The Munich Agreement
Winston Churchill
October 5, 1938. House of Commons
Source
If I do not begin this afternoon by paying the usual, and indeed almost
invariable, tributes to the Prime Minister for his handling of this
crisis, it is certainly not from any lack of personal regard. We have
always, over a great many years, had very pleasant relations, and I have
deeply understood from personal experiences of my own in a similar crisis
the stress and strain he has had to bear; but I am sure it is much better
to say exactly what we think about public affairs, and this is certainly
not the time when it is worth anyone's while to court political
popularity.
We had a shining example of firmness of character from
the late First Lord of the Admiralty two days ago. He showed that firmness
of character which is utterly unmoved by currents of opinion, however
swift and violent they may be. My hon. Friend the Member for South-West
Hull (Mr. Law), to whose compulsive speech the House listened on Monday,
was quite right in reminding us that the Prime Minister has himself
throughout his conduct of these matters shown a robust indifference to
cheers or boos and to the alternations of criticism or applause. If that
be so, such qualities and elevation of mind should make it possible for
the most severe expressions of honest opinion to be interchanged in this
House without rupturing personal relations, and for all points of view to
receive the fullest possible expression.
Having thus fortified
myself by the example of others, I will proceed to emulate them. I will,
therefore, begin by saying the most unpopular and most unwelcome thing. I
will begin by saying what everybody would like to ignore or forget but
which must nevertheless be stated, namely, that we have sustained a total
and unmitigated defeat, and that France has suffered even more than we
have.
The utmost my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has been
able to secure by all his immense exertions, by all the great efforts and
mobilisation which took place in this country, and by all the anguish and
strain through which we have passed in this country, the utmost he has
been able to gain for Czechoslovakia in the matters which were in dispute
has been that the German dictator, instead of snatching the victuals from
the table, has been content to have them served to him course by
course.
The Chancellor of the Exchequer [Sir John Simon] said it
was the first time Herr Hitler had been made to retract - I think that was
the word - in any degree. We really must not waste time after all this
long Debate upon the difference between the positions reached at
Berchtesgaden, at Godesberg and at Munich. They can be very simply
epitomised, if the House will permit me to vary the metaphor. £1 was
demanded at the pistol's point. When it was given, £2 were demanded at the
pistol's point. Finally, the dictator consented to take £1 17s. 6d. and
the rest in promises of goodwill for the future.
Now I come to the
point, which was mentioned to me just now from some quarters of the House,
about the saving of peace. No one has been a more resolute and
uncompromising struggler for peace than the Prime Minister. Everyone knows
that. Never has there been such instance and undaunted determination to
maintain and secure peace. That is quite true. Nevertheless, I am not
quite clear why there was so much danger of Great Britain or France being
involved in a war with Germany at this juncture if, in fact, they were
ready all along to sacrifice Czechoslovakia.
The terms which the
Prime Minister brought back with him could easily have been agreed, I
believe, through the ordinary diplomatic channels at any time during the
summer. And I will say this, that I believe the Czechs, left to themselves
and told they were going to get no help from the Western Powers, would
have been able to make better terms than they have got after all this
tremendous perturbation; they could hardly have had worse.
There
never can be any absolute certainty that there will be a fight if one side
is determined that it will give way completely. When one reads the Munich
terms, when one sees what is happening in Czechoslovakia from hour to
hour, when one is sure, I will not say of Parliamentary approval but of
Parliamentary acquiescence, when the Chancellor of the Exchequer makes a
speech which at any rate tries to put in a very powerful and persuasive
manner the fact that, after all, it was inevitable and indeed righteous:
when we say all this, and everyone on this side of the House, including
many members of the Conservative Party who are vigilant and careful
guardians of the national interest, is quite clear that nothing vitally
affecting us was at stake, it seems to me that one must ask, What was all
the trouble and fuss about?
The resolve was taken by the British
and the French Governments. Let me say that it is very important to
realise that it is by no means a question which the British Government
only have had to decide. I very much admire the manner in which, in the
House, all references of a recriminatory nature have been repressed. But
it must be realised that this resolve did not emanate particularly from
one or other of the Governments but was a resolve for which both must
share in common the responsibility.
When this resolve was taken and
the course was followed - you may say it was wise or unwise, prudent or
short-sighted - once it had been decided not to make the defence of
Czechoslovakia a matter of war, then there was really no reason, if the
matter had been handled during the summer in the ordinary way, to call
into being all this formidable apparatus of crisis. I think that point
should be considered.
We are asked to vote for this Motion which
has been put upon the Paper, and it is certainly a Motion couched in very
uncontroversial terms, as, indeed, is the Amendment moved from the
Opposition side. I cannot myself express my agreement with the steps which
have been taken, and as the Chancellor of the Exchequer has put his side
of the case with so much ability I will attempt, if I may be permitted, to
put the case from a different angle. I have always held the view that the
maintenance of peace depends upon the accumulation of deterrents against
the aggressor, coupled with a sincere effort to redress grievances. Herr
Hitler's victory, like so many of the famous struggles that have governed
the fate of the world, was won upon the narrowest of margins.
After
the seizure of Austria in March we faced this problem in our Debates. I
ventured to appeal to the Government to go a little further than the Prime
Minister went, and to give a pledge that in conjunction with France and
other Powers they would guarantee the security of Czechoslovakia while the
Sudeten-Deutsch question was being examined either by a League of Nations
Commission or some other impartial body, and I still believe that if that
course had been followed events would not have fallen into this disastrous
state. I agree very much with my right hon. Friend the Member for
Sparkbrook (Mr. Amery) when he said on that occasion - "Do one thing or
the other; either say you will disinterest yourself in the matter
altogether or take the step of giving a guarantee which will have the
greatest chance of securing protection for that country."
France
and Great Britain together, especially if they had maintained a close
contact with Russia, which certainly was not done, would have been able in
those days in the summer, when they had the prestige, to influence many of
the smaller states of Europe; and I believe they could have determined the
attitude of Poland. Such a combination, prepared at a time when the German
dictator was not deeply and irrevocably committed to his new adventure,
would, I believe, have given strength to all those forces in Germany which
resisted this departure, this new design.
They were varying forces;
- those of a military character which declared that Germany was not ready
to undertake a world war, and all that mass of moderate opinion and
popular opinion which dreaded war, and some elements of which still have
some influence upon the Government. Such action would have given strength
to all that intense desire for peace which the helpless German masses
share with their British and French fellow men, and which, as we have been
reminded, found a passionate and rarely permitted vent in the joyous
manifestations with which the Prime Minister was acclaimed in
Munich.
All these forces, added to the other deterrents which
combinations of Powers, great and small, ready to stand firm upon the
front of law and for the ordered remedy of grievances, would have formed,
might well have been effective. Between submission and immediate war there
was this third alternative, which gave a hope not only of peace but of
justice. It is quite true that such a policy in order to succeed demanded
that Britainshould declare straight out and a long time beforehand that
she would, with others, join to defend Czechoslovakia against an
unprovoked aggression. His Majesty's Government refused to give that
guarantee when it would have saved the situation, yet in the end they gave
it when it was too late, and now, for the future, they renew it when they
have not the slightest power to make it good.
All is over. Silent,
mournful, abandoned, broken, Czechoslovakia recedes into the darkness. She
has suffered in every respect by her association with the Western
democracies and with the League of Nations, of which she has always been
an obedient servant. She has suffered in particular from her association
with France, under whose guidance and policy she has been actuated for so
long. The very measures taken by His Majesty's Government in the
Anglo-French Agreement to give her the best chance possible, namely, the
50 per cent, clean cut in certain districts instead of a plebiscite, have
turned to her detriment, because there is to be a plebiscite too in wide
areas, and those other Powers who had claims have also come down upon the
helpless victim.
Those municipal elections upon whose voting the
basis is taken for the 50 per cent. cut were held on issues which had
nothing to do with joining Germany. When I saw Herr Henlein over here he
assured me that was not the desire of his people. Positive statements were
made that it was only a question of home rule, of having a position of
their own in the Czechoslovakian State. No one has a right to say that the
plebiscite which is to be taken in areas under Saar conditions, and the
clean-cut of the 50 per cent. areas - that those two operations together
amount in the slightest degree to a verdict of self-determination. It is a
fraud and a farce to invoke that name.
We in this country, as in
other Liberal and democratic countries, have a perfect right to exalt the
principle of self-determination, but it comes ill out of the mouths of
those in totalitarian states who deny even the smallest element of
toleration to every section and creed within their bounds. But, however
you put it, this particular block of land, this mass of human beings to be
handed over, has never expressed the desire to go into the Nazi rule. I do
not believe that even now, if their opinion could be asked, they would
exercise such an opinion.
What is the remaining position of
Czechoslovakia? Not only are they politically mutilated, but, economically
and financially, they are in complete confusion. Their banking, their
railway arrangements, are severed and broken, their industries are
curtailed, and the movement of their population is most cruel. The Sudeten
miners, who are all Czechs and whose families have lived in that area for
centuries, must now flee into an area where there are hardly any mines
left for them to work. It is a tragedy which has occurred. There must
always be the most profound regret and a sense of vexation in British
hearts at the treatment and the misfortune which have overcome the
Czechoslovakian Republic.
They have not ended here. At any moment
there may be a hitch in the programme. At any moment there may be an order
for Herr Goebbels to start again his propaganda of calumny and lies; at
any moment an incident may be provoked, and now that the fortress line is
turned away what is there to stop the will of the conqueror? Obviously, we
are not in a position to give them the slightest help at the present time,
except what everyone is glad to know has been done, the financial aid
which the Government have promptly produced.
I venture to think
that in future the Czechoslovak State cannot be maintained as an
independent entity. I think you will find that in a period of time which
may be measured by years, but may be measured only by months,
Czechoslovakia will be engulfed in the Nazi regime. Perhaps they may join
it in despair or in revenge. At any rate, that story is over and told. But
we cannot consider the abandonment and ruin of Czechoslovakia in the light
only of what happened only last month. It is the most grievous consequence
of what we have done and of what we have left undone in the last five
years - five years of futile good intentions, five years of eager search
for the line of least resistance, five years of uninterrupted retreat of
British power, five years of neglect of our air defences.
Those are
the features which I stand here to expose and which marked an improvident
stewardship for which Great Britain and France have dearly to pay. We have
been reduced in those five years from a position of security so
overwhelming and so unchallengeable that we never cared to think about it.
We have been reduced from a position where the very word "war" was
considered one which could be used only by persons qualifying for a
lunatic asylum. We have been reduced from a position of safety and power -
power to do good, power to be generous to a beaten foe, power to make
terms with Germany, power to give her proper redress for her grievances,
power to stop her arming if we chose, power to take any step in strength
or mercy or justice which we thought right - reduced in five years from a
position safe and unchallenged to where we stand now.
When I think
of the fair hopes of a long peace which still lay before Europe at the
beginning of 1933 when Herr Hitler first obtained power, and of all the
opportunities of arresting the growth of the Nazi power which have been
thrown away, when I think of the immense combinations and resources which
have been neglected or squandered, I cannot believe that a parallel exists
in the whole course of history.
So far as this country is concerned
the responsibility must rest with those who have had the undisputed
control of our political affairs. They neither prevented Germany from
rearming, nor did they rearm themselves in time. They quarrelled with
Italy without saving Ethiopia. The exploited and discredited the vast
institution of the League of Nations and they neglected to make alliances
and combinations which might have repaired previous errors, and thus they
left us in the hour of trial without adequate national defence or
effective international security.
In my holiday I thought it was a
chance to study the reign of King Ethelred the Unready. The House will
remember that that was a period of great misfortune, in which, from the
strong position which we had gained under the descendants of King Alfred,
we fell very swiftly into chaos. It was the period of Danegeld and of
foreign pressure. I must say that the rugged words of the Anglo-Saxon
Chronicle, written a thousand years ago, seem to me apposite, at least as
apposite as those quotations from Shakespeare with which we have been
regaled by the last speaker from the Opposition Bench. Here is what the
Anglo-Saxon Chronicle said, and I think the words apply very much to our
treatment of Germany and our relations with her.
"All these
calamities fell upon us because of evil counsel, because tribute was not
offered to them at the right time nor yet were they resisted; but when
they had done the most evil, then was peace made with them."
That
is the wisdom of the past, for all wisdom is not new wisdom.
I have
ventured to express those views in justifying myself for not being able to
support the Motion which is moved to-night, but I recognise that this
great matter of Czechoslovakia, and of British and French duty there, has
passed into history. New developments may come along, but we are not here
to decide whether any of those steps should be taken or not. They have
been taken. They have been taken by those who had a right to take them
because they bore the highest executive responsibility under the
Crown.
Whatever we may think of it, we must regard those steps as
belonging to the category of affairs which are settled beyond recall. The
past is no more, and one can only draw comfort if one feels that one has
done one's best to advise rightly and wisely and in good time. I,
therefore, turn to the future, and to our situation as it is to-day. Here,
again, I am sure I shall have to say something which will not be at all
welcome.
We are in the presence of a disaster of the first
magnitude which has befallen Great Britain and France. Do not let us blind
ourselves to that. It must now be accepted that all the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe will make the best terms they can with the
triumphant Nazi power. The system of alliances in Central Europe upon
which France has relied for her safety has been swept away, and I can see
no means by which it can be reconstituted. The road down the Danube
Valleyto the Black Sea, the road which leads as far as Turkey, has been
opened.
In fact, if not in form, it seems to me that all those
countries of Middle Europe, all those Danubian countries, will, one after
another, be drawn into this vast system of power politics - not only power
military politics but power economic politics - radiating from Berlin, and
I believe this can be achieved quite smoothly and swiftly and will not
necessarily entail the firing of a single shot. If you wish to survey the
havoc of the foreign policy of Britain and France, look at what is
happening and is recorded each day in the columns of The Times. Why, I
read this morning about Yugoslavia - and I know something about the
details of that country –
"The effects of the crisis for Yugoslavia
can immediately be traced. Since the elections of 1935, which followed
soon after the murder of King Alexander, the Serb and Croat Opposition to
the Government of Dr. Stoyadinovitch have been conducting their entire
campaign for the next elections under the slogan: 'Back to
France, England, and the Little Entente; back to democracy.'
The events of the past fortnight have so triumphantly vindicated Dr.
Stoyadinovitch's policy...." – his is a policy of close association with
Germany – "that the Opposition has collapsed practically overnight; the
new elections, the date of which was in doubt, are now likely to be held
very soon and can result only in an overwhelming victory for Dr.
Stoyadinovitch's Government."
Here was a country which, three
months ago, would have stood in the line with other countries to arrest
what has occurred.
Again, what happened in Warsaw? The British and
French Ambassadors visited the Foreign Minister, Colonel Beck, or sought
to visit him, in order to ask for some mitigation in the harsh measures
being pursued against Czechoslovakia about Teschen. The door was shut in
their faces, The French Ambassador was not even granted an audience and
the British Ambassador was given a most curt reply by a political
director. The whole matter is described in the Polish Press as a political
indiscretion committed by those two powers, and we are to-day reading of
the success of Colonel Beck's blow. I am not forgetting, I must say, that
it is less than twenty years since British and French bayonets rescued
Poland from the bondage of a century and a half. I think it is indeed a
sorry episode in the history of that country, for whose freedom and rights
so many of us have had warm and long sympathy.
Those illustrations
are typical. You will see, day after day, week after week, entire
alienation of those regions. Many of those countries, in fear of the rise
of the Nazi power, have already got politicians, Ministers, Governments,
who were pro-German, but there was always an enormous popular movement in
Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia which looked to the Western
democracies and loathed the idea of having this arbitrary rule of the
totalitarian system thrust upon them, and hoped that a stand would be
made. All that has gone by the board. We are talking about countries which
are a long way off.
But what will be the position, I want to know,
of France and England this year and the year afterwards? What will be the
position of that Western front of which we are in full authority the
guarantors? The German army at the present time is more numerous than that
of France, though not nearly so matured or perfected. Next year it will
grow much larger, and its maturity will be more complete. Relieved from
all anxiety in the East, and having secured resources which will greatly
diminish, if not entirely remove, the deterrent of a naval blockade, the
rulers of Nazi Germany will have a free choice open to them as to what
direction they will turn their eyes. If the Nazi dictator should choose to
look westward, as he may, bitterly will France and England regret the loss
of that fine army of ancient Bohemia which was estimated last week to
require not fewer than 30 German divisions for its destruction.
Can
we blind ourselves to the great change which has taken place in the
military situation, and to the dangers we have to meet? We are in process,
I believe, of adding in four years, four battalions to the British Army.
No fewer than two have already been completed. Here are at least 30
divisions which must now be taken into consideration upon the French
front, besides the 12 that were captured when Austria was
engulfed.
Many people, no doubt, honestly believe that they are
only giving away the interests of Czechoslovakia, whereas I fear we shall
find that we have deeply compromised, and perhaps fatally endangered, the
safety and even the independence of Great Britain and France. This is not
merely a question of giving up the German colonies, as I am sure we shall
be asked to do. Nor is it a question only of losing influence in Europe.
It goes far deeper than that. You have to consider the character of the
Nazi movement and the rule which it implies.
The Prime Minister
desires to see cordial relations between this country and Germany. There
is no difficulty at all in having cordial relations between the peoples.
Our hearts go out to them. But they have no power. But never will you have
friendship with the present German Government. You must have diplomatic
and correct relations, but there can never be friendship between the
British democracy and the Nazi power, that power which spurns Christian
ethics, which cheers its onward course by a barbarous paganism, which
vaunts the spirit of aggression and conquest, which derives strength and
perverted pleasure from persecution, and uses, as we have seen, with
pitiless brutality the threat of murderous force. That power cannot ever
be the trusted friend of the British democracy.
What I find
unendurable is the sense of our country falling into the power, into the
orbit and influence of Nazi Germany, and of our existence becoming
dependent upon their good will or pleasure. It is to prevent that that I
have tried my best to urge the maintenance of every bulwark of defence -
first, the timely creation of an Air Force superior to anything within
striking distance of our shores; secondly, the gathering together of the
collective strength of many nations; and thirdly, the making of alliances
and military conventions, all within the Covenant, in order to gather
together forces at any rate to restrain the onward movement of this power.
It has all been in vain. Every position has been successively undermined
and abandoned on specious and plausible excuses.
We do not want to
be led upon the high road to becoming a satellite of the German Nazi
system of European domination. In a very few years, perhaps in a very few
months, we shall be confronted with demands with which we shall no doubt
be invited to comply. Those demands may affect the surrender of territory
or the surrender of liberty. I foresee and foretell that the policy of
submission will carry with it restrictions upon the freedom of speech and
debate in Parliament, on public platforms, and discussions in the Press,
for it will be said - indeed, I hear it said sometimes now - that we
cannot allow the Nazi system of dictatorship to be criticised by ordinary,
common English politicians. Then, with a Press under control, in part
direct but more potently indirect, with every organ of public opinion
doped and chloroformed into acquiescence, we shall be conducted along
further stages of our journey.
It is a small matter to introduce
into such a Debate as this, but during the week I heard something of the
talk of Tadpole and Taper. They were very keen upon having a general
election, a sort of, if I may say so, inverted khaki election. I wish the
Prime Minister had heard the speech of my hon. and gallant friend the
Member for the Abbey Division of Westminster (Sir Sidney Herbert) last
night. I know that no one is more patient and regular in his attendance
than the Prime Minister, and it is marvellous how he is able to sit
through so much of our Debates, but it happened that by bad luck he was
not here at that moment. I am sure, however, that if he had heard my hon.
and gallant Friend's speech he would have felt very much annoyed that such
a rumour could even have been circulated.
I cannot believe that the
Prime Minister, or any Prime Minister, possessed of a large working
majority, would be capable of such an act of historic, constitutional
indecency. I think too highly of him. Of course, if I have misjudged him
on the right side, and there is a dissolution on the Munich Agreement, on
Anglo-Nazi friendship, of the state of our defences and so forth, everyone
will have to fight according to his convictions, and only a prophet could
forecast the ultimate result; but, whatever the result, few things could
be more fatal to our remaining chances of survival as a great Power than
that this country should be torn in twain upon this deadly issue, of
foreign policy at a moment when, whoever the Ministers may be, united
effort can alone make us safe.
I have been casting about to see how
measures can be taken to protect us from this advance of the Nazi power,
and to secure those forms of life which are so dear to us. What is the
sole method that is open? The sole method that is open is for us to regain
our old island independence by acquiring that supremacy in the air which
we were promised, that security in our air defences which we were assured
we had, and thus to make ourselves an island once again. That, in all this
grim outlook, shines out as the overwhelming fact.
An effort at
rearmament the like of which has not been seen ought to be made forthwith,
and all the resources of this country and all its united strength should
be bent to that task. I was very glad to see that Lord Baldwin yesterday
in the House of Lords said that he would mobilise industry to-morrow. But
I think it would have been much better if Lord Baldwin had said that two
and a half years ago, when everyone demanded a Ministry of Supply. I will
venture to say to hon. Gentlemen sitting here behind the Government Bench,
hon. Friends of mine, whom I thank for the patience with which they have
listened to what I have to say, that they have some responsibility for all
this too, because, if they had given one tithe of the cheers they have
lavished upon this transaction of Czechoslovakia to the small band of
Members, who were endeavouring to get timely rearmament set in motion, we
should not now be in the position in which we are. Hon. Gentlemen
opposite, and hon. Members on the Liberal benches, are not entitled to
throw these stones. I remember for two years having to face, not only the
Government's depreciation, but their stern disapproval. Lord Baldwin has
now given the signal, tardy though it may be; let us at least obey
it.
After all, there are no secrets now about what happened in the
air and in the mobilisation of our anti-aircraft defences. These matters
have been, as my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for the Abbey Division
said, seen by thousands of people. They can form their own opinions of the
character of the statements which have been persistently made to us by
Ministers on this subject. Who pretends now that there is air parity with
Germany? Who pretends now that our anti-aircraft defences were adequately
manned or armed?
We know that the German General Staff are well
informed upon these subjects, but the House of Commons has hitherto not
taken seriously its duty of requiring to assure itself on these matters.
The Home Secretary said the other night that he would welcome
investigation. Many things have been done which reflect the greatest
credit upon the administration. But the vital matters are what we want to
know about. I have asked again and again during these three years for a
secret Session where these matters could be thrashed out, or for an
investigation by a Select Committee of the House, or for some other
method. I ask now that, when we meet again in the autumn, that should be a
matter on which the Government should take the House into its confidence,
because we have a right to know where we stand and what measures are being
taken to secure our position.
I do not grudge our loyal, brave
people, who were ready to do their duty no matter what the cost, who never
flinched under the strain of last week - I do not grudge them the natural,
spontaneous outburst of joy and relief when they learned that the hard
ordeal would no longer be required of them at the moment; but they should
know the truth. They should know that there has been gross neglect and
deficiency in our defences; they should know that we have sustained a
defeat without a war, the consequences of which will travel far with us
along our road; they should know that we have passed an awful milestone in
our history, when the whole equilibrium of Europe has been deranged, and
that the terrible words have for the time being been pronounced against
the Western democracies:
"Thou art weighed in the balance and found
wanting."
And do not suppose that this is the end. This is only the
beginning of the reckoning. This is only the first sip, the first
foretaste of a bitter cup which will be proffered to us year by year
unless by a supreme recovery of moral health and martial vigour, we arise
again and take our stand for freedom as in the olden
time.
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