandate and colonial questions:	Senior Counselor Dr. Bielfeld
Pol. XI	War guilt questions:	Senior Counselor Dr. von Schmieden
Pol. XII	Peace questions, statistics, frontier treaties and other technical questions concerning Reich frontiers which are the subject of negotiations with foreign governments:	Senior Counselor Dr. von Schmieden
ECONOMIC POLICY DEPARTMENT (Ha. Pol.)		
Director of Department: Ministerialdirektor Wiehl		
Deputy Director: Minister Dr. Clodius		
Head of Group East, consisting of Divisions V, VI, VII, VIII: Minister Dr. Schnurre		
Liaison Officer with OKW (War Economy Office):		
		Senior Counselor (unassigned) Dr. Dumont
Ha. Pol. Frie	Armistice affairs and the preparation of the treaties of peace:	Senior Counselor (unassigned) Dr. Dumont
Ha. Pol. I	General section for questions concerning economics and finance. Commercial and forestry attachés; German customs law, technical preparation of commercial treaties:	Consul General Doehle
	Economic press and propaganda affairs:	Referent Dr. Grünbeck
Ha. Pol. II	Western Europe:	
Ha. Pol. IIa	France, Belgium, Netherlands (including colonies, protectorates and mandated territories), Switzerland, Luxembourg:	Senior Counselor Sabath
Ha. Pol. IIb	Great Britain, Ireland, British Dominions (except Canada), and British colonies. General questions relating to trade and economic warfare except matters dealing with angary, which are dealt with in R I:	Senior Counselor Rüter
Ha. Pol. III	Southwest Europe. Spain, Portugal, including colonies and protectorates:	Senior Counselor Sabath
Ha. Pol. IV	South and Southeast Europe	

Ha. Pol. IVa	Southeast Europe (except Rumania), Protectorate, Slovakia, Hungary, Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Bulgaria, Greece:	Senior Counselor Dr. Hudeczek
	Special Assignment: Legal-financial affairs of the former Yugoslav state:	Minister Fabricius
Ha. Pol. IVb	Italy (Albania, Ethiopia, Libya), Rumania:	Counselor Dr. Junker
Ha. Pol. V	Eastern Europe:	
Ha. Pol. Va	Soviet Union:	Consul General Dr. R. Walter
Ha. Pol. Vb	Liquidation of matters dealing with Poland and Baltic States:	Counselor Baron von Behr
Ha. Pol. VI	Northern Europe. Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, Finland. Economic questions affecting the Antarctic. Whaling:	Counselor Dr. van Scherpenberg
Ha. Pol. VII	Near and Middle East. Afghanistan, Egypt, Arabia, Cyprus, Iraq, Iran, Palestine, Transjordan, Sudan, Turkey, Yemen:	Counselor Dr. Ripken
Ha. Pol. VIII	East Asia. Japan, China, Manchukuo, Mongolia, Thailand, Philippines, South Sea territories:	Senior Counselor Dr. Voss
	Special assignment: Commercial treaty negotiations:	Consul General Timmann
Ha. Pol. IX	America:	
Ha. Pol. IXa	North America (Canada, United States, Mexico), Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Liberia:	Senior Counselor Dr. Davidsen
Ha. Pol. IXb	South and Central America (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, El Salvador, Uruguay, Venezuela):	Minister Moraht
Ha. Pol. X	Reich Office for Foreign Trade (economic news and information service; chambers of commerce abroad):	Senior Counselor Dr. Wingen
Ha. Pol. XI	Raw materials, war industry, liaison for control for war economy of German ships in neutral ports:	Senior Counselor Dr. Bisse
Ha. Pol. XII	Transportation:	
Ha. Pol. XIIa	Maritime transportation (including care of passengers and crews of German ships in neutral countries), sale of ships, fisheries:	Minister Dr. Martius

Ia. Pol. XIIb Other transportation questions (except Minister Dr. Martius matters relating to deliveries), railroads, world postal and information associations, post, telegraph, telephone, and radio matters (as far as they are not being dealt with at the Press, Personnel, or Kult. R sections), automobiles and roads, inland navigation, etc.

LEGAL DEPARTMENT (R)

Director of Department: Under State Secretary Dr. Gaus  
Deputy Director: Senior Counselor Dr. Albrecht

CULTURAL POLICY DEPARTMENT (KULT.)

Director of Department: Minister Dr. von Twardowski  
Deputy Director: Consul General Dr. Nöldeke  
Attached to the Director of the Department  
for Special Assignments:  
Senior Counselor Pleinert

NEWS SERVICE AND PRESS DEPARTMENT (P)

Director of Department: Minister Dr. Schmidt (Paul K.)  
Deputy Director: Minister Braun von Stumm

INFORMATION DEPARTMENT

Director of Department: Consul General Wüster (after Aug. 15, 1941)  
Deputy Director: Counselor Dr. Rahn

RADIO DEPARTMENT (Ru)

Director of Department: Minister Rühle  
Deputy Director: Counselor Dr. Schirmer

## Appendix II

### LIST OF GERMAN FILES USED

The following table identifies the German file from which each document has been taken. The documents of the Foreign Ministry were bound into volumes when they were sent to the files. As documents in these volumes have been microfilmed, each film of a file has been identified by a film serial number, while each page of the documents has been identified by a frame number stamped on the original at the time of the filming. (An exception was made with the treaty files, where the frame numbers were not put on the document pages but were attached to them at the time of the filming; thus the frame numbers do not appear on the originals but do, of course, appear on the microfilm.) The documents published in this collection are identified by the film serial number and frame numbers in the upper left hand corner of each document.

By reference to the following table of film serial numbers the location in the National Archives in Washington and in the Public Record Office in London of the copy of the document used in this publication may be determined. (Locating the original documents, which are now in the Foreign Ministry's archives in Bonn, is somewhat complicated by the fact that part of the archives have been reorganized since their return to the Federal Republic.) In some few cases separate files, usually on closely related topics, have been filmed consecutively under a single serial number; these are marked by an asterisk (\*). A number of serials are given as supplementary to earlier ones; these are cases where a re-examination of the file in question indicated that additional filming might be useful to scholars or, as is more often the case, where in the process of editing for publication the editors wished to provide a film record of documents of lesser importance to which references appeared in the documents selected.

For a complete listing of the files of this period (with their titles in German) see *A Catalog of Files and Microfilms of the German Foreign Ministry Archives 1920-1945* (compiled and edited by George O. Kent) the first volume of which was issued by the Hoover Institution in 1962.

<i>Film Serial Numbers</i>	<i>Title of File</i>
32	Under State Secretary: Japanese-American Relations.
34	State Secretary: Soviet Union.
	Under State Secretary: Soviet Union.*
38	Under State Secretary: United States.
41	Reich Foreign Minister: Near East and India, 1941-1942.
46	Reich Foreign Minister: Foreign Affairs Surveys; Rumania and Rumanian Legionnaires, Horia Sima.*
61	Under State Secretary: Turkey.
62	State Secretary: Denmark.
64	State Secretary: Uruguay, 1939-1942.
65	Reich Foreign Minister: Iran, 1940-1943.
67	Secret Files of Paul Otto Schmidt.
70	State Secretary: Syria.

<i>Film Serial Numbers</i>	<i>Title of File</i>
71	State Secretary : Arabia, 1940-1942.
77	State Secretary : Morocco, 1940-1943.
82	State Secretary : Japan, July-September 1941.
83	Reich Foreign Minister : Iraq.
91	State Secretary : Ireland. Under State Secretary : Ireland (Veessenmayer).*
93	State Secretary : Hungary.
95	State Secretary : Spain.
98	State Secretary : England, January-September 1941.
100	German Embassy in Italy : Mackensen's Papers.
105	State Secretary : Russia.
111	State Secretary : The War against North, Central, and South America, 1941-1942.
116	Reich Foreign Minister : Africa, Albania, Danzig, Estonia, Croatia.*
124	State Secretary : Political Correspondence of the State Secre- tary with Officials of the Foreign Service.
129	State Secretary : Portugal.
130	State Secretary : Iceland.
136	State Secretary : German-Spanish Relations.
137	Under State Secretary : Spain, July 1940-July 1942.
138	Dienststelle Ribbentrop : Confidential Reports.
142	State Secretary : Greece.
173	State Secretary : Netherlands, Netherlands Indies.*
177	State Secretary : Japan, April-June 1941.
191	State Secretary : China, 1939-1942.
195	State Secretary : India, February 1941-March 1942.
197	State Secretary : Chile, 1939-1942.
199	Reich Foreign Minister : Bolivia, 1936-1942.
201	State Secretary : Rumania.
203	State Secretary : Bolivia, 1939-1942.
205	State Secretary : Sweden, 1939-1940.
216	State Secretary : Indochina, 1940-1943.
217	Reich Foreign Minister : South Africa, 1936-1940.
221	State Secretary : German-French Relations.
222	State Secretary : Rumania.
229	State Secretary : Peru, 1940-1942.
230	State Secretary : Yugoslavia.
233	State Secretary : Argentina, 1938-1941.
235	State Secretary : Brazil.
239	State Secretary : Rumania.
245	State Secretary : Croatia.
251	Under State Secretary : Bolivia, 1941-1942.
252	Reich Foreign Minister : Paraguay, 1939-1942.
253	Under State Secretary : Argentina, July-September 1941.
260	State Secretary : Finland, April-November 1941.
261	State Secretary : Finland, November 1941-June 1942.
265	State Secretary : Turkey.
266	State Secretary : Egypt, 1939-1943.
278	State Secretary : Bulgaria.
281	Under State Secretary : Iran, 1941-1942.

<i>Film Serial Numbers</i>	<i>Title of File</i>
293	Tables of Organization of the German Foreign Ministry, 1929- 1940.
318	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : United States, 1941- 1943.
319	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Sweden, 1939-1941.
323	State Secretary : Latvia, 1939-1944.
326	Economic Policy Department : Armaments ; Brazil.
329	Under State Secretary : Afghanistan, 1941-1942.
341	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Argentina, 1939-1942.
343	Pol. XIII : General Files (Grosskopf Papers, previously D IX).
378	State Secretary : Peace Negotiations with France.
386	State Secretary : German-French Relations.
405	State Secretary : German-French Relations.
462	German Embassy in Spain : Anti-Comintern Pact.
481	German Embassy in Spain : German-Spanish Labor Rela- tions ; Spanish Workers in Germany.
482	Department for German Internal Affairs : Secret Papers of Division D III.
492	German Embassy in Spain : Internal Situation in Spain.
496	State Secretary : The War (July 1941-June 1942).
498	German Embassy in Spain : Internal Situation in Spain.
502	German Embassy in Spain : The "Blue Division" in Russia.
512	State Secretary : Internal Affairs, July-December 1941.
516	German Legation in Portugal : Wolfram Agreement.
534	State Secretary : Vatican, 1940-1941.
535	State Secretary : Vatican, 1941-1942.
587	Under State Secretary : France.
593	State Secretary : United States, May-June 1941.
610	State Secretary : Slovakia, June-October 1941.
613	State Secretary : Slovakia, November 1941-October 1942.
616	Pol. XIII : Grosskopf : Personal Files.
617	State Secretary : Afghanistan, 1939-1942.
694	Under State Secretary : German Armistice Commission for France.
765	Pol. I M : North American Trial, 1940-1942.
794	Under State Secretary : Iraq, 1941-1942.
851	Ambassador Ritter : Denmark.
852	Ambassador Ritter : France.
898	Ambassador Ritter : France.
911	Ambassador Ritter : OKW.
922	Department for German Internal Affairs [Inland II] : Secret Papers ; Counterespionage and Agents.
927	Information Department : North America, 1941-1942.
945	Renthe-Fink : Personal Files ; Danish Royal House.
1000	Under State Secretary : Egypt.
1003	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : German-French Armistice Commission ; Economic Delegation.
1007	Ambassador Ritter : Japan.
1047	Under State Secretary : Pan-Turanian Movement.
1053	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Brazil, 1939-1942.



<i>Film Serial Numbers</i>	<i>Title of File</i>	<i>Film Serial Numbers</i>	<i>Title of File</i>
1068	Pol. I M : Japan-East Asia.	2871	Political Department : Treaties, 1936-1944.
1084	Pol. I M : Secret Documents.	3068	Pol. III : Holy See ; Archbishoprics and Bishoprics in Germany, 1936-1939.
1099	Ambassador Ritter : Turkey.	3182	Economic Policy Department : Denmark ; Currency, Foreign Exchange, and Foreign Exchange Policy.
1131	Pol. XIII : Grosskopf Papers.	3485	German Embassy in Paris : Secret Political Papers.
1200	State Secretary : Political Correspondence.	3579	Supplementary to 415, 423, 431, 460, 712, 737, 924, 955, 1166, 1167, 1168, 1172, 1176, 1257, 1762, 1894, 1936, 2380, 3196 (Department for German Internal Affairs [Inland II] : Top Secret Papers).
1206	State Secretary : German-Italian Relations.	3607	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Sweden, 1941-1943.
1247	Etzdorf Memoranda (original longhand).	3882	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Spain.
1306	Minister Paul K. Schmidt : Memoranda for the Reich Foreign Minister (April 1941-July 1942).	3883	Supplementary to 2361 (German Embassy in Turkey).
1386	Ambassador Ritter : Soviet Union.	3933	Press Department : Information regarding the Testament of Peter the Great.
1459	Ambassador Ritter : Azores.	4359	Supplementary to 2205 (Economic Policy Department [Wiehl] Portugal).
1517	State Secretary : Italy.	4360	German Legation in Portugal : Secret Papers ; Tungsten, Bor-ratha Mine.
1527	State Secretary : United States.	4475	Economic Policy Department : Treaties.
1531	Reich Chancellery : Ukraine.	4601	State Secretary : Memoranda on non-diplomatic visits.
1543	State Secretary : United States.	4608	Pol. IX : United States ; Jewish Question.
1551	State Secretary : Memoranda on Diplomatic Visits.	4641	Ambassador Ritter : Volunteers.
1584	Reich Chancellery : Netherlands.	4661	German Embassy in France : Secret Files ; Territorial Guards.
1662	State Secretary : Iran.	4669	Under State Secretary : Security Zone, 1940-1941.
1672	German Embassy in Spain : Sea Warfare.	4672	Department for German Internal Affairs [Inland II] : Top Secret Papers of Division D VIII.
1680	Political Department : The War ; East Asia, July-October 1941.	4684	Supplement to 154 (Economic Policy Department [Clodius] Japan).
1780	Tables of Organization of the German Foreign Ministry, 1922-1941.	4685	German Legation in Rumania : Secret Papers ; Telegrams from Berlin.
1857	State Secretary : United States.	4697	Economic Policy Department (Clodius) : Greece.
1901	Supplementary to 1247 (Etzdorf Memoranda : Typescript of Selected Items).	4699	Supplementary to 1979, 3195 (Department for German Internal Affairs [Inland II] : Secret Papers of Division D VIII).
1924	Hewel Papers, 1940-1942.	4703	Supplementary to 2233.
2033	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Italy.	4756	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Syria, 1927-1941.
2048	State Secretary : Diplomatic Visits, July-December 1941.	4757	Cultural Policy Department : Secret ; India.
2077	Economic Policy Department (Clodius) : Italy.	4803	German Embassy in Paris : Netherlands.
2089	Economic Policy Department (Clodius) : Italy.	4806	Supplementary to 2380 (Department for German Internal Affairs [Inland II] : Secret Papers of Division D III).
2109	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Turkey ; Negotiations with Turkey Concerning Credit Agreement.	4826	German Embassy in Paris : Switzerland.
2116	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Sweden, 1941-1943.	4827	German Legation in Croatia : Political Relations of Croatia to other Countries ; Border Questions ; Treaties.
2123	Economic Policy Department (Clodius) : Iran, 1940-1941.	4828	German Legation in Croatia : Resettlement of Slovenes, Hungarians, Croats, Serbs, Ukrainians.
2148	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Hungary.	4832	German Legation in Croatia : Political Relations of Croatia to other Countries ; Border Questions ; Treaties.
2153	Economic Policy Department (Clodius) : Turkey.	4839	Reich Chancellery : The War, 1940-1944.
2163	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Yugoslavia.	4858	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Rumania.
2165	State Secretary : Correspondence on Political Affairs.	4865	German Embassy in Italy : Secret Files.
2174	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Spain.		
2193	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Rumania.		
2203	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl) : Italy.		
2233	Economic Policy Department (Clodius) : Bulgaria.		
2236	Under State Secretary : Greece.		
2231	German Embassy in Italy : Secret Papers.		
2293	Economic Policy Department (Clodius) : Rumania.		
2315	Reich Foreign Minister : Croatia.		
2361	German Embassy in Turkey : Secret Instructions, Reports, Telegrams, etc., Armament Industry.		
2800	Supplementary to 2168 (Department for German Internal Affairs [D IX] Top Secret Papers).		

<i>Film Serial Numbers</i>	<i>Title of File</i>
4875	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Italy.
4877	Economic Policy Department (Clodius): German-Italian Telegraphic Reports from Rome.
4879	Economic Policy Department (Clodius): Italy.
4881	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Turkey.
4885	Supplementary to 2124 (Economic Policy Department [Clodius] German-Turkish Economic Negotiations, September-October 1941).
4886	Supplementary to 2124 (Economic Policy Department [Clodius]: German-Turkish Economic Negotiations, September-October 1941).
4894	German Embassy in Spain: Army and Police.
4927	German Embassy in Italy: Secret Files; Croatia, Bulgaria, Slovakia.
4937	German Embassy in Spain: Morocco.
4940	Ambassador Ritter: OKW.
4963	German Legation in Finland: Reports, Instructions.
4967	Economic Policy Department (Wiehl): Finland, 1940-1941.
4982	Economic Policy Department: Treaty Files; Switzerland.
4995	Economic Policy Department: Treaty Files; Turkey.
5077	Pol. XIII: Ukraine.
5078	Pol. XIII: Organization.
5083	Reich Chancellery: Reichkommissariat Ostland.
5085	German Legation in Finland: Instructions, 1940-1941.
5103	Department for German Internal Affairs: Party Section; Social Policy.
5109	Luther Files: Correspondence N-Sch, 1941.
5111	Supplementary to 1279 and 4127 (Minister Paul K. Schmidt: Memoranda, February-December 1941).
5115	Supplementary to 1306 and 4125 (Minister Paul K. Schmidt: Memoranda for the Reich Foreign Minister, April 1941-July 1942).
5144	Legal Department: Laws of Nations and War; Hague, Peace Conference.
5146	German Embassy in the Vatican: Baltic States.
6435	German Legation in Finland: Instructions, 1941.
6506	German Legation in Finland: Miltex telegrams, 1941-1942.
8539	Navy Archives: OKW Directives.
9903	Supplementary to 4885 (Economic Policy Department [Clodius] German-Turkish Economic Negotiations).
B12	State Secretary: German-Italian Relations, May-August 1941.
B13	State Secretary: German-Italian Relations, January-April 1941.
F1-	German Foreign Ministry film of files of the Reich Foreign Minister's Secretariat.
F20	
M178	Navy Archives: North Sea/Norway; Baltic Sea, Operations.
M180	Navy Archives: Naval War Staff; Miscellaneous Papers.
M209	Supplementary to 2192 and 4859 (Economic Policy Department [Wiehl] Rumania).
M341	OKH Attaché Department: Secret Papers.
P3	Abetz Personal Archive: Memorandum of July 1, 1943.
P6	Navy Archives: Navy copies of the OKW and other documents of the second half year 1941.

## Appendix III

### LIST OF PRINCIPAL PERSONS <sup>1</sup>

- ABETZ, Otto, Ambassador, Representative of the Foreign Ministry with the German Military Commander in France.
- AÓIMOVIĆ, Milan, Minister of Interior of a Serbian Government in Belgrade sponsored by Germany.
- ALBRECHT, Erich, Deputy Director of the Legal Department in the German Foreign Ministry.
- ALFIERI, Dino, Italian Ambassador in Germany; member of the Fascist Grand Council.
- ALI FOROUGHÍ, Iranian Minister President from August 28, 1941.
- ALI MANSUR, Iranian Minister President to August 27, 1941.
- ALTENBURG, Felix, Counselor of Embassy and Chargé d'Affaires ad interim in the German Embassy in China to July 1, 1941.
- ALTENBURG, Günther, Minister, Reich Plenipotentiary for Greece.
- AMAU, Eiji, Japanese Ambassador in Italy, September 1939-October 1940; Deputy Foreign Minister, August-October 1941.
- ANFUSO, Filippo, Minister, Chef de Cabinet to Count Ciano, Italian Foreign Minister; appointed Minister in Hungary, November 1941.
- ANTONESCU, Ion, Rumanian General, Leader of the State and Minister President; Marshal of Rumania from August 23, 1941.
- ANTONESCU, Mihai, Rumanian Deputy Minister President and Foreign Minister.
- ARANHA, Oswaldo, Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- ATLEE, Clement Richard, Leader of the British Labour Party, Lord Privy Seal.
- ATTOLICO, Bernardo, Italian Ambassador to the Holy See.
- BANDERA, Stepan, Leader of a faction in the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN).
- BÁRDOSY, László de, Hungarian Minister President and Foreign Minister.
- BARGEN, Werner von, Counselor of Embassy, Representative of the Foreign Ministry with the German Military Commander in Belgium and northern France.
- BECKER, Wilhelm, Colonel of the Luftwaffe; promoted to Major General in the summer of 1941; in the War Economy and Armaments Office of the OKW.
- BECKERLE, Adolf Heinz, German Minister in Bulgaria.
- BELMONTÉ PARÓN, Elias, Major, Bolivian Military Attaché in Germany to July 1941.
- BELOW, Carl von, Counselor of Legation in the German Legation in Sweden; appointed Consul in Göteborg, August 31, 1941.
- BENE, Otto, German Consul General at Milan; Representative of the Reich for the transfer of the South Tirol population to October 1941; Representative of the Foreign Ministry with the Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands.
- BERNOIST-MÉOHIN, Jacques, State Secretary, attached to the office of the Vice President of the French Council of Ministers.

<sup>1</sup> The biographical details given relate principally to the period and subjects covered by the documents in this volume.

BENZLER, Felix, Minister, Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry with the German Military Commander in Serbia.

BISMARCK, Otto Christian, Prince von, Minister in the German Embassy in Italy.

BLÜCHER, Wipert von, German Minister in Finland.

BÖHME, Franz, German General, Commander of the XVIII Mountain Corps; Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia, September to November 1941.

BÖTTICHER, Friedrich von, German General, Military and Air Attaché in the United States.

BOHEMAN, Erik, Secretary General in the Swedish Foreign Ministry.

BOHLE, Ernst Wilhelm, Gauleiter, Head of the Auslandsorganisation of the National Socialist party, State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry.

BORIS III, King of Bulgaria.

BORMANN, Martin, Reichsleiter of the NSDAP, Head of the Party Chancellery.

BOSE, Subhas Chandra, Indian nationalist leader, former Secretary General and President of the Indian Congress party; leader of the left wing Forward Bloc.

BOSSY, Raoul, Rumanian Minister in Germany.

BRANDAU, Hans, Official in the Protocol Department in the German Foreign Ministry.

BRINON, Count Fernand de, Delegate General, with the rank of Ambassador, of the French Government in the occupied territory.

BRUNS, Georg Viktor, Counselor, official in the Foreign Minister's Secretariat.

BUFFARINI-GUIDI, Guido, Under State Secretary in the Italian Ministry of Interior.

BULLITT, William C., United States Ambassador in France, October 1936-January 1941.

CARCELLER, Demetrio, Spanish Minister of Industry and Commerce.

CATROUX, Georges, General, Free French representative in the Middle East; Free French Delegate General and Plenipotentiary in the Levant, July 1941.

CAVALLERO, Ugo, Count, Italian General, Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff.

CHEN CHIEH, Chinese Ambassador in Germany to July 2, 1941.

CHIANG KAI-SHEK, Generalissimo, leader of the Kuomintang; President of the Executive Yuan (Premier).

CHRISTIAN X, King of Denmark.

CHURCHILL, Winston Spencer, British Prime Minister.

CIANO DI CORTELLAZZO, Count Galeazzo, son-in-law of Mussolini; Italian Foreign Minister.

CLAUSEN, Frits, leader of the Danish National Socialist party.

CLODIUS, Carl, Minister, Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department in the German Foreign Ministry.

COSMELLI, Giuseppe, Counselor of Embassy in the Italian Embassy in Germany, with the rank of Minister.

D'AJETA. *See* LANZA D'AJETA.

DANKWORT, Werner, Counselor of Legation in the German Legation in Sweden.

DARLAN, Jean François, Admiral, Vice President of the French Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs; Minister of the Navy; Minister of Interior to August 1941; Minister of National Defense and Chief of the French armed forces from August 1941.

DE GAULLE, Charles, French General, Head of the French National Committee and leader of the Free French forces.

DENTZ, Henri, French General; High Commissioner in Syria and Lebanon and Commander in Chief of French forces in the Levant to July 1941.

DE VALERA, Eamon, Prime Minister of Ireland and Minister for External Affairs.

DIECKHOFF, Hans Heinrich, German Ambassador in the United States, May 1937; recalled to Berlin for consultation, November 1938, and did not return to his post; on special assignment in the Foreign Ministry, 1938-1943.

DÖRNBERG, Alexander, Freiherr von, Minister, Chief of Protocol of the German Foreign Ministry.

DRAGANOV, Parvan, Bulgarian Minister in Germany.

EDEN, Anthony, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

EISENLOHR, Ernst, Minister, attached to the office of Ambassador Ritter in the German Foreign Ministry.

ERDMANNSDORFF, Otto von, German Minister in Hungary, 1937-July 1941; acting Deputy Director of the Political Department in the Foreign Ministry, September 1941.

EEBURTH, Waldemar, German General, Chief Liaison Staff North; representative of the OKW and OKH at the headquarters of Field Marshal Mannerheim, Commander of the Finnish Army.

ESPINOSA DE LOS MONTEROS, Eugenio, Major General, Spanish Ambassador in Germany to July 1941.

ETTEL, Erwin, German Minister in Iran.

FAROUK I, King of Egypt.

FAVAGROSSA, Carlo, Italian General, Under State Secretary for War Production in the Ministry of War.

FAWZI. *See* QAWUQCHI, Fawzi al-

FELNE, Gerhard, Counselor of Legation in the office of the Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Ministry with the German Military Commander in Serbia.

FILOV, Bogdan, Bulgarian Minister President.

FRANCO Y BAHAMONDE, Francisco, Spanish Chief of State, President of the Government, and Generalissimo of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

FRANCO Y BAHAMONDE, Nicolás, Spanish Ambassador in Portugal.

FRANK, Hans, Reich Minister, Governor General of the German-occupied Polish territories.

FRANKFURTER, Felix, Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court.

FREYTAG, Reinhold, Senior Counselor, Head of Political Division IX in the German Foreign Ministry.

GARDEMANN, Erich W., Counselor of Legation in the German Embassy in Spain.

GAUS, Friedrich, Director of the Legal Department in the German Foreign Ministry with the title of Under State Secretary.

GAYLANI. *See* RASHID ALI AL-GAYLANI.

GEREDE, Hüsrev R., Turkish Ambassador in Germany.

GIANNINI, Amedeo, Director of Commercial Affairs in the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs with rank of Ambassador.

GLAISE VON HORSTENAU, Edmund, former Austro-Hungarian General Staff Officer, appointed "German General in Zagreb," April 14, 1941.

GÖBLING, Hermann Wilhelm, President of the Reichstag; Minister President of Prussia and Reich Minister for Air; Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe; Commissioner for the Four Year Plan; designated successor to Hitler; Reichsmarschall.

GRAND MUFTI. *See* HUSAYNI.

GREISER, Arthur, Reichsstatthalter and Gauleiter of Wartheland.

GREW, Joseph Clark, United States Ambassador in Japan.

GROBBA, Fritz, German Minister in Iraq until 1939, subsequently on special assignments in the Foreign Ministry; on special mission in Iraq, May 1941.

GROSSKOPF, Georg Wilhelm, Senior Counselor, later Minister; Head of Division D IX of the Department for German Internal Affairs of the Foreign Ministry.

GRÖTE, Otto, Secretary of Legation, later Counselor in Political Division I M, German Foreign Ministry.

GRUNDHEER, Werner von, Head of Political Division VI, German Foreign Ministry.

GÜNTHER, Christian, Swedish Foreign Minister.

GUÉRARD, Jacques, emissary of Darian on special mission in Syria, May-June 1941.

GUSTAV V, King of Sweden.

HÄGGÖLF, Gunnar, Head of the Department of Commercial Affairs in the Swedish Foreign Ministry.

HALDER, Franz, Colonel General, Chief of the German Army General Staff.

HALIFAX, Viscount, Edward Wood, British Ambassador in the United States.

HANSSON, Per Albin, Swedish Minister President.

HEMMEN, Hans Richard, Chairman of the Special Commission on Economic Questions with the German Armistice Commission.

HEMPER, Eduard, German Minister in Ireland.

HENTIG, Werner Otto von, Near Eastern specialist, on special assignments in the German Foreign Ministry; representative of the Foreign Ministry with Eleventh Army headquarters, August 1941; in charge of Pan-Turanian questions, October 1941.

HEWEL, Walther, Senior Counselor, official of the Personal Staff of the German Foreign Minister and his personal representative with Hitler.

HEYDEN-RYNSCH, Bernd Otto, Freiherr von der, Counselor of Embassy in the German Embassy in Spain.

HEYDRICH, Reinhard, SS-Obergruppenführer, Chief of the Security Police and Security Service.

HILGER, Gustav, Counselor of Embassy in the German Embassy in the Soviet Union to June 1941; subsequently on special assignment with the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff.

HIMER, Kurt, German General with the Hungarian High Command from March to August 1941.

HIMMLER, Heinrich, Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police; Reich Commissar for the Consolidation of the German National Community.

HIRANUMA, Baron Kichiro, Japanese Minister of Interior to July 16, 1941; Minister without Portfolio, July 18-October 16, 1941.

HIROHITO, Emperor of Japan.

HITLER, Adolf, Leader of the German National Socialist party, Führer and Chancellor, Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht.

HOARE, Sir Samuel, British Ambassador in Spain.

HOPKINS, Harry L., Special Assistant to President Roosevelt.

HOBIKURI, Zenbei, Japanese Ambassador in Italy.

HORTHY DE NAGYBÁNYA, Miklos, Admiral, Regent of Hungary.

HOYNINGEN-HUENE, Oswald, Baron von, German Minister in Portugal.

HUENE. *See* HOYNINGEN-HUENE.

HULL, Cordell, United States Secretary of State.

HUNTZGER, Charles, French General, Minister of War to November 12, 1941.

HUSAYNI, Haj Amin, al-, Mufti of Jerusalem; Arab leader.

İNÖNÜ, İsmet, General, President of the Turkish Republic.

JAGOW, Dietrich von, SA-Obergruppenführer, German Minister in Hungary from July 24, 1941.

JODL, Alfred, Lieutenant General, Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff of the OKW.

JUIN, Alphonse, General, Commander of French forces in Morocco from August 1941; Commander in Chief of French forces in North Africa November 20, 1941.

KASCHKE, Siegfried, SA-Obergruppenführer, German Minister in Croatia.

KEITEL, Wilhelm, Field Marshal, Chief of the OKW.

KEPPLER, Wilhelm, State Secretary for Special Duties in the German Foreign Ministry.

KESSLER, Hanns, Reich Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs.

KILLINGER, Manfred, Freiherr von, German Minister in Rumania.

KIVIMÄKI, Toivo Mikael, Finnish Minister in Germany.

KNOX, William Franklin, United States Secretary of the Navy.

KOCH, Erich, National Socialist Gauleiter of East Prussia; appointed Reich Commissar for the Ukraine, August 20, 1941.

KONOYE, Prince Fumimaro, Japanese Prime Minister, July 1940-October 16, 1941.

KOTZE, Hans Ulrich von, German Minister in Latvia, 1938-1940; Minister in the German Legation in Denmark.

KRAMARZ, Hans, Head of Political Division I M, German Foreign Ministry.

KRETSCHMER, Max, Colonel, German Military Attaché in Japan.

KROLL, Hans Anton, Minister, Counselor in the German Embassy in Turkey.

KURUSU, Saburo, Japanese Ambassador in Germany, December 1939-February 1941; assigned to assist Ambassador Nomura in negotiations with the United States, November 1941.

KVATERNIK, Slavko, Field Marshal, Deputy Minister President and Minister of the Armed Forces of the "Independent Croatian State."

LAMMERS, Hans, Reich Minister, Chief of the Reich Chancellery.

LANZA D'AJETA, Marchese Blasco, Chief de Cabinet to Count Ciano, Italian Foreign Minister, from November 1941.

LAVAL, Pierre, Vice-President of the French Council of Ministers, July 12-December 13, 1940; Minister of Foreign Affairs, October 28-December 13, 1940.

LEAHY, William D., Admiral, United States Ambassador in France.

LETTNER, Rudolf, Minister, attached to the office of Ambassador Ritter in the German Foreign Ministry.

LEY, Robert, Reichsleiter, leader of the German Labor Front, Director of the National Socialist party organization.

LIKUS, Rudolf, Senior Counselor, official of the German Foreign Minister's Personal Staff and of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop.

LINDBERGH, Charles A., American aviator; Colonel, United States Army Air Corps Reserve.

LIST, Wilhelm, German Field Marshal, Commander of the Twelfth Army; Wehrmacht Commander, Southeast, June-October 1941.

LJOTIĆ, Dimitrije, Leader of the right-wing Zbor Movement in Serbia.

LOESCH, Karl von, Secretary of Legation, interpreter, attached to the German Foreign Minister's Secretariat.

LOHMANN, Johann Georg, Senior Counselor, Official of the German Foreign Minister's Secretariat.

LORKOVIĆ, Mladen, Foreign Minister of the "Independent Croatian State."

LUDIN, Hanns, German Minister in Slovakia.

LÜDKE, Erich, General, Commander of German Troops in Denmark.

LUTHER, Martin, Director of the Department for German Internal Affairs, German Foreign Ministry, with the title of Under State Secretary.

MACKENSEN, Hans Georg von, German Ambassador in Italy.

MAGLIONE, Luigi, Cardinal, Papal Secretary of State.

MANNERHEIM, Baron Carl Gustaf Emil, Field Marshal, Commander of the Finnish Army.

MATSUOKA, Yosuke, Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, July 1940—July 16, 1941.

MAYALDE, Count José Finat y Escrivá de Romani, Spanish Ambassador in Germany from September 1941.

MAYR-FALKENBERG, Ludwig, German Consul General at Genoa; High Commissioner of the Reich with rank of Minister for the transfer of the South Tirol population, October 1941.

MEGERLE, Karl, German journalist, on special propaganda assignments for the Foreign Ministry.

MELCHERS, Wilhelm, Counselor, Head of Political Division VII, German Foreign Ministry.

MENEMENCIOGLU, Numan, Secretary General of the Turkish Foreign Ministry.

MENSHAUSEN, Fritz, Counselor of Embassy in the German Embassy to the Holy See.

MEYER, Alfred, National Socialist Gauleiter of Westphalia-North, Permanent Deputy of the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories.

MEYER-DÖHNER, Kurt, Commander, German Naval Attaché in Spain.

MIHAI I, King of Rumania.

MOLOTOV, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich, Vice Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union; People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

MOSCARDO, Ituarte José, General, Chief of the military cabinet of the Spanish Chief of State.

MUFTI. *See* HUSAYNI.

MUSSELT, Anton, Leader of the National Socialist movement in the Netherlands (NSB).

MUSSOLINI, Benito, founder of the Italian fascist party; Head of the Government and Prime Minister; Commander of the Armed Forces.

NEDIĆ, Milan, General, former Yugoslav Minister of War; Minister President of a Serbian Government in Belgrade sponsored by Germany, August 29, 1941.

NEUBACHER, Hermann, Minister, special representative in charge of economic questions at the German Legation in Bucharest.

NOMURA, Kichisaburo, Admiral, Japanese Ambassador in the United States.

NUMAN. *See* MENEMENCIOGLU.

NURI PASHA, Brother of the Young Turk leader Enver Pasha; active in the Pan-Turanian movement in Turkey.

OHASHI, Chuichi, Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister to July 1941.

OLIVERA, Ricardo, Argentine Ambassador in Germany.

ORSENIKO, Cesare, Monsignor, Apostolic Nuncio in Germany.

OSHIMA, Hiroshi, General, Japanese Ambassador in Germany.

OTT, Eugen, Major General, German Ambassador in Japan.

PAMPERRIEN, Dr. Rudolf, Secretary of Legation, Head of Division W VIIIb of the Economic Policy Department in the German Foreign Ministry until its reorganization in December 1941.

PAPEN, Franz von, German Ambassador in Turkey.

PAVELIĆ, Ante, Leader of the Croatian nationalist Ustaša movement; Leader (Poglavnik) and Minister President of the "Independent Croatian State."

PÉTAIN, Henri Philippe, Marshal of France; Chief of State.

PETER II, King of Yugoslavia.

PILGER, Hans, German Minister in Afghanistan.

POPOV, Ivan Vladimír, Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

POST, Eric von, Counselor in the Swedish Legation in Germany.

PRÜFER, Curt, German Ambassador in Brazil.

QAWUQHI, Fawzi al-, Arab nationalist, guerilla leader in insurrections against the French Mandate in Syria, 1926, and against the British Mandate in Palestine, 1936-1939.

RADEMACHER, Franz, Counselor, Head of Division D III in the Department for German Internal Affairs, German Foreign Ministry.

RADTKE, Herbert Paul Otto, Major, attached to the War Economy and Armaments Office of the OKW.

RAEDER, Erich, Admiral, Commander in Chief of the German Navy.

RAHN, Rudolf, Senior Counselor, attached to the German Embassy in Paris and in charge of propaganda and information activities; on special mission in Syria, April-July 1941.

RASHID ALI AL-GAYLANI, Iraq Minister President, April 3-June 3, 1941; subsequently in exile in Iran.

RENTHE-FUNK, Cecil von, Minister and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich in Denmark.

RIBBENTROP, Joachim von, German Foreign Minister.

RICCARDI, Arturo, Admiral, Chief of the Italian Naval Staff and Under Secretary of the Navy.

RICCARDI, Raffaello, Italian Minister of Trade and International Payments.

RIEGER, Arvid, Swedish Minister in Germany.

RINTELEN, Emil von, Minister, Dirigent in the Political Department, German Foreign Ministry.

RINTELEN, Enno von, General, German Military Attaché in Italy; German General at Headquarters of the Italian Armed Forces.

RIPKEN, Georg, Counselor, Head of Division W IIIc, which in December 1941 was redesignated Ha. Pol. VII in the Economic Policy Department, German Foreign Ministry.

RITTER, Karl, Ambassador on special assignment in the German Foreign Ministry.

RIZA SHAH PAHLEVI, Shah of Iran, 1925-September 16, 1941.

ROMMEL, Erwin, Lieutenant General, Commander of the German Africa Corps.

ROOSEVELT, Franklin Delano, President of the United States of America.

ROSENBERG, Alfred, Reichsleiter, Head of the Aussenpolitisches Amt of the NSDAP; deputy of the Führer for supervision of spiritual and ideological training of the NSDAP; charged with "central direction of the questions of the Eastern European area," April 20, 1941; Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, July 17, 1941.

RUIZ GUIÑAZÚ, Enrique, Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs.

RUNDSTEDT, Gerd von, German Field Marshal, Commanding Officer, Army Group South at the Russian front to December 3, 1941.

RYTTI, Risto, President of Finland.

SABATH, Hermann Friedrich, Senior Counselor, Head of Division W II in the Economic Policy Department in the German Foreign Ministry until December 1941; thereafter Head of Divisions Ha. Pol. IIa and Ha. Pol. III.

SALAZAR, Antonio de Oliveira, Portuguese Minister President; also Minister of War and Minister of Foreign Affairs.

SARACOGLU, Sükrü, Turkish Foreign Minister.

SOAVENIUS, Erik, Danish Foreign Minister.

SCHERPENBERG, Hilger van, Counselor, Head of Division W V in the Economic Policy Department in the German Foreign Ministry until December 1941; thereafter Head of Division Ha. Pol. VI.

SCHLEIER, Rudolf, Counselor in the German Embassy in Paris with the rank of Consul General, later with that of Minister.

SCHMIDT, Paul Karl, Minister, Director of the News Service and Press Department, German Foreign Ministry.

SCHMIDT, Paul Otto Gustav, Minister, interpreter in the German Foreign Ministry; attached to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat.

SORNURRE, Karl, Minister, Head of Division W IV in the Economic Policy Department, German Foreign Ministry; with the reorganization of December 1941 he was made Head of Group East (Divisions V, VI, VII, and VIII).

SCHOBERT, Eugen Ritter von, Colonel General, Commanding General of the Eleventh German Army and "Commander in Chief of the German troops in Rumania," May-September 1941.

SCHROEDER, Hans, Director of the Personnel and Administrative Department, German Foreign Ministry.

SCHULENBURG, Friedrich Werner, Count von der, German Ambassador in the Soviet Union to June 22, 1941.

SCHWARZMANN, Hans, Official in the Secretariat of the German Foreign Minister.

SERRANO SUÑER, Ramón, Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs.

SEYSS-INQUART, Arthur, Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands.

SIMOVIC, Dušan, General, Minister President of the Yugoslav Government in exile.

ŠKIRPA, Kazys, Lithuanian Minister in Germany, 1939-1940.

SMETANIN, Konstantin, Soviet Ambassador in Japan.

SÖDEBLOM, Staffan John, Head of the Political Department in the Swedish Foreign Ministry.

SONNLEITHNER, Franz, Senior Counselor, official in the Secretariat of the German Foreign Minister.

STACHIW, Wolodymyr, Representative of Stepan Bandera, the leader of a faction in the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN).

STAHMER, Heinrich, Far East specialist of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop, on special assignment to the Foreign Minister with rank of Ambassador; appointed Ambassador to the Nanking government, September 1941.

STALIN, Josef Vissarionovich, Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Communist party of the Soviet Union and member of the Politburo; Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars.

STAUNING, Thorvald, Danish Minister President.

STEENGRACHT VON MOYLAND, Adolf, Baron, Counselor in the German Foreign Ministry; member of the Foreign Minister's Personal Staff.

STELZER, Gerhard, Counselor of Legation in the German Legation in Rumania.

STIMSON, Henry Lewis, United States Secretary of War.

STOEBER, Eberhard von, German Ambassador in Spain.

STÜLPNAGEL, Otto von, General, German Military Commander in France.

SUGIYAMA, Hajime, Japanese General, Chief of the Army General Staff.

SUÑER. See SERRANO SUÑER.

SZTÓJAY, Döme, General, Hungarian Minister in Germany.

TARDINI, Domenico, Monsignor, Secretary of the Congregation for Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs.

TAYLOR, Myron Charles, Personal Representative of President Roosevelt to Pope Pius XII with rank of Ambassador.

THERMANN, Edmund, Freiherr von, German Ambassador in Argentina.

THOMAS, Georg, General, Head of the War Economy and Armaments Office (Wehrwirtschafts- und Rüstungsamt) of the OKW.

THOMSEN, Hans, Counselor of Embassy, Chargé d'Affaires of the German Embassy in the United States.

TISO, Joseph, Monsignor, leader of the Slovak People's party; President of Slovakia.

TITTMANN, Harold H., United States Foreign Service Officer, assistant to Myron C. Taylor.

Togo, Shigenori, Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union, 1938-1940; Foreign Minister from October 18, 1941.

TOJO, Hideki, General, Japanese Minister of War from July 1940; Prime Minister from October 17, 1941.

TOVAR, Count de, Portuguese Minister in Germany from September 1941.

TOYODA, Teijiro, Admiral, Japanese Minister for Commerce and Industry to July 16, 1941; Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Colonies, July 18-October 16, 1941.

TROLL-OBERGFELL, Heribert von, Counselor of Legation in the German Legation in Croatia.

TSOLAKOGLU, George, Minister President of an Axis-sponsored Greek Government in Athens.

TUKA, Vojtech, Slovak Minister President.

TURNER, Friedrich, State Councilor, Chief of the Administrative Staff of the German Military Commander in Serbia.

UTTMANN, Bruno von, General, German Military Attaché in Sweden.

VARGAS, Getulio Dornelles, President of Brazil.

VESENMAYER, Edmund, SS-Standartenführer, on the staff of State Secretary for Special Duties Keppler in the Foreign Ministry; on special assignment in Belgrade.

VEBEKE, George Gordon Medlicott, British Minister in Finland.

VOGL, Oskar, General, Chairman, German Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden.

WAHLERT, Paul von, Lieutenant Commander, German Naval Attaché in Sweden.

WALTER, W., Ministerialdirektor in the Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture, in charge of questions of customs, trade and foreign exchange; Chairman of the German Committee for economic negotiations with Sweden.

WANG CHING-WEI, Chinese political leader, Head of a Chinese Central Government at Nanking sponsored by Japan.

WARLIMONT, Walter, German General, Chief of the Department of National Defense (Abt. L), Wehrmacht Operations Staff.

WEDDELL, Alexander W., United States Ambassador in Spain.

WEISSÄCKER, Ernst, Freiherr von, State Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry.

WELCK, Wolfgang, Freiherr von, Counselor in the Political Department in the German Foreign Ministry, assigned to the German Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden.

WELLES, Sumner, United States Under Secretary of State.

WENDLER, Ernst, German Minister in Bolivia, November 1937-July 21, 1941.

WERTH, Henrik, General, Chief of the Hungarian General Staff to September 1941.

WEYGAND, Maxime, General, Delegate General of the French Government in French Africa to November 20, 1941.

WIED, Viktor, Prinz zu, German Minister in Sweden.

WIEHL, Emil Karl Josef, Director of the Economic Policy Department, German Foreign Ministry.

WILHELMINA, Queen of the Netherlands.

**WILLKIE**, Wendell, Republican candidate for the Presidency of the United States, 1940.

**WITTING**, Rolf, Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs.

**WOERMANN**, Ernst, Director of the Political Department in the German Foreign Ministry with the title of Under State Secretary.

**WOHLTHAT**, Helmuth, Prussian State Councilor, Ministerialdirektor for special assignments in the Four Year Plan; Head of the delegation for economic negotiations with Japan from April 1941.

**WÜSTER**, Walther, Consul General, Cultural Affairs specialist in the German Embassy in Italy; Director of the Information Department in the Foreign Ministry, August 15, 1941.

**ZECHLIN**, Erich Wilhelm, German Minister in Lithuania, 1933-1940; assigned to the Legation in Finland, May 1941.

**ZECHLIN**, Walter, Head of the Press Department in the German Foreign Ministry and Reich Press Chief, 1926-1932; assigned to the Embassy in Spain in 1939 where he served as Press Attaché.

**ZOULFIKAR**, Yussef, Pasha, Egyptian Ambassador in Iran.

## Appendix IV

### GLOSSARY OF GERMAN TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS<sup>1</sup>

**AA**, Auswärtiges Amt, the German Foreign Ministry

**Abt.**, Abteilung, department  
**Abteilung Deutschland**, *see* D

**Abt. L.**, Abt. Landesverteidigung, the Department of National Defense in the Wehrmacht Operations Staff

**Abwehr**, counterintelligence, the Foreign Intelligence Service of the OKW

**ADEuRSt**, Amtliche Deutsche Ein- und Rückwandererstelle, Official German Agency for Immigrants and Repatriates

**AGK**, Ausfuhrgemeinschaft für Kriegsgerät, Export Cartel for war material

**Ang.**, Angabe, a designation given when action of more than one sort was to be taken on a paper. In such cases the relevant instructions were usually split up as Ang. I, II, etc., which designations followed the file numbers

**AO**, Auslandsorganisation, foreign organization of the National Socialist party concerned with German nationals living abroad

**APA**, Aussenpolitisches Amt, foreign affairs office of the National Socialist party

**Aus.**, Ausl., Ausland, the foreign intelligence department of the OKW

**Ausl./Abw.**, Amt Ausland/Abwehr, the office of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence of the OKW

**BRAM**, Büro RAM, Secretariat of the Reich Foreign Minister

**Brigadeführer**, SA and SS rank equivalent to Brigadier General

**Chefs.**, Chefsache, top secret military  
**D**, Abteilung Deutschland, Department for German Internal Affairs in the German Foreign Ministry

**Dg.**, Dirigent, the deputy head of a Department of the German Foreign Ministry

**Dienststelle Ribbentrop**, office of Ribbentrop in his capacity as foreign affairs adviser to Hitler; of decreasing importance after his appointment as Foreign Minister

**DNB**, Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro, German News Agency, owned by the Ministry of Propaganda

**DNSAP**, Danmarks National-Socialistiske Arbejder-Parti, the Danish National Socialist party

**Einsatzgruppe**, a special task force organized by the Security Police and Security Service

**e.o.**, ex officio; where this precedes the file number, it indicates that there are no previous papers on the subject bearing this number

**g.**, geh., geheim, secret

**Gau**, the largest territorial administrative unit of the National Socialist party

**Gauleiter**, highest official in a Gau

**Gen. Qu.**, Generalquartiermeister, general staff officer in charge of supply and administration

**Gen. St. d.H.**, Generalstab des Heeres, Army General Staff

**g.K.**, g. Kdos., geheime Kommandosache, top secret military

**g. Rs.**, geheime Reichssache, top secret

<sup>1</sup> Abbreviations are explained by giving the full German terms. These terms are explained at their proper alphabetical listings.

- Ha. Pol., Handelspolitische Abteilung,** the Economic Policy Department in the German Foreign Ministry which again became the official designation with the reorganization of December 1941
- Kreisleiter,** district leader of the National Socialist party
- Kult., Kulturpolitische Abteilung,** the Cultural Policy Department of the German Foreign Ministry
- Leibstandarte,** originally a bodyguard, later an SS elite regiment
- Luftwaffe,** the German Air Force of the era of World War II
- Ministerialdirektor,** a grade in the German Civil Service, usually the director of a department in a Ministry
- Ministerialdirigent,** a grade in the German Civil Service, usually deputy director of a department in a Ministry
- Ministerialrat,** Ministerial Counselor, a grade in the German Civil Service
- Multex,** a circular telegram
- NSB, Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging,** the National Socialist movement in the Netherlands
- NSDAP, Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei,** National Socialist German Workers party, the full title of the National Socialist party
- NSKK, Nationalsozialistische Kraftfahrerkorps,** National Socialist Motor Vehicle Drivers' Corps
- NSNAP, Nationaal Socialistische Nederlandsche Arbeiders Partij,** the National Socialist party of the Netherlands
- Ob. d.H., Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres,** Commander in Chief of the Army
- Ob. d.L., Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe,** Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe
- Ob. d.M., Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine,** Commander in Chief of the Navy
- Oberdienstleiter,** a rank in the National Socialist party organization
- Obergruppenführer,** SA and SS rank equivalent to Lieutenant General
- OKH, Oberkommando des Heeres,** High Command of the Army
- OKL, Oberkommando der Luftwaffe,** High Command of the Luftwaffe
- OKM, Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine,** High Command of the Navy
- OKW, Oberkommando der Wehrmacht,** High Command of the Wehrmacht
- OUN, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists**
- P, Presse,** the News Service and Press Department in the German Foreign Ministry
- Pers., Personal- und Verwaltungs-Abteilung,** the Personnel and Administrative Department of the German Foreign Ministry
- Poglavnik,** title of Ante Pavelić as head of the Croatian State
- Pol., Politische Abteilung,** Political Department of the Foreign Ministry; subdivided according to geographic areas, Referate, each designated by a Roman numeral, e.g., Pol. IV (see Appendix I)
- Pol. XIII, a Referat** under Ambassador Schulenburg which was established in May 1942. It developed from the "Russia Committee" and took over certain files from Referat D IX
- R, Recht, Rechtsabteilung,** Legal Department of the German Foreign Ministry
- RAM, Reichsaussenminister,** Reich Foreign Minister
- Referat,** division within a department of a German Ministry
- Referent,** drafting officer, expert, specialist
- Reichsfrauenführung,** the higher leadership of the National Socialist women's organization, and as such a department of the central leadership of the NSDAP with its seat in Berlin
- Reichsführer SS,** Commander in Chief of the SS
- Reichsgau,** administrative division of territories, formerly part of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, which were incorporated into Germany

- Reichsleiter,** highest rank in the National Socialist party organization
- Reichsmarschall, Reich Marshal,** military rank given to Göring
- Reichsnährstand,** the National Socialist public corporation for German agriculture and its branches, established in 1933-1934 by Walter Darré, Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture
- Reichsstatthalter, Reich Governor,** representative of the Reich in a German territory, either a Land or a Reichsgau, with powers of control over its entire administration
- Rk., Reichskanzlei, Reich Chancellery**
- RLM, Reichsluftfahrtministerium,** Reich Ministry of Air
- RM, Reichsminister, Reich Minister**
- Ru, Rundfunk,** the Radio Department in the German Foreign Ministry
- RWM, Reichswirtschaftsministerium,** Reich Ministry of Economics
- SA, Sturmabteilungen der NSDAP, Storm Troops of the NSDAP** (brown shirts)
- SD, Sicherheitsdienst,** security service; intelligence and counterintelligence agency of the SS and the Security Police
- SKL, Seekriegsleitung, Naval War Staff**
- SS, Schutzstaffeln,** elite corps of the National Socialist party, used for police and military purposes
- Stabsleiter,** head of the staff of a central department in the National Socialist party
- Standarte, SA and SS unit equivalent to a regiment**
- Standartenführer, SA and SS rank equivalent to Colonel**
- St.S., Staatssekretär, State Secretary**
- Sturmabteilungsführer, SA and SS rank equivalent to Major**
- Ustaša (plural Ustaše),** Croatian word meaning rebel or revolt. A revolutionary, nationalistic, secret organization founded by Pavelić which became a militia in independent Croatia
- U. St.S., Unterstaatssekretär, Under State Secretary**
- Volksdeutsche, ethnic Germans, i.e., persons belonging to the German cultural community living outside the frontiers of the Reich and not Reich subjects**
- W, Wirtschaftspolitische Abteilung,** the Economic Policy Department in the German Foreign Ministry
- Waffen-SS, SS military units attached to the Wehrmacht**
- Wehrmacht,** designation of the German armed forces after 1935
- Westfalen, code name for a special train used as temporary headquarters by the German Foreign Minister**
- WFSt, Wehrmachtführungsstab, Wehrmacht Operations Staff, an office in the OKW engaged in operations planning**
- WHA, Wissenschaftlicher Hilfsarbeiter, an auxiliary expert employed on a consultant's basis, a professional assistant appointed for special tasks**
- Wi Rü, Wirtschaftsrüstungsamt, War Economy and Armaments Office of the OKW**
- zu, to, in connection with; where this precedes the file number it indicates that the previous papers in the subject have this number**